§ The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Lloyd George)I beg to move, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make further provision with regard to military service during the present War."
We have entered the most critical phase of this terrible War. There is a lull in the storm, but the hurricane is not over. Doubtless we must expect more fierce outbreaks, and ere it is finally exhausted there will be many more. The fate of the Empire, the fate of Europe, and the fate of liberty throughout the world, may depend on the success with which the very last of these attacks is resisted and countered. The Government, therefore, propose to submit to Parliament, to-day, certain recommendations, in order to assist this country and the Allies to weather the storm. They will involve, I regret, extreme sacrifices on the part of large classes of the population, and nothing would justify them but the most extreme necessity, and the fact that we are fighting for all that is essential and most sacred in the national life.
Before I come to the circumstances which have led up to our submitting these proposals to Parliament, I ought to say one word as to why Parliament was not immediately summoned. Since the battle began, the Government have been engaged almost every hour in concerting, with the Allies, the necessary measures to assist the Armies to deal with the emergency. The proposals which we intend submitting to Parliament required very close and careful examination, and I think there is this advantage in our meeting to-day, rather than immediately after the impact of the German attack, that we shall be considering these proposals under conditions which will be far removed from any suggestion of panic.
I shall now come to the circumstances which have led up to the present military position. It is very difficult at this time to present a clear, connected and reliable narrative of what happened. There has been a great battle on a front of fifty miles—the greatest battle ever 1338 fought in the history of the world. Enormous forces have been engaged. There was a considerable retirement on the part of the British forces, and, under these conditions, it is not always easy for some time to ascertain what actually happened. The House will recollect the difficulty we experienced in regard to Cambrai. It was difficult to piece together the story of that event for some time, and Cambrai was a very trivial event compared with this gigantic battle. The generals and their staffs are naturally engaged, and have to concentrate their attention upon, the operations of the enemy, and until the strain relaxes it would be very difficult to institute the necessary inquiries to find out exactly what happened, and to furnish an adequate explanation of the battle. However, there are two or three facts which stand out, and in stating them I should like to call attention to two things which I think, above all, must be avoided. The first is that nothing should be said which would give information to the enemy; nothing should be said which would give encouragement to the enemy; and nothing should be said which would give discouragement to our own troops, who are fighting so gallantly at this very hour. And the second fact is that all recrimination at this hour must be shut out. [An HON. MEMBER: "And all prejudices!"] I can assure the hon. Gentleman that there is no one here afraid of criticism, and he understands the responsibility of the present Government.
What was the position at the beginning of the battle? Notwithstanding the heavy casualties in 1917, the Army in France was considerably stronger on the 1st January, 1918, than on the 1st January, 1917. Up to the end of 1917—up to, say, about October or November—the German combatant strength in France was as two to the Allied three. Then came the military collapse of Russia, when the Germans hurried up their released divisions from the Eastern Front, and brought them to the West. They had a certain measure of Austrian support, which had been accorded then. Owing to the growth of the strength of our Armies in 1917. when this battle began, the combatant strength of the whole of the German Army on the Western Front was only approximately, though not quite, equal to the total combatant strength of the 1339 Allies. In Infantry they were slightly inferior; in Artillery they were inferior; in Cavalry they were considerably inferior; and, what is very important, they were undoubtedly inferior in aircraft.
§ The PRIME MINISTERI am coming to all that. The Germans, therefore, organised their troops so as to produce a larger number of divisions out of the slightly smaller number of Infantry and the slightly smaller number of guns. They had fewer battalions in a division—fewer men in a battalion. That is entirely a question of organisation, and it yet remains to be seen that their organisation is better than ours. It is necessary to explain that, in order that the House may realise why, with approximately the same number of men, the Germans have a larger number of divisions on that front. According to all the facts which have come to hand as to the losses of the battle, that roughly represents the relative strength of the combatants on both sides at this moment.
The Germans had, however, one or two important advantages. The first, the initial, advantage, which is always commanded by the offensive, is that they know where they mean to attack They choose the ground, they choose the location, they know the width of the attack, they know the dimensions of the attack, they know the time of the attack, and they know the method of the attack. All that invariably gives an initial advantage to an offensive. The defence has a general advantage. Owing to air observation, concealment is difficult. At the same time, in spite of all that, owing to the power of moving troops at night, which the Germans exercised to a very large extent, there is a large margin for surprise even in spite of air observation, and of this the enemy took full advantage.
I should like to say one word here as to the difficulty with which the Allied generals were confronted in this respect. Before the battle the greatest German concentration was in front of our troops. That was no proof that the full weight of the attack would fall on us. There was a very large concentration opposite the French lines; there was a very considerable concentration—I am referring now to German reserves—on the northern part of our line after the 1340 battle began. Immediately before the battle the Germans by night brought their divisions from the northern part to the point where the attack took place. They also brought several divisions from opposite the French in the same way, and brought them to our front; but it would have been equally easy for them, whilst concentrating troops opposite our front, to manœuvre them in the same way opposite the French.
I am only referring to that in order to show how exceedingly difficult it is for generals on the defensive to decide exactly where, in their judgment, the attack is coming, and where they ought to concentrate their reserves.