Nuclear Safeguards Bill [Lords]

HC Deb 10 April 2000 vol 348 cc35-114

Order for Second Reading read.

4.20 pm

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Dr. Kim Howells)

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

The Bill will provide the Government with the necessary powers to implement a strengthened nuclear safeguards system in the United Kingdom by bringing into effect an additional protocol to our existing nuclear safeguards agreement with the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency. That will fulfil the UK's commitment to help to strengthen the effectiveness of the international system for detecting clandestine nuclear activities in non-nuclear weapons states.

May I explain a little of the background to the Bill? After the Gulf war, Iraq was found to have been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, even though it had in force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the agency. In response to that discovery, the international community agreed that there was a need to strengthen the international nuclear safeguards system by giving the agency additional information and rights of access to nuclear facilities and to other relevant locations. States throughout the world are negotiating and signing legally binding additional protocols with the agency to provide it with that information and with those rights.

To date, additional protocols for 48 states have been signed. Eight have entered into force. Like most states, the UK needs to put legislation in place to ensure that we can fulfil our obligations under our additional protocol.

The UK additional protocol was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, along with the additional protocols for France and for the 13 non-nuclear weapons state members of the European Union. Our additional protocol requires the UK to provide information to the agency about nuclear and nuclear-related activities carried out for, or with, non-nuclear weapons states.

Mr. Eric Forth (Bromley and Chislehurst)

If it is a matter of any importance at all, how can the Minister explain the considerable time lapse between the signing in September 1998 and the introduction of the Bill now, well into 2000?

Dr. Howells

The right hon. Gentleman, whose defence of liberty I always admire, as he knows, prevented the Bill when it was in another form—a private Member's Bill—from being brought forward perfectly properly under the rules of the House. I am now attempting to put matters right.

The information that we provide, along with that gathered from other states, will enable the agency to draw up a comprehensive picture of nuclear activity in non-nuclear weapons states. That will enhance the agency's ability to detect signs of suspicious activity that may be indicative of clandestine nuclear programmes and to act as a strong deterrent to the development of such programmes.

Mr. Michael Fabricant (Lichfield)

The Minister will understand that the Bill is of great concern to the House, albeit not to Labour Members, all of whom seem to have disappeared to the Tea Room. He is ensuring, rightly, that the UK will comply with the agency. However, what about countries such as North Korea or Iraq? How many other rogue states are there around the world that have nuclear capability, but are refusing to sign the protocol?

Dr. Howells

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. However, I am glad to say that I am the elected Member for Pontypridd, not for Seoul or for any other part of the world, and that I cannot answer for them.

We need the Bill's legal powers to enable the United Kingdom to fulfil its obligations under the new additional protocol. The Bill's core elements can be found in clauses 2 and 5.

The first element—clause 2—is required because much of the information that the additional protocol requires the United Kingdom to pass to the agency will not originate with the Government. Therefore, the clause enables people to give relevant information to the Secretary of State, unrestricted by any obligation of confidentiality or limit on disclosure that would otherwise inhibit them from doing so, although any such obligations and limits will still apply for other purposes. It is anticipated that the great majority of the information required by the agency from the United Kingdom will be given to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry voluntarily by those who have it.

Mr. David Maclean (Penrith and The Border)

Although I appreciate that the Minister is the hon. Member for Pontypridd, rather than for Seoul, nevertheless he is today moving the Second Reading of a Bill that would implement an international protocol to an internationally agreed nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Surely he could tell the House how many other countries, to date, have signed up to the additional protocol. I am sure that that is information that the Foreign Office is bound to supply.

Dr. Howells

I fear that the right hon. Gentleman has come into the Chamber a little late. As I said, 48 states have signed up to the protocol and four have enacted it. We want to be the next in line.

In the event that a person is unwilling to provide information that the Government need to fulfil a United Kingdom obligation under the additional protocol, there obviously has to be a means of compelling that person to do so. Therefore, clause 2 also enables the Secretary of State to serve a notice on someone, with a criminal sanction for non-compliance, requiring him or her to give relevant information.

Clause 5 is the Bill's second core element. The clause gives inspectors designated by the agency a right to enter certain locations in accordance with the additional protocol and to conduct in those places specific activities that the additional protocol requires to be permitted. Those activities are essentially designed to check information that we and other countries have provided to the agency. Although, we would usually expect access by agency inspectors to be granted on a voluntarily basis, the Bill makes it a criminal offence to obstruct inspectors in performing their functions or to interfere with anything placed on land by an inspector in the course of those functions.

It is envisaged that visits from agency inspectors under clause 5 will occur mostly at the sites of the major nuclear companies. All those companies have expressed their support for the new measures. The precise activities that may be conducted by the agency inspectors under clause 5 will depend largely on the location in question and the reason for the access.

Mr. Forth

Will the Minister give way?

Dr. Howells

I shall certainly give way in a moment.

The activities that may be performed include, for example, visual observation, collection of environmental samples, use of radiation detection and measuring devices, and, of course, examination of records.

Mr. Forth

The Minister has said that the proprietors or operators of what he has called nuclear sites have said that they are content with the provisions of the Bill and the protocol. However, does he accept that the wide powers given, particularly those in clause 5, go much further than that, and that he therefore cannot make any presumption about a general consent or relaxation about the wide powers in the Bill? What measures have the Government taken to assess, outside the rather narrow nuclear fraternity, opinion on the powers given in the Bill?

Dr. Howells

We have made our intentions abundantly clear for a long time. We have not heard of any serious worries from any quarter. I shall try to deal with some of the problems that I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman is keen to highlight.

Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham)

I am listening intently to the hon. Gentleman's oration. I regret only that he has such a poor audience on the Labour Benches. Has he been overwhelmed by support from outside bodies for the apartheid that the Bill creates between authorised officers of the British Government, who have to satisfy a justice of the peace before they can invade private property, and international agencies, who have a fiat to trample over the private property of United Kingdom citizens with no justification or explanation?

Dr. Howells

No.

Clause 5, Madam Speaker, gives effect to one of the key obligations under the protocol. It is a fundamental aspect of the protocol that, if a state has provided information to the agency—[Interruption.] I am sorry, I should have said Mr. Deputy Speaker. It is a problem with advancing age. Agency inspectors must have a right of access to confirm the completeness and accuracy of the information provided, subject only to the conditions provided for in the additional protocol.

The remaining clauses are secondary to clauses 2 and 5. I shall outline them briefly so that hon. Members understand the overall structure of the Bill.

Mr. Bercow

I thank the Minister for his confirmation a moment ago that he had not been overwhelmed by support for the apartheid that the Bill creates. Has he been overwhelmed by strong opposition to the authoritarian character of his proposals?

Dr. Howells

No.

Clause 3 is necessary to enable the Secretary of State to identify those from whom he requires information. It enables him to make regulations requiring persons—that includes companies and other bodies, such as universities, as well as individuals—to inform him if they carry out certain types of activity or have certain information that he may need.

Clause 4 enables an officer authorised by the Secretary of State, having obtained a warrant from a justice of the peace—I know that hon. Members are concerned about this—to enter any premises in the United Kingdom to search for information that has been required by the Secretary of State in a notice under clause 2, but that the person served with the notice has failed or refused to provide. That is envisaged as a last resort power, but it is needed because a power to prosecute does not guarantee that the necessary information will be provided. The clause also covers entry when documents or other things containing information needed by the Secretary of State are at risk of being destroyed, altered or disposed of, so preventing the Secretary of State from obtaining information.

Mr. David Wilshire (Spelthorne)

I am doing my best to keep up on this technical matter. The Minister said that the clause gives the Secretary of State the power to ask for information, but if the company concerned will not tell him, how on earth does he know what to ask for?

Dr. Howells

That is a good point. Hon. Members should not look smug. Looking smug and grunting would not have sorted out the problem of arms to Iraq, still less the manufacture of nuclear triggers and other components that could put the lives of a great many people, including British soldiers, under threat.

Mr. Wilshire

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The Minister has just said that somebody had been grunting. Could you advise me who it was?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Michael Lord)

I did not hear anybody grunting.

Dr. Howells

This is a very old building. I agree with you, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

Clause 6 protects information obtained under the Bill or the additional protocol. It prohibits the disclosure of certain types of such information except for certain purposes or in certain circumstances, and sets out penalties for disclosure in breach of those limits. The clause is aimed primarily at civil servants who deal with the information to be passed to the agency or who accompany agency inspectors on visits.

Mr. Owen Paterson (North Shropshire)

The Minister has moved on rather faster than I expected. I am still thinking about clause 5. Will he name any public bodies outside the nuclear industry that support the extraordinary powers given to an extra-national body to enter the private property of a British citizen without any appeal mechanism?

Dr. Howells

We have received no objections from any manufacturing company or private individual. There was an extensive debate on the matter in another place, and their Lordships were satisfied with the assurances that they were given and with the text of the Bill.

Clause 7 makes it an offence knowingly or recklessly to give false or misleading information under the Bill. Clause 8—

Mr. Fabricant

How would clause 7 affect British Nuclear Fuels Ltd?

Dr. Howells

I am here to talk about the work that goes on within Britain in various manufacturing plants, which is done in co-operation with a non-nuclear weapon state. I am not aware that British Nuclear Fuels is involved in any such deal. It would seem that that issue is outside the remit of the Bill.

Clause 8 provides persons authorised by the Secretary of State, having obtained a warrant from a justice of the peace, with the power to search premises for evidence of an offence under the Bill.

Clause 9 sets out the penalties for failing to comply with various provisions of the Bill or interfering with things done under the Bill. Generally, such offences are to be punishable in a magistrates court by a fine up to the statutory maximum, which is £5,000, or after a jury trial by an unlimited fine. However, knowingly or recklessly giving false information under the Bill is to be punishable in the magistrates court by a fine of up to the statutory maximum or, after a jury trial, by an unlimited fine or up to two year's imprisonment, or both.

Clause 9 deals also with a case where a corporate body or a Scottish partnership is found to have committed an offence under the Bill and allows persons of authority in the body, or partners, to be charged if they were involved in the commission of the offence.

The remaining clauses set out how a notice under the Act may be served; amend the Act, implementing the original safeguards agreement of 1976 to bring it in line with the Bill and with corresponding provisions of the Chemical Weapons Act 1996; and deal with commencement, territorial extent and the short title.

I fully expect those who are affected by the new measures to co-operate with them voluntarily. Indeed, we are not aware of any prosecutions under the Act implementing the original safeguards agreement of 1976 and the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978. Those concerned have always acted responsibly and co-operated with the Department voluntarily.

Mr. Nick Gibb (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton)

In essence, the purpose of the Bill is to give powers to the International Atomic Energy Agency to enter premises without a warrant from a justice of the peace so that the IAEA will have the same powers in the rogue states such as North Korea and Iraq. Is it not odd that those states are not signatories to the additional protocol? We are implementing it in the expectation and hope that those countries will sign it and that its powers will be implemented in those states. What progress has been made in persuading those countries to sign the protocol?

Dr. Howells

As the hon. Gentleman well knows, this has always been an international effort. If we do not sign the protocol, how can we expect rogue countries to do so? That is complete nonsense. If the hon. Gentleman is saying that the Conservative party is opposed to these agreements, he should tell us. In the meantime—I very much look forward to his speech—the Government will try to set a good example by signing up to additional protocols.

Mr. Gibb

The Opposition support these measures and give the Government and the agency the benefit of the doubt on the issue. However, I asked the Minister for information to help the House in scrutinising the Bill. Where are we internationally in terms of persuading those countries to sign the protocol? The Minister should know, because he is introducing the Bill.

Dr. Howells

As I have said, many countries have already signed up and the agenda will be taken further by a conference on 24 April. We are making progress, but it is important that this country sets a good example.

Mr. Andrew Robathan (Blaby)

Will the Minister give way?

Dr. Howells

No, I shall try to finish now. Without a mechanism for compelling people to provide the relevant information to the Government, and for ensuring a right of access for agency inspectors, we could not guarantee compliance with the United Kingdom's obligations under the additional protocols, in the—albeit unlikely—event that someone was not prepared to co-operate voluntarily. As I have said, we do not so far have an example of someone refusing to co-operate.

It is also worth emphasising that the burden on business of the new measures is minimal. [Interruption.] A regulatory impact assessment prepared by my Department showed that the estimated cost for businesses likely to be affected by the new safeguards measure would be around £150,000 in the first year. That is minimal compared with the cost of existing safeguard measures, which is more than £10 million a year for BNFL alone. The cost to small businesses involved in manufacturing or consultancy work which would be caught by the proposed legislation would be a few thousand pounds.

Mr. Paul Keetch (Hereford)

The hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton (Mr. Gibb) asked how many countries have enacted such legislation, but can the Minister tell us whether the United States of America has ratified the protocol?

Dr. Howells

No, the US is considering ratification at the moment. The additional protocols still have to be taken through Congress.

It is worth repeating that, without the mechanism for compelling people to provide the relevant information to the Government and for ensuring a right of access to agency inspectors, we could not guarantee compliance with the United Kingdom's obligations under the additional protocols in the unlikely event that someone was not prepared to co-operate voluntarily. That is very important. I would also emphasise that the burden on business of the new measures will be minimal. Hon. Members were talking among themselves when I mentioned that point earlier, so I wished to repeat it.

I note that the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) has tabled an amendment that questions the Bill's compatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998, but I assure him that the Government are committed to upholding the principles of individual human rights set out in the European convention on human rights and in that Act. In drafting the Bill, careful consideration has been given to ensuring that its measures uphold the principles set out in the convention and the Government are satisfied that the Bill's provisions are fully compatible with those principles. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman is aware that the issue was discussed during consideration of the Bill in the other place. We took the opportunity then to consider the point in detail once more, and we are satisfied that nothing in the Bill is inconsistent with the convention. However, I look forward to hearing the right hon. Gentleman's misgivings on that point.

Mr. Forth

It will take a long time.

Dr. Howells

I have no doubt of that, and I am fully prepared for it. I hope that, in the light of my remarks, the right hon. Gentleman is satisfied on that point and is reassured that the matter has been given the careful consideration that it deserves.

Mr. Forth

I am grateful to the Minister for identifying the modest contribution that I have made so far, and I shall make a more substantial contribution later. He may be surprised to hear that I am not prepared to accept the general reassurances that he has given. He will know that there is great difference in substance between the rights granted under clause 4, and those granted under clause 5. I would accept his reassurances about clause 4, but clause 5 gives us all much greater concern.

How can the Minister square the rights in the convention and the Human Rights Act 1998 with the untrammelled rights that would be given to foreigners to trample over British citizens' property and possessions?

Dr. Howells

The right hon. Gentleman is right to identify clause 5 as the key provision in the Bill. Unlike clause 4, it does not require a warrant to be issued before access to premises is sought. A requirement to obtain a warrant is considered an appropriate control on the exercise of a general power to enter a premises, and especially on a power to search for items or information or to collect evidence for possible use in a prosecution. Clauses 4 and 8 contain general search powers of that sort, and those powers are exercisable only on the granting of a warrant. However, as the right hon. Gentleman says, clause 5 does not provide a power to enter premises and conduct a search, nor one to enter premises and carry out activities in general terms.

The agency's rights under clause 5 relate only to entering premises to conduct certain tightly defined activities. As such, a warrant provision in clause 5 is not considered necessary or appropriate.

I hope that, in the light of these remarks, the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst will reconsider his amendment. I also hope that the Opposition will give their wholehearted support to this new and important non-proliferation measure. Germany, Spain and the Netherlands have succeeded in completing their legislative procedures and are in a position to ratify their additional protocols. We must now focus on our efforts to ensure that we can do likewise.

I emphasise the importance of making good progress towards putting the legislation in place before Easter. On 24 April, the review conference of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty starts in New York. Last year, the United Kingdom, along with our EU partners, made a public commitment to make every effort to conclude our ratification procedures for entry into force of the additional protocol in time for that conference.

The conference will be an important event for the United Kingdom, which is a leading proponent of nuclear non-proliferation and a state with nuclear weapons. We hope to be able to report that significant progress has been made towards the objective.

Mr. Maclean

Has the Minister's Department had discussions with the Association of Chief Police Officers or the police service about clause 5(5), which would put a British police constable under an obligation to give help or assistance, or to use force, under the orders of a foreign inspector? If so, what was the view of the British police on the matter?

Dr. Howells

Yes, I believe that extensive discussions have taken place. I hope that Conservative Members are not about to raise the spectre of foreign inspectors trampling through Britain. I remind them that those inspectors may well be British—indeed, they may be English. We are talking about an international agency, and we have many distinguished inspectors.

I am sure that Conservative Members would love to throw a net over all the inspectors and call them filthy foreigners. However, that would be a big mistake, and they must be very careful: this country has played a great part in the International Atomic Energy Agency, and in ensuring that our expertise, built up over many years, is used to best effect.

Mr. Keetch

Will the Minister agree that rhetoric in the House, even when the banter is good natured, could be used by other countries to justify their exclusion of their foreigners? We should be careful that representatives of the United Nations and other international bodies in which this country plays a leading role are not simply called foreigners.

Dr. Howells

The hon.Gentleman has expressed this far better than I could. Those are the words that Saddam Hussein used to drive out International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. I assume that Conservative Members will not behave in a similar way.

Mr. Wilshire

Will the Minister give way?

Mr. Bercow

Will the Minister give way?

Dr. Howells

No, I am about to finish.

To sum up, let me say that enacting the Bill will represent a clear demonstration of the United Kingdom's strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. As a nuclear weapons state, it is incumbent on the United Kingdom to take a strong lead on the issue as a tangible illustration to the European community and the world that we do not procrastinate when it comes to our non-proliferations obligations. I commend the Bill to the House.

Several hon. Members

rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I remind the House that Madam Speaker did not select the amendment that is on the Order Paper.

4.51 pm

Mr. Richard Page (South-West Hertfordshire)

I congratulate the Minister on setting out the Government's position very clearly. The Bill is one of those measures that appear relatively straightforward and uncontroversial on the surface, particularly to any Government wishing to fulfil their international obligations. The logic behind it seems compelling. The United Kingdom, under successive Administrations, has had a good record in this respect, and Conservative Members want us to continue to enjoy that reputation.

That is precisely why my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) objected to the Government's trying to slide this very important issue through as a private Member's Bill. We do not want to send a message to the rest of the world that we regard this measure as so unimportant that we will just stick it through as a private Member's Bill. Frankly, that is just not good enough, and I am delighted that my right hon. Friend has been successful, in that the Bill is being debated in the House and will now go through the proper procedures and become a proper Government Bill in the fullness of time.

I have to confess one minor worry—the Minister said that he would like to see this done by Easter. I am not sure whether the procedures of the House are such that that can happen, given that the Bill has to be considered in Committee and on Report; I am unaware that the Report stage is to occur on Good Friday, for instance. Wherever possible, we wish to help and to expedite the proceedings.

Mr. Fabricant

I wonder whether my hon. Friend has another worry. Was he not as concerned as I was that when the Minister referred to the United Kingdom's international policy on North Korea, he thought that Seoul was the capital of North Korea.

Mr. Page

My hon. Friend, as always, makes his point in his own inimitable fashion. I can understand that as the Minister was born in south Wales, and does not travel very far, he may get muddled about where Seoul is. I suffer from the same problem.

As some of my right hon. and hon. Friends have said, not every country seems to share the justifiable ambitions of this Government and the others who have so far ratified and implemented the treaty. I think that this issue is a bit like the issue of dog licences. Right hon. and hon. Members may wonder how on earth I can draw such a parallel. During earlier Sessions of Parliament, the House has debated dog licences ad nauseam. Eventually, it dawned on people that the good guys will get dog licences, look after their dogs and make sure that they have a tag, while the bad guys will not. We should be focusing our attention and efforts on the bad guys.

The same applies to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which came into force in 1970, and the subsequent efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons technology. One of the principal aims of the treaty has been to try to prevent the diversion of peaceful research and development of nuclear energy into the development and production of nuclear weapons. We all say amen to that. States that did not have nuclear weapons have been encouraged—and cajoled in some cases—to enter into agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to inhibit them from going down the nuclear path.

Like the four other declared nuclear weapons states, this country has entered voluntary safeguard agreements with the IAEA under which inspectors have been granted access to our facilities for the purpose of monitoring the production of potentially fissile materials and for tracing them from the time of their production.

Since 1991, we and our partners—together with other countries—have been engaged in tightening up the systems and safeguards, resulting in the additional protocol that we signed with the IAEA in September 1998 and to which the Bill gives full force.

Not to put too fine a point on it, we have been one of the good boys—or, as the hon. Member for Keighley (Mrs. Cryer) would have it, one of the good persons—in terms of meeting international obligations. Others have not. No one needs reminding of the IAEA's failure to detect the development of clandestine weapons programmes in Iraq and North Korea. Iraq was a member of the IAEA. India and Pakistan were and are members, but that has not stopped them developing their own nuclear weapons in breach of their agreements with the IAEA. It may be that Libya is going down the same route.

I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Mrs. Browning) is worried about the Russian nuclear submarines that are rusting away in the Arctic circle, adding steadily to all the environmental pollution that has occurred there.

I am a little sceptical about the effectiveness of marching to the drumbeat of the IAEA. However, it is the only show in town, and it is important that we demonstrate our willingness to live up to our obligations and to repeat the commitment made by our Conservative colleagues in another place generally to support the Bill.

Mr. Bercow

While it is instructive and reassuring to know that, under clause 4(7), no constable shall search someone of the opposite sex, what recourse does a private individual have against the improper use of powers contained in clause 5? If the answer is that there is no formal recourse against an inappropriate use of the clause, how has the Minister been able to satisfy himself that the Bill is compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998?

Mr. Page

It is a matter of deep regret to me that I am not the Minister in control of these matters. If I were, I am sure we would have proceeded with sweetness and light, without all of the concerns expressed by my right hon. and hon. Friends. I shall touch fleetingly on that subject later; I am sure that the Minister will give crystal-clear answers that will satisfy everybody, and we will all live happily ever after.

There are questions which need answering. The Bill extends the powers of the Secretary of State to require information or records to be kept. Where it is suspected that offences may have been committed under the Bill, it will give his authorised officers and inspectors from the IAEA enhanced rights of entry to the premises and business of corporations, and even into the homes of private individuals, in search of information. That extends even to the colonies of the UK.

It would be helpful if the Minister could explain precisely to what range of installations the record-keeping requirements set out in clause 2 will apply. Some facilities, such as the nuclear reprocessing facilities at Sellafield or the nuclear power stations at Dungeness or Bradwell, are obvious. It is unclear how far university research facilities may be affected. Cambridge university was recently fined a small amount for losing track of nuclear material handled in its laboratories. I assume—the Minister can correct me if I am wrong—that the Bill will apply to university facilities.

Will the Minister discuss the cost implications of the new requirements? He has fallen into the trap of dismissing the sums of money involved as small ones. That shows that the Government do not understand business. As the Bill passed through the other place, we were told: The cost to small businesses involved in manufacturing or consultancy work which would be caught by the proposed legislation would be in the order of a few thousand pounds per year.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 30 November 1999; Vol. 607, c. 777.] It was implied that, as the sum was just a few thousand, we need not worry. As one who knows a small amount about the small business sector, I can say that such sums do matter. A few thousand here or there, or a few regulations here or there, can put a perfectly viable business on the borderline. I wish that the Minister would be clearer on the impact of costs on our smaller businesses.

What requirements will the record-keeping organisation have to meet? Guidance will be issued by the DTI's safeguards office following discussions between the IAEA and the Government. New recording procedures may be necessary, but the Government have given little indication of the period over which such novel demands might be introduced. The House can reasonably ask for that information before we accept clause 2.

From the point of view of the small business—the Conservative party is the small business man's friend—we know that the extra burdens and duties imposed by new regulations will mean that, instead of getting on with running a business, small business men or women will be consigned to filling in lots of forms to satisfy the Government's insatiable desire for information.

Dr. Howells

Will the hon. Gentleman name for me one or two firms that have ever complained about the onerous burden that he so beautifully describes?

Mr. Maclean

They have not seen the regulations yet.

Mr. Page

The voices off mean that I need offer no response to that. May I remind the Minister of what I have just said? His Department has given little indication of the period over which novel demands may be introduced.

What extra compliance will be required? Until businesses know that, they cannot know whether to complain. The Minister is putting the cart before the horse. I have absolutely no doubt that when some organisations read the new demands, they will say, "Not another burden on business; we can add it to the record of 1999 when more burdens were placed on businesses than in any other year of this country's existence."

I shall move on because I do not wish to be accused of delaying matters. May I request further information on the requirements of clause 2(7)? What will the Minister's legal advisers regard as a "reasonable" excuse by a person who fails to comply with a notice requiring certain records to be kept or retained? I recently served on the Committee that considered the Postal Services Bill, in which the word "reasonable" was discussed several times, but I am still waiting for the Minister in charge of that Bill to produce a definition. What would or would not be justifiable as an excuse? Would a failure by the safeguards officer of the DTI to supply a copy of guidance be an excuse?

I am also interested in the regulations that the Secretary of State may make under clause 3, which has one of those lovely, cryptic openings so beloved of parliamentary draftsmen. It states: The Secretary of State may make regulations requiring persons of any description specified in the regulations to inform him that they are of such a description and to give such supplementary particulars as may be so specified. That shows that Sir Humphrey is alive and well and living in the DTI.

After several hours of trying to work out what that provision meant, I decided that, in plain language, it puts the onus on individuals and organisations to identify themselves to the Secretary of State. However, if they are not aware that they should be thus identified—if individuals have not been informed by their employers that they fall into that category—how are those with only a peripheral involvement in such matters to proceed? How will they be clearly identified? Will every junior lab technician at nuclear power plants be included? It would be helpful if the Minister could put some practical flesh on that point in his reply. Obviously, the more extensive his response now, the less will be the need for further debate and questioning on other occasions. Any information gathered about such individuals or organisations must be passed on to the IAEA according to subsection (2)(a) of the clause. What security procedures has the Department agreed with the IAEA to ensure that such information remains confidential? Will the Minister assure us that the agency's procedures are as good—if not better—than those operating in the UK?

Mr. Fabricant

Is my hon. Friend as astonished as I am by the fact that the United Kingdom will sign that important protocol—if the Bill is passed—but that countries such as the Ukraine, North Korea, Libya, Israel, India, Pakistan, Belarus, Iraq and Iran have gone nowhere near it?

Mr. Page

My hon. Friend again makes an important point. Not only am I not the Minister in charge of the Bill and thus unable to answer such questions—as I said before—but I am not in charge of all the countries that he mentioned. I hope that when all our questions are answered and we sign the protocol, we can encourage, by example, some of those countries to tread the path of righteousness and truth so as to bring a little security and stability to the world.

Mr. Wilshire

My hon. Friend referred to righteousness and truth. Is he therefore impressed by the fact that the Holy See has signed up to the additional protocol?

Mr. Page

My hon. Friend has upset me, because I had planned to devote a considerable part of my short introduction to the splendid example set by the Holy See in the matter. I am not too sure about its nuclear capability and capacity.

Mr. Robathan

The ultimate deterrent.

Mr. Page

The Holy See offers a splendid and commendable example to which I hope that the Minister will draw attention in his remarks.

Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North)

A different sort of missal.

Mr. Page

If the hon. Gentleman wants to intervene, rather than making remarks from a sedentary position, I—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. There have been too many sedentary interventions. I remind the House that the subject is extremely serious.

Mr. Page

Thank you for your support and protection, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

I am a firm supporter of nuclear power. It is one of the cleanest forms of energy and it should be more widely used in this country. However, because of the way in which that power can be corrupted and wrongly used, it is vital that information about it does not pass into the wrong hands—certainly not to members of active terrorist organisations.

I can think of no reasonable objection to creating powers to enable the Secretary of State to obtain information or records that have been withheld or not supplied and are required under the notice that he has issued. It is not clear why the power of entry in clause 4 to search for information that should have been supplied to the Secretary of State should be exercised at any reasonable hour.

Again, that lovely word "reasonable" is used, and I hope that the Minister will explain what that means. What is reasonable? Is it reasonable to enter business premises or a private dwelling between 7 am and 11 pm but not after 11 pm? Is the dawn raid no more? Will there no longer be a knock at the door at 5.30 am? I would be grateful if the Minister—who can seek advice from all his sources—could advise us what is meant by reasonable.

My hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow), ever conscious of the need to have balance in our lives, has already pointed out the difficulties of providing officers of each sex to do a search. Every search team will need a woman police constable so that the job can be done properly.

Mr. Robathan

This is an important point. I accept what the Minister has said about the search procedures, but if it is so important to discover illegally held material on somebody's person, it is a little worrying that the absence of a woman police officer might mean that the person hiding that material would get away with it. Surely we must decide whether the needs of international nuclear disarmament should take priority over political correctness.

Mr. Page

My hon. Friend endorses the comment that I just made. The wording of the Bill means that a search will have to include male and female officers if it is to be effective. That is right, and nobody should be given the chance to evade the requirements of such important legislation.

Mr. Keetch

Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that in all forms of search by all agencies in the United Kingdom there is always a male and a female officer present? Is he not aware that if a person to be searched were of the opposite sex to the officers conducting the search, there is no reason why that person could not be held until an officer of the same sex was available? Surely he should move on from this point?

Mr. Page

I am more than prepared to move on; I was saying that the Bill covers that point—and I do not find that objectionable or offensive. The hon. Gentleman can make his own points about other aspects of parliamentary activity and legislation, although they would have to be in order, otherwise Mr. Deputy Speaker, you would rightly come down on him and keep him in line.

As the Government made clear in another place, clause 5 is central to the Bill, and a number of my hon. Friends have homed in on that point. It has been made abundantly clear that the IAEA is not, and never has been, party to the European convention on human rights, and that the Government believe that the powers to be granted to IAEA inspectors to enter premises do not breach the convention. I am aware of the exchanges on that issue which took place in another place.

Nevertheless, I wonder whether the Department's confidence is entirely well founded. The extremely careful language used by Lord McIntosh of Haringey on 13 December and 24 January indicated that he anticipated potential legal challenge from UK citizens whose premises or homes might be entered by IAEA inspectors without warrants granted by justices of the peace. It was admitted in the other place that the courts should be able to decide for themselves whether that inconsistency— that is, between the requirements of clauses 4 and 5 with regard to a warrant— was relevant to any offence with which a person was charged under the Bill—[Official Report, House of Lords, 24 January 2000; Vol. 608, c. 1349.] Does that give the game away? Does that mean that the courts could decide that the Bill infringes the European convention on human rights? if they do, the blame will rightly lie at the Minister's feet.

Of course it is right to restrict the disclosure of information obtained from persons subject to the provisions of the Bill or the additional protocol. I understand that there are circumstances in which such information may be disclosed. There should be no difficulty if the person from whom the information has been obtained consented, as envisaged by clause 6(2).

Clearly, information that is relevant to criminal allegations or offences must be disclosed to the prosecuting authorities, but what is the position of individuals or companies affected by the disclosure of commercially sensitive information in criminal proceedings that fail? One can easily envisage a situation in which information about nuclear fuel reprocessing—for example, at Sellafield, which is a highly sensitive subject—might be of great interest and value to competitors overseas. What redress would there be for individuals or organisations found innocent of alleged offences?

The fact that many of the provisions of clause 8 duplicate those of clause 4 has already attracted comment in another place. Clause 4 determines how information may be sought, if it is not supplied to the Secretary of State, and clause 8 deals with the powers that officers authorised by the Secretary of State will have to search premises for evidence that offences have been committed.

Mr. Bercow

Given that there is some lingering uncertainty as to whether the Bill in all its aspects is compatible with the European convention on human rights, would not Ministers do us a signal service were they to publish the legal advice that they received on that point from our old friends the Government lawyers?

Mr. Page

The Minister has no doubt heard my hon. Friend's request. It would be helpful if he would consider such a kind gesture to my hon. Friend. That would also be a service to the rest of the House.

I do not apologise for making detailed points because, although we are in favour of the Bill in principle, it is necessary to make sure that the matters of concern that I have raised are satisfactorily answered and given a clear bill of health. My final detailed point arises from clause 12.

It is clear that the Bill, if enacted, will apply throughout the United Kingdom, and if Her Majesty grants an Order in Council, to the Channel Islands and Isle of Man. I am intrigued to see that it may be applied to "any colony." What explanation can the Minister offer the House for that provision? Is the development of nuclear power programmes on St. Helena or the Falkland islands imminent? I should have thought not, but this may be one of the few occasions on which the Government are thinking ahead.

I hope that the Minister can provide answers to the questions that have been put to him not only by me, but by my hon. Friends in their contributions. I hope that we can then make sure that the Bill gets a quick passage on to the statute book, showing that we are fully behind its aims and objectives.

5.19 pm

Mr. Tony Colman (Putney)

I support the Bill, which ratifies the additional protocol to the safeguards mandated in article 3 of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, with wider provisions covering undeclared facilities and more effective inspections. It is substantially the private Member's Bill that I introduced—Bill No. 23 of the 1998–99 Session. I am delighted that the Government have found time to take the matter forward.

I am also delighted to pay tribute to a predecessor of mine as the Member of Parliament for Putney, the noble Lord Jenkins, who is 92 years old and still speaking strongly in the other place on the cause of nuclear disarmament. He will be pleased that the Bill, although small in its way, is the way forward.

I should also point out that I succeeded as Labour candidate for Putney the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Neath (Mr. Hain), who, as my hon. Friend the Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs said, will be representing the Government at the review of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty on 24 April. I am very pleased that, as the current Member of Parliament for Putney, I am able to follow in the tradition of those two very great men.

I should thank all those who helped me last year in pursuing my private Member's Bill, particularly Dr. Stephen Pullinger of the Institute for Science and International Security and Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym institute. I also thank the staff at the British embassy in Vienna and of the International Atomic Energy Agency for all their help, which enabled me fully to understand the workings of the IAEA and the need for the protocol. I also thank all-party groups that helped me to pursue the cause of ratification in Hong Kong, with the People's Republic of China, and in South Korea, in discussion with North Korea. I am grateful for the Korean ambassador's continuing support for the additional protocol.

Mr. Gibb

This is all very interesting, but why was there no requirement in clause 4 of the hon. Gentleman's private Member's Bill for Department of Trade and Industry inspectors—let alone international inspectors—to seek a search warrant from a justice of the peace?

Mr. Colman

I look forward to my hon. Friend the Minister answering that question in his winding-up speech.

Mr. Gibb

Will the hon. Gentleman give way again?

Mr. Colman

No, I should like to proceed with my speech. In thanking the all-party British-American parliamentary group, I particularly draw attention to the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) and my hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours). I am also grateful for the widespread support of the United States Administration—in both the House of Representatives and the Senate—for the additional protocol.

Mr. Bercow

I am listening intently to the hon. Gentleman. Am I right in thinking that he has just enunciated a novel notion of parliamentary responsibility? He said to my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton (Mr. Gibb) that it is the responsibility of the Minister to explain the lacuna in a Back-Bench Bill.

Mr. Colman

As I pointed out at the beginning of my speech, this Bill is substantially similar to my private Member's Bill, but its provisions are now those of a Government Bill, and I therefore look forward to the Minister dealing with it.

I am pleased that the United Kingdom is the first nuclear power to proceed with ratification of the additional protocol. I originally chose to promote my Bill because I was concerned that, when United Nations inspectors were ordered out of Iraq in December 1998, there appeared to be no basis for a wider approach to enable all countries across the world to proceed with establishing a standard inspection regime. I was obviously very pleased, therefore, to discover that the additional protocol had been signed on 22 September and that we were able to take matters forward. The additional protocol cannot be imposed on Iraq because of sanctions dating from the end of the Iraq war in 1991. I call on Iraq to demonstrate its openness and to sign and ratify the protocol. As has been said, there is also need for Cuba, Israel, India and Pakistan to do so.

Mr. Wilshire

I understand why the hon. Gentleman calls on Iraq to sign up to the additional protocol, but does he have any reason to believe that, were it to do so, it would be any more likely to stick to it, given that it was a signatory to the safeguard agreement in the first place?

Mr. Colman

The hon. Gentleman does not understand that the safeguard agreement that Iraq signed did not allow the International Atomic Energy Agency the right to search, as the Bill does. The reason for the additional protocol is to deal with Iraq's duplicity. When it was developing nuclear weapons, it stated that it was not doing that.

Mr. David Heath (Somerton and Frome)

Would the hon. Gentleman have confidence that, if Iraq signed the additional protocol, the system would work if any search by the international body required an affidavit from the equivalent of a justice of the peace in Baghdad? Some hon. Members seem to proposing that.

Mr. Colman

I agree. When some hon. Members intervened on my hon. Friend the Minister, I sometimes wondered whether they were speaking for Saddam Hussein. However, I am sure that they were not.

I draw the attention of the House to the excellent work of the current inquiry of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs into weapons of mass destruction. I shall mention two of the people who have given evidence to the inquiry and who have supported my work in the past year. Professor John Simpson of the Mountbatten centre for international studies pointed out in his evidence that many new states are acceding to the non-proliferation treaty, and that it has widened. There is now the treaty of Rarotonga, which covers the south Pacific, the treaty of Bangkok, which covers south-east Asia and the treaty of Pelindaba, which covers Africa. Those treaties cover nuclear weapons-free zones, and involve more than 100 states.

Until all states have ratified the additional protocol, we cannot move to a new system of integrated safeguards. That makes it imperative that we, as one of the nuclear powers, take the lead on the matter.

Rebecca Johnson, who is executive director of the Acronym institute, stated in her evidence: So far, the rate of signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols has been abysmal. For Britain to have ratified before the 2000 NPT conference would be an important signal of its commitment to strengthening the safeguards regime and improving the IAEA powers for monitoring and inspecting nuclear capable states. It has already been said that approximately 48 countries have now signed, including the main nuclear powers: the United Kingdom, the United States, the People's Republic of China, France and, on 22 March this year, Russia. So far, only eight countries have ratified. It is a pity that Euratom has not moved forward on the matter.

Earlier, the Minister and the hon. Member for South-West Hertfordshire (Mr. Page) mentioned the anxieties of the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth).

Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot)

The right hon. Member.

Mr. Colman

I apologise. The right hon. Gentleman expressed anxiety that the Bill might contravene the European convention on human rights. That matter was fully discussed in another place and on Third Reading. Those debates are worth reading. The matter can be taken further in Committee.

I am worried that a more lenient regime might be established in this country, whereby warrants would have to be issued before inspection could take place. Such a regime would be used as a coach and horses, and would ensure that rogue states such as Iraq would continue to be able to hide the evidence. It would nullify the need and effectiveness of the additional protocol.

Mr. Page

The hon. Gentleman's point is one of the fundamental problems that worries my hon. Friends and me. The other place states that the Bill will not contravene the European convention on human rights. Nevertheless, the courts could decide that the Bill constituted an infringement. If that happened, we could be in difficulties.

Mr. Colman

We could have experienced the same problem with our land mines and chemical weapons Acts. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman suggests that we should not enter into any international treaty obligations. It is important to lead the way and not to have a less stringent inspection regime in this country for land mines, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons than elsewhere.

Mr. Page

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way again and I am grateful to him for promoting me, but I am a humble hon. Member. We obviously do not want difficulties. We want things to go smoothly and sweetly and we must have as much information as possible to ensure that the proposal will not be challenged in the courts. I say that the IAEA must be able to take up those powers without infringement; he says, "It's going to be all right and we have them for the land mines and chemical treaties"—but that does not definitively answer what could be a difficult problem.

Mr. Colman

I am suggesting not that the proposal is the definitive answer, but that the matter has been examined again and again by the House in relation to similar treaty obligations. I am sure that it will be fully explored again in Committee. We must not give a signal, particularly ahead of the review of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty on 26 April, that we are against an inspection regime in this country that we would wish on other countries.

I pay tribute to the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge), who recently set up the all-party group on global security and non-proliferation. I was pleased that not only Michael Douglas, but prominent Ministers and shadow Ministers from both sides of the House attended a recent meeting, because dealing with weapons of mass destruction has been too far down the House's agenda for far too long.

I have an important final point to make. In February, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development brought together representatives of developing countries, many of whom were benefiting or were to benefit from the debt relief provisions for which Jubilee 2000 has fought for a long time. The meeting examined their armaments budgets and considered whether they wanted to think again about the amount that they were spending. That is a legitimate way forward. The money forgone for debt relief will be diverted to poverty alleviation and we must consider whether more can be done to persuade countries to move on armaments purchases as well.

As the non-proliferation treaty review approaches, we must consider the fact that expenditure on weapons of mass destruction is largely made by developed countries in the G8 and, as Jubilee 2000 comes to its triumphant conclusion, whether we should establish a Jubilee 2002. We must bring to the top of the agenda the aim of all parties throughout the world moving forward on multilateral disarmament by dealing with weapons of mass destruction. I want the United Kingdom to take the lead and the Bill is a small step in that direction. I commend it to the House.

5.33 pm

Mr. Paul Keetch (Hereford)

As the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Colman) said, no more important matter could be brought before the House than attempts to end the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, especially, of nuclear weapons. I endorse his comments about the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge). I am pleased to see him in the Chamber as he has done a great deal of work not only through the all-party group, but by initiating a recent Adjournment debate in Westminster Hall.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is surely the most important international issue facing the countries of the world and, briefly, I want to add the support of Liberal Democrat Members to the Government's efforts. Many Conservative Members want to speak and I shall not detain the House for long, but I share some of their concerns about the Bill starting life as a private Member's Bill. It should have been a Government Bill from the beginning as it clearly represents a matter of great importance.

Proliferation has been accelerated and exaggerated since the end of the cold war. Indeed, I am off to Russia tomorrow for talks with people from the Ministry of Defence about their problems. It seems clear to us that this country has a duty to impose on itself the most stringent, the most rigorous and the most transparent regime of all to ensure that we can safeguard and monitor our nuclear industry.

I believe that we have an almost unique role to play in leading the calls for multinational disarmament. This country is a leading member of the European Union, a permanent member of the Security Council and a member of the Commonwealth. The hon. Member for Lichfield (Mr. Fabricant) is not in his place, but I would say to him that this country should take a lead by fulfilling our obligations because we are a key member of all those international bodies. We should do so for that reason alone.

This country has a unique position given our special relationship with the United States and our long history of developing and deploying nuclear weapons in the field. It is important that we should take the lead, and I am glad that the Government are now doing so, albeit late in the day. I definitely welcome that.

Reference has been made to the debate in the House of Lords. I commend the words of my noble Friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire. He made an excellent contribution and questioned Ministers in the other place on a number of points.

I want to ask the Minister four specific questions that I hope he will answer in his winding-up speech. Given what the hon. Member for South-West Hertfordshire (Mr. Page) said, will the Minister tell us why the Bill is being applied to the colonies? Does he include Gibraltar in the list? If the Bill is to be extended to the Channel islands, will he ensure that arms brokers and arms companies that place information on the internet from the colonies are also to be subject to this legislation?

What about the role of justices of the peace? It seems to us that the Bill places an important burden on them. Will they be given additional technical support and information so that they can make a proper judgment on whether to grant permission for searches to take place?

Reference has also been made to the position of the United States. Given our special relationship and the concern of hon. Members and many people in the country about the failure of the United States to ratify this and other treaties, and the suggestion that the United States will seek British participation in its national missile defence programme, will the Minister ensure that the Secretary of State for Defence raises the issue of US non-ratification with his American counterparts in any discussions he may have on the NMD programme?

What remedy does the Minister intend British citizens who are searched and have nothing on them should have? Should they have a remedy against the International Atomic Energy Agency, or against the police officers who support a search that reveals nothing?

Mr. David Heath

I am glad that my hon. Friend has raised this issue. The position of the IAEA is analogous to that of Europol, which has rights in this country and has immunity. The answer given by a Minister with regard to Europol was that it would be the constabulary involved against whom any civil action would be taken by an individual or company affected. As this international body also has immunity, is it my hon. Friend's understanding that the same would apply in this instance?

Mr. Keetch

Yes, it is my understanding that the remedy would be directed against the police officer who supported any search. It is important to make that point, especially as reference has already been made to nations whose Governments have attempted to prevent international monitoring.

This country has a proud record of taking a lead on attempts by all countries to control the proliferation and establish verification of nuclear weapons systems. The Bill is an important part of that, and it is unfortunate that Members from all parties in the House are not more inclined to listen to the debate. I hope that it will receive support. It will get the support of the Liberal Democrats, and I look forward to considering the Bill in Committee.

5.39 pm

Mr. Eric Forth (Bromley and Chislehurst)

One of the problems with this procedure is that it always has the taste of a fait accompli. On the face of it, the House of Commons is debating a substantial matter and an important Bill concerning some important international treaties and obligations. However, the puzzlement is that the explanatory notes say: It was agreed by the Council of Ministers on 8 June 1998 and approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on 11 June. The Additional Protocol was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. if it was agreed by the Council of Ministers, it is surely self-evident that a Minister representing the United Kingdom would have been present, and would have given his or her consent.

That raises the question: what is the real meaning of this parliamentary procedure? On the face of it, the answer is that we need a Bill to give effect to what the Minister said on our behalf; but is anyone seriously suggesting that if by some chance the Bill did not receive the assent of both Houses of Parliament, the Minister's signature would somehow be invalidated? What needs to be clarified—a Select Committee is considering it—is whether the Government feel that the parliamentary process that we are undertaking can have any real meaning, or whether we are expected to be some sort of rubber stamp. For instance, if we sought to amend the substance of the Bill giving effect to the protocol, would that in any way invalidate the Minister's signature, given in the Council of Ministers? That strikes me as a relevant question.

The first question, in an overall sense, is this: what is the status of our current proceedings? That is to say nothing of the Committee and Report stages, which will give the House an opportunity to examine in much more detail clauses that have already been touched on and to which I hope to return later.

Then there is the mystery of the private Member's Bill. I remember distinctly, because I was aware of its passage at the time, that the hon. Member concerned gave the impression that it was his Bill and his alone, and had nothing to do with the Government. I had my doubts at the time, and they have simply been confirmed by our proceedings.

It would appear—this is the evidence; I wait for a Minister to deny it—that the Government sought to smuggle their provisions through the parliamentary process using the vehicle of a private Member's Bill, and when that failed owing to the remarkable diligence of a certain right hon. Member, were forced to do what they should have done from the start, and give the provisions proper parliamentary time in the legislative timetable. That is what they should have done, if they thought that their proposals were sufficiently important. That, I think, explains the apparently inexplicable delay between the Government's signature in September 1998 and the Bill's being subjected to a proper parliamentary process in both Houses in 2000.

Mr. Maclean

It would be fair of my right hon. Friend to point out not just that the Government attempted to smuggle the legislation through as a private Member's Bill, but that they attempted to do so by tacking it on to the end of the Order Paper on a Friday. In those circumstances, it would have had to be bounced through with no Second Reading and no Committee stage. It would have completed all its stages instantly—a process that Madam Speaker thoroughly deplores. I am sure that you do as well, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

Mr. Forth

My right hon. Friend would agree that, even at this early stage, enough questions have been raised by my hon. Friend the Member for South-West Hertfordshire (Mr. Page) and the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch), and in interventions, to suggest that the matter is not uncontroversial. Apparently, it is already highly controversial, and I hope to show that it involves several areas of controversy that will have to be resolved during the parliamentary process.

Mr. Bercow

It is bad enough that Ministers should browbeat a hapless Back Bencher into presenting a private Member's Bill that was not of his original choosing, but have they not compounded the error by failing at least adequately to brief the Member in question on why the Bill contained what it did contain, and did not contain what it did not contain?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I think that we have dealt sufficiently with the Bill's history; perhaps we could now deal with its content.

Mr. Forth

Indeed, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The protocol is at the heart of the matter. I want to spend some time on it, particularly its preamble, which mentions the awareness of the desire of the international community— whatever that is, for I have never fully understood what it is; the phrase has slipped into parlance, but has no meaning, as far as I am aware— to further enhance— a split infinitive appears even in the preamble of an allegedly important document— nuclear non-proliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system. That is the rather high-blown, if ungrammatical, intention. It causes me some concern. In both domestic legislation and international treaties, there is a burgeoning of such flowery language, which may reassure some people, but does little to add any substance to what we are discussing.

I invoke briefly a speech by a gentleman called Mr. Michael Douglas, who recently appeared in the Palace of Westminster at a meeting attended by many senior and well-meaning colleagues. He glories in the title of United Nations messenger on something or other. He was here to discuss the very matter that is the substance of the protocol and the Bill. I quote a brief paragraph of his words because they are apposite: Right now, as we sit here in Westminster in March of the millennium year, the United States and Russia are in stalemate. The prospective adoption by the United States of a "Star Wars" missile defence system has already led Russia, China and other nations to declare that this would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and lead to a more confrontational military posture between the US and Russia, and the US and China. He continued:

These three treaties—the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—underpin the current arms control regime. They are in danger of coming apart at a time when more material for making weapons of mass destruction is available worldwide than ever before. There is still the possibility for these three treaties to be saved, and for a return to progress on multi-lateral nuclear disarmament. But it will require leadership. Britain is uniquely placed to assume this leadership role: strong influence is required in Washington, and as a result of the special relationship between our two countries, the influence of the British is particularly strong. That is, we can assume, the view from the UN, carried to us here via the rather unlikely person of Mr. Michael Douglas, but I am sure that he was very welcome.

It gives rise to some important questions, not the least of which is: if the recent stories that the UK wishes to join the United States to extend a new anti-ballistic missile arrangement not only to North America, but to western Europe are true, that in itself will raise questions with regard to the real intentions of Her Majesty's Government on the protocol and the Bill. If Mr. Douglas is correct and if I interpret his remarks correctly, the UK Government, in wishing to go ahead and to move forward with an anti-ballistic missile arrangement, are totally at odds with the ethos, if not the terms, of the protocol and the Bill, so the Government need to come clean as to where they stand on that important issue.

Mr. Keetch

Can the right hon. Gentleman tell me what his position is and—perhaps it would be more enlightening—what the position of his Front-Bench team is on British participation in national missile defence? We have made our position clear. The Government, as he knows, have not yet made their position clear. I would be delighted and interested to know what his position is.

Mr. Forth

I would not dream of speaking on behalf of my Front-Bench team on that or any other matter, but I am pleased to give my view. I am very keen that we co-operate with our American friends on any measure that will give our citizenry protection against rogue attack from powers throughout the world. I happily take that position. It is part of the reason why I have doubts about the thrust and substance of the Bill and the protocol: can one sign up to the motherhood views and aspirations of such a protocol and Bill, yet go ahead with the real nitty-gritty—the defence imperative of an effective anti-missile defence system?

Mr. Maclean

Is not the situation worse than that? Although the Government have been saying that Britain must give a lead by signing the protocol and showing that we are willing to have International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors visit "any" of our nuclear establishments, they do not mean "any" of our nuclear establishments. In the other place, Lord McIntosh of Haringey made it clear that the protocol's additional obligations cover only civil facilities and do not extend to our defence-related facilities. If we in Great Britain are not willing to let IAEA inspectors into our military nuclear establishments, is there any hope of any other countries in the world—particularly the rogue states—agreeing to such a drastic step?

Mr. Forth

My right hon. Friend has, as ever, anticipated the direction of my remarks; I wanted to deal that point now. What worries me about what I would characterise as gesture legislation, or even as gesture protocol, is precisely that point.

The Minister was at pains to tell us, with some pride, that many countries—I think he said that there have been 48 approvals—have already signed and ratified the additional protocol. I have the Library's analysis of the matter. The ever excellent work of the Library shows that there have been 46 approvals, but the Minister told us that two countries have subsequently approved it. The number looks impressive, until one looks at the list's contents. If I were told that Armenia, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador and Ghana have signed the protocol, I would not be particularly impressed. I would be even less impressed if I were told that the Holy See has signed it—to say nothing of Jordan, Monaco, Peru and Portugal.

Dr. Howells

rose—

Mr. Forth

I shall give way to the Minister in a moment.

I have named only a few countries. However, the worrying aspect of this type of exercise is that one is left wondering whether it is only a feel-good exercise for those who strut on the international stage, make self-important speeches, congratulate one another on the progress made, sign protocols and international agreements and make the sort of speeches that we have already heard today. In fact, we are given a list showing that Monaco and the Holy See have signed up to a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. As far as I know, countries such as Libya, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran have not signed it.

Are we really saying to ourselves and to the world that we are doing something productive and useful that carries us forward? I think not. I suspect that such exercises are very much a combination of factors, including the ego massage of those who attend the conferences. We have been told that one of our Ministers—the Minister for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, if I am not mistaken—will be rushing off to the conference on the protocol. [Interruption.] I realise that the conference will be attended not by the Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs, but by the Minister who represents another part of the Principality—[HON. MEMBERS: "Neath."] Indeed, Neath. I was going to spare him the embarrassment, but my hon. Friends have let the cat out of the bag. We have been told that he will go to yet another conference to strut a similar stage and make a similar speech.

It is quite sinister that the Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs, almost casually, in letting the cat out of the bag, told us that he expects the Bill to complete its parliamentary stages by Easter. Mr. Deputy Speaker, I do not know whether you can confirm that a proper regard for the procedures of the House and of parliamentary process make that extremely unlikely, to say the least.

Even supposing that the Bill were to receive a Second Reading today—about which I should have very grave reservations—that the Committee of Selection were to meet this Wednesday and rather peremptorily select the Standing Committee members, and that that Committee were to meet at the earliest possible time, which I think would be next Tuesday—does the Minister seriously suggest the Government would have the gall and arrogance to seek to ram through parliamentary procedure a Bill as important and controversial as this in the two parliamentary days remaining between completion of the Committee's consideration—were it to sit only once, which I think unlikely, given the reservations already expressed—and the House rising for Easter?

I hope that the Minister made an error or slip of the tongue, and misunderstood what he was saying so he could not possibly be suggesting that the Government would have the gall, even before the Bill has received a Second Reading, to consider telescoping parliamentary process to that extent. I hope that he will confirm that.

Mr. Bercow

Is my right hon. Friend suggesting—for the avoidance of any doubt—that the Minister's preference was to ensure that consideration of the Bill in Committee, on Report and on Third Reading is completed on Tuesday 18 April? What a monstrous suggestion.

Mr. Forth

I do not want to put words into the Minister's mouth. I am saying—

Dr. Howells

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Forth

We shall have an explanation. Of course I shall give way.

Dr. Howells

I asked the right hon. Gentleman whether he would give way about five minutes ago. He told me that he would, but he has taken a bit of time in doing so. I am afraid that the verb that is being used is wrong. The fact is that I had hoped—not preferred—that we would be able to make progress on the legislation. Clearly, that hope was a forlorn one.

Mr. Forth

I acknowledge immediately that the Minister's courtesy is an exception to Ministers' usual arrogance to the House. He does us the courtesy of giving way frequently in speeches and of doing his best to answer questions. Typically, he has now shown the proper respect for parliamentary process that is shared by all too few of his colleagues. I am grateful for his comments, which make me feel easier about how the Bill may proceed, were it to be given a Second Reading later today.

Mr. Wilshire

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Forth

I am making only my preliminary remarks, but I should like to deal with the protocol and then the Bill. I hope that my hon. Friend will not detain me too long.

Mr. Wilshire

No; I am sure that Mr. Deputy Speaker would not allow that. My right hon. Friend comments on the Minister's kindness and generosity, but would he not be even more impressed if the Minister not only showed us the courtesies that he has listed, but accepted our arguments?

Mr. Forth

My hon. Friend is pushing his luck a little too far. Let us take it one stage at a time and see whether, on Second Reading, we can tease out some of the problems in the Bill, receive from the Government an acknowledgement of them, and then perhaps get a sense of the possible shape of the Committee's deliberations. I have not even mentioned consideration on Report, when there will have to be further deliberation. That is probably as much as we can expect in this debate.

I think that, in a parliamentary sense, it is proper that the debate on Second Reading should enable us to map out the Bill's broad shape and the type of anxieties that hon. Members express. Such a process will provide some clues, and it might even help the Government in timetabling the legislation. It might also help the Government not to send off the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office with too high an expectation—so that he is not too disappointed when he goes to mix with his very important colleagues, on a very important international stage, to make very important speeches to one another—of being able to go with this Bill tucked in his back pocket.

Mr. Robathan

My right hon. Friend is making an important point. Does it not underline his earlier comments—exempting from criticisms the Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs, who used to pull with me on the tug-of-war team, although he now has a rather weak back—on the Government's attempt in the previous Session to push through very quickly, with the minimum of attention, the private Member's Bill promoted by the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Colman)—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I think that that point has already been more than well made.

Mr. Forth

Yes, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but I am grateful for its endorsement by my hon. Friend the Member for Blaby (Mr. Robathan).

I shall not allow my hon. Friends to prevent me from dealing now with the thrust of my argument. I really should like to deal with the protocol, which is what the Bill is all about. The more that I read the protocol, however, the more it worries me. Therefore, it will take me a little time to go through some of my worries.

I start with article 2, under the general heading of "Provision of Information". It states: The United Kingdom shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (i) … below. Sub-paragraph (i) goes on to talk about A general description of and information specifying the location of those nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities carried out anywhere that are funded, specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, the United Kingdom.

Even in the early stages of the protocol, we begin to see the extent of the legislative commitments that we may have to make to fulfil its requirements. My suspicion is that lurking behind those bland words is the possibility that a lot of our institutions could become subject to some difficult arrangements. For example, nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities could refer to our universities. We should ask whether we are comfortable with our great seats of learning, with their proud tradition of academic freedom and freedom from Government intervention, being the subject of potential intervention not just, as we shall see later when we look at the Bill in detail, from domestic agencies, protected by warrants and by justices of the peace, but from the rather odd international agency, manned inevitably by foreign nationals. The Minister seemed a bit afraid of that word earlier, but we shall hear a lot of it as the debate unfolds. Our universities in particular may well be subject to intrusion by an agency that is unaccountable in any sense to any organ of government or representation in this country. So article 2.a(i) already thoroughly arouses my suspicions.

We asked the Minister earlier whether any institutions, bodies, companies or businesses had expressed any unhappiness about the provisions. I am surprised that our universities have not expressed some disquiet about the fact that their jealously guarded academic freedom and independence and their research and development work may well be subject to intrusion and invasion by an unaccountable and unelected body that is not even subject to proper judicial process through a warrant given by justices of the peace.

Mr. Bercow

Is not the explanation for that blindingly obvious? Most of the seats of learning in this country are supremely unaware of the existence of the Bill, let alone of its potential application to them.

Mr. Forth

That is one explanation. Another might be that the universities are full of lefties and CND supporters. There could be any number of possible reasons. Perhaps it would be incautious of me to go into them in too much detail at this stage. I am merely flagging up the anxieties that it would be right for us to acknowledge about the protocol to which the Bill gives effect.

Mr. Fabricant

I wanted to intervene on my right hon. Friend before he left the subject of our academic institutions. Does he recall that the Minister admitted that there may be same-sex examination? What would he think if his daughter was being investigated or examined by a male examiner from abroad, probing—I do not know why the Minister laughs—every orifice?

Mr. Forth

I shall come to the sexual aspects of the Bill in due course, although not quite in the terms that my hon. Friend has asked. I certainly want to keep my daughter—or daughters, as it is—out of this altogether. I have highlighted some of the issues in my research and I shall deal with some of the implications of the provisions of clause 4(7), to which my hon. Friend referred, because they raise some important practical questions, not least on the difference of approach between clauses 4 and 5. We have not got anywhere near the Bill yet—I am still on the early stages of the protocol. I hope that he will forgive me if I try to keep my remarks in reasonable order, so that hon. Members can appreciate the development of my logic.

Having skirted briefly over article 2 of the protocol, I turn to article 4, which has the bland heading "Complementary Access". It also gives early hints of the extent of the powers that the protocol might lead us to have to give in the Bill. It again refers to the mysterious, shadowy international agency, whose composition we shall have to return to shortly, because it raises a lot of questions. The article says: The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the information referred to in article 2— which I have touched on briefly— however, the Agency shall have access to— the article then gives a list, including Any location referred to in Article 5.c. Here again, the scope of the protocol is broadened, which inevitably drives the provisions of the Bill—because the two are inextricably linked—to any location. That is far too all-encompassing and comprehensive to give our citizenry any relief.

I move rapidly on to article 5, which says that the United Kingdom shall provide the Agency with access to: Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs a. and b. above, to carry out location-specific environmental sampling and so on. It then says the United Kingdom shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, at adjacent locations or through other means.

We have become distressingly used to such wording in domestic legislation. The protocol contains comprehensive and all-embracing provisions, talking about "any location", satisfying agency requirements "without delay", which is gratuitous and a bit insulting, and adjacent locations or through other means.

It is one thing to make provision for access to specific locations. The earlier parts of the protocol lull us into a false sense of security that it is reassuringly specific, but it is nothing of the kind. I would not accuse any hon. Member, least of all those present, of having made only a superficial examination of anything, but even my superficial examination of article 5 has flushed out the fact that we are talking about adjacent locations. That makes it possible to extend the scope of the activities of the shadowy and rather sinister agency not just to the locations specified, but to adjacent locations—that gives very wide scope—"or through other means". That is our old friend the blanket provision, which would allow the agency to go almost anywhere and to do almost anything. That is the protocol to which we are being asked to give effect.

Mr. Fabricant

My right hon. Friend has rightly pointed out that the protocol covers academic institutions. Has he had a chance to estimate the disincentive for institutions such as Microsoft to invest in science parks adjacent to institutions such as Cambridge university, which has nuclear research facilities?

Mr. Forth

I do not want to explore that in too much detail at this stage, because my hon. Friend is inviting me to speculate on whether there is a difference in approach between, on the one hand, universities, other academic institutions and research and development facilities and commercial businesses such as Microsoft, which will carry out research and development that may have a bearing on nuclear facilities and could well be adjacent in location, and, on the other hand, more specifically nuclear facilities, which can be identified more readily. I shall not explore that at this stage. I suspect that some of my hon. Friends may want to pick up on that point later. I do not want to detain the House for too long.

Mr. Bercow

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Forth

Well, yes, but I am trying to make progress.

Mr. Bercow

My right hon. Friend is making splendid progress. However, is not the use of this rather worrying and vague term "by other means" indicative of a tendency, certainly in the context of the protocol and the Bill, to abandon the traditional British legislator's insistence upon specificity in favour of high-falutin' continental declarations of good intent? If this is to be an all-embracing power, is it not doubly important that aggrieved parties should have proper recourse to the law if they feel that the powers contained in the Bill and the protocol have been improperly applied?

Mr. Forth

I would have thought that that is self-evident, and obviously my hon. Friend does. However, that does not seem to have occurred to the Government. It is something that we want to explore when we come to examine the Bill in detail, as I hope that we shall do fairly shortly. We want to explore the differences between the relevant clauses. I am trying to get through the protocol as quickly as possible while doing it justice, and I want to move on.

I may surprise the House, including yourself, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because I want to identify what I think is a weakness in the provisions of the protocol that might undermine the effectiveness of its aims. I hope that this approach will show my even-handedness. I have been rather sceptical and negative about the protocol, and that reflects my general demeanour. I wish to examine some rather worrying provisions.

If the protocol and the inspection process are to be effective, it is essential that there should be the element of surprise. That being so, I was surprised when I read the detail of article 4b(i) and (ii) and then c and e. Article 4b(i) states that the agency shall give the United Kingdom … advance notice of access of at least 24 hours. Sub-paragraph (ii) adds that there can be a period of at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it may be less than two hours. Paragraph c provides: Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and the activities to be carried out during such access. Astonishingly, paragraph e states: Unless otherwise agreed to by the United Kingdom, access shall only take place during regular working hours.

If we are to have effective inspection within a highly sensitive area, it is astonishing that the inspectors should be trammelled and hemmed in by these provisions of notice. Whether we are talking about domestic school inspections or health and safety inspections, surely their effectiveness must be diminished by the extent to which advance notice must be given. If we are saying that the inspector has to say in writing, "Excuse me chaps, but we are coming to see you in a few days' time and we hope to root out all your nuclear secrets and find out how it is that you are making bombs without telling anyone," that is surely an ineffective approach.

Dr. Julian Lewis

(New Forest, East): Does my right hon. Friend's memory take him back to previous arms control treaties? There was once something called the seabed treaty, which provided that it was all right to have nuclear submarines patrolling the depths but not to install nuclear weapons on the seabed. Was not that truly likened to an agreement not to screw aircraft to the ground? In that sense, is not the Bill part of a long and honourable tradition?

Mr. Forth

That may be. I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that my hon. Friend will seek to catch your eye later. His knowledge of these matters is infinitely greater than mine will ever be, and I defer to him. He has illustrated what often underlies these measures: they are high on intent and aspiration and regrettably low on substance and effectiveness. My example seems to suggest that that is the position. Either we are serious about these matters or we are not.

Given all the high-flown words of Ministers, their attendance at conferences, their signing of documents and the issuing of protocols, where is the beef? The astonishing requirements of advance notice do not add anything to the effectiveness of the proposed measures. Almost certainly they detract from it.

I move on rapidly to article 4f, which states: The United Kingdom, or for access under article 5.a. or otherwise involving nuclear material, the United Kingdom and the Community, shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during their access by representatives of the United Kingdom. There is some reassurance for those of us who are worried about foreign nationals tramping round the United Kingdom and invading private premises and people's inherent and well-founded rights. There is some comfort that the inspectors will be accompanied by representatives of the United Kingdom, and as appropriate by Community inspectors, provided that Agency inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

Having given us an apparent assurance, that is almost immediately undermined by the document stating, as I read it and unless the Minister tells me otherwise, that it will be at the discretion of agency inspectors to determine whether they feel that they have been delayed or impeded. If they can argue that they will be delayed or impeded if they have to wait to be accompanied by representatives of the United Kingdom, they can exercise the enormous powers that are provided by the Bill without any such accompaniment. There is an attempt to give an assurance that Members might reasonably expect, but almost immediately that is taken away. That is characteristic of the protocol throughout in that it seeks to face both ways.

Article 7 deals with the important matter of sensitive information. It provides: Upon request by the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom and the Agency shall make arrangements for managed access under this Protocol to prevent the dissemination— I think that there is a misprint— of proliferation sensitive information … to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. It will help us in Committee and on Report if the Minister will explain how the Government envisage these important arrangements being made and being made effective. That will require an institutional arrangement and protocols within the protocol or within the terms of the Bill to try to ensure that concern about sensitive information is properly met. How will that be done?

The article adds that the arrangements about protecting sensitivity shall not preclude the Agency from conducting activities necessary to resolve a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information. It appears that the agency always has a let out. Having been given an assurance about sensitivity or whatever, we are told almost immediately that if the agency sees things differently, it will always have the last word. Our citizenry and those running our academic and business institutions can well be uneasy about that.

I move on to article 11. The House will see that I am picking up pace as I go along.

Dr. Lewis

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Forth

I will, but I am getting quite close to the end of my examination of the protocol. I am anxious to have a brief discussion about human rights, and then I will start considering the Bill.

Dr. Lewis

I eagerly anticipate the later stages of my right hon. Friend's disquisition.

While accepting my right hon. Friend's concerns about the academic freedoms of our universities being impinged upon, does he recognise that there might be a problem in dealing with non-democracies which sign the protocol? Is there not a danger that they would set up bogus educational institutions as covers to manufacture weapons of mass destruction that would be secure from inspection? Is that why the Government feel that they must go as far as they are, despite my right hon. Friend's concerns?

Mr. Forth

I will not attempt to cover that point. I know that many of my colleagues, especially my hon. Friend, are much more qualified to deal with it than I am, and I hope that they will expand upon it. Suffice to say that I share that anxiety.

There is an inherent paradox in the whole process, because the member states which take a pride in their democratic accountability and their international responsibilities will sign up to such treaties. They regularly rub shoulders, and congratulate each other on what responsible world citizens they are. The regrettable paradox is that the very states that ignore the international treaties and do not sign up to them are the ones that are most likely to be a global threat. I shall not explore that matter further now, because I prefer to stick to the minutiae and leave the global vision to those of my colleagues who are much better qualified to address it.

Articles 11 and 12 are interlinked. Article 11 states: Unless the Community or the United Kingdom advises the Director General of the rejection of such an official as an inspector for the United Kingdom within three months of … the Board's approval, the inspector so notified … shall be considered designated. That is a long-winded way of saying—at least, I hope so—that the United Kingdom would have a veto on inspectors. That is an important point and I want the Minister to answer it specifically when he winds up. Is my reading of article 11 correct and will the UK have a veto over the appointment of inspectors? If the answer is yes, I will be somewhat reassured. If it is no, for any reason, I will be very worried that any old foreign national could come in to this country and exercise the extraordinary powers in the Bill.

Dr. Howells

I am delighted to tell the right hon. Gentleman that the answer is yes, we have a veto.

Mr. Forth

I am grateful to the Minister for that courteous and prompt reply to my question. Article 12 contains an important point about visas. Some of my right hon. and hon. Friends present have far greater knowledge on that subject than I do and I shall, therefore, tread only delicately on that ground in the hope that the issue will be covered later in the debate. Suffice it to say that, on the face of it—this is another question for the Minister—it looks as if the normal sovereign power of this country to grant or withhold visas to foreign nationals who wish to come to the United Kingdom will be completely nullified and overridden by this extraordinary provision in article 12.

Article 12 states—I can scarce believe it— The United Kingdom shall … provide the designated inspector specified— one who has survived our veto— with appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and remain on the territory of the United Kingdom. It continues: Any visas … shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as required. That may be completely at odds with many of our domestic statutory provisions and with the powers that I thought that this country had retained for itself as sovereign, even within the European Union. Were we to give effect to article 12, we might give up our power to control the entry of foreign nationals to this country. If that is the case, that is extraordinarily worrying.

Dr. Julian Lewis

Has my right hon. Friend considered the implications of such visas being made available for a period of as long as a year at a time? Even if nothing untoward were done in the course of the inspection visits themselves, undesirable people such as senior intelligence officers would have the facility to come and go at other times apart from when they were doing their job and inspecting the nuclear facilities.

Mr. Forth

My hon. Friend's point reinforces the point that I have just made. The article does not require that the visits by inspectors should be specific to their duties or responsibilities. Instead, it gives those foreign nationals complete freedom to move in and out of the United Kingdom for any unrelated purpose.

Mr. Bercow

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, given the uncertain extent to which this country retains a veto over international persons coming here to undertake their responsibilities, we should not derive undue comfort from the veto? What matters, as Hayek long ago taught us, is not who the men are but what the measures are. Is it not essential that we should keep clearly in view the fact of those substantial powers and the need for adequate safeguards against their abuse, whoever the individuals exercising them?

Mr. Forth

My hon. Friend is right, as ever, and safeguards are there none. My amendment mentions the Human Rights Act 1998, and I am not remotely satisfied by the Minister's statement—one could hardly call it an explanation—that the Government are satisfied that the provisions in the Bill are in accord with the Act and, therefore, the European convention on human rights. The first article of the convention covers the protection of property and states: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. It continues: The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. That is fair enough, and I would argue even before the Minister—although I do not see any signs of him wishing to intervene—that clause 4 probably accords with the spirit of the convention and the Human Rights Act 1998. It gives the reassurance that powers of entry will be given to an authorised officer or constable, that a warrant must be issued by a justice of the peace and that the Secretary of State must be involved.

The worry arises from clause 5, which would allow foreign nationals absolute rights of access to people's property in the United Kingdom. That must be against the spirit and the letter of the convention and the Act because there is no mechanism of accountability within a democratic framework, such as that in which the convention was cast in the late 1940s and has been carried forward ever since. The difference in substance between the approaches in clause 4 and in clause 5 mean that it is perilously close to a breach of the Human Rights Act 1998—as I contend in my amendment. I hope that we will hear more on that point.

Mr. Maclean

I thought that one of the precepts of the Human Rights Act 1998 was that no individual should be deprived of his property or have his rights interfered with without due process of law. The whole point about clause 5 is that it will allow inspectors access to individuals' property without any due process of law.

Mr. Forth

Indeed, and that may be a matter to which we shall return in Committee and on Report. It is our duty as representatives of our citizenry to try to ensure that we give them the maximum reassurance that we can in terms of the Bill.

Mr. Bercow

rose—

Mr. Forth

I shall give way to my hon. Friend but I do not wish to be delayed too much. I am now coming to the Bill itself, and that will be very exciting.

Mr. Bercow

I am waiting for that with bated breath and beads of sweat upon my brow. However, has my right hon. Friend noticed clause 5(6) which refers to a possible dispute and proceedings that might take place about whether someone purporting to be an agency inspector is actually an inspector? Apart from that opaque reference, no reference is made to possible proceedings and the legal entitlements of aggrieved parties to pursue proceedings against agency inspectors.

Mr. Forth

I am grateful, but my hon. Friend is slightly anticipating me on the matter of the mysterious certificate.

I shall talk about that later, although it is unclear what reassurance it gives. However, I want to go through the Bill reasonably in order.

I have little to say about clause 1, but clause 2 presents a potential problem. It states: No obligation as to secrecy or other restriction on disclosure … prevents a person voluntarily giving information to the Secretary of State if that person has reason to believe that it is Additional Protocol information. However, the ellipsis in Hansardwill show where I omitted the following words whether imposed by statute or otherwise. They appear in brackets in the Bill and seem to cause potential conflict between this Bill and other statutes referring to the law of contract.

At least one of my colleagues is a lawyer who may be able to say more about the matter, but I want guidance from the Minister. Is there any substance to my suspicion that a statute that protects contractual confidentiality or secrecy—between institutions or between a person and an institution—might collide with what seem to the overriding provisions of the clause? Could that problem be resolved?

I am not clear about what happens when there is a conflict between the absolute requirements of different statutes.

Mr. Edward Leigh (Gainsborough)

The courts will resolve it.

Mr. Forth

My hon. Friend is an eminent lawyer, but his remark is uncharacteristically unhelpful. I am not sure that it is good enough for the courts to resolve the matter. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Neath (Mr. Hain), is going to an important international convention where he will rub shoulders with people who will ask how Britain is getting on with implementing the protocol. Is it satisfactory that he will tell them that everything is fine with the Bill, apart from matters to be resolved by the courts? The hon. Gentleman will not know how the matters will be resolved, and is unlikely be happy with that. However, perhaps the Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs will help us out.

Dr. Howells

The House may be interested to know that I married a Neath girl, but she is not the present hon. Member for Neath.

Article 15 of the additional protocol requires the agency to maintain a stringent regime to ensure that there is effective protection of information. However, the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh) is right: ultimately, the matter will be resolved by the courts.

Mr. Forth

The Government have some serious questions to answer about their international obligations. I am not sure that it is good enough that Ministers attending international meetings to give an account of the Government's commitment to this protocol and to all the treaties that precede it will have to admit that the British courts will resolve any conflict that arises. What if the courts resolve the matter in favour of the statute requiring secrecy and confidentiality rather than disclosure?

Mr. Maclean

By the time that the courts determined that statutory law of contract took precedence, a person could have been sentenced to two years' imprisonment—the clause 9 penalty for failing to provide information under the Bill. However, might not that person find later that the courts resolve the matter in his favour under statute law?

Mr. Forth

That strikes me as all too possible. It is another potential intrusion on a person's human rights. Conflicts as to which Act overrides another will be institutionalised in our law.

Dr. Julian Lewis

I was surprised when my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh) said that the courts would decide the matter. Does that mean that our domestic courts could decide whether an international treaty should take precedence when a matter of secrecy is the alleged excuse for non-compliance? What about the courts in other signatory countries that are not independent of their Governments? I hope that my right hon. Friend will press the Minister on that.

Mr. Forth

My hon. Friend is right. His remarks raise a series of questions about the different approaches in different countries. Some countries have democratic accountability and independent judiciaries, but many other signatories to the protocol may not.

Clause 3.1 states: The Secretary of State may make regulations requiring persons of any description specified in the regulations to inform him that they are of such a description and to give such supplementary particulars as may be so specified. What sort of regulations does the Secretary of State have in mind? That is a broad provision. We need some idea of the regulations before we can consent to the Bill.

The reassurances given in the early subsections of clause 4 include the involvement of a justice of the peace and of the Secretary of State, who is an elected person accountable through collective responsibility. The clause also requires that a warrant has to be issued that gives powers only to authorised officers. All that is very reassuring, but clause 4(5) deals with the powers of those authorised officers, and again I feel the need to tread delicately. There are at least three hon. Members present whose expertise in matters electronic is legendary, so I shall be careful about what I say.

My next question is directed to those of my hon. Friends who know about these matters. Clause 4(5) deals with the powers of an authorised officer who enters premises under the authority of a warrant under this section and, as set out in clause 4(5)(c), that power is to require any information which is held in electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be reproduced in a form in which he can read and copy it What if no person able to access information held electronically is available to perform that task? My knowledge of electronics is scant to minuscule, but do not most systems have a security code or a provision that mean that only a certain number of people can gain access? What if the person who knows the code is not available?

Dr. Lewis

Perhaps I can enlighten my right hon. Friend. I think that he has just put his finger on a reason for one of the apparent anomalies that he identified earlier—the need to give notification in advance that an inspection is to be made. It would then be held to be unreasonable if the granting of access were not forthcoming.

I thought that my right hon. Friend was going to say that the provision gives no indication as to how the inspector will know whether any such electronically held information exists. Surely the inspector will simply be relying on the candour and good will of the person who has squirrelled away the information in cyberspace.

Mr. Forth

I knew that someone would come to my rescue, and it demonstrates why I should not dwell on it. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. How does an authorised officer, an inspector or anyone else know what is contained within a system that is extraordinarily complex and may contain different levels of security? How will they know what to look for, or how to exercise the powers provided in clause 4(5)(c)?

I have a simple question on clause 4(6), which the Minister may be able to answer now or, if not, subsequently. Does the term A constable who enters premises also cover other ranks of the police? If not, the provision may be unduly restrictive.

Mr. Maclean

I think I am right in saying that "constable" covers every rank of the police, from constable up to chief constable. They all serve in the office of constable. I have indications from elsewhere in the Chamber that that is right.

Mr. Forth

I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend. That allows me to put that matter immediately to rest, which brings me—

Mr. Fabricant

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Forth

I was just coming on to sex. My hon. Friend is keen on that, so I hope that he will not keep me from it.

Mr. Fabricant

I would not like to deter my right hon. Friend from sex—indeed, I am also keen to get on to that subject. However, I am interested in the definition of "constable". We have already heard that inspectors can be other nationals. This may sound like a flippant point, but it is not meant to be. In law, does a constable always mean a British constable, or could it mean a gendarme, a Schultzmann or an officer from any other country? Does it have to be a British police officer?

Mr. Forth

Or a military policeman, perhaps. I will leave others to answer that. I suspect that it will be the sort of police officer with which we are familiar. However, the authorised officer could be any of the agencies or individuals that my hon. Friend mentions, because that is at the discretion of the Secretary of State. We will come in a moment to clause 5, where the real horrors begin. Clause 4 is the reassuring clause, about which we are supposed to feel comfortable.

I want to touch on the intriguing and, to some of us, odd provision that no constable shall search a person of the opposite sex. That may seem self-evident; it may go beyond political correctness. I am sure that it is about gender and other modern things that we are supposed to be keen on. However, it raises practical difficulties. Will the gender of the people on the premises who will be held to account under the provisions of the protocol always be known before a warrant is exercised? Or will the officers, constables or authorised officers always have to go in multi-sex mode?

These are real and practical requirements. As with giving notice, I am worried that this could, in some circumstances, inhibit the proper execution of the responsibilities under clause 4(7). A woman police constable—if we are still allowed to say that—may not be available. It may not always be possible to have people of all genders available. I do not know how many genders there are supposed to be these days.

Dr. Julian Lewis

Or of all sexual orientations.

Mr. Forth

Perish the thought. However, real, practical difficulties could flow from this apparently politically correct provision.

Mr. Maclean

The problem could perhaps be partially solved if we changed some of the rather sloppy drafting of clause 4(6) which refers simply to a search. I recall that under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 or other Home Office legislation, search was subdivided into intimate body searches and those which merely involve the removal of a jacket or outer garment. Perhaps if the word were more precisely defined, the sex of the person conducting a superficial, non-intimate search might not be so important.

Mr. Forth

I have been in the House long enough to know not to be led too far down such a track. I am sure that my right hon. Friend was intending to be helpful, but I will leave it to him, with his vast knowledge and experience of these matters, to explore the possibilities of intimate searches or the concealment of nuclear bits and pieces on or in the body. It is not a matter for me.

I am coming perilously close to the conclusion of my remarks. I say that so that whoever follows me can get in the mood. It may seem odd that I shall not be dwelling excessively on clause 5, to which I now turn my attention. Clause 5, which is the most contentious part of the Bill and causes us the most concern, has already been referred to quite extensively during our exchanges and interventions, so I do not need to gild that particular lily.

It is self-evident that clause 5 will cause the most concern. I argued earlier that its provisions may well cause a breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on human rights. That notwithstanding, it gives the agency unlimited powers to allow foreign nationals to come into this country on an automatic visa. The Government, who represent us and are supposed to protect us, are signing away their power to prevent a foreign national from coming in under the aegis of the agency, which has enormous powers under clause 5.

Dr. Julian Lewis

Does my right hon. Friend see a possibility of conflict if one of the inspectors, allowed in on a year-long visa, is found to be doing something improper when he is not inspecting, and the Government wish to expel him, as we normally do when unacceptable espionage is carried out? Difficulties could arise if it were claimed that, according to the protocol, his visa could not be withdrawn.

Mr. Forth

Yes, that gives rise to a series of consequential questions on how far the agency inspectors may be covered by diplomatic immunity. Are they simply foreign nationals to whom a visa has been given for the purposes of the protocol and the Bill, or do they have an overriding and superior diplomatic immunity of a kind to which my hon. Friend alludes? I do not know the answer to those questions. The Minister may be able to tell us. This is the sort of matter to which we shall want to return in Committee and on Report.

These examples serve to illustrate why the Bill needs this thorough examination. I have been only superficial so far, of course. The really thorough examination must come, perforce, in Committee and on Report. That is another reason why the Minister will have to tell the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office that he may have to disappoint his colleagues at this important international meeting by saying that, regrettably, the matter is still under close parliamentary scrutiny.

Mr. Maclean

I appreciate that my right hon. Friend has passed on from the immunity question. However, I am sure that he will recall in the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, when it was set up, that article 15 on privileges and immunity states: The agency shall enjoy in the territory of each member such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions. There are also other provisions about capacity, privileges and immunities.

Mr. Forth

My right hon. Friend has confirmed our worst fears. We are adding privilege upon privilege, access upon access and right upon right. This appears to be outside the control of the Government who, for the time being, represent the people of this country.

Clause 5(4) and (5)—which deal with an authorised officer or constable accompanying an agency inspector—may seem reassuring, but the word "may" is included. I would have preferred "shall". We need the maximum reassurance, and to weaken the provision in this way could give rise to greater concern.

Mr. Bercow

Is not the concern otherwise that the use of the word "may" in clause 5(5) could conflict with the requirements of clause 5(7), and we would not want an internal contradiction within one clause of this significant Bill?

Mr. Forth

My hon. Friend's forensic and analytical skills are unsurpassed. I have identified sufficient contradictions within the protocol to cause concern, and we are now teasing out contradictions within the Bill. Thank goodness for proper parliamentary scrutiny. If, by some ghastly mistake, the Bill—in its previous incarnation as a private Member's Bill—had been passed, as it had been disgracefully suggested, without proper scrutiny, goodness knows what would have happened.

On the face of it, clause 5(6) should provide reassurance, but fails to do so completely. It says: in any proceedings any question arises whether a person at any time when purporting to exercise powers under this section was or was not an Agency inspector, a certificate issued by or under the authority of the Secretary of State stating any fact relevant to that question shall be conclusive evidence of that fact. We do not know when that certificate will be available. Will it become available automatically, before the agency inspector begins his task? Will it be made available by the Secretary of State during the inspection if a query arises? Will it be available subsequently? If it is available only subsequently, it will be no use whatever, as there is no point in looking for the Secretary of State's approval afterwards.

Dr. Julian Lewis

Is not the answer contained in the clause, where it says If in any proceedings any question arises? Surely that presupposes that the certificate will be called for only if there has been a challenge to the credentials of an inspector, which would delay and undermine the efficacy of the inspection.

Mr. Forth

My hon. Friend may be correct, and the Minister will have to look at this again. All Bills are carefully drafted, and each word has meaning and significance. However, the implication is that, if a matter arises during the inspection, a certificate may be required, suggesting that the Secretary of State would have to provide a certificate during an inspection. Those of us with even a glancing knowledge of Government know that that is unlikely. The danger is that this invalidate the inspection process.

We are back to the paradox of the Bill. The protocol and the Bill give the most enormous powers not only to domestic institutions—which at least have a degree of accountability and are subject to the force of the law—but to these strange and foreign institutions, manned by foreign nationals, who will come to this country and will be unaccountable to either the democratic or judicial process. On the other hand, we have apparent weakness, deficiencies and lacunae in the protocol and Bill which may undermine the effectiveness of the proposal.

The Bill is a mess, and the more I look at it, the more doubts I have. I hope that, even if the House decides to give the Bill a Second Reading tonight, it will want to examine it closely in Committee and subsequently.

Several hon. Members

rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst)

Order. Before I call the next hon. Member to speak, I shall try to offer some guidance to the House in accordance with "Erskine May". Second Reading debates are intended to deal with general principles. I have given the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth)—and other right hon. and hon. Members who have intervened—considerable leeway. However, those interventions which go into detail are matters for the Committee stage, when the House is entitled to the closest scrutiny of any proposed legislation before it. We will now proceed on the basis that we are dealing with the general principles of the Bill.

Mr. Bercow

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Would you expect, notwithstanding the helpful guidance that you have just proffered to the House, that, where a point of detail is of concern to a Member to such a degree that it will affect his or her judgment as to the merits of the principle of the Bill, it is legitimate to raise such an inquiry, either via a speech or through an intervention?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

It is always a matter of proportionality. It is perfectly in order to flag up a point that might require detailed examination at the appropriate stage of the Bill. It is not in order to have that detailed scrutiny of a small point or a sub-clause at Second Reading. "Erskine May" is quite clear; we should deal with general principles.

6.58 pm

Mr. David Wilshire (Spelthorne)

I am grateful for your ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and it would have been enormously helpful to me had you given it earlier. During the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth), I was fretting that my speech was far too general, and I was beginning to worry that you would rule me out of order. I have therefore spent a little while trying to get the details that you now say I do not need.

I am a member of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Colman) kindly referred. As he said, the Committee is carrying out an inquiry into weapons of mass destruction, which is highly relevant to the matter before us. I am at a disadvantage, because whereas the hon. Gentleman will have been given by the authors a number of documents—to which he has, quite properly, referred—much of the paperwork that I have received is covered by the rules of the House. That means that I cannot refer to them without being in danger of disclosing confidential information that has not yet been published by the Select Committee.

Mr. Colman

he matters that I read out earlier were from the written evidence given at a Select Committee meeting. I was not quoting evidence given to the Select Committee orally, which has not yet been disclosed.

Mr. Wilshire

I as not suggesting that the hon. Gentleman was disclosing confidential information. I was saying that I would find it difficult to follow his helpful points and references to publicly available information. The difficulty is mine, not his. I am not sure what is confidential and what is not. I have heard everything, whereas the hon. Gentleman has heard only that part that is public.

I am sorry that the Minister did not explain why the Bill should have been given priority by the Government over other parliamentary business. I regularly read in the newspapers, and hear it said around the Palace, that the Government are pressed for parliamentary time, but we have been offered no explanation of why the Bill has been given priority. It has been hanging around for a couple of years without appearing urgent, so why has it become urgent now?

Dr. Julian Lewis

I pologise for having missed the early stages of this debate, but I am disturbed to hear that the Bill has been attempted systematically over two years or so. We have been told that the UK would be one of relatively few signatories to the additional protocol, which suggests that the Government were once anxious that we should sign it before virtually anyone else.

Mr. Wilshire

I shall come to that point in some detail, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right. He should keep it in mind that only eight countries have signed up to the protocol, and he will see why I think that figure relevant when I come to discuss the countries involved.

Mr. David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden)

There is a stronger case than the one my hon. Friend is making. During the past two years, the strategy behind the non-proliferation and test ban treaties has become flawed. India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons. It is easy to disappear into the minutiae of individual clauses in Second Reading debates, but we should be rethinking the entire purpose of the Bill to see whether we can do something to stop proliferators by mechanisms other than this failed one.

Mr. Wilshire

Exactly so. I shall return to that point when I have concluded my response to my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis), who suggested that there had been regular attempts during the past two years to pass the Bill through the House. What he did not hear earlier was a discussion of how few attempts had, in fact, been made. The Bill was tried as a private Member's Bill introduced by the hon. Member for Putney, which is why that hon. Gentleman made such a helpful speech explaining his position. In two years, the Government's best effort lay in having a private Member divert himself from whatever he felt passionate about to pilot through a Bill that they wanted to shuffle through late on a Friday afternoon. Nothing much else has been done.

Only eight countries have signed the protocol, suggesting that it is not all that important. The Minister has made no effort to tell us what has suddenly changed.

Mr. Savidge

I want to correct an impression possibly given by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr. Davis) in his intervention. Neither India nor Pakistan is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, a fact from which we should surely draw the lesson that it would be better to strengthen and widen the treaty.

Mr. Wilshire

The hon. Gentleman reinforces what my right hon. Friend said. However, we must tackle a point on which the Minister conspicuously failed to touch—why this matter should be given priority over others.

Mr. David Davis

May I remind the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) that I negotiated the test ban treaty on behalf of the United Kingdom? Both that treaty and the non-proliferation treaty have a proliferation aim built into them. The hon. Gentleman was quite right to say that India and Pakistan have not signed, but those countries provide a clear weather vane as to the direction in which the world is going and the ineffectiveness of the treaty.

Mr. Wilshire

I am most grateful for that intervention. It adds some facts to the debate on a matter on which my right hon. Friend is an expert. It also puts me on notice to watch my step, as I am standing just behind a walking expert—

Mr. Davis

A sitting expert.

Mr. Wilshire

I take the point.

Mr. Bercow

I may be able to resolve the uncertainty in my hon. Friend's mind about why Ministers attach such importance to a speedy passage of the Bill. Would that not assist the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Neath (Mr. Hain), when he makes his scheduled visit to an important international conference, at which he will mix with extremely important, highly respected, influential figures from the international community? Obviously, the hon. Gentleman will wish to display his wares in the form of a successfully passed Bill.

Mr. Wilshire

I hear what my hon. Friend says, but while I am many things, some of which I hope he approves of, I am not a clairvoyant. My ability to answer questions about what may be in the mind of the Minister is therefore minimal, if not non-existent. I must leave it to the Minister to tell us what he has in mind.

Mr. Leigh

This conversazione between my hon. Friend and others worries me enormously. A few centuries ago, Parliament was prepared to declare civil war because a Government sought, through the Ship Money Act 1640, to allow inspectors to enter private property. The Government sought to edge this Bill in through the private Member's Bill procedure, then sat on it for two years before introducing it on a quiet Monday afternoon. What is going on? Where are our parliamentary colleagues who should stand up for the freedom of the individual to prevent the Executive—and foreigners—from invading their homes?

Mr. Wilshire

My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst made a splendid attempt to do exactly that, and I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), who is a champion of the rights of the individual, will do the same while I cheer him on.

Mr. Maclean

Before my hon. Friend moves on from the point made about the Minister of State going to the international conference to mix with others who have signed the protocol, ratified it and brought it into law, may I point out that the Minister will in fact mix with very few people—the presidents of Uzbekistan, New Zealand, Monaco, Jordan, Japan and Indonesia, and the Pope?

Mr. Wilshire

I wish to talk about that point in due course, but having been to Uzbekistan with the Foreign Affairs Committee and tasted the flavour of its regime and heard something of its President, I sincerely recommend to the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office that he take some precaution against being bored out of his mind, and that he not pay too much attention to any assurance that he may be given.

Mr. Colman

The hon. Gentleman will surely agree that the UK Government should take a lead in ensuring that the world becomes less threatening, and in non-proliferation. On that basis, does he support the Minister's visit to the review conference on the non-proliferation treaty; and will he provide leadership by ensuring that we ratify the protocol ahead of the meeting?

Mr. Wilshire

All will be revealed to the hon. Gentleman as my speech unfolds. Other Members may not know what I do about the hon. Gentleman, and they may have thought that he was about to say something about the Holy See. He and I both happen to be Methodists, so I knew that he would not, but I shall clarify my position on his other points in due course.

Mr. Forth

I hope that my hon. Friend will not be seduced by the invitation offered by the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Colman), and that he will agree that it is much more important to scrutinise the Bill properly and get it right than to boost the ego of a minor, junior Minister who is footling off to a ridiculous conference to exchange ludicrous pleasantries with lots of other self-important people.

Mr. Wilshire

I have disclosed to the House the masonic-like links between myself and the hon. Member for Putney, but the Methodist Church is a broad one; its members have many points of view. I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman on many matters, and that is one of them.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that he is not conducting Question Time. He should make some progress on his speech because other hon. Members are trying to catch my eye.

Mr. Wilshire

I am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for giving me your protection from my hon. Friends and from the hon. Member for Putney. I shall indeed do as you suggest.

Although the Bill is largely non-controversial—

Mr. Forth

Nonsense.

Mr. Wilshire

I said "largely". There are, none the less, some huge reservations about the detail of the measure that have not yet been mentioned.

We need to consider three matters before deciding whether the Bill should be read a Second time. The first partly relates to the point made by the hon. Member for Putney. Will the Bill help to make the world a safer place? We must face up to that question and we must put the measure into the general context of nuclear control and disarmament. Before we vote, we must ask whether the measure is key to making progress on those matters or whether it is merely a sideline.

Mr. Fabricant

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Bill must be a sideline? It is not merely that only eight countries have ratified the agreement, but other countries such as the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Belarus, North Korea, Libya, Israel, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. Within the recollection of the Chair, that list has already been read out; there is no need for us to hear it again.

Mr. Wilshire

I shall not prejudge the question of whether the measure is a side show. I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield (Mr. Fabricant) to permit me to develop my arguments and then to make up his mind, before he votes, whether the Bill is at the heart of the progress that we should be making.

The second point that we must consider is that if the answer to my first question were "yes"—if the House judged that the Bill would enable us to make progress—we ought then to ask whether the Bill is really the right way to do so. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst posed many questions but, as you have pointed out, Mr. Deputy Speaker, we cannot hold a detailed debate at this stage, so I shall merely suggest which details should be considered and which questions should be debated in Committee.

The third general point—on human rights—was touched on by my right hon. Friend. Whatever judgment we make as to whether the human rights issues are such that the Bill should not be read a Second time, no one in the House would seriously argue that there are no human rights concerns to be addressed before we make that decision. We must acknowledge that the arguments advanced by my right hon. Friend raised some genuine concerns as to human rights. We must decide whether those concerns are more or less important than the nuclear issues raised by the Bill and the progress that is being attempted with it.

That is the approach that we should take on human rights, because the details—as your ruling made clear, Mr. Deputy Speaker—on those concerns are a matter for Committee and for Report. However, the general principle—whether or not we have heard enough about those overall concerns—ought to suggest that we do not give the Bill a Second Reading, because it abuses human rights so fundamentally that no justification can override that matter.

Mr. Bercow

Does not the answer to my hon. Friend's question depend on the content of the regulations under which the powers in the Bill will be exercised? As that is a material consideration when making a judgment as to the acceptability or otherwise, in principle, of the Bill, would it not be helpful if the Government were to inform us, before the conclusion of the debate, whether the statutory instrument, or instruments, in question would be subject to the negative or the affirmative procedure?

Mr. Wilshire

That is an important point. The Minister has been scribbling furiously throughout the contributions to the debate; I am sure that he will have noted it.

Dr. Howells

My handwriting is not curious; it is perfectly legible and always has been.

Mr. Wilshire

I am disappointed; I thought we had saved the Minister the trouble of having to write down yet another question that he will have to answer. Furthermore, I think that he misheard me. I hope that Hansard will record that I said that he was furiously writing, not that he was curiously writing. I do not think that he has ever written to me, so I do not know what his writing is like. However, perhaps his response explains why he referred to grunting earlier, when you were not in the Chair, Mr. Deputy Speaker; the Minister may not be hearing accurately, although he seemed to be having problems with his glasses earlier.

I want to consider the Bill in context. In his opening remarks, the Minister said that he wanted the Bill to be passed before the start of the review conference in New York later this month. In that case, we need to ask the following questions: what are the issues for the non-proliferation treaty in New York, and how does the Bill link to what the Minister hopes to achieve from the conference? We need to be clear about the fact that the Bill arises from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; that is the context for the Bill. We must also be aware that the treaty is only one among a range of nuclear weapon controls and reduction initiatives that we need to take into account. That is why I asked whether the Bill was the right way to progress or whether we should be taking an interest in some of the other initiatives.

A key activity resulting from the NPT is the fact that the United Nations has negotiated safeguard agreements with a range of member states. I shall not re-read the list, but we need to understand that we are dealing with a UN-driven activity as a result of which several states have signed such agreements. The list is long, although some significant countries have not signed up. However, we should note that Iraq has signed up to that UN initiative, so it would seem that the current agreements are inadequate. I am sure that we would all agree on that. That is why I have no difficulty with the Minister's point that we need to do something. There is clear evidence that the way we tackled the matter in the past has not brought the results for which we hoped; I do not quarrel with him on that point.

The House should be aware of the curious fact that, unlike non-nuclear weapons states, which are under some obligation if they have signed the NPT, the nuclear weapons states are not under a binding obligation to have signed an agreement in the first place. The Minister has not touched on that point. I should be grateful if he, or somebody else, told me why the five countries that are most able to supply material to non-nuclear weapons states are those that are exempted from an obligation under the NPT.

Dr. Julian Lewis

Does my hon. Friend see a parallel between that point and permanent membership of the UN Security Council? In effect, international treaties—like international organisations—have to take the facts of the military situation into account. The NPT regime was constructed—as was the UN—in the light of the fact that those five countries have nuclear weapons. The idea is to take that salient fact into account while building up a regime that will have some effect.

Mr. Wilshire

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that helpful point but, irrespective of his impeccable logic I still find it curious that the very five countries that are best able to supply to non-nuclear weapons states the material that they need—and hence to cause problems for the rest of the world—are left to make a voluntary agreement with the United Nations on this matter.

It is to the great credit of this country and Governments of all political persuasions—I do not seek to make a party political point—that we have entered into voluntary agreements of the sort that we are discussing. We have to understand that because we made a voluntary agreement in the first place, we are in the same position again in that we are volunteering to sign an additional protocol. It is to the Government's credit that once again we are prepared voluntarily to do what other countries are not prepared to do even though they are obliged to do so.

Mr. Maclean

It is only fair to point out that although we are prepared to sign up voluntarily, once again our volunteering is strictly limited to civil nuclear installations and research facilities; the Bill and the protocol do not apply to military nuclear activities.

Mr. Wilshire

I agree, and one of the issues that I want to address later in my speech is whether the additional protocol will make any difference. My right hon. Friend makes a valid point that the Bill does not go as far as some of us would like. That does not undermine my statement that it is to this country's credit that we have gone this far, but he properly says that the Government could go even further if they wanted to. There is nothing to stop us volunteering to do whatever we think is in the interests of world peace and world disarmament.

Dr. Lewis

I hesitate to correct my hon. Friend, but could he be a little more careful and not equate the concept of world peace with that of world disarmament? Often the one is not served by the other.

Mr. Wilshire

I could not have put it better myself. I stand accused of sloppy speech making, for which I apologise to my hon. Friend and the House. He captures a sentiment that I often express to other people. If the Hansard reporters could go back and correct that point, my speech would make much more sense along those lines.

It must be made clear that even if we went further than the voluntary agreement, we would be the only ones doing so. What difference would we make if others were not co-operating? If such agreements are to be effective, and if the Bill is to make a difference to world disarmament, it is important that every country that is a signatory to the United Nations charter should do the same as us. I wonder to what extent we can go on making such gestures without asking whether everybody else is following or whether they are ignoring those gestures when it suits them. I think the latter.

We have to ask ourselves why, despite what we have done, there is growing concern throughout the world about progress on nuclear weapons control and disarmament. When the process started in the 1970s, there was huge hope, but that has begun to dissipate. Before we give the Bill a Second Reading, we have to ask whether it will help to get the process moving again at the speed that we desire.

If I recall correctly, an hon. Member asked whether this was a case of good boys making gestures to make themselves feel good. Does such legislation make good boys better, while rogue states carry on regardless and laugh at us for making gestures?

Dr. Lewis

In support of what my hon. Friend—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. Perhaps I could help the hon. Gentleman. He has developed the habit of addressing the hon. Member to whom he is speaking; he should always address the Chair.

Dr. Lewis: I beg your pardon, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I take it that you refer to the direction in which I am facing rather than my terms of address, because I have endeavoured to use the correct ones.

Does my hon. Friend realise that his remarks are supported by the fact that in 1992 we had the revelation that the biological weapons convention, which was concluded in 1972, shortly after the NPT, was systematically flouted by the Soviet Union, as it then was? While western democracies disarmed in accordance with the convention's provisions, the Soviet Union exploited their disarmament by redoubling its efforts to acquire lethal systems.

Mr. Wilshire

Those are very important points. I intended to come on to them, but they have been well made by my hon. Friend, so I will not need to go into detail in that part of my speech.

Mr. Savidge

Surely the very point of the intervention by the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) is that there was insufficient verification of adherence to that particular treaty. That is why we require verification, which the Bill tries to supply.

Mr. Wilshire

I said at the outset, and will say again as I develop my points, that I have no objection in principle to that objective in this Bill or any other. However, the verification that the hon. Gentleman wants has to apply to every signatory state, and not only to the good boys who are trying to be better.

Mr. Maclean

Surely the point that my hon. Friend is making is that either we have a protocol with no teeth which everyone signs without proper verification, or we have a protocol such as that in the Bill which has teeth and includes verification, but which will simply not be signed by the countries that we want to sign it. Some of us suspect that the Bill is a gesture, despite its teeth, because the countries that we need to inspect will not touch the protocol with a bargepole.

Mr. Wilshire

My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct. One of the tests that we have to apply before we vote tonight is whether, having listened to contributions by hon. Members on both sides of the House, we think that the Bill is window dressing or whether we believe that it will make a difference. We have to look back to the beginnings of the NPT and be clear in our minds about its basic objectives so that we can ask whether the Bill advances them.

The NPT was based on the two principles of nuclear weapons states disarming and other states not seeking to acquire the weapons that nuclear weapons states would get rid of. We need to ask ourselves what progress has been made before we can decide whether the Bill will help. The NPT started out with five nuclear weapons states and the rest of the world was non-nuclear. We now know for certain that the five have become seven and there are question marks over other countries—some are probable and some are possible nuclear weapons states.

We need to know where we stand with countries such as Israel, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria. Dare I suggest that although the current Government of South Africa have renounced nuclear weapons, there is still a question mark about what happened in the past and whether they know the whole story? I mean that as no criticism; I just put that point into the pot. We started with five nuclear weapons states; we know that we have seven, but the number could be significantly higher.

We have to decide whether we have made progress and ask why non-nuclear weapons states are becoming restive. They notice that progress on the disarmament agreements entered into by the nuclear weapons states has slowed down and is not as fast as they would have hoped. They also notice that the United States is setting up a national missile defence system, which leads certain countries to believe that they need to acquire nuclear weapons, or to develop more weapons, to counter it.

That is the context of the non-proliferation treaty—the point that we have reached. The Minister tells us that the Bill is essential to advance the non-proliferation treaty. Given the worries that I have mentioned, is the measure as central and urgent as he wants us to believe it is? He will no doubt address that question in his winding-up speech.

We must be sure that the Bill will help to reassure non-nuclear weapons states—otherwise we will not encourage them to turn their backs on developing their own nuclear weapons. We know that the safeguard agreements to which we and many other countries have signed up have not stopped the clandestine development of nuclear weapons. We discovered that only too clearly during the Gulf war. We then discovered what had been going on in Iraq.

Mr. Colman

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. He points out that the previous safeguards agreement did not give the International Atomic Energy Agency the right to search for and identify nuclear weapons in Iraq, despite the fact that Iraq was a signatory. Does that not clearly show the need for the additional protocol to be put in place and made to apply to all the countries that do not claim to have nuclear weapons?

Mr. Wilshire

I would not go that far down the track with the hon. Gentleman. I accept that we need to do something, but I have some doubts about whether the Bill meets that need. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that safeguard agreements patently have not worked. There can be no dispute about that, since we discovered what went on in Iraq, and have subsequently discovered what has been going on in North Korea. In those cases, there can be no argument about the fact that the current arrangements have failed, and we do not know whether they may also have failed in other countries.

We must ask ourselves whether the Bill will increase the chances of detection and prevention: I have my doubts. When the Minister was challenged, he said that he thought it would do what was necessary. One of the reasons that he gave was that the operators are happy with the terms of the Bill. I wanted to intervene on the Minister at the time, but although he took several other interventions, I did not get the chance. I make no criticism of the hon. Gentleman for that.

I was not impressed with the idea that the operators who were to be inspected were happy. If I were an operator who was up to no good, and the Minister presented the details to me and asked whether they were okay, and I spotted a huge great loophole, I would still smile quietly to the Minister and say, "I am delighted, Minister. I'll sign that with pleasure." The fact that the operators are happy does not get me any further in deciding whether I want to vote with the Minister or against him tonight.

The Minister also said that he was happy with the Bill. I hope that he will tell us when he replies how he reached that contented state. I am not a nuclear physicist. I am not sure whether he is, but if he is, he will have understood all the arguments. I, as a layman, have struggled, and it would not mean much to the House if I said that I was happy.

I should be grateful if the Minister would tell us who or what led him to his present state of happiness; who offered him the advice that persuaded him to back the Bill; and whether those who gave him that advice had any vested interest in the nuclear industry. If they have links to an operator, they will have said, "Minister, you can be happy." The operators may have seen a loophole, as may the experts, if they were wearing two hats.

Dr. Julian Lewis

Is there not a further difficulty? Whereas the civil operators in this country have no intention, one hopes, of trying surreptitiously to flout the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty, they are not best placed to judge whether the Bill will close the loopholes that could be exploited by operators in other countries who would be minded to try to dodge the provisions of the NPT.

Mr. Wilshire

That is a valid point. I assume that most or all of the additional protocols being negotiated will contain broadly the same provisions, so a loophole in the United Kingdom would be a loophole in North Korea or Iraq. That reinforces the argument that it is wrong to accept that the operators are content, in whichever country.

As well as considering the NPT, we must consider the Bill in the context of other issues arising out of nuclear control and disarmament. By focusing on the Bill and the issues under the NPT, we may be suggesting that other initiatives are less important, because we are not giving time tonight to them. Should the comprehensive test ban treaty be given greater priority than the Bill gives to the non-proliferation treaty?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. The hon. Gentleman cannot discuss that on Second Reading of this Bill, which deals with the control of civil nuclear power.

Mr. Wilshire

The issue that we are discussing, Mr. Deputy Speaker, is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We may be discussing the inspection of civil facilities, but—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Precisely. That is what we are discussing in the context of the Bill, and I advise the hon. Gentleman to stick with it.

Mr. Wilshire

I will do that, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but the House is being invited to make up its mind whether the Bill is the correct measure that we should be considering if we are trying to achieve a safer world, which is what the debate is about—whether we should focus on the NPT, which is the origin of the Bill, or whether Parliament should use its time to discuss other measures. I believe that that is relevant.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

I have ruled accordingly.

Mr. Wilshire

If that is so, I sincerely hope that when the House—

Mr. Gerald Howarth

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I note your ruling, but may I draw to your attention the fact that, on Second Reading in another place, the Minister referred extensively to the NPT? The Bill arises out of the non-proliferation treaty in the sense that it applies to those states that are not—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. The hon. Gentleman must not argue with the ruling that I have given. The hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) was trying to move on to quite another subject, and my ruling applied to that. I call Mr. Wilshire.

Mr. Wilshire

Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I readily accept your ruling about the test ban treaty. I anticipate that the references that I believe should be made to the anti-ballistic missile treaty would come within the same ruling, but perhaps you will allow me to say in passing that the House should determine whether that should be given priority in relation to the Bill.

With regard to the NPT and the Bill, we are seeking to prevent the spread from countries that produce to countries that do not produce. The Bill sets out to achieve better verification and inspection. We should consider whether it would be more helpful to address the production of fissile material wherever it is produced, than to say that we know where it is produced and that we will make sure that it does not spread. We could usefully be saying to ourselves that, rather than trying for more verification and inspection of facilities in countries that we know are already capable of producing fissile material, we ought to be trying to do something about the stalled debate—as I understand it, it has been stalled since about 1996—about a treaty to prevent such production.

We must also put the Bill into the context of current international security. We cannot divorce what we are doing—however much of a gesture it may be—from that. We must apply the test of whether, if we are concerned about world security, the Bill is the best way in which to act. I see that you are anxious, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that I do not stray. I shall therefore simply flag up two points and not develop them, although I believe them to be relevant.

In the context of what has happened in Kosovo and Chechnya, is an additional protocol likely to make the world a safer place? The issue that I would explore, if it were in order for me to do so, would be whether rogue states were learning that it is worth signing up to the protocol and then ignoring its provisions—because a country such as Russia, which has nuclear weapons, can get away with human rights abuses whereas a country that does not have such weapons cannot. We must take that issue into account when we vote on whether the Bill represents the right priority.

In pursuing such an approach to disarmament, we must also consider what is happening in the United States, with its international missile defences. If I understand the Government's thinking, we are about to support the United States in that matter. Certainly, my Front-Bench team suggested that it would support that—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I do not see how that can relate to civil nuclear power in this country.

Mr. Wilshire

I of course accept your ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, although I would again point out that that issue was addressed from the Front Bench at the beginning of the debate. I would like to join that debate, but, obviously, I accept your ruling. I merely flag up the point that, if one country's system might force rogue states to flout the terms of the additional protocol, perhaps the best way of stopping proliferation is to put pressure on countries such as the United States not to do things that will provoke other countries into ignoring such matters.

The Bill enables the Government to fulfil an obligation to which they have already committed themselves. The Government have already signed the additional protocol and, from reading Government briefing papers, I think that that raises a couple of issues on which hon. Members have not yet touched in any detail, but which I seek to mention. Although, again, I will not explore the issue, such action shows that the Government of the day may sign a treaty, agreement or protocol without any reference to the House. Can that be right? Ultimately, in Committee and on Report, all that we will be able to get our teeth into is whether the Bill is the right way of doing what the Government have already done. That gives me the chance to flag up yet again the point that one of the things that is wrong with the way in which we govern ourselves is that treaties do not come before the House as they should.

The other thing that I noticed when reading the explanatory memorandum and information in the Library is that we were not able to sign the additional protocol until the EU Council of Ministers had approved it. The House must consider whether we should have to go cap in hand to Brussels to be allowed to make arrangements in relation to something that is so vital to our sovereignty and the defence of the nation as nuclear defence and capability. That is a monstrous arrangement, which is tucked away in the footnotes but should be highlighted so that people may understand. We could not even have gone as far as debating the Bill if the Council of Ministers had not already said, "It is all right by us; now you go ahead and do something about it." That is a scandal.

One other preliminary issue that we must consider is whether we are able to justify such use of time. As has been mentioned, of the 193 members of the United Nations, just 45 have signed up thus far to an additional protocol. Of those, only eight have brought it into force. The list comprises an odd bunch of very serious players on the world stage on such issues—one would expect Australia and New Zealand to sign up to it—and others, to which my right hon. and hon. Friends have referred, whose signatures do not add any weight to the argument for our signing up as quickly as possible.

Mr. Gerald Howarth

I apologise, Mr. Deputy Speaker, if this issue has been raised already, but it occurs to me that Ghana's signing up to the protocol ought to be questioned. In what possible activity could the Ghanaians be involved that might pertain to non-military nuclear fuel? Does my hon. Friend know?

Mr. Wilshire

As I said to another of my hon. Friends, I am good at a number of things, but knowing what goes on in Ghana is not one of them, so I cannot add to my hon. Friend's point.

Dr. Julian Lewis

Will my hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Wilshire

Perhaps my hon. Friend is an expert on the matter.

Dr. Lewis

Far from being able to answer the question, I want to ask my hon. Friend another one. Is it not curious that so many countries, after such an amount of time, have not yet signed up to the protocol? I wonder what is holding them back—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. We are in danger of repetition, and I am not prepared to allow that much further. The rules about tedious repetition extend from one speaker to another and are not just confined to the person who is addressing the House.

Mr. Wilshire

I take that point entirely, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

I turn to the Bill itself. One thing that we can all say about it is that it is short. I sincerely hope that the House is grateful for that. I wish, as I am sure do other hon. Members, that more Bills had only 12 clauses. It would make life a great deal simpler and we would have better legislation. Thank goodness, as far as I can see from the explanatory notes, the Bill before us only seeks to do four things, which must be something of a record for a Government Bill. I for one am happy on this occasion to applaud the Government for that. I do not say that easily; I try not to applaud them too often—but we are grateful for Bills like this.

I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst will forgive me for saying that, of the Bill's four objectives, three are relatively non-controversial—although my right hon. Friend rightly referred to the details. The fourth objective is most certainly controversial.

As my right hon. Friend demonstrated, although the Bill is short and to the point, the protocol is a wholly different matter. The protocol runs to eleven and a quarter pages of turgid text and twenty-three and a half pages of annexes which I find it incredibly difficult to get my mind round. I wonder whether anybody is any wiser than I am about the explanatory note half way down page 18 of the protocol, which states: The materials used for centrifuge rotating components are: (a) Maraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 2.05 x 10⁹ N/m² (300,000 psi) or more. There is more; there is much more like that. I hope that the Minister will tell us what it means, because I'm blowed if I know. Yet we are being asked to say that it is right to sign up to such turgid stuff.

Although my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst made a series of points about the protocol, you made a ruling about detail, Mr. Deputy Speaker, so I shall content myself with saying that if I were not subject to your ruling, I would raise 10 items that my right hon. Friend did not mention. I would have liked to consider those in some detail, but I shall simply give notice that 10 questions require an answer. If the Bill gets a Second Reading, I shall ensure that they are asked in Committee or on Report. If 1 am not a member of the Committee, I shall raise them on Report.

The Minister may genuinely have hoped that the Bill would become law before Easter, but he was being wildly optimistic. Perhaps it will be law by Easter 2001. I hope that the hon. Gentleman is not too disappointed. I shall not burden the House with details of the 10 questions now, but I shall raise them later.

Mr. Forth

In fairness to the Minister, we were told that he did not want the Bill rushed through in an unseemly manner. He was thinking of the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Neath (Mr. Hain), who was going to attend an important conference—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. We have already heard that many times.

Mr. Wilshire

I have anxieties about the protocol, but the Minister, hon. Members and you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, will be relieved to know that I have fewer questions about the Bill. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst was so effective and efficient in going through the detail before you made your ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that he raised all the points that I was going to make.

I see that the Minister is poised with his pen. I shall therefore refer him to clause 4(2), which provides that an authorised officer may appear "at any reasonable hour." I am suspicious of such phrases. They get into legislation only to make money for solicitors and barristers, who can argue about what constitutes a reasonable hour. I hope that the Minister will give that serious thought. An authorised officer can either go somewhere or he cannot. Of course, that is to prejudge whether it should be allowed to happen in the first place.

Clause 4(5) sets out The powers of an authorised officer who enters premises … I am slightly worried about the power that paragraph (a) contains. It provides the power for the officer to take with him such other persons and such equipment as appear to him to be necessary … That is an open invitation for the world and his neighbour to go in with hobnail boots. If an authorised officer is told, "You can take whom you like," we maximise the opportunity for people from, for example, MI5, MI6, the KGB or the CIA to get in the coach after they have persuaded the authorised officer that they need to go along. The Minister should consider that.

We should reflect on how the Bill has come about and what has led to tonight's circumstances. As I said earlier, and as other hon. Members have pointed out, the Bill is an unexpected consequence of the Gulf war. At the time of that war, we had no idea that our safeguard arrangements were inadequate. Our discovery that Iraq has been developing nuclear weapons while the agreements to which it has signed up exist means that we have to take action. We have made the same discovery about North Korea.

We must establish whether the United Nations, as an international agency, or the security services of various countries of the world extracted that information. In the case of Iraq, perhaps the armies of the world made the discovery. While there is some consensus about the need to make the agreement stronger through the protocol, we must ask about the way in which we made the discovery. If the safeguard agreements did not reveal what was going wrong, why are we confident that a United Nations-orchestrated additional protocol will do that? Perhaps it would be more sensible to ask whether we should look to our security services and those of other countries to ensure that international treaties are not breached.

We must ask ourselves whether the Bill will do the trick. If we have more information, inspectors and reporting, will the world be a safer place? I do not suggest that I know the answer, but the question must be asked.

We must consider human rights, which are relevant to the debate. You will be pleased to hear, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that I shall not into detail. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst raised the matter and I shall say only that I wholly appreciate his anxieties and those of my other hon. Friends. I shall not repeat them, but I hope that the Minister has listened to them, and will not believe that we raised them spuriously.

There are genuine human rights concerns. It is proposed that international inspectors can come into the United Kingdom without the civil safeguards that we have come to take for granted over the centuries. When the Minister mentioned the subject at the beginning of the debate, he suggested that we were wrong to think of them as foreign inspectors coming into the United Kingdom. I tried to intervene, but the hon. Gentleman was too kind in giving way to everybody else, and missed my jumping up and down. He suggested that we were being paranoid by referring to foreigners and pointed out that they might be Englishmen and women. Yes, they might be cuddly Englishmen and women—

Mr. Forth

They might be Welsh.

Mr. Wilshire

No, Welsh is different. We shall stick with English because I am English and proud of it, and I believe that the suggestion that my fellow countrymen and women might carry out the inspections is relevant. The Minister was not making a fair point. He failed to tell the House that if Englishmen or Englishwomen sign up to work for the United Nations or any other international organisation, they have to give an undertaking that they will put to one side their nationality, or any bias or affection that derives from being Englishmen or women, and work as though they were internationalists. It is as if they sign up to be foreigners. The Minister failed to make that point.

Mr. Keetch

To follow the logic of the hon. Gentleman's argument, if an Englishman who joins the United Nations ceases to be English and becomes international, an Iraqi who joins the United Nations ceases to be Iraqi and becomes international. We should therefore fear none of the inspectors.

Mr. Wilshire

I leave it to the hon. Gentleman to decide whether he welcomes international inspectors, wherever they were born. The hon. Gentleman has a right to welcome people who come in to the United Kingdom with hobnail boots, go where they will, search where and whom they will and turn places upside down in defiance of people's human rights and civil liberties. I trust that his electors will notice that. I do not agree with him.

Mr. Fabricant

Does my hon. Friend agree that there should at least be some reciprocity? People should not inspect us unless they belong to nations that have signed the agreement. That would enable us to inspect them.

Mr. Wilshire

I am sure that that is a valid point. In those circumstances, we would have to consider the additional protocols that other countries were signing.

All that said, even though the Bill is brief, it raises big issues. Its introduction is an admission that the NPT is not working as well as it should be and that the safeguard agreements that have been signed up to are unsatisfactory. The Bill is an admission of failure thus far. Its introduction also implies that the additional protocols should be our top priority. Are they the best or the only way forward? I do not know. That is for the Minister to say, but he gave no justification for that point.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst said, the Bill raises serious human rights matters and also diverts the attention of those who are not satisfied that that is the top priority from other crucial nuclear weapons issues that I have not been able to discuss in my brief contribution. I conclude that the Bill will probably make good boys such as us feel better, but will do little, if anything, for world peace.

8.1 pm

Mr. Harry Cohen (Leyton and Wanstead)

I apologise for missing the early part of the debate. I was meeting the new chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality in my capacity as secretary of the all-party race and community group, and to show my commitment to equality I missed all three Front-Bench speeches. I apologise to those Members and to the Speaker, who has responsibility for upholding the conventions of the House.

Chunks of the speech of the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) were interesting. He asked the key question, "Will the Bill make the world a safer place."? The answer is an unequivocal yes. I do not mind scrutiny being applied by the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth)—I did the same from the Opposition Benches—but the Opposition should not lose the overview of the Bill's purpose. What is the alternative to non-proliferation and treaties authorising verification and what would we get if we dismantled those treaties? It would be nuclear weapons chaos—a free for all. There would be more rogue states because there would be no treaty to contain them. There would be greater danger to us and greater risk of war, and it would be more likely that nuclear weapons would be used.

I give the example of North Korea, which wanted to opt out of the non-proliferation treaty. Only United Nations pressure, which persuaded it to sign up, made a difference. I support the principles of the Bill, which strengthen the international non-proliferation regulation and verification system.

Mr. Fabricant

Surely the hon. Gentleman accepts that the treaty will have no impact unless the rogue states become signatories. Will he explore the possibility of applying sanctions, although I do not know what sort, to what the UN would call rogue states—North Korea and even Libya, for example—that have so far not signed the treaty?

Mr. Cohen

I am not in favour of sanctions, which lead to all sorts of problems. Iraq is an example of that. It is better to have a treaty system in place so that rogue states can be included and encouraged to sign. If there were no treaty system, there would be no incentive and no pressure to sign up to anything, and that would lead to more rogue states.

As a long-standing supporter of controls on nuclear weapons and the materials that could be used to make them, I support the strengthening of nuclear safeguards carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is imperative that those strengthened safeguards are applied equally across the globe and I am proud to see a Labour Government helping to enhance the global effort to stop nuclear proliferation.

As a long-standing supporter of the goal of global nuclear disarmament, I am keen for the nuclear weapon states—the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, France and China—to be covered by stricter safeguards arrangements. The hon. Member for Spelthorne made the interesting point that there was dissilusion in non-nuclear weapons states because the nuclear weapons states have not been seen to make enough progress. Subjecting them to stricter safeguards arrangements is a way of making a bit more progress.

Nuclear safeguards form an important part of the international verification measures that will be required when we achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The more experience of verification measures that all those states acquire, the more confident they will eventually become in moving to a world free of nuclear weapons. The Bill is a good measure, but a few matters could be tightened up. The most significant of the issues that I want to raise is Crown immunity, which has been discussed previously. In the 1980s, Lord Ashley said that a lot of Crown immunity should go from legislation. The previous Government, under the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), introduced the citizens charter, which recognised the problem that legislation did not always cover Government activities. In a written answer, the right hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine), who was then President of the Board of Trade, stated: An Act of Parliament is presumed not to bind the Crown unless the contrary intention is clearly stated, or there is a necessary implication that the Crown is to be bound … Crown immunity is being … reduced, as legislative opportunities arise.—[Official Report, 22 June 1995; Vol. 262, c. 376W.]

We could have expected Crown immunity to go gradually as opportunities arose, but that is not the case here. I ask a simple question: why is there no provision to bind the Crown? Duties and obligations are placed on people inside and outside government, but leaving the Government's legal status in doubt would profoundly weaken the Bill. What would happen if a country with a reputation such as Iraq, Iran or Libya were to pass similar legislation? What if Colonel Gaddafi were to say, "Yes, we have implemented legislation for strengthened safeguards, but of course it applies only to Government operations on a voluntary basis. The Government can ignore the legislation if they want"? The British Government would be apoplectic.

Mr. Maclean

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who is always courteous in giving way. Is not it more likely that Colonel Gaddafi would say, "Britain has implemented legislation with regard only to civil installations and it is still keeping inspectors out of military installations. I wish to copy the great example that the British Government have set"?

Mr. Cohen

The right hon. Gentleman makes a fair point, although progress is made step by step and the Bill is an important step forward. I support his suggestion that it should apply to military establishments as well, which would tighten up things for other countries.

Binding the Crown would also allow for independent judicial tests to establish whether the Government had acted in compliance with the legislation. That is important to ensure that Britain not only complies with this important non-proliferation measure, but is seen to comply with it, and that is a positive signal to send to the rest of the world. Conversely, not do so would send such a damaging signal to the rest of the world that we could lose many of the political benefits that strengthened safeguards could bring.

If another country alleged that Britain was not complying with the strengthened safeguards measures, how would it seem to the rest of the world if it had correctly stated that the Bill did not remove Crown immunity? That would depict this country in an unfair light. However, the remedy is simple. Standard clauses on binding the Crown appeared in legislation as diverse as the Food Safety Act 1990 and the Chemical Weapons Act 1996. Indeed, Crown immunity was lifted from atomic weapons research establishment, Aldermaston, in April 1993.

There is no reason why such a provision should not be in the Bill. In fact, I cannot understand why it has been left out. I am not a suspicious person by nature, but if the Government were to resist the inclusion of a standard clause on binding the Crown I would wonder what was behind it. I would support a Bill that bound the Crown and did not allow Crown immunity in this respect. I shall be interested in the Minister's response to that.

I applaud the Government for including the provision in clause 7. It is almost identical to the amendment that I proposed to the Chemical Weapons Bill, which made it an offence for someone knowingly or recklessly to make a false or misleading statement to an inspector. I am glad that the Government support that. It has been a long-fought battle to get such a provision in arms control legislation. I first raised the question of making it an offence to give false information to inspectors when the House debated the Bill that gave effect to the conventional armed forces in Europe treaty in 1991. My amendment to the Chemical Weapons Bill was accepted by the previous Government in 1995.

Dr. Julian Lewis

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his usual courtesy in giving way. Will he explain to the House how this provision would take effect in countries that are not democracies? If a misleading statement were made to one of the inspectors in Iraq or in some other such undemocratic country, what sanction would be imposed against that country?

Mr. Cohen

That is an interesting point. I understand the hon. Gentleman's point about, for example, the Soviet Union not complying with agreements during the cold war, although I suspect that there was non-compliance on both sides. When the Soviet Union was found to be in breach, the United States took it up with the Soviets. That is one good thing that could be done. Even then, the United States thought it better to have the Soviet Union on board for such treaties than to have the treaties wiped out. I know that that does not satisfy the hon. Gentleman, but it is much better to have countries signed up to these treaties, which can then be strengthened in a step-by-step approach, than not to have them at all.

Opposition Members have raised the issue of searches being carried out by people of a different sex—a different gender. That is not right, and it could create problems. However, the problem could be dealt with simply. I hope that the Government will consider amending clause 4(7), which states: No constable shall, by virtue of subsection (6)(b), search a person of the opposite sex. It could state that "no person shall, by virtue of subsection (6)(b), search a person of the opposite sex." Such an amendment would remove the problem of a person searching someone of the opposite sex.

Mr. Fabricant

The Minister accused me of being interested only in sex, but I am interested in the rights of individuals in this country. Even if the hon. Gentleman persuaded the House to change the word from "constable" to "person", it would have no effect because clause 5 would prevent any control by the House over foreign inspectors coming into the United Kingdom.

Mr. Cohen

I understand that point, but the Bill will be the law of the land. If it said that a man could not search a woman, which is the obvious example, another woman would have to accompany the inspector. That is not unreasonable.

Mr. Maclean

rose—

Mr. Cohen

I shall give way, but I am coming to the end of my speech.

Mr. Maclean

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way in his usual courteous manner. May I advise him carefully to think again about his suggestion? If he removes the word "constable" and replaces it with "person", he is not narrowing but widening the search to a range of other people who are not police officers, male or female, and are not qualified or trained in searching techniques. That may diminish the freedom of the individual, rather than enhance it.

Mr. Cohen

I do not think that that is so, because elsewhere in the protocol it provides that they should be proper, authorised inspectors—so I do not accept the right hon. Gentleman's point.

This is a good, important treaty that can be used for the future, and we should build on it. The alternative is dire. None of the Opposition Members who have spoken has said what would happen if the non-proliferation treaty were weakened or got rid of—[Interruption.]I apologise to the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch), who does not take that position. With those few remarks, I support the Bill and recommend it to the House.

8.15 pm

Mr. David Maclean (Penrith and The Border)

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr. Cohen). That is one of the longest speeches I have heard him make in the House, but it was certainly worth listening to.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton)

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. In what way can you make it possible for me to let my constituents know that the Conservative party is deliberately blocking the Bill to provide free television licences for 75-year-olds?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Michael Lord)

That is not a point of order for the Chair.

Mr. Maclean

I would happily let the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) participate in this debate, and he could make his points in his own way, but he has not been present for any of our discussions. He was not even present for the excellent speech of the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead, or to hear the detailed points made by Opposition Members. Fortunately for the House, and for myself, I shall be brief in this debate, because most of the main points were made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth), and I want to save my main remarks for the BBC Bill, which we shall debate after this Bill. I do not want to tire myself out on this Bill, because I have important remarks—well, I consider them important, but the House may not—to make on that Bill, and I wish to save myself for that.

Much has changed while you were away from the Chair, Mr. Deputy Speaker—although at times you may be forgiven for thinking that not much had changed. There is now a certain consensus across the House. One has heard of the famous Rooker-Wise amendment. I look forward, with the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead, to the Cohen-Maclean amendments on Report, which may deal with the vexed problem of searches or seek to give the Bill more teeth and deal with the problem of the inspection of military as well as civilian installations.

It was said at the start of our discussion of this important measure that this is an historic day and that the Bill is of historic importance. I shall briefly touch on the points made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst. We are having this significant debate only because my right hon. Friend and I objected to the fact that the Government tried to bounce this measure through the private Member's Bill procedure last year. If a private Member in the top 20 in the ballot had presented this Bill, it would have had a proper Second Reading, we would have had this discussion on a Friday morning, and the Bill would have proceeded apace. Attempting to bounce it through on the nod at the end of business on a Friday was not an appropriate way to deal with important legislation that implements an international treaty, a copy of which I have in front of me, better for the purposes of information.

The Bill is historic, and we must consider whether it will make the world a safer place or whether we are deluding ourselves—and that, although the Bill and the protocol deal with crucial matters, they will nevertheless not make a jot of difference. Is it merely a gesture? If so, might that gesture persuade other countries to take a step forward and participate in nuclear non-proliferation treaties? Will it persuade them to sign up to the protocol?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. May I say gently to the right hon. Gentleman that I have heard these points made many times this evening already.?

Mr. Maclean

I accept that point entirely, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but at least you have not heard them from me before. This time, you have heard them in a different accent. Nevertheless, I will push on with other points, which I hope have not already been raised by any of my right hon. or hon. Friends. When one speaks late in a debate, there is inevitably a danger that the great points of principle have already been aired.

If this is an important Bill, we must ensure that the measures in it will make a difference to world peace. We have certain concerns about clause 5, which have already been touched on; we also have concerns about the protocol—the agreement signed by the British Government, and now awaiting ratification and implementation.

Article 4 of the protocol says that "any location" must be inspected by members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or by authorised officials of the British Government. The term "any location" is very broad, and I suspect that it will be interpreted broadly in English law. Article 5 states: The United Kingdom shall provide the Agency with access to … Any place in a facility or part thereof in the United Kingdom designated pursuant to Article 78(a) of the Safeguards Agreement and Any location identified under Article 2. That refers to article 2 of this protocol, which identifies the main nuclear installations, research facilities and organisations where one might expect to find nuclear power and nuclear material of some sort, including nuclear processing material.

Article 5.c., however, states that this can also include Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs a. and b. above, to carry out location-specific environmental sampling. That widens the scope of the Bill. We may feel little concern about officers from the IAEA or other authorised officers of the United Kingdom having the right to enter places such as Sellafield, or other places involved in nuclear reprocessing or research involving nuclear material. Article 5, however, allows agency officers to enter other locations to carry out location-specific environmental sampling.

Article 6 states that the agency may carry out activities including: For access in accordance with Article 5.c., collection of environmental samples and, in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location specified by the Agency pursuant to Article 5.c. utilization at that location of visual observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by the United Kingdom and, as appropriate, the Community, and the Agency, other objective measures.

Mr. Fabricant

My right hon. Friend is presenting his argument eloquently. Does he agree that the definition is so broad that it leaves us open not only to breaches of the Official Secrets Acts, but to industrial espionage by other countries?

Mr. Maclean

I do not want to discuss breaches of the Official Secrets Acts, because I think that they fall under clause 2. I want logically to deal first with the protocol, and then with the Bill. I am not as clear-headed as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, who can speak with the Bill in one hand and the protocol in the other, and deal with both simultaneously. I think, however, that part of the Bill will allow the Secretary of State to serve notices on any person giving assistance or information that would be in breach of the Official Secrets Act.

I fear that article 6 would widen access to a range of places and activities that might have nothing to do with nuclear power, nuclear energy or nuclear research, so that location-specific environmental sampling could be carried out. My only knowledge of that relates to what happened in the Lake district after the Chernobyl incident. Many people thought that it was to do with Sellafield, but it was not. Inspectors from the Environment Department and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food had to visit various sampling spots all around the area of nuclear fallout from the Chernobyl reactor and take samples. In the main, people were willing to participate and to allow the inspectors on to their land—land that was dozens of miles from Sellafield, and thousands of miles from where the incident happened. However, they had to provide access.

I can only assume, unless the Minister tells me otherwise, that the location-specific environmental sampling mentioned in the protocol actually means that. Let us suppose that the Government give the agency information about a location such as those specified in article 2. Let us suppose that they say, "We have a nuclear facility at location X." In that event, under articles 5 and 6, in order to check that material is not leaking out, or that it is the stuff that it should be—strontium 90, for instance—the agency would carry out environmental sampling at points within the vicinity of the location. It might be half a mile out, two miles out, five miles out or 50 miles out. I do not know; it is not clear.

It is obvious, however, that the experts who drafted the scientific part of the protocol have a clear idea of what location-specific environmental sampling is. I should be delighted if someone told me that I had got it wrong and told me exactly what it meant, but, unless I am challenged, I assume it means that within certain distances of certain research facilities and nuclear facilities inspectors can sample the air or the soil, or stick radioactive meters in the air, to find out whether there is any radiation about.

No doubt the agency will operate according to a set plan or a set map. That means that inspectors can say to United Kingdom citizens, "We want to monitor a nuclear facility that is five, 10, 50 or 100 miles down the road, and we want to carry out sampling from this point on your land, on your hillside, on your mountain or in your back garden." They will then have all the powers that the protocol gives them.

Perhaps it should be possible to move to someone else's mountain or back garden—someone who may be happy to co-operate or give permission. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we have built into the protocol and the Bill powers to allow agency officers to say to British citizens who have nothing to do with the nuclear industry, nuclear research or any scientific research, "We are coming on to your land for the purposes of article 5.c. of the protocol, as implemented in the Nuclear Safeguards Bill." I, for one, would like an assurance from the Minister that I am entirely wrong, because that would help to persuade me that the Bill is not as draconian as I think it is.

I would have liked to make a number of other points about the protocol, but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst has covered them comprehensively, I will content myself with some that he did not make in detail. Article 11 concerns the appointment of agency officials to act as safeguards inspectors. My right hon. Friend elicited from the Minister the answer that yes, the British Government have the right of veto—if we do not like Inspector Snooks from a certain country, we can reject him.

The other point that I hope the Minister will cover in his winding-up speech is: can we do that indefinitely? Can we have a large number of vetoes? Is it open-ended? Can our veto be such that we will never accept an inspector who is appointed by a certain country? We do not care how good or honest the person is. We may be certain that he is not a spy, or espionage officer appointed by that country. We may nevertheless say that we will not take inspectors from certain countries.

It may be a small point, but it would be nice to know that, unlike with juries, we can carry on objecting to inspectors from certain countries if we have reason to suspect, irrespective of how many different inspectors they give us, that they are paid officers of the intelligence services of that member state, or have connections to their own military that we might find unacceptable.

Mr. Fabricant

May I probe my right hon. Friend a little further? Does he suspect, like me, that a perfectly honourable person from a specific country, when he returns to his country, if it is non-democratic or, furthermore, has not even signed the protocol, may be blackmailed—as my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) says—or, to go further, tortured to give such information?

Mr. Maclean

My hon. Friend makes some good points, which I am sure that the Minister has heard and will wish to deal with in his reply. There were allegations that one of the inspectors—in fact, the chief inspector—a United States citizen inspecting the Iraqi facilities, was improperly passing information to the United States Government. The allegations were perhaps even worse: he was working in cahoots with the CIA, or some other organisation.

Considering the circumstances of that case and the trust that I have for our American allies, I would be happy if America were clever enough to place a good operative to do that job. Nevertheless, that is probably one of the few countries that I would trust to do such a thing.

If that allegation were true, other countries and Governments might try the same ploy: designating as inspectors people who have impeccable links to their equivalent of the CIA, internal security forces, espionage or spying agencies. We wish to reserve the right—I hope that the Minister will confirm that we have it—to carry on ad nauseam rejecting inspectors from a country if we suspect that they are connected to their spy agencies.

I move to article 12 and a different point from that raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst; it occurred to me as he was making his speech. These people will get visas. The article says: The United Kingdom shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas. It is those visas that interest me. Let us take a hypothetical case. We grant permission for an inspector to be designated. He then receives his year-long multiple entry and exit visa. He comes with the IAEA team and does his official duty. He inspects properly—there are no questions about it. He seems to be perfectly legitimate. Then he goes home to his host country, or a country where he is a citizen and whose Government appointed him to the IAEA in the first place. A month later, he comes back to the UK—shall we say in a private capacity, not on IAEA activities—but there is total freedom of movement in this country for anyone who enters it.

That person has his multiple entry and exit visas. Is he free to enter this country without telling the British Government? Is he free to come on holiday to the Lake district? Is he free to go for a sightseeing tour around Sellafield? Is he free to indulge in private activities, shall we say, and to look around, as close as he can get, research facilities and nuclear installations in this country, without wearing the official hat of the designated inspector?

We need to know. If I were trying to run a spying operation in any foreign Government, that is the sort of chap whom I would want to send to this country. The problem arises not when he comes here with an official team, not when he tells the British Government, "I am arriving within 24 hours. Please tell the people at your nuclear installations that I will inspect X, Y and Z," and not when the Government are officially informed, but when he comes back with his multiple entry and exit visas to do some private work on his own, or with the connivance of the host Government.

If the Minister says that, on every occasion, those people must notify the British Government that they have arrived in this country, I will be pleased. I cannot see it anywhere in the legislation. It is not in the protocol. Perhaps it is built into some operating instructions that we do not have before us tonight. If that is not the case, I should like amendments in Committee or on Report saying that any of the people who have been designated as inspectors must tell the host Government on any occasion that they come to this country. That is the only way in which we can ensure that, if there are any inspectors of whom we are slightly suspicious, our security services can be notified, so that those people can be kept under proper observation, if we think that they are doing, shall we say, freebies.

As I say, I have concerns about other provisions of the protocol, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, in his customary thorough manner, has explored them in considerable detail, so I will not need to go down that route.

It is legitimate to allude to the countries that have signed up to the protocol already. We are being urged to pass the Bill rapidly, so that Britain can carry out its obligations. It has been pointed out—I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that you will not consider it tedious repetition to say it—that the list is not very great.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. If the right hon. Gentleman is going to remind the House of those people who have and have not signed, that point has been dealt with at least twice.

Mr. Maclean

That is why I was not going to point out the minor states that have signed the protocol. Nevertheless, the House needs to be reminded that Britain would be in a unique environment if it joined the other eight. That is a tiny handful out of the 193 countries of the UN that have not implemented the protocol. That takes us back to the key issue of principle relating to the Bill: is it worth while voting for the Bill today, and will it make a difference?

It has been said that this is an historic opportunity. I submit that the end of the cold war provided an historic opportunity to advance the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. As Labour Members have said, the possibility of realising the opportunity to have less proliferation of nuclear weapons depends significantly on verification and standards. To that end, we have this protocol, and the IAEA safeguard system has been strengthened considerably since 1991, when the Berlin wall fell. Moreover, events in Iraq demonstrated the limitations of the systems that we then had in place. When we discovered Iraq's clandestine weapons development activities, it gave us many lessons for the future. I think that that is the direct forebear of this protocol.

Today, I have not heard one hon. Member on either side of the House seriously criticise the IAEA safeguards, which are acknowledged to be a credible means by which the international community can be assured that nuclear materials and nuclear facilities are being used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Fabricant

rose—

Mr. Maclean

I think that the point that my hon. Friend wishes to make is that people can be assured by the safeguards only if countries have signed up to them.

Mr. Fabricant

I simply wonder whether my right hon. Friend was persuaded by the argument so forcefully made by the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr. Cohen) that if we singlehandedly and—I almost hesitate to use this word in your presence, Mr. Deputy Speaker—unilaterally decide to sign the protocol, the rest of the world will sign it, too?

Mr. Maclean

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. It would be naive for anyone to believe that that would happen. However, I do not accuse the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead of naivety—he simply has a confidence in certain countries that I do not share, and believes that Britain can set an example. Although I accept that Britain can set an example in many spheres, I do not believe that merely setting an example on the protocol will cause the rest of the world to rush in behind us. Fundamental interests are at stake.

We can sign protocols and treaties when we are already doing the right things and our fundamental interests would not be affected by signing them. However, we have refused to sign many treaties when we thought that a signature would fundamentally affect our interests. That is one reason why the United Kingdom—under all Governments, including the current one—will not sign up to certain military nuclear treaties that we think could seriously endanger the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. We do not want any interference with that. I do not, however, want to address that issue. I am merely making the point that countries may sign up to things that do not matter, and that they will not always sign up to things that matter to them.

We can sign up to the protocol because it does not seriously affect our military capability. Indeed, as the protocol does not apply to the military, it could not seriously affect the military; nor does it seriously affect our nuclear capability. Clause 3 provides many more regulations and much more bureaucracy and claptrap, but the protocol will not close down any British nuclear research facility. Therefore, the Government can happily sign up to it, wear their heart on their sleeve and show that we are good guys.

Safeguards on verification and other safeguards alone cannot prevent states from acquiring nuclear material, facilities or technology. Neither can they alone ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials or facilities. However, they can—if everyone signs up to them—act as an early warning mechanism. They are the trigger that sets in motion other responses by the international community. That basic principle brings into focus the reality that the safeguard system is merely one component, albeit—as we have been saying in the debate—an important component of the global non-proliferation regime.

The essential elements of the non-proliferation regime—we are being asked to add another element to it today—have long been recognised to include: global, regional and bilateral agreement in accordance with which states commit themselves not to manufacture or possess nuclear weapons; export controls on the supply of nuclear and nuclear-related materials, technology and equipment; the convention and guidelines aimed at ensuring the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities; accelerated action towards nuclear disarmament, of course; and appropriate arrangements for global and regional security.

Although much has been achieved in putting in place those components—which together constitute the rather complex mosaic of the global non-proliferation regime—the forthcoming non-proliferation treaty review conference is likely to highlight how further progress is required. That fact tends to put this protocol into context, and helps us to come to conclusions on the Bill. Specifically, the principles of, and objectives for, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament—which are part of the package of decisions that accompanied the agreement on the NPT's indefinite extension, in 1995—will certainly draw attention to the commitments that need to be fulfilled.

As Labour Members have said today, although safeguards have evolved progressively since their inception, until recently, the IAEA safeguards system focused mainly on nuclear material and activities declared by the state. This protocol is, of course, the result of our recognition that an effective verification regime must also focus on possible undeclared material and activities. That has been a lacuna in our legislation for some considerable time.

In February 1992, the IAEA board of governors reaffirmed the agency's right to verify the correctness and completeness of the nuclear material declarations made by states. Some strengthening measures were introduced within existing IAEA members, but other key elements envisaged for the strengthened system required additional legal authority. In May 1997, the IAEA board approved a model additional protocol, which conferred on the agency additional legal authority to implement further strengthening measures. That has evolved into the protocol that we are discussing, under which states are required to provide the agency with an expanded declaration that contains information covering all aspects of their nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle activities, but relating only to civil installations, not military ones.

The agency's broader access rights are, to a large extent, linked to confirming or clarifying particular aspects of the information provided. Whereas access was previously limited to certain strategic plants in declared facilities, under the new protocol a state is required to provide access to any place on a nuclear site and to other locations—that is the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst was concerned about—where nuclear material is or may be present. The state is required to provide access to all locations that are or could be engaged in nuclear fuel cycle-related activities and, in cases in which that may not be possible, to make every reasonable effort to satisfy agency requirements without delay through other means.

Mr. Forth

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the really bothersome aspect of that is that it appears that all decisions on such matters rest with the agency? Throughout the protocol and the Bill, what is regarded as a prime location or an adjacent location is a matter for the discretion of the agency and its inspectors. That appears again and again to give them unlimited scope in their decision as to where they go to invade—and, arguably, to violate—the privacy of hitherto safe locations.

Mr. Maclean

My right hon. Friend is right. I do not criticise the present Government, because the situation would be the same if the Conservatives were in power, but when Britain implements an international obligation, we always put gold knobs and bells on. The British Government are required to send information to the agency. In clauses 2 and 3, the Government and parliamentary draftsmen have ensured that under no circumstances will Britain ever be likely to be accused of missing out a single place where someone may be carrying out the tiniest bit of research that might have relevance to the nuclear industry. I suspect that British Telecom would be notified to the IAEA if it reverted to the old phones that had radioactive dials, as would a manufacturer of luminous watches, because of the radioactivity in the products or the research for them. The British Government never want to be accused of failing to implement their obligations.

Clause 2 says: The Secretary of State may serve a notice on any person requiring him to give the Secretary of State information, or information of a description, specified in the notice.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. This is not a Committee debate. It is not right to go into such detail.

Mr. Maclean

I am sorry that I began to do so. I should not let my hon. Friends lead me astray into that detail. We shall have to spend considerable time in Committee looking at the detail of clauses 2 and 3.

Mr. Fabricant

Given the broader picture that my right hon. Friend has painted, is he aware that there will be costs for manufacturing companies as a result of the Bill's scope and the sort of companies that can be investigated under its terms? Has he noticed whether there has been any compliance cost analysis?

Mr. Maclean

My hon. Friend makes an important point in his own way. I shall not go into the details of clauses 2 and 3, but the House will see the space that they take up in the Bill. The Government have built in every catch-all provision that they can to ensure that they have the details of every company, business or person engaged in research on anything nuclear. That information will then be passed on to the agency.

Mr. Bercow

Given the extent of the powers that the Bill confers upon agency investigators and the fact, which will not have escaped you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that we have been debating the Bill for precisely 270 minutes, it is imperative that the Minister who replies should deal in detail with the concern of many of us that aggrieved individuals should have redress against abuse of power, the opportunity for which is provided deliberately or inadvertently by the Bill.

Mr. Maclean

My hon. Friend is right but slightly ahead of me. I intended to take up that point when I turned my attention to the Bill and drew attention to the lack of a redress system for those who have been aggrieved. I do not need to deal any more with the protocol because my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst dealt with it extensively.

As I pass on to the Bill, I wish merely to point out that although the Government have signed the protocol and wish to ratify it and bring it into law, we must not think that we have made a marvellous step forward. I do not think that we have, because many challenges still remain. For example, many states that are party to the non-proliferation group have yet to conclude safeguard agreements with the agency. There may be no harm in Britain being one of the few countries to have done so, but in five years' time there may be an opportunity to initiate an Adjournment debate on these matters, and we may find that Britain is still No. 9 and that no other state has signed up.

It would be a welcome development if some of the 50 other NPG states, without the safeguard agreement in force, were to review the run-up to the April conference at the end of this week. I understand that the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office will attend the April 2000 review conference, and I hope that the House will be told that having gone there, aiming to clutch the Nuclear Safeguards Act in his hand—I suspect that we shall not be able to make it an Act by Easter, but instead carrying the Bill—he will say, "We have completed Second Reading and we are now in Committee, and ratification will take place shortly." How many other Ministers from the 50 states that have failed to make progress will be able to make a similar report?

Before we judge the Bill, we want an estimate of how many other states will sign up. I do not wish to discuss individual countries or to say that we can now sleep safely in our beds because the Pope has signed up and we shall not be nuked by the Vatican, which is reassuring. However, we are entitled to know from the Minister whether the Government expect that there will be many other states following the lead that he wishes the British Government to give.

Mr. Forth

My right hon. Friend has made a new point, which must be something of a record in the debate. He is introducing an important angle. We have been talking in terms of what the Government will want to take to the April conference. We have the unseemly spectacle of the Minister wanting to rush the proposed legislation through the House. My right hon. Friend must be correct: if we are to give the Bill a Second Reading, we should in Committee have knowledge of whether progress has been made at the international forum so that we can make a judgment about completion of the Bill's consideration. It may be that we would want to pause on Third Reading if we were not satisfied that progress was being made at great international conferences.

Mr. Maclean

My right hon. Friend, in his usual highly intelligent and erudite way, has made an exceptionally good point. One of the reassurances that I would like to hear from the Minister tonight is that he will delay going into Committee until after Easter. He would only lose one Committee session and it would not jeopardise the Bill. Or the Bill could go into Committee and the Minister could table a sittings motion for the Committee to proceed after Easter, at which point we could have a report from the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the progress that he made at the April 2000 review conference. He could also give us a list of the other countries which attended clutching their own Bills.

Mr. Bercow

Am I right in thinking that the Minister, who has been somewhat lonely on the Front Bench in the past few hours, will only by leave of the House have the opportunity to speak for a second time in replying to the debate? Does my right hon. Friend agree that if the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office wishes to brandish aloft at an international conference a piece of paper that testifies to the success of his Government in securing early passage of the provisions in the protocols, the least that he could do in courtesy to the House would be to offer to wind up this debate? The fact that he is not even attending our proceedings is further naked evidence of the contempt in which Ministers of this Government hold this elected House.

Mr. Maclean

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point in his own way. It is a point that needs repetition, but I make no accusation against the Minister who is present. He is exceptionally courteous. Indeed, I hope that the Government have not abandoned the tradition of ensuring that, if a Minister has to be present in the Chamber all day, another Minister comes in to allow him to have a break for some beans on toast. The Minister has not had the chance for refreshment all day, and that is an unfair burden on any Minister.

With regard to the substance of my hon. Friend's remarks, I cannot think of any right hon. or hon. Friend who would object to the Minister seeking the leave of the House to reply to the debate. He is a courteous Minister and I would much prefer to hear his reply than that of the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. No one on the Opposition Benches would object to the Minister seeking the leave of the House to speak again.

I turn now to the Bill itself. We need an indication of the extent of the regulations that will be required under clause 3, which will give the Secretary of State power to make regulations requiring persons of any description specified in the regulations to inform him that they are of such a description and to give supplementary particulars. If I read that correctly, it means that the Secretary of State will make regulations concerning certain persons and the first thing that they will have to do is to confirm that they are the people whom the regulations are about, so that the Government know that they made the regulations broad enough.

Clause 3 is wide ranging, as is clause 2, and the Government should indicate what regulations they have in mind. I recall a time, not so long ago, when what is almost a Henry VIII measure such as this would not have got through the House, or past the other place, unless the Government produced in advance the draft regulations that they intended to make. I remember several Bills that I piloted through the House that were held up until Home Office officials had drafted in advance all the regulations that we could possible conceive of making, because the Opposition and the other place demanded to see the pig in the poke.

Dr. Howells

Which regulations is the right hon. Gentleman referring to? Draft regulations under clause 3 were put into the Library on 29 November last year. They set out what it is envisaged will be required from companies under that clause.

Mr. Maclean

I am delighted to be corrected on that and apologise for suggesting that that had not been done. The extensive material that I collected from the Library did not contain them, so I assumed that the Library did not have them. If the regulations are comprehensive and make clear what the Government want, that is excellent. I withdraw my remarks without hesitation.

Mr. Bercow

My right hon. Friend should not be too apologetic. Sackcloth and ashes are not required. The Minister will recall an intervention that I made in the contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) to inquire whether the regulations would be subject to the negative or the affirmative procedure. The Minister intervened on him with a reference to his own handwriting. Does my right hon. Friend think that we should look to the negative procedure for the regulations, or to the affirmative?

Mr. Maclean

That is a good point. I assumed that the Minister would have mentioned that, if he knew about the regulations when he said that he did. However, there is no harm in apologising when one is wrong, and I was wrong about the regulations. I wish other Departments could be as forthcoming as his has been in producing draft regulations under the Bill.

Clause 4(5) states: The powers of an authorised officer who enters premises under the authority of a warrant under this section include power— (a) to take with him such other persons and such equipment as appear to him to be necessary. I can understand that authorised officers might want to take with them scientific and technical help, or equipment that Sherpas are required to carry. However, subsection (6) of what I think is a permissive clause talks of A constable who enters premises under the authority of a warrant.

Authorised officers may have power to take whatever people they choose with them, but will constables have to comply? An authorised officer with a warrant to enter a premises may decide to take a couple of bobbies with him because he fears difficulty, or merely for the sake of appearances. When he tells the relevant chief constable that he wants officers to accompany him, do the police have the right to refuse? If the chief constable agrees, will the force be recompensed for the officers' time?

Police provision for football matches is always recompensed, as it is additional, unusual expenditure. However, the police are worried about the burdens that are placed on them, and about the vicious Government funding cuts that have caused bobby numbers to fall. Will the chief constable of my county, Cumbria, now say that he will have to close more rural police stations and take more bobbies off the beat because his officers have been summoned by authorised officers to accompany certain persons into nuclear installations or research facilities?

Clause 8 deals with the search provision, and the Minister should get his officials to look at it again. I cannot remember the rules introduced by the previous Government on searches, but they were introduced under legislation relating to the transfer of prisoners. I seem to recall that searches range from removing a person's hat or coat to removing all his or her clothing. The severest form of search is the intimate body search by police service doctors.

The Government could save themselves a problem if they specified what sort of search they mean. I assumed that it was, as with security searches at airports, a case of patting the body without asking people to remove any more clothing than a coat—without going into grubby details.

Clause 5, by far the most contentious in the Bill, deals with the powers of inspectors to come into this country and go into any private property without a warrant. Under clause 4, a warrant must be granted before British inspectors can enter British property. When we referred to foreign inspectors invading private British property, the Minister pulled us up and told us not to be disparaging about the inspectors—some of whom are British—who have an excellent reputation. I agree entirely. I have no criticism of the inspectors in the British nuclear industry or the agency officers who have been doing such work since 1946 or 1956. They have a long-standing and noble reputation of proper, thorough, decent inspection. However, our fundamental freedoms existed even before those inspectors. So, although I have no criticism of the inspectors who may enter our property, it is nevertheless legitimate to challenge them, along with police constables, Customs and Excise officers, or any other officers who seek extraordinary rights to invade our fundamental freedoms.

The Committee considering the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill has just ended. It dealt with clauses giving draconian powers to the security service, the special intelligence service, Customs and Excise, MI5, the fisheries inspector, the Department of Health dodgy medicines inspector—even the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food egg inspector, as we discovered by accident one day. The Committee regularised their draconian powers to undertake covert surveillance, directed surveillance and, for some of the top security agencies of the state, electronic surveillance such as tapping e-mails. The Minister of State, Home Office, the hon. Member for Norwich, South (Mr. Clarke), was extremely courteous, and meticulous in assuring the Committee that the powers for people to enter private property and bag all mail and correspondence were necessary only because there were serious issues at stake. We were told that the Home Secretary could be trusted because we could always ensure that, whenever he granted a warrant, it would be done properly, and there would be a judicial committee to check on it.

Mr. Fabricant

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Maclean

Yes, but I do not want to stray down this road because I would be on the borderline of order. Under that Bill, the powers given to the security services and the police are under warrant, and the Home Secretary has to answer for every time that they get it wrong. I cite that merely as a contrast to the powers in clause 5.

Mr. Fabricant

My right hon. Friend almost answers my question. Is not the crux of the matter that MI5, MI6, GCHQ and the other agencies are answerable, directly or indirectly, to Parliament, whereas the IAEA is not?

Mr. Maclean

My hon. Friend is right. Why do we bother having the powers in clause 4? It provides an elaborate procedure, under which British officers will have to seek a warrant and obtain judicial approval. The procedure will be the same as for any other police officers getting a warrant before going on to private property, carrying out inspections or arresting people. We have even built in those powers for MI5, MI6, Customs and Excise, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, the national crime squad, the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and other chief constables. We have built an elaborate procedure, ending with scrutiny by an independent judicial committee. Clause 4 almost emulates that, while clause 5 does not build in any safeguards.

I see the Minister's difficulty. The Government have signed up to a protocol, and the Bill must implement it. If we try to build safeguards into clause 5, that will fly in the face of the protocol of the treaty. Under the protocol, we have signed away our rights by allowing inspectors to come into this country and go on to private property without necessarily getting a judicial warrant. I understand why clause 5 must implement that in law.

It is not good that the Bill has two inconsistent clauses. British inspectors must get a warrant, but foreign inspectors—who may include British inspectors—can inspect without scrutiny.

Clause 5(5) states that a constable "may" give such assistance as an inspector may request. Does that really mean "shall"? We need to know. The phrasing suggests that the constable may not—he or she may refuse. There is a permissive power for the constable to refuse.

If, during an inspection, a constable refuses to do something that the inspector asks him to do, and the person is then charged with wilfully obstructing an inspector, does the person have a defence because the constable did not back up the agency inspector? Would that be an offence? For example, an agency inspector visits a facility accompanied by a British bobby, and the person concerned refuses to do what the inspector demands. The British bobby suggests that the person does not refuse, and the inspector then orders the British officer to compel the person to comply.

Dr. Howells

If a warrant says that a constable must be present, the police service would have to provide a PC unless there were exceptional circumstances for justifying a refusal. A constable would be expected to use his own judgment about what he should do, subject to any conditions in the warrant. However, he would be expected to provide whatever assistance was appropriate, if so requested by an authorised officer.

Mr. Maclean

I am grateful to the Minister for taking us forward. If the warrant specifies that a constable should be present, the police must provide an officer. However, if the warrant does not specify that, the police can refuse.

Mr. Fabricant

I wonder whether the Minister has been as helpful as he had wished. If a warrant is issued, as the Minister said—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. Both the hon. Member for Lichfield (Mr. Fabricant) and the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) are falling into the trap about which I warned them earlier. These are Committee points and ought not to be pursued.

Mr. Maclean

I accept your ruling, of course, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but should be grateful if the Minister would reconsider clause 5(5) and (7). I shall wish to ask in Committee what would happen if an agency inspector ordered something and a British bobby thought it contrary to British law or Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 rules. The bobby might be asked to take illegal fingerprints or samples, and might refuse to do so. The person who had refused to comply, because a police officer had thought that compliance was wrong, could then be charged with having failed to co-operate with an agency inspector. That person might be charged with an offence, which the police did not consider to be an offence, merely on the say-so of the agency inspector.

I wish to turn to information held electronically. I have spent much time discussing encryption over the past few weeks in the Standing Committee on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill. Clause 4(5)(c) of the Nuclear Safeguards Bill creates a power for an authorised officer to require any information which is held in electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which he can read and copy it. Let us suppose that the information is encrypted, and that the person who holds it claims to have lost his key. Under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill, that person will receive an automatic two-year sentence for not producing the encrypted material—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. The right hon. Gentleman is repeating points that he has told us he made in Standing Committee. Clearly, by his own admission, those are Committee points, and I ask him to move on.

Mr. Maclean

I shall certainly move on, Mr. Deputy Speaker, although I was not aware of having mentioned encryption previously. I thought that I was on safe ground as I could not recall anyone having mentioned it.

My other points are points of detail, and I need not trouble the House with them tonight.

Mr. Bercow

My right hon. Friend is an expert on the big picture. Given the considerable anxieties expressed about the disparity between clauses 4 and 5, it would be helpful if the Minister told us how he would respond if the House did not approve the Bill's Second Reading. In that eventuality, would he talk to his international colleagues and produce a revised Bill, or would he abandon the project altogether?

Mr. Maclean

That is a valid question. I do not oppose the Bill; I do not think that any of my hon. Friends does either. However, we have deep concerns about clause 5 because we do not like to give draconian powers, without review or judicial oversight, to inspectors of any nature. I should not want to give those powers to my local VAT inspector, never mind to international inspectors of any agency.

I do not oppose the Bill, but I challenge the Government to prove that it is essential and will make a great difference. It has about it the aura of a gesture, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst said. If it were vital to nuclear non-proliferation, the Government would have introduced it themselves in 1997, soon after they were elected. They could have introduced it in 1998, but instead it was tacked on to the end of the Order Paper on a Friday morning when we were dealing with important private Member's Bills. My right hon. Friend or I objected to it because we assumed that it was a measure of no consequence. We thought that the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Colman) was trying to bounce through a Bill that he had dreamt up off the top of his head, and that that would have been an abuse of the procedures of the House. Today, we have heard the Minister say that it is vital—

Dr. Julian Lewis

Historic.

Mr. Maclean

Indeed, the Government say that it is an historic measure that will make a great difference. If it would make a difference now, surely it would have made a bigger one two years ago. Perhaps if it had been introduced then as a Government measure, more than eight countries—the House knows which ones, and I shall not recite the list again—would have signed up to the protocol.

If we are to make the gesture of passing the Bill, and if Britain intends to signify to the rest of the world how good it is, we must bear in mind that it applies only to civil activities, not defence-related ones. We have rightly said to IAEA inspectors and to other countries in the protocol, "You can draw up this protocol, chums, and we can all go to the international review in April and congratulate ourselves on passing it, but your inspectors can keep their noses out of our military nuclear facilities. We are not having any foreign inspectors wandering around them. We are not signing up to any of that.

" I defend the Government for that attitude—just as I defended the previous Government and shall defend any future Government who say that, in the world in which we live, our military nuclear capability is vital to the security and peace of our nation. I trust our British inspectors to ensure that such matters are properly carried out.

However, despite the fact that the Government will not give the protocol any remit over military establishments, we should not pat ourselves too much on the back, because inspectors from foreign countries can wander around all our other nuclear facilities. They can go into all the little labs in Cambridge and elsewhere—inspecting, detecting and picking up paperwork on all the minutiae of civil nuclear power—while we say how good, open and up-front we are and that the rest of the world should follow our lead.

The Gaddafis of this world—the Libyas, Iraqs, Indias, Pakistans and all the other countries that might have a nuclear capability—will not be persuaded by countries that say, "Come and inspect all our civil nuclear establishments, but keep your noses out of our military ones." We are no more moral than they are, but I am happy with our position. I should not like the Government to extend the Bill's provisions to our military nuclear facilities.

9.22 pm

Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot)

I am delighted to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) in the debate. He rightly referred to the provenance of the Bill. Many right hon. and hon. Members who take seriously the principles of our democratic system will be concerned by the fact that the measure started out as a private Member's Bill. The Government made a mistake by introducing it in that way; they now realise that it would have been better to have presented it as a Government Bill. Private Members' Bill should be reserved for issues such as hedgerows, on which the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions might be anxious to introduce a measure that would not be appropriate as main Government business.

However, the debate has permitted us to have the pleasure of the company of the Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs. I echo the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow): the Minister is a most assiduous Member. I am sorry that I was not in the Chamber to hear his opening speech, or his explanation as to why the Government were unable to make a statement to the House on car competition policy. I pay tribute to his belief in the House and to the fact that he has listened attentively to all the arguments in the debate.

Mr. Bercow

May I echo my hon. Friend's tribute? The Minister is liked and admired on both sides of the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] As the Minister will have the burden of securing the Bill's passage, would it not be appropriate if he, rather than the significantly less popular Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, were to have the pleasure of attending the celebrated international conference?

Mr. Howarth

Enough of that—we have done the Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs quite enough harm already. I like him enough not to want to inflict further damage. Although I missed his opening remarks, I was able to study the words of Lord McIntosh of Haringey, who moved the Bill's Second Reading in the other place last November.

During that debate, a noble Lord described the powers in the Bill as draconian. Furthermore, he said: One of those whose advice I took on the Bill said: "We are all in favour of the most draconian measures to protect the nuclear non-proliferation treaty". That was said not by a Conservative peer but by Lord Wallace of Saltaire, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats. He is a professor of international relations at the London school of economics and a former director of studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. I make that point to demonstrate that he has made a lifetime study of international affairs, and he acknowledges that the powers conferred on authorities in the Bill are draconian.

Mr. Keetch

I think that my noble Friend said that although he considered the powers draconian, he thought the cause worthy of such powers. I would not want the hon. Gentleman to misrepresent my noble Friend by suggesting that he was critical of the powers.

Mr. Howarth

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but I do not see in the noble Lord's remarks precisely where he said that he accepted the need for these draconian powers. He said: I understand that it is the priority of all the members of Euratom to ratify as soon as possible. This requires all members to ensure that they have amended their domestic legislation appropriately.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 30 November 1999; Vol. 607, c. 782.] I do not want to suggest that the noble Lord was not conscious that the powers were draconian. In so far as there was no Division in the other place, one might be entitled to assume that he accepted the need for them and did not think that they were so draconian that they warranted his voting against Second Reading.

It is important that we understand that we are being asked to vote for the Bill tonight because of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I understand that the Bill is a means by which non-nuclear weapons states can be policed to ensure that they are not using civil nuclear programmes clandestinely to develop nuclear weapons and that they are not receiving support from nuclear weapons states.

That prompts the question of why, of the signatories to the non-proliferation treaty—which also include the United States, France, Russia and China—we should be required to expose our domestic civil nuclear programme to the arrangements that are being introduced principally to deal with rogue states such as Iraq and North Korea, which have been mentioned. Today we are faced with the historic prospect of a meeting between North and South Korea, and it may be that even North Korea will come into line. The Bill provides draconian powers of access to private sector companies and their civil nuclear programmes to deal with rogue states, and it is a substantial hammer to crack that particular nut.

Clauses 2 and 5 are the key parts of the Bill. Clause 2 provides the initial powers and details of the information that may be required from private sector companies. Extensive powers—

Mr. Thomas McAvoy (Glasgow, Rutherglen)

rose in his place and claimed to move,That the Question be now put.

Question put,That the Question be now put:—

The House divided:Ayes 219, Noes 13.

Division No. 156]	[9.30 pm
AYES
Abbott, Ms Diane	Davis, Rt Hon Terry (B'ham Hodge H)
Ainger, Nick
Anderson, Janet (Rossendale)	Dawson, Hilton
Ashdown, Rt Hon Paddy	Dean, Mrs Janet
Atkins, Charlotte	Dismore, Andrew
Baker, Norman	Dobbin, Jim
Banks, Tony	Donohoe, Brian H
Barron, Kevin	Doran, Frank
Beard, Nigel	Dowd, Jim
Begg, Miss Anne	Drew, David
Benn, Hilary (Leeds C)	Eagle, Maria (L'pool Garston)
Bennett, Andrew F	Ellman, Mrs Louise
Benton, Joe	Etherington, Bill
Bermingham, Gerald	Fisher, Mark
Best, Harold	Flynn, Paul
Betts, Clive	Foster, Rt Hon Derek
Borrow, David	Foster, Michael J (Worcester)
Breed, Colin	Fyfe, Maria
Brown, Russell (Dumfries)	Gapes, Mike
Browne, Desmond	Gardiner, Barry
Buck, Ms Karen	Gerrard, Neil
Burden, Richard	Gibson, Dr Ian
Burgon, Colin	Gilroy, Mrs Linda
Burnett, John	Godman, Dr Norman A
Campbell, Rt Hon Menzies (NE Fife)	Golding, Mrs Llin
	Griffiths, Jane (Reading E)
Campbell, Ronnie (Blyth V)	Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)
Campbell-Savours, Dale	Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)
	Grogan, John
Cann, Jamie	Hall, Mike (Weaver Vale)
Casale, Roger	Hall, Patrick (Bedford)
Caton, Martin	Hancock, Mike
Chapman, Ben (Wirral S)	Hanson, David
Chisholm, Malcolm	Harris, Dr Evan
Clapham, Michael	Heal, Mrs Sylvia
Clark, Rt Hon Dr David (S Shields)	Heath, David (Somerton & Frome)
Clarke, Eric (Midlothian)	Henderson, Ivan (Harwich)
Clarke, Tony (Northampton S)	Hepburn, Stephen
Clwyd, Ann	Hopkins, Kelvin
Cohen, Harry	Howells, Dr Kim
Coleman, Iain	Humble, Mrs Joan
Colman, Tony	Hurst, Alan
Connarty, Michael	Iddon, Dr Brian
Cotter, Brian	Jenkins, Brian
Cousins, Jim	Jones, Rt Hon Barry (Alyn)
Cox, Tom	Jones, Helen (Warrington N)
Crausby, David	Jones, Ms Jenny (Wolverh'ton SW)
Cryer, Mrs Ann (Keighley)
Cummings, John	Jones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C)
Cunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)	Jones, Dr Lynne (Selly Oak)
Dalyell, Tam	Jones, Martyn (Clwyd S)
Darvill, Keith	Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Davey, Valerie (Bristol W)	Keen, Alan (Feltham & Heston)
Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)	Keetch, Paul
Davies, Geraint (Croydon C)	Kennedy, Jane (Wavertree)

Khabra, Piara S	Rapson, Syd
Kidney, David	Reed, Andrew (Loughborough)
Kilfoyle, Peter	Rendel, David
King, Andy (Rugby & Kenilworth)	Rooney, Terry
King, Ms Oona (Bethnal Green)	Ross, Ernie (Dundee W)
Kirkwood, Archy	Roy, Frank
Kumar, Dr Ashok	Ruane, Chris
Ladyman, Dr Stephen	Ruddock, Joan
Lepper, David	Russell, Bob (Colchester)
Levitt, Tom	Salter, Martin
Lewis, Ivan (Bury S)	Sarwar, Mohammad
Linton, Martin	Savidge, Malcolm
Livsey, Richard	Sawford, Phil
Lloyd, Tony (Manchester C)	Sedgemore, Brian
Llwyd, Elfyn	Sheerman, Barry
Love, Andrew	Simpson, Alan (Nottingham S)
McAvoy, Thomas	Singh, Marsha
McCabe, Steve	Skinner, Dennis
McDonagh, Siobhain	Smith, Angela (Basildon)
McFall, John	Smith, Rt Hon Chris (Islington S)
McGuire, Mrs Anne	Smith, John (Glamorgan)
McNamara, Kevin	Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)
McNulty, Tony	Smith, Sir Robert (W Ab'd'ns)
Mactaggart, Fiona	Spellar, John
McWalter, Tony	Starkey, Dr Phyllis
McWilliam, John	Steinberg, Gerry
Mahon, Mrs Alice	Stinchcombe, Paul
Marsden, Gordon (Blackpool S)	Stoate, Dr Howard
Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)	Stuart, Ms Gisela
Maxton, John	Stunell, Andrew
Meale, Alan	Sutcliffe, Gerry
Merron Gillian	Temple-Morris, Peter
Michie Bill (Shef'ld Heeley)	Thomas, Gareth R (Harrow W)
Miller, Andrew	Thomas, Simon (Ceredigion)
Mitchell Austin	Touhig, Don
	Truswell, Paul
Moffatt, Laura	Turner, Dennis (Wolverh'ton SE)
Moore, Michael	Turner Dr George (NW Norfolk)
Moran, Ms Margaret	Twigg, Derek (Halton)
Morgan, Alasdair (Galloway)	Twigg, Stephen (Enfield)
Morgan, Ms Julie (Cardiff N)	Tyler, Paul
Mountford, Kali	Vis, Dr Rudi
Mullin, Chris	Wareing, Robert N
Murphy, Denis (Wansbeck)	Watts, David
Murphy, Jim (Eastwood)	Webb, Steve
Naysmith, Dr Doug	White, Brian
O'Brien, Bill (Normanton)	Whitehead, Dr Alan
O'Hara, Eddie	Williams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)
O'Neill, Martin	Williams, Mrs Betty (Conwy)
Öpik, Lembit	Willis, Phil
Pendry, Tom	Wills, Michael
Pickthall, Colin	Winnick, David
Pike, Peter L	Wood, Mike
Pollard, Kerry	Worthington, Tony
Pope, Greg	Wright, Dr Tony (Cannock)
Pound, Stephen
Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)	Tellers for the Ayes:
Prosser, Gwyn	Mr. Kevin Hughes and
Rammell, Bill	Mr. Robert Ainsworth.
NOES
Bottomley, Peter (Worthing W)	Maclean, Rt Hon David
Forth, Rt Hon Eric	Maples, John
Fowler, Rt Hon Sir Norman	Paterson, Owen
	Winterton, Mrs Ann (Congleton)
Gill, Christopher	Winterton, Nicholas (Macclesfield)
Howarth, Gerald (Aldershot)
Leigh, Edward	Tellers for the Noes:
Lewis, Dr Julian (New Forest E)	Mr. Edward Leigh and
Lilley, Rt Hon Peter	Mr. Michael Fabricant.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Question put accordingly, That the Bill be now read a Second time:—

The House proceeded to a Division.

Madam Speaker

Would the Serjeant at Arms investigate the delay in the No Lobby? An inordinate amount of time is being taken there; hon. Members should be through by now.

The House having divided:Ayes 215, Noes 7.

Division No. 157]	[9.44 pm
AYES
Abbott, Ms Diane	Fisher, Mark
Ainger, Nick	Flynn, Paul
Anderson, Janet (Rossendale)	Foster, Rt Hon Derek
Ashdown, Rt Hon Paddy	Foster, Michael J (Worcester)
Atkins, Charlotte	Fyfe, Maria
Baker, Norman	Gapes, Mike
Banks, Tony	Gardiner, Barry
Barron, Kevin	Gerrard, Neil
Beard, Nigel	Gibson, Dr Ian
Begg, Miss Anne	Gilroy, Mrs Linda
Benn, Hilary (Leeds C)	Godman, Dr Norman A
Bennett, Andrew F	Golding, Mrs Llin
Benton, Joe	Griffiths, Jane (Reading E)
Bermingham, Gerald	Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)
Best, Harold	Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)
Betts, Clive	Grogan, John
Borrow, David	Hall, Mike (Weaver Vale)
Bottomley, Peter (Worthing W)	Hall, Patrick (Bedford)
Breed, Colin	Hancock, Mike
Brown, Russell (Dumfries)	Hanson, David
Browne, Desmond	Harris, Dr Evan
Buck, Ms Karen	Heal, Mrs Sylvia
Burden, Richard	Heath, David (Somerton & Frome)
Burgon, Colin	Henderson, Ivan (Harwich)
Burnett, John	Hepburn, Stephen
Campbell, Rt Hon Menzies (NE Fife)	Hopkins, Kelvin
	Howells, Dr Kim
Campbell, Ronnie (Blyth V)	Humble, Mrs Joan
Campbell-Savours, Dale	Hurst, Alan
Cann, Jamie	Iddon, Dr Brian
Casale, Roger	Jenkins, Brian
Caton, Martin	Jones, Rt Hon Barry (Alyn)
Chapman, Ben (Wirral S)	Jones, Helen (Warrington N)
Chisholm, Malcolm	Jones, Ms Jenny (Wolverh'ton SW)
Clark, Rt Hon Dr David (S Shields)
Clarke, Eric (Midlothian)	Jones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C)
Clarke, Tony (Northampton S)	Jones, Dr Lynne (Selly Oak)
Clwyd, Ann	Jones, Martyn (Clwyd S)
Cohen, Harry	Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Coleman, Iain	Keetch, Paul
Colman, Tony	Kennedy, Jane (Wavertree)
Connarty, Michael	Khabra, Piara S
Cotter, Brian	Kidney, David
Cousins, Jim	Kilfoyle, Peter
Cox, Tom	King, Andy (Rugby & Kenilworth)
Crausby, David	King, Ms Oona (Bethnal Green)
Cryer, Mrs Ann (Keighley)	Kirkwood, Archy
Cummings, John	Ladyman, Dr Stephen
Cunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)	Lepper, David
Dalyell, Tam	Levitt, Tom
Darvill, Keith	Lewis, Ivan (Bury S)
Davey, Valerie (Bristol W)	Linton, Martin
Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)	Livsey, Richard
Davies, Geraint (Croydon C)	Lloyd, Tony (Manchester C)
Davis, Rt Hon Terry (B'ham Hodge H)	Llwyd, Elfyn
	Love, Andrew
Dawson, Hilton	McAvoy, Thomas
Dean, Mrs Janet	McCabe, Steve
Dismore, Andrew	McDonagh, Siobhain
Dobbin, Jim	McFall, John
Donohoe, Brian H	McGuire, Mrs Anne
Doran, Frank	McNamara, Kevin
Dowd, Jim	McNulty, Tony
Drew, David	Mactaggart, Fiona
Eagle, Maria (L'pool Garston)	McWalter, Tony
Ellman, Mrs Louise	McWilliam, John

Mahon, Mrs Alice	Sheerman, Barry
Marsden, Gordon (Blackpool S)	Simpson, Alan (Nottingham S)
Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)	Singh, Marsha
Maxton, John	Skinner, Dennis
Meale, Alan	Smith, Angela (Basildon)
Merron, Gillian	Smith, Rt Hon Chris (Islington S)
Michie, Bill (Shef'ld Heeley)	Smith, John (Glamorgan)
Miller, Andrew	Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)
Mitchell, Austin	Smith, Sir Robert (W Ab'd'ns)
Moffatt, Laura	Spellar, John
Moonie, Dr Lewis	Starkey, Dr Phyllis
Moore, Michael	Steinberg, Gerry
Moran, Ms Margaret	Stinchcombe, Paul
Morgan, Alasdair (Galloway)	Stoate, Dr Howard
Morgan, Ms Julie (Cardiff N)	Stuart, Ms Gisela
Mountford, Kali	Stunell, Andrew
Mullin, Chris	Sutcliffe, Gerry
Murphy, Jim (Eastwood)	Temple-Morris, Peter
Naysmith, Dr Doug	Thomas, Gareth R (Harrow W)
O'Brien, Bill (Normanton)	Thomas, Simon (Ceredigion)
O'Hara, Eddie	Touhig, Don
Öpik, Lembit	Truswell, Paul
Pendry, Tom	Turner, Dennis (Wolverh'ton SE)
Pickthall, Colin	Turner, Dr George (NW Norfolk)
Pike, Peter L	Twigg, Derek (Halton)
Pollard, Kerry	Twigg, Stephen (Enfield)
Pope, Greg	Tyler, Paul
Pound, Stephen	Vis, Dr Rudi
Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)	Wareing, Robert N
Prosser, Gwyn	Watts, David
Rammell, Bill	Webb, Steve
Rapson, Syd	White, Brian
Reed, Andrew (Loughborough)	Whitehead, Dr Alan
Rendel, David	Williams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)
Rooney, Terry	Williams, Mrs Betty (Conwy)
Ross, Ernie (Dundee W)	Willis, Phil
Roy, Frank	Wills, Michael
Ruane, Chris	Winnick, David
Ruddock, Joan	Wood, Mike
Russell, Bob (Colchester)	Worthington, Tony
Salter, Martin	Wright, Dr Tony (Cannock)
Sarwar, Mohammad
Savidge, Malcolm	Tellers for the Ayes:
Sawford, Phil	Mr. Kevin Hughes and
Sedgemore, Brian	Mr. Robert Ainsworth.
NOES
Forth, Rt Hon Eric	Paterson, Owen
Gill, Christopher	Wilshire, David
Howarth, Gerald (Aldershot)	Tellers for the Noes:
McIntosh, Miss Anne	Mr. Edward Leigh and
Maclean, Rt Hon David	Mr. Michael Fabricant.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Bill read a Second time, and committed to a Standing Committee, pursuant to Standing Order No. 63 (Committal of Bills).

Mr. Maclean

On a point of order, Madam Speaker. As you will know, the Order Paper states that the debate on the Nuclear Safeguards Bill may continue until 10.00 p.m. Have you ever known an occasion on which the Government have closured their own Bill at 9.30 pm, just as the winding-up speeches were about to start, when the debate could have continued until 10 pm?

Mr. Forth

Further to that point of order, Madam Speaker. You must be aware, because you were in the Chair at the time, that the closure was inexplicably moved before the Minister had had an opportunity to reply to the debate. The Minister was courteous and assiduous enough to be present throughout the debate, taking notes and participating. I had the impression that he wanted very much to reply. How could the closure motion be moved by the Minister's own side before he had had any chance to reply to the debate?

Madam Speaker

I noticed that a number of Opposition Members spoke for a considerable time. I have always believed that the Opposition must have their say and they certainly did so, according to the list today.