HC Deb 05 April 1935 vol 300 cc753-61

3.2 p.m.

Mr. MORGAN JONES

I beg to move, in page 137, line 7, to leave out Sub-section (1).

The effect of Clause 247, as I understand it, is that no civil posts of a certain grade can be abolished if that abolition involves adversely some person or persons. There are certain exceptions to that rule. I am not quite sure what the words" "adversely affect" mean precisely. I think I recall that in the Joint Select Committee there was some sort of discussion concerning this question of guaranteeing to people their right of promotion. If their promotion was jeopardised, then the subject of compensation to them would have to be considered. Would it be argued that the words "adversely affect" could be interpreted in this way? Suppose that the holder of a post had vacated it and that the authorities then decided not to fill up the post would not the words "adversely affected" be then properly interpreted as meaning that by not keeping that post open a second person who ordinarily would be promoted to that chief post would lose by it?

The point we have in mind is just this. Everybody knows that the cost of the Services in India—I am speaking from the Indian point of view—is deemed to be somewhat heavy. There are British officers and Indians. The scale of salaries is based on what is deemed to be appropriate to a Britisher occupying a given post, and because of the difficulty of making any differentiation the Indian officers are paid on the same basis. If the Services were wholly Indian it might very well be that the rate of salary would be much less. Suppose that the Indian Ministry desire to effect an economy by not filling up a post that has become vacant. Surely there ought to be no impediment placed in the way of their realising that ambition by not filling up a post. But clearly, if the interpretation that I have just given to the words "adversely affect" is the proper interpretation that cannot be done, because it would affect the prospects of the person next in seniority, as it were. We think that to lay down a hard and fast rule such as this in the terms of an Act of Parliament is a little hard and does unduly hamper the future Indian Ministry, either at the Centre or in the Provinces. We think, therefore, that Sub-section (1) of this Clause ought not to be entertained. The exception, of course, is provided for here that in the case of a Federal Government it can be abolished with the consent of the Governor-General exercising his individual judgment, and in the case of a Provincial Government by the Governor exercising his individual judgment. That is to say that, although the Ministry at the Centre recommends the Governor-General to do this, not to fill up a post in this instance, he is not obliged to do it, and so the Ministry is to that degree restricted in the measure of freedom which it can exercise.

3.5 p.m.

Sir S. HOARE

After the explanation that I shall give I hope that the hon. Member will not feel it necessary to press this Amendment. The Clause deals with existing officials in these various classes. Many of them will be Indians. It was felt, quite rightly, that in a case of existing officials they ought to be guaranteed from their careers being disadvantaged in the same way as we guarantee officials in the other services. That being so, there must be a discretion left somewhere for giving compensation in the event of appointments being abolished on a large scale and the officials careers being as a consequence seriously damaged. The speech of the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. M. Jones) has confirmed me in my view that the way to deal with that situation is the way proposed in this Clause. The lion. Member himself said that you could not have a rigid rule for compensation. I agree. This proposal does not make a rigid rule for compensation. It gives a discretionary power to deal with cases of this kind. Cases of this kind can only be dealt with upon the individual merits of each case. It is impossible for us here and now to lay it down that the abolition of this or that post ought to involve with it the compensation of this or that individual official.

Mr. JONES

I have expressed no objection at all to compensation where a post is abolished. There is no reference to compensation here. The question is as to freedom to abolish a post.

Sir S. HOARE

I was widening the scope of my answer. Just as in the ease of the services, where we are keeping control over the abolition of existing posts, so we feel that in these services we ought to keep similar control over existing officials. That does not tie the Government from making new arrangements for the future, but it does safeguard the position of existing officials in accordance with what, they regard as their contract of service. This is the procedure we have adopted for the Secretary of State's services, and I think it is necessary to adopt it also for these services.

3.9 p.m.

Mr. H. WILLIAMS

I understand, Mr. Chairman, that you are not likely to call an Amendment which I have on the Paper, in page 137, line 17, to leave out "exercising his individual judgment" and to insert "in his discretion". Possibly the Secretary of State would consider this point. This Clause contemplates cases where for one reason or another jobs are to be abolished and the existing holders may be adversely affected. Quite properly the Secretary of State desires to protect them. The Ministers tender advice and the Governor-General or the Governor can refuse to accept that advice. If this Measure is to come into operation we all desire that causes of friction between a Minister and a Governor-General should be reduced to the minimum. Therefore, I believe that the words his individual judgment" should appear in the Bill as seldom as possible. Where a final decision lies with the Governor-General or the Governor of a Province it is better that it should be "in his discretion" and not "in the exercise of his individual judgment." Suppose that the ministers concerned think that some post ought to be abolished. Suppose that Ministers are induced for some reason not of the highest to take that point of view. Let us be frank and admit that all Ministers are from time to time subject to pressure. Suppose that constituency pressure or communal pressure is brought to bear upon Ministers and it is desired to "get at" Mr. So-and-so, and therefore there is a proposal that the post held by Mr. So-and-so should be abolished. We are only dealing with existing posts. It seems to me better that those cases should be taken away from the purview of Ministers, officially at any rate.

There will still be cases of informal discussions between the Governor-General or the Governor and the Ministers, at least in a good government there would be such discussions. But there is all the difference in the world between an informal conversation and a formal tendering of advice, and it is where advice is tendered formally and then rejected that friction will be caused under the new Constitution. In a case where a Governor-General or a Governor is deliberately taking steps to protect an official against what he regards as an improper attack by a Minister, there is the kind of thing which is going to cause friction. This is a transitional Clause, and after a certain number of years it will cease to have any significance. During that transitional period it would be a good thing if these causes of friction did not arise and I ask the Secretary of State to consider the possibility, in the case both of the Centre and the Provinces—because the argument is equally valid as applied to both—that the words 'used should be "in his discretion" and not "in the exercise of his individual judgment."

3.13 p.m.

Sir S. HOARE

I take a somewhat different view from that just expressed by the hon. Member for South Croydon (Mr. H. Williams). I do not think that consultation with a Minister in cases of this kind is likely to lead to more friction. It is likely, rather, to lead to less friction. In cases of this kind the practical proposal is bound to come up through the Minister. I cannot conceive a proposal for the abolition of a post or, it might be, several posts coming up in any other way. If, in practice, the proposal is bound to come from the Minister it is better frankly to accept the fact and I would go so far as to say to welcome the fact, that it should come up as the Minister's opinion. As a result there is much less likelihood of friction than there would be if the Governor attempted to take action without consulting Ministers at all.

3.14 p.m.

Mr. COCKS

The Sub-section covers a wider ground than that suggested by the hon. Member for South Croydon (Mr. H. Williams). It covers not only cases in which the abolition of a post would cause disadvantage to the occupant of that post, but cases in which abolition of a post would adversely affect some junior officer who might in the course of years expect to reach that post. It seems a very wide power to give to the Governor-General or Governor. It means that if a re-organisation of services were desired on grounds of economy or because there was a superfluity of posts he could prevent it as long as there was somebody in that service who might expect in 30 or 40 years time to occupy one of those posts. I do not know where that principle comes from. Surely it is not a principle known to this country. If it were, it would mean that the Board of Admiralty, for instance, would not be able to cut down the number of admirals as it sometimes doest because there was a midshipman in the Navy who might rise to that position in a certain number of years' time. Nobody would ever think of compensating the midshipman in such a case for loss of his prospective advancement. We know very well that if services are re-organised there are some who will get disappointment. That is one of the disappointments to which all human beings are liable in this very uncertain, changeable, and disappointing world, but people have to put up with it. If the Ministers think that certain posts should be abolished, I think the Government should accept their opinion. I am not saying that people should not be compensated, but I am saying that reorganisation should not be prevented on those very wide grounds.

Amendment negatived.

3.17 p.m.

Mr. BUTLER

I beg to move, in page 137, line 10, after "II", to insert: "a Railway Service Class I, a Railway Service Class II."

This Amendment and the next one which I shall move are purely drafting Amendments. The reason we are including them here is that railway services are classified under a separate set of rules from those of a central service proper, and therefore it is more accurate to refer to them in this way.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: In line 24, after "I", insert to a Railway Service Class I" —[ Mr. Butler.]

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

Mr. MORGAN JONES

May we have a reply from the Government on the point put by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxstowe (Mr. Cocks) with regard to Sub-section (1) of this Clause? What precedent is there for this provision for safeguarding the prospective advancement of some junior person some 30 or 40 years hence, as is obviously implied in this Sub-section?

3.18 p.m.

Sir S. HOARE

It always has been, or at least it has been for many years, a principle of Indian government. I suppose it came about as a result of the big changes that have taken place. I think the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones) will agree that, supposing the whole of the superior persons in a particular service had been abolished, they would obtain compensation. That shows that we must deal with these cases on the merits of each case. I would agree with him that it would be altogether illegitimate for some newly joined official to obtain compensation because six posts at the top of the service had been abolished. You have to judge, on the merits of each particular case, whether, in the first place, the official has been damaged and, secondly, whether his damage has been of such a kind as to be susceptible to compensation. That is the way in which we are working in the Secretary of State's services, and in the condition contemplated, namely, that there may be changes in the near or distant future, there is bound to be a principle of this kind.

3.20 p.m.

Mr. MORGAN JONES

I can understand that in individual cases there should be compensation, but that is not quite the point which we are raising. The point is the freedom of the Government to reorganise if they see fit. I know from my own experience that if the headship of a department becomes vacant, the next person in the department does not always get it. If the head of the Treasury becomes vacant it does not follow that the next person succeeds. We often transfer a person. Why, therefore, is it assumed that the second person in seniority has automatically some sort of claim to the reversion of the post? Surely that is very hampering to the Government when they approach the problem of re-organisation in order to get better government. We still maintain our objection to the Sub-section, although we cannot carry it to a Division.

3.22 p.m.

Mr. H. WILLIAMS

Owing to the absence of some of my friends, the Amendment which you called, Sir Dennis, was not moved. It was in page 137, line 34, at the end, to insert: (3) If by reason of anything done under this section any person mentioned therein is adversely affected in any way such person or his representatives shall be entitled to receive from the revenues of the Federation or as the case may be, the revenues of a Province such compensation as the Governor-General in his discretion or, as the case may be, the Governor in his discretion may consider just and equitable. (4) Any sum payable under this section from the revenues of the Federation or the revenues of, a Province shall be charged on the revenues of the Federation or, as the case may be, that Province. I would like to ask the Secretary of State what is in contemplation in connection with this Clause. I was somewhat impressed by the remarks of the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks). There are two distinct issues in this Clause, namely, the position of a man holding a post which is abolished, and the heirship to that post, as it were. They are two different categories. If a man takes a post he may have hopes that he will reach an exalted position, but if the position is abolished and he cannot get there, he has no grievance unless there is some contract. That is one of the chances that has to be taken in life. On the other hand, I am not clear from the Clause what happens to the man who is the holder of an existing past. Those who take part in these Debates must from time to time make mistakes, because this Bill is so great that it is almost impossible for any of us to keep in our minds all the various Clauses, and it may be that under some other Clause there is protection for such people.

If this Amendment had been moved, we should have had from the Secretary of State an explanation of what will happen to the people who are what I call legitimately prejudiced, as distinct from those mentioned by the hon. Member for Broxtowe, who are what I would call very remotely prejudiced. If, as a result of an international conference, we built no more battleships of 25,000 tons, it would mean that no midshipman could ever command a battleship of that size, but he would have no grievance, because policy had decided that there should be no more battleships of that size. There is a difference between (men hoping for promotion six months hence and the lately joined recruit who would not have got to a high post for 25 years more. I would like the Secretary of State to tell us, assuming this Act comes into operation while he is still Secretary of State and therefore in a position to deal with the Governor-General or the Governor when they are acting in their discretion, and the rest of it, exactly how he thinks this will work out. I know that what he says is not binding, but it will nevertheless be an indication of what is intended in practice by this Clause.

3.25 p.m.

Sir S. HOARE

There are, generally speaking, two classes of officials. In the case of the Secretary of State's services the Secretary of State will have to take each case on its merits and give compensation with the concurrence of his service advisers. In the other cases, I imagine the Federal Government will adopt the same principle, and under Sub-section (3) of Clause 238 we give them the power to take this course. Sub-section (3) of Clause 238 together with this Clause which we are now considering and under which we are giving protection to existing holders, will, I am informed, make suitable provision.

Mr. WILLIAMS

It is not votable expenditure under Clause 238.

Sir S. HOARE

I am not sure whether it would be non-votable expenditure under Clause 238, because it would emanate from the Federal Government, but Clause 238, together with Clause 247 —Clause 247 making the position of existing holders secure—does, I think, make the position quite safe.

Question, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill," put, and agreed to.

Clause 248 ordered to stand part of the Bill.