POWER TO APPOINT INVESTIGATING OFFICERS

HC Deb 26 April 1995 vol 258 cc860-93

'The Commission may either themselves appoint an investigating officer to carry out inquiries or, if they think it appropriate, may require the appointment of an investigating officer as set out in section 18.'.—[Mr. Mullin.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

3.42 pm

Mr. Chris Mullin (Sunderland, South)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Speaker

With this, it will be convenient to discuss also the following: New clause 2—Investigating officers—

'—(1) In this Act 'investigating officer' means—

1. (a) a person appointed by the Commission from among its staff,
2. (b) a person appointed by the Commission by way of a contract to undertake investigating duties, or
3. (c) a person appointed in accordance with the provisions of subsections (2) to (7) of section 18.

(2) Before making the appointment of an investigating officer, or approving the making of an appointment under section 18(6), the Commission must be satisfied that the person selected has the appropriate experience, skills and independence to carry out his investigatory duties.

(3) The investigating officer shall be responsible to the Commission for all aspects of the investigation for which he is appointed.'.

Amendment No. 27, in clause 18, page 14, line 26, after '(a)', insert 'if the Commission is satisfied that the matters to be investigated do not involve matters originally investigated by officers still serving in that force,'.

Amendment No. 38, in clause 19, page 15, line 19, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.

Government amendments Nos. 34 to 36.

Mr. Mullin

This Bill follows on nicely from the ten-minute Bill that we have just heard, which called for an independent force to investigate alleged corruption in football. I particularly liked the quotation by my hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Ms Hoey) that the present arrangements consisted of a group of the unwilling, picked from the unfit to do what they thought was unnecessary. I am afraid that we are faced with the same position in the investigation of alleged miscarriages of justice. One of the purposes of this group of amendments is to rectify that.

I am sorry to see that the Home Secretary is not in his place. One has always had the feeling that the Government's heart was not entirely in the Bill. One of my colleagues said the other day that the Bill was one of the few pieces of Government legislation on which the Opposition were keener than the Government. The Home Secretary may have a good reason for his absence, but it is yet another illustration of that possibility. In addition to the names on the Order Paper, my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) and the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Howarth) have signed the new clause.

The new clause seeks to rectify what I regard as a potentially fatal flaw in the proposed criminal cases review commission. It gives the commission a reserve power to take an investigation into an alleged miscarriage of justice out of the hands of the police and give it to an independent investigator nominated by the commission in those cases—which, I anticipate, will be rare—in relation to which it appears that the police are not trying hard enough.

As the Bill stands, the commission will depend entirely on the police for the conduct of investigations. The investigation will be conducted by a police officer. That police officer will be appointed, not by the commission, but by the chief constable of the force in which the alleged miscarriage of justice has taken place. That chief constable can then appoint an officer from his own force or from another to conduct an investigation.

The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but, once appointed, the commission has no power to remove that officer. That can be done only by the chief constable who set up the inquiry in the first place. It is true that, under clause 18(6), the commission may veto an appointment made by a chief constable, and I welcome that, but it is not enough because, at the end of the day, the process of investigation will remain entirely in the hands of the police.

As Ministers have been at pains to emphasise, the commission will have the power to direct and supervise police inquiries. When I intervened on that matter in the Home Secretary's speech on Second Reading, he told me: there are no sensible limits on the power of the commission to direct and supervise the inquiries that are carried out on its behalf"—[Official Report, 6 March 1995; Vol. 256, c. 28.] but of course there are.

The inquiry must be carried out by a police officer; that is a limit. That police officer will be appointed, not by the commission, but by the chief constable of the force where the alleged miscarriage of justice has occurred; that is another limit. If that inquiry is not being carried out satisfactorily, the commission has no power to take the inquiry even to another police force. The commission can huff and puff as much as it likes, but ultimately it is a matter for the chief constable; that is a third limit. The commission does not have the power to authorise an inquiry by a person who is not a police officer; that is a fourth limit.

The powers of investigation that the Bill gives the commission appear to be modelled closely on those of the Police Complaints Authority. Ministers appear to think that the PCA is a success, whereas anyone who has had anything to do with it knows that it is a failure—through no fault on the part of many PCA officers, who are diligent. On occasion, however, they have been tearing their hair out with frustration at their inability to obtain adequate co-operation from the police.

For that and other reasons, the PCA has become so discredited that any sensible lawyer will advise a client with a complaint against the police to take a civil action rather than risk a trip to the PCA. The result has been a mushrooming of civil actions and out-of-court settlements, costing in total many millions of pounds. That surely cannot be a cause of satisfaction for Ministers.

It is an extraordinary state of affairs. Here we are, protesting our desire to put right the mistakes of the past, while building into the new system one of the central weaknesses of the old—the fact that, ultimately, investigations into alleged police malpractice will be carried out by police officers and by no one else.

We are confronted by a position in which, after a long series of scandals and years of deliberation, Ministers finally get round to creating what they say is an independent review body and it turns out to depend heavily on the one part of the criminal justice system that has let us down most badly—investigations of the police by the police.

How has that extraordinary state of affairs arisen? From where has come the pressure on Ministers that has caused them to build into their Bill that potential self-destruct mechanism? What mighty vested interest is bringing pressure to bear on them to take that road? Is it the lawyers? No; it is not. This is what the Bar Council has to say on the subject, in its briefing to members of the Standing Committee on the Bill:

The Bar Council is concerned that the commission is not presently given sufficient control over the appointment of an outside investigator, or over the course of the investigation. As presently drafted, the commission is unable to sack the investigator if they are unhappy with the course of the investigation, and are only empowered to veto the appointment. In cases where there have been allegations of police misconduct giving rise to an alleged miscarriage of justice, it is important that the commission's independence should not be compromised by an alleged lack of independence in the investigatory process. The Bar Council goes on to recommend that the commission should be empowered to appoint its own employees as investigating officers, which is what new clauses 1 and 2 seek to achieve. That is what the Bar has said; what about the solicitors? The Law Society, in a commentary on the Bill, said: police officers conducting investigations on behalf of the commission must be isolated from other areas of police work, owe their loyalty to the commission and be specialists in investigation". It continues: The society believes this could only be achieved by the commission employing its own investigators and/or with a dedicated group of police officers who are seconded to the commission for a reasonable period of time, who are employed by the commission during the period of their secondment … The committee's investigators should also include civilians. The Law Society is also in favour of new clauses 1 and 2. In fact, almost everyone who has had first-hand experience of dealing with alleged miscarriages of justice has emphasised the need for the commission not to be entirely dependent upon the police. I pressed that point when the Home Secretary was kind enough to receive me in his office as long ago as May last year. The organisation Justice, upon whose council distinguished lawyers of all political persuasions serve, stated: Justice would wish to press ministers on the arguments of principle and practice for the CCRC to have its own core investigating team". That view is also in line with new clauses 1 and 2. Justice goes on to say that the commission has fewer supervision duties than the Police Complaints Authority, on which it is apparently modelled. It says: The PCA must supervise police inquiries in certain circumstances … The commission is under no such duties … The investigating officer is under no duty to pass on the evidence accumulated during the inquiries, but only to prepare a report for submission to the commission and the chief constable. As Home Office Ministers will be aware, Cardinal Hume, together with Lords Jenkins of Hillhead, Rees and Scarman and the late Lord Devlin, has taken a close interest in the matter. In a letter to The Times of 6 March he complained that the Bill made the commission too dependent on the police. He continued:

It appears to provide no reserve power for the commission to instigate and carry out investigations using only its own suitably qualified staff and it appears to leave the commission with insufficient powers effectively to plan, direct and supervise police investigations carried out on its behalf". New clauses 1 and 2 are intended to provide a remedy to the fundamental defect identified by the Cardinal. The Association of Chief Police Officers has told me that it is satisfied with the Bill as it is currently drafted—although that is not the impression that one or two of its senior members have given me in private. The Police Federation says that it is also satisfied with the proposals in the Bill, although several senior officers from the federation have expressed a different view in private. Paradoxically, the Police Federation has expressed support for independent inquiries conducted by the Police Complaints Authority. So we have a situation where almost the only people willing to support investigations being carried out exclusively by the police are the police themselves.

In support of his case, the Home Secretary also cited the royal commission which concluded—one suspects with some reluctance—that there was no practical alternative to investigations being carried out by the police. I think that the royal commission was wrong about that. The history of investigations carried out by one group of police officers into the activities of another is so unsatisfactory as to outweigh any practical advantages of leaving the conduct of such inquiries exclusively to the police. Whatever view one takes of the royal commission's conclusion, nothing in its report says that the police should have the final say over which force is appointed and which officers are selected, nor does it say that the review body should not have the power to remove the inquiry from a police force that is seen not to be trying hard enough.

In short, nothing in the royal commission's report is inconsistent with what is proposed in new clauses 1 and 2. If new clause 1 were implemented, all investigations would still be carried out by the police, at least initially. The only difference would be that their minds would be concentrated by the knowledge that if they failed to inquire seriously, the inquiry could be taken away from them.

I have discussed the matter with Lord Runciman, who chaired the royal commission, and he has kindly authorised me to say this: Although the Royal Commission envisaged investigations being carried out by a designated police force under the direct supervision of the new review body, that body should not be precluded from recruiting onto its own staff trained investigators who would not necessarily be serving police officers. I am grateful to Lord Runciman for clarifying that important point and I hope that this afternoon we will not hear any more Ministers calling him in aid in support of their case.

While we are on the subject of the royal commission, there is nothing in its report to justify the provision in the Bill that the police and not the commission should have the final say as to which force and which officers should carry out the investigation. That was dreamed up entirely in the Home Office.

The Home Secretary has also justified his decision to leave investigations entirely in the hands of the police by pointing to the police inquiries which have led to the quashing of wrongful convictions. In the debate on Second Reading, he referred to the inquiries into the Guildford, Birmingham, Stefan Kiszko and Darvel brothers cases. I readily acknowledge that thorough and professional police investigations played an important role in each of those instances.

It is an unhappy fact, however, that for every honest and professional investigation conducted by the police into an alleged miscarriage of justice, I can point to several other police investigations that were anything but honest and professional.

To take the Birmingham case, the first investigation by an outside police force was commissioned within weeks of the original arrests in 1974. It was conducted by Mr. David Owen, then the assistant chief constable of Lincolnshire and until recently the chief constable of North Wales. The purpose of the inquiry was to discover who had been responsible for the injuries inflicted on the six men charged with the pub bombings during their first days in custody.

Had the inquiry been conducted honestly, the tragic events that followed might have been avoided. Mr. Owen, however, chose to conduct a dishonest inquiry. In the face of clear evidence to the contrary, he exonerated the police and pinned all the blame on police officers. The Owen inquiry is a classic example of what happens when one set of police officers investigates the activities of others.

In September 1986, following the publication of my book on the case, the Home Secretary ordered a second police inquiry into the Birmingham case. The officer they chose to conduct it was Mr. Tom Meffen, an assistant chief constable with the West Midlands police force, the force that had the most to lose should the truth ever emerge. Unsurprisingly, Mr. Meffen concluded that there was nothing to worry about.

In 1987, the Home Office ordered a third inquiry into the Birmingham case. It was conducted by the Devon and Cornwall police and headed by Superintendents Reay and Essery. It was clear from the outset—and I met the officers on several occasions—that they saw their role primarily as discrediting the new evidence that I and others had patiently collected, and that is what they did. As a result, another opportunity was lost.

Mr. David Ashby (Leicestershire, North-West)

Were not the Devon and Cornwall police at that time far too busy investigating "Operation Countryman", which resulted in no prosecutions whatsoever?

Mr. Mullin

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who also put his name to the new clause, but I have no knowledge of that matter. If he will forgive me, I will avoid a direct answer. If that force was involved in another major investigation, that might explain why its mind was not entirely on the ball. I do not think that it was too busy, but it was not interested in conducting a proper inquiry. I had the advantage of meeting the gentlemen involved and discussing the issues with them.

In 1987, another opportunity was lost to put matters right, when a large amount of money was wasted on a public inquiry that everyone concerned knew would lead nowhere. In 1990, following a prolonged public outcry, the Home Secretary ordered a fourth police inquiry into the Birmingham case. It was also conducted by Devon and Cornwall constabulary, but this time the chief constable himself, Mr. John Evans, took charge. It was a thorough and professional inquiry and led to the result that we all know. However, it was not the first inquiry but the fourth. If any of the previous inquiries had been conducted with the same rigour, the entire scandal might have been brought to an end many years earlier and a great deal of time, money and anguish saved.

4 pm

After the convictions were quashed, there was a fifth inquiry. Believe it or not, it was conducted by the West Midlands police. It was intended to discover who had carried out the bombing. The force appointed for that purpose was least qualified to arrive at a sensible conclusion. That inquiry lasted more than two years and involved more than 40 officers. I leave aside the question of whether it was wise to entrust that task to a police force which, to a man and even to this day, refuses to accept that the real culprits got away. I will say only that that inquiry also left a great deal to be desired.

Much time was wasted interviewing people who did not need to be interviewed. There was widespread suspicion that the inquiry's main purpose was to reconvict the persons whose convictions had been quashed. Later, there were selective leaks to the media that could have come only from officers serving on the inquiry. Their purpose appeared to be to rescue the four West Midlands officers then awaiting trial on charges of perverting the course of justice. In the end, that inquiry, like most of the others, led nowhere. I make no complaint because its task was the most difficult of all. It was never likely that sufficient evidence could be unearthed nearly 20 years after the event which would lead to the arrest of the real culprits.

The Home Secretary cites the role of the police in the Birmingham case as evidence for his contention that the police and only the police are capable of investigating alleged miscarriages of justice. With the exception of the 1990 inquiry, exactly the opposite has proved true. We do not have to look far for other examples of alleged miscarriages of justice where long and expensive police investigations led nowhere. The Carl Bridgewater case is now the subject of the eighth police investigation, and still amateurs are turning up evidence that previous police inquiries overlooked.

I regard that case as the litmus test of the new climate of straightforwardness that is alleged to be abroad in our criminal justice system. So far, the omens are not auspicious. All the usual people are behaving in the usual way. In the Home Office and in the police, there appears to be a steely determination not to face unpalatable truths. If ever there was a case for independent investigation of the sort permitted under new clause 1, it is the Carl Bridgewater case. I cite also the Brian Parsons case, which is of particular interest because the police force involved is Devon and Cornwall—the same force praised for its good practice elsewhere. By a happy coincidence Mr. Parsons' case will be the subject of a Channel 4 "Trial and Error" programme this evening. On Monday, the chief constable, Mr. Evans—for whom I have much respect, and with whom I had many dealings during the course of his inquiry into the Birmingham case—held, I regret to say, a foolish press conference at which he said intemperate things about everyone involved in trying to raise the Parsons case again. Moreover, in the course of the press conference he made it clear that he had not seen the film he was talking about. That was most unwise. Funnily enough, it is similar to what happened in the Birmingham case. The former chief constable of Birmingham, Geoffrey Dear, did the same thing—and in due course lived to regret what he had said. Mr. Evans, too, will live to regret some of his remarks on Monday.

In the Brian Parsons case substantial new evidence has been unearthed. As usual, the work has been done by journalists and a diligent solicitor. Faced with that, the Home Office asked Mr. Evans to set up an inquiry. Unsurprisingly, Mr. Evans appointed one of his own senior officers—from the very force that faces embarrassment should the conviction be quashed—to conduct the inquiry. Unsurprisingly again, the officer in question, Mr. Keith Portlock, has concluded that there are no grounds for reopening the case. Indeed, from the outset he made it clear to anyone who cared to listen that the inquiry was going nowhere. His primary objective seems to have been avoiding the intervention of an outside police force.

I say this to Mr. Portlock and to anyone else who may be interested: the Brian Parsons case is not going to die down. I and others are taking a close interest in how it is being handled. It is a classic example of the folly of allowing the police to investigate their own alleged misconduct. I hope that it will be resolved before the independent review body is established, but if it is still unresolved by that time, it is an early candidate for independent investigation of the sort proposed in new clauses 1 and 2.

Ministers have given cost as one reason why investigations must be kept in the hands of the police. The truth is that what they propose is by far the most expensive option. Millions of pounds have been wasted on bogus police inquiries, and even those that have been properly conducted have tended to be very expensive. They are often regarded by the officers involved as an excuse for unlimited overtime. A great deal of time is spent investigating matters that do not need to be investigated.

So a desire to keep costs down cannot possibly be one of the reasons for keeping inquiries exclusively with the police. As the Home Secretary will be aware, the police themselves are worried about the enormous costs of these investigations. Indeed, I believe that a delegation from the Association of Chief Police Officers will be coming to discuss the matter at the Home Office shortly. Given that concern, I am mystified to know why the Home Secretary should choose the most expensive, least efficient and least credible system for investigating alleged miscarriages of justice.

There is actually a precedent for an independent inquiry into allegations of corruption. In 1973 in Hong Kong, ruled of course by Britain, there were big scandals in the Hong Kong police force. They led to a series of inquiries that got nowhere. In the end an inquiry was set up under Sir Alistair Blair-Kerr. Following his report, on 17 October 1973, the Governor of Hong Kong set up a special force to investigate alleged corruption. He said at the time: I believe that it is quite wrong … that the police, as a force, should carry the whole responsibility for action in this difficult and elusive field. As with the case that I have described, he added: A further and conclusive argument is that public confidence is very much involved. Clearly the public would have more confidence in a unit that was entirely independent, and separate from any department of the Government, including the police. So let no one say that this has never been done before. It was done in Hong Kong, no doubt sanctioned by the British Government of the day—a Tory Government.

Finally, it is in the interests of everyone who cares about justice—not least the police—that the proposed criminal cases review commission be successful. As it stands, there is a serious danger that the body will not be credible and that, in due course, there will be a further series of scandals. New clauses 1 and 2 will go some way towards remedying the principal defects of this Bill, and I commend them to the House.

Mr. Ashby

It gives me great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) who, in many ways, could be said to be the author of the Bill. His investigations, his tenacity and his belief in justice and the truth have uncovered some of our country's worst scandals, certainly in my time, and he has so often been proved to be right.

I readily admit that, when the hon. Gentleman first raised issues such as the cases of the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six—I hope that I have always got the numbers right—many of us were highly sceptical. We knew about the inquiries that were held and of their results, and felt that the police must, of course, be right, and that therefore the hon. Gentleman must be wrong.

We heard anecdotal evidence from former Home Secretaries, one of them a Labour Home Secretary. That confirmed my view, because I thought that he must know and be right, and that the hon. Gentleman must be wrong in respect of at least one case. It has been proved time and again that the previous Home Secretary was wrong and the hon. Gentleman right.

We must therefore be very careful about this Bill and carefully consider what the hon. Gentleman has to say about it. He gives vent to a feeling that there are imperfections. We know there are, but there is a tremendous feeling that we should not accept that, but should say that everything is perfect when we know that it is not. We need only consider the cases of the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four to realise the imperfections that there were and are in the police force.

We complain a great deal about the Court of Appeal in those cases, but we must realise that the Court of Appeal is tainted with the same background as I had, and everyone else: the investigations kept saying wrong, wrong, wrong—and wrong the hon. Gentleman was not.

I have said that the hon. Member for Sunderland, South would make an ideal chairman of the proposed body if we wished to ensure absolutely that we had a completely independent body. I do not resile from that at all. The hon. Gentleman may sit down the aisle on the Opposition Benches but he is a very original, honest and honourable thinker on the subject, and I pay tribute to him.

I was pulling the hon. Gentleman's leg a bit when I spoke about Operation Countryman, but the hon. Gentleman was absolutely right to raise the question of the Police Complaints Authority, because a most exceptional amount of corruption was involved. The Devon and Cornwall police force investigated. I am pretty certain that Operation Countryman, despite the enormous number of allegations, which were undoubtedly true bills, never got as far as a trial. I am not even sure whether it got as far as bringing charges. That was an example of one police force investigating another.

From my early days at the Bar, I well remember the investigation of what was called the porn squad, and I have never forgotten the impact that that trial at the Old Bailey had on me. We learned of the chief inspector who had joined the porn squad and was sitting at his desk when someone came up to him and said, "Here's your money." He asked what it was, and was told that it was his cut. He did not know what to do, and refused the money, but he was told that it was too late and the money was put in his drawer. In no time at all, his drawer was absolutely stuffed with money. He went on the tube and got rid of it by throwing it out on to the line as the train went along. I remember that man so well, because he burst into tears and cried almost throughout the trial while he was giving evidence. I could only describe him as a man who was raped—his soul was raped. The case was a good lesson for me. He was, nevertheless, tainted. There was virtually no police officer in London of any seniority who had not served in the porn squad, and the problem probably went to the very top of the Metropolitan police.

4.15 pm

Those of us at the criminal Bar at the time were uncomfortably aware that no one who had served in the porn squad could possibly have been untainted. Although what I am talking about happened 20 years ago, some of the officers may still be in the force. I am sure that they regret what happened. We had to bring in people from outside London to aid the police.

Can hon. Members imagine what would have happened had the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ordered a deputy commissioner to investigate the allegations about the porn squad? Unfortunately, one of the deputy commissioners at the time, and possibly both, had served in the squad. They knew everyone, from the top of the force to the bottom.

Another pet subject of the hon. Member for Sunderland, South is the masons. I do not know how many hon. Members are masons now, but the hon. Gentleman is right to say that we should investigate freemasonry in the police force. In any event, it is the same tainting that should worry us.

The new commission is supposed to make things whiter than white and transparent, and ensure, as far as possible, that there are no more miscarriages of justice. I shall use the example of the porn squad case, and those who have been at the Bar will know what I am talking about when I say that, as they would if I referred to the West Midlands case or the Countryman case. In such circumstances, the one thing that we should want is to feel happy about the person in charge. We should not be at all happy if anyone connected with the police in any way were in charge of the investigation.

Such a person might direct police officers to do certain things, but should not be involved in getting the investigation under way. Perhaps we should look for someone like a district attorney, a lawyer, someone who was independent with an investigative mind and who could perhaps direct the police about what he wanted investigated, but who was not under the full and final control of the police force.

New clause 1 highlights a weakness in the Bill. We have waited a long time for the Bill, not because of politicians but because of the Home Office itself. Getting the Home Office to give up any of its powers is one of the most difficult things to do. It is being asked to give up a little power, and does not want to relinquish any more. I dread to think what will be said about new clause 6, which says that the Commission may refer a matter to the Secretary of State for his consideration of whether to recommend the exercise of Her Majesty's prerogative of mercy. The Home Office is having to give up some but not all of its powers. It will retain what makes it feel safe and comfortable. I am not so sure that we should feel so safe and comfortable.

All right, let us throw out new clause 1. Let us go against it. The hon. Member for Sunderland, South has been proved right in the past, and I predict that, in seven, eight, perhaps nine, years' time—it will not be immediate, because these things do not happen immediately—someone will table an amendment to the Criminal Appeal Act. It will be amendment No. 1 or new clause 1, and everybody will say, "Absolutely right." It will go through on the nod, because something will have happened—perhaps a miscarriage of justice—and we will have realised that we were wrong. I predict that that will happen.

It is with reluctance that we have the Criminal Appeal Bill. I agree with the analysis of the Bill given by the hon. Member for Sunderland, South, who said that it is a Government Bill that the Opposition want more than the Government. It has that amusing aspect to it. I think that we see a reluctance, and a refusal to accept new clause 1 is part of that.

I make no bones about it. I have told the hon. Gentleman that I shall not vote against the Government on new clause 1. I have told him that I am prepared to put my name to the new clause, to push it and to let my views be known, but, as I have said right from the beginning, I am not prepared to vote against the Government, and I will not, despite my speech. People may say that I am giving in, but I am not.

I ask my hon. Friends on the Front Bench to consider the points that have been made and that will be made. We are not asking for a great deal here. It will be rare, but there will be times when we will want to appoint a district attorney-type person to oversee an investigation. Public opinion will demand it.

There has to be provision somewhere. It does not mean that the police will be excluded, but they will be under the direction of someone else, who will be telling them what they should look for, how they should look for it and what they should produce. That is what we need. It is the ultimate safeguard. When we have that, we shall be able to say that the Bill is satisfactory.

It has taken a long time to get this Bill and to reach the stage that we are at now. I ask my hon. Friends please to think again on this one.

Mr. A. J. Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I support new clause 1. I shall also speak to amendment No. 27, which has been tabled by the Liberal Democrats and deals with a situation in which officers are asked to investigate matters that were originally investigated by officers of the same force. That was one of the points raised by the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin).

New clause 1 is a moderate new clause. Critics of the hon. Member for Sunderland, South might be surprised that it is so moderate, as they would regard him as almost extreme in these matters, but it is a perfectly sensible power, enabling the commission, where it thinks it appropriate, to appoint an investigating officer, on its terms, within its discretion. It addresses an extraordinary weakness in the Bill—that the commission does not have the staff or capacity to mount its own investigations, even in the rarest of cases. It is difficult to understand why the Government should have circumscribed the commission to such an extent.

I have been persuaded all along of the royal commission's argument that the greatest repositories of people able to carry out investigations are the police forces, and that therefore the large majority of investigations would be most appropriately carried out by police forces who not only have the skilled manpower to do it, but could be organised in structures and with support staff, which makes it practicable to mount an investigation, without enormous upheaval. That will be necessary and appropriate for a great many investigations.

I have argued that it might be desirable for the commission to second police officers or to have retired police officers working for it, carrying out further or supervisory functions, but in general I have accepted that police officers are best able to carry out such investigations.

But situations will arise when the commission might consider it appropriate to use its own staff to carry out an investigation, and will be precluded from so doing by the way in which the Bill is cast. I cannot understand why the supervisory responsibilities assigned to the commission are so limited and circumscribed, particularly when the analogy is made with the Police Complaints Authority.

I am not such a stringent critic of the Police Complaints Authority as the hon. Member for Sunderland, South. It does much excellent work. It does not satisfy everyone all the time, and the possibility of successful legal action as an alternative to it was raised by the hon. Gentleman. But the lay members of the Police Complaints Authority carry out supervisory responsibilities over investigations in a way that the Bill does not envisage happening for the investigations that will take place on criminal appeals.

One wonders why the commission should be told almost from the start to keep its distance from an investigation and have such limited powers of supervision.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. David Maclean)

I do not understand the right hon. Gentleman's point about the limited powers of supervision. Clause 19(1) states: A person appointed as the investigating officer in relation to a case shall undertake such inquiries as the Commission may from time to time reasonably direct". There, and in other parts of the Bill such as clause 19(4), the commission is clearly in the driving seat, with full powers to control an investigation.

Mr. Beith

That may well rest on the interpretation of those and other parts of the Bill. I understood clause 19(1) to relate to the overall subject of inquiry, rather than to particular lines of inquiry within the whole. If my interpretation is too restrictive, I shall be pleased to hear it. I hope that the Minister's definition this afternoon will be read by the courts now that they have taken to reading Hansard in the way that they did not use to do.

Mr. Mullin

It is true that the commission has powers and will certainly be consulted, but at the end of the day is it not a fact that the chief constable of the force where the offence or the alleged irregularities occurred will have the final say in who is appointed and how the investigation is conducted? That is the central problem.

Mr. Beith

Exactly so. It is that to which I want to turn.

I should have preferred to see a presumption in the Bill against the force which carried out the original investigations being the force responsible for carrying out the inquiries that the commission directs. It ought surely to be a presumption that, if there is any reason to believe that the original investigations were seriously defective—if they were seriously defective, it has to be a possibility that there was some malfeasance in the conduct of the original investigation—another force or officers from another force should carry out the inquiry. That presumption is not found in the Bill.

Therefore, I tabled amendment No. 27, which says that the matter should be investigated by a particular force only if the Commission is satisfied that the matters to be investigated do not involve matters originally investigated by officers still serving in that force". That is reasonably narrowly drawn, but it addresses the likelihood that, in a number of cases, forces will be directed to carry out an inquiry which will then be carried out by officers who, even if they do not include some of those who were involved in the first investigation, are closely associated with them, work closely with them and will continue to work closely with them when the investigation is over, and who will not wish to believe that their trusted colleagues, known to them over so many years, with whom they may have worked on many cases and upon whose previous good work they may have depended for their own safety and the success of other inquiries, could have made fundamental mistakes—or, still worse, have acted improperly—in the conduct of the original inquiry.

Even if none of that were the case, members of the public are likely to believe that it is. Therefore, there should be a presumption that, in such circumstances, that risk is avoided as far as possible by going to another force. We should not simply rely on an ad hoc decision being taken to do so, because there is overwhelming pressure and public dissatisfaction with the possibility that the same force will be involved. I do not see why that presumption could not have been built into the Bill. Like the hon. Member for Sunderland, South, I wonder why, and in what recesses of the Home Office, pressure has been exerted to circumscribe the Bill in that way.

To a significant extent, the Bill is about maintaining and improving public confidence in the police, particularly in the ability to undertake investigations where the police may have made fundamental mistakes, or where police misconduct may have taken place. Therefore, why circumscribe the processes in such a way that that confidence will not be as strong as it could possibly be?

Some people would say that bringing in officers from another force is not a sufficient protection. They may regard the police as a seamless robe of men and women, bound together by the same calling, work, activity, and a certain amount of movement between police forces, particularly at more senior levels. Some evidence exists of that insufficient protection in some of the cases that we have discussed. In others, however, good, vigorous inquiries have taken place where other forces have come in.

4.30 pm

In areas apart from criminal appeals, it is a common feature of police life for investigations to be carried out by officers from another force. I hope that the Home Office clearly understands, and that officers are left in no doubt, that all the people involved in the management of the police expect people who undertake investigations into other forces to maintain the highest standards. Through their work, a number of officers have justified that degree of confidence. It would be rare, therefore, for it to be necessary to use the direct staff of the commission, or a body separately appointed by it, to undertake investigations, but that possibility should be available.

It may be somewhat more common for people to believe that investigations should be carried out by officers who are not from the force that is the subject of complaint in the appeal, and that a presumption should exist in favour of those officers conducting the investigation if that force and its officers are still around.

I do not understand why the Government, having taken the decision to introduce the Bill, and having taken on this major issue, should now balk at its smaller but significant features, which are important to public confidence. If we are to make a success of the Bill, we should ensure that it can attract maximum public confidence. The absence of a presumption in favour of an independent inquiry by officers from another force, and the absence of a clear route to a wholly separate and independent inquiry, where that is necessary, seem a great weakness.

Mr. John Hutton (Barrow and Furness)

I missed the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin), and I apologise to him and the House for that, but I understand that he rightly expressed the view that this is a rare example of a Government Bill that has more support from the Opposition than from Conservative Members. The consequences of that state of affairs are fairly clear in key aspects of the Bill. One of the most important is that the Bill's provisions dealing with the conduct of inquiries and investigations are characterised by a spirit of half-heartedness.

The Minister has made a number of interventions. He has tried to argue the case, as he did in Standing Committee, that the Bill as now drafted is adequate and gives the commission sufficient flexibility to conduct relevant inquiries. A close investigation of the Bill, however, particularly clauses 18 and 19, around which the group of amendments and new clauses have been constructed, reveals a different picture.

Those new clauses and amendments are designed not to restrict the commission's freedom or flexibility to operate, but to improve them. The commission will need them if it is to discharge its principal function: to boost confidence in the criminal justice system, which has been haemorrhaging in the past few years, following the appalling miscarriages of justice in the 1970s in relation to alleged IRA terrorists.

The amendments are designed not to undermine the commission's work, but to improve it. The hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby), who has now left the Chamber, has said that it is immensely important that, on this occasion, when we have an opportunity to discuss these matters, we get the commission right. I concur entirely. The hon. Gentleman is right. There will be future occasions when hon. Members will come back to the House with amendments to the Bill, when it is an Act, because it is clearly deficient.

In general terms, the amendments and new clauses raise two fundamental issues of importance which go to the heart of the Bill. First, they are designed to increase public confidence in the commission's work; secondly, they are an attempt to ensure proper independence and objectivity in the inquiries that will be carried out by investigating officers on behalf of the commission. Clauses 18 and 19, as now drafted, may not be helpful in respect of either of these two important matters.

We need to try to do two things at this stage. We need to strengthen the powers of the commission over the appointment and work of investigating officers. New clause 1 and new clause 2 would achieve that in an important respect. I am not sure that Government amendment No. 34 adds anything of substance to clause 19(4); this is an important point. All that amendment No. 34 appears to do is to drop the reference to "the public interest" which is contained in clause 19(4), and to substitute a rather vague and unspecific form of words.

The Minister commented on clause 19(1) when the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) was speaking. The point was raised in Committee that the wording of clause 19(1), far from giving the commission the flexibility that the Minister implied, was likely to invite problems between the commission and the investigating officers in the conduct of some of these important inquiries.

The point needs to be made again on this occasion that the wording of clause 19(4), especially the use of the word "reasonably" in line 6, is almost an invitation for investigating officers and the commission to have arguments about the correct line that a particular inquiry should take. It invites investigating officers, and perhaps chief constables of police, to take the view that the commission is not acting reasonably in giving instructions to an investigating officer. Under clause 19(1), the commission has to be acting "reasonably" in giving instructions to investigating officers.

On a general level, we are entitled to assume that the commission will always act reasonably, so including that word in the Bill may be superfluous. We assume that the commission, by its nature, will always act reasonably, especially given that the Prime Minister will have the ultimate say over who will be appointed to it. Clause 19(1), as the Minister presented it in his intervention, does not address the issues to which the new clauses and amendments relate. The Bill as drafted is not helpful in securing the two important tasks that I have identified.

We need to eliminate any suggestion of conflicts of interest arising between investigating officers and their own police forces. There is the potential—I do not put it higher than that—in the Bill for conflicts of interest to arise between the responsibility of investigating officers to investigate alleged miscarriages of justice and their natural and perfectly understandable loyalty and sympathy for colleagues in their own constabulary. We expect that loyalty in the police force, and, in most cases, it is entirely appropriate. It is not, however, appropriate in these circumstances, and not when these issues are being investigated.

We should think carefully about whether, in some cases, we may put investigating officers into completely impossible situations. If we do so, we shall undermine not only public confidence in the police and the work of our police forces, which is important to maintain, but the credibility that the investigations should have.

We should follow the advice that my hon. Friends and the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed have given to the House today, and always assume that it is not appropriate for police officers to conduct investigations on behalf of the commission when their fellow officers from the same force may have been involved in alleged miscarriages of justice. I do not think that that is helpful. I cannot understand why that appears to be the normal course governing the appointment of investigating officers. The Bill seems to imply that.

One of the first suggestions in the Bill is that it will be appropriate for the chief constable of the original investigating force to appoint one of his fellow officers to carry out the investigations. In fact, that should be the last possible suggestion on which the commission should be acting. It is much more important that we give the commission a power—a general power in some cases as outlined by the new clauses—to appoint its own investigating officers. If that is not appropriate, it should appoint a police officer from another force, which is not connected with the original inquiry, to conduct inquiries on its behalf. That seems to be a much more logical sequence of events than the prescription in the Bill.

I do not want to over-emphasise the point and ham it up, but it is fundamental. We do not need over-exaggeration to make any of these arguments because the strength of them is very clear. We want to avoid any suggestion of a cover-up, which would be fundamentally unhealthy for the whole nature of our criminal justice system. We want to exclude the possibility of anyone, whether it is the alleged victim of the miscarriage of justice or anyone else, alleging that an entire inquiry had been the subject of a cover-up.

Unfortunately, the Bill will allow such arguments and allegations to continue to be put. The whole point of the Bill is to get away from that and to construct a state of affairs which will make it impossible for such suggestions to be made. Of course there will always be an opportunity for people to put such arguments—that is the nature of the beast—but we need to limit the possibilities. The new clauses address that issue and I am thinking especially of amendment No. 27, to which the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed referred.

It has often been said, and it was said throughout the proceedings in Committee, how important it is that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. That is one of the standard political cliches of our time, but it is extremely relevant to the Bill because it is the Bill's target. Frankly, justice has not been seen to be done in far too many cases, with consequences that we have all noted. Now we have an opportunity to address that target and to get it right.

I hope that the Minister will advise his hon. Friends, very much in the light of the views expressed by his hon. Friend the Member for Leicestershire, North-West, to think again about this issue and indicate that he is prepared at some later stage to concede the arguments that have been made.

Mr. David Trimble (Upper Bann)

New clause 1 is very seductive and it has been generally presented this afternoon in terms of studied moderation. The clause merely gives the commission discretion to depart from the procedures in clauses 18 and 19 if it considers it appropriate and to appoint its own investigating officer. A proposal to widen the discretion of the commission is attractive. The new clause is a far cry from the proposals and arguments which were put forward on Second Reading. Then, the argument pressed very strongly was that the commission must have its own investigating forces, must use only those and must not go through the police, which I did not find at all attractive.

Mr. Mullin

I must say that I do not remember anybody arguing that we should not go through the police. It has always been understood by those of us who take the view set out in the new clause that most investigations will continue to be carried out by police officers. All we are talking about, and all we have ever talked about, is a reserve power. It is quite true that we have also talked about the commission having its own team of dedicated investigators, but they would be only a very small part of the operation. Indeed, Lord Runciman, as I quoted in my speech, said that he would support that.

Mr. Trimble

None the less, I feel that there is a significant difference between the tone in which the argument is being presented today and the tone in which it was presented on Second Reading. The hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) must take care not to push me back into the position that I adopted on Second Reading, when I am moving somewhat in his direction.

Mr. Mullin

I shall keep quiet. Thank you.

4.45 pm

Mr. Trimble

The proposal is attractive in that it enables the commission to have its own investigating officers if it so wishes. The argument has also been presented in terms of public confidence, public perception and so on, and one can readily identify with that.

However, as was said on Second Reading and in Committee—so I repeat it fairly briefly now—it is not right to use the commission's own investigating forces as a matter of course or, indeed, in any other than the most exceptional circumstances. I feel that there is a real danger, in that if the commission has its own investigating officers they will operate, and be seen by police officers and police forces, as a form of anti-police police force, and that will create and reinforce a set of new institutional loyalties and jealousies.

The hon. Member for Sunderland, South referred to past cases in which investigation was not carried out by the police as thoroughly as it might have been. There is some suspicion that the police officers investigating those matters were more concerned to vindicate the original investigation and to cover up for it than to inquire further. I well understand those worries. As the hon. Gentleman knows, we have had similar experience in Northern Ireland, when an investigation has, as far as we can see, been motivated more by a desire for damage limitation and to try to rescue the original miscarriage of justice from the point of view of the police, than by the interest of serving justice.

That has happened in the past, and the danger exists that it could happen in the future. A police force could cover up even more effectively where the commission had its own investigating officer, who would be a complete outsider to police forces in general, whatever his background might originally have been. I suspect that it would be easy, or at least possible, for police forces to conceal things from an outside investigating officer.

I do not argue entirely against new clause 1, because it adds a discretion and it may be a good thing that such discretion should exist, but it would not be appropriate to use the provision except in the most exceptional cases. It is essential that, not only in the normal run of cases but in as many cases as possible, investigations are carried out by police officers.

The whole object of the exercise must be not to reinforce the bad aspects of police culture that have been described and properly criticised in the debate. We must take care not to reinforce the negative feelings that some police officers have that lead them to think that they must defend the actions of other police officers in all cases and cover up their wrongdoing.

Instead, we must lay down and follow procedures that will change the culture within police forces so that the feeling of defensiveness is diminished and replaced by an overriding desire to ensure that justice is done, even if that means uncovering circumstances in which other police officers have behaved improperly. That is what we want to happen, and that is what I hope will happen.

Much will depend on the commission and the way in which it operates. The new clause, like so many of the other provisions, simply gives it discretion and powers. The crucial factor will be the way in which the commission operates. The view that I expressed on Second Reading remains my main view on the matter. As the Minister said on Second Reading, the important requirement is that the commission must be in a position to control, to direct and to supervise. It is crucial that the powers to control, direct and supervise the details of particular cases exist, and that they are used effectively.

I welcome Government amendments Nos. 34, 35 and 36. The Minister will realise that I particularly welcome amendment No. 35, which reflects an amendment that I tabled in Committee. It plugs a small gap in the Bill. I am delighted that those powers of control and supervision are being strengthened, but the crucial thing is how the commission operates them.

I am sure that there will be those in the House, in the Home Affairs Select Committee and elsewhere, who will watch closely how the commission exercises its powers. I am sure that the matter will come back here again if there is a feeling that the commission is not exercising its powers according to the spirit of the Bill and the spirit of the speeches that we have heard here today. It will also come back if we do not achieve a change in the culture of not only the police force but other people involved in the criminal justice system, who tend sometimes not to be sufficiently open-minded and alert to the possibility of a mistake.

I am not sure what advice I shall give to my colleagues if new clause 1 is pressed to a vote. My speech on it has leaned to both sides. I do not object to providing extra powers to the commission if it is simply a matter of extra discretion, but I should hate to see the provision in new clause 1 regarded as the normal course. The normal course ought to be the procedures laid down in clauses 18 and 19. Our concentration should be on ensuring that that procedure is effective, works in the way that is intended, does not work in the way that some hon. Members fear and does not lead to the sort of cover-up that some hon. Members fear.

Mr. Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills)

I agree with much of what my hon. Friend the Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) has had to say on new clause 1, but he left us hanging in the air. The House must share a concern that the police should not for ever be perceived as the villains in the case. I do not hold that view and I believe that the vast majority of hon. Members do not either. There has been concern over a number of years about one or two important incidents, but that is nothing out of the ordinary for great enterprises such as our police.

My hon. Friend the Member for Upper Bann rightly said that the integrity of the police and our regard for the criminal justice system is at the very heart of our democratic process and our trust and belief in our community. He accepts that there is no reason, so long as it is not seen as an anti-police measure, why the commission should not appoint an officer who may assist, if necessary, to provide the other thing that we seek here—public confidence.

The concern of the commission is that the police force is diffident about the way in which it approaches the matter. I am genuinely puzzled, as my hon. Friend is. It is a question that I ask my own Front-Bench colleagues, now that I am allowed to call them that again. They are often too hung-up on the concept of self-regulation. We saw that right through the 1980s. You may think that "self-regulation" is inappropriate in terms of a commission and the police, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but I use it in the sense of inquiry by a body into itself.

In recent months, I have seen how diffident right hon. and hon. Members are about looking into the affairs of one another. I understand that. If I am sitting next to a colleague whom I respect, enjoy being with and have sympathy for, I am perhaps much more diffident about coming to an appropriate conclusion. The House will know that I am a member of Lloyd's. I do not want to talk about criminal organisations and fraud within the context of the new clause. I am sure that the Opposition will dispose of those important matters when they ascend to office, as their plans suggest, under the new guise of new Labour, but there we are.

Why is there an objection to placing in the hands of the commission a discretion to appoint an investigating officer, if necessary? That is all that it is about. What is the philosophical bar to that? It seems to me that the gains to be achieved are profound. If we were starting from scratch, if we had no history in these matters and we were setting up a commission, would we deny it that power? I rather suspect that we would not. Therefore, to put the burden back on institutions and say that institutions such as Lloyd's and the House of Commons should regulate themselves gives rise to understandable diffidence.

To allay any scintilla of public anxiety about that, the Government should accept the new clause—I see no reason why they should not. After all, it is reasonably drawn. It does not mandate the commission to appoint an outside investigating officer but states clearly that The Commission may … or … may require". It uses the conditional tense and does not place an insistent mandate on the commission. The admirable members of the commission whom the Home Office is to appoint will bear in mind their responsibilities solemnly in this matter because they will want to achieve results that give public confidence to our criminal justice system. In that regard, I support the new clause. Incidentally, I also welcome Government amendments Nos. 34, 35 and 36.

I simply argue, as the new clause does, for the reaffirmation of our belief in our procedures. This is not an anti-police measure. It strengthens the Bill and the Government should consider the possibility of acceding to the new clause, if not here then in the House of Lords.

Mr. Jack Straw (Blackburn)

We have just heard six speeches in favour of the new clause from hon. Members representing four of the country's political parties, one of which is the governing Conservative party. All six speeches have been in favour of the new clause; not one has been against it. Given the substantial consensus in favour of the Bill as a whole, I hope that the Minister will think carefully about his reaction to the proposal and, even at this stage, will not advise his hon. Friends to vote against the new clause.

Hon. Members on both sides of the House believe that the successful launch of the criminal cases review commission depends partly on the power proposed in the new clause. I intend to use the next few minutes to try to persuade the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) to cast his vote with us in the event of a Division. He has stressed that how the commission operates is crucial. It is also crucial that we get the commission's operating arrangements right first time; otherwise, the commission's experience will be as unhappy as that of the Police Complaints Authority.

Like every other hon. Member, I do not for one moment doubt the integrity and assiduity of members of the Police Complaints Authority and those who serve under it. It is a fact of life, however, that the authority and its arrangements have always lagged behind public opinion. They have never quite overcome the suspicion that they are merely part of a self-regulation operation in which, ultimately, the police investigate themselves. They lack public credibility and, as a result, are much less efficient and far more costly than would otherwise be the case because people will not take no for an answer.

I make that point because I know that the Minister of State is concerned about that aspect of the matter. The arrangements are costly in direct terms. They add to the cost of investigations because all those with experience of the Police Complaints Authority may end up sending cases back. In addition, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) said, there is a huge cost to public funds. Public confidence in Police Complaints Authority arrangements is now so lacking that people bypass them altogether and sue the police in the civil courts. On Second Reading, I gave the figures for the phenomenal increase in the number of civil actions now taken against only a single police authority—the Metropolitan police. Credibility is therefore central to whether the new commission operates effectively and with full public credibility.

The hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) spoke with great eloquence about his experience, 20 years ago, as a member of the criminal Bar in London. I also worked—briefly—at the criminal Bar at the same time. It was a time when public perception about the police was changing. For years before then the police had known that whatever evidence they gave, however much they "verballed up" the defendant or roughed him up in the cells, the chances were that they would be believed in the witness box and the defendant would not. One had to put up with the fact that the people whom one represented, who frequently complained about being verballed up or duffed up, were likely to receive longer sentences if they made such allegations, however justified, when in the witness box.

5 pm

Then there was the historic investigation by The Times into corruption in the Metropolitan police. There was the great determination of Sir Robert Mark, then Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, to try to discover what was going on in the Metropolitan police. Bit by bit, it emerged that, far from the Metropolitan police being an unblemished police force, as was the myth, there was endemic corruption in the criminal investigation department of the Metropolitan police, which was a cancer in that police force. Many people in that authority knew about it, including people at the top of the Metropolitan police, but no one did anything about it. If anyone said anything about it, they were accused of being anti-police; how dare people suggest that the police in London and elsewhere might be corrupt? We now know, more or less, the truth about that period. That culture developed inside the Metropolitan police, as it did in some other police forces, not because those people were any more venal than people are today, but because there were insufficient arrangements for supervising the enormous power that those police officers had. No one was there to check on them.

Gradually, the system of the Police Complaints Authority grew up. As I have said, however, it lagged behind public opinion and the needs of justice. As a consequence of the very few—let us be sure about that—but none the less appalling cases of malpractice by the police, a head of steam built up for a wholly independent organisation to investigate miscarriages of justice.

The old justification for police corruption—for verballing up the type of petty criminal whom I used to represent in the magistrates courts and the Crown courts—was the idea of "noble cause" corruption, on which the current Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Sir Paul Condon, recently reflected. The police would say, "Your client is guilty of something. He is a well-known crook. He may not be guilty of the specific crime with which he is charged, but he is guilty of a series of crimes." That was the justification.

On the whole, the police did not pick up innocent people in the street; they picked up people whom they knew, whom they had crossed in some way or other. It was their way of maintaining a semblance of law and order. Occasionally, however, the power to fix the evidence went to their heads and, as a result of enormous pressure from outside, wholly innocent people ended up being convicted of serious crimes—principally as a result of the lack of supervision of police investigations at the police stations.

I suspect that the Minister of State is about to parrot a brief explaining why a case which has been strongly made on both sides of the House should not be conceded. For a great many years, even after some of those miscarriages of justice were brought to light, the response of successive Home Office Ministers to proposals for an independent commission was that it was not needed. We were told that the existing arrangements were entirely satisfactory. That was the response to proposals in the 1960s for such a commission and again to the carefully worked out proposals of Liberty and the all-party Home Affairs Select Committee in the 1980s.

Finally, that intellectual, political and, I guess, emotional log jam has been broken and the Royal Commission on criminal justice has recommended the establishment of a criminal cases review commission. Nevertheless, despite all the evidence of police corruption and miscarriages of justice and the palpable evidence of the way in which those serious blemishes have greatly damaged the reputation of the police in the eyes of the law-abiding public, Ministers continue to resist the proposition that the commission's investigations should be conducted wholly independently of the police in circumstances where the commission deems it appropriate.

I find that especially odd in the light of the opinions expressed by the police themselves when they responded to the consultative document in May 1994. All the police officers whom I meet these days, from the senior ranks to the most junior, are even more worried than Members of the House about the reputation of the police. They resent and detest their inheritance. Senior and junior officers in the Metropolitan police clearly hate the fact that 20 or 30 years ago many senior officers connived at corruption and, as the hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) said, systematically led innocent officers down the path of corruption. Many senior officers with whom I speak say that of course they recognise the overwhelming need to ensure that justice is seen to be done in terms of the criminal cases review commission and I should be astonished if that opinion had not also been expressed to the Minister of State.

Inevitably, the Association of Chief Police Officers is in a difficult position. It is bound to have to co-operate with any Government of the day and it does not want to become involved in any partisan argument. Nevertheless, I will detain hon. Members on both sides of the House and the Minister for a moment to quote what ACPO said in its detailed letter of 9 May 1994 to Mr. Potts of C3 division in response to the discussion paper. Commenting on paragraphs 54 to 65, on the subject of investigations, the writer—I cannot read the signature, so I cannot say who it was, but I am happy to pass a copy of the letter to the Minister—said: I have already laid out, in my letter of 4th March 1994, my considerable concerns about the resources involved in this aspect of the proposed arrangements. I have also expressed my concern about the way in which the options for investigation are laid out in the consultation paper: without costings and with a clear bias in favour of the Police Complaints Authority model. In their responses to me, Forces have raised a number of points in relation to this section of the paper. In summary these were:— The process of investigation will inevitably call for substantial skills from the Investigation Teams. If the new commission were to follow the PCA model then in selecting and approving the Senior Investigator and team the commission would be bound to be seeking officers with both experience and training. Such Officers are also, inevitably, difficult to replace within force. The effect can be substantial in both small and large forces … With the small number of large forces, there is an inevitable tendency for them all to be undertaking one or more enquiry at a time. This is a very important argument indeed:

This may also mean, as has recently been the case with West Midlands and West Yorkshire, that they are, simultaneously, investigating each other. However well the enquiry is carried out, this is not, I suggest, likely to enhance the credibility of the result. The Minister is asking the House to accept that even in the most serious and controversial cases one can end up with a position whereby West Midlands is investigating West Yorkshire and West Yorkshire is investigating West Midlands.

Mr. Maclean

rose—

Mr. Straw

Does the Minister—I will, of course, answer what he has to say—believe that that will be a satisfactory outcome? ACPO certainly does not.

Mr. Maclean

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that that is up to the commission? In clause 18(4)(b), the commission has the power to impose a requirement to appoint a person serving in such other police force as the chief officer thinks fit and the powers that we have given there to the commission are such that the commission could control which force investigates which other force. If the commission wished to have that reciprocal investigation, it could do so, but if it would be as unacceptable as the hon. Gentleman suggests the commission would have the power to do otherwise.

Mr. Straw

The letter makes the point elsewhere that in many cases the commission may not have the option of choosing an alternative force. Under the current arrangements, the West Midlands police force may investigate the West Yorkshire force and vice versa because only the larger forces have the resources available to conduct larger investigations. An option that is not available to the commission under the Minister's scheme, but which would be available under our scheme, is the opportunity to appoint its own investigating officers. That point is central to our argument.

Mr. Mullin

I once asked the deputy Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary about the Judith Ward case and he replied, "Oh, she was framed"—that was the word that he used—"by the West Yorkshire police." He then added, "The irony is that they then send the West Yorkshire police over here to investigate us when it is alleged that we have done something wrong." Is that not a good illustration of the problem?

Mr. Straw

It certainly is. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael) has also pointed out the very curious and overly elaborate arrangement in clause 18(4)(a), whereby a chief officer may be required to appoint a person serving in such other police force as the chief officer thinks fit". People who wish to see a commission that is wholly independent of the police and who want to believe the Minister when he says that investigations will be conducted in a manner that is wholly independent of the force which conducted the original investigation will be troubled when they read clause 18. It does not appear that justice will be done under the elaborately constructed scheme outlined in clause 18.

I shall continue by quoting from the letter that ACPO sent to the Home Office just under a year ago. Paragraph 3 states: The PCA model has a number of further drawbacks. There is no accountability on the Authority for the resources used in the investigation. The entire cost of the enquiry falls upon the force being investigated. Such costs can be enormous—West Midlands have quoted the figures of £1.5 million for the Birmingham Six Investigation and a still larger sum for the Serious Crime Squad enquiry by West Yorkshire. Is it really right that the force against whom an allegation is made has to support the cost of the investigation? Equally, is it really right that the Authority"— now the commission— carrying out the investigation has no accountability for the cost? The Minister has complained—I believe that his charge is unsubstantiated—about the cost of our proposals. It is very interesting that 11 months ago ACPO complained strenuously about the lack of costings for the Home Office's proposed model. The letter continues:

A number of forces raised objections to the model of investigation based on seconded officers. This, as is the case with the PCA model, has a substantial impact on the pool of experienced officers in forces. Again, this was a particular concern of a number of smaller forces". The letter goes on to make a very important point, given the current climate in the police force. It states: There is a further concern that developments in streamlining management in the Service will make both the PCA model and a seconded model extremely onerous for forces, whether they be large or small. Police Forces have already reduced the number of senior and middle managers significantly in recent years. Further substantial reductions in the numbers of officers at Chief Inspector and Superintendent rank are likely as forces seek to reduce costs and maximise the resource in front line policing. This must mean that the pool of officers available for either PCA style appointment as an investigating officer or secondment to a central body will reduce. Overall this section in the paper seems to be based on the assumption that all investigation by the CCRA will be similar and should be handled the same way. Indeed, at paragraph 62, it is suggested that it would be difficult to explain to the applicant 'why their case had been handled in one way rather than another'. I am not convinced that this is a valid argument. After all, in discussing the procedures for summary cases, the paper has already set out a different system for such cases. Is it really valid to suggest that all indictable cases are similar and must be investigated the same way? Of course, that is not the case.

The writer goes on to suggest that the cases should be graded according to their complexity, the level of independence necessary from the original police investigation, and the type of allegation. He goes on to say: Under such circumstances, it should be possible to develop a model for investigations which relies on a combination of the options:—

1. (i) A Central Unit, independent of Police Forces, which would be capable of carrying out, or, at the very least, managing the more complex and controversial investigations.
2. (ii) The use of a seconded team of Police Officers from a different Force to investigate some cases, notably where Police criminal conduct or misconduct is alleged and the PCA are involved.
3. (iii) Using the same Force to assist the investigation, particularly where the applicant is satisfied that the Police involvement in the case does not form part of his grounds for review.
4. (iv) Using other non-Police investigators where Police skills or powers are not required, particularly where the substance of the case involved legal procedures".

That seems to me, and to everyone who has read it, to be a very robust intellectual categorisation of the sorts of cases that the commission is likely to deal with and the way in which they should be processed.

5.15 pm

I do not wish to wreck his fine political career, but I hope that my hon. Friend—with a small "f"—the Member for Upper Bann will be convinced by the ACPO analysis of the case in support of our new clause 1. The new clause would give legislative force to ACPO's proposal for

A Central Unit, independent of Police Forces, which would be capable of carrying out, or, at the very least, managing the more complex and controversial investigations. I did not serve on the Standing Committee which examined the Bill, but I have read very carefully what the Minister said in dismissing our proposals for empowering the commission to appoint an independent and central unit of officers. So far as I can see, he did not advance any arguments of principle against it, but merely said that there would be great difficulties establishing the right size for an in-house team—either it would be overburdened with work or it would have no work at all.

That is true of any police activity up to a point. For large parts of any day in a year many police officers will be doing nothing in particular because they are patrolling in a reactive sense. The police force deals with situations of uncertainty. I found the Minister's argument wholly unconvincing because he knows—and the commission will find it out very quickly—that a huge volume of cases will come before the commission. As soon as the commission is established, those who do not believe that they have been dealt with properly under the current procedures will also make applications. Grading those cases will prove a substantial administrative challenge. From that large number of cases—most of which, numerically, will be unmeritorious—there will be a core that will require investigation. I have no doubt that, with sensible management, that would provide sufficient work for the kind of core of officers, independent of police forces, that we and the Association of Chief Police Officers have in mind.

I turn to the issue of where those people would come from and how they would be trained. As many senior police officers accept privately, and as is hinted at in the letter from ACPO, they will come from the vast pool of retired police officers. Many senior and middle-ranking police officers are being squeezed out of the force as a result of the Sheehy reforms and other changes introduced by the Government. Those officers have considerable experience; they are not duds and they could form a core of investigating officers.

In supporting the proposal for a core investigating team, Justice cites a study conducted by Coopers and Lybrand. Coopers and Lybrand pointed out the merits of having a dedicated core of officers. The Minister, if I read him right, seemed to suggest at column 91 in Standing Committee B on 28 March that it was a bad thing to have a private police force. He dismissed it as though it were some casual scheme. I hope that he does not do that this evening, given the opinion that has been expressed from all parts of the House.

In dismissing the proposal for what he described as a private police force, the Minister referred to the need for in-house training. Coopers and Lybrand compared the development of a core of investigating officers working directly with the commission with that of auditors, who have a similar role and gradually build up experience and expertise from which they can train others. As Coopers and Lybrand pointed out, there is no reason why that could not apply to the team of investigators.

My last point relates to costs, on which the Minister's case, which is always defective, is least convincing. In Committee, the Minister claimed in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth that there would be substantial cost as a result of our proposals. When my hon. Friend asked him the straightforward question: What is the Minister's estimate of the increase in cost? the reply was:

I have had no estimate of the increase in cost. We have not calculated the number of officers that a hypothetical in-house team would need."—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 28 March 1995; c. 91.] That confirmed the suspicion of the writer of the letter from ACPO that Ministers and officials of the Home Office decided to accept only one option—the Police Complaints Authority model—and not to consider properly any other option. Properly established, the model that we are proposing, with a core of dedicated investigators independent of the police, and in many cases drawn from the police, is bound to be more efficient and less costly than the PCA arrangements that the Minister is proposing, which will involve both the direct additional costs and the indirect costs to which I have referred.

It is of crucial importance that we get the arrangements right and that justice for those who have suffered the most serious injustices—miscarriages of justice—is not only done, but seen to be done. That can happen only if powers reside centrally in the commission to establish independent investigations wholly separate from the police. That is the purpose of new clause 1. It is supported by every Member who has spoken in the House so far and by most observers outside the House. I urge the House to accept it.

Mr. Maclean

We have had an interesting debate with worthwhile contributions from all those who have spoken. One of the most telling remarks was made by the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble), who said that the crucial issue concerned the powers of the commission and how it chose to use them. I agree that the powers of the commission to investigate possible miscarriages of justice would be crucial to the success of its work. Those powers must be sufficient to give people confidence in the commission's effectiveness.

The Government have given a great deal of thought to the matter in the past few months and since our discussions in Committee. I still believe that the arrangements set out in the Bill, with the amendments that we are proposing tonight, are the most effective means of ensuring that the commission will have access to the wealth of knowledge and expertise within police forces. We also believe that they represent the most cost-effective means of investigating possible miscarriages of justice in future. However, the case does not rest on cost grounds alone and the methodology set out in the Bill will ensure that the commission has all the powers that it needs to investigate thoroughly alleged miscarriages of justice.

As I listened to speeches from all parts of the House relating incidents of past and alleged miscarriages of justice, it occurred to me that hon. Members on both sides may have missed the point that the commission will have tremendous powers. Hon. Members seemed to be under the misapprehension that all that would happen in future is that someone would come along with a terrible miscarriage of justice and we would say to a police force, "Off you go and investigate it. You are solely in charge. There are no time constraints on you and no one is supervising you. You carry out the whole investigation. You are totally in charge and we will have your report at the end and reach a conclusion."

My colleagues will obviously realise that I exaggerate slightly—nevertheless, I got the distinct feeling that not enough attention was paid by Opposition Members and by my hon. Friends to the severe and strong powers that the commission will have, and that are provided in the Bill, to take charge and control an investigation. The police will not be solely in charge of doing what they like at any pace they like, because the commission will be in charge of that.

Let us recap briefly the powers that the commission will have. The Bill gives the commission the power to require the appointment of an investigating officer by a police force or another public body to carry out any inquiries that it considers necessary. The powers regarding such inquiries are extensive. The commission will have the power to approve the choice of the investigating officers, to require that another person be selected and appointed if it is not satisfied with the first person chosen, and to insist on the appointment of investigating officers from a force or public body other than the force or other public body which originally investigated the case.

Mr. Alun Michael (Cardiff, South and Penarth)

I am not sure that the Minister has understood the limitations on the powers. He quoted clause 18(4)(a) in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw) and suggested that it would ensure that forces would not mutually investigate each other, but clause 18(4)(b) does not give the commission the power to break the arrangement whereby the West Midlands force investigates the North Yorkshire force, and North Yorkshire investigates West Midlands. The Minister is wrong. The Bill empowers the commission only to get an outside officer to investigate. It is then up to the chief officer to choose the other force.

Mr. Maclean

Yes, that is correct in that part of the clause, but I refer the hon. Gentleman to clause 18(6) which states: The Commission may direct that an appointment under this section shall not be made unless they have given notice that they approve of the person whom it is proposed to appoint. Under clause 19, the commission has powers to supervise the work of the investigating officer and, indeed, to dispose of the services of that investigating officer. I suggest to hon. Members that the commission's powers are very extensive indeed.

Mr. Beith

It is difficult to understand why such a tight restriction has been used. In the circumstances that the Minister described, if, having been told that the chief constable had decided to appoint another officer from that chief constable's choice of another force, the commission said, "We are not having him either as we think that it should be a different force altogether," under the Bill the chief constable can say, "No. You can have another officer from the force I choose, but you will not have an officer from a different force."

Mr. Maclean

Theoretically, that is possible, but the Opposition are working on the assumption that chief constables and the commission will be constantly at loggerheads over the selection of officers. If the commission is unhappy with that appointment, it will still have the power to dispose of that officer as well. We are getting into rather fanciful country here, with the idea that chief constables will constantly try to appoint people who are totally unsuitable in the view of the commission.

Mr. Trimble

I can understand the Minister's irritation; we are almost getting down to an argument more appropriate for Standing Committee. I ask him to take the point away and consider it, possibly for amendment in another place at another time. The interpretation of the hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael) is correct. I take the point about clause 18(6), but I do not think it can be used in the way in which the Minister suggested. I do not know why clauses 18 and 19 have been drafted in such a cumbersome manner, but they are not appropriate to achieve the Minister's objective. His objective is right, but the drafting is not as happy as it could be.

Mr. Maclean

I am always happy to take drafting advice from the hon. Gentleman. I am glad that he agrees with the Government's intention, and am grateful to him for improving the drafting of other parts of the Bill and of some Government amendments, for which he must take some credit.

5.30 pm

Mr. Straw

The Minister said that my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael) was theoretically right. The Minister was therefore making the huge admission that my hon. Friend was legally right when he said that the commission would not have unfettered discretion as to which force to appoint. If the Minister continues to make such poor arguments, he will face difficulties in the other place. Would it not be a good idea for him to accept the suggestion of the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) and reconsider the matter?

Mr. Maclean

The hon. Gentleman is not being fair. We cannot consider one part of the Bill in isolation. I told the hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael) that his interpretation of clause 18(4)(b) was correct, but the Bill does not stop there. Clauses 18(6) and 19 give further information on the powers available to the commission. Both clauses have checks and balances, but generally they give the commission extensive powers to control and direct investigations that have not been available before.

Hon. Members talk as if the commission would not exist and police officers would have complete carte blanche in undertaking their investigations—that they could make them tardily and without control. The supervision of the investigation can be as close as the members of the commission in charge of the case think fit. In addition, the commission may take any other steps that it thinks appropriate to investigate its case load.

The Bill's powers are far reaching and will enable the commission to ensure that investigations are effective, thorough and independent. My hon. Friend the Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) made a powerful plea for a district attorney-type figure charged with the overall investigation and oversight of a case. My hon. Friend had to leave to attend a Home Affairs Select Committee, but before he departed, I informed him that we have the district attorney-type concept he seeks. The commission is the DA, with the powers in clause 19 to direct, supervise and take charge. In using its district attorney powers—I do not like that term but as my hon. Friend used it, I shall stick with it—I do not see any sense in the commission appointing another outside person to serve as yet another district attorney.

The Bill makes it clear that the members of the commission will be in charge of any investigations undertaken by police officers acting on its behalf. If the commission is not satisfied with the way that those investigations are proceeding, it can require further inquiries to be made, and the commission will be able to insist on the replacement of any investigating officer by another, if it thinks that necessary.

New clauses 1 and 2 would enable the commission to draw on in-house investigators or on those whom it has contracted in, as well as on investigating officers appointed at its request by the appropriate chief constable. They would, in effect, give the commission power to appoint an in-house investigations unit to make inquiries. I listened carefully today, as in Committee, to the arguments, but I am not convinced that creating an in-house investigative capacity would be helpful or necessary. It would add significantly to the commission's costs and would not be an efficient use of resources.

Aside from the difficulties, which we have discussed before, of establishing the appropriate size of an in-house team, there would be the practical difficulties in determining which cases merited internal investigation and which external. Even more importantly, any investigators who were contracted in, or any commission staff appointed to investigate in the way apparently envisaged, would need to be able to exercise police powers. They would have to be made accountable for the exercise of those powers and be subject to appropriate disciplinary arrangements with regard to their operational duties. Special arrangements would also be needed to give them access to the training opportunities available for all serving police officers, to keep them up to date with police practice. The Government considered those genuine practical difficulties and are not convinced that would be a sensible approach.

New clause 2 gives the commission the responsibility for ensuring that an investigating officer is properly qualified and independent, and it emphasises the responsibility of the officer in question to the commission. We believe that those provisions are unnecessary. Of course the commission will be looking for an officer who has the skills necessary to undertake the work that the commission requires—it would be extraordinary if it agreed the appointment of an officer not having the necessary skills—and the commission does not need prompting from the statute.

The Bill enables the commission to approve or disapprove the choice of investigating officer, and if the conduct of the investigation he undertakes is in any way unsatisfactory, the commission can require that he be replaced. The officer is appointed to assist the commission, which makes it clear that the commission is in charge. It is not a case of bobbies doing their own thing without anyone directly supervising them. New clause 2 does not add anything to the commission's powers.

The Bill provides the commission with all the powers that it needs to do its work thoroughly and effectively. The proposed new clauses would not increase the commission's effectiveness. They would complicate its procedures, introduce practical difficulties and add to its costs.

The hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) quoted the original submission of the Association of Chief Police Officers to the consultation paper, but things have moved on since then. ACPO now fully supports the model in the Bill, and that was confirmed as recently as last week by the association spokesman in charge. It was slightly disingenuous of the hon. Member to quote a submission of a year ago without giving up-to-date information.

I am used to giving credit to the hon. Member for Upper Bann. In Committee, he made the telling point that the police should be seen to root out cases of corruption. Much of today's discussion was based on cases of corruption in the 1970s or 1980s, before the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the close supervision to which the hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw) referred. All the police officers whom I meet these days are dedicated to rooting out corruption wherever they find it. They are incensed when colleagues misbehave because they get it in the neck from media attacks, which tarnish their good reputation.

Mr. Mullin

I cited two contemporary cases. In the Brian Parsons case, the chief constable of Devon and Cornwall is resolutely fighting to keep the investigation in-house, and the Carl Bridgewater case is the subject of an eighth police investigation. The Minister cannot claim that those are matters of history.

Mr. Maclean

Nor can the hon. Gentleman say that they are matters of police corruption. At this point, I am talking about police corruption and the police these days being in the forefront of wishing to root it out because corruption tarnishes their name. The hon. Gentleman refers to two alleged cases of a miscarriage of justice. I saw the press release issued by the chief constable of Devon and Cornwall. I understand perfectly why he would issue a press release on trailers for a programme when the film makers did not, in accordance with their original promise, extend to the chief constable the courtesy of seeing their so-called evidence before screening the programme. The chief constable is right to be indignant. His report of 1,800 pages has been submitted to the Home Office and will be meticulously studied. We will not make judgments based on trailers screened last week and a programme to be broadcast tonight.

Most horrific cases of alleged miscarriage of justice related to activities in the 1970s and 1980s, before PACE and the rigid controls that exist now. When one considers the pressures under which police forces operate today, it is miraculous that out of a total force of 126,000 men and women, there is so little corruption in our police service. We have one of the most incorrupt police forces in the world. One has only to read foreign news stories—even then with a pinch of salt—to know what so-called police forces in some other countries are like. In any one year, the Home Office gets requests from at least 50 countries for British police to come and lend their expertise—often because those countries cannot trust their own police.

Of course there are cases of police corruption in this country. I think it terribly important that police officers have the duty to root out corruption in their midst and be seen as the ones who are destroying it. That is another telling reason why we want police officers, under the commission's powers of direction, to take charge of these investigations and to root out corruption.

Finally, I should just like to mention the Government amendments taken with this group. I sense that the mood of the House requires that we move on to a vote, however, so I shall not run through the amendments—except to say that I again give some credit to the hon. Member for Upper Bann for drawing certain matters to our attention. In short, I commend the amendments to the House; but I am not convinced by new clauses 1 and 2, and I recommend that my hon. Friends vote against them if they are pushed to the vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes 239, Noes 267.

Division No. 136]	[5.40 pm
AYES
Abbott, Ms Diane	Brown, N (N'c'tle upon Tyne E)
Adams, Mrs Irene	Bruce, Malcolm (Gordon)
Ainger, Nick	Burden, Richard
Anderson, Donald (Swansea E)	Callaghan, Jim
Anderson, Ms Janet (Ros'dale)	Campbell, Mrs Anne (C'bridge)
Armstrong, Hilary	Campbell, Ronnie (Blyth V)
Ashdown, Rt Hon Paddy	Campbell-Savours, D N
Ashton, Joe	Canavan, Dennis
Austin-Walker, John	Cann, Jamie
Barnes, Harry	Chidgey, David
Barron, Kevin	Chisholm, Malcolm
Battle, John	Clark, Dr David (South Shields)
Bayley, Hugh	Clarke, Eric (Midlothian)
Beckett, Rt Hon Margaret	Clarke, Tom (Monklands W)
Beggs, Roy	Clelland, David
Beith, Rt Hon A J	Clwyd, Mrs Ann
Bell, Stuart	Cohen, Harry
Benn, Rt Hon Tony	Connarty, Michael
Benton, Joe	Cook, Frank (Stockton N)
Bermingham, Gerald	Cook, Robin (Livingston)
Berry, Roger	Corbett, Robin
Betts, Clive	Corbyn, Jeremy
Blair, Rt Hon Tony	Cousins, Jim
Boateng, Paul	Cunningham, Jim (Covy SE)
Bradley, Keith	Dalyell, Tam
Bray, Dr Jeremy	Darling, Alistair

Davidson, Ian	Lynne, Ms Liz
Davies, Bryan (Oldham C'tral)	McAllion, John
Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)	McAvoy, Thomas
Denham, John	McCartney, Ian
Dewar, Donald	Macdonald, Calum
Dixon, Don	McFall, John
Dobson, Frank	McGrady, Eddie
Donohoe, Brian H	McKelvey, William
Dowd, Jim	Mackinlay, Andrew
Eagle, Ms Angela	McLeish, Henry
Eastham, Ken	McMaster, Gordon
Enright, Derek	McNamara, Kevin
Etherington, Bill	McWilliam, John
Evans, John (St Helens N)	Madden, Max
Ewing, Mrs Margaret	Maddock, Diana
Fatchett, Derek	Maginnis, Ken
Field, Frank (Birkenhead)	Mahon, Alice
Fisher, Mark	Mandelson, Peter
Flynn, Paul	Marek, Dr John
Forsythe, Clifford (S Antrim)	Marshall, David (Shettleston)
Fraser, John	Marshall, Jim (Leicester, S)
Fyfe, Maria	Martin, Michael J (Springburn)
Galbraith, Sam	Maxton, John
Galloway, George	Meacher, Michael
Gapes, Mike	Meale, Alan
George, Bruce	Michael, Alun
Gerrard, Neil	Michie, Bill (Sheffield Heeley)
Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John	Michie, Mrs Ray (Argyll & Bute)
Godman, Dr Norman A	Milbum, Alan
Godsiff, Roger	Miller, Andrew
Golding, Mrs Llin	Mitchell, Austin (Gt Grimsby)
Gordon, Mildred	Molyneaux, Rt Hon James
Grant Bernie (Tottenham)	Moonie, Dr Lewis
Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)	Morgan, Rhodri
Grocott, Bruce	Morley, Elliot
Gunnell, John	Morris, Rt Hon Alfred (Wy'nshawe)
Hall, Mike	Morris, Estelle (B'ham Yardley)
Hanson, David	Morris, Rt Hon John (Aberavon)
Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy	Mowlam, Marjorie
Henderson, Doug	Mudie, George
Heppell, John	Mullin, Chris
Hill, Keith (Streatham)	Murphy, Paul
Hinchliffe, David	O'Brien, Mike (N W'kshire)
Hodge, Margaret	O'Brien, William (Normanton)
Hoey, Kate	O'Hara, Edward
Hogg, Norman (Cumbernauld)	O'Neill, Martin
Home Robertson, John	Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Hood, Jimmy	Patchett, Terry
Hoon, Geoffrey	Pearson, Ian
Howarth, George (Knowsley North)	Pendry, Tom
Howells, Dr. Kim (Pontypridd)	Pickthall, Colin
Hoyle, Doug	Pope, Greg
Hughes, Kevin (Doncaster N)	Powell, Ray (Ogmore)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)	Prentice, Bridget (Lew'm E)
Hutton, John	Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)
Ingram, Adam	Prescott, Rt Hon John
Jackson, Glenda (H'stead)	Primarolo, Dawn
Jamieson, David	Quin, Ms Joyce
Jones, Barry (Alyn and D'side)	Radice, Giles
Jones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C)	Raynsford, Nick
Jones, Lynne (B'ham S O)	Reid, Dr John
Jones, Martyn (Clwyd, SW)	Rendel, David
Jowell, Tessa	Robertson, George (Hamilton)
Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald	Rooker, Jeff
Kennedy, Charles (Ross,C&S)	Rooney, Terry
Kennedy, Jane (Lpool Brdgn)	Ross, Ernie (Dundee W)
Khabra, Piara S	Rowlands, Ted
Kilfoyle, Peter	Ruddock, Joan
Kirkwood, Archy	Sedgemore, Brian
Lestor, Joan (Eccles)	Sheerman, Barry
Lewis, Terry	Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert
Liddell, Mrs Helen	Shore, Rt Hon Peter
Livingstone, Ken	Short, Clare
Lloyd, Tony (Stretford)	Simpson, Alan
Llwyd, Elfyn	Skinner, Dennis
Loyden, Eddie	Smith, Chris (Isl'ton S & F'sbury)

Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)	Vaz, Keith
Snape, Peter	Walker, A Cecil (Belfast N)
Soley, Clive	Walker, Rt Hon Sir Harold
Spearing, Nigel	Walley, Joan
Spellar, John	Wardell, Gareth (Gower)
Steel, Rt Hon Sir David	Wareing, Robert N
Steinberg, Gerry	Watson, Mike
Stevenson, George	Welsh, Andrew
Stott, Roger	Wicks, Malcolm
Strang, Dr. Gavin	Williams, Rt Hon Alan (SW'n W)
Straw, Jack	Williams, Alan W (Carmarthen)
Sutcliffe, Gerry	Wilson, Brian
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Dewsbury)	Winnick, David
	Worthington, Tony
Taylor, Matthew (Truro)	Wright, Dr Tony
Timms, Stephen	Young, David (Bolton SE)
Tipping, Paddy
Touhig, Don	Tellers for the Ayes:
Trimble, David	Mrs. Barbara Roche and
Turner, Dennis	Mr. Stephen Byers.

NOES
Ainsworth, Peter (East Surrey)	Couchman, James
Alison, Rt Hon Michael (Selby)	Cran, James
Allason, Rupert (Torbay)	Currie, Mrs Edwina (S D'by'ire)
Amess, David	Curry, David (Skipton & Ripon)
Arbuthnot, James	Davies, Quentin (Stamford)
Arnold, Jacques (Gravesham)	Davis, David (Boothferry)
Arnold, Sir Thomas (Hazel Grv)	Day, Stephen
Ashby, David	Deva, Nirj Joseph
Atkins, Robert	Devlin, Tim
Atkinson, Peter (Hexham)	Dicks, Terry
Baker, Rt Hon Kenneth (Mole V)	Dorrell, Rt Hon Stephen
Baker, Nicholas (North Dorset)	Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Baldry, Tony	Dover, Den
Bates, Michael	Duncan, Alan
Batiste, Spencer	Duncan-Smith, Iain
Bellingham, Henry	Dunn, Bob
Bendall, Vivian	Dykes, Hugh
Beresford, Sir Paul	Eggar, Rt Hon Tim
Biffen, Rt Hon John	Evans, David (Welwyn Hatfield)
Bonsor, Sir Nicholas	Evans, Jonathan (Brecon)
Booth, Hartley	Evans, Nigel (Ribble Valley)
Boswell, Tim	Evans, Roger (Monmouth)
Bottomley, Peter (Eltham)	Evennett, David
Bowden, Sir Andrew	Fabricant, Michael
Bowis, John	Field, Barry (Isle of Wight)
Boyson, Rt Hon Sir Rhodes	Fishburn, Dudley
Brandreth, Gyles	Forman, Nigel
Brazier, Julian	Forth, Eric
Bright, Sir Graham	Fowler, Rt Hon Sir Norman
Brooke, Rt Hon Peter	Fox, Sir Marcus (Shipley)
Brown, M (Brigg & Cl'thorpes)	Freeman, Rt Hon Roger
Browning, Mrs Angela	French, Douglas
Budgen, Nicholas	Gale, Roger
Burns, Simon	Gallie, Phil
Burt, Alistair	Gardiner, Sir George
Butcher, John	Garnier, Edward
Butler, Peter	Gill, Christopher
Butterfill, John	Goodlad, Rt Hon Alastair
Carlisle, John (Luton North)	Goodson-Wickes, Dr Charles
Carrington, Matthew	Gorman, Mrs Teresa
Carttiss, Michael	Gorst, Sir John
Cash, William	Greenway, Harry (Ealing N)
Channon, Rt Hon Paul	Greenway, John (Ryedale)
Chapman, Sydney	Griffiths, Peter (Portsmouth, N)
Churchill, Mr	Grylls, Sir Michael
Clappison, James	Hague, William
Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)	Hamilton, Rt Hon Sir Archibald
Coe, Sebastian	Hamilton, Neil (Tatton)
Colvin, Michael	Hanley, Rt Hon Jeremy
Congdon, David	Hannam, Sir John
Conway, Derek	Hargreaves, Andrew
Coombs, Anthony (Wyre For'st)	Harris, David
Coombs, Simon (Swindon)	Haselhurst, Alan
Cormack, Sir Patrick	Hawksley, Warren

Hayes, Jerry	Oppenheim, Phillip
Heald, Oliver	Ottaway, Richard
Heath, Rt Hon Sir Edward	Page, Richard
Heathcoat-Amory, David	Paice, James
Hendry, Charles	Patnick, Sir Irvine
Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael	Patten, Rt Hon John
Hicks, Robert	Pattie, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Higgins, Rt Hon Sir Terence	Pawsey, James
Hogg, Rt Hon Douglas (G'tham)	Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth
Horam, John	Pickles, Eric
Hordern, Rt Hon Sir Peter	Porter, David (Waveney)
Howell, Rt Hon David (G'dford)	Portillo, Rt Hon Michael
Hughes, Robert G. (Harrow West)	Powell, William (Corby)
Hunt, Rt Hon David (Wirral W)	Redwood, Rt Hon John
Hunter, Andrew	Renton, Rt Hon Tim
Jack, Michael	Richards, Rod
Jackson, Robert (Wantage)	Rifkind, Rt Hon Malcolm
Jenkin, Bernard	Robathan, Andrew
Jessel, Toby	Roberts, Rt Hon Sir Wyn
Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey	Robertson, Raymond (Ab'd'n S)
Jones, Gwilym (Cardiff N)	Robinson, Mark (Somerton)
Jones, Robert B (W Hertfdshr)	Roe, Mrs Marion (Broxbourne)
Jopling, Rt Hon Michael	Rowe, Andrew (Mid Kent)
Key, Robert	Ryder, Rt Hon Richard
King, Rt Hon Tom	Sainsbury, Rt Hon Sir Timothy
Kirkhope, Timothy	Scott, Rt Hon Sir Nicholas
Knapman, Roger	Shaw, David (Dover)
Knight, Mrs Angela (Erewash)	Shaw, Sir Giles (Pudsey)
Knight, Greg (Derby N)	Shephard, Rt Hon Gillian
Knight, Dame Jill (Bir'm E'st'n)	Shersby, Michael
Knox, Sir David	Sims, Roger
Lait, Mrs Jacqui	Skeet, Sir Trevor
Lamont, Rt Hon Norman	Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)
Lang, Rt Hon Ian	Soames, Nicholas
Lawrence, Sir Ivan	Spicer, Sir James (W Dorset)
Legg, Barry	Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)
Leigh, Edward	Spink, Dr. Robert
Lennox-Boyd, Sir Mark	Spring, Dr. Richard
Lester, Jim (Broxtowe)	Sproat, Iain
Lidington, David	Squire, Robin (Hornchurch)
Lightbown, David	Stanley, Rt Hon Sir John
Lilley, Rt Hon Peter	Steen, Anthony
Lloyd, Rt Hon Sir Peter (Fareham)	Stephen, Michael
Lord, Michael	Stern, Michael
Luff, Peter	Stewart, Allan
Lyell, Rt Hon Sir Nicholas	Streeter, Gary
MacGregor, Rt Hon John	Sumberg, David
MacKay, Andrew	Sweeney, Walter
Maclean, David	Sykes, John
McLoughlin, Patrick	Tapsell, Sir Peter
McNair-Wilson, Sir Patrick	Taylor, Ian (Esher)
Madel, Sir David	Taytor, John M (Solihull)
Malone, Gerald	Taylor, Sir Teddy (Southend, E)
Mans, Keith	Temple-Morris, Peter
Marland, Paul	Thompson, Patrick (Norwich N)
Marshall, John (Hendon S)	Thomton, Sir Malcolm
Martin, David (Portsmouth S)	Thurnham, Peter
Mates, Michael	Townsend, Cyril D (Bexl'yh'th)
Mayhew, Rt Hon Sir Patrick	Tracey, Richard
Mellor, Rt Hon David	Trend, Michael
Merchant, Piers	Trotter, Neville
Mills, Iain	Twinn, Dr Ian
Mitchell, Sir David (NW Hants)	Vaughan, Sir Gerard
Moate, Sir Roger	Viggers, Peter
Monro, Sir Hector	Walden, George
Montgomery, Sir Fergus	Walker, Bill (N Tayside)
Moss, Malcolm	Waller, Gary
Needham, Rt Hon Richard	Ward, John
Nelson, Anthony	Wardle, Charles (Bexhill)
Neubert, Sir Michael	Waterson, Nigel
Newton, Rt Hon Tony	Watts, John
Nicholls, Patrick	Wells, Bowen
Nicholson, David (Taunton)	Whitney, Ray
Nicholson, Emma (Devon West)	Whittingdale, John
Norris, Steve	Widdecombe, Ann
Onslow, Rt Hon Sir Cranley	Wiggin, Sir Jerry

Wilkinson, John	Yeo, Tim
Willetts, David	Young, Rt Hon Sir George
Winterton, Nicholas (Macc'fld)	Tellers for the Noes:
Wolfson, Mark	Mr. Andrew Mitchell and
Wood, Timothy	Dr. Liam Fox.

Question accordingly negatived.