§ The PRIME MINISTERWhen I am referring to the Army, I am referring to the whole Army—generals, officers, and soldiers—I mean the whole Army, and I draw no distinction. Their conduct has been one of incredible courage, and great coolness under the most trying conditions. I do not think any distinction can be drawn between officers and men. I am referring to the British Army and that means all. I might specially refer to what one brigadier-general did—some reference has been made in the Press already to it—where at one point there was a serious gap which might have let the enemy into Calais, and in the confusion of retreat things of that kind happen on a very wide front. He gathered together signalmen, engineers, a Labour Battalion, odds and ends of machine gunners—everybody he could find—and threw them into 1343 the line and held up the German Army, and closed up that gap on the way to Amiens for about six days.
§ Sir HERBERT NIELDName!
§ The PRIME MINISTERBrigadier-General Carey. I think he deserves special mention, for one of the most brilliant achievements in the history of the British Army.
§ The PRIME MINISTERIf I were to name all the generals who have distinguished themselves in this battle, it would take me a very long time to deal with them. Until the whole of the circumstances which led to the retirement of the Fifth Army, and its failure to hold the line of the Somme at least till the Germans brought up their guns, and perhaps the failure adequately to destroy the bridges—until all these are explained, it would be unfair to censure the general in command of the Army—General Gough. But until those circumstances are cleared up, it would be equally unfair to the British Army to retain his services in the field.
§ Mr. T. M. HEALYIs he to be court-martialled?
§ 4.0 P.M.
§ The PRIME MINISTERIt was necessary to recall him until the facts have bean fully ascertained, and laid before the Government by their military advisers. After the retirement of the Fifth Army, the French Reserves came up with remarkable rapidity, when their position before the battle is borne in mind. In fact, when the final decision was taken as to the real designs of the enemy, the speed with which the French Reserves were brought up is one of the most remarkable feats of organisation in this War. And between the courage of our troops and the handling of the Army, the way the Third Army held, never giving way 100 yards to the attack of the enemy—I think it is right that that should be said about the Army commanded by General Byng. Their retirement took place in order to conform to a retreat on their right flank—what between the efforts of our soldiers, and the loyal assistance given, in the true spirit of comradeship, by the French Army, the position is, for the moment, stabilised. But it is clear that the Germans, having gained an initial success, are preparing another—perhaps even a 1344 greater —attack on the Allied Armies. The result of the fighting up to the present is that the enemy has undoubtedly obtained a great initial success. There is no good in not accepting facts. It is from; this basis that we must begin to build. But he has failed so far in his main object. He has failed to capture Amiens. He has failed to separate the British and French Armies. But we should be guilty of a great, it might be a fatal, error if we were to underestimate the gravity of the prospect. The enemy has captured valuable ground, which is too near Amiens for comfort or security, and he has succeeded, for the time being, in crippling one of our great Armies