HC Deb 12 May 1983 vol 42 cc1001-10 9.51 pm
Mr. Tam Dalyell (West Lothian)

I initiate this Adjournment debate on the circumstances surrounding the sinking of the Belgrano not simply to hark back on history. If all this were history and had no effect on the future I might have been a great deal quieter than I am now.

I start by considering a dreadful scenario which was put to me again only last week by Alain Guegnon when he interviewed me and others for Radio Televisione Francais. He said that the week before he had been in Argentina to interview politicians—Alfonsin and senior Peronists—a number of the military and even ex-President Galtieri, under house arrest. Guegnon's scenario was that there would probably be no bee sting attack, although there could be low intensity operations against our forces involving enormous expense, at any rate until elections had taken place in Argentina. It was his opinion and mine, for what little it is worth on this, that a civilian Government, although they would be under considerable pressure from the military establishment to do something and might wish to see that military establishment thinking about what they call the Malvinas rather than a counter coup against an infant Parliament in Buenos Aires, would do nothing.

It is the opinion of French experts and, indeed, of some Latin Americans that such is the chaos in Argentina that within six to nine months a civilian Government will get into terrible trouble. The military will feel that they have to come back, that they want to come back and, said Guegnon and other people, there will then be real danger because the one popular cause that will unite left, right and centre, military and civilian, is a saving of Argentine honour in relation to what the Argentines see as their Malvinas. Therefore my activity is directed, above all else, towards warning about a second Falklands-Malvinas war. That is why it is important to return to the circumstances surrounding the Belgrano.

I was surprised by the Prime Minister's response to question No. 4 this afternoon. I understood her to say that news of the Peruvian proposals had not reached London until after the attack. I do not think that I have that wrong. But if that is true, what was the Foreign Secretary doing in Washington and New York? My understanding—and I ask to be corrected if it is not right — is that the Foreign Secretary knew of the Peruvian plans at least six and a half hours earlier.

Whatever may be said about Mr. Peter Snow in public print, he is an extremely careful journalist. Members of the BBC Newsnight team do not tread such delicate ground without checking and counter checking. They do not simply take my word. I must repeat what was said on 29 April on Newsnight. The transcript states: It was now 12 hours before the attack on the Belgrano … and by this time there was a further development in Buenos Aires: according to the Peruvians a call came through in the early hours of Sunday from the Argentine capital: it was General Galtieri for president Belaunde. He said that he accepted the Peruvian plan and would put it to his junta that afternoon … At breakfast time in Washington Haig and Pym had a long meeting. Our American source tells us that it was now clear to Haig that Mr. Pym wanted a settlement, and was working hard for it. To the best of my belief, the BBC's American sources were different from mine. Mr. Snow continued We're told that Mr. Haig personally phoned Mrs. Thatcher. So, according to the Peruvians and the Americans Britain was aware—at the highest level—of all that had developed at the time they were getting up from lunch at Chequers: now what no-one is telling us is exactly when the war cabinet at Chequers made its decision to give the Navy the green light for the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano but whether or not the full reported details of President Galtieri's alleged acceptance of the plan were known to Mrs. Thatcher when she finally said Yes to Commander Wredford Brown"— the commander of the Conqueror— there should have been time to attempt to call the mission off in the intervening five hours. Is the Newsnight report accurate? If it is not, I hope that this opportunity will be taken to spell that out.

A remarkable article has been written by Mr. Paul Foot in the current issue of New Statesman. It is best to be candid, and I do not hide from the House the fact that after my long speech on 21 December about the circumstances of the sinking of the Belgrano Mr. Paul Foot, together with a number of other journalists, came to cross-examine me. As a result, I urged him to go to Lima, and he finally decided to do so.

This is the evidence not of someone who has written an article off the top of his head in New Statesman, but the carefully considered writing of a journalist with a track record of considerable success, care, and accuracy—whatever some people may say about his political views. I have known him for 20 years since he was a reporter with the Scottish Daily Record in Glasgow, and he is an outstanding professional journalist. We ought to listen to his description in the current issue of New Statesman on Sunday, 2 May. He said that optimism was increased considerably when Galtieri phoned Belaunde in the early morning. The high command, he said, was almost unanimous in approving the terms, though there were a number of small points to be negotiated. Throughout that morning, Belaunde negotiated these points in calls to Washington and Buenos Aires.

It being Ten o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. David Hunt.]

Mr. Dalyell

The article continued: In Washington, General Haig was in close touch with Francis Pym (he was probably in the same room for most of the time—certainly the two men had lunch together). I gather they had breakfast together. It is extraordinary that the Prime Minister should say this afternoon that news of the Peruvian proposals did not reach London until after the attack. The implication is that her Foreign Secretary was doing all this, closeted with Haig, and that not a word had seeped through to Downing street. Are we to believe that? If we are, it indicates mind-boggling incompetence which, as a defender of the Foreign Office, I do not think it is capable of.

Foot continued: The proposals were amended. Points of view and wishes' of the islanders was changed to 'needs and aspirations'. The membership of the contact group was left open, though it was suggested that Canada might come in for the US and Venezuela for Peru. By noon, an agreement seemed secure. A final draft of a treaty was prepared by officials who had been at work in the 18th century Torre Tagli mansion (the headquarters of the Peruvian Foreign Office) since the early hours. It was drawn up for signature by the British and Argentine Ambassadors in Lima. The ceremony, it was confidently expected, would take place that night. I should like to know, as would many other people, precisely what instructions were given to ambassador Charles Wallace. In his Daily Mirror article last Thursday Mr. Paul Foot referred to something of which I had no notion, that is, that there was a treaty, bound in red leather, ready for signature. Are we to believe that Downing street knew nothing about this?

In the New Statesman article Foot continued: General Galtieri, who had given the go-ahead for these preparations, made it clear that he must first get the approval of his official junta meeting, scheduled for 5 pm that afternoon. But, he insisted, the agreement of the junta was a formality. This is confirmed by the Sunday Times Insight book on the Falklands war, which quotes a 'senior official' of the Argentinian Foreign Ministry as saying, 'I was in the room when Foreign Secretary Costa Mendes came in and said: "We have an agreement. We can accept this". Everybody was very excited.' Once the junta meeting started in Buenos Aires, President Belaunde decided to hold his weekly press conference, which had been long delayed. At 4.45 pm, he went in front of the cameras with his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to tell the world that a settlement was at hand 'this very night'. All three men made it quite plain that a settlement was imminent. Indeed, the COI's recent guests from El Commercio, the Financial Times of Lima, talked freely to me about this. They have very close links with El Gaucho and the Peruvian military. Foot's article continued: Very soon after the press conference, these high hopes were dashed. News came in of the sinking of the Belgrano some three and a half hours earlier … Communications were slow, since the cruiser's signalling systems were destroyed and its escorts and the submarine wanted to protect their positions. I am leaving out some of the article because of the limited time. Later he said: At 6.30pm, Foreign Minister Arias Stella received the Ambassadors of Britain (Mr. Charles Wallace) and Argentina (Mr. Louis Sanchez Mareno). Perhaps they came to sign the treaty. They were told the bad news and left. Is it true that the British ambassador in Lima turned up expecting to sign a treaty? If it is not, I think that we should be told precisely what the truth is. I for one would very much like to hear the Foreign Office's view of the statements in New Statesman, to which I referred publicly when addressing a point of order to Mr. Speaker, thereby giving warning to the Foreign Secretary's office. Accordingly, I hope that these remarks are not coming out of the blue to the Minister.

Foot says: The Belaunde proposals, it is safe to conclude, were taken seriously by both sides. They were drawn up into a treaty which was expected to be signed. And they were put to flight by the sinking of the Belgrano. Senor Arias Stella, who is a fellow of the Royal Society of Pathologists in London and has no anti-British feeling, generously ascribes the Belgrano sinking to military accident. He told me that he and all his colleagues had assumed that some hothead submarine commander had let fly at the cruiser without any idea of the state of negotiations in Lima, Buenos Aires and Washington. Commander Wredford Brown was no hothead submarine commander. He let the cat out of the bag when he came back to Faslane on the west coast of Scotland on 5 July and told friends of mine, reputable members of the Scottish press corps—Eric Mackenzie of the Scotsman and The Aberdeen Press and Journal—that he was a first-time submarine commander. He had not acted on his own initiative. He had acted on orders from Northwood. I do not agree in this instance with the generous Peruvian view that it was a hothead submarine commander who was responsible.

Foot states: The seven-point plan had been agreed between Haig and Belaunde the previous night (in Britain, the early hours of the morning). Was it conveyed to Chequers that night? Did the War Cabinet meeting not have before it 'the latest from Francis in Washington'? Even if they did not, they knew that Pym had gone to Washington in a last bid for peace. However hopeless such a mission seemed in the eyes of the hawks in the war cabinet (and by all accounts they were all hawks, except Pym), they knew that the armed forces could not be seen to cut the ground from tinder the Foreign Secretary's feet. On arrival in Washington the previous evening, Mr. Pym gave an impromptu press conference. He explained that the attacks on the Falklands that day had been intended to concentrate the Argentines' mind on a peaceful settlement. He went on: `No further military action is envisaged at the moment, except to keep the exclusion zone secure.' (Times, 2 May 1982.) This pledge was kept —right up to the sinking of the Belgrano. At the very least, then the Cabinet that Sunday morning knew that Pym was trying for peace and that a period of calm was vital if he was seen to be trying. That is the background, apparently, in which they gave the order to attack a ship on the high seas, with a complement of 1,000 men, when it was outside the war zone that they themselves had designated. I just ask that there should be continuing study of the rest of what Foot has said. In the meantime I have tabled a parliamentary question for tomorrow, which the Foreign Office is free to answer or not to answer. It reads: Pursuant to her answer of 12 May, by what means the Peruvian proposals reached London, and whether Her Majesty's Ambassador in Lima negotiated with the Government of Peru with the approval of Her Majesty's Government prior to any intimation of those proposals arriving in London. I hope that there will be some answer given to that. I cannot believe that ambassador Wallace was acting entirely on his own.

I referred to the important article in the Daily Mirror, which was written by the man who was there. It states: Frantic diplomatic activity in the eighteenth century mansion which is the headquarters of the Peruvian Foreign Office. The most experienced diplomats in the service had been working all day on the draft treaty, erasing old clauses and inserting new ones as the talks went on. Now they prepared the final document. It was couched in all the necessary diplomatic protocol, and bound in red leather. Spaces were left for the signatures of the British and Argentine ambassadors. Ministers swarmed into the presidential palace. The American ambassador, Mr. Frank Ortiz, was there all afternoon. Had all of that gone unbeknown to our Prime Minister? Are we expected to believe that? What were the instructions to Charles Wallace? The implication is that he was acting off his own bat. I find it curious to understand what senior diplomats may have been doing. "Seven Days to Victory", the Timescan publication, says: Sir Nicholas Henderson was about to give a press conference when he heard the news of the attack from American Secretay of State Alexander Haig. Reporters say that he had lost his normally urbane manner and appeared white and shocked. I asked Sir Nicholas Henderson, whom I have seen at Konigswinton on several occasions, about it, and of course it was understood between us that he could not talk about the matter. I hope that it is no discourtesy — and certainly none is intended to him—when I say that I was astonished that I should be asked to give evidence to Franks and that neither Anthony Parsons nor Nicholas Henderson were, but that is by the way.

This afternoon, the Prime Minister—I think I have her words correctly—said that the Belgrano was sunk for military reasons and that the threat was real. Not at the time of sinking it was not, I say, because if we are to be convinced of that, we need to have the previous course for 48 hours. There has been a whole tissue of inaccuracies.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Cranley Onslow)

Hear, hear.

Mr. Dalyell

Not by me.

On "The World At One", Mr. Ted Harrison presented an interesting programme reminding us of a clip from Mr. Nott, that the Belgrano had been detected at 8 pm. That was the first of a number of small inaccuracies and was part of larger inaccuracies; small truths as part of larger truths. We had the business of Faslane and the commander hoisting the jolly roger and saying that he did not act under the rules of engagement. The actions must have been known to the Prime Minister because the commander was directly under the command of Northwood, as were all the other submarines. As I understand it, the submarines were not under the command of the task force commander. One cannot establish that by way of parliamentary questions because it is an operational matter.

It is said that the Belgrano and her escorts were detected either on Saturday I May or possibly on Friday 30 April; that appears in The Sunday Times book. It is also the view of the crew to whom I talked, as well as appearing in Hastings and Jenkins, who are no friends of mine in this matter. That completely contradicts Fieldhouse's report and the statement in paragraph 110 of the White Paper: On 2nd May, HMS Conqueror detected the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano accompanied by two destroyers. Not true. Not true again that the Belgrano and her escorts were converging on the task force. They were on a 280 degree course and, by way of a parliamentary question, it was established that there were no units of the task force—or task group; I understand the distinction between the two —west of where the Belgrano was sunk.

We have been over the whole ridiculous business of the Burdwood bank, and that has been exposed. We have been into the whole question of the pincer movement and the Vincento de Mayo, and that has been exposed. If I am told by the Minister that I am wrong in all I am saying, it is up to him to give the Belgrano's course and that of her escorts in the previous 48 hours because there was no military threat and the sinking was political.

What we really must establish is the gap, in technical terms, between the sending of the message to Conqueror and its time of reception. At what time did the captain of Conqueror receive the order to sink the Belgrano? How continuously well informed were the authorisers of the sinking? What was the timing of the despatch of the authorisation to fire the torpedo in relation to any incoming news that agreement was being reached on the basis formulated by the Peruvian Government and that it was imminent?

If the Government knew that agreement was imminent and sent instructions, I concede it is different from sending instructions with the knowledge that the agreement was imminent. The timing in this matter is important. I asked the Government when they heard that agreement was close and what was the timing in relation to the despatch of the authorisation to sink and whether that authorisation was given before or after it was known that the Peruvian agreement was so close.

I believe that the real threat to the Prime Minister then was not the threat of the Belgrano and her escorts to the task force but the treaty which was to be bound in red leather. If it is said that this is just the hon. Member for West Lothian on his hobby horse, I must refer to today's Daily Mirror. I have given notice of this matter. The passage to which I refer is on page 7. To save time, I should welcome a statement of the inaccuracies in the article "Belgrano: How much did Thatcher know?" Let us be told if the Daily Mirror has it entirely wrong.

The treaty involved the withdrawal by Argentine forces —the object of the exercise in the beginning—and the withdrawal of the task force. If the task force had been turned round, it is the judgment of many of us that many influential members of the Conservative party would have been wanting another leader. The paramount threat was to the occupancy of Downing street.

I assert that when Haig and Pym telephoned the Prime Minister with what they thought was peace, her reaction soon after receiving the messages about the state of the Argentine military that I assert she did receive—from American sources and MI6, which was not that imcompetent and the Nimrod A470 Marconi transceivers, to which I have referred previously—was one of horror on hearing that agreement on the treaty was so close. She saw the threat to her position. She telephoned Northwood and said, "Sink the Belgrano". With Nimrod there are good communications with the submarines. From Fieldhouse's report we know that Nimrods were on Ascension island from 6 April and had refuelling capacity soon after. There was no difficulty in communications.

I assert that the reaction was that Saint Francis of Assisi and peace, brought about by the Foreign Secretary, must be torpedoed. I assert further that a pale, horrified and livid Foreign Secretary went to his former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath)—that is why I referred to him at Question Time this afternoon—and told him the appalling story of the Prime Minister's behaviour. It was the suspicion of the relationship between her Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Member for Sidcup that partly precipitated the Prime Minister's order to sink the Belgrano. It is an appalling charge to make. It is not geared to the forthcoming general election, because it may continue after.

I believe that the Prime Minster's first two statements this afternoon were false. Her third statement, that negotiations continued until 17 May, is ridiculous because once the Belgrano had been sunk negotiations were savaged.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, said that he wanted five or 10 minutes to reply. I have said a lot and we shall doubtless return to the subject, either tomorrow or in another Parliament, but the Minister of State has the right to reply.

10.20 pm
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Cranley Onslow)

I am glad to have that recognised. The hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) has hurled a lot of baseless assertions and rubbish across the Chamber. He asked a lot of questions and I might be more inclined to feel that he wanted answers if he had left me a little more time in which to reply.

The hon. Gentleman had the answer from my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister this afternoon. The fact that he does not accept it—

Mr. Dalyell

Lies.

Mr. Onslow

The hon. Gentleman's behaviour in these matters begins to cast grave doubts on his mental stability. He seems to have an obsession or a fixation from which he cannot free himself. He comes back time and again. However often he may he told that he is wrong and shown the facts, another invention creeps into his mind or inflames his imagination or a journalist eggs him on and off he goes again.

The hon. Gentleman can return to the subject as often as he likes, and I dare say that he will, but he will not alter the facts. The facts are as he has been given them. The Government have made it perfectly clear time and again that the General Belgrano was attacked soley for military reasons, because she posed a threat to ships of the task force. The hon. Gentleman chooses to ignore the warnings that were given not merely about the exclusion zone but in the message on 23 April from our Government, through the Swiss, to the Argentine Government, making it clear that ships of their navy that approached the exclusion zone would be attacked if they threatened to interfere with the mission of the British forces in the South Atlantic. That was a public statement and the fact that the hon. Gentleman chooses to ignore it does not carry the conviction that the hon. Gentleman always seeks to carry.

Circumstantial detail and a mass of verbiage pour from the hon. Gentleman on these occasions.

Mr. Dalyell

What about the previous course of the Belgrano?

Mr. Onslow

Here we go again. I shall come to the Belgrano presently. I want to talk seriously to the hon. Gentleman about what he is alleging. He puts the proposition that the Belgrano was attacked in order to sabotage the Peruvian-sponsored peace effort. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that I have had a thorough re-examination made of the relevant papers. The results show conclusively that news of the United States—Peruvian proposals reached London only after the attack on the Belgrano, which is what the Prime Minister said this afternoon.

Mr. Dalyell

Then what the hell was the Foreign Secretary doing?

Mr. Onslow

If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I will tell him what was going on. Then he will not have to rely on journalistic speculation.

The first intimation that we had of the existence of any such proposals came in a series of conversations between Mr. Haig and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in Washington on 2 May. After Mr. Haig outlined elements of a framework for a diplomatic solution, they were explored first by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and later, after his departure for New York, by Sir Nicholas Henderson, our ambassador in Washington.

My right hon. Friend and Sir Nicholas both made it clear to Mr. Haig that, following the failure of Mr. Haig's detailed efforts because of the Argentine attitude, they did not wish to be rushed into hasty consideration of the framework elements and would wish to consult the Government in London before giving any reaction. The result of those conversations was telegraphed to London at 22.15 GMT, over three hours after the attack on the Belgrano. It could not be telegraphed before, because it was not possible to get a clear and concise statement before that time of what was in the air.

It is clear that Ministers in London had no knowledge of any new proposals before the Belgrano was attacked and that they were acting solely on the basis of the perceived military threat. There is no evidence to suggest that Peter Snow was right in saying that there was a real prospect of peace. Indeed, suggestions in the press today that the Peruvian proposals should have been transmitted to London sooner and that there was a treaty which, for some extraordinary reason, was the only window of opportunity for peace in the South Atlantic are fanciful in the extreme.

The fact that the treaty, which did not exist, is alleged to have been bound in red leather is another classic example of an attempt to add verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative. The hon. Gentleman should understand this. He should understand that some of the information that reaches him is not necessarily from untainted sources, and the same is true of some of the information that Mr. Paul Foot receives. Unnamed Argentine officials are scarcely the most reliable witnesses in the circumstances that we are considering.

This is the position. The proposals that came through to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and the ambassador in Washington on 2 May were no more than a framework of ideas. They were put across in a series of consultations on that day. There were certain points that our ambassador needed to pursue further with Mr. Haig after my right hon. Friend had left Washington for New York on that afternoon. Mr. Haig was not pressing for an instant reaction. As soon as the framework was clear, a reporting telegram was dispatched at the time that I have said. Our ambassador in Lima could not have gone anywhere or signed anything as he had had no instructions and there was no treaty. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept these things, but I doubt it, because we know his track record in these matters. He is apparently capable of deluding himself into believing that my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Gow) is the most important man in the Conservative party. He made a great speech on 25 January going on at length about that. He said on that occasion that there were any number of opportunities when an honourable peace could have been had for the asking. That is simply not true, and the hon. Gentleman must know that it is not true because it was Argentine intransigence that always caused the negotiations to founder. It was the Argentines who in the end backed away. I do not know how the hon. Gentleman defines "honourable", but a statement of that kind is pure fantasy.

Then, the other day, we had the episode when the hon. Gentleman gave great publicity to a series of unfounded smears about the Gurkhas. I hope that he now accepts that there was no truth in that and is sorry that he put those statements on the pages of Hansard. He is, of course, not sorry, because he has no regrets and no shame. However, his motives are not of the purest. He stands there with some great personal crusade that he says has nothing to do with political inspiration or party motive. I doubt if many people think that that is the case. The hon. Gentleman's halo is not shining particularly brightly, because he is pursuing a vendetta for personal reasons, which is based on an obsession of which he cannot free himself. It is time that he faced that fact and stopped wasting the time of the House with the baseless allegations that serve no purpose for him or for anybody else.

I must make one point clear. If the hon. Gentleman wants to find where responsibility lies for the deaths that resulted from the sinking of the Belgrano, he should not be looking in London or seeking to put the blame on anybody here. Let him go and look in Buenos Aires and ask himself and others why the Belgrano was at sea.

Mr. Dalyell

What was the Foreign Office doing for 17 years?

Mr. Onslow

The hon. Gentleman is in danger of flipping his lid by going on in this extraordinary way. I find it, as others do, difficult to understand the hon. Gentleman. I found it difficult to understand his intervention at Prime Minister's Question Time today. My right hon. Friend's answer could not have been clearer, more categorical, more firm or closer to the truth.

Mr. Dalyell

Untrue.

Mr. Onslow

Here we go. The hon. Gentleman, for some reason, persists in saying "Untrue" from a sedentary position, but I wish to bring my points to a conclusion.

If the hon. Gentleman is looking for the people who were responsible for the deaths in the Belgrano, let him look in Buenos Aires and try to pin down the homicidal lunatic of an Argentine admiral who sent that ship to sea and caused it to sail up and down on the fringes of an area, and into an area where he must clearly have known that the ship was in danger of meeting the fate that befell it. That is where the blame lies, so let the hon. Gentleman take himself off there and pursue his vendetta somewhere else.

10.29 pm
Mr. Dalyell

I have just asked factual questions and received an astonishing answer. We are told that at 22.15 there was a telegram that was the first that the Foreign Office knew about the matter. Apparently we are expected to believe that Ministers in London did not know what their Foreign Secretary had been doing in Washington. This raises the most crucial questions about communications between the Foreign Secretary and his Department and his relationship with the Prime Minister. The Minister of State's answer persuades me to believe every statement that I have made, not least that about the relationship with the right hon. Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath). I give notice that tomorrow I shall be queuing up for another Adjournment debate and—

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at half-past Ten o'clock.