HL Deb 20 October 1943 vol 129 cc253-86

THE EARL OF HUNTINGDON had given Notice that he would ask His Majesty's Government whether they have any further statement to make with regard to the famine conditions prevailing in certain Provinces in India, and what steps are to be taken to relieve the situation; and also move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, in the week ended September 30 the mortality figures in Calcutta were 1,492 persons, as against 581 for the same week a year ago. Last week the figure is quoted as 2,154. The special correspondent of The Times on September 24 stated that in the Calcutta hospitals approximately 50 persons a clay were dying of starvation. In the five weeks from August 16 to September 24 the same authority reports that 4,400 victims of starvation had been removed to the Calcutta hospitals, of whom 972 died. Apart from these, from August I to September 24,2,500 corpses of starved men, women and children have been picked up in the Calcutta streets. In the first week of September the Calcutta hospitals received 849 starvation cases, of which 202 died. In the country districts the mortality figures are harder to get, but famine is acute there, and in fact the struggling of starving people into the cities is, I understand, one of the greatest complications to be faced by the authorities.

I have no wish to give more of these harrowing figures. Those I have given are enough, I think, to confirm the dreadful stories of starvation and misery which are coming from India to-day—especially in the Deccan, and the States of Cochin and Travancore, and even more so in Bengal. Rice has risen over 950 per cent. above pre-war prices and in some places even more. Not only is there a shortage of grain and rice, but there is also a great shortage of milk and milk products, and in fact foodstuffs of all kinds seem to be in great scarcity and at exorbitant prices. And whenever food is short cholera makes its appearance. In the Malabar districts 3,000 cases have been reported. Grim stories have come of patients not wishing to be cured of cholera, as the only alternative would be a slower death from starvation. There are also worse stories of parents deserting dying children, and children deserting parents, and even of children being sold for the price of food. But we do not need to stress these stories; I think the figures are enough to stir our imagination and to show how appalling the conditions in India must be.

When we are confronted with such a situation, the major concern of all of us must be, I feel in the first place, to express our deepest sympathy with the Indian people, and particularly with the sufferers from the terrible conditions in Bengal and in the rest of India. Our second concern must be to ask what can be done to relieve this terrible suffering, and how quickly can the measures of relief be applied. It was with great thankfulness that I, and I think many others among us, heard that food ships were on their way to India, but I am sure that everyone in this House must feel that more drastic measures are essential if we are going to deal with this acute crisis. I should like to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give us any fresh news of the situation there, and also whether they can let us know what steps are being taken now, and can be taken, to deal with the crisis. I should also like to ask them whether more grain could not be shipped from Australia, or even from the United States of America, and even whether some of the Army reserves could not be released to feed the civilian population; they could later be replenished on the arrival of future supplies of grain. Obviously the greatest need and the greatest difficulty must be that of shipping, and I should like to urge on His Majesty's Government that the shipping of food to India to-day is a vital war need. If we are going to keep up the morale of the Indian population and of the Indian Army, India must at least have food.

If for a few moments I ask your Lordships to examine the causes of this disaster, it is with the object in view of finding out in our discussion further remedies and, if possible, preventing the recurrence of such a major disaster. There has been a Committee set up in India under the Chairmanship of Sir Theodore Gregory, Economic Adviser to the Government of India—the Food Grains Policy Committee. Its Report takes the view that there is no one cause of the famine, but that many causes, working together, have all contributed to the final result. I personally very much agree, from what I have heard, with that view. For instance, the Report suggests that the loss of the Burma rice was obviously a very strong contributory cause; but we should remember that the rice imported from Burma is about 1,500,000 tons, of which under 100,000 tons normally went to Bengal. So we cannot completely attribute the famine to the loss of the Burma rice, though it was a contributory factor. The cyclone in Bengal in 1942 was another contributory cause, and so was the failure of the monsoon in Madras. On the other hand, these losses were largely made good by the exceptional crop in Northern India in the spring of 1943. Grain, bought for the Army and for Army reserves, must also have been a contributory cause—not so much the amount probably shipped out of the country as the fact that the Indian as a soldier eats very much more than the Indian as a civilian can ever afford to do. But, looking at the whole situation, it would seem to be not so much a question of absolute shortage of foodstuffs as of a complete breakdown in distribution. A few Provinces seem even to have had a surplus but to have been unwilling to export it to the deficit Provinces in case they should go short themselves. Sometimes Provinces had shortages in one foodstuff and a surplus in another. But everywhere rising prices and uncertainty about future supplies tempted both merchant and farmer to hold up their stocks, thus increasing the shortage and again raising prices.

The terrible poverty of the Indian peasant allows only a very small margin between subsistence and starvation. His methods of agriculture are extremely primitive, and the good of the soil is being constantly used up without anything being put back to replace what is being taken out. It stands to reason that an agricultural people that is so reduced in poverty as to have to burn cow dung as fuel instead of using it as manure is on the way to committing race suicide. About 55,000,000 small farmers produce a surplus of about 14,000,000 tons of grain and rice, which feeds the cities, and if even a small amount is kept back by each farmer, who may be frightened of future conditions, this surplus to feed the cities diminishes and almost disappears. This is especially so in a case where consumer goods are scarce—and especially iron to repair agricultural instruments—as there is little to give the farmer in exchange for his produce.

But I think the most important part of this Report is not so much the aspect which deals with the causes—though that is important enough—as that which deals with the steps which it advises the Central Government of India to take at once to relieve the situation. The main steps are price control; the establishment of a food grains reserve; control of distribution, transport and supplies; extension of rationing in the cities; the creation of a Central Food Board with wide powers, and especially the stopping of all food exports and, instead, the importing of large stocks to meet the emergency. This is a very good Report, and I agree with most of these recommendations, but what is puzzling many people—and I hope the Minister who will reply will clear up this point— is this. If the situation was foreseen a long time ago, and has been developing for many months, why did not the Central Government of India take adequate preventive measures before the famine reached the terrible disastrous dimensions and before the situation became completely out of hand?

The Secretary of State for India, speaking at Birmingham only last week, said: The dangerous possibilities of the situation were fully realized by the Central Government of India as soon as the loss of Singapore and the invasion of Burma showed that India could no longer rely upon her customary rice imports, or easily secure wheat cargoes from Australia. The loss of Singapore happened some time ago, so why were none of the measures now advocated in the Gregory Report put into operation—price control, rationing in the cities, establishment of food grains reserve, control of supplies, establishment of a Food Board, and so on? The problem is obviously an All-India one affecting all the Provinces, and as such it could only have been dealt with by the Central Government. The Secretary of State in the same speech seemed to suggest that the reason for this not being done was that the Central Government was reluctant to encroach on the functions of the Provincial Governments. Again I quote his words from a newspaper report: It is a very serious thing, when you have entrusted wide powers and responsibilities to a democratic Government, to brush these powers aside.

In British India, as we all know, whether the States are being ruled by a British Governor through his appointed nominee, or whether a popularly-elected Government functions and is still functioning, in every case the ultimate power rests with the British Governor, just as the final and ultimate power in the Central Government rests with the Viceroy. As we all know, these powers are immense. We have seen the powers of the Central Government exercised in a drastic and sweeping way, brushing aside everything, very recently, and why in this case, when the whole welfare of hundreds of thousands depended on these measures being taken, were not drastic reforms instituted by the Central Government? I particularly raise this point because I feel sure there must be some other reason beside scrupulous regard for red tape which has influenced the Government in its action. We must remember that all questions of control or rationing of foodstuffs in India are immensely complicated by the vast-ness of the country, the complete illiteracy of the peasantry, and the absence of sympathy and co-operation on the part of the Indian people with any schemes originating from the British Government. The noble Lord, Lord Woolton, has successfully introduced most drastic measures here to keep us from being hungry, but I feel that his task has been made easier by the whole-hearted support of the people of this country.

It is for that reason, if we are to cope successfully with this dreadful famine, that I suggest, and earnestly press, that the problem of the future of India should be brought out of cold storage and another attempt made to thaw Indian distrust by sympathy and generous understanding in this crisis. Once we have won the confidence and friendship of the Indian people half the problems connected with this famine would be solved. Public opinion in India could be brought to support any scheme or regulations, the leaders of the different Parties, if given a chance, could induce the farmers and merchants to release their stocks, the public would be prepared to make any sacrifices demanded of them. Mistrust is so great that this confidence would be difficult to win, but a sincere gesture to prove the integrity of our aim in regard to India's future might succeed, and it is this gesture which I should like to see made. I am going to suggest that the British Government should, as it were, declare India to be in a state of trust or wardship—might, in short, declare her to be what I should call, for want of a better expression, a "ward in democracy." By that I mean we should ask our great Allies to join hands with us in guaranteeing India's future freedom. Inter-Allied co-operation now envisaged in high places as the basis for world peace is so vast and thorough that I do not think it would be impossible for us to ask the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China to act with Great Britain as guardians, who would be jointly responsible for India's present welfare and guarantee her future freedom, perhaps to be realized a year after the end of hostilities.

With India established as what I have called a "ward in democracy," and with her future freedom thus guaranteed, the mistrust of Indians of all Parties might be dispelled. The leaders would surely be only too glad to co-operate in even the most drastic schemes for fighting this terrible famine, and it is not too optimistic to suppose, given such a basis of mutual co-operation and confidence, that the Indian leaders would be prepared to work under the Viceroy for the fullest prosecution of the war as well as for an immediate offensive against this famine. Such a beginning might be the first step towards Indians working together to find a basis for the future Constitution and government of their own country. Whether His Majesty's Government should consider such a gesture or not, the most immediate and important step to be taken is the sending of more food as speedily as possible to relieve the present situation. I realize the strategic necessity of shipping in other war areas, but for the security of the Pacific Front, and above all in the interests of humanity, the Indian people must be saved from the disaster which is threatening to engulf them. I beg to move for Papers.

LORD CATTO

My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down has wandered away somewhat from the terms of his Motion into certain political aspects of this question. I do not propose to follow him in that because, quite candidly, I do not know what is meant by a "ward in democracy," and I doubt very much if many of my Indian friends would understand such an expression. We are not discussing this afternoon the merits or demerits of constitutional arrangements in India. We are not discussing even how or why this calamity has fallen upon these poor people. We are discussing how best to relieve and bring succour to these distressed people in the quickest possible time. I hope that my noble friend the Under-Secretary of State, who will be replying for the Government, will be able to give us some reassurance in regard to these matters. This is not the time to ask how or why this has happened. I hope that at a later date we shall be given an opportunity of going into these matters, and I can assure your Lordships that I shall not be backward in asking how and why this calamity has come about. But that is for the future. Heresy hunting at this time will not fill the bellies of the Indian people. It is a tragedy we all deplore that in a world of plenty there should be such suffering in an important part of His Majesty's Dominions.

It so happens that the part of India chiefly concerned is one that I know well and I cannot speak on this matter without strong feelings. But I would speak with equal vehemence if these events were happening in any other part of His Majesty's Dominions or even in any other part of the world, for famine is a preventible thing. India from the very dawn of her history suffered cruelly from this terrible scourge, but in modern times it has been comparatively free from such calamities, not because the causes of famine have changed, such as failure of the monsoon, floods and other catastrophies, but because the Central Government had perfected famine relief organizations of the greatest efficiency combined with transportation facilities which made it possible to bring relief quickly to afflicted districts. Indeed these arrangements had become so perfected that the horrors of famine in India had become almost a thing of the past.

The present conditions in Bengal and the surrounding districts have been brought about by very special causes. One of the most vital has been that this part of India normally imported from Burma, as the noble Lord has already told us, something in the neighbourhood of 1,500,000 tons of rice annually, and of course that source of supply was immediately cut off when Burma was overrun by the enemy. It may be that this shortage should have been well understood and that foresight might have been shown in arranging supplies from other sources. Certain efforts were made. Increased sowings were enforced and it was hoped that these, with some help from the Provinces which have some surplus of food grains, would be sufficient to make up the deficiency. But in the event these efforts have proved sadly inadequate, largely I think because there was not sufficiently taken into account the manifold difficulties of war-time transportation, both internal and external. Moreover, the districts of India where there are food surpluses are mainly on the other side of that Continent, vast distances away from Bengal. War congested railways have undoubtedly increased the difficulties of war transportation. War has brought about another serious problem which is not confined alone to India and that is the problem of hoarding, for in an uncertain world such as we are now living in primitive people are liable quickly to take fright and to hoard food supplies in excess of what they really need. I regret to say, too, that there have often been speculators in food grains. But we cannot point the finger of scorn at India in that respect, for India is not the only country in the East where there are speculators. Indeed, we have some in this country, though I hope not very many. The noble Lord interrupted me when I was going to call these speculators by a much stronger name. I was going to refer to them as "these vermin."

But, my Lords, if Bengal is remote from those districts in India where there may be food surpluses, it has one great advantage in that it is on the seaboard and normally relief could, with forethought, have been quickly brought from overseas. Again, war conditions have interfered with this and, as the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State for India said in the speech at Birmingham last week to which the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, referred, the problem of external help was and indeed is, to use his own words, "essentially and entirely one of shipping." I trust that the noble Earl who is replying in this debate will have some reassuring words for us on this point. For there can be little doubt that the problem of help for these stricken districts cannot be completely dealt with without substantial assistance from overseas. In a vast country like India, and in war conditions, and with comparatively small surpluses even in the more fortunate Provinces, the most stringent Government regulations as to holding cannot quickly bring about substantially changed conditions. It may be that these regulations were not instituted quickly enough; it may be that the magnitude of the problem was underestimated; it may be that the Central Government relied too much on the Provincial Governments and that the latter found the problem too much for them. These and many other questions quickly come to our minds and they will have to be answered at the right time.

I do not need to tell your Lordships that famine is a terrible thing, nor do I need to tell you that it falls very heavily upon the poor, because there is always some food which those with money can buy. Unfortunately, therefore, it is always the poor that suffer most and that applies with special severity in the districts upon which this calamity has fallen, for even in normal times these people live with hardly any margin for emergencies. The result is that as soon as food prices begin to rise they very quickly reach limits beyond the means of these poor people. There is another and a very terrible aspect of this problem and it is one of great importance. In time of war famine is not only a calamity, it is a menace. Millions of these poor people live in districts behind the lines of the Allied Armies on the Indo-Burma frontier. Already the Japanese are using these famine conditions as propaganda and it is no wonder that insidious lies are quickly absorbed by a people with empty stomachs.

And there is a further menace. Famine conditions breed disease and disease is no respecter of persons. Various diseases are always endemic in these parts of India and there is a grave danger, due to famine conditions, of these diseases becoming epidemic. Cholera, which is always there to a small extent, even in the great city of Calcutta, is increasing and the spectre of that dread disease is stalking through those districts and in that great city, the second largest in point of population in the British Empire. And history teaches us that epidemics, if not checked in their early stages, often become more dreaded than the enemy, and that is especially so in the East. In conclusion, I would make this final point. We are not discussing the matter only because of its humanitarian aspects; we are discussing it because we have a direct responsibility. Let me remind your Lordships that by the constitutional arrangements, as they still exist in India to-day, in the final analysis the British Parliament is responsible for the welfare and good government of that country and we are part of that Parliament and we share that responsibility.

LORD HAILEY

My Lords, I think one could well wish that this question had been confined both here and elsewhere to the simple issue of what steps are being taken to put an end to this distressing and harrowing situation in Bengal and what guarantee we have against its recurrence. But, unfortunately, discussion has taken a very much wider range. I do not refer merely to the somewhat wide range Lord Huntingdon gave to it in his introduction of this Motion. I am referring to the fact that events in India have been followed by a very wide reaction both in this country and outside this country. It has given to those outside this country who are critical of us a handle for impugning once more the character of British rule. It has given to others an opportunity of pointing out that we ourselves have been conniving at a state of things which must impair the position in India as one of the central factors in our campaign in the East.

Quite apart from that very wide sympathy of which both the Earl of Huntingdon and Lord Catto spoke, and which certainly most of us feel, apart from all those feelings of humanity to which it has given rise here, there is the question of the competence of the authorities in India and the position of His Majesty's Government. Let me add that I suppose there are few who have been connected with the administration of India in the past who did not feel this very deeply indeed. Many of us remember the famines at the end of the last century—we have good personal reasons to remember —but we had hoped that that chapter had closed, and we were in the habit of taking pride, legitimate pride, that in the last forty years there has been no famine in India. Now it appears that once again the dread spectre of scarcity and starvation is stalking, not indeed throughout India, but in an important part of it.

Since these widespread issues have been raised your Lordships will perhaps permit me, as one who has had to deal with some of these matters in the past, to try and distinguish between the different questions that have been raised. There is, of course, first the outstanding question which must override in importance all others. How far in fact can we be satisfied that all essential steps are being taken to remedy the immediate situation, so far as it can be remedied? Secondly, looking beyond the immediate present, what means exist for preventing the recurrence of a situation like this? Many of the factors which have produced it will persist and as far as can be seen will produce somewhat similar results. Thirdly (and this is a point in which I think many people are interested), does the very obvious administrative and constitutional difficulty which has been experienced in dealing with this situation convey lessons which must be borne in mind—we must hope by Indians, but certainly by ourselves—in considering the constitutional position of the country?

But to appreciate the bearing of these questions, one has to look at the facts in due perspective. Normally India can be said to be almost self-sufficient in the production of foodstuff. I am not speaking of course in the sense that she produces enough to give her people all the nutrition which modern standards demand, but judged by the rough test—the only test we ought to apply in the circumstances— of imports and exports she is reasonably self-sufficient. True, she has normally an import of some 1,250,000 tons of rice from Burma to which some noble Lords have already referred, but the significance of this may be seen from the fact that it amounted to only about six per cent. of her own total production of rice. Apart from that, it is significant that only 100,000 tons of the Burma rice went to the Bengal area, the area now mostly affected. Though, therefore, the cessation of Burma imports was an important fact it did not have the same significance, or perhaps the same results, as a cessation of imports of food grains would a few years ago at all events have had on the nutritional position in this country.

There are also those who point to the great increase in Indian population during the last few decades and see in it one of the factors which must have helped to produce the present situation. They point out that the population has increased by 50,000,000 in the last decade, and they say that every month India has 300,000 or 400,000 more mouths to feed. I am anxious to mention this point because I think that, though this great increase in the population of India is a very important factor, which will have to be taken into consideration in any effort we make to raise her standard of life, it is not a factor which we need necessarily import into the present discussion. It is the general conclusion of economists that hitherto the increase in India's production has preserved some reasonable ratio to her increase in population. The increase of population—again, of course, I am applying previous standards of consumption, not ideal standards—has left a very narrow margin in the event of emergencies such as crop failure, but not any state of normal deficiency.

It is clear that the situation which has arisen on this occasion, unlike previous famines, has not been due to crop failure. The harvest in 1942 was reasonably good. Such crop shortages as occurred were only local—for example, in Bombay and Madras—and should normally have been adjustable by drawing grain from the surplus areas in the north and centre. It has been calculated that any loss suffered by crop failures and the loss of imports combined only amounted to a total reduction of 4 per cent. in food supplies. India had in the last ten years been able to deal on at least four occasions with larger shortages—on one occasion up to 14 per cent. Clearly, therefore, the cause has been internal maladjustment, as the noble Lord, Lord Catto, said—the difficulty of transport, profiteering, and what is known as hoarding. That was the kind of situation for which a civil power has to attempt to find a remedy within the range of the administrative measures open to it. But that there was going to be a very considerable inflation of price was obvious. It occurred, from much the same causes, in the last war; but it was bound to occur with increased force now, for the war hardly touched India in 1914–18 in the sense in which it has come home to her to-day. Every force which operated then operates in double strength now.

It would be unprofitable to ask ourselves whether it was feasible to prevent some inflation in the price of foodstuffs, for that was clearly impossible. It must be realized that 80 per cent. of the producers are also consumers. It is natural to them at any time to reserve a certain part of their production for their own subsistence. When, as on the present occasion, there are threatenings of war or trouble clouding their economic future with uncertainty, this tendency must become all the stronger. But this is not all. It is inevitable that when there are signs of a rising market they should keep back as much as possible of their marketable food crops, such as wheat and rice, in order to take advantage of it. They were on this occasion, particularly in Northern India, better able to do so, because the high price of cotton and other non-edible crops enabled them to meet their ordinary expenditure, in the nature of rent or land revenue, and India has always shown herself able to reduce expenditure on consumption goods, such as clothing and the like, when occasion de- manded it. Hoarding had therefore a somewhat different meaning from that which we attach to it here. The Governments had not merely to deal with profiteering in a wholesale market or with a recalcitrance of dealers; they had to deal with a vast mass of producer-consumers, actuated by motives which could hardly appear to them either unreasonable or illegitimate, and which in any case reflected a traditional practice on their part. To judge of the size of this problem, let me recall again that, as Lord Huntingdon has said, there are between 55,000,000 and 60,000,000 cultivated holdings in India.

We must admit all these difficulties; but still the question remains whether it was not possible to prevent a price inflation so extreme as that which has actually occurred. The normal price of rice in Bengal is about 5 rupees a maund of 82 lbs. It rose to 35 rupees; it is said that at Dacca it even rose to 80 rupees. The Government of India stated in March that the rise in the price of a certain essential range of foodstuffs had amounted to 950 per cent. Now we may well imagine what this meant to the urban or industrial population, or to the section of the people who were not themselves producers of foodstuffs; what it meant to vast numbers of people in India, who, as Lord Catto has said, are always living a little above or a little below the margin of starvation. And there is a second question. How is it that the result was felt with such severity mainly in Bengal? There was scarcity in certain parts of Bombay owing to local crop failure, and in certain parts of Madras due to a similar cause. But it is only in Bengal, and notably in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, that we hear of actual starvation. Yet Bengal has always been considered to be self-sufficient in the supply of foodstuffs. She produces normally some 8,500,000 tons of rice. As I have pointed out to your Lordships out of the total of 1,250,000 tons of rice imported from Burma or Siam only some 100,000 tons normally went to Bengal.

What were the steps taken by the Government of India or the Provincial Governments to anticipate or prevent inflation of this type? In 1941 there was set on foot a campaign for growing more 100d, and we are told that this actually resulted in adding about 4,000,000 acres to the area under food crops, notably rice and millets. True, this had the effect of reducing the area under cotton and certain other cash crops, and thereby increasing their price to an extent which gave a large body of producers of mixed crops an increased ability to keep their food crops off the market. But in general the effect of the campaign could not have been otherwise than beneficial. The Government of India began to exercise control over inter-provincial exports in order to reduce competition between the different areas suffering from shortage, and attempted to fix a ceiling price for wheat. But the Punjab and Sind—among the principal producers of wheat—had already begun to show themselves unwilling to co-operate. For one thing, the ceiling price fixed for wheat was five rupees a maund, whereas the market price had already risen to ten rupees. The Punjabi peasant, naturally, resented the suggestion that the price of his own product, wheat, should be controlled, and very strictly controlled, while producers of other crops elsewhere were able to take full advantage of the rising prices for their production.

At the beginning of 1943, when the general rise in prices began to cause anxiety, Bombay began to make preparations to ration the population of the city; a measure which was brought into full effect in the following May. Bengal had not, apparently, at that stage, taken alarm at the situation. The Government of India now withdrew the ceiling price on wheat, and as a result somewhat larger supplies came forward. But the measure did not have full effect, for the Punjab and Sind Governments still showed themselves unwilling to co-operate. The Punjab in particular was able to point out that while they were sending wheat to Bengal at ten rupees a maund, free on rail, the Bengal Government was selling it to the mills at 15½ rupees, and earning a considerable profit for itself from the transaction. That was an unfortunate incident, and it undoubtedly added to the difficulties of the situation. It does not appear, however, that the situation became really severe in Bengal until about August. By that time, if my figures are correct, some 450,000 tons of rice and a considerable quantity of wheat had been sent to Bengal by Government agencies alone. Meanwhile, however, the population of Calcutta had been swollen by large numbers of destitute people coming from outside. Their numbers have been put at from 80,000 to 100,000, and it is they who have furnished the largest number of sufferers from actual starvation. The needs of the industrial labour have been largely met by purchases made by mill companies, and sold to employees at a normal price. And I think that it may well be said here that we owe some tribute to a number of these companies for what they have done for their labour in this situation.

Judging from what information is available to us at this distance, it would seem that there are actually now, or shortly will be, sufficient supplies of foodstuffs for Calcutta. I emphasize the word "supplies." Nearly a million people are actually being fed by the Government. But the real source of trouble still remains; the pitch of prices continues entirely beyond the capacity of the ordinary consumer to pay. And this remains a standing cause for anxiety. It will not, so far as one can foresee, be remedied by natural means—such as the arrival of a new harvest, however good this may be. Unless they are removed the forces which have produced this present situation will persist.

Now there can, normally, be only one solution for this. There must be some drastic measure to control all prices of foodstuffs and to force them on to the market. The Government of India has now taken such powers under its recent ordinance; but I have already pointed out some of the difficulties, and they have been increased by the fact that the present distinction between "surplus" and "deficiency" Provinces, and the wide range of prices which prevail between areas of abundance and areas of dearth, has persisted long enough to create a network of vested interests which it will be very difficult to break down. Clearly also, inter-provincial difficulties still exist; the Punjab in particular, to judge by the speech of one of its Ministers, Sir Chhotu Ram, is still far from being in a mood to cooperate. One does not desire to be unduly pessimistic; but it is clear that a situation has been allowed to grow up which, though it may be bettered by vigorous administrative measures, will continue to present grave difficulty until the seas are open again, and prices brought back nearer to normal by importations of rice from Burma, and the free importation—or possibility of free importation—of wheat from Australia and Canada.

Looking back, I think we may fairly say that the Bengal Government certainly did not show itself sufficiently far-seeing or sufficiently active at an earlier stage of this situation. This attitude seems to us who have been to the best of our powers watching the situation to compare unfavourably with that of Bombay and Madras in circumstances that were not entirely dissimilar. If any criticism of the Central Government can be justified, it is, I think, on the ground that it showed undue hesitation in putting sufficient pressure on the non-co-operating Provinces. It is true that the Provinces are autonomous, but the Central Government had in reserve powers which could have been and now have been invoked to exercise a certain measure of control over them. One can appreciate the reason for its hesitation. The political situation was, to say the least, uneasy. Autonomy is a very real thing to the Provinces, and the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, to my mind tended to overlook the reality of autonomy and independence which the Provinces have in a constitutional sense achieved, which is the most solid achievement of the Act of 1935. Again, the Punjab— to take one particular instance of a non-co-operating Province—had in other respects, and particularly in regard to the war, been very fully co-operative.

The use of any special power by the Central Government had been strenuously opposed by political circles in India, although, characteristically enough, the Congress is now strongly critical of this very lack of control exercised by the Central Government in the present situation. But the issue was grave, and, if the hesitation shown by the Government of India is understandable, and may on political grounds have even had some justification, its results have certainly been unfortunate. It is difficult to see in what respect the action of the Home authorities can be impugned. There is as yet no evidence that they refused to the Government of India any powers or denied it any assistance for which it asked. In circumstances such as these, which involve matters of purely internal control, the initiative must inevitably lie in India itself.

Let me conclude by asking whether these events have for us any lesson which bears on future constitutional developments in India. I will say here, if I may, that I join with Lord Catto in deprecating any suggestion that we should make a gesture to India such as the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, proposed. India has only one objective and one ambition, and that is independence. Already the word "trusteeship" as used by us is in very little favour in Indian political circles, and I doubt whether the association of our Allies or of the United Nations in the form of guarantee suggested, or the joint assumption by them of trusteeship for India, would be any more satisfactory to India than it would be flattering to us. But, looking to the future, there is certainly one lesson that stands out. There could be no stronger argument than that provided by these events to prove the inadvisability of the fragmentation of India, which would inevitably result from such schemes as that for the creation o[...] separate Dominion consisting of the Moslem Provinces. Again, though it may well be that the future, so far as we can foresee it, will demand that the Centre should no longer occupy a predominating position as a political and legislative factor, yet there must somewhere remain a strong reserve of executive action, capable of dealing with emergencies of this nature, and it must be placed in hands which will have both the initiative and the resolution to override the individualistic policies of Provinces. More and more does it become clear that whatever the benefit to India of the growth of her political institutions, and whatever the benefit of a broad-based form of popular government, she cannot dispense in the future, any more than she has been able to in the past, with the necessity for a strong, a competent and a reliable form of executive.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, I think that I can congratulate the noble Earl who is to reply for the Government in this debate on the masterly defence of his Government which has been made by the noble Lord who has just addressed the House. Most respectfully and with great humility I should also like to congratulate Lord Hailey himself. Never before do I remember hearing so masterly a defence of inaction and indecision, or a more competent finding of reasons why nothing could be done, and why what has happened could not be helped, and was inevitable, and would have happened in any case. I cannot withhold my admiration for this feat.

LORD HAILEY

I am very grateful to your Lordship !

LORD STRABOLGI

I have heard better Governments defended with far less ability than the noble Lord has shown. That is not to say, however, that we do not all recognize that he feels as deeply as any of us the implications of this terrible tragedy in India, and is not as conscious of the sufferings of these people as any one in your Lordships' House. The noble Lord informed us that India was self-supporting in food. I understand that the statisticians have been rather nervous for a number of years on this point, and have been alarmed for a long period at the shrinking margin of foodstuffs available in India. Indeed, I believe it is correct to say that quite apart from this present emergency of war, if the war had not taken place India could have been self-supporting in foodstuffs at the present time only if we had set an inadequate standard of diet for a very large proportion of the Indian population, below the needs of normal life and health.

If I may trouble your Lordships with a few figures, I should like to do so. My noble friend Lord Huntingdon put the case a little differently, and spoke of the countryside providing foodstuffs for the big cities. I should like to deal with the whole peninsula. On the supposition that a pound of grain food a day is needed per person—and that is very low, when we remember that grain and vegetable foods are the only diet of vast numbers of her people—India needs every year 50,500,000 tons. If we add to that 4,500,000 tons for seed, we have a total requirement of 55,000,000 tons of grain a year. The production in a normal year, however, is of the order of 50,000,000 to 51,000,000 tons. If the supposition of a pound of grain food a day is correct, there would have been by this year, even If the war had not intervened, a deficit in India which would be quite different from the deficits with which Lord Hailey and his colleagues had to deal in the famine years, and of which we have heard something in the very able speech of my noble friend Lord Catto.

I think there has been general agreement in this debate that the conditions which we now have to face are not to be compared with the ordinary catastrophes due to failure of the monsoon and other climatic difficulties in the past. Indeed, I believe that it is right to say that the present trouble in India has been foreseen for years, but it was coming on very gradually, and has been accentuated by causes attributable to the war. My noble friend Lord Huntingdon referred to the very large Army in India, and to the great amount of food required for the active soldier, and that has accentuated it. But if these danger signals have been, or should have been, noted by the Central Government and by the Provincial Governments, the unfortunate fact is —this was not dealt with either by Lord Hailey or by any other of your Lordships who have spoken—that considerable quantities of food continued to be exported from India for war purposes to the Middle East. It went on because it was the normal thing to do, and unless there is some strong hand at the centre—which, as Lord Hailey said, will always be needed in India—to take command of the situation and to insist on the Forces in the Middle East getting their foodstuffs elsewhere, you are bound to have this trouble.

I have here a telegram received yesterday morning in answer to a cable sent by a friend of mine to a gentleman whom Lord Hailey knows very well, Mr. Martin Herlihy, the special correspondent of Reuter in New Delhi. He was asked about this question of exports, and the warning that the Central Government had daily received of the trouble that is now come upon these unfortunate millions of people. Perhaps I may trouble your Lordships with the telegram, and particularly commend it to the attention of Lord Hailey. This, after all, is an independent source; Reuter's correspondent is impartial and he knows the facts. The cable reads: In the earlier part of this year the Indian Government, realizing the possibilities of the food shortage, pressed for large imports of food to India, and received 150,000 tons. This was only part of the amount asked for. With operations in North Africa and U-boat sinkings, the position became acute, and in view of these facts, coupled with bumper harvest in Punjab, the Government decided not to press for further imports. It is now admitted that this was a serious mistake. Government's next step in July was; to appoint a Committee to work out long-term food grains policy. Note, long-term policy; but the need, of course, was for emergency measures. The correspondent adds: Report of Committee was presented to Government at end of September. Recommendations can be summed up as (1), import of food; (2) rationing; (3), drastic tightening up of machinery for acquisition of food; (4), drastic revision of relation between Provinces; (5), statutory price control. That is the news received only yesterday morning, and it brings the whole history of this unfortunate affair up to date.

I am afraid that it discloses—what indeed was implicit in the defence of the noble Lord who has just addressed the House—once more in the greatest, the most hidebound, indeed ironbound, bureaucracy in the world, that of the Government of India, that fatal disease of bureaucracy, procrastination. They consider too long, they set up too many Committees, they talk too long about what they are going to do, and in the meantime this terrible famine was galloping towards them. To show how dilatory was not only the Bengal Government but the Central Government in dealing with this matter, between January 1 this year and March 15, from Bengal alone, despite the loss of the Burma rice which Lord Hailey and other speakers have mentioned, 300,000 tons of rice were exported.

LORD HAILEY

That has been denied.

LORD STRABOLGI

It was stated in the Bengal Legislature by the Minister responsible. If it is denied I am very glad to hear it. But I think the export of food was stopped far too late. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, can find good bureaucratic reasons for defending the Government, but he cannot deny the fact.

LORD HAILEY

May I give the facts?

LORD STRABOLGI

I shall be very glad to hear them.

LORD HAILEY

And I speak, not as one interested in bureaucracy, but as one interested in facts. The actual facts with regard to export are that in the first seven months of 1943 only 21,000 tons of wheat and 70,000 tons of rice were exported to Ceylon, the Persian Gulf or the Arabian ports. Of course, those are comparatively small figures. And it was officially denied on behalf of the Government of India that there had been this alleged export of 300,000 tons of rice from Bengal to other parts.

LORD STRABOLGI

Of course I accept that at once, and I am very glad to hear it. It is apparently a conflict once more of evidence between the Provinces and the Central Government. In addition to the large numbers of soldiers to be fed, Indian and European, referred to by my noble friend Lord Huntingdon, there is another cause as well, and that is the abnormal number of Indian labourers working for the Government on various schemes, who also have to be fed, the immense roads across the Burmese mountains in the Shan Province and so on. And not only have the military authorities to feed their own vast Army but, looking ahead, they have hoarded food, they have bought up foodstuffs on a short market. Also the Government Departments concerned with feeding these vast armies of labourers, directly or indirectly concerned with the war effort, have bought up, and indeed hoarded, foodstuffs so as not to be caught short. That cause has not been mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Hailey and Lord Catto.

Another matter that affects the whole situation adversely is that there is inflation in India, or if there is not inflation, the effects of inflation are there because there is wide distrust of the paper rupee. With the fear of inflation you at once get hoarding and withholding of goods from the market. That has obviously happened here, as has been admitted in this debate. It is said, "Don't look for scapegoats. What is the good of looking for scapegoats? What is wanted is to deal with the emergency." I do not want to look for scapegoats, but thank heaven Lord Wavell has now arrived in Delhi, a man who is used to dealing with realities, a man of great organizing power, and I hope he will take the most drastic steps to deal with this terrible disaster. Your Lordships are agreed that the first need is shipping. Mr. Curtin says there is enough wheat in Australia to relieve the Indian famine, it is only a matter of ships. But I do not think any of your Lordships have suggested the release of some Army food stocks for feeding these starving people, and the using of the Army to administer the distribution of the foodstuffs, as well as to provide the trans- port. As for all the difficulties, described to us by Lord Hailey, of the friction between the Central Government and the Provincial Governments, surely we are not going to tolerate any more of that, and the Provincial Government Services will be compelled to relieve the deficit Provinces.

I want to deal with one other matter. The noble Lord, Lord Catto, referred to Japanese propaganda. The Japanese are taking advantage of this terrible state of affairs in Bengal and elsewhere, and are using it against us. Of course they are doing that, and the Germans as well. Part of the Japanese propaganda by wireless—and the Japanese wireless stations in Rangoon and elsewhere are sending their programmes in five or six of the principal Indian languages during the whole 24 hours—is to the effect that they would feed Bengal, and would release rice from Burma for the poverty-stricken population, if the British would allow it. It is probably nonsense, because I understand that in Burma their own maladministration has so upset the cultivators that there is now a deficit of rice in Burma. At any rate there is great difficulty there. But they are using this against us as a weapon of propaganda, and saying that they have rice which they would be prepared to send to Bengal.

Very seriously I ask my noble friend Lord Munster to consider this suggestion. Their bluff ought to be called. It will not do, when you have at least 10,000,000 people in danger of starvation, to allow this story to pass from mouth to mouth through India that the Japanese would send rice if the British Raj were removed. You cannot permit that. Therefore call that bluff. If the Japanese are prepared to send rice in, take the rice. It would be something to make up for the devastation and damage they have caused to Asia by plunging Asia into war. If they have not got the rice, you will expose the cruel and horrible lie for what it is. In any case do not sit down and do nothing in the face of this propaganda. The whole trouble has been a lack of grip and a lack of action on the part of the Central Government. We have a new Viceroy now and we can all wish him well. I believe myself that if he is properly supported by the India Office here he will accomplish great things.

House adjourned during pleasure, and resumed by Viscount MERSEY.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE EARL OF MUNSTER)

My Lords, at this comparatively late hour I must ask your Lordships' indulgence if I make a somewhat lengthy reply to the Motion which has been moved by the noble Earl. I have no wish to be drawn into discussion of the future constitutional problems which may concern India, and therefore I shall confine my remarks entirely to this very highly complicated question raised by the Notice on the Paper. I wish at the outset to follow the noble Earl who proposed this Motion and record my deep and sincere sympathy with the Indian people in this dire misfortune that has come upon them. As there are considerable doubts existing in the minds of many people concerning the present constitutional position in India, I have thought it advisable, after consideration, to draw up my remarks under five headings:—Firstly, the fundamentals of the food problem in India; secondly, the responsibilities of His Majesty's Government, the Government of India, and the Provincial Administrations, of which the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, rather seemed to be unaware; thirdly, the action taken by the Central Government; fourthly, the reason for the shortage of foodstuffs in Bengal; and, lastly, what action has been taken to relieve that shortage.

There are certain fundamentals in the economy of Indian agriculture peculiar to that country, and which are perhaps not found in any other great country in the world with the possible exception of China. The task of supplying and maintaining the daily needs and wants of one-fifth of the human race—a population which has increased incidentally by some 60,000,000 in the last dozen years— devolves upon 55,000,000 subsistence fanners who, from time immemorial, have followed the practice of retaining a portion of their products for their own consumption and that of their families and dependants, and of selling or marketing the surplus to pay their taxes and their debts and buy those things which they most require. It will be realized that, when all the families are counted in, the 55,000,000 farmers probably represent some 300,000,000 peasant consumers. Consequently, at times when low agricul- tural prices prevail, the farmer may be compelled to sell an unduly large quantity of his products which he would normally wish to reserve in order to pay his debts and to buy things he particularly requires. When high prices for foodstuffs prevail he Is able, by disposing of only a smaller quantity, to meet his current liabilities, and it consequently happens, when prices are high, that he tends to eat more, to save more, and probably market less.

Your Lordships will see how narrow and precarious—and indeed how narrow and precarious has always been—the margin of supply for the urban population. Despite the increased acreage which is now under cultivation, the amount of foodstuffs available per head has, in spite of the vast increase of population, remained practically stationary from year to year. The bulk of the production goes direct from the producer to the consumer, and therefore the steady distribution of home-grown products must always play a very important role in the feeding of the people.

There are other additional factors which affect the even distribution of foodstuffs, the most important of which are the fixed diet habits of the people and the difficulty which is experienced in persuading them to vary their customary foodstuffs if any shortage should occur in the particular food grains to which they have become accustomed. I have met this same difficulty in another part: of the Empire, and although it can usually be overcome by the spoken or written word, it is far more difficult in India where we are faced with a very large illiterate population who, in times of famine, as has been said to-day, are the very people who suffer the greatest tribulation and need. Your Lordships will realize that, should anything occur to disturb that normal flow of trade between the small subsistence farmer and the great urban population, a man-made artificial famine is at once created, a famine which is quite distinct from that caused by the failure of crops due to reasons over which mankind has little or no control. At the moment Bengal is unfortunately enduring both forms of disaster—man-made and natural—and they react on and exaggerate, as they must do, one another. From the districts on which Calcutta relied for rice, and which are themselves faced with starvation, there have flocked into the cities thousands and thousands of destitute villagers looking for charitable relief and swelling the proportion of the city population which is already destitute. That point was made very effectively by my noble friend Lord Catto this afternoon.

I leave the fundamentals of the Indian food problem, and go on to the responsibilities of His Majesty's Government, the Government of India, and the Provincial Governments, which are in fact the three authorities concerned in the government of the Indian Empire. I shall try to explain to the House—for it is a most substantial point—the duties which fall on each of these authorities under Act of Parliament. Any of your Lordships who know India will not forget that, under the existing Constitution, and leaving aside for the moment the Indian States of great and varying sizes and wealth, the Indian Empire is made up of eleven Provinces, some as great and as big as the principal European countries, to which certain responsibilities have been allotted to enable them to function as autonomous units in many respects practically self-governing. The Provincial Governments under the Government of India Act, 1935, are responsible for agriculture, agricultural development and the production and distribution of foodstuffs. In fact, the House will see that they are primarily responsible for the well-being of their community in their respective districts. There is no other administrative organization in existence for the execution and carrying out of any common food policy in India other than that which is provided by the administrative organizations of the Provinces and States, it is, 01 course, true to say that the Central Government has certain powers of co-ordination and it has used them from time to time to give advice, assistance and help to the autonomous Provinces, but for the functions of government which have been developed in the Provinces it has no administrative agency of its own and it must therefore depend on the machinery which, as I have said, is already in existence and only in existence in the Provinces.

That then is the position at the present time in all Provinces and in the States as well. Let me pass to the Central Government and explain to your Lordships the position which it occupies. It is quite true that the Government of India has special war-time powers which enable it to override the Provincial Governments if necessary, in order to secure that provincial action conforms to All-Indian requirements. These powers were, I venture to think, not granted by Parliament for the purpose of coercing these Provincial Administrations, who possibly in the performance of their proper provincial functions seemed perhaps overanxious to protect the interests of their own populations or failed to move at that speed which might have been expected of them. They were granted, as I understand it, for use in a time of emergency and when the security of India is threatened by war. That, as I see it, is the governing situation, but it would be an extreme measure to use these powers to deal, even in war-time, with a problem of famine. It may be said that the granting of provincial autonomy has resulted in a lessening efficiency as viewed from an All-Indian standpoint. But, so far as I can see, there is no reason whatever why the Central Government should encroach on provincial responsibility except in the most exceptional circumstances. If it should prove that the Provinces failed to co-operate in handling the food problem to such an extent that the war effort was seriously affected, then the Central Government would be justified in using these powers.

I think that it would be an unhappy development if the Government of India were to exert these powers and, to use words which have been used to-day, brush aside the responsible democratically-based Governments whenever an ugly situation develops or threatens in any particular Province. I think it is quite true, as was said by my noble friend Lord Hailey, that the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, did overlook that point in the speech he delivered to your Lordships. I ask myself this question, what is the first act of any democratic Government? Surely it is to look after and safeguard the well-being and interests of all the people in its district, both the majority and the minorities, and most elected Governments are usually deeply sensible of this responsibility. I should have thought myself that it is quite clear that the Central Government has adopted the only possible course short of the extreme measures which I have mentioned, for it has continually and earnestly sought to obtain the loyal co-operation of the Provinces. It would be contrary to all the facts in this very com- plicated story to assume that the Government of India was content to do absolutely nothing until the situation had developed into the serious dimensions that we see to-day.

I shall have to return again in a moment to give the House further facts which will show what action has been taken by the Central Government from the first day of the war, now more than four years ago, but let me for a moment try to elucidate the position of ourselves at home—that is to say of His Majesty's Government. Quite apart from the statutory and constitutional responsibilities which we retain for securing the safety of the peoples of India, it would be our natural wish at all times to render every conceivable form of assistance and help to all our partners within the Empire whatever their precise constitutional relations to this country, and wherever they may be situated, and indeed whatever the cost might be. That wish of course is magnified in times of grave tribulation and of great need. As I understand it, loyalty to the Empire implies an obligation on the part of all of us, a mutual safeguard of common interests and a recognition of a duty of mutual assistance to each other. The problem, then, so far as we are concerned at home, in what is essentially a matter of internal administration in order to secure effective distribution within India, is limited entirely to the provision of shipping for the carrying of food supplies that India requires from outside sources. It is hardly necessary, I think, for me to remind the House of the many calls that are made upon us in this matter of shipping. We have to judge in the light of all relevant factors, we have to judge in the light of all the other urgent demands of the United Nations, and allot shipping as and where it can be of most use and assistance to the war effort. I am happy to think that these efforts we have made have not been without some considerable degree of success and large quantities of food grains are now arriving in ships which have been diverted to meet the present needs of the food shortage in certain districts of India.

Perhaps I may revert for a moment in order to give your Lordships some account of the action which has been taken by the Central Government, action with which, I venture to suggest, the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, is completely unfamiliar, otherwise he would not have given us the speech to-day which contains so many magnificent examples of gross inaccuracies. From the earliest days of the war the Government of India realized that it would inevitably be confronted with some of the consequences of war conditions and the commodity supply position was taken in hand at that time. Every development was carefully and closely watched and the co-ordination of policy was achieved by price control conferences convened by the Central Government of Provincial and State representatives. Powers under the Defence of India Rules were taken to authorize Provincial Governments to control prices of certain essential commodities. I do not propose to worry your Lordships with the many details of events which occurred from that time to the beginning of 1942 when the position did undergo a radical change. The loss of Burma deprived India of rice normally imported from that country. In December, 1942, the Central Government set up a food department of its own with regional food controllers whose duty it was to advise and assist and to convey instructions, At the same time a basic plan was evolved which arranged for the purchase and distribution of food grains from the surplus areas to the deficit areas, and agencies were established under the authority of Government for that very purpose.

At that time the Central Government experienced many unforeseen difficulties when they came to consult the Provinces as to the quantity of food grains available by way of surplus and of the dimensions of the deficiencies to be met. In spite of an excellent wheat harvest in North-West India, it became obvious in the middle of this year that the basic plan was not in fact providing sufficient remedy for meeting the difficulties of the more hardly pressed areas and therefore amendment was found necessary to this plan, which, as I have said, was formulated at the beginning of the year. In normal peace time the imports of foodstuffs into India spread through the period of twelve months amount to about 2½ per cent, of the total consumption. The situation, therefore, differs fundamentally from the position in this country where by far the greater part of our foodstuffs is imported and the State can easily institute a price control of vital commodities without a great deal of difficulty. The basic plan did not deal with price control, but it was believed its effective operation would bring food grains on to the market at reasonable prices. Fixed prices for wheat were actually in operation in India for a time, but when a shortage was apparent dealers were unwilling and reluctant to sell at the controlled price and it was accordingly removed. This naturally resulted in a large quantity of wheat coming on to the market, but of course at higher prices. It should also be remembered that, with the exception of wheat, there is no organized system of marketing food grains in India, and there is now no general price control on food grains, though practically all the Provinces have taken steps to control prices either directly or indirectly. There is further a ceiling price on rice which has been imposed throughout Bengal.

The Central Government also instituted, during the early months of last year, a grow-more-food campaign which brought an additional 8,000,000 acres of food crops under cultivation and will probably bring a total of 12,000,000 acres this year. This should normally have met the deficiencies which have resulted from the fall of Burma alone. The Government is also providing financial assistance to the Bengal Government to meet the heavy increased cost of relief. From time to time an All-India food Conference has been held when all matters pertaining to food supplies have been exhaustively examined. I think your Lordships will quite easily see that the Central Government has been and is continually and energetically devoting its efforts to the food problem.

Last July the Government of India appointed a Committee of Provincial and other representatives to make recommendations on what was described as the long-term food policy. That I think was referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, and by my noble friend Lord Strabolgi. That Committee reported at the end of last month and the Government of India called a conference last week to consider it. The full text of the report and of the discussion has not yet reached us, but a telegram was received at a late hour last night explaining that the decisions include a new and revised edition of the basic plan for the marrying of provincial surpluses and deficits and the continuance of present methods of procurement by the Provinces under central advice and direction pending the Government of India's consideration of the possibility of a central food grains monopoly. As regards prices, statutory price control both for food grains and other commodities is to be established ultimately, being built up from a provincial and regional basis. Provincial control of prices meanwhile is to be subject to central approval. Lastly, full urban rationing of towns over 100,000 population, is accepted as fundamental. I wish I had further information, but I thought the House would probably desire the earliest information that could be given to it. I think that if this scheme works well it will prevent a recurrence of this man-made famine which has given so much anxiety to us.

May I go on now to explain some of the reasons for the shortage of foodstuffs in Bengal? The present unhappy situation which has developed there is due to a variety of reasons. The loss of Burma had repercussions upon Bengal and upon other districts of India, but the Provincial Governments were not seriously alarmed at that time for there were reserves of stocks which had been obtained from an excellent crop and which had come on the market at the beginning of the year. That reserve was in the hands of a number of traders and cultivators. Unfortunately, cyclones and floods occurred in parts of the rice growing areas of Bengal and not only destroyed a portion of the coming season's crop, but also resulted in the loss by floods of some of the reserve stocks which, as I have just mentioned, were in the hands of the traders and cultivators. As a result of this the rice harvest was poor, with probably a 25 per cent, reduction in quantity on former years. The distribution of foodstuffs within the Province was also hampered by the lack of small craft which had been removed by the boat denial policy instituted at the time of the threatened invasion of Burma. Furthermore, as your Lordships must know quite well, the railways in Eastern India were carrying immense quantities of military personnel and equipment.

The cumulative effect of these causes aggravated the food problem and caused a shortage in the production and the distribution of foodstuffs. The traders in all crops tended to hoard in the hope of obtaining a substantial rise in prices, and the cultivator was reluctant to dispose of any surplus which he held for fear of having to buy back at a higher price if famine conditions spread or the next harvest failed. Thus your Lordships will see that the position as a whole was accentuated by the loss of Burma, by the adverse supply position, by the fear of invasion which at that time was very much alive, by the lack of any marketable surplus through hoarding, and by the withholding of stocks for speculative reasons.

Your Lordships will naturally wish to hear what action is being or has been taken to relieve the food shortage in Bengal. In August, instructions were issued for the immediate establishment of an elaborate relief organization based on very similar lines to those indicated in the famine code. Emphasis was laid on the importance of affording relief in kind through free kitchens and cheap grain shops, in addition to the more usual forms of Government assistance and relief. As a result of these remedial measures, 4,000 free kitchens have been established or have been subsidized by the Government, and nearly 1,500,000 people are being fed daily in this manner. As the House already knows—it has been announced in another place—the problem of the destitutes in Calcutta and elsewhere is being tackled by the opening of relief camps. The Government of Bengal, with the aid of the Government of India's adviser— and incidentally I may mention that he is an expert who was recommended by my noble friend the Minister of Food to meet the request of the Government of India—is working out a system of individual rationing for Calcutta, and this should be in full operation before the end of November.

In addition to these methods of relief, the Central Government has treated this question the whole time as a matter of first-class importance, and has taken a number of steps to assist the Bengal Government. Arrangements have been made for the running of special food trains each day to carry food grains from North-West India to Calcutta and beyond. Deliveries of food grains to Bengal since the beginning of April on Government account have amounted to 181,000 tons of rice and 194,000 tons of other food grains. During the month of September deliveries amounted to 72,000 tons.

My Lords, I have endeavoured, at, I am afraid, far too great a length at this time of the day, to put before your Lordships an examination of all the relevant factors which have led up over a period of time to the present very unhappy condition which is prevailing chiefly in Bengal, though it exists in other parts of India as well. We are, as I have endeavoured to show, making every effort to remedy the situation as quickly as it is humanly possible to do so, for it is vital, not only for the war effort but for the civil life of the community at large, that they should return to normal conditions without any undue delay. The Aus crop has already been harvested, and, subject to adequate distribution and to assistance rendered from outside sources, it is hoped that this will carry Bengal to the New Year when the Aman, or winter rice crop—which is the main crop for Bengal—will be coming on to the market.

I hope that I have dealt with all the questions which were asked me in the speeches which have been delivered to-day. But may I be so bold as to conclude my remarks by referring to a matter which does concern this House and indeed the country at large? I refer, of course, to the appointment of the nob|e and gallant Field Marshal Lord Wavell as Viceroy and Governor-General of India. I feel sure that your Lordships would naturally wish to express your best wishes to the noble Viscount in the gigantic task which he has undertaken. It is, I think, only one further indication of his willingness to serve his country in whatever position he can render the most useful service. This, perhaps, is not the time to refer to the work performed for seven and a half long and arduous years—four years of which have been years of war—by the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow, who will shortly be amongst us again. But I must quite frankly say that fortune has not been kind to Lord Linlithgow during the last few remaining months of his Viceroyalty, for the hideous spectre of famine has raised its ugly head in spite of the many remedial measures which he took and which he has undertaken to relieve it. But, nevertheless, we are grateful to the noble Marquess for the loyal, long and very distinguished service which he has given to us and to our great Indian Empire.

THE EARL OF HUNTINGDON

My Lords, I do not wish to keep you long at this late stage of the day, but I should like to thank the noble Earl for the very full and pithy reply which he has given to the question which I have raised, and to the questions which have been asked by other noble Lords. I think that we have had an exceptionally interesting debate, with valuable contributions from Lord Catto and, particularly, from Lord Hailey. There are just one or two points which I should like to mention before we cease dealing with this matter. One is this. I cannot quite agree with the remarks of the noble Earl about the emergency powers. I understood that those powers were given to the Central Government of India for use in any war-time emergency. Surely this famine is about as great an emergency as we could possibly come up against. I should like to express my agreement with Lord Hailey in what he said about the importance of price control. Although there are some other topics on which we may not altogether agree, I do agree very strongly with what he said in this connexion. I should like, finally, to express the gratitude which I think all members of this House must have felt at hearing the news that grain ships and other forms of relief are now going to India. I hope that His Majesty's Government will continue to make every effort to fight this dreadful famine. I beg to ask leave of the House to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.