EXPEDITION OF THE FRENCH TO ITALY. (Hansard, 7 March 1832)

§ Sir Richard Vyvyan
wished to take the opportunity of putting a question to the noble Lord, on a subject of considerable importance. It would be in the recollection of the House that he had put a question to the noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, about a fortnight since, respecting the supposed intentions of the French government in sending troops to the coast of Italy. The noble Lord said, that he was not answerable for the conduct of the French government. With this answer he was obliged to be content, although he considered it any thing but satisfactory. Further information had since been received, and, it appeared, that the expedition had reached the place of its destination—that the troops had landed at Ancona—and that, on their doing so, the Papal troops retired before them into the interior, after the commander had protested against the landing of this force. It was clear, from the conduct of this military officer, that he was not aware of the intentions of the French. These appeared to be the facts of the case, according to public report, and he was desirous of knowing whether the occupation of Ancona by a French force had the consent of the Papal government, and whether the expedition was undertaken with the knowledge of the other Powers of Europe? The interference of France in the internal affairs of any Italian state was materially different from the interference of Austria. It should be recollected, that the latter Power was called in by the Pope to put down the disturbances which had broken out in his territories; and that Power might feel the better justified in obeying that call, in consequence of the persons who had taken up arms having called upon the Italians of the north of Italy, over which Austria had dominion, to join them. Under these circumstances, Austria was justified in interfering, if the Pope was not powerful enough to put down the insurrection. Austria was the more called upon to interfere, because its subjects had been called upon to rebel against their acknowledged sovereign. The French, however, had no territory in the immediate vicinity of the Papal dominions, and the French government had no right to send troops to take possession of Ancona, unless they had been requested to do so by the Papal government. Of course, he only spoke on public rumour, but he had reason to believe the French troops landed at Ancona, not only without having been invited to do so by the Papal authorities, 1227 but even against their wishes, and, notwithstanding the protests of these authorities. It was one of the misfortunes of those who unhappily engaged in this revolt, that an envoy of the French Revolution of 1830, was introduced at the court of Modena, and he induced the inhabitants of that duchy, and the subjects of the Pope, to break out into rebellion against their acknowledged sovereigns. He regretted that so many of those persons were induced, by false promises, to embark in an undertaking which had terminated by consigning many to the scaffold, and a great number to exile. False hopes, he suspected, were held out to these persons, and they were encouraged to embark in an enterprise under the promise of assistance, and they had been left to see what little reliance could be placed upon the assurances they received. He should regard with satisfaction the adoption of improvements in the governments of many of the Italian states. As an admirer of our Constitution, he must say, that the governments of the Duke of Modena and of the Pope were such as no admirer of our institutions could sanction. With respect to those who lured the subjects of the Duke of Modena and of the Pope to acts which had brought many to the scaffold, and had led to exile and confiscation, he wanted words to describe his abhorrence of their want of good faith. It was owing to the excitement occasioned by the French Revolution, and to the stimulus of French emissaries, that the inhabitants of the Bolognese, and Modenese, and the neighbouring districts, were induced to break out into rebellion. He feared that the landing of the French would again excite a civil war in Italy, and lead those persons on to their destruction. He did not hesitate to assert, that the French had never entered Italy without bringing a train of evils, and inflicting the greatest miseries upon the people. France had long been the curse of Italy; and the iron crown of Lombardy had been only a searing-brand round her brow. The point, however, to which he was anxious to draw attention was, that the French troops had been allowed to land without a British squadron being at hand to observe and give notice of their proceedings. With the view of obtaining information on those points, he begged to ask the noble Lord, the Secretary for the Foreign Department, whether, after the destination of the French troops was known, any communication passed between the government of France and our 1228 Government on the subject? and whether the French troops landed at Ancona with the sanction of his Britannic Majesty? These were the first questions to which he wished an answer. Another question, which he considered of greater importance was, whether the sovereign of the Papal states acquiesced in the plan of landing a band of French troops in the Papal territories? If the French troops landed in defiance of any protest made by the Pope, and, contrary to his will, it was the first time since the days of Napoleon that such invasion had taken place. It was the first time that England had allowed such a matter to pass without demanding immediate explanation. Such was not the course pursued by Lord Castlereagh, in 1820, in the case of Naples, nor the course pursued by Mr. Canning, when the combined fleets—unfortunate as the combination was—were ordered to Navarino. When called upon, he fully admitted the rights of neighbouring states to interfere for the suppression of insurrection; but the question was, whether any states had a right to interfere when the sovereign protested against such interference; and, whether the landing of troops, under such circumstances, must not be looked upon as an invasion? He was all this time assuming that the landing took place contrary to the wishes of the Pope. But, perhaps, he was wrong. Perhaps the Papal government had acquiesced in the landing of French troops either at Civita Vecchia, or at Ancona. All that he knew on the subject was, that the French troops had landed, and, knowing this, he felt himself justified in asking, whether the landing was acquiesced in by the British Government, and whether it was authorized by the government of the Papal territories?

§ Viscount Palmerston
With respect to the general facts in which the hon. Baronet's questions are founded, namely, the corps of Austrian and French troops have appeared in the Papal territories—I believe that no doubt exists, and, therefore, it is not necessary that I should touch upon those facts. With respect to the questions put by the hon. Baronet, I am sure the House will understand and give me credit for my motives, when I state, that I do not think it consistent with my public duty to make any statement at this period with regard to what might have passed between this Government and that of France, with respect to the expedition to Italy, and still less with respect to any 1229 thing which might have passed between the French government and the government of the Papal states. This is not the proper time to enter into any discussion on the line of policy adopted by the French government; but it appears to me that the chief accusation which the hon. Baronet makes against the French government is, that it has not sufficiently interfered, inasmuch as he considers it ought to have given to the people Of another country institutions, in his opinion, more congenial to their welfare. With respect to the Government of England, the charge against us is of a similar description. The hon. Baronet seems to say, that the English Government ought to have sent an English fleet, to co-operate with the French expedition sent to Italy. I am not now going to discuss those accusations, but I wish to point the attention of the House to the hon. Baronet's opinions, as it may be useful for future purposes. I repeat, that it would not be consistent with my duty to give any further answer to the hon. Baronet's questions: but it might be satisfactory that I should state, that, so far as his Majesty's Government is informed, I see he reason to apprehend that the circumstances which led to the advance of the Austrian and French troops into the Papal territories may not be adjusted, without any interruption of the peace of Europe.

Sir Robert Peel
When my noble friend distinctly states, that his public duty prevents him from answering the questions put by my hon. friend near me, I am very unwilling to press for any premature declarations; but, in the present state of our information, I think it is impossible for us to view the proceedings taken on the part of the French government—I will not say, without suspicion, but, certainly, without very great anxiety and apprehension. I do not prefer any charge against the French government, because I have no materials on which I could found any charge, and because, although I would never consent to sacrifice the honour or the permanent interest of this country to maintain a good understanding with the French government, yet my noble friend himself cannot have a more sincere desire than I have, that that good understanding should not be interrupted. But, entertaining this feeling, I do hot think it right that we should be withheld from doing our duty, as Members of the British House of Commons, by any few of offending the 1230 French government. In the observations which I am about to make, I beg to state distinctly, that I do not take part with the French or the Austrian governments; but, if it appears, according to the statements which have been made, that a French corps, without any intimation having been made to other governments, has taken forcible possession of a part of the Papal territories, that is a matter of the gravest and most fearful importance, considered, not only as to its immediate and probable consequences, but as to the precedent which it affords, if the fact cannot be satisfactorily explained. If it shall appear, too, that this act of the French government was only intended to conciliate a party in France anxious for the delusions of military glory, all my apprehensions, as to the danger of the precedent will be more strongly confirmed. In the last year the French government sent a large army into Belgium, without having previously obtained the consent of the Allies. France has also taken possession of a large territory on the south coast of the Mediterranean. French troops occupy a part of Greece (and I do not say that this occupation would afford any ground for observation if it stood alone); and, lastly, we see a detachment of French troops how taking possession of the Papal territory. I do not say that these acts of interference are not separately justifiable; but, when we see a continuance and combination of these acts—of acts done without the union of the other Allied Powers—I say it gives me great apprehensions as to the maintenance of peace, and of that balance of power on which the permanent tranquillity of Europe so much depends. I refrain from saying more, because my noble friend has stated, that the time has not yet come for the discussion of those topics. Balancing the inconvenience of putting some questions on the subject against the advantage, I own I do see much greater advantage in putting the questions than in letting it be supposed that such a subject has been passed by in total apathy by the British House of Commons.

§ Sir Richard Vyvyan
had particularly guarded himself, as he thought, against identifying the government of France with that faction which his fight hon. friend (Sir Robert Peel) had alluded to, and to pamper which, he feared, much had been done by the French government. His observations were directed against that faction which had sent its agents to 1231 Modena, and had lured on the Poles to destruction, and not against the French government.

§ Viscount Palmerston
was exceedingly glad to hear the hon. Baronet's explanation; and that his observations were not directed to the government of France, but to the Propaganda faction. He must be allowed, however, to make an observation or two on what had just fallen from his right hon. friend (Sir Robert Peel), who had stated, that he felt a great anxiety, and no doubt a very justifiable anxiety, with regard to the maintenance of the peace of Europe, as affected by the proceedings of the French government. His right hon. friend had referred to the French expeditions to Belgium, Greece, and Algiers, as affording ground for apprehension. With regard to the first of these expeditions—the entrance of the French troops into Belgium—it was due to the government of France to state, that though the advance of the French troops took place, without previous communication, yet that expedition was in perfect accordance with the spirit in which France and her Allies had previously acted—it had been immediately adopted by the Allies—and he (Lord Palmerston) was satisfied that it had been mainly instrumental in preserving the peace of Europe. He might further add, that, on that occasion, the French government acted with perfect good faith, and evacuated the country as soon as the object for which her troops had entered it was obtained. With respect to the occupation of Greece, that act was done by France in concurrence with her Allies; and the continuance of the French troops in Greece was entirely consistent with the views and wishes of the other Powers. As to the expedition to Algiers, the Government of this country, he believed, received assurances, which they conceived were satisfactory, at the time the expedition took place.

Sir Robert Peel
said, it was not very easy to answer such statements as those just made by his noble friend, without some previous consideration. With regard to the French expedition to Algiers, however, he believed he might draw upon his recollection to state, that the assurances then made by France were, that, in the event of the expedition proving successful, she would seek to derive no benefit from that success, but would call in the other Powers, to determine upon what permanent footing the state of Algiers should be placed. The understanding, no doubt, might have been 1232 satisfactory, but the question was, whether it had been fulfilled? With respect to Greece, he had already distinctly stated, that it would be impossible, from that single case, to found any suspicion against France; yet still the occupation of Greece, and the retention of a strong post in the Mediterranean, were examples which no one could say might not be dangerous if followed in other places, and he owned they afforded additional reason, in his mind, for viewing with some degree of jealousy the descent now made on the Papal territory. With respect to Belgium, he could not agree with his noble friend, that the evil had terminated when the French troops evacuated that country. The evil was in the example of a great Power occupying part of an independent state, without being able to assign any satisfactory reason, nor having previously communicated with her Allies.