HC Deb 18 March 1901 vol 91 cc313-37

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the chair."—(Mr. Arnold-Forster.)

*THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. ARNOLD-FORSTER, Belfast. W.)

The House has for many years had the advantage of having the Navy Estimates introduced to it not only by the First Lord, but by a First Lord whose record of service is of peculiar and almost unique experience in the House; and as it happens that I am commissioned to perform the duties which Mr. Goschen so often performed with such great success in this House, perhaps it may be permitted to me to say a word with regard to the work done by Lord Goschen in connection with the Navy, because I believe his record of service is unique. He served for eight and a half years as First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Commons, and during every one of those years he added to his accumulated wealth of experience in regard to naval matters. I believe I am correct in saying that no civilian Minister who has ever had the honour of administering the affairs of the Admiralty ever more completely gained the confidence of the Naval service than Lord Goschen. I believe he understood to a most remarkable degree the feeling of all those serving in the Fleet, and I believe no Minister was ever more jealous for the preservation of those privileges and regarded more carefully those feelings. Knowing as I do the great regard in which Mr. Goschen was held in this House, knowing the high esteem in which he was held in the Navy, I can only say that I humbly associate myself with that feeling of respect as a Member of this House, and, as one temporarily connected with the great service of the Navy, with the feeling of the Navy. But while I desire to have him before me as an example, cannot help feeling that the fact that I, in a much less important position, have to undertake the task he performed with so much success places me in a somewhat difficult position; and I ask for, and think I shall obtain from the House, the indulgence which naturally is desired by one in so difficult a, position. I think I shall merit that indulgence best if I do not attempt to embroider my theme by any matters that are not strictly relevant. My task will be made easier by the fact that my chief, the First Lord of the Admiralty, has already made a statement, very exhaustive and important, with regard to the plans of the Admiralty during the ensuing year. I do not think, however, it would be respectful to the House of Commons, which is asked to vote a sum of over £30,000,000, if I were to ask merely to be allowed to hold up that document and ask the House to receive it as read. I am not entitled to assume that every Member of this House has read that document; and, even if they had, I think they might justly demand from me an elucidation of some of the points referred to, and some enlargement of the propositions it contains. Hut I shall endeavour to avoid, as far as possible, going into any unnecessary detail, or wearying the House by reference to matters on which they can inform themselves from the First Lord's Memorandum.

Now, I imagine what the House really wants to know is, very briefly, whether value has been obtained for the very large sum which the House, with great unanimity, has voted for the service of the Navy in past years, whether value is now being obtained for such sums as are being expended, and whether there is a reasonable probability that, if they grant the very large Supply which is asked for in the Estimates this year, that sum will be expended in strengthening the Navy and in additions to the Navy. I believe that I shall be able to give that assurance, and to supply facts which will convince hon. Members on both sides of the House that they *For "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1901–1902,"see Appendix to this Volume. are justified in acceding to what I admit is the very large stun which the Navy demands. My business is financial, but there is an old saying that an ounce of fact is worth a ton of theory, and though we may test the value of the Navy by the amount of the sums which we appropriate to its service, and may value the service it renders on the basis of the report which may he made by its representative in this House, we can value those services far better when we can put them to the test of actual fact. We must not shut our eyes to the fact that the Navy is maintained really for one purpose alone—that is, for carrying on successful war when war happens to be unhappily necessary for this country. [An HON. MEMBER: To prevent war. My hon. friend very truly says that the object of the Navy is to prevent war, but it can only prevent war by being an efficient instrument for the conduct of war when war takes place.

We have had during the, last twelve months some evidence that tends to show that the Navy is adequate for the purpose for which, we maintain it and to which we devote such large sums. We have had the operations in China, in connection with the relief of the Legations in Peking, and I think it is permissible for me to say one word with regard to those operations. I am happy to say—and I hope the House will understand that on this matter, and every other naval matter on which I speak. I am here as the mouthpiece of the Lords of the Admiralty, who instruct me, and by whom I am bound to be instructed, with regard to the technical matters of the Navy. They tell me, and I gladly accept what I think we all know to be the fact, that the conduct of the naval contingent in China has been admirable and excellent, that the gallantry of the naval contingent which followed Admiral Seymour and attempted to relieve Peking was all that we could desire from British sailors, and that the subsequent conduct of the naval detachment which was under the orders of General Gaselee was equally creditable to the Navy. I do not think it is in my province to make any selection where all have done so well; but I am permitted to make special reference to the gallant behaviour of a party of some forty-eight of the Royal Marines who attacked and took, against great odds, the military college in the neighbourhood of Peking on the occasion of Admiral Seymour's advance. The testimony of a post-captain in the Royal Navy, which every man serving in the Navy will appreciate, was that these gallant Marines, when they attacked this fortification, climbed the walls as coolly as if they were bird-nesting. I must not leave the subject of active operations in China without one word of tribute to the effective service which was rendered by the Australian contingent. For the first time. I believe, since the war of 1812. we have had a colonial naval contingent taking an active and effective part in the naval work of this Empire. We have had three Australian contingents. We have had the-contribution of His Majesty's ship "Protector" and two other Australian contingents from New South Wales and Victoria, both taking part in the advance on Peking; and we have but one testimony, both from the naval and military officers concerned, as to the effective service rendered by these men and the excellent behaviour of the men. I confess I permit myself to hope that this remarkable precedent, which has been set almost on the day of the birth of the great Commonwealth of Australia, may at some no distant day be imitated with advantage to the Empire by the equally great Dominion of Canada.

Passing from this very brier illustration of the power of the Navy to render those services which we rely on it to render in case of emergency, I come to what is strictly my business, the exposition of the financial aspect of the naval expenditure during the coming year. The sum which the House of Commons is asked to vote is unprecedented; it is larger, I believe, than any sum, which it has ever been asked to vote to the service of the Fleet: but I think I -hall be able to give good reasons why Parliament should assent to that expenditure. The total expenditure which the House is asked to vote is £30,875,676, as compared with £27,522,600 in the past year. But. in order to make that statement of figures absolutely fair, it is necessary to add on to the expenditure of last year the additional Estimate which was asked for by the First Lord, at a late period of the session, for certain specific purposes, a sum which does not come into the category of a Supplementary Estimate, and which was added to the original Estimate before it was finally sanctioned by the House. That additional Estimate of last year amounted to £1,169,300, giving a total for last year of £28,691,900, as compared with this year's Estimate of £30.875,67, or a net increase for the coming financial year of £2,183,776. I have not added on to those figures the Supplementary Estimate which has been asked for, and agreed to by the House of Commons during the present year. The items of the Supplementary Estimate have been explained very fully to the House by my hon. friend the Civil Lord: and he has shown that they were without exception due to unforeseen circumstances which could not have been contemplated at the time when the original Estimates, or when the additional Estimates, were presented to the House. I should nor like to take upon myself to say that there is no possibility that unforeseen circumstances will not arise during the year to entail an equivalent Estimate. I think hon. Members will agree that it is fair to compare the original and additional Estimate of last year with the Estimate I am now submitting to the House, and from those figures we get this increase of £2,183,776.

The House will want some explanation of this very large increase in the Estimate. The House will want to know, when they are consenting to vote over £2,000,000 increase, whether all this money is being expended for the one purpose in which it is interested, namely, the effective strengthening of the Navy. I believe that I can give that assurance to the House. A portion of the increase, of course, cannot be classed under the head of an effecting increase for the strengthening of the Navy, as there was an increase in prices. There was a large increase in the price of coal last year, which was met by a Supplementary Estimate. There was a certain increase in the price of stores and clothing which also went to. the Supplementary Estimate; but I am happy to say that, unless our anticipations prove incorrect, these items will be substantially diminished during the forthcoming year. Additional expendi- ture without additional advantage to the Navy will be diminished in the year to come. There may be, no doubt, a certain amount of increase owing to the continuance of the war in South Africa, and there may be items owing to the disturbed state of things in China which we are not able to foresee; but whatever is spent on these heads I cannot pretend is an effective addition to the resources of the Navy. Setting aside all these matters, there is a large remaining addition which I believe will be expended in making the Navy stronger next year than it was last year.

There is an addition to the vote for personnel, the men, and officers of the Navy, of £233,000. There is an addition to the other two important Votes which appear in the Estimates—Votes 8 and 9 — which are concerned with the construction of ships and with the guns of the Navy—which amounts to £1,274,000 and £161,000 respectively, or, roughly speaking, a total of £1,436,000. I contend that an addition of £233,000 for personnel is a pure addition to the strength of the Navy. There is, in addition to this, another sum with reference to which I do not propose to trouble the House. That is the addition which will, I hope, be made under the head of the Works Loan Bill of the Navy. That is a matter which my hon. friend the Civil Lord will deal with at a later stage; but I think he will be able to assure the House that, whatever the amount of the addition which he may have to disclose, all of it will be spent on increasing what I may call the plant of the Navy. Now. I should like to speak first with regard to the personnel of the Navy. The increase proposed for personnel in the Estimate includes an increase of 287 officers, 1,150 seamen, 1,000 Marines, 500 stokers, 100 electricians, and one or two other small additions. There have been also other additions to the Reserves. But what I desire to speak of at a little more length, and what the House will desire to know before I go into the small amount of detail into which I propose to go, is the net result upon the total available resources of men available for manning the Fleet in case of war, because here we come in contact with the root fact of the situation—the position of the Navy in the event of war. We shall have, we hope, 118,625 men upon the active list of the Navy. We shall have 28,650 men in the Royal Naval Reserve, and we shall have, if our anticipations are fulfilled, during the financial year, 7,300 men of the Royal Fleet Reserve, or a total of 154,575 men available for manning the Fleet.

MR. KEARLEY (Devonport)

Exclusive of the Seamen's Pensioners Reserve?

*MR. ARNOLD- FORSTER

The number of seamen pensioners at present is 10,000 men. We offer to all those men who are eligible the opportunity of entering the Royal Fleet Reserve and an opportunity of entering the Royal Naval Reserve. We have reason to believe that, excluding those who on account of age are not eligible there will be an entry of something like 5,000 out of those 10.000 men into the Royal Fleet Reserve. The remaining 5,000 men will remain as they are now, classed as seamen pensioners; and I hope they will be able in an emergency to render valuable service. But I have not taken this residue into account in computing what I consider to be the effective number of men for the service of the Fleet in time of war. The hon. Member will understand that I have not counted anybody twice. On the other hand, I have omitted to count the 5,000 seamen pensioners. I am glad that the First Lord and the Board of Admiralty have decided to make this attempt to raise the Royal Fleet Reserve. I entertain a personal opinion, which I believe is shared brothers, that it is a heavy tax on this or on any other country to maintain 112,000 men on the active list for service in the Fleet. It is difficult to train them and to employ them in time of peace; but, on the other hand, every naval officer knows, and everyone interested in the service knows, that the value of trained men in time of war cannot be exaggerated.

We are confronted by two alternatives: whether we shall go on adding indefinitely to this great burden—and it is a great burden—or whether we shall seek to obtain from some other source, an addition to that force eligible for service in time of war which shall have the same qualities as the trained men we have under the present system. I believe it will be found that in the Royal Fleet Reserve which it is now proposed to establish we shall have at any rate a partial solution of that somewhat difficult problem.

There are many hon. Members who are interested in another branch of the Reserve, and that is the Royal Naval Reserve, which now stands at 28,650 men. In the First Lord's statement it is recited that there has been a difficulty in recruiting for the Royal Naval Reserve up to the full strength which we desire it to attain, and that the proposals which were made not long ago in the House for improving the efficiency of the Royal Naval Reserve have not proved as satisfactory in their working as we desired. It has been found that the conditions which were imposed on the Royal Naval Reserve were too onerous, or, put in another way, they were not sufficiently attractive to bring men into the Naval Reserve to the extent we desired. The Admiralty has reckoned with that fact. and they have immediately taken steps to remedy the state of things they deplore. The terms offered to the seamen of the Royal Naval Reserve have been modified. Under the old regime they were conditions which did not prove satisfactory to the men. The pay of 1s. 3d. a day was, I think, considered insufficient in itself for men who were asked to vacate their ordinary vocations for' a period of six months. The six months training at sea was regarded as too long by the men, and I am informed that the withdrawal of the gratuity of 10s. a month paid to the men of the Royal Naval Reserve under the old system operated adversely to the force. The fifteen months compulsory service at sea was not regarded with favour—the fifteen months, I mean, which entitled them to qualify for the full pension under the old system. All these facts have been carefully considered by the Admiral Superintendent and the Board of Admiralty. Steps have been taken which I think the Admiralty are right in believing will remedy the difficulty. The sea service of the Royal Naval Reserve has been reduced from six months to three months, and the total sea service from fifteen months to nine months. The gratuity of the men serving is at the rate of 20s. per month for each of the, three months served, with a further gratuity of 40ss. at the end of the period, or a total sum of £5. I expect that my hon. and gallant friends who criticise the pro posal will say that the reduction of the period of training at sea from six to three months is inadvisable, but we ask them to reconsider that opinion, because in the opinion of the most competent officers of the Fleet that will not be so. Under the old system many men were called upon to serve in ordinary seagoing ships of the Navy, and the complaint was made, whether justified or not I do not say, that the duties which the men were called upon to perform were neither interesting nor dignified in their character, and were not such as to encourage men to undergo them voluntarily. It is now proposed to put the whole of the Royal Naval Reserve men who come up for their period of three months training under the direct control of the Admiral Superintendent of the Naval Reserve, who will embark them in coastguard ships, giving them during the three months training the full course of which that period allows, and who will demand from them— that which I believe they will be perfectly willing to give—the performance of the ordinary routine of bluejackets' life, and that efficiency which they are required to furnish for the service of the country. By this means we believe the efficiency of the Royal Naval Reserve will be restored and its numbers raised.

With regard to the Royal Fleet Reserve. I think in one respect it is an absolutely new departure. The Royal Fleet Reserve is to be composed entirely of trained men. At the commencement we are to draw it from two sources. There is the Seamen Pensioners Reserve, which is composed of men who have served their apprenticeship in the Navy and who are now in receipt of pensions, and are under the liability to serve in case of war. We offer to such of these men as are eligible the opportunity of entering the Fleet Reserve. If they do so, they will undoubtedly receive advantages which they have not received while members of the Reserve in receipt of pensions. Their period of drill will be reduced from two weeks to one week; they will have a gratuitous issue of clothing, or in lieu of that a sum of 10s., and they will have the higher rate of continuous service pay as opposed to non-continuous service pay. But we do not depend on the seamen pensioners for manning the Fleet Reserve; we rely on taking a certain number of that Reserve, and for the future we shall ask all seamen pensioners to enter the Fleet Reserve. We shall make it compulsory upon them to enter the Fleet Reserve. We throw open this opportunity to all seamen who have served twelve years, and to those who have served for a lesser period and who have left the Navy with a good character and have received a recommendation from the commander-in-chief of the station. We reckon that during the present year we shall bring up the total of these two classes to 7,000, and that eventually we shall raise the number of class "B," that is to say the number exclusive of seamen pensioners, to 15,000. I want the House to understand that all these men will be exceedingly valuable to the Navy, for all will have gone through a full probation of a long period on ships at sea during their lives. I venture to make this remark. Suppose this country is in difficulties and dangers and in the competition of preparation for eventualities I think we cannot overrate the advantage which is given us by the possession of a great amount of trained material.

*MR. WILLIAM ALLAN (Gateshead)

And what about the engineers and stokers in the service?

MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER

I know the hon. Member's interest in that subject, but he must allow me to deal with it later on. I am now dealing with the Fleet Reserve. I think any seaman and any man acquainted with naval matters will admit that the difference between a trained and untrained crew is enormous, and it will be invaluable to the Navy if we can add 15,000 trained men as we propose.

While I am dealing with the personnel, let me mention certain other arrange- ments. Questions have been asked on various occasions in regard to warrant officers, and I mention these in passing, for I know questions will be asked as to whether anything has been done in redemption of pledges frequently given. To such I have to say that the subject has received the very careful consideration of the Admiralty and that a Committee has been appointed, which Committee will, I hope, shortly report on the whole question of the Naval Ordnance Store Department, and I hope as the result of the labours of that Committee that opportunity will be presented to us for giving further employment to warrant officers, whose claims have so often been advocated in the House of Commons. There is another matter mentioned in the First Lord's statement—and I only mention this in passing as emblematic of the progress made on the scientific side of organisation in the Fleet—is that of the rating of electricians. This is a new rating, on which I hope we shall maintain 100 in the present year and 100 subsequently. The enormous development in the electrical department of a ship has necessitated this outside rating. These men will pass through examination into the Navy and will form, I hope, a valuable contribution to the staff of torpedo lieutenants in ships.

SIR FORTESCUE FLANNERY (Yorkshire, Shipley)

asked if they would be rated as engineers or as executive officers.

*MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER

They will be rated as petty officers and chief petty officers, assistants to torpedo lieutenants, in connection with the large amount of electrical gear they have to superintend on ships. I thought the hon. Member was going to ask me about engineers. I am aware that the whole question of the position of engineer's in the Navy has attracted the serious attention of Members of the House, and none more than of the hon. Member for Shipley, and perhaps those hon. Members will not take it amiss of me if I ask leave not to go into this matter at length to-night. The hon. Member and others know what has been done for engineers in the present year, and I am aware that what has been done has not given entire satisfaction to engineers in the Navy and those who claim to he their representatives. But the subject is much too wide and much too important for me to attempt to deal with it on an occasion like this. It will be raised at a later stage of the Navy Estimates, and I feel that I should be wasting time if I endeavoured to deal with it at the present time in the manner hon. Members interested would wish me to deal with it. I will only say this. The question of dealing with the position of engineers in the Navy is a very difficult one. I have done my best to make myself personally acquainted with it. The difficulties we have felt, however, are not peculiar to our own Navy; they have been experienced in. all the European navies and in the United States; and if we are cautious in dealing with the matter, and if I hesitate to pronounce an opinion on it, I hope that hon. Members will not charge me with being recalcitrant. The difficulty which we feel has been, and is. felt by others.

There remains one matter of great interest to the House in connection with the personnel, and a statement has been made in the House, which, if carried into effect, would largely touch the question of the personnel of the Navy, and that is the question of furnishing protection for coaling stations. This matter has been mentioned by my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for War, and my right hon. friend has stated that in his personal view it is desirable that the Navy should undertake to find the men for garrisoning certain coaling stations. I think he made it clear to the House, and, if he did not. I desire to do so, that the view expressed by the Secretary of State was, to a certain extent, a personal view. The view expressed by a Secretary of State for War is, of course, of very great weight, but it is also fair to state, as he said, that this matter has yet to receive the careful consideration of the Admiralty authorities. The Board of Admiralty is most anxious in this, as in all other matters, to co-operate with every other department for the service of our country, but they feel entitled and, indeed, bound to consider whether they can effectively contribute to the service of the country in this particular manner. I know I am correct in stating that the Lords of the Admiralty have not up to the present moment been able to examine with the minuteness so important a project deserves the whole of the bearings of this very grave proposition. It will be the duty of the Admiralty to review the subject in all its bearings, and I hope the House will accept my promise that when it is so reviewed they will be informed of the result; but I ask them not to anticipate the view of the Admiralty at the present stage.

I pass from the question of personnel with a few remarks upon a subject in which my hon. friend the Member for Yarmouth and others take great interest—the training of officers. The Admiralty have laid on the Table a Report with regard to the training of executive officers, which, no doubt, will be discussed at the proper time. I believe it to be a bonâ fide contribution towards the solution of a very difficult question, and I believe it will greatly relieve the situation. I do not pretend that it goes over the whole subject; it does not touch the age of the entrance of cadets to the "Britannia," or the education to be given to lieutenants in the second course at Greenwich. It does not throw any light on a matter which has received the earnest consideration of the Admiralty, the matter of the prescribed course of the torpedo and gunnery lieutenants at Greenwich. It has been suggested that the time there is too great, that-some of the subjects are too complex and too little connected with the service of the Navy at sea and that the whole curriculum might be amended with advantage. I shall have something to say when that question is raised, but I wish the House to understand that the Report does not represent the whole of the consideration which has been given to it by the Admiralty, and when the question is raised I shall be prepared to state the views of the Admiralty in regard to every aspect of the matter.

Passing now from the question of personnel to that of matériel, I must mention Vote 9, the vote for guns and projectiles, on which an increase of £161,000 is asked for, The right hon. Gentle-man the Member for Forest of Dean has sometimes criticised, with the great knowledge he possesses, the quality of our guns, and other hon. Members have criticised with absolute justice the delays in the delivery of our guns. I am glad to say those difficulties have passed away. We have caught up in the matter of guns, and delivery is now taking place with absolute regularity, and the quality of the guns is. I believe, all that could be desired. The new 7.5 gun referred to in the First Lord's statement is equal, if not superior, in ballistic power and general efficiency to similar guns of any foreign Power. Last year we asked for an additional sum for armour-piercing projectiles. I believe I can tell the House that that money is well spent, that these armour-piercing projectiles are absolutely essential to the efficiency of the Fleet, and that we are now in a fair way. for the first time, of supplying the Fleet with a, full and adequate supply of these projectiles, without which no Admiralty would like, under present circumstances, to send the Fleet into action. The question of a new powder—a very important question -is under the consideration of the Explosives Committee, and we hope that a derision will be arrived at at a very early date. We hope and believe that that decision will enable us to furnish for our magazines a powder which, while it will be equal, if not superior, to the cordite now in use, will be less destructive than that powder now is of the tubes of the guns in which it is used. Perhaps I may mention at this stage that the system of gunnery training has been very largely improved, and that we are making arrangements by which the amount of ammunition at the disposal of officers commanding all ships, and gunnery training ships especially, will be largely increased. We are directing our efforts towards forming a school of gunnery at sea, while doing nothing to detract from the high state of efficiency of the gunnery training ships "Whale Island" and "Excellent," and the "Cambridge" at home; and we have introduced a system of encouragement and rewards, guided by selection, for those men who are competent to aim a gun—a very rare and very precious accomplishment—and we believe it will be of inestimable value to the Fleet in time of war.

We have asked the House to sanction considerable expenditure for anchors and moorings in connection with the new harbours for which you are asked to vote money, and for part of which you have already voted money. We are taking steps to do what is a most important thing—that is, to render the coaling arrangements for the Fleet, not only at home stations but throughout the world, adequate to the growing needs of our Navy. I come now to a matter which is also of great interest. I refer to the question of construction. But before I enter upon this subject I should like to make an announcement which, I think, will be of interest to some hon. Members of this House. We have year by year heard attacks made, which I am not prepared to say were wholly unjustifiable, on the arming of ships with muzzle-loading guns—a class of gun which, hon. Members know, has long ceased to rank, to put it mildly, in the first place among the navies of the world. There is a Return associated with the name of my right hon. friend the Member for the Forest of Dean of ships of this and of foreign countries, and I think it will be some consolation not only to him, but to others, to know that from that Return there have been struck off' the list of so-called effective ships of the Navy, no less than sixteen vessels—the"Triumph,'' the "Invincible," the "Audacious," the "Northumberland," the "Agincourt," the "Achilles," the "Minotaur," the "Black Prince," the "Warrior," the "Belleisle," the "Hydra," the "Neptune," the "Swiftsure," the "Iron Duke, "the "Nelson," and the "Northampton." Some ships partly armed with muzzle-loading guns remain on the list, and must remain until we have effective additions to the Navy-List. I may mention the case of the Alexandra," which carries twelve 6-inch breech-loading guns, as well as twelve very heavy muzzle-loading guns, and it will be realised that there are conditions in which this ship might be utilised and might be a formidable addition to any squadron to which she was attached.

I now come to the question of construction. We are asking for a Vote of a sum of over nine millions sterling, the largest sum that has ever yet been asked for construction in the Royal Navy. [An HON. MEMBER: New construction?] I am speaking of ships which are under construction and ships which are proposed to be commenced. Both come: technically under the head of new construction. We have now built or commenced since a period which is well within the recollection of hon. Members —that is to say, the completion of the class of ship of which the "Majestic" was a type—we have completed or commenced, or asked authority to commence, twenty-three battleships. Of these five—the"Canopus,"the"Glory," the "Albion," the "Goliath," and the"Ocean"—are now completed. Others are in various stages of completion, and we are asking authority to commence three more battleships, for which the design is not yet settled. As to cruisers, since the completion of the "Diadem" class we have asked authority to commence thirty. Of these a large majority are of the armoured cruiser class—a vessel which is very greatly required in the Royal Navy at the present time. One of these, the "Cressy," is already completed, and a, large number of them are in an advanced stage of building, and, we hope, will be available for service to the Navy at an early date. But when I speak of construction, I picture to myself what is the reflection which is in the mind of almost every hon. Member who hears me. They will say—"What about delay in the construction?" I want to say a word which, I think, will make it easier to discuss this question at a later stage. These delays are, of course, owing to very various causes. I believe I am justified in stating that the causes which have; been responsible for these delays have diminished, are diminishing, and will pass away altogether. Of course, one of the greatest causes of delay was the delay in the supply of armour. I have taken great pains to inform myself as to who was responsible for the delay in the supply of the armour. believe that the answer to that problem is this—that the great change in the form of the armour used is the real reason for the delay in completion. The whole method of making armour was revolutionised when first Harveyised plates, and, secondly, the Krupp system, was introduced into the Navy. In order to produce that kind of armour the whole plant of the armour-makers had practically to be reconstructed, and that work took time. It has been said that if the Admiralty had been awake, if they had given a pledge to the makers of armour that they would take so much armour from them in any particular year, they would have had the armour at an earlier date. I do not think that is the fact. It is not in the power of the Admiralty without legislation by this House to give any pledge of the kind. But an equivalent pledge was given when a large programme of armed battleships and armed cruisers was announced, and it had the effect that the Admiralty thought it would have. These great armour-plate manufacturers accepted that pledge, and have expended enormous sums of money. I know of two firms each of which has expended a million sterling in adding to their plant for the construction of armour, and now, for the first time, we get the result in an enormously increased output. I have been down to see this armour as it has been delivered, and the House may take it from me that we are going to get a delivery of armour during the next year such as has never been paralleled during the last six or seven years.

In regard to the question of machinery, there has been undoubtedly a great deal of delay which has hampered the completion of the ships. With knowledge which I did not before possess, I repeat what has been said by those who have spoken before me, that a large part of that delay is still due to the engineers' strike. That may appear to be a far-fetched cause, but I come face to face with this fact. The whole of the ships of the "Diadem" class were ordered prior to that strike, and they were completed prior to the contract time. Then supervened the engineers' strike, and from that time not one single ship has been completed within the contract time. I think I am justified in connecting these two circumstances—and the evidence I receive enables me to connect them as a logical consequence—and to say that delay has resulted from the engineers' strike, which affected not only the output but the whole of the machinery supplied by the contractors for the production of the articles which we required. I do not intend to dilate upon this question. What I want to say now is that who are all agreed that this question of arrears is deplorable. | There have been arrears; there are arrears. We have not built ships as quickly as we have wanted them built. But the amount of the delay is perhaps exaggerated. The arrears have not been anything approaching what we have been led to suppose by the criticisms in the press. I have particulars of the rate of building in all the great countries of Europe, and in the United States, and I find that we still hold our preeminence in the matter of rapidity in the building of our ships, though we have not gone back to that happy state when we built the "Royal Sovereign." The "Canopus," the "Goliath," and the "Ocean" have been built and completed in two years and eleven months, three years, and three years respectively, while Russian ships have taken eight years, or six years and three months. In France the "St. Louis" has taken five years and five months, and the "Gaulois" three years and nine months. The only Rower that has approached us has been Germany. [An HON. MEM-BEE: Japan.] That is another matter. They were ships built in this country. What I want to point out is this, that if there has been delay in construction it has not been quite as serious as some hon. Members would have us suppose. But I admit frankly that there have been arrears; they are deplorable and ought to cease. I believe the Admiralty have taken steps in regard to this matter which will commend themselves to the House. The First Lord has appointed a Committee, of which I happen to be a member. Another member of that Committee is the Controller of the Navy, an officer who has a long and ample experience of everything that appertains to the ship construction of the Navy. But we have added to that Committee two gentlemen whose names are very familiar to this House—the hon. Member for Maidstone and Sir Thomas Sutherland. By selecting two shipowners accustomed to order their own ships, and to get them, we have made the best selection we could. I am anxious that the real facts of the case should be ascertained, and that we should get at the bottom of the question of whether everything has been done which might have been done by the Admiralty with regard to the building of ships. I am bound to say, on behalf of the Department I am associated with, that I do not believe we shall find, and, as far as our researches have gone, who have not found, that there have been much more than natural causes at work, and that, although the procedure of the Admiralty has occasionally gone hardly with certain firms, whose whole effort has not been devoted to building for the Admiralty, in the majority of cases the arrangements of the Admiralty have been found reasonable an i workable, and the difficulties which have supervened have been difficulties due to circumstances outside the control of the Admiralty or the contractors. If that be not so, we are in the way to find out the facts. We have invited the representatives of all the great firms to come and state their own cases and give their evidence frankly and openly.

Having got over, as far as we can, the question of arrears, we are venturing upon a new programme. We propose to commence during the coming year three battleships, six first-class armoured cruisers, two third - class armoured cruisers, ten destroyers, five torpedo-boats, two sloops, and five submarine vessels. I will not say much about submarine vessels, but I will say that I am glad that the Admiralty, under the advice of Lord Gosehen, took the view that it was wise not to be found unprepared in regard to this matter. We have a, great amount of information about these boats, but we do not attach, an exaggerated value to it. But who believe that an ounce of practice is worth a ton of theory, and that when we get officers and men to see these boats they will learn more from them than from many reports which come from foreign countries. One thing stands between the submarine boat and efficiency, and that is the motor by which it is propelled. But there is no disguising the fact, that if you can add speed to the other qualities of the submarine boat, it might, in certain circumstances, become a very formidable vessel. We are comforted by the judgment of the United States and Germany, which is hostile to these inventions, which I confess desire shall never prosper. But we cannot regard our position as the same as that of other nations. The United States to-morrow, if a perfect submarine were invented, would only have more secure protection for their harbours. in Germany the harbours are no doubt carefully protected now. But we live in the narrow waters of the Channel, and our problem is not precisely that of any other nation, and I am glad that Lord Goschen did give this instruction to the Board which has now borne fruit in this determination to put this experiment into execution and we shall see the result of it during the next financial year.

Now I come to the last point—that of boilers, which has very justly and rightly been agitating the minds of many outside as well as inside the House, The facts have already been revealed in the? Memorandum presented to this House in the Report of the Boilers Committee. I believe the House has but one view on the boiler question—that is. that the only solution which will be satisfactory is that which will give an absolutely secure boiler to His Majesty's Fleet, and they will not be content with anything less. I think we must consider for a moment what the situation is. There have been many complaints, in this blouse and outside, against the Belleville boiler. I saw the very first Belleville boiler which was placed in a French ship of war, and I have followed the question with no less interest than the hon. Member opposite ever since they have been introduced into the British Navy. I do not desire to blame those responsible for the introduction of those boilers into our Navy. I believe it would be disastrous to penalise any officer for venturing to accept responsibility. In justification of those responsible I will say that a Committee, of which the competence is acknowledged, has endorsed their conclusion that the water-tube boiler should be introduced in ships of war. And this is not only the conclusion of this Committee, but of every advisory board of every Admiralty in Europe, Asia, and America. Therefore, I am not going to take upon myself to lay any blame upon those who introduced the water tube boiler. Many hon. Members were of opinion that the trials which had taken place were not adequate or satisfactory. We are all acquainted with the history of the question, and of the expression of opinion inside and outside this House. We know that, to the great satisfaction of Parliament, Mr. Goschen consented to appoint a Committee to inquire into the whole question. This Committee has issued an ad interim Report, which unequivocally condemns the Belleville boiler and says it was not the best. This places the Admiralty in a very peculiar position, for, while the Committee has condemned the Belleville boiler, it has added two recommendations which are entitled to equal weight. It is said that water-tube boilers are essential, that there are boilers other than the Belleville which might with advantage be used, but the Committee has not reported in favour of any of them. Indeed, up to the present moment the Committee has not had an opportunity of conducting experiments which would enable it to pronounce an opinion with regard to any one of these boilers. It is absolutely imperative that the Navy should be augmented and that the ships should not be delayed. The First Lord has done what was obviously a wise thing to do. He has stopped the construction of new ships for which boilers have not been constructed, and he has ordered an inquiry as to whether any other ships can be arrested with regard to their boilers the future type of which is not yet settled. Experiments are to be made with regard to the boiler which should be used in lieu of the Belleville boiler, and those experiments will be pressed forward with the greatest possible rapidity. But in the opinion of the Admiralty it would be wrong to allow any delay in the completion of these ships to occur if such delay merely depended on a long series of experiments. There are two types of boilers which have already received the imprimatur of the German and the United States Admiralties respectively, and one of which has received, in addition, the favourable opinion of our own Admiralty; I refer to the Babcock and Wilcox boiler. This boiler has been adopted in the United States Navy, and it has the advantage of having been successfully tried in a large number of ships of the mercantile marine. So we are not without data to go upon in introducing these boilers into the ships of the Navy. I have been to sea with these boilers. I have my own view of their merits. But it would be unfortunate if the House of Commons were to receive the impression from me that these boilers are what the hon. Member for Gateshead described them to be. The Report of the Committee is to this effect—that this is not the best type of boiler for His Majesty's ships; but they do not report that "it is murder to send men into the stokehold," or that the boilers "are so much scrap-iron"; and when I heard it stated that one of His Majesty's ships was drifting round a buoy in the East Indies, and I see reports from the commanding officer and the engineers of this very ship stating that there is absolutely nothing to complain of in the working of her boilers, that she has made under ordinary conditions and with bad coal a speed of 19 . 5 knots, and that she is just leaving for the Persian Gulf, the exaggeration does appear to me so gross that it is necessary to guard against the danger that might arise if we were to accept the whole of the views of the hon. Member for Gateshead. There are scores of ships of all kinds—battleships, cruisers, and mercantile ships—running every day and all day with these boilers—scores of ships running in European waters.

MR. WILLIAM ALLAN

Merchant ships?

*MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER

Yes, merchant ships. Great Japanese battleships have been out to the East, and battleships of our own have only within the last few days made runs with these boilers, which have given the greatest satisfaction. I have always held, and do believe, with regard to these boilers, that they have defects which are not equally common to all other boilers, and we must be very careful that we do not get another boiler which has the same defects and disadvantages. The House must not, however, believe that all the difficulties which are attributed to the manipulation of the Belleville boiler are peculiar to that boiler, for some of them are common to other boilers. I have said this in order to justify the position of the Admiralty. The position is this. They accept frankly and freely the Report of the Committee, and they intend to make the change the Committee has recommended. Moreover, they intend to make it retrospective, as far as it possibly can be without delaying the completion of His Majesty's ships. If it is found that there is some other boiler so manifestly superior to the Belleville boiler, it is still open to the Admiralty to put it into other ships in the course of time; but they will not be frightened into any weakening of His Majesty's Fleet in order to meet what they believe to be an exaggerated and fanciful view of the situation.

I know that many of the matters I have referred to cursorily will come up at another stage, and I shall endeavour then to meet any criticisms that may be passed; but this I do believe, that perhaps not those who have heard me, but those, who have read the statement of the First Lord will agree that though there may be matters open to criticism and additions which commend themselves to hon. Members, these Navy Estimates for the year 1901 are a reasonable and adequate compliance with the wish of the nation that the Navy should be maintained at that high standard of efficiency which is inseparable from the safety of the State. There is this great satisfaction about discussing anything with regard to the Royal Navy, that, whoever may be the exponent of the views of the Admiralty, though he has opponents to meet, and though, no doubt, some of those who differ from him are far superior to him in knowledge of technical matters—

MR. WILLIAM ALLAN

Hear, hear.

*MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER

Yes, Sir, I will gladly make an exception of the hon. Member for Gateshead, with regard to the matter I have just been dealing with but I do not except him from my next remark, which is this, that all those engaged in the discussion of matters connected with the Navy are as sincerely anxious as the Admiralty itself to make the Navy more efficient—

MR. WILLIAM ALLAN

As I am.

*MR ARNOLD-FORSTER

That is why I did not except you from this portion of my statement. We are all anxious to make the Navy more efficient, and to keep it up to the standard we all desire, and though we may differ we are all anxious for the same result.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

In obedience to what I understand is the general wish of the House, to which I gladly accede. I now ask leave to withdraw the motion before the House.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Resolved, That this House will immediately resolve itself into the Committee of Supply.—(Mr. A. J. Balfour.)

Considered in Committee:—

(In the Committee.)

[Mr. J. W. LOWTHER (Cumberland, Penrith) in the Chair.]