HC Deb 04 July 1980 vol 987 cc1949-68

Lords amendment: No. 2, in page 3, line 6, at end insert— 81B.—(1) Subject to subsection(2) of this section, any person aggrieved by a decision of licensing justices or a magistrates' court—

  1. (a) to revoke or not to revoke a special certificate on an application under subsection (2) or (4) of section 81 of this Act,
  2. (b) to impose or not to impose a condition under subsection (1) of section 81A of this Act on an application for the grant of a special hours certificate or to impose a condition under that subsection on an application for the revocation of such a certificate, or
  3. (c) to impose or not to impose a condition on an application under section 81A(2) of this Act,
may appeal to the Crown Court against that decision. (2) Only the chief officer of police may appeal against a decision not to revoke a certificate as mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section or not to impose a condition as mentioned in paragraph (c) of that subsection; and a person may appeal against a decision not to impose a condition under section 81A(1) of this Act only if he has appeared before the licensing justices or magistrates' court and made representations that the condition be imposed. (3) A person other than the appellant shall be a party to an appeal under this section if, and only if, he has appeared before the licensing justices or magistrates' court and made representations on the application to which the decision appealed against relates. (4) Licensing justices shall have the same power to make an order for the payment of costs on the abandonment of an appeal under this section as a magistrates' court has by virtue of section 85 of the magistrates' Courts Act 1952 on the abandonment of an appeal to which that section relates.

Mr. Trotter

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bernard Wetherill)

With this we may take Lords amendment No. 4.

Mr. Trotter

Lords amendment No. 2 provides a right of appeal where, under the Bill, the justices decide against an applicant for a late night drinking special hours certificate. Under the Bill, provision is made for magistrates no longer to have automatically to grant a special hours certificate for late night drinking until the same time as covered by a music and dancing licence. It was felt by representatives of those with such establishments as require these certificates that justice might not always be done by the initial court which hears the application and that there should be a right of appeal.

I have great faith in British justice. While I cannot help reflecting that half the time the learned gentlemen at the Bar appear to be wrong, I am sure that the justices are not often wrong. Certainly they are not wrong half the time. It is, however, a fair point that there should be a right of appeal against a decision. I was, therefore, prepared to accept an amendment setting out such a right. From the point of view of procedure, it was easier for that to be done in the Lords, and I should like to pay tribute, as has the Minister, to the help given by Baroness Phillips in steering the Bill through the other place. Their Lordships accepted the argument for a right of appeal, and Lords amendment No. 2 has that effect.

Lords amendment No. 4 is a consequential amendment which slightly alters the title of the Bill.

Mr. George Cunningham

This Bill has had a chequered career through two Parliaments. There have been many stages to it but very few speeches on it. This is certainly the first time that I have opened my mouth on the subject, and I do so only to make one or two points.

First, I add my congratulations to the hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) on his perseverance in pushing the measure through and on the great clarity with which he has explained it to the House on this and previous occasions.

This Lords amendment was described by one noble Baroness as being technical. Of the four amendments with which we are dealing, it is the one which is least accurately described as technical. It is a substantial amendment, creating a right of appeal which did not exist before. Because in the past I have often been irritated when looking back at the manner in which this or that Bill has passed through Parliament, and not being able to find the basis upon which an amendment has been passed or the assumptions about it which were in the minds of hon. Members at the time, I believe that it would be right either for the sponsor of the Bill, or perhaps preferably for the Minister, to tell us how the right of appeal which is added to the Bill by the amendment relates to the right of appeal which normally exists in licensing matters.

I think, although I am not at all sure that I am right, that in respect of these new discretions in the hands of magistrates, this gives an exactly comparable right of appeal to the Crown court which presently exists for the discretion which magistrates have on other points. If I am right, let us have it said during the course of someone's speech so that if points arise on the issue in future we know the basic upon which the House has decided to pass the Bill.

Mr. Lawrence

This is a thoroughly sensible improvement. As the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Cunningham) has said, it is certainly not a technical amendment.

I should also like to compliment my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) on the measure that he has introduced and on the excellent way in which he has handled the matter from start to finish. I should also like to take the opportunity of thanking Baroness Phillips for her contribution in the House of Lords.

My astonishment is as to how we ever let the Bill get as far as it did without noticing that apparently it deprived people who are concerned with matters dealt with in the Bill, in that it did not give them a proper opportunity to appeal, short of an appeal on a point of law to the Divisional Court.

With the benefit of hindsight, one can always blame oneself. One never likes to blame others. I took part in the earlier proceedings on the Bill. So preoccupied was I with the general principles that were set out in it, that I completely failed to notice on Second Reading that we were depriving those concerned with the operation of the legislation of a valid right of appeal.

10.15 am

Of course, an injustice would have been thought to have been done where an addition to the processes of the licensing law, which was a restrictive one, is introduced which does not provide for an appeal to another tribunal, as is provided by other matters contained in the Bill.

Of course, the position before the Bill was introduced was that the justices had to grant the upgraded licence, provided that the music and dancing licence and the suitability of premises applied. Those matters were not arguable. It lay at the discretion of justices to upgrade. That was the evil of the situation as identified, not only by my hon. Friend but by licensing practitioners and writers, notably Mr. Martin, who I am proud to say was educated at the same superb establishment as I was, the Brighton, Hove and Sussex grammar school. That is yet another connection that I have with this legislation which enables me to speak. I am only sad that that wonderful grammar school in Brighton became—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I do not think that we can have that.

Mr. Lawrence

I have no wish to digress, Mr. Deputy Speaker. My sadness shall be buttoned up inside me for another more appropriate occasion.

The point made by Mr. Martin and other writers, which I observed when I read all the established writings and the authorities, and made my limited contribution to the understanding of the licensing law, was that that matter has been put right. Its object is to restrict, but we should not restrict without giving a right of appeal.

Mr. Douglas Hogg

I am somewhat troubled by Mr. Martin. I am afraid that I do not know very much about Mr. Martin, nor the nature of the work that he has published. Perhaps my hon. Friend can tell us something about that man, together with his works.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I do not think that Mr. Martin has a great deal to do with appeals in respect of special hours certificates. Perhaps we should listen to the views of the hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence).

Mr. Lawrence

I am conscious of the fact that I mentioned the eminent and learned gentleman's name without saying anything about him. If I did so, that would add to the strength of purpose of the Bill. But probably the leading authority in this sphere thought it appropriate that this legislation ought to be introduced.

Sir Ronald Bell

Would that be the Mr. Martin who is the secretary of the Lord's Day Observance Society?

Mr. Lawrence

Not that I am aware of. This is Mr. J. N. Martin, OBE, who is a solicitor and was formerly the Clerk to the Justices for the petty sessional divisions of Beccles, Blything and Lowestoft. He has devoted his life to the licensing practice and the informing of practitioners. He is, of course, well known to those practising at the licensing Bar as the editor of "Paterson", which is the leading authority. I am sorry for forgetting that my hon. Friend the Member for Granthan (Mr. Hogg) has moved on from the licensing practice to wider and—I hope—more remunerative areas, and has forgotten the name of the editor of the book.

I welcome the Bill, and I pay tribute to those who have introduced it. I have explained why this amendment is necessary, but I do not think—I say this with considerable trepidation and some hesitation—that the way in which it is to be integrated into the law is as tidy as it should be. I understand that the clause, which gives the right of appeal to a Crown court on questions of fact, is to become a part of section 81 of the Licensing Act 1964, which is a consolidation Act. That is untidy, and it is unnecessarily verbose. Section 21 of the Act deals with appeals. A lawyer advis- ing a client or a layman seeking to find out his rights will obviously look at the definitive Act—the Licensing Act 1964 —under the section on appeals. Therefore, he would expect to find the contents of this amendment in section 21 of the Act. But it will not be there. It will be included in section 81. Although I concede that anyone who looks at the statute for that purpose will naturally look at section 81, this is untidy, and we should not churn out ill-digested legislation—as Lord Renton reminded us in the report on legislation.

If this amendment had been an amendment to section 21 of the Act, it would have been simpler and shorter. Section 21, which specifically deals with appeals, states: Subject to subsection (2) of this section, any person aggrieved by any of the following decisions of licensing justices, that is to say—

  1. (a) a decision granting or refusing to grant a new justices' licence or an ordinary removal of a justices' licence;
  2. (b) a decision refusing the renewal, transfer or special removal of a justices' licence;
  3. (c) a refusal to declare a provisional grant final or to affirm a provisional grant or to give consent, on the application of the holder of a provisional licence, to a modification of plans;
  4. (d) the making of an order under section 19 of this Act;
  5. (e) the refusal of a consent required under section 20 of this Act; or
  6. (f) any decision as to the conditions of a justices' on-licence;
may appeal to quarter sessions against that decision. The amendment uses over 100 words. If the amendment had been more appropriately included under section 21, a paragraph (g) could have been included stating "Any decision covering revocation of a licence under section 21 of the Act", and a paragraph (h) stating: "Any decision as to the conditions of special hours certificates under section 21 of the Act". That would have been far simpler.

Mr. Kimball

As a non-lawyer, I am in some difficulty over this matter. The amendment states that: Only the chief officer of police may appeal against a decision. Section 21(1)(a) to (f) does not deal with the position of the chief officer of police. Can my hon. Friend give some guidance

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. We are dealing with this Bill, and not with the 1964 Act. The hon. Gentleman must not be tempted to digress too much from the amendment.

Mr. Lawrence

I take your indication, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but this is relevant I am merely making the specific technical point that instead of using over 100 words which are appended to the wrong section, 30 words might have been used concisely, and added to the appropriate section of the Act. It is a simple point. I do not wish to detain the House by dilating upon it further, but I ask the Minister to consider my suggestion.

Sir Ronald Bell

I also welcome these amendments, but, like my hon. Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence), I am a little astonished at the complication that has been necessary to introduce a right of appeal.

The hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Cunningham) invited the Minister to explain the background and circumstances. I think that my hon. Friend the Minister of State has now found out what the amendment is about, and no doubt in due course we shall be given an explanation. This is a remarkably cumbrous way round. Perhaps it was felt in another place that this was the only way of proceeding, because the principal Act could not be amended in the way that my hon. Friend suggested, which would be shorter and more convenient. In principle, I welcome the amendment. It was a remarkable omission that a right of appeal was not incorporated in the Bill, although I do not criticise my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) for that. A right of appeal is necessary in these cases.

10.30 am

Occasionally one gets some odd licensing benches. They are always interesting, but sometimes odd. I remember one place, very near Teignmouth for which my hon. Friend is not the Member, where the licensing justices, holding strong evangelical views, had not granted a licence or an extension since the First World War. But this was one particularly strong case and they wrestled with the devil for about two hours before granting the licence. One knows that on a number of occasions idiosyncratic results emanate from licensing justices. Therefore, we must be able to go to the Crown court to know that there is scrutiny of them.

Mr. Lawrence

Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that not only are licensing justices sometimes idiosyncratic but that they are often selected from politically elected councillors? That being so, some areas have a political attitude to the control of licensing. For example, Conservative predominated areas have always tended to think that there should be no restraints, or a limited number of restraints, on the opportunities for licences to be granted and, as it were, that the applicants or licensees should fight it out amongst themselves for business. If they are not successful, they will go out of business. The successful licensees will make a greater contribution to the community than would otherwise perhaps have been made.

In other areas, there is a tendency to restrict and to control which is almost Socialist in its concept; that is, that there shall be just three licensees and anybody else who applies will not get in because that would take business away from any other licensee and the competitive instinct is removed. Therefore, it is not only idiosyncratic. In licensing policy and its application there is often a political policy-making slant. Because licensing is a legal matter, which should not in any sense be political, it is appropriate that appeals should be made to the Crown court which is in no sense political.

Sir. R. Bell

I am obliged to my hon. Friend for that intervention. Not being the hon. Member for Burton, I am not so well informed on these matters as my hon. Friend. What he said had a great deal of truth in it. However, I do not think that it is so much the political affiliations of the magistrates which produce the idiosyncrasies as their religious affinities. At least, that is what I have found. It is much harder to get a licence from a Calvinist bench than from a high Anglican bench. I speak as one of Calvinist background who has urged the House that people of that persuasion should not be compelled to wear seat belts because they believe in predestination. It may be that some of these convoluted theological arguments find their way into the apparently mundane subject of licensing although, I have always found it an interesting one.

There is a certain unpredictability about licensing benches. Therefore, one must be able to go to the Crown Court. When I say "one", I mean not only the applicant but the objectors, too, because they are affected. I suppose that a good deal of neighbourhood change could be affected by the extensions that we are considering—noise, people and so on. Therefore, it is important that both sides should have recourse to the Crown Court in a matter which never fails to excite a great deal of local interest.

Both before the magistrates court and Crown court, the witnesses are local people who usually feel quite strongly about these matters. When people on both sides give this kind of evidence—it is more an expression of opinion than evidence in the strict sense—and find the decision by the local bench odd, they do not feel that they have had justice. Therefore, they must be able to go—I say this without disrespect—to a proper court for a rehearing.

I once had the agreeable experience of finding that my tutor from Oxford of 30 years ago was a witness pressing for increased facilities for the consumption of alcholic liquor in the neighbourhood. I hope that agreeable tradition of Oxford is not changed by the influx of women which I have noticed with regret.

It gives me great pleasure to support Lords amendments Nos. 3 and 4 which are hinged on Lords amendment No. 2, although we are not positively discussing No. 2, I am sure that this will be an improvement in the law. I hope that one day we shall meet on one of these agreeable Fridays to tidy up the prolixity to which we seem to be committed today by the stage of proceedings at which the amendment is made. It will look absurd to have a section 81B in the Licensing Act conferring this isolated right of appeal on both sides in this long form.

I could say a good deal more about this matter, but I see that my hon. Friends are anxious to speak. Therefore, I shall not stand between them and their comments on the amendment.

Mr.Kimball

rose—

Sir R. Bell

Perhaps I may restrain my hon. Friend's eagerness for a moment. One point which struck me as odd was the restriction to the chief officer of police in appealing against the grant. The subsection then goes on to say: and a person"— presumably it must be a chief officer of police because he is the only person who can— may appeal against a decision not to impose a condition…only if he has appeared before the licensing justices or magistrates' Court and made representations that the condition be imposed. That seems odd if it applies only to refusal to impose a condition, not to the revocation of a certificate. I hope that the Minister of State will explain that extreme refinement. First, the person must be a chief officer of police, and, secondly, he can appeal only against refusal to impose a condition. Is one to infer from that he can appeal on a revocation matter even though the police were not present and represented in the magistrates' court? Is that the position? It is a little odd.

I look forward to a full explanation of this whole matter from the Minister. We are obviously going to get it, because my hon. Friend has been running back and forth between the Box and the Front Bench. I know that he is now fully briefed on all the implications, and no doubt my hon. Friends will refine the question.

Mr. Michael Shaw (Scarborough)

I had not intended to intervene, but, having listened to the words of my hon. and learned Friends, I feel that certain aspects of what I thought was a simple and wholly unexceptionable Bill should be commented upon.

Mr. George Cunningham

For those who are witnessing our proceedings or may later read them, will the hon. Gentleman say whether Conservative Members are filibustering against the Youth and Community Bill of the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Skeet) or one of the other Bills that we may come to later in the day?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. I have listened carefully to the debate, and it is important that hon. Gentlemen should stick to the amendments on this Bill. We have a lot more business in front of us.

Mr. Shaw

I shall follow your ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Sir R. Bell) suggested that on occasions licensing benches were rather odd bodies.

Sir Ronald Bell

But always interesting.

Mr. Shaw

My experience is limited but practical, and I have found that they are very representative of local opinion.

Sir R. Bell

Local opinion is often odd, although always interesting.

Mr. Shaw

We may owe our presence here to the fact that the oddity of our constituents is closely allied to our own quirks. Therefore, we should not be too critical.

Representative though they are of local opinion, licensing benches embody the perpetuation of local opinion. Others who have a different opinion may not have a chance when appearing before licensing benches to get a new point of view accepted. It is important that there should be a right of appeal. The generality of decisions may be welcome and wise, but there are occasions when the exceptional view should be taken into account and given a right of appeal, which would bring an outside mind to judgment on the matter.

Certain appearances before the local bench have been almost automatic in the past. It may be that that should continue. However, there can be sudden changes in the representatives on the bench, in the police force or in the practice. It may seem unreasonable to those concerned that, although there has been no change in their circumstances, such changes should dramatically affect their living. It is only right that justice should be seen to be done by there being the right of appeal.

In view of my hon. Friend's comments, I felt that the position of local licensing benches, given the tremendous amount of valuable work that they do, should be put into perspective. Even though that excellence has been proved, there are occasions when the right of appeal is appropriate.

10.45 am
Mr. Douglas Hogg

I support the amendment, and in particular the provisions for appeal.

I have the misfortune to differ in part from the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence). He described applications before licensing justices as being of a judicial character. That is the theory, but in practice such hearings are more of an administrative character. Whether that should be so is largely irrelevant to the argument. To appear before justices is mainly to participate in an administrative function. That fact is important to the question of an appeal. Many justices sitting on licensing benches do not consider an application for such licences in a wholly judicial way. Indeed, I am not even sure that they should do so. They take into account broad questions of local policy, together with the views of the local community, as is right. However, it is not wholly judicial. The judicial process involves examining a question on its narrow merits, and forming an opinion on that narrow question.

If I am right in saying that what the licensing justices are essentially doing is carrying through an administrative process, one sees at once that the absence of an appellate procedure can cause considerable hardship to those affected by that decision. Frequently licensing justices refuse to grant a licence not because the applicant is in some way unsuitable but because in their opinion there is a sufficient number of licence holders in the immediate area.

The House will wish to understand the financial repercussions that can befall somebody whose licence is revoked or may be subject to repressive conditions. We are not talking about only a few hundred pounds. In many cases it is thousands of ponds. It is unsatisfactory that such a decision can be taken on administrative grounds and not be the subject of an appeal.

It is not for me on this occasion to digress on the wider implications of the problem. However, administrative decisions are too frequently taken without the ability to appeal. This is a useful precedent to which I hope the House will have regard in the future, when considering wider issues involving administrative law.

Mr. Kimball

Is my hon. Friend aware that, if there are any changes in these conditions, and the landlord is a tenant and it is not a managed house, the brewery will still want the same rent from the landlord before there is a chance to change his lease? Publicans can be seriously affected by changes.

Mr. Hogg

That is a valuable intervention. Not only could the landlord be affected, but also the tenant. There could be a change in the conditions that would make the business wholly uneconomic. The burden will fall not on the landlord but on the tenant, who will be contractually bound to pay the rent provided for under the tenancy agreement, although his income may be substantially reduced because of the conditions imposed by the licensing justices. My hon. Friend's comment emphasises the importance of the appellate procedure.

However, the argument for the appellate procedure goes much further. I have dwelt on the nature of applications before licensing justices and stressed that it is essentially of an administrative character. The amount of time devoted to such administrative decisions varies considerably from bench to bench and area to area. But frequently the amount of time devoted to the process is naturally very small. The courts are overburdened, they have many applications, and as a matter of fact licensing justices often hold the licensing sessions at the beginning of a full morning's business, and, therefore, are under considerable pressure to cut short the hearing. This is an important point because it means that the justices frequently—and no blame to them—do not have sufficient time to probe all the relevant considerations.

The existence of an appellate procedure provided by this clause introduced from the other place gives a court—in this case, the Crown court—an ability to consider the application in considerable detail in so far as it applies to a revocation of a grant.

Moving from the general to the particular, I should like to say something briefly about the second subsection in the new clause. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Sir R. Bell) asked an important question about the application of the new subsection. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister of State will give a full description of what this subsection purports to do. My understanding of what it purports to do is that it gives to the chief officer of police, and only to him, the right to appeal against a decision not to revoke the certificate and a right to appeal against the decision not to impose a condition mentioned in paragraph (c). The chief officer of police has a right to appeal against a refusal to act in the specified ways, but no other person whatsoever has such a right. I understand that that is the effect of subsection (2).

The subsection goes on to say that in respect of decisions not to impose a condition under section 81A(1), any person may have a right of appeal provided that that person participated in the lower court and made representations. I understand that to be the effect of subsection (2).

I regard that as being a wholly sensible approach to this problem, for two reasons. First, I think that it is right that there should be some finality in proceedings of this kind. If we were to allow any person who might deem himself to be affected by a refusal to grant a condition or to revoke a licence, there would be a multiplicity of appeals and thus no finality. It is in the interests of justice broadly that there should always be finality on matters of this kind. Therefore, I welcome and support the restricted right of appeal.

There is the other point that, in so far as the second part of the new subsection is concerned, we should not have a situation in which people should be taken by surprise.

Mr. Kimball

Hear, hear.

Mr. Hogg

Therefore, I agree with the proposal contained in the second part of the new subsection that a person should be able to appeal unless that person appeared before the licensing justices and made his representations. The reason is that the person likely to be affected by the appeal must have at least some knowledge of the case which he has to meet and, therefore, is not taken by surprise. Therefore, I entirely support the proposal contained in subsection (2) of the amendment.

Turning to subsection (3), I should like some clarification from my hon. Friend the Minister of State. He may have some hesitation about giving that clarification but I hope, none the less, that he will do so, because I think that the House would like to know exactly the interrelationship between the provisions contained in subsection (2) and those contained in subsection (3). As my hon. Friend the Minister is hesitant, perhaps I could indicate to him what I think it means.

Subsection (3) does not touch on the right of appeal at all, but when an appeal has been mounted by an appellant it enables other persons who have views— such as interested Members of Parliament—to toddle along and make their representations to the appellate court. But that right, as I understand it—the Minister will tell me if I am wrong—is limited by an important restriction, namely, that they should have appeared before the licensing justices already and made those views apparent.

I am sure that the Minister of State will treat this as an important matter. It is essential that the House should appreciate the interrelationship between these two quite significant subsections. Therefore, I hope that he will take advice, if he needs advice, and tell the House about it.

There is also the question of costs. Subsection (4) contains an important provision dealing with costs. I have long held the view that magistrates' courts and licensing justices are not sufficiently alert to their powers to award costs to successful litigants. I do not wish to digress and, therefore, the point I make is very brief. It is very important that, whenever the licensing justices or magistrates have a power to award costs, they should exercise that power so as to prevent successful litigants from having to fund the litigation or the complaints which are determined in their favour. The higher courts, in particular the High Court and the county courts, have long held the rule that costs follow the event. I wish that the licensing justices and the magistrates' courts would, as a matter of practice, adopt the same approach.

That is the general proposition. Subsection (4) deals with an important situation which would not previously be covered. It is this. It is very easy for an application to be made before the licensing justices which gives rise to some form of decision, and that decision gives rise to an appeal. So one has an appeal to the Crown court, but, for reasons best known to the appellant, the appeal is not proceeded with. The respondent to the appeal is, in such circumstances, in rather a difficult position, because once the appeal has been launched he must prepare his case in order to meet the appeal.

Frequently in cases of this kind—and, as I have already emphasised, substantial sums of money are involved—the respondent to an appeal has to take expensive advice. I am not here referring to advice from people such as my hon. Friend the Member for Burton. I have in mind advice from surveyors, estate agents, accountants, and so on—all of whom charge substantial sums, probably correctly, for preparing the respondent's case. But then one has the embarrassing situation of the appellant not proceeding with his appeal, and, therefore, there is no matter before the Crown court which can give rise to an order for costs in favour of the respondent.

So what this subsection does is to provide against that situation, namely, when the appeal has not been proceeded with but the respondent has incurred substantial costs, the respondent can go back to the justices' court and require an order for costs. That seems to be an important safeguard and it has the additional advantage of making frivolous appeals somewhat less likely.

Mr, Kimball

Hear, hear.

Mr. Hogg

Therefore, having considered this proposed new section with some care, having reviewed all its subsections, and having asked certain questions of my hon. Friend the Minister of State, I think that I can, with a degree of confidence, recommend it to the House.

11 am

Mr. Kimball

It is with some trepidation that I speak on this new clause. I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg)— who is also my political neighbour—for his lucid and erudite explanation. It is significant that two Members who represent the same county are involved in the consideration of this legislation. It shows how strongly Lincolnshire feels about today's Order Paper and this measure.

Although the electors in Grantham and Gainsborough feel strongly about the issue, I should hate to create the impression that we in Lincolnshire are a bucolic lot. We are not. We are worried about an increase in drinking outlets, not about their closure. At the end of March, a whole Friday was devoted to considering the eight P's of the countryside—the parson, the postmistress and so on. Among those people was the publican. Publicans are important because they keep local communities going. We in Lincolnshire suffer because we do not have the eight P's in the villages. However, I do not wish to create the impression that we seek an increase in the number of drinking outlets.

The other place has, as I understand it, but I am not a lawyer, prevented a grave injustice. My hon. Friends the Members for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) and for Scarborough (Mr. Shaw) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Sir R. Bell) are all trained in the law. As a layman, I was impressed when I heard them make clear that a grave injustice would have been committed if the Bill had not been amended.

Earlier, I misled the House because I did not have the benefit of the presence of my hon. Friend the Member for Burton. As a layman, I said that the licensing court sat only at the brewster sessions. I think that I said that one had only one opportunity of appealing to the licensing court. I wish to put the record straight. I understand that the licensing justices sit four times a year. The fact that an appeal can be made to the Crown court is an advantage as the Crown court is always available and is non-political. However, I shall not stray on to that subject as it has been covered well by my hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield.

All hon. Members will be grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) as he has carried on the famous traditions of this House. He is willing to accept an important amendment that will prevent a major injustice.

Mr. Raison

The Government believe that it is only just that there should be a right of appeal to the Crown court against decisions made by the licensing justices and the magistrates in relation to restricting the operation and revocation of special hours certificates. Such decisions will affect not only the livelihood of the operators but also the environmental comfort of the community. The Government also think it right that all interested parties should enjoy the right of appeal. We find the amendment quite acceptable.

Several points have been raised during a spirited debate. The hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Cunningham) asked whether the provision brings the right of appeal into line with other rights of appeal in discretionary decisions in this area. I confirm that it does.

My hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg) spoke at greater length. His interpretation of the amendments has been of the accuracy that we would expect of a lawyer of his calibre. Concern was shown about who could appeal. As has emerged from the debate, this is a slightly complicated issue. In order to answer that point, one must look at the original Bill as well as at Lords amendment No. 2. In clause 3 there is a new section 81A under which there is a general power for licensing justices—or, for members' clubs, magistrates—to impose conditions. Anyone may appear in the proceedings if the original tribunal will hear him. If so, he can appeal.

Under section 81A(2), 81(2) and 81(4) of the principal Act—which allows the chief officer to apply for revocation—only he can apply for a condition once a certificate has been granted. Only he can appeal in that situation. I think that that confirms my hon. Friend's interpretations. I congratulate him on his erudition and diligence. The Lords amendments are helpful and sensible, and we certainly support them.

Mr. Trotter

With the leave of the House, may I say that the appeal procedure was not in the original Bill, because this valid argument had not been raised. In the past there has been no right of appeal against a revocation of a special hours certificate. When it was suggested that such a right of appeal should exist against the imposition of conditions it seemed right to consider whether there should also be an appeal against the original power of revocation. The amendment will provide a right of appeal against the imposition of conditions and also give the right of appeal against revocation. The situation has therefore been improved immeasurably. It has been said that those concerned with legislation should know what it means.

Mr. Lawrence

That applies to revocation but not to the conditions attached to the justices' licence. Section 21 of the Licensing Act 1964 provides a right of appeal against decisions on the conditions.

Mr. Trotter

That is absolutely correct. It is important that those outside the House of Commons should know what laws are being passed. We wish to know the views of outsiders when we debate Bills. I do not wish to filibuster, but I should like to mention en passant the Tyne and Wear [Lords] Bill. It proposed to make masters of ships liable for the bills incurred by the owner of ships entering the port of Sunderland. It was only because that provision was spotted that the clause was withdrawn. Master mariners would not have spotted that point. More thought should be given to measures before they become law.

Several hon. Members have raised the question of complexity. My hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough (Mr. Shaw) said that this was a simple Bill. I am not an expert on licensing law, but I have spent about three years on the Bill and I quickly found out that licensing was extremely complex. We are being forced to refer to many different measures on licensing law. I believe that we need a consolidation measure. I therefore hope that the Government will present such a measure.

Mr. Lawrence

I made a point about complexity on Second Reading. The Erroll committee was set up to consider the complexities of licensing legislation, and it reported in 1970. Does not my hon. Friend feel that it is inexcusable that nothing has been done about it? Does he not share my view that it is time that the Government applied their mind to the total reform of licensing law? They should consider the well-intended and sensible suggestions for simplifying the procedures that the Erroll committee put forward. Will he join me in asking my hon. Friend the Minister to say some- thing about his intention to implement at least some parts of those recommendations?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. This is not a Third Reading debate. The Minister has already spoken once. The hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) is speaking for a second time by leave of the House and he should not be tempted into discussing the whole of the licensing law.

Mr. Trotter

I will be guided by your advice, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

My hon, Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg) expounded in the most erudite way the complexities of the Bill and the amendments. He referred to the loss that would be suffered by a person who had a special hours certificate if there were conditions imposed. We are talking about enormous sums of money. At some of these establishments there are 4,000 people present at the same time. If a place such as that is to have its certificate withdrawn or conditions for shorter hours imposed it will suffer enormous losses.

The need to deal with the late night nuisance in urban areas has been foremost in my mind during discussions on this part of the Bill. I take the point that even in Lincolnshire from time to time there have been troubles, even if there are not as many pubs there as there used to be. All over the country there has been excessive trouble at night caused by late-night drinking. This is not due to the well-run establishment; it is caused by the fly-by-night operators. This Bill will help to deal with that problem, not least because for the first time it brings in the condition that magistrates may have regard to disturbances outside the premises and not just inside. That will be a great help to magistrates in improving the position.

Finally, there has been a genuine feeling of concern expressed in this debate by all the hon. Members that this measure is necessary. I pay tribute to those who have supported me, not just now, but throughout the proceedings, not least Mr. Martin the editor of "Paterson's Licensing Acts".

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 3 and 4 agreed to.

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