Homicide (Amendment) (Hansard, 18 December 1991)

§ Mr. Jack Ashley (Stoke-on-Trent, South)
I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Homicide Act 1957 in respect of the defence of provocation.
I appreciate that the Maastricht treaty has wide-ranging implications for people, but my Bill has far-reaching implications for the individuals whom it will affect: it is a matter of great moment to them. My main reason for introducing the Bill is that those women who are the victims of domestic violence, who are driven to despair and provoked into killing their spouses, may find that the defence of provocation is useless when it is used in a court of law. This is a grave injustice to those women. [Interruption.] The clearest example is that of the case of Mrs. Sara Thornton—a woman who suffered a great deal of brutality. [Interruption.]

§ Ms. Dawn Primarolo (Bristol, South)
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am sorry to interrupt, but my right hon. Friend is talking about a subject—domestic violence —that is vital to the women of this country and, rather than listening, hon. Members are having conversations.

§ Mr. Speaker
I am listening.

§ Mr. Ashley
If some hon. Members wish to play the chauvinistic role, I do not mind. I assure them that I have had letters from many of their constituents asking for support. If they want to chat and talk among themselves, and disregard this, fine—I will just go on talking.
The issue is of profound importance both to women and to men, but especially to women. Sara Thornton suffered great brutality and then she killed her husband, but in a court of law it was found that she was not provoked. Sara Thornton took a knife, sharpened it and stabbed her husband. When he died, she was arrested and taken to court. The court found that she was not provoked, because the law says that she had no provocation for killing her husband. The years of brutality were brushed aside.
How did this work out? To understand what happened, we have to recognise that the defence of provocation could not help her, because some time had elapsed between the provocation and the killing. To understand that, we have to go back to 1949, when Mr. Justice Devlin, as he was then known, made a significant ruling: that, to be successful in a court of law, provocation has to cause a sudden and temporary loss of self-control—a sudden loss of self-control. He said that, if there were a time gap, there was time for reason to be restored. If reason is restored, then the act is deliberate, and is murder.
The view adumbrated by Mr. Justice Devlin, that reason could quickly be restored after great brutality, was acceptable once. It was acceptable in the 1914–18 war, 274 when we shot shell-shocked young men. It may have been acceptable in 1949, when we did not really appreciate the effect of violence upon the human mind. However, it bears no relation to what we know in 1991 about the effects of violence.
The fallacy at the heart of Mr. Justice Devlin's dictum is that it failed to appreciate that many people cannot regain normal self-control soon after brutality. We recognised that with the American troops in Vietnam. They were given full consideration. We recognised that with the British troops when they fought in the Gulf. We recognised that with the hostages in the middle east—we recognised the effect of brutality and captivity on their minds, whose balance could not quickly be restored. There is no reason why we cannot have the same consideration for battered and brutalised women that we have for soldiers and captives. The same consideration should apply. However, case law states that loss of control in women must be sudden.
My Bill would simply remove the word "sudden". It includes the requirement that cumulative violence be taken into account. I am well aware some lawyers oppose the Bill on the grounds that it would allow revenge killing, would make killing easier and would induce women to kill. Those are preposterous suggestions, which I hope will not sway the House. Surely we are far too sensible to accept revenge killing; it is not possible. Those women who kill are oblivious to the law. They are desperate and they have been driven by brutality to kill. They are not aware of the fine points of the law.
A similar Bill was enacted in New South Wales in 1982, but there has been no increase in killings by women. The claim that there would be increased killings has not been supported by the facts.
I have spoken long enough, and I simply put a plea to the House. The Home Secretary has promised to consider my plea for a change in the law. He has every right to disregard it and instead to pay attention to the pedantic meddling of the lawyers. If the Home Secretary were to take on the Bill, which is launched in all modesty, he would take a massive step forward in giving the victims of domestic violence a far better deal and a much fairer trial in British courts of law.