HC Deb 18 March 1901 vol 91 cc337-64

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a Supplementary Sum, not exceeding £893,316, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31 st day of March, 1901, for the following Civil Services and Revenue Departments. viz.:—

CIVIL SERVICES.
Class V. £
Vote 3. Colonial Services 212,300
Vote 2. British Protectorates in Uganda, etc. 200,000

Class VII
Vote 1. Temporary Commissions 9,000
Class II.
Vote 23. Stationery and Printing 110,000
Vote 27. Secretary for Scotland, Office of 100
Class III.
Vote 2. Miscellaneous Legal Expenses 400
Class IV.
Vote 5. Wallace Collection 3,333
Vote 8. London University 70
Class V.
Vote 1. Diplomatic and Consular Services 15,800
Vote 6. Treasury Chest Fund 66,108
Class VI.
Vote 1. Superannuation and Retired Allowances 10,000
Vote 5. Savings Banks and Friendly Societies Deficiencies 51.758
Class VII.
Vote 2. Miscellaneous Expenses 4,600
Vote 6. Local Loans Fund 4,337
Vote 7, Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York (Visit to the Colonies) 20,000
Vote 8. Funeral of Her late Majesty 35,500
REVENUE DEPARTMENTS.
Vote 2. Inland Revenue 20,000
Vote 3. Post Office 130,000
Vote 4. Post Office Packet Service 10
Total Civil Services and Revenue Departments £893,316

*MR. LOUGH moved the reduction of the item by £100. His desire in doing so was to ask some explanation from the Colonial Secretary with regard to the military operations in Ashanti, of which very little was known in this country. Those military operations, we understood, were carried out entirely by black troops, who had not been employed on such an important expedition before, and were carried out very successfully, and he joined in the praise given to them for the way in which they had carried out their task. He, however, regarded war as a bad business, and a proof of bad diplomatists being in power, though when we got into war it had to be carried through in a businesslike mariner. The Blue Book which had been distributed was almost completely filled with the record of military operations to which he desired to make no further reference, as his object was to consider the clauses which led to their being undertaken. Turning to the question of policy, the Colonial Secretary was responsible for the settlement of the country after the military expedition of 1896, which had led to the late war. A military expedition went up to Coomassie in 1895, and in connection with that expedition a great constitutional change took place in the government of Ashanti. After that expedition Ashanti was united with the Gold Coast; King Prempeh, who was acknowledged as over-lord by the other native kings, was forcibly removed from the country, a British Resident was appointed, and the natives were called upon to pay not only the cost of the expedition, but the war of twenty-three years before, when Sir Garnet Wolseley seized the country, in the shape of an annual tribute.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. J. CHAMBERLAIN, Birmingham, W.)

No, no. They were called upon to pay £12,500 per annum.

*MR. LOUGH

said that was for the old war. The natives were required to pay a capital sum of £250,000, and they were also asked to pay the cost of the expedition of 1895–6.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

The hon. Gentleman is labouring under a misapprehension; £12,500 was the total sum they were asked for.

*MR. LOUGH

thought that if the right hon. Gentleman looked into the figures he would find that the total amount came to an annual payment of £20,000. But in addition to this heavy annual tribute on the poor natives, all the gold ornaments of King Prempeh and treasure that could be found in the country had been taken away.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Some of the articles were plated, others were pure gold, but the total value was quite insignificant. They had been valued by an expert at £1,000. They were exhibited for some time in London, and afterwards sold.

*MR. LOUGH

said the right hon. Gentleman entirely failed to appreciate his point. The whole of the possessions of these unfortunate savages might not be of any value to us. but of very great value to them. And if these savages attached some sacred or historic value to these articles, it might be a means of conciliating them and making them content under our rule if we had to remove them from the country.

*MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

One of the most valuable of the articles was the sword of the executioner. I do not know if the hon. Member wishes that to he returned?

*MR. LOUGH

said he undoubtedly wished it to be returned, Heappealed to the House to consider this question seriously. Why could not the Government say to these people that so long as we remained rulers of the country their gold ornaments would always he safe? This was the first step in a policy of loot which had been pursued by the right hon. Gentleman from that day to this. We took the gold ornaments, the treasures, the sword of the executioner, and the king himself, and the result was that we disturbed twenty-five years of peace which had existed under our rule, and produced chaos and confusion in the country by disturbing the institutions with which the people were familiar. He implored the Committee to consider the results of the expedition in 1896. Let them take the Jesuits in Coomassie itself. Instead of being as it had been previously a prosperous African city, it was in a state of absolute desolation. By removing King Prempeh the Government got into bad relations with all the chiefs, who would have been able to deal with King Prempeh, he being able in turn to deal with us. We, however, took him away, and dealt directly, and eventually bad relations arose with all the minor kings. The Resident at Coomassie had unlimited power in the matter of fining these chiefs, and was under no obligation to make any return of the fines he exacted. That in itself was a bad system to encourage, and some restraint should be put upon it. The Resident in collecting the taxes also allowed the chiefs to keep 10 per cent. of all the money they got.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

The sum which the chief has to find is a fixed amount, and be is only allowed to keep 10 per cent. of that. He would have no advantage in collecting a larger sum, because we do not ask for a larger sum, and should not receive it.

*MR. LOUGH

complained of the right hon. Gentleman's constant interruption. He thought that the right hon. Gentleman's points were very thin. The Government fixed a sum which bad never been collected in any one year, and which was, in his opinion, absolutely uncollectable. The Government fixed the amount at about 300 ounces of gold a year, He would ask the right hon. Gentleman, as a matter of fact, did the Government ever get from any king in one year the full amount which they bad fixed?

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

The charge was fixed at the time when Sir Frederick Hodgson went to Coomassie. The war broke out immediately afterwards and consequently it was not collected, it is only now that we are going to receive it.

*MR. LOUGH

contended that notwithstanding the right hon. Gentleman's explanation within the maximum fixed the Resident is entitled to take as much as he could and to allow the kings to retain 10 per cent. of whatever they brought in.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

If the hon. Gentleman complains of my interruptions and I cease to interrupt him he must not take it that I agree with what he says.

*MR. LOUGH

I do not object to being interrupted if I am inaccurate.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Oh, it is all inaccurate.

*MR. LOUGH

said he challenged the wisdom of the Government in insisting upon annual payments of this kind. When Sir Frederick Hodgson went to Coomassie in 1895 he insisted that a large payment should be made by each king. He found fault with the Government because it had not succeeded in establishing good relations with the subject kings. Turning now to the military operations of last year, he had to bring before the House one of the most extraordinary stories it had ever heard. In December, 1899, there came to Accra an idiot boy who said that he knew where the Golden Stool was, and that if a white officer and some Hausas were sent secretly with him he would take them to the spot. The Governor actually accepted the story of this mad boy and sent out an expedition to seek for the Golden Stool and the treasure concealed with it. In March, l900, the Governor went up to Coomassie, where he had a palaver with the Ashanti kings and chiefs at which he made a speech to them. These natives had tried all they could, as he ventured to think, to remain peaceful subjects of this country, but when Sir F. Hodgson demanded from them this large tribute and the Golden Stool, and told them that the over-lordship of Prempeh would never be restored, they made no answer and were extremely dissatisfied. It was from that palaver that the siege of Coomassie arose and this dreadful war broke out. The Hausa soldiers behaved most gallantly, and we lost 200 or 300 of them, and perhaps nearly 1,000 carriers. The slaughter among our opponents, who it must be remembered were British subjects and had been so for twenty-five years, was immense, but no attempt had been made to calculate it. He wanted the Committee to consider three points. First, in regard to the Golden Stool. To the Ashantis this was a most serious matter. The Golden Stool meant a throne on which the king sat as the over-lord of all the other kings and chiefs. Now, why should we remove that Golden Stool from Ashanti? This war had been caused entirely by the unsympathetic policy of the Colonial Office and the inability of the resident Governor to deal with these people who were struggling for an idea, namely, that the over-lord of the country should be allowed to be the means of communication between them and us. What was wrong in that? He did not say anything now about King Prempeh, for there was another alternative, Atcheri Boanda, whom the Ashantis, if we objected to Prempeh, would accept as an over-lord, and who was willing to render homage to us. Why should we not accept that system of government under which the people were willing to live? He maintained that the whole attempt to take the Golden Stool had been a mistake. His next point was the tribute. This tribute was not for the purpose of governing the country, but for the cost of Sir Garnet Wolseley's war in 1873–4, and the expedition of 1896, and the last war -a total of £400,000. It was no wonder that these natives were driven into revolt. We had got in Ashanti one of the richest gold-producing countries in the world, and the idea of making these poor people pay the cost of our acquiring their own country seemed to him one of the most iniquitous propositions ever made. He would leave the morality of the transaction aside, because that argument might not appeal to many hon. Gentlemen opposite. We had never got the tribute, and why should we continue to send costly expeditions to exact it? It was absolute folly to torture these poor people into rebellion. Another point was that during these four years, in which we have been mis-governing the country, we have allowed the free importation of arms there. [An HON. MEMBER: From Birmingham.] In regard to policy, then, he might sum, up the matter by asking five questions. He would ask the Colonial Secretary whether the constitutional principle of a native over-lord who would be an intermediary between the Ashantis and this country to facilitate government might not be accepted by the Colonial Office. Second, he asked the Colonial Secretary to promise that there should be no more hunts after the Golden Stool, that we should leave it in the country, and assure the Ashantis full protection in that and their other property. Third, he would ask the Colonial Secretary to promise that the fines which the Residents were allowed to exact from the chiefs without giving any report to the Government of the Gold Coast, or to the Colonial Office, would be put a stop to, and that a strict record of the fines exacted after proper trial should be kept. Fourth, the total cost of the three wars would amount to £900,000. We would never recover. that £900,000, or even the interest on it; it was far too large a sum, and he would ask that all these attempts to exact this money might be abandoned. Finally, he would ask whether some better means of collecting the tax might not be arrived at than by a commission of 10 per cent. on the amount collected. The Ashantis were a valiant people, with many good qualities, their country was one of the richest in the world, and we should treat them with some sense of justice. He begged to move the reduction of the Vote by £100.

Whereupon Motion made, and Question proposed, "That item A, 1, Class 5, Vote 3, be reduced by £100."—(Mr. Lough.)

*MR. SYDNEY BUXTON

thought his hon. friend was fully justified in raising this question, and he would like to associate himself in regard to what had fallen from him with reference to the military-operations. It was essential that the Governor should be rescued, and that those besieging him in Coomassie should be thought a lesson for the future. He thought the ability and efficiency with which the military operations had been carried out reflected great credit on General Sir J. Willcocks and the men of the West African Field Force whom he commanded. If we were to have these expeditions on the West Coast of Africa it was satisfactory that instead of using white men or the West Indian regiments we should be able to fall back on what was really a very efficient and economical force. Some further I explanation and defence of these two expeditions was demanded from the right hon. the Colonial Secretary, and some justification for the policy which led to them. The first did not involve any actual fighting, but the second, involving very considerable lighting and bloodshed, was a bolt from the blue. The unexpected had happened, as unfortunately had been too frequently the case in the record of the present Government, and the Secretary of State must bear the responsibility for what he could only call a costly muddle. The reason given by the Governor in his despatches why this war suddenly broke out was, that there had been compulsory labour enforced in one of the sections, that various attempts had been made to recover the Golden Stool, and the imposition of very considerable fines for past wars. These were all matters which had been the subject of negotiations for a long time, and the Government and Colonial Secretary ought to have appreciated their importance, and to have done something to soothe the irritation caused by them. The general proposition he ventured to lay down in regard to this war, and in regard to the wars we had had in every one of our colonies on the West Coast of Africa, during the past five years, was, that in his system of colonial development and extension the right hon. Gentleman had been too much in a hurry, and had been treading in many cases on the susceptibilities of the natives and interfering too rapidly with their customs, laws, and systems. Some tact, discretion, and patience was needed in dealing with these tribes. The right hon. Gentleman admitted that plea?

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

No, I do not.

*MR. SYDNEY BUXTON

said that at all events his argument was that, while he agreed with the general view that these colonies must be developed, there were many ways of developing them, and he thought the right hon. Gentleman had tended to move too quickly. As regarded this particular outbreak, he attributed it largely to two causes. In 1896 an expedition was sent up to Coomassie which did not meet with armed opposition. The right hon. Gentleman's instructions to the Governor were that he was to see that King Prempeh made submission to the English Government and accepted an English Resident. Prempeh agreed to the Resident, and had to make submission in the most humiliating way. That was necessary under the circumstances. But after Prempeh had submitted, the Governor, acting under the direct instructions of the Secretary of State, made further demands - the immediate payment of a tine of 50,000 ounces of gold as an indemnity for past wars. Prempeh said that he had not 10,000 ounces of gold in his pocket But the Governor would not accept that plea, and though he had given the King and the tribes no notice, he by what seemed to them an act of treachery, took possession of the person of Prempeh and his immediate followers, sent them down to the coast, and then to Sierro Leone, where they were still in prison. Now. however great a tyrant Prempeh might have been, and however bad his moral qualities, at all events we had acknowledged him some years before, we had negotiated with him, we had never given him notice either that we were going to raise this claim for a large sum of money, or that we would take him, in default, a political prisoner out of his country and never allow him to return to it. He maintained that the Ashantis were fully justified in thinking that we had committed an act of treachery, and therefore it was not likely that they would trust us again. Moreover, when Prempeh was taken prisoner he was promised good treatment. When a discussion was raised some little time ago on the point that Prempeh was hardly receiving that treatment which, under the circumstances, he should have got, the right hon. Gentleman, with a sneer, described the King as a drunken blackguard, or words to that effect.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I do not recognise my own words. Perhaps that is the interpretation of the hon. Gentleman.

*MR. SYDNEY BUXTON

said he had not the reference by him, but the right hon. Gentleman spoke in such a way of this man as to imply that whatever his treatment it was not worse than he deserved. It was treatment on which the tribes might naturally feel sore. Then what happened? The Governor went up to Coomassie, which had been in the meantime fortified and armed. He then called a palaver of the chiefs and kings of the neighbouring tribes and made them a speech, in which he said they must be under no misapprehension that Prempeh would ever be restored as king; that the Queen was now paramount chief, that being the policy of the Government. He (the hon. Member) had no objection to that particular part of the speech; but the Government went on to talk about compulsory labour for the service of the State, which the chiefs did not seem to have at all appreciated; and then he raised the question of the indemnity. This question had been raised before by the Governor, who himself said that it was most distasteful to the chiefs, and had been received by them with the greatest dissatisfaction. Then the Governor raised the question of the Golden Stool, and said it must be given up to the Queen. That was a matter on which the chiefs and kings felt most strongly, and which most likely would induce them to take up arms against the British Government. While the Governor was negotiating with the people in this way he did what, again, must have seemed to them almost an act of treachery by sending up an armed force to endeavour to obtain the Golden Stool by stealth. Under these circumstances, it seemed an extraordinary thing that the right hon. Gentleman should have sent up the Governor to make these extreme demands on the Ashantis with a totally inadequate force and with only one or two days preparation. He (the hon. Member) had endeavoured to show adequately the actual historical facts of the case; and he maintained that this was a most unfortunate way of dealing with these tribes, who naturally did not wish to be brought under-British control. Surely, it would have been better for the right hon. Gentleman to have endeavoured to gain his ends by tact, patience, and consideration for the susceptibilities of these tribes, rather than by armed force to the great effusion of blood, and great loss to the colony and to the Empire. His hon. friend the Member for Islington had asked various questions to which he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would give adequate answers. Many very difficult matters were arising in the colonies. In several of his despatches, Sir F. Hodgson, the Governor, mentioned as a reason why he was in such a hurry that the gold miners were anxious to get up country; and there were other matters on which there would be acute differences of opinion before long. If these little wars, and big-wars too, were to be avoided in future, it must be by some greater desire than at present to respect the susceptibilities of the natives.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

The Committee has listened to two speeches. The first was from the hon. Member for West Islington, who takes, I believe, a great interest in this matter. He is a private Member who has never held any official position, and who may therefore easily fall into error, as we all do when we are unacquainted with the inner side of questions of this kind. But he asks very fairly for information to enable him to form a final opinion. I respect his desire, and I shall endeavour to fulfil it; and, although I do not agree with a great deal that he has said, I am hopeful that I may persuade him that there are reasons leading to this policy of which he is necessarily ignorant, and which when he knows them may probably alter his views. But it is quite a different thing with the hon. Member who has just sat down. He has been inside. He knows all the inner facts with reference to these matters. He is, therefore, pitting one official policy against another, and, of course, the issue becomes much more important. The hon. Member who has just sat down has explained that his idea of colonial policy is a policy of tact, patience, and discretion. He has also stated that he thinks it most undesirable to interfere with native customs; and that the system of development which is now going on, although it. may have soma advantages, nevertheless has been pressed with great precipitancy by the present occupant of the office of Colonial Secretary. That indicates a different policy, indeed; but I do not know that I should describe in the terms which the hon. Gentleman used the policy of my predecessor which he would press upon me. When I first came into this office I rather hoped that my action would be less the subject of contention than it had been in the past; that colonial questions would be treated as a non-party matter; and that I might expect, especially as I desired as far as possible to continue the policy of the office, to have the support of gentlemen who in other things might be political opponents. But I have been disappointed. I have not had their support: and perhaps the time has now come when it is desirable that the issue should be clearly stated and the two policies should be presented to the House in all their consequences, so that the House may judge between them.

What is the theory of the hon. Member for Poplar? It is that all these colonies were enjoying a sort of Elysian happiness; that these natives, who, as the hon. Gentleman says, have their good qualities, were engaged in peaceful, innocent pursuits; that the colonies were proceeding gradually towards a higher civilisation, and that if they had only been left alone no evil consequences could have resulted. And then upon this picture a baneful shadow is cast the shadow of the Colonial Secretary. Everything is changed. War takes the place of peace and harmony, and the Ashanti, who was no doubt ploughing his furrows and living under his own vine and fig tree, is suddenly interfered with, his Golden Stool is taken from him and all sorts of outrages are perpetrated on him in his domestic and political life, and his constitutional customs are interfered with. All these things follow the terrible advent of the bogey-man of the colonics. War, the loss of life, bloodshed, and the expenditure of treasure all follow. [An HON. MEMBER: Hear, hear. I am glad I have rightly represented the opinions of hon. Gentlemen opposite. That is all a romance, and it has the character peculiar to romance—there is not an atom or shadow of foundation for the story which is related.

What are the real facts? It is worth while asking, because this is a matter which is raised again and again. It was discussed in 1807, and now it is raised again as if it were a new question. The facts are these. Africa, as far as we were concerned with it, was some ten or twenty years ago a mere question of outposts, We and other European nations had stations on the coast, and the great interior was left to itself. Whether the condition of the great interior was the condition depicted by the hon. Member for West Islington in his natural ignorance of the circumstances, whether the tribes of Africa were engaged in constitutional disputes, is a different question, but, at all events, we had no responsibility for the state of affairs in the centre of Africa. But about that time began what has been called the scramble for Africa, and that scramble was going on during the period when the hon. Member for Poplar was Under Secretary for the Colonies. What action did the Colonial Office take in those circumstances? Their action was characterised by "tact,'' "discretion," "patience," and "noninterference''; in other words, they did nothing. In the most critical stage of our history as an empire in Africa, the Colonial Office was silent and inept, and the result of that was that our colonies in West Africa and elsewhere were being surrounded and their value destroyed by the advance of other nations. If we remained "quiet," "tactful," patient, and "indifferent, other nations did not pursue that course of policy, and they pressed forward their posts. very often in apparent indifference to our previous claims. The danger was serious that in a very short time we should find all our colonics on this coast enclosed and depreciated, just as our colony of Gambia had been many years ago. Well, when we came into office we found every important and critical question left unsettled. Of course there was no war in times like that. When the policy is one of avoiding a war at all costs it is easy enough to keep the peace — for a time; but meanwhile you are losing your position. Our position was in danger, and we had to take serious steps. I am not going into details of our relations with foreign countries, but we had to raise a considerable force, the West African frontier force. At that time we had no force whatever worth the name that could protect our rights and position in West Africa, while foreign countries had huge forces at their disposal. We had to create a- force; and let me say I rejoice that hon. Members opposite agree with me in praise of that force, and of the way in which it has been conducted by Sir James Willcocks, who was senior officer under General Lugard, and also of the action of other native forces concerned in putting down the native rebellion. But we had to create this force, and the result of that was that we had to come to terms with foreign countries. We had, at the same time, to negotiate with Germany and France. We have made arrangements which have not excited much public attention, but as to which? will only say that I think they were fair arrangements, in which we gained all, or nearly all, that we hoped to gain, and, perhaps, as much as we could expect to gain in peaceful and friendly negotiation with other Powers. We have secured, therefore, vast Hinterlands for these colonies which otherwise would have been shut in, and which have now become spheres of influence or British protectorates. And we have no longer. I am happy to say, an international question. We have settled the questions which the hon. Member and his Government left unsettled. That is something. I only state this to the Committee now to point out that as long-as we were allowing foreign countries to take our territory, and to repudiate all obligations, it was a, very simple matter. It did not matter what happened in these countries. We allowed them to go into foreign hands, or if they remained independent we were not responsible for what happened within them. Rut the moment we had defined boundaries internationally agreed upon we entered upon a new series of obligations and responsibilities. For my part. I am perfectly ready to agree with anyone who would say that it would have been better for other countries as well as for us if this scramble for Africa had been still further postponed. But it was not we who began the scramble, and we could not fail to take our part-in protecting our interests. But from the moment that this new condition of things was established we had to deal with protectorates and spheres of influence for which hitherto we had no responsibility. The hon. Member for Poplar complained of the present colonial policy because, forsooth, he said that we were interfering with the customs of the natives. What are the customs of the natives with which we are interfering? Human sacrifice is one, fetishism of all kinds is another, and slavery is another.

MR. LOUGH

I did not mention either of those, or blame you for them.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I am not now directing myself to the speech of the hon. Member. His time will come. The hon. Member for Poplar said we had interfered unjustly and imprudently with native customs. He did not indicate the customs, of course; but the only customs with which we interfered were human sacrifice, fetishism, and slavery.

MR. SYDNEY BUXTON

I did not mention any of these, and none of my remarks could possibly have been directed to them. My argument was that with a little more tact, a little more patience, and a little more discretion, the friction between the natives and ourselves might have been solved.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Unfortunately I have a habit of desiring to get to close quarters. All that the hon. Member says is vague. He says we interfered with native customs, but he did not specify them. I defy the hon. Member to find anything else with which we have interfered beyond human sacrifice and other cruel and savage fetish customs and slavery. [Mr. BUX-TON assented. | Oh, yes, the hon. Member agrees, but he is one of those who is continually attacking this Government because we do not take sufficient steps to stop slavery. I want the Committee to consider what that means. We have suddenly, by the necessity I have endeavoured to explain, become responsible for vast areas of country in which we now exercise protectorates and spheres of influence. The hon. Member and a few of his friends are continually pressing us —we do not want to be pressed, because we, at any rate, sympathise with their views—to interfere with native customs and to interfere with slavery—not merely with the slave raids, but with slave-holding, with domestic slavery. That has been pressed upon us again and again; and although the hon. Member was in office himself I did not observe that he was particularly keen with regard to it. We have been more so. We have declared in all these places that the legal status of slavery shall be abolished. We have gone further than the hon. Member went or ever dared to go. We have done that, knowing what the consequences are. The consequences are war. It is not a, question of tact, discretion, or patience. When you say to these savage tribes, who for centuries have exercised these rights of slave-raiding, who regard labour as something discreditable, and to whom it is necessary they should have slaves in order to preserve their personal dignity," From this day, when the British flag and the British protectorate come, there is an absolute prohibition of slave-raiding, then you have to fight for your principles. And that is why in this ease the hon. Member and my predecessors left all these things without dealing with them— because, although they had such strong views upon slavery, they did not dare to prohibit it or interfere with it. Their "tact, discretion, and patience" resulted in peace being kept: and now we are prepared to give effect to the policy — which I believe to be the policy of both sides in this House—of saying boldly that we will not allow these customs to continue. It is on that account we find ourselves in frequent contest with some of these native populations.

That is the general statement. Now apply it to this case of Ashanti. What is the case? The hon. Member for West Islington has not said enough in praise of the Ashantis. They are a very brave and gallant native race. They have been the predominant race in that part of Africa; but what is the result of being the predominant race? They themselves would do no work what- ever. They insisted upon having slaves, and were constantly attacking the tribes in their neighbourhood. There was no peace or security for life or property within reach of them, and trade was impossible throughout the territory. They maintained themselves by a tyranny which was natural to them as a great African tribe, but which we could not tolerate from the moment we had any responsibility. The hon. Member would have been the first to criticise us if we had allowed it to continue. The Ashantis were a slave-raiding people. They were guilty of human sacrifices; they exercised a tyranny over the neighbouring tribes, and by their superior strength and fighting ability they kept this "overlord-ship" of which the hon. Member speaks. The hon. Member speaks of these savage tribes of Africa as though he was speaking of a modern European Power. He talks of the Ashantis fighting for their "constitutional rights." The Ashantis, if they understood what constitutional rights meant, would explain that their constitutional rights were to exercise absolute power and authority over all neighbouring tribes, to make slaves of them, to procure from them all the labour they required; and, if they did not get it, and tribute also whenever they desired it, to torture them, sacrifice them to their fetish, and generally treat them with the utmost barbarity. Seeing the condition of civilisation in which they were, we may make allowance for the Ashantis that they knew no better; but it is absurd to treat these tribes as if they were members of a civilised community: and nothing of the kind was attempted. The hon. Member has spoken of the Ashantis as having been British subjects for twenty five years; but in that he is absolutely and entirely mistaken. We never claimed any authority whatever over them until recently. That we claimed their territory as within our sphere of influence, excluding the influence of other European Powers. is true; but we claimed nothing in the nature of sovereignty over them. They were an independent Power under treaty with us, made after the original expedition to which the hon. Member has gone back, under which they were to pay us a certain indemnity. They have never paid that indemnity. In the time of Sir William Maxwell the question of that indemnity came up.

But now let me pause for a moment. I make a great distinction between the hon. Member for West Islington and the hon. Member for Poplar. The hon. Member for West Islington spoke in harsh terms of the Resident at Coomassie, who, he said, was left too free a hand and showed no discretion. He spoke of Sir Frederick Hodgson as having followed the advice of a mad boy, and generally conveyed the impression that these officers of the Crown, working under very difficult circumstances, were either fools or knaves. I will answer him with all courtesy, and I hope I may persuade him to deal differently in future with these officers. But what shall I say to the hon. Member for Poplar? He spoke of Sir William Maxwell as guilty of an act of treachery, and he was so pleased with the word applied to an Englishman now dead, appointed by the Government of which the hon. Member was a member—so pleased was he with the phrase that he went on to speak of Sir Frederick Hodgson as also guilty of an act of treachery, and I think he was also appointed by the Government of which the hon. Member was a member. These two Englishmen, or Scotchmen —I believe both are Scotchmen—these two Britons. appointed by the Government of which the hon. Member is the representative in the House on this question, appointed to responsible positions in places in which the difficulties are tremendous, in which a, man carries his life in his hand every day, in which if he has not the confidence of his superiors here he could do nothing, and in which, therefore, a certain amount of discretion must be left to him—these two British Gentlemen the hon. Member declares with real delight, and he gloats over the fact, were guilty of acts of treachery. They were guilty of no such acts. The thing is impossible. I implore the Committee to resent these attacks on men who have saved the Empire abroad. You may attack the Colonial Secretary. That is all right. That is a political business. If the hon. Member bad said that I had been guilty of treachery I would have said "Of course." I know that in his opinion and that of his friends I am not guilty of anything else.

MR. SYDNEY BUXTON

I simply said that in all these matters the Secretary of State is responsible for what is done, I explained the reasons why I used the word, and the particular incidents to which I referred. But the responsibility is, of course, with the right hon. Gentleman, not with the officials.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

That is a curious way of putting responsibility upon me. What the hon. Gentleman said was that Sir William Maxwell and Sir Frederick Hodgson were guilty of acts of treachery. Then he says I was responsible. Of course I am officially responsible for everything that my subordinates do, but that does not in the least diminish, or attenuate the charge he brought against these two officials. I am responsible. I accept responsibility as I have said. Neither Sir William Maxwell nor Sir Frederick Hodgson was guilty of acts of treachery. As regards Sir William Maxwell, that is really ancient history. It is now five years ago that Sir William Maxwell went up to Coomassie. He was not opposed on the route, and a great palaver of chiefs was called. He explained his demands, and those demands wore refused.

MR. LOUGH

What were they?

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Oh, I will not go into that. That is not the point. The hon. Member is referring to a matter which was debated in 1896, and I certainly decline to deal with it in 1901. Sir William Maxwell's demands were refused, and he removed Prempeh to the coast as the king who had refused his terms. The expedition accordingly was so far successful that it was concluded without a single drop of blood having been shed. And when you come to ask what is the cause of the subsequent disturbance, I have no hesitation in saying that it was the blood-lessness of the previous expedition. The people of Ashanti in common with every savage tribe, hold it to be a point of honour to fight for their chief, and to fight for their cause. They are ready to accept defeat, but they are not ready to accept the consequences of defeat without actual conflict. If you want to get at the bottom of the recent disturbance you will find it in the fact that these people were called upon to suffer the consequences of defeat without having been defeated. The result was they nourished the intention of rising on the first opportunity, and anybody who reads the Blue-book will see that preparations were being made, and it was quite certain that sooner or later the Ashanti warriors would desire to try conclusions with the British before they finally submitted. The hon. Member for West Islington says, very truly, that Sir Frederick Hodgson went up to Coomassie. He says that there was a mediaeval fort established at Coomassie. I am thankful that it was not a mediæval fort, or it would not have sustained the siege it had to sustain.

MR. LOUGH

I did not say mediæval. I quoted from the Blue-book—a square fort with round towers at the corners.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I will not pursue that. If the hon. Member quotes from the Blue-book he is quite safe. But this fort was established there very properly-, and very properly Sir Frederick Hodgson, in accordance with instructions to every Governor on the West Coast to take an early opportunity of visiting these Protectorates in the Hinterland, decided to go up to Coomassie. He went with a small force, not a provocative force, and called a meeting of the chiefs, to whom he desired to explain the intentions of the Government. Let me first deal with the incident of the Golden Stool. That really is of collateral and not of very great importance. Sir Frederick Hodgson did not ask my permission to go for the Golden Stool, but, speaking now after the event, I entirely approve of his attempt to secure it. The Golden Stool is of very great "moral and intellectual value." It is not loot in the sense the hon. Member supposes. It has no great pecuniary value. If we got it we should not have melted it down for bullion. But in the opinion of the tribe and according to the custom of the tribe the possession of the Stool gives supremacy. And if, therefore, we could secure this stool we should be doing more for the peace of Ashanti than, probably, by any armed expedition. Therefore, it was of the greatest importance to get hold of this symbol of sovereignty if who could possibly do it. The hon. Member for West Islington ridicules the proceedings of the Governor. He says he got hold of a mad boy. What does he mean by that? Does he know the boy?

MR. LOUGH

I quoted from the Blue-book. It says, "He came to the conclusion that the boy was mad."

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

The boy was at all events apparently in possession of his senses when he stated to Sir Frederick Hodgson that he had come from certain chiefs who were custodians of the Golden Stool, and were prepared to deliver it up to the British Government if they would send a representative to receive it. I think he will find that the Blue-book says the boy seemed mad with terror. The exact words are these. It was after the boy had been summoned to carry the expedition through a country which was supposed to be hostile, and in which there had been evidence of hostility. The track came to an abrupt ending on the edge of a dense forest, and at that point the report says, "The boy was now practically off his head with fear." If everyone who showed signs of fear after such an experience as the boy had were to be shut up in a lunatic asylum, I think there would be need for very much extended accommodation. The hon. Member has entirely misunderstood what he has read in the Blue-book. There is no pretence for saying the boy was mad. No Governor would be justified in neglecting the information which was sent to him that he could have this emblem if he sent for it. Sir Frederick Hodgson did send for it, but the expedition failed because, as we understand, the chiefs themselves became afraid and refused to deliver up the Stool, and the boy was unable to indicate the exact spot where it was. To say that the Governor was wrong in seeking for it is altogether a mistake, considering the extreme importance which a symbol of this kind has among a savage population. The second complaint made by the hon. Member is that Sir Frederick Hodgson asked for interest for the expenses of the wars of 1876 and 1893 and the present expedition.

MR. LOUGH

I said that that would be seen in the despatches. The right hon. Gentleman himself includes in the Estimates before us the amount which is to be recovered from the Gold Coast, if possible.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Sir Frederick-Hodgson did nothing of the kind. The hon. Gentleman is, at all events, a sufficient arithmetician to know that the interest on those sums would be enormously greater than what we are asking for. It is all clearly stated. When we undertake responsibility for these protectorates, when we have to prevent slave raiding, to interfere with native customs, who must establish a police and get some kind of income from the population. The chiefs before us got a tribute. Our tribute is, at all events, regularly paid. It is not exorbitant, and is not capable of being made an engine of extortion by the chiefs. We must have a reasonable contribution from the population for which we are responsible. We decided to ask for £12,500 a year as a direct tax of about 4s. per head on the male population, to be collected by the kings and chiefs of the various tribes on the understanding that they were to receive 10 per cent. for the collection. That is a condition to which I attach, the greatest importance, and which I am making in every case in which a native tax is collected. We do not want to destroy the authority of the native-chiefs, but to regulate it. We are not making these vast territories parts of our colonies, but protectorates over which our control is more or less indirect. We desire to govern through the chiefs, to regulate their action, but not to interfere with their dignity and position. Therefore we allow them to take a certain proportion of every tax collected for the budget of the protectorate itself. We wanted £12,500 towards the expenses of the protectorate, and we were advised by Sir Frederick Hodgson — although the hon. Member for Poplar said we acted against his advice—

MR. SYDNEY BUXTON

No, I did not say that.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I refer the hon. Member to a report of his speech. I will read a quotation from the despatch sent to Sir Frederick Hodgson, who naturally knew most about local prejudice. He suggested it should not be called a tax or a tribute, but interest on the debt incurred in the wars of 1876 and 1893, which he stated the Ashantis would understand as perfectly just. In a despatch to Sir Frederick Hodgson I stated, "I observe that you concur with these proposals, and that you agree that the collection of this revenue is not likely to cause any serious trouble." We had to collect revenue, properly due, for the protection and government of the protectorate, and the question was by what name it should be called—a direct tax or tribute or interest. We took local opinion, and that local opinion was to the effect that under the latter name it would be more acceptable to the Ashantis. I daresay the Ashantis, like most other people, objected to any tribute or tax; but was that the real cause of the outbreak? Certainly not. In the statements some of them made to our agents on the Gold Coast they put as the first reason for their objection to British rule, our interference with slavery. They said we wore interfering with their domestic labour and their right to hold slaves.

MR. LOUGH

Is that in the Blue-book?

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Yes. I thought the hon. Member said he knew the Blue-book. Here is the quotation— King of Iuabin Yaw Sapong states that about two years ago he heard that the Ashantis were plotting to fight the English, and getting guns, powder, and lead from the coast in small quantities, for these reasons: that they thought the Government would send their king and chiefs back after punishing them by staying in strange land for some time, but they had seen no sign of their returning back to Ashanti; that their slaves used to run away from them, and were helped by the Government giving them freedom: also they were forced to roof houses, and had been stopped to deal in slaves; and also the white man at Coomassie lined them too much. Another quotation has been put into my hand, a despatch from the Governor, in which he states— The other and larger party had determined to fight unless the Governor complied with the following conditions, which they had been requested to state:—(1) Prempen to be given back, and to regulate and collect any annual payment to he made. (2) Permission to buy and sell slaves as in the old time. I think, Sir, I have now answered the questions put to me by the hon. Member.

MR. LOUGH

The question of fines.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Oh, yes. I really hardly understand the hon. Gentleman's complaint. It is quite natural that the Resident should be empowered to impose a small fine for minor breaches of discipline. We do not wish to destroy the authority of the chiefs by imprisoning them, therefore a certain discretion to inflict small fines—in no case have fines been of a large amount—must necessarily be left to the Resident. Rut when the hon. Member says the Resident is under no obligation to report those fines. I do not know where he gets that information.

MR LOUGH

In the Blue-book. Sir Frederick Hodgson, speaking of the cause of the war in a more serious way than the right hon. Gentleman has spoken of it, says— The responsibility of fining rests entirely with the Resident, who has not been required to report to the Governor this exercise of power on his part. I became aware of the fact that there was discontent arising from this cause when on my way to Coomassie, the King of Adansi having made it a matter of complaint when I met him at Kwisa. It was also mentioned to me by Opoku Mensa, the senior member of the Coomassie Native Committee. But for the sudden outbreak of the revolt it was a matter which? should have carefully looked into.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I do not understand why the hon. Member should fall into an error, which is becoming common in these times, of quoting paragraphs without their contexts. Here is the context which has been omitted by the hon. Member— The imposition of lines is necessary in connection with the maintenance of authority, and I cannot find that the exercise of this system had in any way been abused. Well, Sir, I have now endeavoured to reply to the questions put to me, and also to put the Committee in possession of the general principles involved in this matter. It is not to be supposed that native wars such as this in which we have been engaged are the peculiar result of the presence in office of the Colonial Secretary. The hon. Member is no doubt aware that there have been small wars not only in those parts of Africa which are under the Colonial Office, but also in East Africa, in Nigeria, and in Somaliland, which are tinder the Foreign Office. I have always observed that when it is desired to complete the case against the Colonial Secretary he is confronted with his colleague and chief, the Prime Minister, and he is told that the Prime Minister is always anxious and desirous for peace if peace can be preserved with honour. I beg humbly to say that I share that view with the Prime Minister. But, for the moment, let us suppose that there is a distinction to be drawn. Then how does the hon. Gentleman account for the fact that even with the beneficent and peaceful influence of the Prime Minister there have been, I think, five native wars in countries which are under the Foreign Office? Surely under those circumstances there must be some general influence at work. It is not due to the particular iniquity of the Colonial Secretary. What that general influence is I have endeavoured to represent to the Committee. It is that this Government has decided from the first to deal with a strong hand with those questions which the party opposite allowed to drift. We have settled those questions of boundaries and spheres of influence in West Africa satisfactorily and peacefully so far as European Powers are concerned. That was a gigantic work. But from the moment we undertook responsibility for those spheres of influence it became necessary, unless we were to take the advice of hon. Members opposite not to interfere in native customs, that we should be prepared for the attacks of native tribes whose customs we had interfered with. For one man—I have pointed this out before—that is killed in a war of this kind, hundreds of men will in future generations have life and peace and security for their possessions.

This great continent of Africa possesses every advantage for the races native to it. Why have the native inhabitants not multiplied? Why are they still so largely, out of proportion to the gigantic extent of the continent? It is because for centuries, possibly for thousands of years, there have been going on these internecine contests between different tribes, attended by terrible loss of life. First one tribe assumes superiority; then another, equally arbitrary, cruel, and tyrannical, obtains the primary position. That state of things has been put a stop to. The moment we came into our sphere of influence or protectorate we made it our business to establish once and for all that great Rax Britannica which we established in India., where similar conditions existed before our rule was firmly established. We have had to go through trials and difficulties and bloodshed before that rule was established; but once it was established there was ample compensation for all we suffered, and ample compensation to the natives who will benefit by our more generous and more just rule. It has been said that the colony is a burden to the United Kingdom, that this Vote of £400,000 which the war has cost must be borne by the Imperial Exchequer. I have not the slightest doubt whatever but that the whole of it will be repaid. It is, properly speaking, a loan, though, in accordance with precedent, it is put down as a grant-in-aid. If it had not been for the last rebellion the surplus from the Gold Coast would have amounted to more than £50,000, and we should have been able to pay off at least one-half of the cost of the previous expedition. I believe that the surplus will be increased in future, and I have not the slightest doubt that this expenditure will be repaid to the British Exchequer in the course of a reasonable number of years. The hon. Member for Poplar said that in our policy we have been too hasty. We have not only secured the boundaries, but we have undertaken the devolepment of the territories within those boundaries. Within five years we have added 446 miles of railway to the West Coast of Africa. Within the same period the exports of British produce -produce of British origin, not of foreign manufactured goods—passing through Great Britain have increased from a little over £2,000,000 a year to over £3,000,000 a year. That is to say, we have increased the exports of this country to the colony by 50 per cent. That is not a bad record. It is one of which I am not at all ashamed.

MR. SYDNEY BUXTON

I wish to make a personal explanation. The right | hon. Gentleman more than once said that I accused two of our officials of treachery. What I said was that their action might be looked on by the Ashantis as treachery. I apologise if I did not make myself clear, but I should be the last man in the House to accuse any public official of treachery.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I am glad to hear that explanation of the hon-. Gentleman, and I entirely accept it.

It being midnight, the Chairman 'left the Chair to make his Report to the House.

Committee report Progress; to sit again, to-morrow.

Adjourned at five minutes after Twelve of the clock.