CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS BILL

HC Deb 09 June 1969 vol 784 cc975-1189

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.
New Clause 1
RESTRICTIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FOR OFFENCES BY YOUNG PERSONS
	(1) A person other than a qualified informant shall not lay an information in respect of an offence if the alleged offender is a young person.
5	(2) A qualified informant shall not lay an information in respect of an offence if the alleged offender is a young person unless the informant is of opinion that the case is of a description prescribed in pursuance of subsection (4) of this section and that it would not be adequate for the case to be dealt with by a parent, teacher or other person or by means of a caution from a constable or through an exercise of the powers of a local authority or other body not involving court proceedings or by means of proceedings under section 1 of this Act.
10	(3) A qualified informant shall not come to a decision in pursuance of the preceding subsection to lay an information unless—
15	(a) he has told the appropriate local authority that the laying of the information is being considered and has asked for any observations which the authority may wish to make on the case to the informant; and
(b) the authority either has notified the informant that it does not wish to make such observations or has not made any during the period or extended period indicated by the informant as that which in the circumstances he considers reasonable for the purpose or the informant has considered the observations made by the authority during that period;
20	but the informant shall be entitled to disregard the foregoing provisions of this subsection in any case in which it appears to him that the requirements of the preceding subsection are satisfied and will continue to be satisfied notwithstanding any observations which might be made in pursuance of this subsection.
25	(4) The Secretary of State may make regulations specifying, by reference to such considerations as he thinks fit, the descriptions of cases in which a qualified informant may lay an information in respect of an offence if the alleged offender is a young person; but no regulations shall be made under this subsection unless a draft of the regulations has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
30	(5) An information laid by a qualified informant in a case where the informant has reason to believe that the alleged offender is a young person shall be in writing and shall—
35	(a) state the alleged offender's age to the best of the informant's knowledge; and
(b) contain a certificate signed by the informant stating that the requirements of subsections (2) and (3) of this section are satisfied with respect to the case or that the case is one in which the requirements of the said subsection (2) are satisfied and the informant is entitled to disregard the requirements of the said subsection (3).
40	(6) If at the time when justices begin to inquire into a case, either as examining justices or on the trial of an information, they have reason to believe that the alleged offender is a young person and either—
	(a) it appears to them that the person who laid the information in question was not a qualified informant when he laid it; or
	(b) the information is not in writing or does not contain such a certificate as is mentioned in subsection (5)(b) of this section,
45	it shall be their duty to quash the information, without prejudice to the laying of a further information in respect of the matter in question; but no proceedings shall be invalidated by reason of a contravention of any provision of this section and no action shall lie, by reason only of such a contravention, in respect of proceedings in respect of which such a contravention has occurred.
50	(7) Nothing in the preceding provisions of this section applies to an information laid with the consent of the Attorney General or laid or on behalf or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
55	(8) It shall be the duty of a person who decides to lay an information in respect of an offence in a case where he has reason to believe that the alleged offender is a young person to give notice of the decision to the appropriate local authority unless he is himself that authority.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Speaker

I have posted, as is my wont, my selection of Amendments for Report. The House will note that I have grouped together with new Clause 1 the four Amendments to it in line 4, leave out from 'opinion' to 'that' in line 5; in line 7, leave out from 'constable' to first 'or' in line 8; in line 8, leave out 'or by means of proceedings under section 1 of the Act; in line 24, leave out subsection (4).

Amendment No. 17, in Clause 2, page 5, line 9, at end insert: (11) Nothing in this section shall empower a local authority when making enquiries pursuant to subsection (1) of this section on receiving information suggesting that the condition mentioned in paragraph (e) of subsection (2) of section 1 of this Act is satisfied, to deprive a child or young person of his liberty, either with or without the consent of his parents other than by an order of a court. And Government Amendments, which are linked, Nos. 24, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 41, 42;

Amendment No. 43, in Clause 9, page 11, line 27, leave out 'the justice or';

Government Amendments Nos. 44, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95, 96, 110, 112 and 115.

4.12 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Elystan Morgan)

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

When Clause 5 of the Bill was discussed in Standing Committee, the Government gave an undertaking to move on Report a revised version of the Clause which omitted the requirement for the consent of a juvenile court magistrate to the prosecution of a young person. This new Clause gives effect to that undertaking.

The essential object of Clause 5 as introduced was that Parliament should clearly establish the principle of dealing with offenders aged 14 and under the age of 17 outside the court so far as possible, and should provide for the laying down of criteria for the decision whether or not to prosecute in each case. The machinery for the achievement of that object involved the consent of a juvenile court magistrate to any prosecution of a young person.

Provision was also made for the local authority to have a right to be heard by the magistrate, thus ensuring that the police normally consulted the local authority before deciding to apply to the magistrate for consent to a prosecution.

The object of the original Clause 5 has been generally accepted both in this House and among interested bodies outside. The new Clause maintains that object. The argument has been about the best means of achieving that object. In particular, doubts have been expressed whether it is necessary or appropriate to involve a magistrate in decisions on prosecution. The new Clause proposes a different means of achieving aims that are generally accepted.

Comments on the original proposals in the White Paper "Children in Trouble" revealed divided views on what has come to be known as the "single magistrate" procedure. Some bodies accepted it, and these included the Association of Municipal Corporations, the County Councils Association, the Police Federation and the professional child care associations. Others criticised it, and these included the Magistrates' Association, a number of juvenile court panels, the Justices' Clerks' Society and a majority of chief officers of police. In these circumstances, the Government decided that the right course was to put before Parliament the proposals as set out in the White Paper, including the single magistrate procedure, and to listen carefully to the views expressed in Parliament.

The general view put forward, both on Second Reading and in Committee, was that decisions on the prosecution of young persons can and should be left to the police, after consultation with the local authority. That, in brief, is what the new Clause provides, together with guidance to the police on the criteria they are to apply in taking their decisions.

In Committee, doubts were expressed whether legislation was required at all. Since important issues of social policy are involved, it would seem surprising if Parliament were to refrain from taking an interest in the matter. This is a question on which it is proper and desirable that the legislature should not only express views but should also ensure that these views are reflected in the law. In any event, there are strong constitutional and practical reasons why legislation is necessary.

As has been repeated in Committee and on Second Reading, the police, in enforcing the law in individual cases, are not subject to the directions of the Government or the Home Secretary. If a policy of dealing with juvenile offenders so far as possible out of court is to be established effectively, this policy must be embodied in the law itself. At present, because this is not so, because the police have been given no guidance by Parliament in this matter, the extent to which young persons are prosecuted varies widely from one police area to another. It is Parliament's job to remedy this situation. It will not be properly remedied unless Parliament itself acts. The new Clause contains appropriate proposals for the necessary parliamentary action.

Very briefly, the contents of the subsections are as follows: Subsection (1) provides that no one except a "qualified informant"—an expression that is defined in subsection (9)—may lay an information against a young person. It was stated in Committee on 15th April that decisions on prosecution would be for the police; and this will be so in the great majority of cases. On practical grounds, however, it would be too restrictive to confine prosecutions strictly to members of police forces within the meaning of the Police Act 1964. There are other public servants and public bodies which may properly be entrusted with this responsibility, and subsection (1), read with subsection (9), provides for this.

Subsection (2) lays down the tests which a qualified informant is to apply in deciding whether to prosecute a young person. These are of two kinds. First, the informant must be satisfied that the case is of a description prescribed in subsection (4). In this respect, the new Clause follows the original Clause and the proposal in "Children in Trouble". The only difference, of course, is that it is the qualified informant, not the single magistrate, who has to apply the prescribed criteria. Secondly, the qualified informant must also be satisfied that it would not be adequate for the case to be dealt with in any of the other ways set out in the second half of that subsection. This is a new requirement, but it does no more than make explicit what was implicit in the original proposal.

Subsection (3) deals with consultations between the police and the local authority before a decision is taken whether to prosecute a young person.

4.15 p.m.

Subsection (4) is based on subsection (6)(a) of the original Clause 5, and empowers the Home Secretary to make regulations specifying the kinds of case in which a qualified informant may, if he is also satisfied as required in subsection (2), prosecute a young person. Such regulations will be subject to draft affirmative Resolution procedure.

Subsection (5) contains machinery provisions to ensure that a qualified informant complies with the requirements of the Clause before instituting proceedings against a young person.

Subsection (6) is based on subsection (8) of the original Clause 5, and it covers the possibility of a mistake about the age of a young person or a failure to comply with the requirements of the new Clause.

Subsection (7) excepts from the preceding provisions of the Clause proceedings instituted by or with the consent of the Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Subsection (8) requires a qualified informant to notify the local authority when he decides to prosecute a young person. This notification will normally be the final stage of the consultation process, and it will ensure that the local authority is aware of impending prosecutions in cases where is was not consulted.

Subsection (9) defines the term "the appropriate local authority" which has to be consulted under subsection (3) and notified under subsection (8). The definition follows the existing Clause 5(3). There is also the important definition of a "qualified informant". Although the informant will normally be a police officer, who is defined in Clause 66(1) as a member of a police force within the meaning of the Polce Act 1964, it is desirable on practical grounds to include certain other police forces; for example, the British Transport Police; local authorities, for example, for bye-law offences: Government Departments, such as Customs and Excise; and other responsible public bodies which may have regular occasion to prosecute juveniles, for example the G.P.O. in its new form. There are a number of small police forces, for example, docks and harbour forces, and public bodies, statutory undertakers of various kinds, which might be suitable for inclusion in the list, but it is not possible to be certain of identifying all such bodies immediately.

The definition thus covers police officers and Crown servants, acting as such, and local authorities, and enables the Home Secretary to designate other police forces and public bodies, so as to ensure that other suitable forces and public bodies are not inadvertently or unnecessarily precluded from acting as qualified informants.

Mr. Marcus Worsley (Chelsea)

Will the Under-Secretary be kind enough to say a little about the meaning of the phrase "a servant of the Crown" in this context? What precisely is covered by this phrase?

Mr. Morgan

Perhaps, Mr. Speaker, with your leave, I shall have the opportunity of dealing with that and other matters arising particularly under the Amendments put down by the Opposition.

Mr. Speaker

It might be convenient if I observed at this point that Amendment No. 17 does not appear on some of the duplicated lists as being among those Amendments which I have selected for discussion with the new Clause. The necessary correction was made on the list in the "No" Lobby, but I thought I had better mention that Amendment No. 17 is among those which I have selected.

Mr. Mark Carlisle (Runcorn)

This is a major new Clause and, in debating it, we are discussing a number of Government and Opposition Amendments. It is a major proposal because it radically changes what was a substantial part of the Bill in that it greatly amends the whole process affecting the prosecution of people aged between 14 and 17.

Although we are grateful to the Under-Secretary for the manner in which he explained the Clause, there remain a number of questions to be answered about how the proposal will work. I am also gravely concerned about some of its provisions. I wish to make it clear at the outset, however, that we are grateful that the Government have decided to remove Clause 5 and to do away with the original proposal, which was heavily criticised, that a magistrate should intervene before a prosecution was brought and that every case should go before a magistrate to decide whether or not proceedings should be instituted.

As the Under-Secretary said, that idea was criticised not only by my hon. Friends but by any body of people having anything to do with the administration of justice. It was criticised because it was cumbersome, because it would have caused delay and because it was believed to be undesirable. We undoubtedly welcome the fact that the Government have had second thoughts on this matter and have removed the necessity to obtain a magistrate's permission before bringing proceedings.

While we welcome that part of the new Clause, a great many questions about its operation remain unanswered. One need only consider the Amendments which we have tabled to the proposal to see that we have anxiety about it. The Under-Secretary said that, on reflection, the Government believed that the question whether or not prosecutions of people between 14 and 17 should be brought was a matter that could and should be left to the police. With that we entirely agree. My criticism of the new Clause is that that is exactly what it does not do.

It proposes, in subsection (4), to limit the discretion of the police by laying down by regulations the type of offences for which a person aged between 14 and 17 can be charged. The Under-Secretary said nothing to justify that course. He said that there were strong constitutional and practical reasons for this decision, that the question of prosecuting people aged 14 to 17 raised important issues of social policy on which Parliament must have its say and that it was Parliament's job to remedy the variations which exist in the number of prosecutions brought by different police forces.

I remind the hon. Gentleman that Parliament's job is to lay down what are criminal offences, but that the necessary enforcement is not a matter for Parliament, any more than the judicial exercise of any sentences that may be imposed. Why, therefore, do we need regulations to specify the type of offences for which those aged from 14 to 17 can be prosecuted, any more than we need such regulations applying to people over 17? We only need the general principles of the criminal law, explaining that certain matters are crimes, and then it can and should be left to the police—in using their discretion, as the new Clause requires, to consult the local authority in cases involving people of 14 to 17, which I support—to consider whether there are other means by which the matter can be dealt with, rather than going before the court. However, the police should be able to decide whether to prosecute on the basis of what are crimes for the rest of the population, and not be limited to crimes of a particular description laid down by the Home Secretary.

We have not at any stage, on Second Reading or in Committee—for obvious reasons, since the Government undertook to redraft the Clause—been given any guidance about the type of regulations which the Home Secretary proposes to lay, as well as the type of offences for which a person of this age can be charged, other than those suggested originally in the White Paper "Children in Trouble".

It is interesting to consider the types of offence which it is suggested in the White Paper the Home Secretary should lay down by regulation and which will apply to people aged 14 to 17. The first is that he should prescribe offences of homicide or other serious offences. Nobody will doubt that. However, it is intended that the actual offences will be stated, or that the regulations will merely says, "other serious offences?" If the latter, who is to interpret what is a serious offence?

The second group of offences for which, by regulation, a person is likely to be prosecuted contains offences of a type "causing much public concern." What does that mean? When does an offence become of such a type that it causes much public concern? In Committee, I gave what one might call a stupid example in this connection. I said that this idea reminds me of the story of two magistrates. When one appeared before his brother magistrate for a speeding offence he was fined £2. They changed places and for the same offence in identical circumstances the other magistrate was fined £5 by his brother magistrate. When asked why he had imposed a heavier fine he replied, "This offence is becoming too prevalent and I wanted to make an example of somebody."

Does an offence cause much public concern when it becomes so prevalent that the public are aroused, and then proceedings must be taken? Will people be charged with such an offence only when much public concern has been caused? For example, vandalism in telephone kiosks in Birmingham aroused great public concern when the matter was raised in the national Press. Will that type of offence be the subject of proceedings only when it has become so prevalent that much public concern has been aroused? If so, on what basis will the Home Secretary lay down regulations that decide matters of this kind, rather than leaving it to the good sense and discretion of the local police, in conjunction, for people of the age we are considering, with the local authority?

We are then told of the type of offence where the nature of the offence and the Home circumstances of the accused suggest that a court appearance and a simple deterrent would be appropriate. How on earth is a chief officer of police to interpret words of that kind in relation to any particular offence? Do the Government intend that the regulations which the Home Secretary will lay will mention offences of this kind and say that the police may prosecute if the nature of the offence and the home circumstances of the accused suggest that a court appearance and a simple deterrent would be appropriate?

If so, it seems obvious that the question whether a person between 14 and 17 shall be prosecuted will depend to a large extent on his home circumstances? If two people aged 16 commit a crime, will one be prosecuted because his home circumstances are such that it is thought desirable that he should be prosecuted while the other will not be prosecuted because his home circumstances are such as to suggest that it would be inappropriate to prosecute him?

4.30 p.m.

Finally, we have traffic offences carrying a likelihood of disqualification from driving or endorsement of the licence. But what about those driving offences which do not? Let us get away from traffic offences. What about riding a bicycle without lights? If that offence became so prevalent that it caused much public concern, presumably an example would be made of someone by prosecuting him. But are we to say that if a person aged 16 rides a bicycle without lights he cannot be brought before the court, but that if he commits a similar offence at the age of 17 he can?

Once an attempt is made to lay down by regulation the types of offences for which people of 15 and 16 can be prosecuted, one runs into trouble. It would be far better to leave such matters to the discretion of the police officers concerned. I hope that we shall hear a clear explanation of the type of offence which it is intended to prescribe by regulation and what the purpose of it is.

I agree entirely that it is right that the police should consult and decide whether or not there are other means of dealing with young people of this age. If they feel in their wisdom that it is unnecessary to bring such a person before the court, I agree that they should not be obliged to. However, the Clause says that the qualified informant shall not prosecute unless he is satisfied that it would not be adequate for the case to be dealt with by a parent, teacher or other person or by means of a caution, … or through an exercise of the powers of a local authority or other body not involving court proceedings … What do those words mean? What are the powers of a local authority not involving court proceedings which the police officer is to deem to be adequate and so make it unnecessary to bring the young person concerned before a court? What is meant by these powers?

This raises again the spectre which we discussed in Committee, when the Under Secretary suggested that it would be possible for young people to be sent to attendance centres without ever appearing before courts. He said: There will be those sent there under supervision orders made under Clause 1. There will be those who have transgressed and in respect of whom a caution has been issued, or those who have been detected at an early stage in their delinquent development … for whom it is thought that attendance would be beneficial."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee G, 27th March, 1969; c. 121.] Is that what is envisaged when the hon. Gentleman talks about the powers to be exercised by the local authority? Is it intended that the local authority may decide that it would be beneficial for the individual to attend at an attendance centre and, therefore, that he will not be prosecuted? It is very dangerous to start talking about powers to be imposed by local authorities which will apparently avoid prosecution or be deemed to be adequate to make it unnecessary or inappropriate to prosecute.

This raises again the concern expressed about the original White Paper and the fear that tremendous persuasion may be brought to bear on a young person and his parents to admit his guilt and agree to attend at an attendance centre because it is said to be in the young person's interest, when it may be that if he was tried by a court he would be found to have done nothing wrong.

I come then to the words … or by means of proceedings under section 1 of this Act …". Is it the idea that care proceedings should be brought rather than prosecutions? As the Bill is worded, it seems that if a police officer things that care proceedings would be adequate, he cannot bring a prosecution. However, that is putting it the wrong way round. Surely we do not want more and more care proceedings brought which are unnecessary and can be dealt with in the case of young people of 15 and 16 by straightforward prosecutions.

If it is necessary to bring care proceedings against a young person of 16 who is in employment, since he cannot be fined for an offence or sent to an attendance centre, further work will be imposed on the child care officers by extending unnecessarily the number of young people put under supervision or care.

Having made my criticisms of the Clause and put forward our serious complaint that the Home Secretary should attempt by regulation to prescribe the type of offence for which a person can be charged, perhaps I might make one more general observation. One of our major concerns about the original Clause 5 was that it would lead to delay if there had to be the intervening stage of an appearance before a magistrate. However, when one looks at subsection (3) of the new Clause, one sees that the police officer concerned has a duty to ask the appropriate local authority if it has any observations that it wishes to make.

The subsection goes on to say that the officer cannot bring proceedings unless he has been notified that the local authority does not wish to make such observations or it has not made any during the period or extended period indicated by the informant as being, in his view, a suitable period. What period has the Home Office in mind? If a young person is to be prosecuted for an offence, it is very important that prosecution should follow as quickly as possible after the event which eventually brings him before the court.

Indeed, the Under-Secretary said as much in Committee. If police authorities have to look to local authorities for observations, I hope that there will be a limited period in which those observations can be put forward and that matters will not drag on for months before it is decided whether or not to prosecute.

Undoubtedly, the new Clause is better than the original Clause 5. It is a substantial improvement in that it removes one of the most disquieting features of the original Clause 5. However, the unnecessary restriction on the prosecution of people of 15 and 16 still remains. We have to realise that people are worried about juvenile crime. People believe that if a young person of 15 or 16 is involved in crime and is caught he must expect to be punished for what he has done. Laving down regulations describing and limiting the type of offence for which a young person can be punished diminishes the deterrent to potential crime for people of that age. I hope very much that the Amendment to delete subsection (4) will be accepted.

Mr. Philip Goodhart (Beckenham)

I accept the Under-Secretary's remarks about the desirability of the discrepancy between various parts of the country in police forces applying cautions to young offenders being to an extent being evened out. But this evening-out procedure can come at perhaps too high a cost.

The Chief Inspector of Constabulary at the Home Office has recently returned from a visit to America, where he rightly noted that the substantial delay between apprehending a subject and bringing him into court has hindered efforts to maintain law and order.

The procedures outlined in the new Clause, as my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) has mentioned, will increase the time between apprehending a suspect and bringing him into court. If the procedure means anything at all, it will bring about delay. At the same time, we know that children's departments throughout the country are suffering from the burden of substantial overwork. Again, if these procedures are to mean anything at all, they will considerably increase the amount of work that will have to be done by the children's departments in addition to all the other burdens that will be put upon them by the Bill.

In Committee, our main arguments on Clause 5 were devoted to getting rid of the examining magistrate's procedure which, fortunately, have been accepted by the Government. As a result of this concentration of arguing about the rôle of the examining magistrate, we did not devote a great deal of time to discussing what sort of cases should be covered by the regulations that are to be made under subsection (4) of the new Clause. To guide us, as my hon. Friend has reminded us, we have only Appendix A of the White Paper "Children in Trouble". The Under-Secretary has so far not even been able to tell us whether the criteria mentioned in paragraph (2) of Appendix A as possibly forming the basis of the regulations will, in fact, be the basis of those regulations.

Mr. Elystan Morgan

I did not go into great detail about that matter as I thought it was understood that, although a further examination will be given to the detail of the matter, it is the intention that the broad structure set out in Appendix A will form the framework of the Regulations, with the exception of paragraphs (d) and (f) which are no longer necessary owing to the second leg of subsection (2) of the new Clause.

4.45 p.m.

Mr. Goodhart

I think that we should not only look at the broad structure, but also at some of its details. I have a list of the non-indictable offences from magistrates' courts in 1967, with the sex and age of those persons found guilty. I suppose that some of the mildest forms of offences listed here are the stealing of fences, trees and flowers. But I have some interest in this matter because, during the last two years, I have lost, through theft, a fence, some trees and some plants.

It may be that the person who took the fence from the top of my garden wall was young. It may be that the person who took the plants out of my front garden was young. After all, the road in which I live is on the way to a large school in the neighbourhood. It is possible that some of the people who took trees from some property that I own near Oxford were also young persons under the age of 17.

What will happen under the regulations? It may be that the case will be covered by paragraph 2(1)(c): The young person appears not to be in need of sustained support or treatment, but the nature of the offence and his home circumstances suggest that a court appearance and a simple deterrent (e.g., a fine) would be appropriate. But we have had no definite assurance that this is so. Unless this is so, it seems that if one finds a young person removing a fence, plant or tree—something that is not causing wide public concern and which cannot be considered a serious crime in itself—the position will be that I will merely say, "Please go ahead, because there is no way in which I can be protected by the law".

What happens in motoring offences that are not directly covered by subparagraph (e), where the traffic offence does not carry a likelihood of disqualification from driving or endorsement of the licence that will remain effective after he has reached a minimum age for holding a driving licence"? This can be a very substantial figure indeed. The number of young persons between the ages of 14 and 17 convicted of motoring offences in 1967 was almost 24,000.

Unless paragraph 2(1)(e) of the proposed statutory regulations is to be rewritten, there may be a privileged class of drivers and bicycle riders who will be able to park their vehicles in illegal places and commit minor traffic offences without being brought before a court. On the other hand, if the statutory regulations are made, shall we go through the other procedures laid down in the Clause and will there be a check on the family background of every young driver who leaves his car where he should not leave it? That will be a very cumbersome procedure.

I hope that the Under-Secretary will be able to tell us in detail what the statutory regulations will cover or, better still, accept the Amendment and allow subsection (4) to disappear.

Mr. Peter Archer (Rowley Regis and Tipton)

It appears from the speeches of all three hon. Members who have spoken so far that the screening magistrate having passed, no one remains to mourn his passing. I would not seek to add a note of mourning. The hon. Members for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) and for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) are a little worried lest, in consequence of the Amendments now proposed, the police may be unduly fettered in the exercise of what would otherwise be their discretion. I intervene only because I wonder whether that discretion ought not to have been fettered a little more.

I do not intervene because I wish to oppose the Amendments. I certainly should not dream of pressing the matter to a Division, but I should not like this occasion to pass without expressing some reservations which remain with me about this whole business. I certainly do not wish to cast any aspersions on the police force. It is amazing how a body of men who so regularly during the course of their work come into contact with the unbalanced, the perverted, the unscrupulous and the ruthless can, as to the great majority of them, remain so balanced, so normal, so scrupulous and so compassionate. I only wonder whether the burden which the operation of the Clause will impose upon them may not be rather more than they deserve to have imposed upon them, and whether the public will be convinced that this is the best way of handling the matter.

I do not believe that it follows, because we rejected what might at one time have been thought to have been the arguments in favour of the screening magistrate, that, therefore, there should be no authority intervening between the discretion of the police, even after discussions with the local authority, and the juvenile court, or perhaps even a higher court. I wonder whether there might not yet be an argument for an authority which can hold the balance between the public and the individual and, especially bearing in mind what the hon. Member for Beckenham has said, between the victim and the offender, an authority which can give undivided and objective attention to the justice and the merits of the matter and not be distracted by the necessity for investigation and administration.

The Standing Committee considered but rejected a proposal for introducing an examiner rather on the lines of the reporter known in the law of Scotland. I shall not seek to trespass through a gate which was closed in Committee. However, some of the objections to a screening magistrate might not prove to be insuperable if the proposal were to be altered. My objections were that it was wrong to impose what is essentially a judicial decision upon a single lay magistrate, that it would appear that the court was committed by a decision taken by a member of that court in advance of the hearing, that the decision which called essentially for a positive investigation and the asking of questions—something like what is done by the juge d'instruction in many continental countries—was not possible for an examining magistrate here who had to accept what he was told; and that his function, as it was proposed, was to act as a brake and not as a motive power; that he could prevent the bringing of proceedings, but could not direct that they be brought.

I wonder whether there might not be the possibility of some intervention which did not lend itself to those objections. I do not propose to be more specific than that, simply because I have not given notice of any specific proposals. I merely wonder whether, in view of these reservations, it might be possible to re-examine the matter between now and the Bill's being considered again by another place.

If something along these lines is not done, could there not be criticisms that the Bill has not yet achieved a right balance from two sides? First, it might be said from the one side that a Bill which grounds itself quite properly in compassion for the child, and which seeks to benefit the public by reforming the offender and not by stamping on him, may at the end result in overlooking the interests of the victim, or may at least tempt the victim into believing that his interests have been overlooked. The victim may feel that there is no one with a duty to consider the trouble—sometimes the tragedy—imposed upon him and that everything turns exclusively on the interests of the young offender.

The victim may be left with a chip on his shoulder against the whole system, and may even be tempted to take the law into his own hands. I do not suggest that this would apply to every victim. I cannot imagine the hon. Member for Beckenham seeking to take the law into his own hands when he discovers that his plants have been damaged. However, I can well imagine a victim feeling completely frustrated at the whole system because he believes that all the emphasis is on the one side and that his interests have been overlooked.

On the other side, if the police are able to discuss the situation with the parents and to suggest the alternatives outlined in the Clause, may it not be felt by the parents and by the children, as the hon. Member for Runcorn suggested, that the police are holding a pistol at their heads?

A very interesting report by Professor J. A. Mack, on Juvenile Liaison Officers in Scotland, was published in December of last year. The report, and particularly the very helpful foreword by the noble Lord, Lord Kilbrandon, suggested that there was a general feeling among parents, particularly amongst those of the kind who were often likely to be involved in such situations as these, that what was proposed was an alternative to prosecution—that they had the opportunity of submitting to supervision by a juvenile liaison officer and that, if they did not so submit the alternative was prosecution.

The Professor and Lord Kilbrandon took the view that it was undesirable that parents should view the matter in this way, because then it was not voluntary co-operation in the alternative way of dealing with the matter, but was co-operation under extreme pressure. If it is felt that there is no one but the police who can decide whether to prosecute, that no other authority can intervene, the family can often be forgiven if they feel that they are left with the alternative of acceding to the proposals of the police for dealing with the matter and of admitting the offence or of facing the consequences, which will be prosecution.

The hon. Member for Runcorn presented in Committee an argument which found favour with large sections of the Committee, namely, that if a further authority were introduced delays would result. I wonder whether there is not a difference in philosophy between us here. I do not accept that every administrative step which is introduced into any process necessarily entails a delay. I suspect that very often the fact that there is someone else looking at the matter and who may criticise delays which have taken place, may be a useful way of expediting proceedings at an earlier stage, because those concerned in the proceedings at an earlier stage may feel that unless they deal with the matter expeditiously they will be open to criticism.

I am not asking my hon. Friend to give a straight yea or nay to these proposals now, but I invite him to believe that some of us feel that eliminating the screening magistrate does not dispose of all the problems, and possibly even at this late stage it might be looked at again.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. Percy Grieve (Solihull)

I support my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle), who, in welcoming the proposed Clause, proposed also what I suggest are very succinct and proper Amendments to it. I support him in those Amendments.

The House will, I think, agree that the most vital thing in the education and upbringing of young people is that at as early an age as possible they should be able to distinguish, and should be brought up to distinguish, between right and wrong. For a very large part of society—indeed, if not for the whole part of society—the way in which right and wrong are primarily distinguished is not only by moral teaching, but by what the criminal law tolerates or forbids.

I exercise judicial functions both in the borough and in the county and I have found that the great worry of almost all those who, by reason of their callings and vocations, have had to consider the Bill, is that for a large part of the population at its most impressionable age it does precisely the reverse of that which we all ought to do to distinguish between right and wrong. It blurs that distinction.

As many probation officers have said to me, the trouble about reducing criminal responsibility for those below the age of 14 and then making special provisions for the prosecution of those over 14, so that they may be prosecuted only in certain circumstances laid down and provided for by Parliament, instead of by the ordinary and due process of the law, is that it would blur the distinction between right and wrong.

Many who may be going out in gangs and may be tempted to commit crime may say, if they are under 14, "We can get away with it; we shall not be made responsible for this". Secondly, they may say, even if they are over 14, "We may not be prosecuted. Even if we are found out, this may not get us into trouble".

For that reason I welcome the new Clause as a considerable modification of the original proposals in the Bill. But I share the apprehensions of my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn as to the danger of the interference by Parliament, in the ordinary and due process of the law, and it is wholly wrong that the decision whether or not to prosecute in a proper case for prosecution should be hedged about by regulations made by the Minister. Over recent years there have been many cases in which Parliament has interfered with the discretion of the courts and of the authorities, both as to their dealing with the young and in their powers of sentencing.

I do not believe that the authorities or the courts who administer the law in this country are not imbued with exactly the same considerations of humanity and sympathy as imbue this House. It is wholly wrong and leads to great trouble in the administration of the law by those who try to do justice, to find that where they feel that a certain course is the right and only course to take with a young person, Parliament has said "You may not take it".

This arises on questions of sentencing. Now the suspended sentence must be imposed in a large number of cases—for instance, where a sentence of six months or less is imposed by the court. A young person under 21 may not now be sent to imprisonment unless it be for less than six months or more than three years, and in certain circumstances the rule is 18 months instead of three years. I and those of my colleagues on the bench and at the Bar have found cases where the right sentence has been one of over six months and under three years but Parliament has said "You may not impose it". This is the sort of danger which lies in legislation of this kind.

Similarly, in this Bill, the age for borstal training is to be raised. At present a boy of 15 can be sent to borstal. Under the Bill the age is to be raised to 17, although I understand—I had not the honour to serve on the Standing Committee—that the Minister indicated that certainly for the foreseeable future the age was unlikely to be raised beyond 16. Nevertheless, there are cases were borstal becomes necessary at the age of 15. It is difficult to see how we are to deal with young men whom the courts think require sentences of borstal training, but who have not passed the age of 15, once this Bill comes into effect.

I should like to indicate the sort of case which, as a matter of practical every day work, comes before the courts, and which indicates the difficulty which would arise from this legislation unless it is mitigated to some extent as indicated by my hon. Friend. Last week—for obvious reasons I will not mention the name of the case—I had to deal at quarter sessions with a young man of 15 who had broken into a chemist's shop and stolen a large quantity of dangerous drugs, some of which he had disposed of on the market.

That boy had been in trouble since the age of 11. At that age he had been before the juvenile court for the first time for stealing ammunition and money. In the same year, in 1965, and at 12 years of age, for stealing an offertory box containing money he was put on probation for three years. In November, 1966, for housebreaking and stealing money, for attempted stealing from motor vehicles and stealing an offertory box and money he was sent for the first time to an approved school.

In February, 1958, for shopbreaking and stealing cigarettes and tobacco, he was given a conditional discharge for three years. In September that year, for house breaking and stealing property worth about £1,200, he went to a detention centre for three months. He was then 14. In January this year, at the age of 15, for burglary and taking and driving away a vehicle without consent and one case considered, he again went to an approved school.

It was hardly surprising that when he came before the quarter sessions the master of the approved school said that there was nothing more that an approved school could do for him. Perhaps some might say that had it been possible in law such action should have been taken earlier. At any rate, it was plain now that he had to go to a place where more discipline could be applied and firmer authority and more security were available. If the Bill is passed into law as it stands, the courts will be deprived of the power of sending such a boy to an institution such as borstal. I do not know what degree of security and discipline the Minister expects to put into selected community homes, if that is their title, to take the place of borstal for youths at that age?

It may be thought that I have strayed a little from the terms of the proposed Clause and the Amendments to mention the difficulties which face the courts in dealing with boys like these when the courts have only one anxiety—to reform them if possible and turn them into decent citizens before it is too late. I mention the case to illustrate the danger which lies in Parliament's interfering with the powers of the court which hitherto—there are always exceptions—have been exercised with sympathy and understanding.

I cannot remember a previous occasion, certainly for many years, of sending such a young man to borstal, but there are occasions when that becomes necessary. There are occasions when the knowledge that strong measures may be taken, and the knowledge that the law says that something is wrong, may deter a young man—even though it did not deter this one—when he stands on the brink of a serious offence.

For this reason, I am very doubtful about the philosophy which lies behind the interference with the powers of courts and the administration of the law which the Bill makes possible, and I ask the House to support the Amendments to the new Clause.

5.15 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)

I had not intended to intervene in this debate. I shall do so only very shortly, largely to ask the hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve)—whom I know well from my constituency, where he is greatly respected, not only by myself—this rather sad question. Does he think that his sentence of borstal will do that boy any good?

Here is a boy who, from 11 onwards, has been before the courts off and on. He has been to approved schools; everything has been done that the courts can do. Now he is going to borstal and in our hearts we all know that it will not do him the slightest bit of good. From borstal he will go on to prison. It is just that kind of tragic sequence that the Bill is trying to avoid.

Mr. Grieve

I appreciate the force of what the hon. and learned Member has said. One, alas, knows all too well from long experience that in many cases someone who has been to borstal will offend again—but that is not always true. It is not true in more than 50 per cent. of the cases. There are youngsters under 17, at 15 and over, for whom the security and discipline of borstal appears to be, and indeed is, the only measure which society thinks right. I ask the House to hesitate a long time before depriving the courts and society of that measure.

Mr. Paget

I do not in the least wish to decry borstal or the measure of success which borstal has. As the hon. and learned Member said, it has a measure of success in some of the better borstals of up to 50 per cent., but that is not after this kind of record. For this kind of boy I should think that the percentage is considerably under 10. With this kind of boy who has been in trouble from 11 onwards the damage has been done. Whether anything can help the boy at that stage, although I hope that I am profoundly wrong, I very much doubt. It is at the age of 11 when one begins to deal with this kind of case.

Another thing which the hon. and learned Member said seemed contrary to the spirit of the Bill. I do not know whether I have a precise note of what he said, but I think it was that it is important as soon as possible to bring home to children the distinction between right and wrong and that distinction for most children is between what is criminal and what is not criminal.

Mr. Grieve

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for saying that that is what he thought I said. Obviously, I do not say that for the bulk of children the criminal law explains the difference between right and wrong, but for those who are already going out in danger of doing a criminal offence the criminal law does bring home the distinction. This is not a view I have been able to form at first-hand; it is the view of many probation officers with whom I have discussed the matter.

Mr. Paget

I would not disagree that factually that may be so, but it is something we ought to avoid at almost any price. To get a child into the state that his idea of the difference between right and wrong is what he can suffer criminal consequences for—that it is wrong for him to park his bicycle in the wrong place, but not wrong to bully his little brother—seems to be producing a kind of atmosphere which we want to avoid.

We want to get away from the criminal distinction and come to the moral distinction. We wish to bring home that this is just one of the things which children must learn not to do. In the process of being brought up it should be dealt with by the same kind of machinery—the home, the school, or whatever it is—that deals with the other wrong things which the child may do, which have nothing at all to do with the criminal law but which, in ethical terms, may be a great deal more serious because they are more cruel and unkind.

Above everything the tremendous lesson is that perhaps the greatest distinction of all between right and wrong is the distinction between kind and unkind. It is very difficult to teach children who tend to be assertive and to feel that they express their growing virility by torturing and hurting, but this distinction we have to get into a child. To present him with a process which adopts the infliction of punishment and the infliction of pain as part of its method of asserting itself is in a large measure to invite the child to do that same thing and that is the very thing which he ought not to be doing.

One does find little villains. There are occasions when the stick is probably the only answer, but that is probably primarily because of the failure of the school and parent in letting the situation go that far. But it does happen, and it must be dealt with.

The Bill is on the right lines in teaching an ethical rather than a criminal difference; that is the principle behind it. It is also right in saying that probably the best people to decide whether a matter has become such a public nuisance that it must be dealt with by the courts are the police. To interpose the certifying magistrate, or whatever he was called, is to impose a worse judgment for a better one. I feel that what is proposed is roughly the right way. I apologise for intervening when I was not on the Committee, but I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will forgive me.

Mr. David Lane (Cambridge)

I, too, have misgivings about the new Clause and should have felt happier if the Government had restricted their change to the simple deletion of the original Clause 5.

A great deal has been said today and earlier about the supposed lack of uniformity in police practice in cases of the kind with which we are concerned. But I wonder whether the Government, in their anxiety to restrict criminal proceedings for offences by young persons, have rather exaggerated the degree of this lack of uniformity. It may have been a more serious problem several years ago, but I suspect that increasingly, as police amalgamations take effect and police practice becomes more uniform in different parts of the country, it will become less and less of a problem. I do not believe that the Government have paid sufficient attention to what is already happening and will continue to happen as a result of the amalgamations.

I still see three main snags in the procedure, in spite of the Under-Secretary's explanation. The first is the danger of excessive delay. The more I look at the new subsection (3), the more puzzled I am by what its practical effect will be. If we carry through the procedure in subsection 3 (a) and (b) and the police consult the local authority, how long a period does the Under-Secretary envisage in those cases? Of course, it will vary according to the nature of the case, but we are entitled to more explanation than we have had.

The last four lines of the subsection, paraphrased, say that the police can disregard the obligation to consult, if they are satisfied that whatever the local authority may say will not make any difference. This is a confusing procedure, because the police either have a long delay to face—and we are not told how long it is likely to be—or they can say, on their own initiative, "We have read the Act. We do not think that the local authority's views will make any difference. We are going ahead." That takes away the point of the consultation entirely. We should hear more from the Government on why they have drafted the subsection in this double way and how they see it operating in practice.

The second snag I see is that we are in danger of making the procedure more complicated than it needs to be and consequently overloading the police. Surely, this is the last time when the House, by passing ill-thought-out legislation, as I believe certain parts of the new Clause to be, should add still more to the burdens the police have to carry.

The third snag is the undesirability of subsection (4). We are already seeing too much done and decided by Ministers exercising then administrative functions, not always subject to adequate check by this House. To add again to the ability of the Home Secretary, whoever he may be, to tinker with the law in this case would be a bad thing for the House to do.

I believe that we have not yet got the procedure right. I hope that the Under-Secretary will think very carefully about the criticisms made this afternoon before the Bill passes into law.

Mr. Elystan Morgan

We have had an excellent debate so far, but this is one part of the Bill where there will be a great gulf and chasm between the Opposition and the Government, though I respect the absolute sincerity with which the views of hon. Members opposite are held and tendered and the great totality of experience that hon. Members who have spoken can amass in this context.

Subsection (2) is obviously a key part of the new Clause and, therefore, it is not surprising that the Amendments have concentrated on it. It is heartening that the Amendments accept the need to give guidance to the police in deciding whether or not to prosecute a young person. However, their collective result would be to make the guidance proposed in subsections (2) and (4) much less comprehensive and effective. The possibility of alternative action by a parent, a teacher or other person, or of a police caution, would be considered, and nothing else.

If the Clause were reduced to that substantial extent, it would operate, but in a much less satisfactory way. It is constructed on the basis that a qualified informant should consider both the positive reasons for prosecuting and the possibility of alternative action. It is important that both sides of the coin should be covered by subsection (2). The first and fourth Amendments, by eliminating the prescribed criteria for prosecution, would eliminate one side of the coin and, therefore, leave an unequal test to be applied by the qualified informants.

The criteria envisaged were set out in paragraph 2(1) of Appendix A of the White Paper. In the light of subsection (2), criteria (d) and (f) are no longer necessary, but the others remain as a suitable basis for the regulations. The function of the regulations would be to give guidance to qualified informants on the exercise of discretion. It is right and inevitable that such guidance should be in reasonably general terms. But if it were excessively general, it would not serve one of its main purposes, which is to rectify the gross discrepancies of police practice which now exist in relation to the prosecution of juveniles.

This I feel, as I felt on Second Reading and in Committee, is the heart and kernel of the whole situation, and it has not been disposed of by the argument of right hon. and hon. Members opposite. No Member would say that he or she is content with a situation in which the caution rate may run at 2, 3, or 5 per cent. in one part of the Kingdom and at 65, 67, or 70 per cent. in another part.

In our debates on the Bill we have had excellent and sincere speeches on the need to remove discrimination. It is inevitable that distinctions will be drawn when one is dealing with such cases as these, each on its own merits, bearing in mind what the needs of the young person might be. But provided these distinctions are drawn on proper criteria, the discrimination in itself is not improper. The fact that a court has discretion to deal with a case in a variety of ways of necessity means that there is the possibility of discrimination. What we are concerned with is wrongful discrimination.

5.30 p.m.

It is argued by hon. Members opposite that it would not be proper to set out a code which would give broad guidance for senior police officers in deciding whether or not a prosecution should take place, but none has suggested that such guidance should be given in any way other than by legislation. Obviously, it would not be proper for the Home Office, and it would have no effect in law, if it were to publish a circular to be issued to senior police officers. No one would want to see a Home Secretary going on a legislative frolic of his own in such a context.

Granted that that is the case, what are we left with? Either that we have this complete lack of uniformity that is so abhorrent to all of us; or we might hope that, in some pious but impractical way, by some process of intuition or clairvoyance, senior police officers will happen to hit upon a proper approach to the problem and the proper guidelines; or we are left with the situation as it is.

The caution rate for the whole range of indictable and non-indictable offences for children and young persons up to the age of 17 is about 25 per cent. Without the Bill, quite irrespective of what we are now discussing, the figure might well rise to 40 or 50 per cent. in 10 years' time. Despite what the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) has said about amalgamations, it is inevitable that there will be grave discrepancies as between one police force and another and, indeed, between one area and another within the territory of one police force.

Discretion without guidance must of necessity give a clear idea to the ordinary layman that it is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious way. That is no attack upon the senior officers concerned. They are sensible men carrying out their duties as they see proper. Each one depends upon his own views, his own bent. It was said of equity many centuries ago that it varied according to the length of the Chancellor's foot. Is it right and proper that a discretion exercised in this context should vary according to the length or breadth of a chief constable's foot? We want to see a uniform pattern. Is there any other way of getting nearer to uniformity than to have the criteria suggested in subsection (4) of new Clause 1?

Mr. R. H. Turton (Thirsk and Malton)

Will the hon. Gentleman explain how the adoption of the vague wording in the Appendix will avoid these different interpretations by police officers?

Mr. Morgan

I do not pretend that this provision will bring about a perfect uniformity. What I do say is that it will bring us much nearer to a system of uniformity than the situation which now obtains.

The second and third Amendments to new Clause 1 relate to lines 7 and 8, which are the latter part of subsection (2). The whole object of the second half of subsection (2) is to give a comprehensive description of the kind of possible alternative action which might adequately deal with a case without the need for prosecution. The result of the Amendment to lines 7 and 8 would be that this part of subsection (2) would cease to be comprehensive and alternative methods which obviously should be taken into account would not be mentiond.

Taking, first, the exercise by a local authority or other body of its powers, some examples may be given as follows—and this was the point raised by the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle). The first and most obvious power is in Section 1 of the 1963 Act, which requires the local authority to make available … such advice, guidance and assistance as may promote the welfare of children by diminishing the need … to bring children before a juvenile court; It would be extremely odd and unsatisfactory, in view of this clear statement of one of the objects of action taken under Section 1 of the Act, if a qualified informant were not required to take into consideration whether such action would result in the case being dealt with adequately.

Secondly, there is Section 1 of the Children Act, 1948, which places upon the local authority a duty in defined circumstances to receive a child into care. This power might be relevant where an offence arises out of family difficulties and the parents ask that a child be received into care, not necessarily for a long period, and this is clearly an appropriate course which removes any need to consider court proceedings in respect of the offence. The other examples include references to a child guidance clinic or admission to a special school. The examples are comprehensive and illustrate why local authority powers must be mentioned in subsection (2). It seems almost self-evident that the qualified informant should be required to take account of matters of this kind before deciding whether or not to prosecute.

The apparition of delay has once again presented itself. The hon. Member for Cambridge and others asked how it is intended that the system of consultation should work and what delay is envisaged in this connection. The procedure will work broadly speaking as follows: While consultation between police and local authorities will be normal practice there will be some cases where it is clear, without such consultation, that there should be a prosecution—for example, where the offence is a very serious one or is a driving offence of a kind where the court would have the opportunity to consider imposing a disqualification.

In such cases, a qualified informant will be entitled to initiate a prosecution without prior consultation with the local authority. In any other case, he will be required to tell the authority that he is considering whether to prosecute the young person and, unless it indicates that it does not wish to do so, to allow it reasonable time in the circumstances of the case in which it may express any views it may have, and to consider such views before deciding to prosecute.

It is, of course, impossible to make a calculation of exactly what the time lapse will be. The best guide we have is that of experience. In relation to the juvenile bureaux which have been set up in the metropolitan area, I understand that, where such consultations take place with the local authority, the average delay or lapse of time is nine days. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that that is a reasonable period and a price well worth paying in order to have all the information that is relevant and material to the case and enabling the court therefore to come to the best possible decision.

Mr. Speaker was kind enough to indicate a group of Amendments which we are discussing with new Clause 1. I propose formally to move them later, but perhaps I can take the opportunity now to assure the House that they are all consequential. Many technical matters are involved, but I do not propose to deal with these unless, of course, hon. Members wish me to do so.

Mr. Worsley

We are discussing a very important matter and there is nothing wrong in discussing it at some length. We are discussing nothing less than the application of the criminal law to all those under the age of 17. My hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) made a good point when he said that in Committee, when we were discussing the Clause which the new Clause replaces, we concentrated our attention on the issue of the single magistrate, and we are grateful to the Government for making that issue disappear.

We are discussing this matter at a time when there is an increase in juvenile crime, when there is an increase in public concern about this matter and what we do therefore matters greatly. I am inclined to think that were we to ask the people whether they wished to make the criminal law easier for young people under 17, they would not come down on the same side as the Government.

We are not talking only about children; we are talking about young persons who have been in employment for about two years, about young persons who are now within a year of exercising their right to vote, about young persons who by every evidence mature earlier, about young persons who sometimes, alas, although as a generation they are splendid, have shown a deplorable sense of viciousness, gang warfare and the rest. We look at this with a critical eye to ask whether the Government are making the task of those who have to enforce law and order easier or more difficult.

If we wish to promote humane treatment, to break the tragic sequence, to use the phrase of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), we must carry public opinion with us or we are doomed to failure. I cannot believe that a restriction on the ability of the police to bring criminal actions, particularly against 16-year-olds, is the best way forward.

It is, first, on those broad general grounds that I believe it to be wrong to restrict the ability of the police to bring criminal actions where they believe that to be necessary. Most of us, certainly those of us who served on the Standing Committee, would like an increase in the use of care and control proceedings, particularly for the younger end of this age group, but also for the older end. However, I agreed with my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) when he questioned whether short, sharp criminal action, against 15 and 15-year-olds particularly, was not likely to be the best course. I do not go so far as to say that the ultimate goal which we all seek is to transfer all cases of this sort from criminal to care and control proceedings.

We are discussing what guidance should be given to the police in these circumstances. I accept that others are involved, but we are concerned mainly with the police. This brings me at once to the nub of the argument. The Under-Secretary constantly spoke about guidance and about broad guidance. But what he proposes is more than guidance; he is proposing dictation. He is not allowing the decision in these matters to remain in the hands of the police. He is attempting to take it from the police and to put it in Whitehall. It is no good calling that guidance.

5.45 p.m.

Over and over again he mentioned the enormous divergences between individual police forces in the use of cautions. I accept that if we argue against subsection (4), as we do, we must attempt to deal with that difficulty. I agree that these variations are much too wide, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) said, increasing amalgamations will reduce these figures. The guidance which would remain in the new Clause would of itself impose a certain restriction on this discretion. Secondly, and more important, to attempt to regulate from Whitehall the criteria to be used by the police is the wrong way. The right way to give guidance is to spread abroad the concepts of the best practice, and that can be done by sending circulars to police authorities.

The hon. Gentleman appeared to think that to do that would be something like a piece of legislative private enterprise, a frolic. Every Department constantly sends out a spate of paper of advice and guidance for every local authority in the country.

Mr. Elystan Morgan

I was saying that in these circumstances the use of circulars to do the work of legislation would amount to a legislative frolic, although it would not in most other cases.

Mr. Worsley

Surely that is not so. What we are seeking to do in all these things is to allow a local authority, or in this case a local police force, to use its own discretion, but to do so in an informed way, informed by what is regarded as the best practice. There is a world of difference between that sort of guidance, that sort of educative process, and the sort of hard and fast restrictions which, presumably, regulations would lay down.

Apart from that, police forces are always discussing these matters. The police do not merely live in their own localities and discuss these things inside their own forces. Particularly with the mergers which are going on and the increase in training, these things will be discussed more and more widely. Rather than the necessarily restrictive conditions which would be laid down by Whitehall, would it not be better to allow the police themselves, with guidance from the Home Office and by mutual discussion, to reach what they regarded as the best way forward?

This at least is what we feel and why we seek to take out this regulation-making power. The more I look at Appendix A of the White Paper the more I am confirmed in my view that this will be either ineffective or needlessly restrictive, and I suspect that the latter will be the case. Let me instance this by taking some of the headings from Appendix A. Item (b) says: the offence is of a type causing much public concern". Things that excite public concern vary enormously from one part of the country to another.

Very often there may be an outbreak of hooliganism in one town, perhaps connected with football matches or perhaps something quite different, when the police would like to come in and prefer a few criminal charges in the hope that the courts will make an example of the individuals concerned. This may have no relevance at all to a town 20 miles away, yet this will have to be based on national criteria. What concerns Torquay will have to concern Newcastle.

Mr. Niall MacDermot (Derby, North)

Why does the hon. Gentleman say that? Surely the advantage of the procedure proposed is that it will leave it to the discretion of the local senior officer to decide whether this is an offence in his locality which public concern requires that there should be a prosecution. That is the advantage of laying down criteria rather than trying to specify offences in regulations.

Mr. Worsley

My understanding of the way this would work was that offences which are regarded as being of public concern would be laid down by the Home Office. I am grateful if I am now corrected by the Under-Secretary and the hon. and learned Gentleman.

Secondly, item (c) deals with circumstances which vary with the individual. Surely this is much better left to the discretion of the individual police officer rather than imposing criteria from Whitehall which could easily be irrelevant? Most extraordinary of all is the subject of traffic offences. Presumably we are dealing with motorcycle offences exclusively, because a juvenile under 17 driving a car without authority would be caught in other circumstances.

I want to be clear about what is intended here. A lot of us, staid drivers of motor cars, regard young motor cyclists, who sometimes come up on both left and right of one as one drives along, with considerable aversion and alarm. We would not want anything done in the Bill that would in any way allow those persons to get away with anything for which they should be charged.

As I understand the criteria laid out in Appendix A, they will only be allowed to be charged if there is a likelihood of disqualification from driving or an endorsement of the licence that will remain effective after they have reached the minimum age. There will, therefore, be offences under the Traffic Acts which cannot be charged.

For all these reasons we feel that, rather than the Home Office seeking to lay down criteria centrally for the guidance, to use the Under-Secretary's word, of the police authorities, it would be very much better to allow them a discretion. The Under-Secretary said that he had no prejudice against the police, but he used the word "capricious". With all respect this is a pejorative word.

Mr. Elystan Morgan

What I said was that if no guide-lines are laid down and

each senior officer decided in his own mind, honourably and according to his experience, it would give an intelligent layman the impression of being arbitrary and capricious. Those were my exact words.

Mr. Worsley

Nevertheless, there is latent in the attitude of the Home Secretary and the Under-Secretary towards the police a lack of trust and confidence. I know that it is not their conscious intention, but we would be much wiser to leave this issue in the hands of the police.

Mr. Paget

If we take a case, leaving aside whether it is capricious or not, suppose that down one side of a street juveniles are prosecuted for parking their bicycles and they are not so prosecuted on the other. This would be an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Surely the question of minor traffic offences, whether juveniles should be prosecuted like everyone else for parking offences, should be the subject of guidance?

Mr. Worsley

Under these criteria it will not be possible to prosecute on either side of that street, so the question would not arise. We are not convinced of the necessity for subsection (4) and we would ask, if it is possible, to divide on the first of the Amendments to the new Clause.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving)

Order. May I inform the House that Mr. Speaker has agreed to a Division on the first of the Amendments in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) if the House so wishes.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time.

Amendment proposed to the proposed Clause: In line 4, leave out from 'opinion' to 'that' in line 5.—[Mr. Carlisle.]

Question put, That the Amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 141, Noes 203.

Division No. 233.]	AYES	[6.0 p.m.
Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)	Berry, Hn. Anthony	Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward
Astor, John	Biffen, John	Brinton, Sir Tatton
Baker, Kenneth (Acton)	Biggs-Davison, John	Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter
Batsford, Brian	Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel	Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Bell, Ronald	Black, Sir Cyril	Buck, Antony (Colchester)
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)	Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)	Bullus, Sir Eric
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)	Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John	Burden, F. A.
Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)	Hornby, Richard	Pym, Francis
Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)	Howell, David (Guildford)	Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James
Carlisle, Mark	Hunt, John	Rees-Davies, W. R.
Channon, H. P. G.	Iremonger, T. L.	Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Clark, Henry	Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)	Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
Clegg, Walter	Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)	Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey
Cooper-Key, Sir Neill	Jopling, Michael	Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Corfield, F. V.	Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith	Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Costain, A. P.	Kershaw, Anthony	Royle, Anthony
Craddock, sir Beresford (Spelthorne)	King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)	Russell, Sir Ronald
Crouch, David	Kitson, Timothy	Scott-Hopkins, James
Cunningham, Sir Knox	Knight, Mrs. Jill	Sharples, Richard
Dance, James	Lane, David	Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)
Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)	Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry	Silvester, Frederick
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)	Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)	Sinclair, Sir George
Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)	Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Selwyn (Wirral)	Smith, John (London & W'minster)
Errington, Sir Eric	Longden, Gilbert	Speed, Keith
Eyre, Reginald	Lubbock, Eric	Tapsell, Peter
Fortescue, Tim	McAdden, Sir Stephen	Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)
Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hjugh (St'fford & Stone)	MacArthur, Ian	Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)
Glover, Sir Douglas	Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)	Temple, John M.
Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.	McNair-Wilson, Michael	Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret
Gower, Raymond	McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)	Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy
Grant, Anthony	Maginnis, John E.	Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.
Gresham Cooke, R.	Maude, Angus	Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John
Grieve, Percy	Mawby, Ray	Vickers, Dame Joan
Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)	Miscampbell, Norman	Waddington, David
Hall, John (Wycombe)	Monro, Hector	Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)
Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)	Montgomery, Fergus	Walker, Peter (Worcester)
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)	Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)	Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)	Morrison, Charles (Devizes)	Walters, Dennis
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)	Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles	Ward, Dame Irene
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere	Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh	Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
Hastings, Stephen	Murton, Oscar	Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel	Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael	Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard
Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward	Onslow, Cranley	Woodnutt, Mark
Higgins, Terence L.	Page, John (Harrow, W.)	Worsley, Marcus
Hiley, Joseph	Pearson, Sir Frank (Clltheroe)
Hill, J. E. B.	Percival, Ian	TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin	Pink, R. Bonner	Mr. Jasper More and
Holland, Philip	Pounder, Rafton	Mr. Humphrey Atkins.
Hordern, Peter
NOES
Abse, Leo	Darling, Rt. Hn. George	Haselaine, Norman
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)	Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)	Hazell, Bert
Alldritt, Walter	Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)	Heffer, Eric S.
Anderson, Donald	Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)	Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret
Archer, Peter	Davies, Ifor (Gower)	Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)	Delargy, Hugh	Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)	Dell, Edmund	Howie, W.
Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)	Dempsey, James	Hoy, James
Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice	Diamond, Rt. Hn. John	Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Bagier, Gordon A. T.	Dickens, James	Hunter, Adam
Barnes, Michael	Doig, Peter	Hynd, John
Barnett, Joel	Dunnett, Jack	Irvine, Sir Arthur (Edge Hilt)
Bence, Cyril	Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)	Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)
Bidwell, Sydney	Eadie, Alex	Jackson, Peter M. (High peak)
Binns, John	Edwards, William (Merioneth)	Jeger, George (Goole)
Blackburn, F.	English, Michael	Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)
Booth, Albert	Ennals, David	Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Bradley, Tom	Ensor, David	Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)
Bray, Dr. Jeremy	Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)	Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)
	Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)	Judd, Frank
Brooks, Edwin	Fernyhough, E.	Kelley, Richard
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.	Fitch, Alan (Wigan)	Kenyon, Clifford
Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)	Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)	Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)
Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)	Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)	Kerr, Russell (Feltham)
Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)	Fraser, John (Norwood)	Lawson, George
Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)	Freeson, Reginald	Leadbitter, Ted
Buchan, Norman	Gardner, Tony	Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)
Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)	Garrett, W. E.	Lee, Rt. Hon. Jennie (Cannock)
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)	Ginsburg, David	Lipton, Marcus
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)	Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony	Loughlin, Charles
Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James	Gregory, Arnold	Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Carmichael, Neil	Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)	Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Carter-Jones, Lewis	Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)	McBride, Neil
Coe, Denis	Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)	McCann, John
Coleman, Donald	Griffiths, Will (Exchange)	MacColl, James
Concannon, J. D.	Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)	MacDermot, Niall
Conlan, Bernard	Hamling, William	McGuire, Michael
Crawshaw, Richard	Harper, Joseph	Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)
Grossman, Rt. Hn. Richard	Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)	Maclennan, Robert
Dalyell, Tam	Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith	MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)

McNamara, J. Kevin	Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)	Spriggs, Leslie
Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)	Pavitt, Laurence	Taverne, Dick
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)	Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred	Thomas, Rt. Hn. George
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)	Pentland, Norman	Thomson, Rt. Hn. George
Manuel, Archie	Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)	Thornton, Ernest
Marks, Kenneth	Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.	Tinn, James
Mayhew, Christopher	Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)	Tuck, Raphael
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert	Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)	Urwin, T. W.
Mendelson, John	Price, William (Rugby)	Varley, Eric G.
Millan, Bruce	Probert, Arthur	Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)
Miller, Dr. M. S.	Rankin, John	Walker, Harold (Doncaster)
Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)	Roes, Merlyn	Wallace, George
Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)	Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)	Watkins, David (Consett)
Molloy, William	Rodgers, William (Stockton)	Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)
Moonman, Eric	Roebuck, Roy	Wellbeloved, James
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)	Ross, Rt. Hn. William	Whitaker, Ben
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)	Rowlands, E.	Whitlock, William
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)	Ryan, John	Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Moyle, Roland	Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)	Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)
Neal, Harold	Sheldon, Robert	Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)
Newens, Stan	Shinwell, Rt. Hn. E.	Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
Ogden, Eric	Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)	Willis, Rt. Hn. George
Oram, Albert E.	Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)	Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)
Orbach, Maurice	Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)	Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)
Orme, Stanley	Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)	Woof, Robert
Oswald, Thomas	Silverman, Julius
Owen, Will (Morpeth)	Slater, Joseph	TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Paget, R. T.	Small, William	Mr. Ernest G. Perry and
Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles	Snow, Julian	Mr. Ernest Armstrong.
Parker, John (Dagenham)

Clause added to the Bill.

1. New Clause
cc1013-6
1. LEGAL AID 885 words
2. New Clause No. 3
cc1016-20
1. INFORMATION CONCERNING CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS OF PEOPLE SEEKING TO WORK IN COMMUNITY HOMES, &C. 1,457 words
3. Clause 1
cc1020-57
1. CARE PROCEEDINGS IN JUVENILE COURTS 14,753 words, 1 division
4. Clause 2
cc1057-65
1. PROVISIONS SUPPLEMENTARY TO S. 1 3,215 words
5. Clause 3
cc1065-71
1. FURTHER SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO S. 1(2)(e) 2,372 words
6. Clause 4
cc1071-87
1. PROHIBITION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FOR OFFENCES BY CHILDREN 6,275 words, 1 division
7. Clause 5
c1087
1. CONSENT REQUIRED FOR CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST YOUNG PERSONS 14 words
8. Clause 6
c1087
1. SUMMARY TRIAL OF YOUNG PERSONS 35 words
9. Clause 7
cc1087-112
1. ALTERATIONS IN TREATMENT OF YOUNG OFFENDERS ETC. 9,499 words, 1 division
10. Clause 8
cc1112-7
1. FINGER-PRINTING OF SUSPECTED YOUNG PERSONS 2,228 words
11. Clause 9
cc1117-23
1. INVESTIGATIONS BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES 2,202 words
12. Clause 10
cc1123-5
1. FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON PUBLICATION OF PARTICULARS OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS 944 words
13. Clause 12
cc1126-37
1. POWER TO INCLUDE REQUIREMENTS IN SUPERVISION ORDERS 4,569 words, 1 division
14. Clause 13
cc1137-41
1. SELECTION OF SUPERVISION 1,421 words
15. Clause 15
cc1141-6
1. VARIATION AND DISCHARGE OF SUPERVISION ORDERS 2,064 words
16. Clause 16
c1147
1. PROVISIONS SUPPLEMENTARY TO SECTION 15 83 words
17. Clause 18
c1147
1. SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO SUPERVISION ORDERS 149 words
18. Clause 20
cc1147-57
1. ORDERS FOR COMMITTAL TO CARE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 3,828 words, 1 division
19. Clause 22
c1157
1. SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO INTERIM ORDERS 227 words
20. Clause 24
cc1157-8
1. POWERS AND DUTIES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO PERSONS COMMITTED TO THEIR CARE 267 words
21. Clause 25
cc1158-61
1. CONSEQUENTIAL MODIFICATIONS OF 1948 c. 43 SS. 11 AND 12 896 words
22. Clause 26
c1161
1. DETENTION OF CHILD OR YOUNG PERSON IN PLACE OF SAFETY 200 words
23. Clause 27
cc1161-2
1. RELEASE OR FURTHER DETENTION OF ARRESTED YOUNG PERSON 304 words
24. Clause 29
c1162
1. REMOVAL TO BORSTAL INSTITUTIONS OF PERSONS COMMITTED TO CARE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 17 words
25. Clause 31
cc1162-4
1. TRANSITIONAL MODIFICATIONS OF PART I FOR PERSONS OF SPECIFIED AGES 747 words
26. Clause 33
cc1165-7
1. REGIONAL PLANS FOR COMMUNITY HOMES 842 words
27. Clause 38
c1167
1. MANAGEMENT OF CONTROLLED COMMUNITY HOMES 83 words
28. Clause 40
cc1167-70
1. CONTROL OF PREMISES USED FOR, AND CONDUCT OF, COMMUNITY HOMES 990 words
29. Clause 44
cc1170-1
1. DISCONTINUANCE BY VOLUNTARY ORGANISATION OF CONTROLLED OR ASSISTED COMMUNITY HOME 317 words
30. Clause 58
cc1171-4
1. CONTRIBUTIONS IN RESPECT OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS IN CARE 1,227 words
31. Clause 65
c1175
1. ORDERS AND REGULATIONS ETC. 100 words
32. Clause 66
c1175
1. INTERPRETATION AND ANCILLARY PROVISIONS 22 words
33. New Schedule
cc1175-8
1. MODIFICATIONS OF PART IV OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1967 1,350 words
34. Schedule 3
c1178
1. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS AND SAVINGS 25 words
35. Schedule 4
cc1178-9
1. MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS OF ENACTMENTS 159 words
36. Schedule 5
cc1179-89
1. REPEALS 4,191 words