§ This problem was considered very closely by the Military Staff at Versailles, and I think it is right, in justice to them, to point out that, after very close study of the German position and of the probabilities of the case, they came to the conclusion—and they stated their conclusion to the military representatives and to the Ministers in the month of January or the beginning of February—that the attack would come south of Arras, that it would be an attack on a very wide front, that it would be an attack on the widest front that has ever yet been assailed, that the Germans would accumulate ninety-five divisions for the purpose of making that attack, that they would throw the whole of their force and their strength into breaking the British line at that point, that their objective would be the capture of Amiens and the severance of the British and the French forces. That was the conclusion to which Sir Henry Wilson came, and which was submitted at that time—two or three months ago—and I think it is one of the most remarkable forecasts of enemy intentions that has ever been made. As a matter of fact, the attack was made up, I think, by about ninety-seven divisions; it was an attack on the widest front that has ever been engaged; its object undoubtedly was the capture of Amiens and the severance of the British and the French Forces; so that, almost in every detail, that very remarkable forecast has been verified in the event.
§ Mr. BILLINGWere preparations made to meet it?
§ The PRIME MINISTERMy hon. Friend must really allow me to speak in my own way. I propose to give a narra- 1341 tive of the events as they happened. Another remarkable prediction was that it might probably succeed in penetrating the British line to the extent of half the distance of the front attacked. They came to that conclusion from a close examination of the offensives of the War.
There was another advantage, and here I come to the point raised by my hon. Friend below the Gangway (Mr. Lynch). There was, first of all, the advantage which the Germans had from having the initiative. There was the further advantage they had—and this is undoubtedly the greatest advantage—from having a united Command opposed to a dual one. The Germans undoubtedly relied on this to a very large extent for their success. They owe much of their success in this attack to unity. It was reported to me on good authority that the Kaiser informed the ex-King Constantine, "I shall beat them, for they have no united Command," which shows that that was what they were relying in the main upon—that, although their numbers were slightly inferior, they knew the importance to be attached to the fact that there was a perfectly united Command. And that is an obvious advantage, for if the risks in one particular part of the line be great and in another part of the line great but substantially less than in the former, with one Command, there is no hesitation in the mind of a Commander-in-Chief as to which risk he will make the greatest provision against. With two separate Commands the problem is a different one. It is more difficult to adjust the balance of risk, and a general is always naturally inclined to give to himself and his army the benefit of any doubt there may be, because if anything should go wrong there he, and he alone, will beheld responsible by his own countrymen for the safety of the army.
The enemy had another incidental, but, as it turned out, a very important advantage—that of the weather. The exceptional weather favoured his designs. It was both dry and misty. The attack which succeeded was made on a part of the line where, under ordinary spring conditions, the ground would have been almost impassable. A wounded officer told a friend of mine to-day, a general, that tinder ordinary conditions no one could walk across the part which was traversed by the Germans this time of the year. But it just happened to be absolutely dry and firm, and they were enabled to walk across the ground, which no one had any 1342 right to expect at this time of year would be in that condition. Not only that, but the fact that it was warm increased the mist, and the Germans were in some parts actually within a few yards of our front line before anyone knew of their approach—it was quite impossible to observe them. This was a special disadvantage to us, inasmuch as our scheme of organisation in that particular part of the line depended largely upon cross-line fire of machine guns and artillery. They had therefore that very special advantage, of which they made the fullest use.
With regard to the battle itself, as I have already stated, it will take some time to ascertain the whole of the facts. At one time it was undoubtedly very critical. The enemy broke through between our Third and Fifth Armies, and there was a serious gap. The situation was retrieved owing to the magnificent conduct of our troops. They retired in perfectly good order, re-establishing the junction between the two armies, and frustrating the enemy's purpose. The House can hardly realise, and certainly cannot sufficiently thank—nor can the country—the troops for their superb valour and the grim tenacity with which they faced the overwhelming hordes of the enemy and clung to their positions. They retired, but were never routed, and once more the cool pluck of the British soldier that refuses to acknowledge defeat saved Europe.