§ 2. Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £40,830, be granted to His Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1909, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Department of His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs."
§ *MR. A. PONSONBY (Stirling Burghs)said that he desired to raise a question in the sphere of foreign politics, which was of the greatest importance at the present time. He alluded to the state of affairs in Turkey, especially as it affected our policy in Macedonia. It was with a feeling of great embarrassment that he touched upon this subject, not only from the fact that he was addressing the House for the first time, but also because events in that part, of the world had been passing with such surprising rapidity during the last few days that anyone who took a close interest in the foreign politics of Europe was obliged to feel that his views were daily and even hourly undergoing some change or modification. He had intended to raise the question of Macedonia not in any spirit of criticism or even of complaint, but with a view to supporting and encouraging the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary in the attitude he had taken up with regard to affairs in the Balkan Peninsula. And he ventured 940 to choose this subject because three years residence in Constantinople had enabled him to realise how complicated was the path of any Minister and with what difficulties and dangers it was strewed, in any negotiations he had to carry on with the Turkish Government. There were many ways of approaching this intricate problem. Indeed, there were many grounds for forming political opinions on any subject. People built their political opinions on moral foundations, on legal and economic foundations, and on humanitarian foundations; and he thought that those who built their views on humanitarian foundations, although they might sometimes be laughed at for indulging in sentimentality, in the long run, whether they were dealing with problems which concerned our social life at home or with national and international questions, their views were generally found to be disinterested, just, and generous. But it was not only the humanitarian view that had to be considered in regard to this question. The whole problem was fraught with danger and concerned closely the interests of all the great Powers of Europe. Perhaps he might be allowed to allude to matters as they stood before the last two or three weeks had very much altered the state of affairs. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, after two and a half years, finding that no real change had been made and that the situation was really becoming more dangerous, and that the population of that unfortunate country was suffering more and more from misgovernment, drew up 941 a scheme of reforms which met with general approval, and which was submitted first of all to the Russian Government and eventually to be transmitted to the other Powers and ultimately to the Sultan himself. He considered that the scheme which the right hon. Gentleman suggested was one that was moderate and would be effective if it were ever accepted. There was no doubt that there was every justification for taking strong measures, considering that for the last two years, since the promulgation of the Mürsteg programme, there had been absolutely no amelioration; on the contrary, the state of affairs had become considerably worse, and the outrages of the bands had increased. Before attaching blame to any particular section, it must be remembered that retaliation was often more violent than the original act which provoked it, and, to use a phrase employed two or three years ago by the Leader of the Opposition, "the balance of criminality" did not rest with that particular section of the population which was responsible for the greatest number of outrages, but with the authority in whose hands the government or mis-government of the country lay. If the bands of Servians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Albanians had been treated with equal justice, or even with equal severity, a very different state of affairs would have been the consequence. But as those who had studied the problem closely knew well, favour was shown to the Servian and Greek bands in order that they might counteract the encroachments of the Bulgarian bands. He, therefore, insisted that the blame rested on the responsible authority. That was not the Turkish Army. The Turkish Army, if properly officered and with efficient generals, would be, he might say, almost the most formidable Army in the world. The blame did not rest with them, nor with the Sublime Porte. The Sublime Porte only consisted of a number of officials who registered the decrees of the Sultan and who, with all the wiles of Oriental diplomacy, managed to frustrate the demands of the Powers. No, the ultimate authority responsible was the Sultan himself— 942 that strange and, he might say, uncanny personality who, in his cowardly retirement at Yildiz, managed to control the affairs of his country and the destinies of every individual one of his subjects with a control so complete and so absolute that it might be fairly said that no autocrat had ever before managed to get the whole authority centred in his own person to the same extent. It was with the Sultan that they had to deal. He did not wish to elaborate the scheme of reforms of the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary. There were many points in it which might be considered the absolute irreducible minimum for the reform of these provinces. But to what extent was everything changed by the revolution now going on? This revolution had been accomplished very rapidly. To what influence was it to be chiefly attributed? There was no doubt that the Young Turkey movement had had a considerable influence, but he believed the disaffection in the Turkish Army, widespread for so many years, had gradually come to a head, The Young Turkey Party had taken advantage of the opportunity and also of the Albanian national movement. The result was that the Sultan had granted a constitution. He believed that that constitution would be very like the one granted in 1876; it was a ruse on the part of the Sultan in order to tide over an embarrassing moment. He had shown great skill in the past in dealing with all sections of people, with the Armenians, with the Macedonians, and, time after time, with the Powers of Europe, and no doubt in this instance he would know how to deal with his own countrymen and his own race. With the Army against him he knew that resistance was useless, but he would no doubt find means to get them on his side. If, however, this revolution were successful, if it was a great liberal movement which was to result in better treatment being meted out to the Christian subjects of the Sultan, then it would be wrong for us to interfere, and we ought to stand by and look on sympathetically. But he doubted whether it was a movement of that kind, and he thought that in a few months time it 943 would be seen that this concession, given by the Sultan at a time of danger, had not diminished any of Ms power. The Secretary of State when he spoke would be able to tell the Committee what was going on, but in the condition of flux in which Turkey now was it was not likely that the right hon. Gentleman would be able to outline any definite policy. He himself felt, however, that the right hon. Gentleman's schemes for the reform of Macedonia should not be put aside altogether, but should be kept until a favourable opportunity could be found for putting them forward. When they were pressed he trusted the Government would not assent to any mitigation, weakening, or whittling down which would have the effect of rendering them as useless as many of the reform schemes which had been presented to the Sultan before. He was not a great believer in the Concert of Europe and the concert of ambassadors at Constantinople. Unanimity was apparently the main object, and they were only completely successful if they were absolutely inactive. But if it was intended to work through the Concert, then it should have a conductor, and he suggested that this country could undertake that role better than any other Power, because we had a high reputation for disinterestedness and for being the champions of international justice. When he travelled in Turkey he had been received with embarrassing cordiality, not because he was attached to the Embassy, but because he was an Englishman. The light hon. Gentleman would know how and when to press his schemes and there was no one who enjoyed greater confidence or who was supported by a more powerful public opinion than the right hon. Gentleman who now occupied the position of Secretary of State. Before concluding, he might be allowed to refer to the misgovernment in another great Empire, namely, Russia, and he would, with all respect, urge the right hon. Gentleman to remember that even in an Empire where we were not bound by treaty obligations and where there could be no question of our interfering with the internal affairs, the heartfelt sympathy of the British people was on the side of 944 the oppressed and not on the side of the oppressor, and any attempt on our part to condone, even by expressions of official cordiality, the misdeeds and unjustifiable cruelties of an authority who must be held responsible for the misgovernment and persecution, would not be approved by the people of this country who were lovers of justice and political liberty.
§ Mr. LYNCH (Yorkshire, W.R., Ripon)said the questions which he desired to raise were on two subjects which were most prominent on the political stage to-day. They were Persia and Macedonia. What was the paramount interest of Great Britain in Macedonia and Persia? In Persia we had great commercial interests. Our trade with that country was in the past greater than that of any other country in the world, and at the present time was only second to that of Russia. We had constructed telegraph lines from one end of the country to the other, and anybody travelling in Persia and taking note of the currency would find that it was issued through a British bank. In Macedonia our commercial interests were small, but in Turkey, of which Macedonia was a part, they were very large, but commercial interests were not the paramount interests of Great Britain either in Macedonia or Persia. Our paramount interest in those countries was to maintain their integrity, to foster so far as that might be possible by a friendly outside Power like ourselves, all the best elements of the population, and to prevent the extension at the expense of those countries of the great military Empires of Europe. Everything that tended, therefore, to strengthen these countries was a British interest. The right hon. Gentleman had put the case extremely well on a previous occasion when speaking on Macedonia. He said that the greatest weakness in Turkey itself was the continuance of the Macedonian difficulty. So long as we held India on the one hand and Egypt on the other this country could not afford to be indifferent to the conditions of the population of those countries that lay between. Should those conditions become bad and the population suffer from any cause whatsoever; 945 should the Governments which ruled over them become indebted to a large extent either to the Government or concession hunters of any particular country, the result must be that the country would come under foreign control. They might lose their own native resources and strength and the tendency would be for a great military Empire to approach ever nearer to our borders of India and Egypt. It might be asked how we were going to prevent the great military Powèrs of Europe extending into these countries. That was a difficult question to answer, and he certainly would not argue that it was possible for a country with resources like ours single-handed to arrest the aggression of great military Empires in these countries. What he would urge was that we should do nothing by our diplomacy to assist them in that direction. On two occasions in recent history we had so assisted. We assisted in 1902 when we refused a loan to Persia at a high rate of interest on excellent security. From that refusal dated the Russian predominance in Persia, and all those deplorable events which had recently happened in that country, including our exclusion from the paramount position which we had previously occupied. Only last year there was another question which had a great influence in the same direction, he alluded to the concession of 3 per cent. Customs. He had never concealed his admiration for the manner in which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had conducted the later stages of those negotiations. His hands were, he had no doubt, in a sense tied by the action of his predecessor, but he did say that the grant of this 3 per cent, had had the effect of releasing other revenues for the purpose of the great enterprise of the Bagdad Railway, and this concession on our part had been rightly made if "the result was to promote that railway, but it had been a very powerful factor in bringing about the financial relation of Turkey with Germany, and the extension of German influence over that country. With regard to the question of Macedonia, which was raised by his hon. friend the Member for Stirling Burghs, how did the matter stand at the present day? After nearly five years of so-called reforms, 946 after the programme of reforms introduced in 1902, the condition of Macedonia was now actually worse than it was before the Powers ever put their hands to the plough. If he merely took the period—and he only did so because it was a convenient measure of time for hon. Members — during which the present Parliament had sat, a period of about two and a half years, no less than 5,000 people out of a population of 2,000,000 had met with violent deaths in Macedonia. The figure was even possibly higher. Now the blame for this state of things had been thrown upon the bands, but the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, in a memorable speech some years ago seemed to attribute the blame to the bands by a phrase which had been quoted by his friend, the phrase about "the balance of criminally." He did not know whether that view would be fought shy of to-day. But the bands were small, and had very little to do with the real cause. What was the real cause? Obviously it was careless government on the part of the Turkish Government. And it was more than that—it was the refusal both on the part of the population of Macedonia and on the part of the adjacent Balkan States to recognise the seriousness of the reforms introduced by the Powers. The Macedonian peasant had to get their living in the adjacent States, and on the other hand the people of those States saw what was going on in Macedonia. The Macedonian peasant contrasted his lot with that of his brother or his cousin who lived under a very much happier state of things in the adjacent States, and the people themselves saw that anarchy was proceeding in Macedonia. They had no confidence in the reforms, and therefore they were all engaged among one another in pegging out their claims. He thought that he had a perfect right to say that the bands were not the cause of the state of things in Macedonia, but were merely a symptom of that state of things. What had the Powers done? They had combined to introduce the machinery of reform, but they had altogether omitted to supply the motive power. The machinery of reform they had put down in the shape of some forty 947 military officers who represented the Powers, the gendarmerie, the civil agents, and the financial advisers who proferred advice to the Turkish Inspector-General. But they had never supplied the motive power, that was to say, they had never given these officers or these civil agents any real executive control of the affairs of Macedonia. These officers ate out their hearts in the wild mountains of Macedonia. He had sat with them; he had enjoyed their hospitality; and he had found that one and all said that they regarded it as disgraceful to the Powers of Europe that they should send their officers to Macedonia on such a purposeless errand. They had no power; and their superiors at Salonika, the financial and civil agents, were always thwarted by the counsels which prevailed in Macedonia and at Yildiz Kiosk, where the Sultan had control. He had preached from this text whenever he mentioned the subject of Macedonia; therefore, he was delighted when he heard the debate of 25th February, and these remarkable words of the right hon. Gentleman—
With things as they are in Macedonia, anything which is less than a real remedy can be but little better than a farce.That was a sentiment with which he found himself in complete agreement. What was the real remedy? His hon. friends opposite were, at all events, deeply interested to find a real remedy. There were two alternative remedies which they might adopt. One was that they might copy the example of the Ottoman Public, Debt Commission, an institution controlled by Europeans working with native officials, and which had produced the most admirable results without in any, way offending the susceptibilities of the people. They might follow that precedent, and they might grant an executive to the financial Commission which they had already established. Or, they might keep the Financial Commission as they kept the gendarmerie officers, to assist the Turkish officials, and they might appoint a Turkish governor with the consent of all the Powers, for a definite period of years, to be irremovable without their consent, and to have a pension on retirement. That was the alternative 948 remedy, and it was a remedy suggested, by the right hon. Gentleman in that memorable speech of 25th February. Personally he cared little or nothing which remedy it was they adopted, and he thought that his hon. friends opposite would agree with him in that matter. But what they wanted to-night was this. If this were the real remedy, as he had every reason to believe that it was, why had there been this intolerable delay in putting it into operation? Why, the proposal to appoint a Turkish Governor responsible to the Powers was a proposal which dated from the time Lord Lansdowne was in office—before the present Government came into power. He thought they had a right to ask why it had taken all this time to put the proposal into practice. The right hon. Gentleman had told them, by way of explanation, in the debate of 25th February, that the delay was due, at all events in part, to the exhaustion which was felt by the Powers after the naval demonstration of 1905. He was in complete agreement with him. He knew that the feeling of exhaustion was apparent, and that it was difficult to do anything with the Powers, in that frame of mind. He did not traverse that at all. But what he did say was that, since that naval demonstration of 1905, two very important things had occurred. Two weapons had been placed in the hands of the right hon. Gentleman which were not in the possession of his predecessor, Lord Lansdowne. On the one hand we had given our consent to the increase of the Customs, and he really thought that we might have obtained at that time a greater reform; we might have obtained the real reform of which the right hon. Gentleman had spoken in February last; or else we might have refused to penalise our trade by consenting to the Turkish revenue being reduced. Then again, about a year ago was concluded a very notable Convention with Russia—the Anglo-Russian Convention. Russia, as the House knew, was one of the Powers which would have sway in the Macedonian question. In September of last year we concluded that Convention, and 949 what had we given to Russia under it? We gave her a large part of Persia for her commercial exploitation—in fact, the greater part of Persia. We gave her equal rights with ourselves in Tibet, though the Russian territory did not adjoin Tibet, but was hundreds of miles away. In Afghanistan we gave Russia the privilege of sending commercial agents to that country, and we even engaged that Russian goods should be admitted into Afghan on the same terms as ours, though Afghan goods, if they wished them to penetrate into Russia, had to pay enormous duties. All these were concessions, which to anybody who had considered the subject were undoubtedly great. The concessions made to Russia under the Convention were great and far-reaching, and the House were led to hope that we should be able to work with Russia in a much more friendly way towards the solution of the many problems in which both countries were interested, and they had a right to expect some consideration from Russia in settling such questions as the Macedonian question in a thorough-going way. The debate in which the right hon. Gentleman enunciated his real remedy, a Turkish governor, took place on 25th February. On 12th March in answer to the hon. Member for Tottenham he said a despatch had been addressed to the Powers putting forward the views of His Majesty's Government. On 23rd July, many months afterwards, he put a similar Question and the right hon. Gentleman told him that only a part of his proposals had been submitted to the Powers at all. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would explain the discrepancy between these two answers. He understood that the present position of the matter was this. We had made a proposal to the Powers for the organisation of a flying-column to hunt the bands; and the other proposals, a Turkish Governor responsible to the Powers, the retention of the financial delegates, placing them on terms of equality with the civil agents, and that the civil expenditure should be made a first charge upon the Macedonian Budget, he understood would follow later, and so far as he could judge from the newspapers, 950 they were likely to be submitted not by ourselves, but by the Russian Government. He would like to know why there had been all this delay in dealing with these proposals. He hoped the Russian Government would not allege, as was alleged by certain Russian newspapers, that any delay was necessary owing to recent events in Macedonia. He saw no reason why the movement which had set the Army in a position of power in Macedonia should in any way delay the presentation of the formal proposal. He could understand that it might delay the proposal for the hunting of the bands, because after all the bands had fraternised with the Army apparently, and there was no reason at the present moment for organising a force against them. But surely those who led the Young Turkey movement, and who had established themselves in a position of supreme power in certain districts of Macedonia, would not be averse to adopting the real remedy enunciated by the right hon. Gentleman. He thought one of the main contributory causes to the liberation of Turkey which had just taken place had been the presence in Macedonia of the foreign gendarmerie officers and the civil agents. The Turkish officers had seen among them a number of officers from various other Powers, well paid, well clothed, men who really enjoyed a position which inspired respect. They had also seen a great improvement in the collection of taxes, and he was sure this result, at all events, was due to the excellent work which had been done by the European members of the Financial Commission, which he did not wish to disparage in any way. He was loth to believe now that they had established themselves in a position of power, that they would be anxious to rid themselves of all these foreign institutions at a moment's notice. He should think they would rather be disposed to accept gladly the right hon. Gentleman's real remedy to see a Turkish governor set up in Macedonia, practically independent of the central Government in Constantinople. It was true they hoped to reform the Government as a whole, but, if they did, Macedonia, where the Christian population were double the Mussulmen, 951 must always present a special problem which would have to be treated in a special way. He could not help thinking that the wisdom of those who controlled the new movement in Turkey would for all those reasons accept the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman without demur and put it loyally into execution, and that when they had contrived to govern the country and to profit by the example which had been given them all these proposals could be thrown on one side and Macedonia would be governed by the people to whom it actually belonged. He trusted the right hon. Gentleman would give it to be understood that his consent to the increase of Customs duties would not be granted for more than seven years. The general receipts of the province had increased by £234,000 Turkish within the last two years, and the Financial Commission expected that they would be able still further to increase the revenue by £100,000 Turkish in a year or so. This revenue had not been obtained by grinding down the peasants. On the contrary it had been accompanied by an amelioration of their condition. The way the revenue would be obtained was by forcing the well-to-do taxpayers, who formerly eluded taxation altogether, to make their due contributions to the revenue. The same reform movement which had overspread Macedonia had taken root in Persia, but there it was a popular movement. It did not spring from the Army as in the case of Turkey. The idea of a Persian constitution had become accepted by the people of Persia of all classes, not merely as a political expedient, but as an article of faith. As a result of that they saw the rising into being of a popular assembly, which had been temporarily suppressed, not by influences from within Persia itself, but by Russian influence. On 23rd June the Persian Parliament House was reduced, by the direction of Russian officers, to a mass of ruins. On the day before the Shah held a council With his Russian advisers, and gave orders to the Russian commander to deal with his subjects as he liked. The result was that shell and shrapnel were brought against the Parliament buildings 952 and the adjacent mosque, great bloodshed took place, and the Popular Assembly was suppressed. It could be shown, and it was a matter of some importance that it should be shown, that this action on the part of the Shah was wholly unconstitutional. By Article 45 of the Persian constitution it was provided that the Royal firmans would be sanctioned only when they had received the signature of a responsible Minister. It could not be contended that the suppression of the Popular Assembly was sanctioned by any Minister responsible to the Assembly. It should not be overlooked that in December last, when the Shah for the first time attempted, a coup d'etat against the Parliament, the Legations of Britain and Russia, the two protecting Powers of Persia, pressed their advice upon the Shah to observe his promises to the Popular Assembly. They had, therefore, made themselves parties to the establishment of a constitutional regime in Persia. In July of this year Russian officers or the active list made it possible for this same Shah to break the promises which he made to the Popular Assembly at the instance of the Legations. He thought that was a novel procedure. They had lent British officers, but they had never become a party to a constitutional grievance between a ruler and his people, and then sent their officers to suppress one part of the Agreement, namely, the Popular Assembly. Was that the spirit in which the Anglo-Russian Agreement was to be dealt with? They had been told that much would depend upon the spirit in which it was worked. Was that the spirit? What was the outstanding feature of the Anglo-Russian Agreement? That it was an instrument to maintain the integrity of Persia. It was stated in the preamble that both Powers had mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and the right hon. Gentleman told them, and he was very glad to hear his declaration on the 25th May, in answer to a Question, that the maintenance of the integrity of Persia was one of the principal objects of the Convention. The question he wished to put was, if 953 the maintenance of the integrity of Persia was one of the principal objects of the Convention, how did they propose to maintain that integrity if they allowed the Parliament to be suppressed? The only way in which they could maintain the integrity of a loose organisation in an Oriental country was by assisting the central Government in that country. One of their great difficulties in assisting the Central Government of Persia had always been that the money was paid over to the Shah, and it went into the Royal Treasury to be expended on motor cars, gramaphones and other luxuries. The principal fault was that Parliament had insisted that guarantees should be given for all moneys paid in future to Persia to sec that it was devoted solely to national objects. They could not set Persia on her legs or give that solidarity to the Government which was necessary unless they had a Parliament and somebody who would see to it that the national funds were devoted to national purposes. Some hon. Members, and even the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, might say that it was no business of ours to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia.
§ MR. LYNCHIf by that cheer was meant friendly assistance to the people of Persia then he maintained, and he challenged his hon. friend to contradict him, that foe a period of 100 years they had consistently interfered in the internal affairs of Persia. Every Shah of Persia from the year 1834 had been placed on the throne with British assistance. The Government of Great Britain called in Russia, and the two Governments put the Shah on his throne, or to be more accurate, the Shah came to the throne with the assistance of Russia as well as Great Britain. It was the practice of every Shah of Persia to announce to the two Powers of Russia and England the person he nominated as his successor. Not only had the Powers interfered in the internal affairs of Persia, but they had also stood as sponsors for the National Assembly. 954 The Anglo-Russian Agreement had worked in the spirit of maintaining the National Assembly and not allowing it to be suppressed by the reactionary Power, and in that way they had been maintaining the integrity of Persia. He asked the House to consider the importance to us of Persia in this matter. At the present time Russia possessed the greatest military frontier in the world, and if Russia was to absorb Persia and come down to the line on the map drawn by the Anglo-Russian Convention, they would have a land frontier contiguous with that of Russia for no less than 1,200 miles. Was there any hon. Member of the House who for a moment supposed that this country with its present military resources could defend such a frontier as that? To those hon. Members who were of that opinion he would like to read a short passage from a very important despatch addressed by the Government of India to Lord George Hamilton on 21st September, 1899. This was what the Council of India said—
We desire deliberately to say to your Lordships, with a full consciousness of our responsibility in so saying, that, difficult us we find it in existing circumstances to meet the financial and military strain imposed upon us by the ever increasing proximity of Russian power upon the northern and north-western frontier of India from the Pamirs to Herat, we could not contemplate without dismay the prospect of Russian neighbourhood in Eastern or Southern Persia, the inevitable consequence of which must be a great increase of our own burdens; while the maritime defensibility of India would require to be altogether reconsidered were the dangers of a land invasion to be supplemented by the appearance of a possible antagonist as a naval Power in waters contiguous to Indian shores.The Indian Government, in the full sense of their responsibility, said they could not contemplate without dismay the occupation of those great districts of Persia by Russia. But, supposing another course was adopted and Russia got Persia over to her side and armed the Persian Gulf. He would like to quote on this point the views of the greatest soldier we had ever sent out to those parts, the late General Sir Henry Rawlinson—There are no people in the world who offer better rough material for military purposes than 955 the Persians; the physique of the men is admirable, and their powers of endurance are great; their general intelligence and personal courage are beyond all praise. If the Persian material were placed at the disposal of a European Power who would encourage and take care of the men, and develop their military instincts, a fine working Army, very superior in my opinion, to anything Turkey could produce, might be obtained in a very short period of time.In a lecture in 1858 Sir Henry had previously said that—It was impossible to avoid foreseeing that as any European war becomes developed in the East, the military resources of Persia must be called into action. In fact, it seemed that we could not have a more formidable engine of attack and defence launched against India than a Persian Army commanded by Russian officers. In the same way we could not have a more efficient instrument of defence than the same Army led by British officers, or by officers acting in our interests.Those were weighty words, and he could add nothing to their weight. In the present critical phase of the fortunes of Persia and of British relations with that country he commended those words to the consideration of the Government, of the House, and of the country.
§ *SIR CHARLES W. DILKE (Gloucestershire, Forest of Dean)said that until now the House had not had the opportunity of considering those relations which lay at the very bottom of all these questions. The hon. Member for the Stirling Burghs had expressed his hostility to Russia and the greatest anxiety to concern himself with the internal affairs of that country, and he had expressed the greatest horror of what was going on there; and yet at the same time the hon. Member was supporting Anglo-Russian action in Macedonia. To him it seemed to weaken their policy if it were to be supposed that they were specially inclined to act with Russia only, or, at any rate, specially inclined to act with a group of Powers which invariably excluded one of the great Powers. He spoke with the greatest hesitation upon a subject of extreme delicacy. Personally he had no complaint to make of the language or so far as he knew it of the policy of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in this respect. The speeches which had been made here about the entente with France and its supposed necessary consequence 956 in a certain entente with Russia were correct and generally approved of, and were perfectly consistent with friendly relations with all the Powers. Unfortunately persons were continually writing articles which were supposed to help the policy of this country, and in foreign Parliaments persons made speeches which were supposed to express the foreign policy of this country. It was said that we had succeeded in isolating Germany. He did not in the least impute that to the policy of the Government. He found nothing in the language of his right hon. friend to give ground for that suspicion, but it was most unfortunate that throughout the world that explanation was given of our foreign policy. He was not speaking of the danger of war. He was not one of those who believed in the likelihood of war. He was speaking of the danger, from the point of view of our policy in all parts of the world, of such a belief. As to the entente with France, that it should be closer if possible, and that it should be permanent was desired by all of them, but there were some who wrote as though we had achieved this curious measure of success, that while there was no alliance with France, and while France did not desire a military alliance with us, we on our part should defend France as though a military alliance existed between these two countries. As a matter of fact by glosses such as he had described there was a risk—that of promoting the rapid increase of armaments. The direct tendency of comments such as those which were made without contradiction all over the world was to increase the German Fleet, and to force the literal execution of the German naval programme of construction, and therefore, to involve us in corresponding construction, and in a race of armaments to add to our burdens. Moreover, he could not but think that it directly weakened our policy in Macedonia. At the present time the Committee were in this position. They wore not acquainted with the whole of the proposals of the Government, but only with a portion of them. They did not know what the Powers had said in reply in regard to that portion, and they were unable, therefore, effectively or usefully to discuss the policy. But it was described as an Anglo-Russian policy, and he thought it would be far 957 more likely to achieve success if it represented also the Powers which had the most influence in Turkey. Personally he had every hope, without having too much confidence, that the Powers would welcome the return at Constantinople to the constitution of twenty-eight years ago. He doubted whether they could usefully discuss the details of that subject that night, although it did come under his general belief that our policy had been weakened by its being represented that one of the great Powers had been isolated. There had been in the House no real debate on another great international occasion, namely, the conference of the Powers at the Hague. Some of the papers which had been promised in regard to the conference had not yet been circulated, and he had hoped to have them in time for that debate. What they might be he did not know, but it was impossible to read the Papers which had been laid before them without seeing that there was hostility all through the Hague Conference between Germany and ourselves. One result had been claimed for the Conference. The Leader of the Opposition and the French Foreign Office had said that it was the only result, and the late Prime Minister said that an enduring result and very solid achievement of that conference was the agreement to create a maritime court. In the instructions given to Sir Edward Fry the Government put that proposal very high indeed; they gave the most direct instructions to Sir Edward Fry that the Government were anxious to see the constitution of an international tribunal of appeal from the decisions of the Prize Courts, and wrote that, if the Hague Conference accomplished no other object than the constitution of that tribunal, it would render inestimable service to mankind. That was very strong language. He understood that the Germans were aware of the proposal. We communicated it just before the Hague Conference, began, and they made no reply, but at the conference itself they gave notice of a Resolution on the same subject. They were called first, and the result was that our proposal became a German proposal, and it was adopted as such. Since that time the question had gone backwards. The German Government stated 958 that Germany took the initiative for the establishment of that tribunal, but that they were acting with "some degree of caution." Then a Question was asked in this House by the hon. Member for Norwood, and in reply the late Prime Minister said that there must be legislation by Parliament before the ratification of the Convention could take place. It seemed to him pretty clear from the proceedings of the conference that there was jealousy and hostility behind the scenes all the time between Germany and this country, and he confessed that he was not surprised,—as a policy, which was perfectly correct and defensible in itself, had been described as one which had isolated Germany. He was not surprised that a feeling of irritation should have grown up, and that suspicion had been thrown on our policy in all portions of the world. He was far from being convinced that our policy in regard to the Congo State was not influenced by the same cause of difficulty and hostility. We were as deeply committed in regard to the Congo State as in regard to Macedonia. This Parliament would be sitting in the autumn months, but it would be sitting dumb so far as foreign affairs were concerned. There would be no opportunity for debate on this subject. Both in regard to the Congo and Macedonia the Government were under deep promises to this country. It was, therefore, all the more incumbent on them before the House separated that they should state what they would be responsible for, and what their pledges were in regard to the Congo State. The fresh Congo Papers had not yet been distributed, and curiously enough the Belgian Government had stated publicly that they insisted on their immediate publication. The Government would have to carry out the promises made to the House in Congo matters as in Macedonian matters, and he would like very briefly to state, subject to correction if he was wrong, and subject to confirmation of hon. friends on both sides if he was right, what he understood these promises to be. The Secretary of State had told them that he had represented to the Belgian Government that it must be a condition precedent to any annexation that the Congo State should be taken over on terms which would afford a 959 guarantee to us that the conditions of our Treaty and the Berlin Act were carried out. The circumstance to which we attached most importance and which that guarantee was concerned with was stated by the Secretary of State in the words "A radical alteration in the economic system." In reply to Questions on 25th June, as to whether the changes required and to be so guaranteed would include the free collection of rubber by the natives and the sale by the natives to merchants of all countries, the answer was that all concessions should be subject to native rights and that the natives must not be debarred from the collection or rubber or from the sale of it to merchants of all countries. He thought "concessions" was a word of undue limitation. The right should exist anywhere throughout the territory, and not in the territory of the concessions only. Subject to that, the answer was thoroughly satisfactory. But since that answer was given there came the White Paper called "Taxation of Natives, and other Questions" and in that he confessed he thought that rather too much importance was given to secondary questions, such as those relating to currency, at the expense of our main position. How dangerous it was in dealing with Belgium to make any concessions at all might be seen from a comparison between statements on page 2 and page 37 of the White Paper. On page 2 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a letter dated 27th March, 1908, said—
His Majesty's Government have every confidence in the earnest desire of the Belgian Government to introduce thorough and far-reaching reforms into the present system of administration in the Congo, and they are therefore particularly anxious to maintain an attitude of strict forbearance, and to abstain from any act which might be construed as interfering with the complete liberty of action of the Belgian Government in the future management of the internal affairs of the Congo.'The Secretary of State went on to say that there must be adherence to our treaty and the Berlin Act which covered everything. What did the Belgian Government do? They omitted these words, and took solemn notice of the words which he had quoted. They said—The Government of the King are happy to take act of the assurance given by the Govern- 960 ment of His Britannic Majesty to abstain from any act which might be construed as interfering with the complete liberty of action of the Belgian Government in the future management of the internal affairs of the Congo.At this moment the Belgian Government were professing, not for the first time, their most anxious desire for complete publicity in regard to their position. Last week an article appeared in Le Temps which stated that the Belgian Government had insisted that the correspondence should be published as speedily as possible; but they had not yet got it. This country, at all events, had nothing to lose by publicity. The position was clear, and he had set forth why our expectations ought to be carried out. If the present session passed over without the Act of annexation being passed, it was highly probable that the matter would drag on and that in November, when this House was known to be sitting, but from the nature of their proceedings they should be prevented from expressing their opinion, a state of things might arise when the Foreign Secretary might be glad if they reminded him and the Belgian Government through this House of the promises which had been given, and of the policy on which both sides of the House were united in supporting the Government. There was only one other matter, closely connected with the feeble administration of the Congo in the interior, to which he wished to draw attention. As a result of the captures which had taken place by thousands of revolted troops who carried on slave raiding and the sale of slaves, a stream of slaves continually passed to Portuguese possessions on the islands of San Thome and Principe. A party of convicts were also sent to serve their sentences in these islands. The slave trade was carried on by the Portuguese Government, and the report which Mr. Burtt had made upon the subject had been toned down for publication. They had been told that the Government were giving anxious consideration to this subject, and that communications had been made with the Portuguese Government with regard to it. A Captain Francisco Paola Cid, who had been formerly a governor of the territory, it was said, had been sent to report upon the whole matter. He thought that this excrescence on the 961 Congo, which was notoriously continuing to the present time, was a matter which required more rapid attention than the Government had yet given to it. They had allowed themselves to be put off with promises; those promises had not been kept any more than those which had been given by the Belgian Government. In conclusion, he wished to say that in his opinion our policy in all parts of the world was not facilitated by attempts which were made in many quarters to direct it against a particular Power. This country meant peace; but we had a great interest besides that of peace—the interest of not pushing warlike preparations, and, consequently, the cost of these warlike preparations, to the extreme.
§ *EARL PERCY (Kensington, S.)said he thought the House owed the right hon. Baronet a debt for having raised the general debate on foreign policy, and for having redeemed their discussions from the charge that they entirely concerned themselves with the internal affairs of o her countries. He supposed they would all be glad if the Government could do or say anything which would mitigate or remove the unfortunate suspicion which our foreign policy appeared to excite in some quarters in Germany. On the other hand, he confessed that it was difficult to understand, apart from the constructions placed upon it in the Press, why a policy, which consisted merely in trying to remove the grounds of friction between ourselves and other countries with which we had various controversies at issue, should excite the suspicions of any other Power.
§ Mr. DILLON (Mayo, E.)What about Lord Cromer's speech?
§ *Earl PERCYsaid that Lord Cromer's speech illus' rated the difficulty of bringing about a better atmosphere of public opinion either in this country or Germany until the two Governments could arrive at some kind of agreement for arresting what had become an acknowledged rivalry in naval armaments. In regard to the Congo question, he agreed with the right hon. Baronet that they would be faced with some difficulty next session by the fact that annexation might be 962 decided upon without our having any opportunity of debating it. They must trust to the Government with regard to the proper time to renew our representations, but they should be renewed before annexation was decided upon. The despatch of the Belgian Government left on his mind the impression that that Government, having assured us of their general concurrence with the reforms which we had urged, thought that they might now investigate at their leisure the systems prevailing in other parts of the Congo basin, and that they were under no necessity to communicate any further information as to the precise steps by which they meant to carry their professions into practice. If that were their view, it betrayed a very serious misconception of the position of this country; and he was not quite sure that that misconception might not be strengthened by the sentence in the despatch of the Foreign Secretary when he said that it was not our desire to prescribe the precise method by which the administration of the Congo should be brought into conformity with the principles of the Berlin Act. There was no doubt that the present Congo administration was a violation of the Berlin Act. But it was also a violation of the expressed conditions under which the original International Association obtained recognition from this country and from America—and so obtained the status which alone enabled it to become a party to the Berlin Act at all. The vital point, as it seemed to him, was that before we gave our consent to the annexation of the Congo by the Belgian Government we should insist that in the Treaty of Cession, the same legal security which was provided for the rights of the concessionary companies should also be secured for the rights of the natives by the restitution to them not only of land sufficient for occupation, but also of their original freedom to sell all the products (except ivory) grown in territories which are not effectively occupied by the companies and exploited by means of free labour hired in the open market. Passing to the question of Macedonia, he would be glad if the right hon. Gentleman found it consonant with the public interest 963 to make a statement with regard to the present state of Turkish affairs. There seemed to be a general impression in the responsible Press that in view of the events of the last few days England and Russia would take time to look around and reconsider their position before they presented their new reform schemes to the Sultan. He imagined that this impression was well-founded. It would appear somewhat absurd to enter into a solemn discussion as to the co-operation of the military and gendarmerie for the repression of these bands, at a time when the bands had temporarily disappeared and the military had broken loose from control.
And it must be remembered that whatever other results might follow from the present constitutional movement in Turkey, it was almost certain that it would increase rather than diminish the general dislike and opposition to interference from outside. He had always believed that the desire for reform was as widespread among the Mahomedans as among the Christians, but at the same time it sprang in no small measure from the conviction that only the removal of the most glaring abuses would rescue their country from constant and humiliating tutelage on the part of the Powers. Speaking for himself alone, he had never pretended to view with any satisfaction or hope the schemes for so-called autonomy, partial or otherwise, in separate provinces of the Turkish Empire. He believed that it was idle in the light of past experience to expect that they could persuade the Mahomedans that a policy of that kind was anything else than a first step towards the dismemberment of the country, nor did be think that their belief in the justice of the European Powers was likely to be strengthened by the contrast between their constant readiness to apply the strongest pressure at Constantinople, and their extraordinary reluctance to go beyond the most polite representation to the Governments at Sofia, Belgrade and Athens, who were responsible for permitting the equipment and passage of the bands. He had no desire to go back to the details of the reform scheme which was adumbrated in the last speech of the Foreign Secretary and of which they had sonic further information in the White Paper, but he must 964 allude to one part of the scheme for which the right hon. Gentleman was responsible and upon which he confessed he looked with some regret. The right hon. Gentleman, following in that respect the policy of Lord Lansdowne, declared some time ago that he thought that it would be unfair and unjust to ask Turkey to reduce her Regular forces in Macedonia unless we either asked for a corresponding reduction of forces by the Bulgarian Government or unless the Powers were ready to give a collective guarantee for the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish frontier. The idea of a collective guarantee fell through owing to the opposition of the Russian Government. The right hon. Gentleman then very properly dropped the proposal that we should insist on the reduction of the Turkish Army. But what he thought it was unjust to do directly he did indirectly. He laid down the condition that the support of the troops must not be made a charge on the Macedonian Budget.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir EDWARD GREY,) Northumberland, BerwickI said that the civil expenses were to be the first charge.
§ *EARL PERCYsaid all the evidence went to show that, if the civil administration was to be made a first charge on the Budget, the finances would be wholly inadequate to support the large force which the Turks were compelled to keep up in Macedonia. What must the practical result of that policy be? It was neither just nor expedient, because it must throw upon the unfortunate taxpayer in other parts of the Turkish Empire the greater part of the burden of maintaining the army in Macedonia.
§ MR. LYNCHsaid a great pact of the expenditure in Macedonia was found by the 3 per cent. import duty, which was derived from the trade of the whole of Turkey.
§ *EARL PERCYwas glad to hear from a free trader that the 3 per cent. import duty was paid by the foreigner and not by the consumer. He had only raised this point for the purpose of showing the extraordinary difficulty, 965 he thought the impossibility, of treating the Turkish question piecemeal. We seemed now to be in the presence of a general movement on the part of all races and creeds to combining together for the pursuit of common reforms on the basis of a common patriotism. We might be sanguine or the reverse as to the results of that movement, but, at all events, let us do nothing to prejudice its success. This country had always had a great reputation among the populations of the Turkish Empire for being probably the only disinterested Power in Europe, and he earnestly hoped that at the present juncture we would show by our words and our diplomatic action that nothing would please us better than the success of any movement for reform from inside, which might perhaps eventually free us from the necessity of having to interest ourselves in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire.
§ SIR EDWARD GREYI cannot think that the noble Lord's account of the proposal which I made with regard to the civil and military expenditure of Macedonia really gave a fair impression of what that proposal was. The words of his to which I took exception were that we had demurred to the military expenditure being defrayed out of the Macedonian Budget. We did not demur to the military expenditure being defrayed out of the Macedonian Budget. What we did demur to was the part of the Macedonian Budget allocated to civil expenditure being starved for the sake of the military expenditure. We did not attempt to say that either one or the other should have been defrayed out of the Macedonian Budget. What we did attempt to lay down was that, if there was not sufficient for the full amount of both, the civil expenditure should be defrayed first and the deficit on military expenditure should be made up by funds from elsewhere. The noble Lord says that that would have caused the expenditure on the Army in Macedonia to be defrayed by taxpayers in other parts of the Turkish dominions. But the army is not kept there solely for the internal purposes of Macedonia. It is kept there, as other nations keep large parts of their Army on their frontier, for the sake of the integrity 966 of the whole empire. My hon. friend the Member for Ripon seemed to me to be urging that in making the Anglo-Russian Convention we might have used that as a lever to get some special co-operation with Russia in regard to the Macedonian question which might have shortened the delay that is taking place in pressing reforms. That is exactly what we could not do. It was expressly understood that the Anglo-Russian Convention was being arranged between the two Powers to deal with parts of the world and interests in those parts of the world which concerned themselves, and that we were not going to bring into that Convention any extraneous interests which might be a cause of offence to other Powers. Therefore we could not mix up the two things. As to the delay which has taken place, I made no secret at the time when I originally placed the proposal before the House that we were not going to take isolated action, and that we must carry the other Powers with us. Neither Russia, nor England, one or other, nor both together, had either the disposition or the power to attempt to settle the Macedonian question without consulting the other Powers, and if it has taken a long time it has simply been due to the fact that there are so many Powers to be consulted, and that the problem itself is very complex and full of details. But I will ask to be excused to-night under the special circumstances from going in any detail into the question of Macedonian reform. The situation has changed, and has changed so suddenly and yet so greatly in the last few days that I would rather confine myself to some general observations upon how the prospect is affected by the changes which have taken place. They must be general observations only, because it is too soon to pronounce a definite, considered opinion. My hon. friend the Member for Stirling Burghs in a speech to which the House listened with interest and welcome, knowing well the interest which he has taken in politics, and expecting from him, as I am sure they are entitled to expect in future years, much help and useful support in our debates—in his speech he analysed what the, situation in Macedonia had been. It may be summed up in one word. The root cause of the mischief of the situation 967 has been bad, weak government. It is that which has been the temptation to neighbouring States, or to the citizens of neighbouring States, or those who in Macedonia itself are of the same nationality as the neighbouring States—it is that which has been the temptation to them to strengthen their own nationalities in Macedonia at the expense of each other. The Government being weak, being incapable of adopting methods for the preservation of order, played off the one party against the other, instead of taking strong, vigorous, and impartial measures. It is against that situation, against those methods of governing, we, in common with the other Powers of Europe, have been for some years protesting. There was some protest from the Turkish army and from the Musulman population; but the extraordinary part of the matter is this, that these sudden events of the last few days, though attended with violence which in some circumstances might have been expected to lead to further violence and disorder, suddenly produced, for the time, order, security, even rejoicing. It is a very remarkable situation, and it comes at the very moment when we submitted to the other Powers proposals for forming a mobile force composed partly of Turkish troops and partly of gendarmerie, to be placed at the disposal of the Turkish Governor, and organised in Macedonia by Turkish officers and the commanders of the gendarmerie, in order that this force might be allocated for the purpose of putting down the bands impartially and vigorously. At this moment—so far as my information goes—at this moment the bands have melted away, they have dispersed under the influence of the events which have taken place. W ell, of course, if this state of things continues, if these bands have really dispersed for good, there is no further need for the mobile force. We welcome the momentary situation and trust it may last. We trust that the Balkan States and also Greece on the border will use their utmost endeavours to secure that it shall last, and that no advantage will be taken of anything which has occurred in Macedonia itself for anything but a good purpose; that 968 those States will do all in their power to prevent bands being recruited from their own territories, and will do their utmost with the Powers of Europe to preserve the present situation. Our object has never been political, as the hon. Member for Stirling has said; it has been truly humanitarian and disinterested. It is known at home, but is not yet credited abroad, that for us the Macedonian question is the question of good versus bad government. It has been pointed out that our object in Macedonia has been to derogate from the authority of the Sultan as head of the Mahomedan faith and the integrity of his dominions. There is, of course, no truth in that. Then it has been said that our object is to assist the Christians against Mahomedans; but, as we know, we have only been acting in the Macedonian question because of the treaty obligations we have in common with other Powers in regard to particular parts of the Turkish Empire, and we are well aware that, while the Christian population has suffered from bad government, Mahomedans have suffered as well. It comes back to this, that in the Macedonian question our sole desire is to see good government introduced; and if Turkey is going to improve the whole government of the country and ensure that the Mahomedans and Christians shall benefit equally by the improvements, then it is better that the Macedonian question should be settled by the Turks taking in hand and doing hat for years we have been urging them to do than by pressing partial reforms on reluctant, unwilling and obstructing authorities. I noted the apprehensions expressed by the hon. Member for Stirling that things may not turn out so well as they promised at first. Well, of course we must wait events; but at the present time I can only say this: our own sympathy must be with those who are trying to introduce reforms, and I should be the last to prophesy that they will fail. If they succeed, then they must succeed by their own efforts; but our sympathy is with them. I will only say this: we shall continue, watchful and earnest as we have ever been, in pursuing the object of securing good government in Macedonia, and in the other parts of Turkey 969 with which we are concerned. But at the present moment it would be impossible to forecast by what methods that object would be achieved; and I will only say with reference to present events in Turkey that we welcome the news that the Sultan has proclaimed a Constitution. We welcome the news of the strength of the feeling which has brought about the proclamation of the Constitution; and while not relaxing our watchfulness, while not becoming slack in our desire to do all in our power to promote improvement in Macedonia, we shall for the present preserve an expectant and sympathetic attitude. I come to another question of great importance which I should not have touched upon if it had not been touched upon by the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean. It is a question of great importance and of extreme delicacy, and, indeed, he himself recognised by the manner in which he spoke that it was necessary to be careful and guarded in the words he used. It is as necessary for me to deal with it delicately, and I would not myself have introduced it into this debate. I do not complain that it has been introduced; but it is a serious question. It is undoubtedly most undesirable that any section of opinion in this country should represent it as an object of British policy to isolate Germany. It is equally undesirable that any section of public opinion in Germany should believe in that being the case. When you come to deal with a question of the relations between two great Powers of this kind, I would ask the people who really wish to form an opinion of the feeling of the two countries towards each other not to take too short views. The feeling of any two great countries towards each other may vary in degree from year to year; but I at least say this—that anybody who reviews the history of the last twenty years impartially must be bound to admit that the attitude of this country has not been that of a Power which was reluctant to be on good terms with Germany. And if on reviewing the last twenty years you carry your mind back to the events which occurred in the first decade of the twenty years, you will find that there was at one time a moment when there was constant 970 friction between this country and France, and at another time a moment when there was constant friction between this country and Russia. Now what have We done in recent years? We have come to agreements with those two Powers which have removed the friction which existed, and removed all danger of a breach of the peace either between us and France or between us and Russia. That is a distinct change. But does any Power in Europe say to us that a favourable balance of power from their point of view depended on our being on bad terms with France or Russia, or any other Power? We have settled by agreements which are known to the world certain causes of dispute, removed possibilities of friction between us and these two Powers. It is not so long ago—I think only last year—that Prince Billow said that the policy of Germany did not depend on provoking enmity between other Powers. I would complete that by saying that, as far as we are concerned, it is no part of our policy to give our friendships any hostile point towards any other Power. But we must be free to make those friendships. Having made them, I am willing to give the utmost guarantees that we shall use them for the mutual advantage of ourselves and the other countries with which we are concerned; but we shall not take advantage of those friendships to make enmity between our friends and any other Power; nor is it our object to isolate any Power whatever. And, after all, when the isolation of Germany is spoken of, I think it is only fair to bear in mind that Germany has two allies. We have never grudged that alliance; we have never considered that alliance as directed against us, and if we have made agreements with France and Russia (which, by the way, are public to the world, while those of the Triple Alliance are not) there is as little reason to suppose that the object and motive of these agreements was isolation or unfriendly action towards any other Power. Let me examine the point which the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean raises with regard to Macedonia. His argument was that there might be an impression that, because Russia and ourselves were acting together on the 971 Macedonian question, we were forming something apart from other Powers which might give offence to them. I will explain exactly how these proposals about Macedonia arose. We made proposals which were announced in this House, and those proposals were made on our own account without consultation with other Powers, simply because, in our opinion, the situation was such that it was necessary, either that we should dissociate ourselves from the reform movement altogether or that it should take some more vigorous and active shape. After we had made these proposals, Russia intimated that she would be prepared to advance some proposals of her own going in the same direction but not going so far, and the other Powers including, I am pretty sure, Germany, were among the first to say that they would be willing to receive the Russian proposals and to accept them. The proposals were discussed between us and Russia because vie at first adumbrated the larger scheme, for it was important for us to know' how much substance there was going to be in the Russian proposals in order that we might make up our minds whether we could give them our cordial support; but as far as other Powers were concerned, they showed not only readiness but even alacrity to accept the Russian proposals after ours had been announced. Therefore there can be no question of the action of England and Russia in Macedonia having originated in any desire to form a group among the other Powers. With regard to the Hague Conference, if we had had any political design we should not have chosen as our first delegate, as we did, a man of the highest character, of great learning in international law, and of great judgment, but one who had had no experience as a diplomatist. If we had had a political object in view we should have thrown considerations of international law to the winds and chosen the most experienced diplomatist we could find. We gave everybody a guarantee that we should discuss all questions at the Hague Conference on their merits; and, as a matter of fact, if he read the proceedings, the right hon. Baronet will know that, while we were often at variance with Germany, we were at 972 variance, I think, with almost every other Power in turn on some question. We were at variance, sometimes with one, sometimes with another, because we dealt with questions solely on their merits, and sometimes with one Power and sometimes with another we differed. But when Germany brought forward the Prize Courts Convention we cordially welcomed it; and if it has not proceeded faster since, it is due simply to this, that in order to adhere to that Convention legislation would be necessary here, and we cannot get that legislation through Parliament unless we have some further agreement with other Rowers, including Germany, but not Germany alone, on certain points connected with the law of maritime war, which it is obvious we must have some agreement with the great naval Powers before we can pass legislation to ratify the Prize Courts Convention. We have a conference which will meet in the autumn to discuss the question, and I hope it will arrive at an agreement which will enable us to ratify the Convention next year by the time named. With regard to the Congo, which, I think with the right hon. Baronet, is the third instance in which we were isolated, it is quite true that we have been alone except for the United States.
§ *SIR CHARLES W. DILKEI did not say we were isolated.
§ SIR EDWARD GREYI understood the argument to be that, owing to our general policy, we were weaker with regard to the Congo than we might have been, because the other Powers have not been willing to act with us. I have said over and over again that we should be delighted to welcome the co-operation of any Power and we should be relieved not to have to bear the burden of promoting reform alone. If any other power made the least intimation that it is taking interest in reform, we should be delighted to welcome their co-operation; and I can assure the House that with the burdens we have upon us, we have no false pride on our side and no artificial ambition to play the leading part ourselves if any other Power desires to do so. With regard to the publication of further Papers, we are quite ready, and I had hoped they 973 would have been presented already, but the Belgian Government wishes to present Papers, including the ones we are going to present. They are also going to include some communications they have had with the United States. They are arranging that matter at the present moment, and the present situation is that I have informed the Belgian Government that we are ready to publish Papers at any time, and are only waiting to hear from them what the date of their publication will be so that we may publish them simultaneously. But when they are published I am sorry to say that they will be very incomplete. They end up with a communication we have received from the Belgian Government, but they do not contain our reply. They carry the matter as far as it can be carried by general assurances, and I hope the House will recognise that, as far as general assurances go, the line taken by the Belgian Government is very different from that taken by the Congo Government. The whole tone of the correspondence is very different. The noble Lord is perfectly right in supposing that before we definitely accept the situation of the transfer of the Congo State to Belgium we shall need to send a reply to the last Belgian communication. That reply will take some consideration. It must deal somewhat exhaustively with the question of concessions and with our own right to have some say before we definitely recognise the transfer of the Congo State to another Power. We originally recognised the Congo State under a certain agreement and, in the expectation that it would promote free trade and be a civilising influence. Those treaty rights we consider have been broken, and when the Congo State has broken the treaty rights which were the very foundation and origin of its existence the Powers which are aggrieved are bound and I consider entitled to examine very closely the terms on which that State is to be transferred to another, and to get explicit assurances as to the interpretation which will be placed on their treaty rights. Therefore when the next Papers are published I must ask the Committee to bear in mind that they are published quickly because the Belgian Government desire them to be published before the Belgian Parliament rises, and 974 that, so far as we are concerned, they must not be regarded as complete because they necessitate a reply from us which will need some consideration and some time. The question of concessions is an exceedingly difficult one. I quite realise that it would be going on a somewhat exacting tack to demand of the Belgian Government that it shall apply in the Congo, if it becomes a Belgian Colony, some system different from and less free than that which exists in the Colonies of other countries who have possessions in the same region. What has our own practice been? I understand it to be this: before giving any concessions we have surveyed the country carefully, and we have then only given concessions where it has appeared clearly that there were vacant lands which had not been in native occupation. In West Africa, I believe, our general practice has been to give no concessions, because we found that the different native tribes and villages had already parcelled out the land between them. In East Africa I believe there are lands which have never been in native occupation, and those lands are regarded as the property of the Crown and as available for concessions. The Congo Government pursued the reverse course. It gave concessions first without inquiring about native rights. The problem before the Belgian Government is to put that matter right. It is going too far to say there should be no concessions in the Congo State. Vacant lands, if there be vacant lands, we can hardly contend should not be the subject of concessions in the Congo State as they are in our Colonies. But the concessions which have been granted have been granted without any regard to native rights, and it is an exceedingly difficult matter to produce order out of this situation. The Congo question divides itself to me, roughly, into two heads—first of all there is the question of forced labour and abuse of it. The Belgian Government says definitely that forced labour must come to an end. If it is to come to an end it is essential without delay that the natives should be put in possession of large tracts of territory which will enable them to cultivate and to feed themselves and to trade, otherwise they would have no means of earning a livelihood. These 975 tracts must come out of the concessionary area where there are natives in the concessionary area. The question of forced labour and the treatment of natives is one which I regard as an axiom in the eyes of any civilised State. The Belgian Government have made no scruple about saying they will abolish forced labour. In regard to the other branch of the question, the right of freedom of trade, we have proposed to the Belgian that if there should be difficulties of interpretation of treaty rights in this matter, the question should be submitted to arbitration. The humanitarian side of the question—the question of decent treatment of the natives—is separate from the commerical question.
§ EARL PERCYDoes that include the freedom of the natives to trade? Is that to be referred to arbitration?
§ SIR EDWARD GREYNo. It goes without saying that the native must have the lands of which he has been in occupation and freedom to trade in those lands. When you come to the question how vacant lands should be dealt with, the questions of the monopolies of a particular province and questions which are purely commercial, I should be prepared to refer those questions to arbitration, because I have always wished to make it clear that in the matter of Congo reform our prime motive at any rate has been the humanitarian motive. When it is purely a matter of trade interests as distinguished from the humanitarian interest, I think it only right we should deal with it as any other country would deal with it, and agree that it should be a matter for arbitration. Before the Government commits itself to any definite recognition of the situation as satisfactory, assuming that the Belgium Parliament decides to empower the Government to annex the Congo, we shall have to have had further correspondence, which we shall lay before the House, and the whole situation will have to be carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, who will then, no doubt, announce what their decision is. I can say little about the Portuguese question. We have brought all the information at our disposal before the Portuguese Government and urged them to do all in their 976 power and with as little delay as possible to put things into a satisfactory condition. Of course, anyone who reflects on the internal troubles of Portugal will realise that the time has not been a fortunate one for undertaking reforms in Portuguese territory. With regard to Persia, I will only say that the hon. Member for Ripon did not give a correct impression, in regard to the Russian officers. The Russian officers were not sent in to suppress sedition. These were officers who had been in Persia for some years—long before the Anglo-Russian Convention. They were officers not sent in by the Russian Government, but acted as bodyguard under the orders of the Shah, and with regard to what part they may have taken in the events at Teheran I do not suppose the Russian Government itself has full information in regard to the facts. The general situation is this, that there are two parties in Persia, the constitutional play and the reactionary party, and that there has been practically a state of civil war, in which the Shah has won in Teheran, and the nationalist or constitutional party has got the upper hand at Tabriz. The only course for us to take in these circumstances is that, so long as there is no danger to British subjects, and there has been none, we shall not go one inch further in intervention than we can help. As long as we abstain from intervention, I hope the Persians will fight out their affairs in their own way. The hon. Member for Ripon recommended friendly assistance. Yes; but it is a very difficult matter offering friendly assistance when there is a state of civil war. When you offer friendly assistance the party to whom you offer it are apt to ask how far you are prepared to go, and there is no more dangerous thing than to offer sympathy and friendly assistance unless, when a dangerous state of affairs occurs, you are prepared to back up those who have leant upon you by going somewhat further. I can assure the hon. Member for Ripon that if we have not intervened in Persia it is not because we are more on one side or the other or because we have not got sympathies; it is simply because it is not right to leave people to expect your assistance unless you are prepared really to intervene to protect them. Take, for instance, the case of the Legations. There is a custom in Persia that 977 anybody who has a grievance against the Persian Government takes refuge in a foreign Legation. It is a custom peculiar to Persia, and I am most desirous it should not be extended. In fact, it has really become necessary to keep it within bounds in Persia. Two years ago some thousands of people took refuge in the British Legation in Teheran because they were dissatisfied with their Government. The other day the same situation began, but we had only sixty-six persons who took refuge in the British Legation. The instructions that have been given are these: That refuge is not to be refused to anyone who is in danger of his life, but that refuge must not be given to people who use the Legation for political purposes. That is an obvious precaution, otherwise you would have to contend with political parties when some among them, suffering under a temporary disadvantage, took refuge in a foreign Legation to wait until the bad time has passed by and then take up the contest again. Any foreign Legation used in that way would have its position made impossible; and so we have restricted the right of allowing refuge to those who are in immediate danger of life. Within these bounds we have kept. That is the reason why refuge was refused at Tabriz, though refuge to a limited extent was admitted at Teheran. The state of excitement was very great at Teheran; a considerable number of lives were lost, and the fact that some of the constitutional party, in getting the worst of it, were taking refuge in the British Legation was a reason for some improper proceedings on behalf of the Shah's troops round the Legation, impeding access to it, and placing it almost under surveillance. We demanded, and we received, a proper apology for what had taken place; and if we did not ask for more reparation than that it was because there was practically a state of civil war in Teheran, and we passed by somewhat more lightly events that would have been taken more notice of had they been more deliberate. Then, with regard to the refugees in the Legation, we obtained a promise of security for their lives and their property. A condition was made in regard to some of them that they should go out of the 978 country for a year and a half; but as long as we obtained security for life and property it was the utmost limit to which we could go without interfering with the politics of the country. As to joint action, I trust that we may continue to agree as at the present time on the policy of non-intervention in internal affairs. If there be in Persia genuine movement on behalf of freedom and good government which takes a practical shape, it will lack no sympathy from us. No action of ours will ever embarrass it; but the Persians must work out their own affairs in their own way. But as far as we and Russia are concerned, there is a genuine desire on the part of both to intervene as little as possible in the internal affairs of Persia as long as our own subjects are not threatened. That, I am sure, is a wise policy, because any Government in Persia at the present time which was known to I an on foreign support would be unpopular in the country, and what we desire is to see a Government there possessing the confidence of the Persian people.
§ SIR GILBERT PARKER (Gravesend)said the House always listened with interest, and generally with great satisfaction, to the right hon. Gentleman, not only because of the gravity of the problems with which he dealt, but because of his own impartial attitude. He felt to-night that on one question the right hon. Gentleman had not spoken with the directness and clearness which they had been used to in his speeches, and that was on the question of the Congo. There had been one clear policy in regard to the Congo on both sides of the House. It was expressed with determination on the part of the last Government by Lord Lansdowne in 1903, and it had been continued by his successor the present Foreign Secretary. That policy was that the question of the Congo must be settled upon the basis of the Berlin Act. Speaking in this House on 26th February last in regard to the possibility of the transference of the Congo Government to the Belgian Government, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said—
But assuming that this does not take place, and that after the close of the present Belgian 979 session we have to deal with the existing Government of the Congo unchanged, then we Must be free to deal with questions of this kind or others which may arise out of our treaty rights in our own way.He and his friends relied absolutely on that assurance given with great deliberation by the, right hon. Gentleman.
§ SIR EDWARD GREYsaid he did not wish to go back in the least on what he said in February. If no conclusion was reached at the end of the present Belgian session that would be a very grave circumstance to be considered by the Government as a whole.
§ SIR GILBERT PARKERsaid they were extremely glad to hear the re-affirmation of the right hon. Gentleman's statement. He was sure that he did not exaggerate in the least when he said that the speech delivered by the Belgian Prime Minister in July must have caused great anxiety in the minds of those who had been interested in this question from the beginning. In that speech he stated that there were practically no obligations on the part of the Belgian Government in connection with the Congo to other nations, and in effect he repudiated any responsibility on the part of the Belgian Government or the Congo Government to the signatory Powers of the Berlin Treaty. He was sure the right hon. Gentleman must have read that speech with anxiety. They all made allowances, of course, for speeches made under the stress of party passion. There was a great deal of opposition in the Belgian Parliament, and when speeches were made on such occasions there was always a temptation to appeal to the patriotic instincts of an independent people, and he had no doubt that the Belgian Prime Minister was somewhat led away by the circumstances of the moment. But the speech remained, and it had not been explained away. The Committee had no papers before them which could give them any understanding of the real situation. He gathered from the right hon. Gentleman's hesitation that the Government were not satisfied, because he said that the Government had received general assurances only, and that before the Government replied to Belgium's last communication they must carefully con- 980 sider what course they might find it necessary to pursue. That was a grave statement, and it suggested to the minds of those who listened to the right hon. Gentleman that he was not wholly satisfied. Anyone who read the White Paper and other papers which had been published, and the speeches delivered in the Belgian Parliament, must have come to the conclusion that the fundamental evils which existed in the Congo under the present system were not being dealt with radically by the Belgian Parliament in the transfer that might be made. He referred to the question of concessions. The right hon. Gentleman said that assurances had been received from the Belgian Government that forced labour must come to an end. That sounded very well, but the right hon. Gentleman had allowed the Committee to see what was his view of forced labour coming to an end. It was that the native, if he was to have the position that was provided for him under the Berlin Act, must have an opportunity to trade. The natives must have rights in the products of the soil, and be able to buy and sell in currency to which the right hon. Gentleman had attached so much importance in his despatch. The right hon. Gentleman had given great satisfaction when he said that the position of the Government remained unchanged regarding this question as to the rights of the natives; and he made it very clear to the Committee that concessions on the present basis, without any formal system being established by which land might be set apart for the natives, and a communal tenure of the land be granted to the natives would not be satisfactory. All that this Government could ask was that the communal system should be recognised, and that the land outside the plantations and outside the villages should be set apart for the benefit of the natives, otherwise the end of the race inhabiting the Congo Basin was sure. When civilisation came in, and at the same time the kind of concessions which now existed in the Congo came with it, the natives must either be forced to work or the system must break down and the country become bankrupt. It had been said that the natives of the Congo would not be forced to work if the system 981 proposed by the Belgian Government was established, but it would come in the end to the same thing as long as the natives had not a right to trade in the products of soil, and the right of tenure which they had enjoyed from time immemorial. At any rate it was the duty of the Government which took over the Congo to see that the vacant lands were set apart on a reasonable and impartial basis for the use of the natives. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not think him in the least inappreciative of the great difficulties under which he had laboured. It was always difficult to intervene, even when we had the right, in the internal affairs of another country. We were obliged to do it with the consent of all the Powers in the case of Egypt. We had done it in the case of Macedonia; but only successfully in the case of Egypt where we had the power to enter, to re-construct the administration, and to put our own people to work. Happily, in the case of Turkey it would seem as though the reforms would proceed from the inside, as all true reforms must proceed. The action of all the foreign nations could not produce true reform in Macedonia without the co-operation and consent of the Government primarily responsible, and we should not succeed with reforms in the Congo State unless the Belgian Government co-operated with us and accepted the principles of reform which we had laid down. He sincerely hoped that the assurances which the right hon. Gentleman had given in the past, and which he had renewed that night, but which still left them considerable anxiety with regard to the position of affairs, would be fulfilled, and that what the Government had striven for would be attained. He trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would be able when they met again in the autumn, if not before, to place before the country not only the assurance, but the simple fact that all that had been urged in previous debates in relation to the Congo would be accomplished; and that the Belgian Government, representing a great free, strong, and democratic people in modern Europe, would recognise that the system which had existed in the Congo was one which could not last in this age of civilisation and at this time, when every European nation understood the 982 principles on which native races should be governed. If the Belgian Government and people recognised that, and made such a treaty of transfer as would incorporate the two clear principles which this Government had laid down, then, he believed, this country would once again have justified its pure humanitarianism and its real desire to assist those nations and those people who were struggling for better conditions. Happy were those free peoples who were too strong to be dispossessed, but blessed were they among nations who were prepared to be strong with the rest.
*DR. RUTHERFORD (Middlesex, Brentford)expressed his pleasure that it was not our object to isolate any particular Power in entering into an entente with other Powers. The fact, however, was that Germany was isolated, and many felt that in the interests of the preservation of peace and the limitation of armaments the policy of an entente should be extended to Germany. He trusted the Foreign Secretary would use his best endeavours to bring that state of things about. With regard to freedom, he must just say they were witnessing a spectacle such as he believed the world had never seen. They saw freedom in travail, in what would be called the Grand Conception, in India, Persia, Egypt, Russia, and Turkey. It was with that movement, as it related to Egypt, that he wished to deal. In Egypt there were two parties, the moderates, who wished to see self-government under British influence, and the extremists, who wished for full and complete independence. There was, happily, no Clan-na-Gael party, or anything of that kind, in Egypt, and he was anxious that the Foreign Secretary should see that no such party was ever formed by a policy of coercion on our part, and also by taking care that the legitimate demands for reforms by the people should be no longer delayed. They all recognised that British rule in Egypt had been of undoubted benefit, but at the same time, Egypt to-day was in a position of political servitude which was unsatisfactory. The imperative needs of the country were self-government and extension of education. Some might 983 advocate that it would be better to educate first, but his view was that self-government and education should be run together. We seemed unable to frame a scheme of education satisfactory to the people. Although we were meeting the need for education in some degree by introducing Arabic gradually as the medium of teaching in the higher schools, and by setting aside an additional £100,000 this year, it must be realised, when only £374,000 was spent on all the Departments of education for the instruction of 12,000,000 of people, that that sum was wholly inadequate. At the elementary schools there were only 24 per cent. of boys of school age in attendance. There were only four secondary schools provided by the Government in the whole of Egypt, and there was no University of modern character such as would be recognised in this or any other European country. The El-Azhar was chiefly a theological college. There was now a movement among the Egyptians to establish a University of their own, and he would like to know why the Government Could not arrange financially to help such an institution. In Cairo there was a medical, a law, an engineering, and an agricultural school. Why could not the Government amalgamate those, and let them form the basis of a University for Egypt? If such Universities were established, they would be a great benefit to the intellectual as well as the moral life of the people. With regard to self-government, Sir Eldon Gorst in his first annual report argued against it, because such a small percentage of electors voted in the first stage. The reasons were the complicated system of election, and the fact that the vast majority of the Egyptians looked upon the Legislative Council and the General Assembly, which were purely consultative and advisory bodies, as a sham and a fraud. The remedy was simple; first, they should get rid of the system of electing delegates to elect the members of these bodies and then give real power to the institutions themselves. These institutions were started under British auspices by Lord Dufferin, but they had not been encouraged by this country. They had no power, no authority, and no reasonable or fair chance to show what was in them. 984 What the Egyptians were asking for, and what he hoped the House would listen to and assist them to get, was a real Parliament with Ministers responsible to it, with power to legislate and to administer. At present the Ministers were mere puppets in the hands of the British advisers. If real power were given to the Legislative Council and. the General Assembly it was felt by many that the party system would be developed, electors canvassed, elections hotly contested, and political life and character developed in the country. A Parliament in Egypt would be a tremendous force in the new life of the country, and it was the business of England to give it to them at the earliest possible moment. It was said that the capitulations were the great drawback and bugbear to Egypt, but the granting of self-government would be one of the best means, after free institutions had gained the confidence of the foreign Powers, of getting rid of the capitulations. He and those who thought with him felt there was no true national life, and could be none, in Egypt until these concessions were given. He hoped the Foreign Secretary would at an early period turn his mind and hand to this subject. The proposals of Sir Eldon Gorst with regard to the Provincial Councils had been condemned by Egyptians, because their functions were also of a merely advisory character. Egypt was at the present moment a source of great weakness and danger from foreign complications to this country. We could not get over that if we ignored what was just and right to the Egyptians. They were just as much entitled to govern their country as we were to govern our own, and until we recognised that justice could not be done. He would like to quote the advice of the late General Gordon on this matter. General Gordon said—
Do not take Egypt. Have a grip over it and give its people free institutions.After all, they believed that Liberalism was quite capable of solving the Egyptian riddle as it had solved most successfully the Transvaal and Orange River Colony pr blems. He asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to tell them what his policy was. An attitude of laisserfaire or non-possumies was unworthy of the great Liberal Party. 985 He hoped his policy was a big, real, and good step towards a solution. He knew there were risks, attendant on self-government, but it was nfinitely better to risk embarking Egypt on the ocean of freedom than to let it remain in the dead sea of despotism.
§ SIR F. BANBURY (City of London)said he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman a question with regard to the alteration of the treaty with France as regards the imposition of duties upon certain goods imported from this country. He was informed there was a Commission sitting in France with the object of revising the Customs tariff between this country and France. It was proposed to make alterations in the import duties on elastic fabrics. It was first proposed to raise the duty upon all elastic fabrics from 200 frs. minimum to 250 frs., with a maximum of 300 frs. Since then it had been proposed to raise the duty on silk goods from 200 frs. minimum to 400 frs., with a maximum of 600 frs., and on artificial silk from 200 frs. minimum to 600 frs., with a miximum of 900 frs., and on cotton and woollen goods from 250 frs. minimum to 300 frs. He was informed that the Foreign Office had been communicated with, and the reply of 7th July from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was to the effect that the whole question was engaging the attention of His Majesty's Government. That morning he asked the Foreign Secretary whether the French Government proposed to increase the import duties on elastic tissues, and, if so, what steps the Government proposed to take to protect British interests. The answer he received was that the right hon. Gentleman did not know whether the French Government proposed to increase the import duties as no official publication had yet been made of any of the proposals put forward by the Customs Commission of the French Chamber of Deputies, which was now engaged in studying the revision of the existing French Customs tariff. How could that answer be reconciled with the statement of 7th July that the whole question was engaging the attention of His Majesty's Government? No answer at all was given to the last part 986 of his Question as to what steps the Government proposed to take to protect British interests. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman thought it was impossible for him under the present one-sided system of free trade to take any steps to protect British interests. He was afraid that was a fact. He would, however, be obliged to the right hon. Gentleman if he would inform him whether it was possible for him to make representations to the French Government upon this revision and increase in the duties which would undoubtedly destroy a large trade which existed between this country and France, and at a time when unemployment was rapidly increasing.
§ SIR EDWARD GREYsaid there was no inconsistency in his answers. The first answer was that they were giving attention to the question, and it was as the result of that attention that he was able to give the House of Commons the answer to his second question. He was able to give him the information contained in the answer which had been given that afternoon. He could tell him what the position of the matter was. A French Parliamentary Commission had for some two years been considering what report it should make on the question of Customs duties. Nobody yet knew what that report was. It had not been published. If he were to make representations to the French Government their answer would be that they did not know what the Report of the Parliamentary Commission was yet. When it was published they would have to consider it, and so it was impossible to give any reply until the draft was published and considered. Therefore, it was premature to consider the question as between the two Governments at all.
§ *MR. REES (Montgomery Boroughs)said he felt considerable diffidence in addressing the Committee after the hon. Member for Brentford, who was able to speak with confidence of the feelings and wishes of all the Egyptians! His confidence was colossal. It was of that kind which was only characteristic of profound acquaintance or profound unacquaintance with the subject. It was somewhat painful to those who had lived in Russia to hear the manner 987 in which that Government was always referred to in that House, and though he believed he was the only Russian interpreter in the House he had had no opportunity to speak when the deplorable debate on the King's visit to the Czar took place, nor could he do more now than express his dissent from what the hon. Member for Stirling Burghs had said, and he recommended him rather to go to Russia and live amongst the peasants, than to take the sentimental imaginations of popular writers as his guide. The subject to which he wished especially to refer was the Bagdad railway. Could the right hon. Gentleman tell them anything now on this very important subject, which was a matter of pleasantry to certain hon. Members opposite, who hardly realised that it was a project of equal importance with the Suez Canal, in which this nation above all others was exceedingly interested. He understood that four new sections were to be made, and that the Porte was now in a position, thanks to our permission, to raise their Customs duties by 3 per cent., to give the necessary kilometric guarantee. He did not know if the door was open to us still to participate financially in this great project, but if it was he trusted we should, or at any rate that we should obtain some internationalisation or some power over the Gulf section, which would enable us to maintain the position we had hitherto had in the Persian Gulf, and in surrounding territory. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be able to tell them that something was being done following on the Anglo-Russian Convention to get control over the Northern shores of the Gulf and to obtain concessions there which might at any rate serve to keep other Powers out of concessions. He had received a letter that morning from one of the ports in the Gulf emphasising the importance of a subject on which he had several times interrogated the right hon. Gentleman—the great extent to which gun-running took place there. He was told that for three months in every year large cargoes of guns were run under the very bows of our gunboats, or at any rate close by, and were landed on the Northern shore, and sent up country to Afghanistan. Whether these guns came from England 988 or Germany, they were destined to be fired at our own people. These questions were of as much importance as any others which had been debated, and even now perhaps the right hon. Gentleman would say a word or two upon them.
§ SIR WILLIAM BULL (Hammersmith)asked when the trial of the four Englishmen in Antwerp was likely to come on. He knew the Foreign Office had interfered in one particular, and they were acquitted of the first charges made against them. But since that another charge of stealing had been made against them, with the result that a trial was still hanging over them. Could the right hon. Gentleman give any assurance that the British Government would interfere to have them brought to trial as quickly as possible?
§ SIR EDWARD GREYsaid he was unaware that this last point was to be raised, but he would make inquiries as to the present position of the trial. He asked to be excused from entering into the question of Egypt at that late hour. The question of the Persian Gulf and the Bagdad Railway was also of very great importance, for the construction of the railway must be of great interest to any country that had possessions in the East. But he did not know that either of these subjects lent themselves to public discussion at the present moment. If he did not deal with the various points raised, it was not because he did not admit their importance, but because there was considerable difficulty in making a public statement at that late hour.
§ Resolutions to be reported.