HC Deb 09 June 1969 vol 784 cc1071-87
Mr. Carlisle

I beg to move Amendment No. 23, in page 6, line 36, after 'homicide', insert: 'or any other offence which is committed by an adult would be punishable with imprisonment for fourteen years or more'. Clause 4, as we know, prohibits the prosecution for criminal offences of people under the age of 14. I repeat what I said in moving the Amendment to Clause 1: I realise that we are concerned only with children up to the age of 12, and, therefore, the immediate relevance of our Amendment is of less import than it would have been were we concerned with children at the age of 14.

The Bill envisages the prosecution of all people up to 14, and, therefore, in that light it must be considered. Are we right in saying that nobody should be charged with anything that he did while under that age? We make an exclusion. It is specifically made in cases of homicide, murder or manslaughter. But whether or not an offence is murder or wounding with intent may well in the end depend on the brilliance or otherwise of a surgeon.

Are we, therefore, right to say that a person can be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter but that in no case can he be prosecuted for wounding with intent when, as I say, the line drawn in between may be one more of chance than of any intent on the part of the young person concerned?

What we have attempted to do in this Amendment is to widen the power to bring criminal prosecutions against people under 14 to those which might be called the most grave offences; namely, those which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable with imprisonment for 14 years or more. I do not propose to attempt—it would not be of assistance to the House—to list the offences concerned and I am sure that the Under-Secretary can tell me, when he replies, that the list probably includes some which would be highly unsuitable for the purposes we have in mind, but the normal dividing line when looked upon as offences which are of grave intent and those which are of lesser seriousness is whether or not they carry maximum imprisonment of 14 years or more.

If the Government had accepted our Amendment to Clause 1—on which we had a Division—so that the offence itself was sufficient to bring care proceedings, there would probably have been no need to put this Amendment. The Government did not do so and we are back at the stage where a child who commits an offence can be brought before the court only if he can be shown to be in need of care and control. The example quoted by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg), the example sent to me by the Clerk of the Warrington County Bench, is even more relevant to this Amendment than to the Amendment on Clause 1.

What is the position of a child who commits a really serious offence such as that of wounding with intent or deliberate arson of a substantial building? On the face of it, it may be an isolated offence. If one quotes the case of the cadets referred to by my right hon. and learned Friend, it may be found on inquiry that the parents did not know that the child was committing that type of offence. They normally kept good control of the child and the court could not say that the child was in need of care and control but was not receiving it.

There may be a child of 13 committing a really serious offence as a deliberate act, but it will not be possible to take proceedings against him. Often it is not only in the public interest but in the child's interest that proceedings should be taken. The sudden act of violence which leads to wounding with intent may be an outward expression of something badly wrong with that child. The Under-Secretary rightly nods. I think he would accept that there is force in that argument, but under this Measure what action could be taken unless it could be shown that within the law care and control was lacking and the child was in need of care and control and was unlikely to receive it? Action could not then be taken.

Because we believe that so long as there is the two-tier burden of proof under Clause 1 there should be an alternative method of dealing with occasional cases of serious crime committed by young children, we put forward this Amendment. It has been said several times today that this House should not forget the concern that is expressed outside about the rate of juvenile crime. I think it is highest at the ages of 13 and 14. This Bill will remove those who are 13. At a time when, as was said in an earlier debate by my hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Mr. Worsley), we are reducing the age of majority to 18 when we accept that, as the hon. Member for Bebington (Mr. Brooks) said, children are maturing earlier and that 13 is an age at which there is a very high rate of crime, with the exceptions of manslaughter and murder we are preventing any form of prosecution, however wicked the act of the child.

9.15 p.m.

We must accept from our experience, and I ask the Under-Secretary to look back upon his experience before he entered the House, as members of the legal profession that there are occasions when children who outwardly appear to come from respectable homes, with good care and control, can commit some such act as an act of arson. There was a letter from one of the leading magistrates which suggested that such an act may sometimes be almost a cry for help from the child, showing that something is wrong. But we could not bring them before the court under Clause 1 without showing that there was a lack of care or control and that an order was necessary.

It would be unwise before we see how the Act works in practice to exclude completely the right to prosecute children under 14 for serious crimes. I accept that there may be arguments against the use of the words "for fourteen years or more" as a definition, but it is one normally used to describe the most serious types of offence. I hope that we shall hear from the Under-Secretary that he feels there is validity in the argument and is prepared to accept the Amendment.

Mr. Elystan Morgan

The hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) has lucidly presented his arguments in favour of retaining prosecution for what he calls serious offences. The difficulty is that offences punishable with imprisonment for 14 years or more may be very serious or very trivial, according to the circumstances. Likewise, offences punishable by less than 14 years' imprisonment may in certain circumstances be very serious. Snatching a bottle of lemonade from a fellow schoolboy and drinking it is robbery punishable with life imprisonment. Under the existing law the powers of the juvenile court are the same whatever the maximum term of imprisonment which can be imposed on an adult may be. So they will be in care proceedings. The only additional powers that the court would have in the case of the prosecution of a child compared with the powers it would have in care proceedings would be to impose a fine or to grant an absolute or conditional discharge.

Since the argument is that these offences may be very grave it is somewhat odd to suggest that it should be possible to prosecute them merely so that they can be dealt with by way of a fine or a conditional or absolute discharge. The hon. Gentleman has argued that it may well be that in the case of a very serious offence it will be impossible to satisfy the second test in Clause 1(2). This is a highly theoretical argument. What must be considered there is whether a child needs care and control and whether he is likely to get it if an order is made. The words "care and control" must be read against the background of the facts of every particular case.

It is a question not of whether the child needs general care or control but of whether his particular condition as evidenced by the offence he has committed will be met in those circumstances. Although it is theoretically possible for a child to commit a very serious offence and for the test not to be satisfied, in practice it is extremely unlikely, and impossible in my estimation, for such a thing to happen without the test being satisfied.

Mr. Peter Mahon

Would my hon. Friend not agree that at this stage of a child's life it can commit a crime for which it alone is positively and absolutely culpable, and which is in no way the fault of the parents? Would it not be an injustice to try to shift the responsibility? Would it not be better to devise some method whereby the full responsibility can be laid upon the child for the heinous crime it could possibly commit? This is not just a theoretical case.

Mr. Morgan

I would admit that it is possible for quite young children to commit very serious offences, and not in a moment of thoughtlessness but as the result and in consequence of deliberate planning and forethought, and that in those circumstances the serious act will be the clearest indication that something is fundamentally wrong with the life of the child. It will manifest a very particular need. The question that the court will have to direct its mind to is whether or not, in view of the particular need of the child, it is likely to get the care and control it is crying out for without an order being made. I cannot conceive of the possibility of that type of serious offence being committed without in practice the court finding that the second condition contained in subsection (2) was satisfied.

Mrs. Jill Knight (Birmingham, Edgbaston)

I am puzzled by one statement made by the Under-Secretary of State and I want to be clear about it. I understood him to say that it was possible for an adult to be punished by imprisonment for 14 years for a trivial crime. Is that so?

Mr. Morgan

I said that it is possible for an offence that can carry a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment to be, in practice, a trivial incident. I cited the case of a boy snatching a bottle of lemonade from another boy. That, technically, is an act of robbery, and robbery is punishable by 14 years' imprisonment. In theory, that is a serious offence, but in practice, of course, it would be a very trivial incident.

Mr. Frederick Silvester (Walthamstow, West)

I approached this Clause in Committee willing to accept the Amendment then moved, which was accepted by the Government in that the change was made to the age of 12. I have approached this Amendment in the same spirit, but I find that I have perhaps moved to a more reactionary rather than a less reactionary position on this issue. I think that the Amendment begins to show me the fallacy of the argument which has surrounded the Clause. It would take further the distinction already made-in the Clause between homicide and other crimes. It is saying that we should decide whether a child should be brought before the court for an offence by the nature and magnitude of that offence rather than by the fact that the child has committed an offence.

Throughout discussion on this Clause, we have been asked to believe that there are good reasons for raising the age of 10 to 12 to 14. Looking back on the debates, I have not yet heard a very convincing argument and I have obviously felt the same sort of brain washing that all of us have felt over the years during which we have been reminded of times when people were hanged for stealing a loaf of bread and young children were incarcerated in prison. That is the background in our minds, so that we have been predisposed to believe that it must be right to raise this age. Now we are asked to do it yet again. Furthermore, we are asked to write into the Bill the presumption that when Parliament has accepted that it needs to raise the minimum age from 10 to 12 it would be a good idea to raise it from 12 to 14. We are told that experience will show us that we should add another couple of years.

I think that the Amendment is a good one because it at least would improve the present situation. At least it puts a limitation on the Clause as drafted. However, people who have been ignoring the Bill are now beginning to take note of one or two matters.

There is a growing conviction that the presumption of our times should be that the law should be clearer and that when an offence is committed, action should clearly be taken by the law enforcement agencies and that the flexibility which we like in our law should be dispensed by the courts. In other words, people would be happier if when a crime was committed, someone was brought before the courts and if the courts had that flexibility, rather than that that person should not be brought before the courts at all.

There is no need for us to take an extreme position and be worried about our past in the matter of crime and about children in the last century being put into prison at an early age, because the courts already have enormous flexibility and the Bill extends that flexibility. There is no question of some poor child being bashed about the head by a cruel court, or treated in any other way which we would now regard as inhumane. The simple question is whether at this time it is wise for Parliament to extend the area in which people will not be held responsible before the courts.

Mr. Speaker

The hon. Gentleman is seeking to debate the Clause, but we are discussing an Amendment to the Clause, to add after "homicide" other kinds of offences. The hon. Gentleman will not be out of order if he comes to the Amendment.

Mr. Silvester

I will immediately do so. I support the Amendment in the sense that it is a small step towards the ideal which I was seeking to describe.

Mr. Walter Clegg (North Fylde)

I support my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow, West (Mr. Silvester) and my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle). What I dislike about the Clause as it stands is that it limits the exception to homicide. We are in danger of falling into the trap into which Parliament has already fallen, that of considering that the death of someone makes the offence which leads to that death different in quality and kind from an offence which falls short of inducing death.

I refer to a valid previous Parliamentary experience. Parliament created the offence of causing death by dangerous driving. The experience of the courts all over the country in administering the law governing the offence of causing death by dangerous driving is that a minor accident may result in someone being killed and the person driving the car being brought before a Judge of Assize, with all that that entails. By a much worse piece of driving, a much more culpable piece of driving, another driver may not actually kill someone, but may make him a raving lunatic for the rest of his life, but all that driver has to face is a bench of magistrates. I am afraid that a similar situation may arise if the Clause remains as drafted.

There was a tragic case recently of children being tortured by other children. A child who tortured another, resulting in its death, could be prosecuted under the Clause as it stands. But if that torture resulted not in death but in maiming the other child or disabling it for the rest of its life it could not be prosecuted. Therefore, I believe that we are tackling the whole question of not prosecuting a child from the wrong point of view. I do not believe that making an exception of homicide is right. Serious offences should still be prosecuted, and the Amendment would have that effect. The Minister asked about the bottle of lemonade which is stolen. But would not that be dealt with under the new Clause 1? Would not there be, under the new Clause, a warning and not a prosecution? I do not accept the hon. Gentleman's argument on this.

I return to the main concept behind the whole Clause, the deep underlying principle that to cause somebody's death is somehow worse than causing injury to another, though in many cases that can be far worse than death. Is it more culpable to kill by a trivial act a man who perhaps has a month to live than to maim a child with 30 or 40 years more to live? I do not believe that it is, and that is why I oppose the Clause.

9.30 p.m.

Mr. Brooks

I too find a basic inconsistency in the argument. All of us agree that homicide is a serious offence, and if we were to think of any one particular offence that we wished to put in as a qualification it might well he the one we would think of.

But this creates in logic a most unsatisfactory position, because presumably what we are saying is that children below a certain age are, by virtue of that age, incapable of being judged guilty of an offence at all. We are saying, in other words, that they are below the age of responsibility for taking criminal action. This is no doubt a point of view that can be sustained. All of us would at least accept that there is a threshold below which it would be monstrous and perverse to prosecute a child for an action it had taken. But once one has accepted that proposition it becomes totally self-defeating to say that there is one category of offence where the child can be seen in principle to be responsible for its actions. That is the point the hon. Member for North Fylde (Mr. Clegg) made admirably and succinctly; we are, in effect, judging the offence not really by the wilful intent of the child but by the results.

For example, one could think of a child setting fire to the Albert Hall at midnight, when there is no one there. Some of us might necessarily regard that not as an offence at all but as a basis for architectural innovation and acoustic improvement. But if that act of arson were committed on the last night of the Proms and we saw whole legions of the young decimated inadvertently—

An Hon. Member

Not singing "Rule Britannia".

Mr. Brooks

—no doubt the child could be brought before the courts as having committed an act of homicide. But the action taken against the child is dependent not on the nature of the act itself, setting fire to the Albert Hall, but on the time it set fire to the Albert Hall.

In a sense, I am caricaturing the argument, but there is a serious point, that if we are to say that below a certain age a child is incapable by definition of committing a criminal act owing to its age, immaturity, lack of experience and sheer childishness, it is not really possible to have any exclusion whatsoever from that principle. An act committed by such a child by definition cannot be held to be its responsibility.

Mr. Lane

I found the argument of the Under-Setcretary of State very unconvincing, and I should like to counter it on two scores from experience and opinions in the region in which my constituency lies.

The hon. Gentleman said that he could not conceive of any of the offences committed by a child covered by the Amendment which would not be caught by the double test under Clause 1. I have some figures for 1968 relating to the Mid-Anglia police area. I should have liked time to quote more, but I wish to make two points based on these figures.

Out of the total number of crimes in 1968 in this not very populous, fairly law-abiding area committed by juveniles under the age of 17, over 45 per cent. were committed by children under 14 years of age. However, the main point that I quote these figures to illustrate is that among the crimes by children under 14 years of age there were 46 cases of housebreaking and 64 cases of breaking into shops. I do not envisage these cases invariably being caught by the sort of double test which the Under-Secretary of State mentioned.

Second, in all his reasoning in answer to our Amendment, I did not detect any understanding, certainly any adequate understanding, by the Under-Secretary of State of the concern felt about this and many other features of the Bill by people outside the House who believe that in some respects we are going too far. Only last week leading members of the police authority in the Mid-Anglia area decided to set aside a morning to discuss the Bill and the Amendments which had been made in Committee with a number of hon. Members from the area because they remain so concerned about its provisions. These were not hard, vindictive people. They were humane, experienced men and women from many walks of life. They were not all magistrates or all policemen. They were exceedingly concerned about this provision.

I ask the Under-Secretary of State to think again before the Bill leaves the Houses of Parliament. We are trying by the Amendment to put in a reserve safeguard for exceptional situations. For the sake of reassuring public opinion, this is a step which we should take.

Mr. A. P. Costain (Folkestone and Hythe)

I wish to make a short point in support of the Amendment.

A number of crimes are committed by children in gangs. What worries me most about this provision is this. In a gang of children there may be one child under 14 years of age. Suppose they are caught. Will not great pressure be brought to bear on the child under the age of responsibility to admit the crime? Is it not possible that he will be bullied into saying that he committed the crime? As a result of the Bill, a new type of criminal may be created. Will the Home Secretary take note of this point?

Mr. Miscampbell

We seem to have reached the ultimate absurdity. The Government, having refused to recognise an offence in itself as being sufficient reason for taking a person before the court, are not prepared to go all the way and say that this is a universal criterion. They seek to say in the Clause that homicide should not be treated as other crimes but should be exceptional. Why that should be so I cannot understand. This point has been made on both sides of the House, particularly by the hon. Member for Bebington (Mr. Brooks).

The crime of homicide can arise in a variety of circumstances. If it arises in the case of very young children, the circumstances surrounding it are likely to be extraordinary and very rare. Unfortunately, this may not be so if we progressively increase the age from 12 to 14 and perhaps later to an even greater age. But it is not murder about which one thinks so much, because homicide includes all varieties of manslaughter. In many cases they may not be much less heinous, and certainly not much less heinous than the more serious crime of attempting to murder somebody in circumstances which may be much worse than in the successful crime. There are also the crimes of wounding and arson.

Here the Government—I suppose, with a feeling of outside pressure—feel that they cannot possibly allow homicide to be unreprimanded by the courts; a child or young person must go straight to the courts if he has committed the offence of homicide. This seems to me to be totally illogical.

Mr. Elystan Morgan

Would the hon. Member accept that homicide is placed in that position not only because it occupies a certain position in the public mind but because the very few cases of homicide committed by children are such that the needs of those children make it necessary for them to be tried by a judge and jury, and it is also necessary for the court to have the right to be able to detain them indefinitely? The second reason is the really compelling one rather than the former.

Mr. Miscampbell

The Under-Secretary gives the whole case away. If that is what he is saying, the reply is quite simple. This House recognises by the speeches which have been made here this evening that there are many circumstances that are worse than homicide. I can think of virtually no cases of homicide arising in 14 or 15 years at the Bar.

The hon. Gentleman is quite right to say that it arises in very few cases, but that surely cannot be a reason for arguing that it should be excluded in the Bill. If the needs of the child have to be considered, why not in the case of the much more serious offences for which an adult who committed them might be liable to imprisonment for 14 years? I am not wedded to that entirely as the criterion or yardstick by which to decide whether a crime is serious, but it is a yardstick which can be used.

If the Under-Secretary says that there may well be cases when the child has to be detained for his own good, how much more forceful that argument would be for offences which, in the circumstances in which they were committed, were much more serious than homicide. I emphasise to the Under-Secretary that homicide is not simply murder but is all the varieties of manslaughter also.

For these reasons I feel that the Government, taking one view, have departed from their principles or, on another view, have been completely wrong-headed from the beginning.

Sir E. Errington

As my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Miscampbell) has said, homicide varies very much from the very serious to the comparatively trivial in regard to manslaughter. A typical example of what might well occur could be a case of manslaughter arising from a fight between two children. Does the Under-Secretary visualise that in those circumstances the Clause should apply?

Mr. Worsley

I sense that the House wishes to come to a decision on the Amendment and I intend to wind up extremely briefly. I understood the Under-Secretary to remark that any child who committed the sort of offence which we seek to include under the Amendment would be certain also to be in need of care and control. I wonder how he argues, as he must if he says this, that there can be circumstances where a child commits homicide and is not in need of care and control. Surely, if he is using that argument for this slightly wider set of cases, he must in logic use it in the case of homicide.

9.45 p.m.

In other words, to draw the line where the Government are seeking to draw it is an illogical place to draw it, and this is what has been said in speech after speech from both sides of the House: it is the illogical place. Surely, the only logical place to draw this line is at what might be called the seriousness of the matter, and this is what we are attempting, by this Amendment, to do. There has been some argument whether this is the best way of defining the seriousness, but certainly none other has been put forward which is more

appealing, and for the moment this is, as it were, the front runner.

I would like to draw the attention of the House to the extremely important effect of new Clause 1 on this Amendment. I quote new Clause 1 but leaving out the irrelevant words: A qualified informant shall not lay an information unless the informant is of opinion that it would not be adequate for the case to be dealt with by means of proceedings under section 1 of this Act. The effect of that is to destroy completely the argument used by the hon. Gentleman about the stealing of a lemonade bottle; because, clearly, although of a potentially serious character, larceny, it is, nevertheless, a case of a trivial character. It would be dealt with under new Clause 1 and would not be caught by this Amendment. The Clause which the Government have themselves introduced automatically puts in a procedure which would keep any frivolous or any slight case out of the criminal charge procedure altogether. Thus we have already built in—as it were, accidentally, because the Government have put it in—just the sort of distinction which we are seeking to make between the serious and the frivolous.

I must say to the hon. Gentleman that we intend to divide on this issue because we feel it to be a matter of very real importance. He has listened to the debate, and he must realise that this feeling of its importance is shared widely among hon. Members on both sides of the House, and also the feeling that it is an illogical situation in which we are putting the law if we put homicide in a category different from that of some other offences in this respect. I hope that the Government, whatever position they take about it this evening, will look extremely carefully at this point, because it really is essential that in these matters the law should stand on a firm basis of sense, and, as drafted, the Bill in this respect does not so stand.

Question put, That the Amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 121, Noes 186.

Division No. 235.] AYES [9.49 p.m.
Astor, John Biffen, John Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward
Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n) Biggs-Davison, John Brinton, Sir Tatton
Balniel, Lord Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay) Black, Sir Cyril Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm) Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.) Bullus, Sir Eric
Buck, Antony (Colchester) Berry, Hn. Anthony Boyd-CarPenter, Rt. Hn. John
Burden, F. A. Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford) Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.) Jennings, J. C. (Burton) Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn) Jopling, Michael Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Carlisle, Mark Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Clark, Henry King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.) Russell, Sir Ronald
Clegg, Walter Kitson, Timothy Scott, Nicholas
Costain, A. P. Knight, Mrs. Jill Sharples, Richard
Cunningham, Sir Knox Lane, David Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)
Dance, James Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry Silvester, Frederick
Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford) Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland) Sinclair, Sir George
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton) Longden, Gilbert Speed, Keith
Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.) MacArthur, Ian Stainton, Keith
Errington, Sir Eric McNair-Wilson, Michael Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.
Eyre, Reginald McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest) Tapsell, Peter
Fortescue, Tim Marten, Neil Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)
Glover, Sir Douglas Maude, Angus Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)
Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B. Mewby, Ray Temple, John M.
Gower, Raymond Miscampbell, Norman Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret
Grant-Ferris, R. Monro, Hector Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.
Grieve, Percy Montgomery, Fergus Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John
Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds) More, Jasper Vickers, Dame Joan
Hall, John (Wycombe) Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh) Waddington, David
Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh) Morrison, Charles (Devizes) Walker, Peter (Worcester)
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury) Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek
Harrison, Brian (Malden) Murton, Oscar Walters, Dennis
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye) Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael Ward, Dams Irene
Hastings, Stephen Onslow, Cranley Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel Page, Graham (Crosby) Wiggin, A. W.
Hiley, Joseph Page, John (Harrow, W.) Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Hill, J. E. B. Percival, Ian Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard
Holland, Philip Pink, R. Bonner Worsley, Marcus
Hordern, Peter Pounder, Rafton
Hornby, Richard Prior, J. M. L. TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Howell, David (Guildford) Pym, Francis Mr. Anthony Grant and
Iremonger, T. L. Rees-Davies, W. R. Mr. Bernard Weatherill.
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye) Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David
NOES
Abse, Leo Dunnett, Jack Lipton, Marcus
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.) Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e) Loughlin, Charles
Alldritt, Walter Eadle, Alex Luard, Evan
Anderson, Donald Edwards, William (Merioneth) Lubbock, Eric
Archer, Peter Ellis, John Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Armstrong, Ernest English, Michael Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)
Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw) Ensor, David Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.) Evans, Fred (Caerphilly) McCann, John
Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham) Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley) MacDermot, Niall
Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice Fernyhough, E. McGuire, Michael
Bagier, Gordon A. T. Fletcher, Ted (Darlington) Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)
Barnett, Joel Fowler, Gerry Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)
Bidwell, Sydney Fraser, John (Norwood) Maclennan, Robert
Binns, John Freeson, Reginald MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)
Blackburn, F. Ginsburg, David McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, c.)
Booth, Albert Gregory, Arnold McNamara, J. Kevin
Bradley, Tom Griffiths, David (Rother Valley) Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)
Bray, Dr. Jeremy Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside) Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D. Grimond, Rt. Hn. J. Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan) Hamilton, James (Bothwell) Manuel, Archie
Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.) Hamilton, William (Fife, W.) Marks, Kenneth
Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury) Hamling, William Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert
Buchan, Norman Harper, Joseph Mendelson, John
Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn) Harrison, Walter (Wakefield) Millan, Bruce
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.) Hazell, Bert Milne, Edward (Blyth)
Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James Heffer, Eric S. Mitchell, R. c. (S'th'pton, Test)
Carmichael, Neil Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret Molloy, William
Carter-Jonss, Lewis Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas Moonman, Eric
Coe, Denis Howell, Denis (Small Heath) Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)
Coleman, Donald Howie, W. Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
Concannon, J. D. Hoy, James Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
Conlan, Bernard Huckfield, Leslie Moyie, Roland
Crawshaw, Richard Hughes, Roy (Newport) Neal, Harold
Dalyell, Tam Hunter, Adam Newens, Stan
Davidson, Arthur (Accrington) Hynd, John Ogden, Eric
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.) Irvine, Sir Arthur (Edge Hill) Oram, Albert E.
Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford) Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak) Orbach, Maurice
Davies, Ifor (Gower) Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.) Orme, Stanley
Delargy, Hugh Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.) Oswald, Thomas
Dell, Edmund Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West) Owen, Will (Morpeth)
Dempsey, James Kelley, Richard Paget, R. T.
Diamond, Rt. Hn. John Kenyon, Clifford Palmer, Arthur
Dickens, James Lawson, George Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles
Dobson, Ray Leadbitter, Ted Parker, John (Dagenham)
Doig, Peter Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton) Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)
Pavitt, Laurence Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney) Walker, Harold (Doncaster)
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne) Wallace, George
Pentland, Norman Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.) Watkins, David (Consett)
Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.) Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford) Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)
Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.) Silverman, Julius Wellbeloved, James
Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E. Slater, Joseph Whitaker, Ben
Price, Christopher (Perry Barr) Small, William Whitlock, William
Price, Thomas (Westhoughton) Spriggs, Leslie Wilkins, W. A.
Price, William (Rugby) Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, w.) Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)
Probert, Arthur Taverne, Dick Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
Rees, Merlyn Thomas, Rt. Hn. George Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)
Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.) Thomson, Rt. Hn. George Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)
Rodgers, William (Stockton) Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy Winstanley, Dr. M. p.
Roebuck, Roy Tinn, James Woof, Robert
Ross, Rt. Hn. William Tuck, Raphael
Rowlands, E. Varley, Eric G. TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Ryan, John Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley) Mr. Alan Fitch and
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.) Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley) Mr. Neil McBride.
Sheldon, Robert
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