HC Deb 16 March 1971 vol 813 cc1199-296
5 (1) In determining, for the purposes of Part II of this Act, any question as to the reason, or principal reason, for which a worker was dismissed, penalised, or otherwise discriminated against, or any question whether the reason or principal reason for which a worker was dismissed was a good reason or whether the employer acted reasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing him,—
(a) no account shall be taken of any pressure which, by means of any action to which this section applies, was exercised on the employer to dismiss, penalise or otherwise discriminate against the worker, and
(b) any such question shall be determined as if no such pressure had been exercised.
10 (2) This section applies to action of any of the following descriptions, that is to say
(a) calling, organising, procuring or financing a strike, or threatening to do so;
(b) organising, procuring or financing any irregular industrial action short of a strike, or threatening to do so.
15 (3) It shall be an unfair industrial practice for any person (including any trade union or other organisation of workers or any official of a trade union or of such an organisation) to take any action to which this section applies, if the purpose or principal purpose for which that action is taken is—
20 (a) to induce an employer, or a person acting on behalf of an employer, to take any action which (whether by virtue of subsection (1) of this section or otherwise) is 20 or would be an unfair industrial practice, in accordance with section 5(2) or section 20(1) of this Act, on the part of the employer or of the person acting on the employer's behalf, or
25 (b) to induce an employer to comply with any provision in an agreement in so far as that provision is void by virtue of subsection (1) of section 7 of this Act, or to induce an employer to enter into an agreement consisting of or including a provision which would be void by virtue of that subsection, or
(c) to induce an employer or an employers' association to join in making an application under Part I of Schedule (Provisions as to certain closed shop agreements) to this Act.
30 (4) In this Act 'irregular industrial action short of a strike' means any concerted course of conduct (other than a strike) which, in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute,—
(a) is carried on by a group of workers with the intention of preventing, reducing or otherwise interfering with the production of goods or the provision of services, and
35 (b) in the case of some or all of them, is carried on in breach of their contracts of employment or (where they are not employees) in breach of their terms and conditions of service.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

3.54 p.m.

The Solicitor-General (Sir Geoffrey Howe)

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker

Hon. Members will see from my list of provisional selection that it will be in order to discuss at the same time the following:

New Clause 4—"Contribution to compensation on complaint under s. 94"— and Government Amendments Nos. 10, 12, 13, 17, 77, 78, 84 and 103.

The Solicitor-General

New Clauses 2 and 4 do not make any far-reaching changes in the structure of the Bill. They are, however, a logical and fair development of the proposals which the House has already accepted.

Hon. Members have already accepted the proposition that an individual who is unfairly dismissed is entitled to a remedy. That is in Clause 20. Hon. Members have already accepted the proposition that an individual who is discriminated against because of his exercise of trade union rights is entitled to a remedy. That is in Clause 5. Hon. Members have accepted that an individual can be deprived of those rights or interfered with in the exercise of those rights not only by an employer but also by means of industrial pressure brought to bear on his employer. That proposition is implicit in Clauses 6 and 25.

There is no doubt, in the light of those propositions, that a dismissal or discrimination that is induced by industrial pressure can be unfair and is something in respect of which a remedy is necessary. A discrimination of that kind could be procured by industrial pressure not only because of the individual's membership or non-membership of a trade union, about which there are differences between the two sides of the House, but on discriminatory grounds because of his sex, race or religion, and that is recognised under other legislation.

In all these cases the individual needs a remedy against those responsible for the discrimination from which he suffers, and the employer who is being encouraged to discriminate in this sort of way by industrial pressure also needs a remedy to prevent unfair pressure of this kind.

Those are the propositions which have already been recognised in Clauses 6 and 25, but those two Clauses do not, as drafted, entirely cover the field where it is necessary to provide a remedy. There is, first, a certain amount of overlap between the two Clauses, and, secondly, Clause 25 in particular puts it on the employee to prove an all-or-nothing situation. It is for him to get an order under that Clause, and he must show that the discrimination or dismissal was induced by industrial action in plain terms. If he fails to do so, he gets no remedy under the Clause. Under that Clause he would also have to bring proceedings in the National Industrial Relations Court, and that seems to place undue difficulties in the way of the employee.

We intend by these new proposals to improve the position of the employee, and we also intend to make sure that, in conjunction with new Clause 3, an employer has two clear remedies in respect of discrimination of this kind; namely, that induced by industrial action or the threat of it. First—this is where new Clause 3 comes in—it makes it plain that the employer can apply for an order to restrain industrial action that is trying to get him to act unfairly. Secondly—this is where new Clause 4 takes effect—an order can enable an employer who has been ordered to pay compensation to an unfairly dismissed or discriminated against individual to secure contributions from those who induced him by industrial action to act unfairly in that way so far as that is a just and fair conclusion.

These provisions recognise the reality of the situation—that although in some cases it is plainly the employer who acts unfairly and who is solely responsible for acting unfairly to secure the dismissal of or discrimination against an employee, there are other cases in which that sort of result is brought about by industrial action organised on such a scale and in such a way as to be unfair to the individual and to the employer, who finds himself placed between the individual and those who organised that sort of industrial action.

4.0 p.m.

I will explain the object of these two Clauses. The opportunity has been taken of drawing together the various provisions which apply to the inducing of unfair dismissal or unfair discrimination. To draw them to the attention of the House, Clause 6 of the Bill is to be repealed and that is the subject of Amendment 10. Clause 7(2) that is the Clause which makes it an unfair practice to organise industrial action to induce entry into a closed shop is also to be repealed and is the subject of Amendments 12 and 13. Clause 25 dealing with the question of it being unfair to organise industrial action to procure dismissal is also to be removed and is the subject of Amendment 70. Clauses 6, 7(2) and 25 will all reappear in a more compact form in the provisions of new Clause 2(2), (3) and (4) with a couple of additions which I will explain later.

Subsection (2) identifies the kind of industrial action which can be unfair and in respect of which the new Clause can operate. It does so in a way familiar to the House from a number of other Clauses in the Bill, Clauses 6, 86 and 87. The Clause applies to the "calling, organising, procuring or financing a strike" or any irregular industrial action short of a strike or threatening to do so.

Subsection (4) reuproduces the definition of "irregular industrial action short of a strike", which was in Clause 6(2) which is to be repealed. There is one addition to the definition of irregular industrial action short of a strike which appears at the very end of this new Clause. The words added are: … or (where they are not employees) in breach of their terms and conditions of service. so as to make it plain that collective action of that form can take place as a result of the activities of workers other than employees who are employed on terms and conditions of service rather than under contracts of employment.

That brings it in line with the other parts of the Bill. There is a corresponding Amendment, Amendment 103, which simply replaces the reference in the definition Clause 149 to explain where irregular industrial action short of a strike is to be defined. Subsection (3) identifies the situations in which industrial action can be unfair. Subsection (3)(a) identifies Clauses 5 and 20 as situations in which industrial action could be unfair if the action is taken or threatened to induce an employer or a person acting on behalf of an employer to take any action which would be an unfair industrial practice, in accordance with Clause 5(2) as we have already discussed it, or under Clause 21 as we have already discussed it.

Subsection (3)(b) reproduces the provision from Clause 7(2) about it being unfair to organise industrial action to enforce a closed shop. Subsection (3)(c) is the matter which the House discussed yesterday and which the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) referred to in his opening speech. It is also to be unfair to organise industrial action to induce an employer or employers' association to join in the making of a closed shop agreement. Those are the matters which draw together the two additions I have explained, the provisions which are being replaced.

The effective provision of new Clause 2 is in subsection (1). That provides that when the question has to be considered as to whether a person has been unfairly dismissed, or discriminated against, where the employee is claiming or alleging unfair discrimination or unfair dismissal, in considering whether it is unfair, the tribunal will disregard any industrial action or threat of it. The tribunal will simply consider, on the merits, whether the dismissal or discrimination can be identified as fair or unfair. From the point of view of the employee bringing the claim in that situation it is all one to him whether the employer is acting unfairly against him, off his own bat, or because he is being induced or persuaded to do so.

In the first instance, and this is the effect of subsection (1) it is made plain that the employee who brings a claim brings his claim against the employer and the question has to be answered: Can the employer establish a fair ground for dismissal quite apart from whether he is subject to any industrial pressure? There is a matching change in Clause 103 made by Amendment 84. This requires the same test to be applied in any case brought under Clause 103. The question as it arises, before we come to new Clause 4, is: Can the employee establish a claim either because of discrimination or unfair dismissal by the employer, whether or not the employer was persuaded or induced to act by industrial action?

Mr. Stanley Orme (Salford, West)

Did the hon. and learned Gentleman say that we had discussed Clause 21?

The Solicitor-General


Mr. Orme

I thought the Solicitor-General said that we had discussed it, but I cannot remember discussing it in Committee.

The Solicitor-General

I did not say that. I said that the House had discussed Clause 6.

Mr. John Mendelson (Penistone)

The hon. and learned Member will find tomorrow that he said quite distinctly that we had discussed Clause 21. Let it be on the record now that we have had no opportunity of discussing that important Clause.

The Solicitor-General

My right hon. Friend tells me I did say that. If I did say it it was an oversight. What we were discussing was the proposition contained in Clauses 5 and 20 corresponding to Clauses 6 and 21. If I implied or appeared to imply that we had discussed Clause 21 I withdraw that.

The propositions I have referred to in Clauses 5, 6 and 7 have all been discussed and are reproduced here. The effective provision of the new Clause is that which I have explained under subsection (1). The fresh thought comes in in new Clause 4 dealing with the employers' right to obtain a contribution from any person or organisation who has induced him to act unfairly against an employee, if it is just and equitable that that should happen.

I will explain this new Clause quite shortly. The circumstances in which new Clause 4 operates are defined in subsection (1). First of all, it is a situation where a tribunal is making an award to the individual because, from his point of view, he has been unfairly treated. Secondly it is the situation where the employer claims that his action has been procured by indusetrial action and thirdly it is a situation when it is established that industrial action was unfair as I have explained it under new Clause 2.

In those circumstances subsection (2) of new Clause 4 makes it plain that the employer may join the person or organisation who was bringing pressure to hear upon him to get him to act in that unfair way, and in these circumstances the industrial tribunal or court may, if it considered that it would be just and equitable to do so, make an order requiring that third party, the organiser or organisations responsible for the unfair industrial action, to contribute to the compensation payable to the individual. The extent of the contribution is set out in subsection (3) as such amount as is just and equitable, amounting, although this might be unusual, to a complete indemnity in certain circumstances.

There are certain additional points to note about new Clause 4. First of all, subsection (4) protects the official of a registered union from any personal liability in the same way as is done by corresponding provisions elsewhere in the Bill, but leaves it open to the court or tribunal to order an organisation to pay such compensation in a way with which the House will be familiar from other provisions.

Subsection (3) makes it plain, and this is an important part of the way in which the two Clauses are constructed, that the primary liability for unfair treatment of an individual, of whatever kind we are concerned with, is on the employer but, and this is where we part company from the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) and her provisions in this respect, if that employer can show that some part of the responsibility for what has happened to the individual, who has won his case, so to speak, rests with an organisation or with other people who have promoted industrial action to bring about just that unfair result, that organisation or organiser of industrial action can be required to contribute to the compensation that is awarded to the individual.

We believe that this is a central and sensible provision. It accords with the realities of industrial life. Just as employers can act unfairly, whether by dismissal or discrimination, so organisations can conceive unfair purposes and seek to strike or organise industrial action against employers as a means of producing an unfair result for an individual—

Mr. John Mendelson


The Solicitor-General

The hon. Member interrupts by saying, "Unfair", but what has first to be established in this situation is that the individual has won his case against the employer and has established the proposition that he has been unfairly dismissed. That is the first premise. If the individual puts himself in a position where he can show that his employer has treated him unfairly the provisions of Clauses 20 and 22 apply, but when the employer can show that he was prompted and pressed by industrial action into acting like that we believe it to be entirely right that those who organised that industrial action with a view of producing that result should contribute to such extent as is fair to such compensation as the individual receives.

That is nothing more than recognition of the realities of industrial life. It does not involve the proposition that trade unions or organisations of workers are generally unfair, any more than it involves the proposition that employers are generally unfair. But just as an individual employer, just as an employing corporation, can sometimes act unfairly, so we believe that organisations of workers and those who lead them can similarly act, and try to make other people act, unfairly, and we are closing our eyes to the facts of industrial life if we choose to ignore it.

Mrs. Barbara Castle (Blackburn)

But is not the hon. and learned Gentleman closing his eyes to the effect of the Bill; namely, that in it the Government have taken their own entirely arbitrary definition of "unfair", and applied it to such natural, and certainly not contrary to natural law, situations as sympathetic action, or action by unionists who refuse to work next to non-unionists?

The Solicitor-General

The right hon. Lady has made that point in other contexts before, but it has no validity in the context of this Clause, because for the provisions of new Clause 4 to come into play so as to entitle the employer to seek a contribution from the organisation of workers, the dismissed or discriminated against employee has to show as against his employer that he was unfairly treated. The only way in which hon. Members opposite can quarrel with that concept in this part of the Bill is on the grounds that by Clause 5 we give to an individual the right, subject to the qualifications contained in the agency shop provision, not to belong to a union. If that modest proposition—

Mr. Orme

Modest—this is the centre of the whole thing.

4.15 p.m.

The Solicitor-General

—on which we spent so much time is to be regarded as invalidating this entirely sensible provision, I can only express astonishment. But the central purpose of the Clause is that if an individual is dismissed by an employer in circumstances which are unfair, as between him and the employer, someone else who causes that situation should, if it is right, be required to contribute to it.

Mr. Orme

The Solicitor-General should recognise that people in industry are not dismissed for being trade unionists or for being activists. The employer finds some excuse for dismissing a trade unionist, and those working alongside decide whether or not he has been unfairly dismissed. Sometimes they take action and sometimes they do not. The hon. and learned Gentleman is denying them taking that basic action.

The Solicitor-General

I am not denying them taking that action without providing any alternative remedy. We do not believe that we have to continue living in a world in which decisions as to the fairness or unfairness of dismissal have to be taken by resort to the crude and destructive methods of industrial action when alternative remedies are available. We are here providing a fair and sensible system whereby anyone who complains of unfair dismissal can go to the tribunal, and if he shows that he has been dismissed and there is any suggestion that he has been dismissed because of his participation in trade union activities, or anything of that sort, he is entitled to compensation from the employer and, indeed, entitled to be re-engaged to the same extent as under the provisions foreshadowed by Donovan.

We are here providing a system to defend the rights of individuals, and we cannot believe that it is impossible or intolerable to ask the trade union movement as well as the country to accept that this is a sensible alternative, so that in the resolution of this kind of dispute the resort to industrial action becomes a weapon that is not a weapon of first resort but is replaced by a civilised code and a civilised framework for the resolution of these matters.

Mr. Sydney Bidwell (Southall)

The hon. and learned Gentleman raises an extremely important point. In the event of a blackleg in a strike being subsequently dismissed by an employer the allegation might be that because he was a blackleg in the strike the action had been induced by the trade union. But in normal industrial practice today there are sometimes mitigating circumstances, and workers, notwithstanding having to come back to work with former blacklegs, do in some circumstances forgive and forget. In other cases bitterness arises. The employer meets that situation, if he is a solid and sensible person, by perhaps finding the blackleg worker alternative employment elsewhere. But in such circumstances as the hon. and learned Gentleman is outlining; wholesale advantage could be taken of this provision by employers to saddle the union or union organiser with these responsibilities. The employer must always take the prime responsibility. He is the agent of dismissal and the agent of hiring and firing.

The Solicitor-General

That is precisely why the Clause puts the primary responsibility on the employer, and the third party, the organiser of industrial action, comes into play only when the individual has established his right of remedy against the employer, and the organiser of industrial action comes into play only to the extent that it is right and fair for him to be brought in to share the liability. The hon. Gentleman suggests that the resolution of disputes that can arise after the settlement of a strike, the redeployment of a labour force in order to accommodate friction between those who take part in a strike and those who do not take part in a strike—"blacklegs" as the hon. Gentleman chooses to call them—is something for tranquil and reasonable action between reasonable men.

If that were so, and if the House and the country were satisfied that that was what always happened, there would be scarcely any need for these provisions. Unhappily, however, the House and the country know very well that in this kind of situation cases do arise of wholly unfair and intolerable discrimination against individuals who are doing no more than assert reasonable, sensible and loyal positions. It is only right for those individuals to have access to this kind of remedy within the framework which we are proposing. If it be a sledgehammer to crack a nut, the hon. Gentleman need not be worried about it. In fact, it is an important and legitimate provision to secure fair play for the individual.

Anyone who believes that the whole of our industrial life is conducted without unfairnesses ever being inflicted or attempted upon the individual by a trade union or by organisations of workers—which is the position adopted by hon. Members opposite, while they believe, at the same time, that our industrial life is so unfair that individuals need to be provided with remedies against their employers—is looking at the world with a totally blinkered view.

Organisations, be they organisations of employers or organisations of workers, can be unfair. One has only to read the newspapers day after day at this time to see the way in which unfairnesses can be inflicted upon individuals by organisations of this kind. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about the newspapers?"] I hear one hon. Member opposite mutter, "The newspapers". One has only to read the letters one receives—I know that this is true of the mail received by my right hon. and hon. Friends—to find case after case in which people are identifying situations in which they are being treated unfairly. All we are saying is that the justice which is to be provided by the Bill should be justice available against anyone who can be shown in fact to have acted unfairly, with responsibility being properly apportioned.

I come back again to the point that there can be liability upon the inducing organisation only if, in the first case, the dismissal by the employer was unfair. If there is no liability on the employer, if he has good cause for the dismissal or the discrimination, that is an end of the matter, and in that situation still less is there any possibility of the organisers of industrial action being under any liability at all.

I return to a theme which was, understandably, mentioned by hon. Members opposite in our earlier debates. It was suggested then that in some cases an individual may behave unsafely, dangerously or incompetently, and in those circumstances, it was said, it is perfectly right and natural for those who are working with him, and those who organise them, to go to the employer and say in plain terms, "That man is a menace. If you allow him to remain on this site any longer, we will not stand for it." We had a graphic illustration put to us by one hon. Gentleman opposite in our earlier debates.

In those circumstances, if the employer chooses, as one expects he would, to dismiss the person who had been identified as incompetent, dangerous or unsafe, there can be no question of that dismissal being regarded as unfair on the part of the employer. It would be a perfectly good case of dismissing someone whom the employer could establish—no doubt, with the support of the union—was incompetent, unsafe or dangerous, and, if it is fair for the employer to dismiss such a person, again there can be no question of industrial action to secure his dismissal being identified as unfair.

I come back to the point that it is only when the dismissal or discrimination by the employer is capable of being established as itself unfair to the individual that these two Clauses provide for a contribution by those who organise industrial action to produce that unfair result, to such extent as makes sense. This is doing no more than provide for a fair and reasonable distribution of liability towards the individual victim of unfair discrimination; liability, that is, for the compensation to which he would certainly be entitled.

Mr. Harold Walker (Doncaster)

I begin by congratulating the Solicitor-General on the admirable and deft manner in which he weaved his way from Clause to Clause and subsection to subsection, particularly in the opening part of his speech. I could not help looking at the faces of some of his hon. and learned Friends, distinguished lawyers in their own right. Their blank looks were testimony to the difficulty under which I was labouring at the same time.

The Solicitor-General is not only a distinguished lawyer but he is, I understand, the architect of the Bill, and it would be astonishing if he did not know his own Bill as he has demonstrated this afternoon, but I wonder how the trade union officials and shop stewards to whom the Bill applies will have the slightest hope of starting to understand its complications if we in the House labour under such difficulties in trying to understand the complexities of this Measure. With every new Clause, Schedule and Amendment, and with every new cross-reference, this complex fabric becomes tattier. It is beginning to look distinctly ragged at the edges.

The Solicitor-General has repeatedly referred to the realities of industry. If I may say so—I say it without in any way wishing to be deprecatory or derogatory to him—some of us can claim to have somewhat more authentic knowledge when we speak on the realities of industry than the Solicitor-General can. He really does not understand the realities of industry.

I am at one with the hon. and learned Gentleman when he talks about his desire, indeed, our desire—I am sure that I can speak for hon. Members on both sides here—to establish remedies against flagrant injustice. If these two new Clauses were designed to do just that, he would find a not unsympathetic response from the Opposition. But they do not do that. They go far beyond that.

It is right to stress at the outset that all of us, while we abhor injustice, have come across situations in which to remedy one injustice can only create another and greater injustice. This is part of the reality of industrial relations. We find in industry the truth of the old adage that a chain is as strong as its weakest link.

Very often, the weak link in the chain is the non-unionist, the blackleg. For that reason, unless all the workers in a particular establishment are to be exposed to injustice, injustice against which they can defend themselves only by having good trade union organisation, they have to put pressure on an individual to join a union. This is part of the reality which the right hon. Gentleman does not see. I apologise to the Solicitor-General and the House for miscalling him. He is not a right hon. Gentleman, he is not a Privy Councillor—he is neither a privy nor a councillor—he is an honourable and learned Gentleman.

What I am putting accords more closely with the reality of industry, with which I am familiar, than it does with what the hon. and learned Gentleman has been describing as the reality. I am sure that he will agree that both these new Clauses set out to diminish the power of trade unions and trade unionists to put pressure on employers. Indeed, he said so, and that is how both Clauses are styled. But trade unions are nothing if they are not pressure groups. It is not their only function, but it is their main function to be a pressure group.

The principal object of the pressure which trade unions apply is the employer. Pressurising employers is one of the main functions of a trade union. By and large, their effectiveness is a reflection of their ability to pressurise, and in so far as this or any other parts of the Bill are designed to reduce that ability to pressurise, they are aimed at weakening the trade unions. That cannot be denied.

It may be argued, though I have serious doubts about the strength of the argument, that subsection (1) of new Clause No. 2 might possibly be construed as conceding something to the unions' side of the argument. It might be said that by compelling the employer to stand on his own, depriving him of the opportunity to find a scapegoat when he is seeking a reason for having dismissed a worker, it could to that extent deter an employer from acting hastily or without sound and just reason. This also falls into the pattern of the Government's general philosophy of compelling people to stand on their own feet and thus to harden their attitude and position in particular situations.

4.30 p.m.

As the Solicitor-General, by implication, conceded, if I understood his speech, this exemption from, "Do not blame me", only applies to the determination of the reason for the dismissal. It seems that that is much more than offset by the provisions of new Clause 4, which the Solicitor-General described, whereby the employer, as outlined to us, can have the union dragged before the Industrial Court or before the tribunal not only to carry the can but also to foot the bill.

The Solicitor-General joins his right hon. Friend in consistently reiterating his belief, no doubt sincerely held, that people in industry should be members of their trade unions. They equally repeatedly insist that they do not want to detract from or diminish the role or function of trade unions. But we heard the Solicitor-General condemning the crude and destructive methods used by unions, and presumably this is what the Government are tilting at. They prefer peaceful persuasion as a method of carrying out their functions. So do we all. When does peaceful persuasion cross that hazy frontier and become inducement? When does it cease to be legitimate and become illegitimate? It seems that it is extremely difficult for lawyers, let alone laymen like us, to distinguish between the two.

We see again resurrected in the new Clause this minefield of irregular industrial action short of a strike. In our earlier debates we did not have an adequate explanation of some of the examples that were put before the House. One of my hon. Friends has referred to the difficulties arising from, for example, the refusal of people in a factory to cooperate with the non-unionist. I am not talking of the "down tools if he comes in" attitude, but of the situation which will arise on the assumption that there is an acceptance of the provisions of the Bill, where the trade unions in an establishment, confronted with the man exercising his new-found right under Clause 5 and saying, "I shall not be a trade uninist", accept this but say, "All right, we will just not co-operate with him. We will not deliberately send him to Coventry, but you can lead a horse to water but you cannot make it drink."

Life in a factory is essentially a social business. It is only tolerable when people can work effectively and efficiently in association and co-operation with each other, with the ordinary give and take of industrial life, where mate helps mate, where they swap tools, help each other out, and so on. The reality of the industrial situation is that it is intolerable for an individual to try to work alongside people who do not want anything to do with him. I ask the Solicitor-General to say whether that irregular industrial action short of a strike may constitute an unfair industrial action under the provisions of new Clause 2.

There are other new weapons in the trade unionist's armoury these days. I am not merely talking about working to rule, although my understanding of "working to rule", which presumably is construed as one of the irregular actions short of an actual strike, is that this was a decision to do what one ought to do anyhow in the first place, to observe the rules of working. It is a sad commentary that it becomes an effective industrial weapon, because so often in our industrial life generally, in the interests of efficiency and production, or perhaps under the coercion of piecework prices, people go beyond what the rules require them to do and often expose themselves to risks of all kinds. I am thinking of the new weapon used recently by draughtsmen up and down the country, that it, working without enthusiasm. I confess that this was a fairly common feature of my industrial life when I worked in a factory, but I never dreamed of it being used as an industrial bargaining weapon. Apparently it has some potency. In that situation, how can one define "lack of enthusiasm"? The Government are getting themselves into what seems a hopeless quagmire because of their inability to recognise the new answers to the industrial situation.

Exactly what does new Clause 2(3)(c) mean? That contains the provision that it shall be an unfair industrial practice to induce an employer or an employer's association to join in making an application to establish an approved closed shop. Surely the Government cannot mean that it can be an unfair industrial action, exposed to action in the Industrial Court or before the tribunal, for shop stewards or trade union officials to say to an employer, "We have here all the conditions for a closed shop, post-entry. Will you join with us in making an application to have this ratified and formalised?" It seems that that is exactly what the new Clause says. I shall not pursue that point because there is an Amendment on the Order Paper which no doubt will be moved later.

On new Clause 4, I remind the House that the same hazards which I have been describing arising in new Clause 2 exist in new Clause 4, but in a new kind of situation, because now there is being written into the Bill an open invitation to employers seeking to dismiss a worker to use the trade union or the shop steward as a scapegoat. It seems to go even beyond that. As I understand it, even a shop steward who is carrying out his normal union recruiting functions can land himself in trouble with the combined provisions of new Clauses 2 and 4.

The shop steward is the principal recruitment agent for the union. The rulebook of my own union, the A.E.F., imposes such an obligation on the shop steward. The requirement is that he shall ensure that all persons working in the particular workplace where he functions shall be the members of the trade union. It seems that he is running the risk of landing himself before the National Industrial Relations Court or the tribunal if he carries out his responsibility and seeks to peacefully persuade the worker to become a member of the trade union. But more than that, and perhaps most offensive of all, is that the Clause deliberately reproduces—

The Solicitor-General

To suggest that a shop steward or anybody else could have any liability for seeking peacefully to persuade somebody to be a member of the trade union is a grotesque misunderstanding of the provisions of the Bill, because the provisions of this Clause and new Clause 4 apply only in respect of calling, organising, procuring or financing a strike, or threatening to do so in order to bring about the dismissal of someone because he will not belong to a union. But any kind of persuasion directed or addressed to the employer or to the individual to belong to a union is entirely fair, and, indeed, persuasion by the employer of the individual to join a union, and there is no foundation to the suggestion that the hon. Gentleman puts forward.

Mr. Walker

If the Solicitor-General says that I have misunderstood the Bill and that the situation to which I have referred could not arise, I am happy. I said that I was taking new Clauses 2 and 4 together for the purpose of making this point. New Clause 2(3) provides: (3) It shall be an unfair industrial practice for any person to take any action to which this section applies, if the purpose or principal purpose for which that action is taken is—

  1. (a) to induce an employer, or a person acting on behalf of an employer, to take any action which is or would be an unfair industrial practice, in accordance with section 5(2)…"
Clause 5(2) provides: It shall accordingly be an unfair industrial practice for any employer, or for any person acting on behalf of an employer,—
  1. (a) to prevent or deter a worker from exercising any of the rights conferred on him by subsection (1) of this section".
Clause 5(1) gives a person a statutory right not to belong to a trade union.

I may be wrong as the Solicitor-General says, but I believe that the cold black and white print says that anybody who is held by the courts to be seeking to interfere with an individual's right not to belong to a union is guilty of an unfair industrial action.

The Solicitor-General

There is a misunderstanding on the hon. Gentleman's part. This arises on new Clause 2 (3), and this is common to the Bill: It shall be an unfair industrial practice for any person … to take any action to which this section applies for the purpose of inducing an employer to disregard a man's right not to belong to a union, as the hon. Gentleman put it. It is only to take any action to which this section applies". Subsection (2) says: This section applies to action of any of the following descriptions, that is to say—

  1. (a) calling, organising, procuring … a strike".
It is only the organisation of industrial action that is taken to induce an employer to discriminate that can be unfair. Peaceful persuasion by the employer, by a shop steward, by people of each other, persuasion by the employer because he has entered into an agency shop agreement—all that is entirely fair. The only restraint is upon the organisation of industrial action designed to infringe a worker's right either to belong or not to belong, subject to the agency shop provision. It must go as far as the organisation of industrial action as defined before there can be any shadow of suspicion of its being unfair.

Mr. Walker

The Solicitor-General suggests that I have it wrong. I was about to go on to describe what would happen in the normal course of industrial practice where the shop steward seeks to carry the obligation imposed on him by the rules of his union and where the trade unionists in the factory say to him, "We are unhappy about this situation", as a result of which the steward must go and inform the employer. If the Solicitor-General tells me that I have it wrong and that the shop steward's seeking to persuade the employer that he ought to have the man in and say to him, "It would be good sense if you fell in line" would not the inducing the employer to commit the offence or the unfair industrial practice, I am prepared to accept the Solicitor-General's word.

As I said at the outset, we are dealing with an extremely complex matter. If the Solicitor-General says that its com- plexity has beaten my understanding, I will accept his word. No doubt in the course of the debate we shall examine this carefully and when we sum up from this side we shall be able to determine whether the Solicitor-General's words are reconcilable with the provisions of the new Clauses.

4.45 p.m.

The most fundamental characteristic of new Clause 4 is that it deliberately reverses Parliament's decision in 1965 when, in the Trade Disputes Act of that year, it sought to protect unions from the situation which had arisen from the Rookes v. Barnard decision. The Government are now writing into a Bill the situation which was responsible for the Rookes v. Barnard decision. All the arguments in favour of protecting unions against a recurrence of Rookes v. Barnard were presented to and accepted by the House in 1965. The Government are deliberately reversing that situation.

Mr. David Mitchell (Basingstoke)

Hear, hear.

Mr. Walker

Apparently I have it absolutely right and hon. Members opposite think that the decision of Parliament taken in 1965 should he reversed. Parliament took the trouble to take that decision then because it realised the great risk to which trade unions were exposed and realised that the threat to unions represented by the Rookes v. Barnard decision was likely to put trade unions back into the Taff Vale decision era. Presumably the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell), judging by his warm "Hear, hear", wants to create that situation and wants to see trade union strength diminished to the very dramatic extent to which it was diminished by the Rookes v. Barnard decision.

Mr. Mitchell

The hon. Gentleman suggests that I wish to see trade unions weakened. I hope that he will accept it from me that I said, "Hear, hear" because of the prospect of the taking out of the Statute Book that disgraceful and disreputable piece of legislation of 1965 which permitted a union to use intimidation to gain membership.

Mr. Walker

The object of the 1965 Act was to protect trade unions from the vulnerability to which they had become exposed, a vulnerability which threatened to emasculate them and deprive them of their real bargaining power. The hon. Gentleman said "Hear, hear" to the prospect of a return to that situation.

As I said at the outset, whilst deploring injustices against individuals we must recognise that the redressing of injustices can sometimes create a much greater injustice.

These Clauses are designed deliberately to place severe restrictions on long established and wholly legitimate industrial relations practices. They are designed to diminish the pressurising power of trade unions and to that extent are designed deliberately to weaken them. For that reason, at the end of the day we on this side will feel compelled to divide the House against them.

Mr. David Mitchell

In an effort to re-establish an accord across the Chamber with the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker), may I immediately join him in regretting the complexities of the draftsman's work in this Part of the Bill and, indeed, in much of the Bill. I publicly urge my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to repeat the assurances which I believe were given earlier that this part of the Bill, too, will figure in simple explanatory leaflets about the operation of the Bill when enacted which the Government can at that time issue to trade unions, unionists and management so that they can all see in practical, simple, straightforward, workshop language how the thing will work, what they are able to do, and what they are not able to do. I was a little disturbed to see the Opposition spokesman rubbing his hands and smiling in an anticipatory way as he spoke of the new weapon the trade unions have discovered of working without enthusiasm.

Mr. Alex Eadie (Midlothian)

It is not a new weapon. In Scotland we call it the "Ca'canny", and we have been working it for years.

Mr. Mitchell

That only goes to prove that what is old in Scotland is often new in England a little while later.

When unemployment is giving cause for concern, when one of the major international motor manufacturing giants talks so depressingly about how unattractive is investment in British industry, and when there is desperate need to increase investment for the prosperity of British workers, it is not the appropriate moment for Opposition Front Bench spokesmen to rub their hands over new weapons of working without enthusiasm.

Mr. Harold Walker

Let us be frank. We are talking about Mr. Henry Ford. There is a Ford factory in my constituency, and I am prepared to wager with Henry Ford or the hon. Gentleman that the average time lost by my Ford workers in Doncaster compares very favourably with the average time lost by Henry Ford's boys in the United States. The Secretary of State shakes his head in disagreement. I am prepared to have the same wager with him, if he likes.

Mr. Mitchell

If the hon. Gentleman will make the wager about lost production, then I will take it on. In the United States there are virtually three years of peace while a contract runs. There may be a bad strike at the end, but the factory knows that it is coming and works overtime so that production is not lost. The wholesalers stock up with models before it starts. Therefore, the real damage to the company and the lost production is far less than that caused by constantly recurring disputes holding up production during the term of the contract, as happens in this country.

Mr. Tom King (Bridgwater)

My hon. Friend is being a little less than fair. Is it not the case that when the U.A.W. strikes it does not strike across the whole industry in the United States? There is not even the certainty of a strike every three years. On the last occasion the union struck only against General Motors and not Ford's.

Mr. Mitchell

I was referring to the Ford Motor Company and the situation which may or may not arise in relation to its American activities.

Mr. Orme

What has this to do with the new Clause?

Mr. Mitchell

My point is perfectly valid, that it is very unfortunate when members of the Opposition show such obvious satisfaction at new methods of disrupting production at a time when this country faces the economic consequences of too much of that sort of activity already.

The purpose of the Clause—

Mr. Orme

Hear, hear.

Mr. Mitchell

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the enthusiasm with which he has greeted my dealing with his hon. Friend and his remarks.

We are dealing with a situation in which a union forces a man's dismissal and the dismissed man sues the employer for compensation, which is awarded because he has been wrongfully dismissed. It is suggested that the union which caused the dismissal should pay or contribute to the compensation. I cannot see anything unreasonable in that.

Mr. Orme

Absolutely irrational.

Mr. Mitchell

Does the hon. Gentleman seek to defend a situation in which a union forces an employer to dismiss someone, and then the employer has to pay compensation to the man? Is he deliberately seeking a way to bring ruin to employers? That is what is sought, to judge by the tenor of remarks being made across the Chamber.

The Clause simply reverses the unfortunate situation created by the 1965 Act. The hon. Member for Doncaster defended that Act. I would perhaps have found some common ground with him had I not sat on the Committee considering that Measure and moved Amendments seeking to limit the Act's scope, so that the union did not have a right to use intimidation to secure recruiting. The then Minister of Labour rejected those Amendments, and the Act specifically permits intimidation to be used as a means to put pressure on employers to dismiss workers if they do not join a union. It must be incompatible with the Bill and with any sense of justice and fairness that intimidation should be used as a legitimate weapon to try to increase trade union recruitment.

In this day and age, with the millions of members that the trade unions have, surely they do not need to sink to intimidation to secure additional membership? I hope that the House will pass the Clause.

Mr. Emlyn Hooson (Montgomery)

Almost inevitably we revert to what are really Second Reading points of general principle, both in our debates in Committee and now. The real question in the matter we are debating is jurisprudence, a problem of what is an injustice. If we take the view point of the hon. Member for Salford, East—

Mr. Orme

Salford, West.

Mr. Hooson

I apologise for getting the hon. Gentleman geographically wrong. I think that I have him emotionally and politically in the right category.

Mr. Orme

Do not say that.

Mr. Hooson

That is not a smear but a compliment. The hon. Gentleman has always maintained that he regards industry as inevitably a struggle between labour and management, which, by the very nature of the relationship, however good-willed people may be, will persist. I understand that he argues from that that therefore injustice to the individual may be necessary to balance the force between labour and management, with the tools of trade at their disposal—capital and otherwise. He feels that the greatest injustice is to blunt in any way the group's ability to enforce its will against the management. I am always obliged to the hon. Gentleman for deepening my understanding of his view point. Having listened to many debates on industrial relations, I think that what I have just said basically represents his view.

Mr. Orme

The hon. and learned Gentleman has put it very fairly. What he is saying, as I have said many times, is that in some instances group freedom is more important than individual freedom in this situation.

Mr. Hooson

I am glad that I have understood the hon. Gentleman.

The real question on the Clauses we are discussing is one of balance. They undoubtedly elevate individual freedom at the expense of group freedom. I do not think that in industrial relations it is possible to ensure total group freedom, or total individual freedom. In any situation of strife there is bound to be injustice, sometimes to a group and sometimes to an individual. The Government's avowed purpose has been to try to redress the balance.

5.0 p.m.

The longer I have listened to the debates on the Bill at all stages, the more I have returned to my original view, expressed on Second Reading, that we have started at the wrong end of the scale in discussing industrial relations. It would have been far better to follow the model of Germany and to have required works councils on the factory floor, where the trouble so often starts. That was the right place to start, but that is not the Government's approach.

I think that the Rookes v. Barnard decision was right. I voted against the 1965 Act, which I thought was unjustified because the right to group freedom was being taken too far. That is my view point, which is substantially different from that of the hon. Member for Salford, West.

Mr. John Mendelson

The hon. and learned Gentleman has an impeccable reactionary record.

Mr. Hooson

Coming from the hon. Gentleman, that is to be regarded as a compliment, because in his view anything slightly to the right of Left wing is reactionary.

The question arises of whether the new Clauses set out fairly the right balance. Much of the trouble with them is caused by the use of the word "induced" in new Clause 2. That is a highly emotive word. I find it very difficult to interpret exactly what it means. What is the difference between "induced" and "persuaded"? A far better word in this context, which might make the Clause much more acceptable, if ever it could be acceptable to hon. Members around me, would be "compel". New Clause 2(3) says: It shall be an unfair industrial practice for any person … to take any action to which this section applies, if the purpose or principal purpose for which that action is taken is—

  1. (a) to induce an employer, …"
The word "induce" follows with regularity thereafter. Everybody knows what "compel" means. We are talking not of the result but of the intention. If the intention is to "compel", the use of that word should meet the situation. To leave "induce" here creates a considerable area for disagreement and uncertainty. As we are dealing with an intention, the words "compel" or "force" would meet some of the doubts I have about whether the Clause fairly balances between group freedom and justice and individual freedom and justice.

Mr. Raymond Gower (Barry)

I have a good deal of sympathy with the hon. and learned Gentleman's suggested use of "compel", but it might not accurately describe what sometimes happens. I think that he will agree that in some cases action would amount to intolerable persuasion; in other words, the pressure on the employer would be such that he could not resist it. In such cases it would not be compulsion but action bringing the employer under intolerable pressure.

Mr. Hooson

The hon. Gentleman misses the point. The word "induced" is qualified by if the purpose or principal purpose … Therefore, we are looking at the intention of the person trying to persuade the employer. If the intention is to compel, the matter is quite simple.

Mr. Gower

I still think that "compel", while conveying something of what the hon. and learned Gentleman has in mind, would be inaccurate in this context. Is my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General satisfied that the new Clause will wholly embrace the sort of case which seems to annoy and distress so many members of the general public outside the normal interplay of employer and employed in factories? It is the sort of case where a trade union is opposed to a strike but local unofficial action is taken. Certain individuals obey their union rather than those who call for unofficial action. Those individuals are subsequently subjected to this kind of pressure through the employer and are given notice and have to leave the firm or even the industry basically for obeying their union. That is the sort of case which seems to many people to be completely without justification.

Mr. James Sillars (Ayrshire, South)

The hon. Gentleman says that the public have been concerned about these cases. Will he give concrete examples of what he has in mind?

Mr. Gower

The hon. Gentleman has seen in the Bible the phrase, "Their name is legion". There have been many cases of this kind in recent years. Several cases have been published. I do not think that it is necessary to know their names. They are truly legion. There are many cases in which individuals have obeyed the wishes of their union but local action has been taken in defiance of those wishes. Would the new Clause embrace such cases? I think that it would.

The Solicitor-General rose

Mr. Eric S. Heffer (Liverpool, Walton)


The Solicitor-General

My hon. Friend the Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) asks whether, on the facts he has put, the new Clause will apply. The facts as I understand them are that someone has been dismissed, in a situation which cannot be justified as fair, as a result of local unofficial industrial action or threatened industrial action. In that situation, the employer could not justify the dismissal. It would be regarded as being unfair and those who had induced the dismissal by threatening the unfair action would be liable.

Mr. Gower

That is the sort of case I have in mind. I am glad to have that assurance.

The hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) suggested that it was undesirable in some way that any machinery should prevent this kind of pressure upon an employer. He said that people could not be made to work with others with whom they disagreed. We must not put into law something we believe to be manifestly unjust. Convenience or what is easy should not determine what we put into a Bill. Sometimes one must choose. My hon. Friends have shown that they reject the idea of this kind of compulsion. It is disgraceful when an employer is put under this pressure so that a person who has done nothing wrong is drummed not only out of his employment but, in some cases, out of the industry. This could be the consequence.

Mr. Tom King

One of the difficulties here is that very often these cases are brought in confidence and people do not want them publicised. I had a case in my constituency about four months ago. It was not a closed shop but there was one of those nasty understandings between the employer and the union. Nothing was in writing. In fact, the rules of employment that the person received did not indicate that he was required to be a member of the union. Subsequently, he was asked to join. When he said that he would rather not, he was asked more forcibly. He said that he was grateful for the offer but would still rather not. It was put to him even more forcibly and the management was told that it must choose between him and the group. He was sacked.

Mr. Gower

That bears out what many of us know to be the case. We understand and sympathise with the views of the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) about the group, but I do not think that the best interests of the group will ultimately be served by intolerance towards the individual. The best interests of the group will be served by justice. There is no such thing as half-justice. A thing is either just or unjust. We cannot put into this Bill something we believe will lead to injustice.

Mr. Orme

Those of us who have faced this problem on the factory floor have bent over backwards to accommodate the sort of person the hon. Gentleman is talking about. Workers have gone out of their way to accommodate such a man by allowing him to contribute to another fund. They say to him, "The group is in your interests", but they do not look to chasing people out of their work. The hon. Member is contradicting the facts. I would like to hear concrete examples of the sort of cases he claims exists.

Mr. Gower

The best interests of the group, about which the hon. Gentleman is justly concerned, will best be served by ensuring justice, and I still say that there can be no half-measures here. There is either right or wrong. There are cases where there are half-measures, but in justice there cannot be half-measures, and I support the new Clause.

Mr. John Mendelson

The hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) graced us with his presence and addressed us, but I cannot see him at present. He showed considerable delight in the fact that the Government are reversing the legislation which the Labour Government introduced in 1965. He also introduced the interesting person of Mr. Henry Ford II, referring to him as a super-authority, and almost seemed to make him an equal with the Prime Minister. I rather deprecate acceptance of what Mr. Ford says as holy doctrine. I deprecate the eager putting out of the red carpet for Mr. Ford immediately after he had denounced the working people of this country at large. He did not even limit himself to what might be thought to be his proper business—the administration of his own firm—but spoke about British workers at large. The Prime Minister should have told him where to get off.

Mr. Orme

So should the Secretary of State have done—he especially.

Mr. Mendelson

As my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) says, the Secretary of State himself should also have told Mr. Ford where to get off. After all, the Secretary of State has a special responsibility in these matters. But we had none of that. I thought it extraordinary to see the Government fawning on an employer who had just denounced Britain as a country in decline. One must search the pages of history for a long time to find any previous Prime Minister or Minister of Labour who has acted in this degrading fashion.

The hon. Member for Basingstoke did his side a disservice in introducing this matter into the debate. He was delighted with the reversal of the decision which the last Government took over the Rookes v. Barnard case. As he often does, he blurted out the real anti-trade union purpose behind the Bill. He has some position on one of the back-bench committees opposite, and I think that he takes part in the discussions. But he has not yet learned the discernment of the Solicitor-General, who normally uses guarded language. The hon. Gentleman does not.

But occasionally the Solicitor-General also drops his guard a little when he has been made a little angry by an intervention from this side. He did so today when he used the term, "crude and destructive action". Normally, he and the Secretary of State parade themselves as defenders of the right to strike and to take industrial action. The hon. and learned Gentleman does not normally use the term "crude and destructive action", but he was betrayed into that language today, as he was betrayed into an earlier slip.

5.15 p.m.

At the beginning of his speech, the hon. and learned Gentleman said that the new Clause was based upon and closely related to Clause 21 which we had discussed. My hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West and I were keen to force him to admit that we had done no such thing. We wanted to put on record the absurdity of what the Government are doing today. The Government are introducing a new Clause which is without meaning if it is not read against the background of Clauses 5 and 21. Clause 1 deals with the important matter of the meaning of dismissal, yet the House has never discussed it because of the deliberate introduction of the guillotine. The guillotine made discussion of Clause 21 and its implications completely impossible. Those who will have to work the provisions of the Bill will not even have the benefit of detailed parliamentary discussion about what is in the Government's mind and in the mind of the House, which has on both sides employers and trade union representatives with a great deal of industrial experience. None of that experience has been brought to bear on the vital Clause 21.

The hon. and learned Gentleman talked about "crude and destructive action" when he normally talks about "industrial action". He did so because he was angry. I think that he was angry because he saw that his hon. Friends are using language which he does not use normally when he is trying to hide the true purpose of the Bill—that is, to weaken seriously the power of the trade union movement. That is what leaks out every time we get down to this discussion.

All this talk by hon. Members opposite about individual freedom and the protection of the individual is only a fraud and a facade for their real purpose. Let us, however, examine the industrial situation. People do not go around the factory floor having academic discussions about the meaning of the terms which are thrown about by hon. Members opposite. I do not even accept the rigid distinction made by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson). What happens is not as clear as that. One does not have, in big factories with 4,000 or 5,000 employees, groups of men going around saying, "We must make a careful distinction between individual freedom and group freedom". That happens in the seminars of the London School of Economics. It does not happen in factories.

The plain fact of industrial life is that people go about their daily task in the course of their normal work, and in doing so enter into certain relationships with their foreman, the floor manager, the shop manager, the shift manager and so on. They arrange the work between them and multifarious situations can arise. Where there are individual people with a conscientious reason—of a religious kind, for example—for not wishing to belong to a certain association, their views are universally respected. Everyone with experience of industrial life knows that to be true.

It is only necessary to research a little into the composition of the local leadership of trade unions. Many of these people have built their ethical foundations upon the Nonconformist faith, for instance. There could not have been the kind of history that the trade union movement has without that one great inspiration. Other sentiments have come from other religious persuasions. Most of these people in their own upbringing have learned to accept the importance of a religious persuasion which might induce a man to wish not to be associated with a particular association.

The Government have been giving a completely misleading impression, and that has been getting into the American newspapers. I dare say that Mr. Henry Ford, when he does read, has read some of these reports and has accumulated some of the misinformation which produced this blurred and misleading picture of what goes on in British industry every day. No doubt he has been titillated by the horror stories put into the papers by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite. How can we serve the national interest by creating an atmosphere about the attitude of the ordinary British working man in his day-to-day tasks that is completely divorced from reality, from what goes on in factories?

Mr. Tom King

The hon. Member has come back to Henry Ford and is discussing what he reads. Whatever he does or does not read about reports of British activities, I am sure that he reads the production records and productivity sheets from his own plants. It is significant that the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker), who has now left the Chamber, did not meet the challenge to compare the productivity outputs from the various factories. Is there really any sense in not listening to someone who has an important part to play in the British economy?

Mr. Mendelson

There are two answers to this. The first deals with the rest of the British motor car industry. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman knows this, but the Government must do; Lord Stokes and his firm and the British motor industry in general over the 12 months preceding January last have exported 50 per cent. of their total production. Profits have been considerable—and for the Henry Ford company. The average level of wages paid as a total proportion of income is higher in West Germany than in this country.

The total record of the British motor car industry in the 12 months preceding January, 1971, is a good one and this is what we want to hear before anything else from the Treasury Bench. I want to put on record that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury Bench are partly responsible for the completely misguided picture that has grown in the minds of Americans, and leading Americans too, about the industrial position of this country. I say this as a regular reader, every day, of some of the most important American newspapers. I know the people quoted and on another occasion I will give chapter and verse.

Returning to the main issue, the drafting of these Clauses, it is against this real background of British industry, which the Secretary of State knows to be true, that the proportions of this problem have to be seen. There are no large numbers of persecuted people in British industry, as my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) said earlier. They do not exist. Tolerance is being exercised. When we come to the Rookes v. Barnard situation difficulties can occasionally arise. That is when there are difficult industrial situations in a firm and when the trade union is engaged in a struggle.

I have always held that it was a bond of honour that when a man's colleagues or mates are engaged in a struggle, he is with them. There are bad employers who, as the history of industrial relations in this country has proved, have tried to use individuals, to put pressure upon them so that they should stand out and say, "We do not want to take part in the decision of our union." They have been made heroes the next day and their pictures have been splashed all over the front pages to help create an atmosphere.

Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite accept this kind of conduct I am speaking of in many other spheres. I have never known a Conservative in my Army life who did not immediately agree that when the regiment was in trouble the honourable thing was to stand by it. If we transfer that to the industrial scene, where people have spent years building up resources by contributing shillings and sixpences—while they accept that kind of solidarity elsewhere—they jeer at it. This is what we call solidarity and that is the real background to this debate.

They know that this is so. I do not give hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury Bench the excuse that because of their different experience they do not understand this. I should be offending their intelligence if I argued that. They know very well but they pretend not to do so when putting forward these shabby Clauses.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins (Putney)

My hon. Friend was referring to the action of the Press with regard to shop stewards. Is he aware that this morning on B.B.C. News a shop steward was referred to as a "splendid" shop steward because he had refused to carry out the instructions of his union? Is he aware that this is the only occasion on which the B.B.C. has ever referred to a shop steward as "splendid"?

Mr. Mendelson

I take note of what my hon. Friend has said, and continue at the point I had reached which concerns the drafting of the Clauses. Line 32 of new Clause 4 says: nothing in the preceding paragraph shall affect the power of the tribunal or Court to order a contribution to be paid by the trade union. The trade union is the one whose third party liability is to be hit.

Then the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell) cheered the reversal of our legislation of 1965 because this is what he and his Committee had in mind. This has been discussed in the most reactionary employer circles and in the most reactionary quarters of the Conservative Party for many years. They are arguing that they should weaken the trade unions and one way of doing that is to intimidate them so that they fear that their funds will be taken away from them if they do not act in an intimidated manner.

It is no use the right hon. Gentleman making speeches in the country saying that a false impression is being created by trade union leaders and others who seek to give the impression that what the Government want to do is to impress upon working people "You work and shut up "This is precisely the impression that the Government try to create. This solves the mystery that we have met with in many debates, with people on the one hand saying that some of these Clauses will not work and others on the other hand saying that they were pernicious Clauses. The Government for their purposes do not mind in the slightest. That is what they want. Of course they know that some of the Clauses are wholly unworkable but they want to create an impression of intimidation among working people.

Let us not assume that we are dealing all the time with the biggest factories where there is 100 per cent. trade unionism. There are other cases where organisation is not so strong and where intimidation will play a part. One of the reasons for the bitterness in all these debates is because we on this side understand the real purpose of the Government in making all these regulations in spite of the protestations of the right hon. Gentleman that he wants to support responsible trade union leaders.

How he can maintain this position after the way in which the General-Secretary of the T.U.C. and the unanimous vote of the General Council has rejected his claim and will reject it again on Thursday in no uncertain terms, beats believing. The bitterness is there.

What the Government have introduced is something which is wholly unnecessary, born in propaganda, conceived in that misleading picture of British industrial life and the attitude of ordinary British trade unionists which the Government have painted. When there is a problem the movement deals with it and people are respected for a dissenting opinion. What the Government want to do is to build up the blackleg, the man who wants to have nothing to do with his mates in certain situations, and make him into a hero. They want to give him the legal right to say, "I do not want to have anything to do with my workmates". The problem is not to allow individuals to have individual rights and the right of dissent. It is a complete travesty of the truth for the Government to advance that as the purpose. They want to reverse the historic position of the trade unions which has been built up because solidarity is the be-all and end-all of their effectiveness, because of the big contrast between employers and employees, and because the employers own the means of production, as the early founders of the trade movement knew. One has only to look at the records of the 1875 Trades Union Congress to realise that. There is nothing new about this.

Because of the imbalance between work-people and employers the history of industrial relations has been to allow the trade union movement to express this solidarity in action. That is what the Secretary of State and his Government and supporters seek to reverse. I am therefore glad that it has been announced that we shall vote against the two Clauses.

5.30 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Robert Carr)

The hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson), in his closing remarks, talked about solidarity. I agree that solidarity is what trade unionism is about. However, until recently, I thought that trade unionism was also about solidarity based on constitutional authority. What is constitutional about a situation in which 95 per cent. of all the industrial action is unofficial? What is constitutional about the political strike which will be called on Thursday?

Mr. Orme

It is an industrial strike.

Mr. Carr

I ask hon. Members opposite to go about the country and to talk to the workers in industrial factories and then try tell us that people are freely going on strike on Thursday on the basis of constitutional authority.

Mr. Orme

What does the right hon. Gentleman say about the doctors?

Mr. Carr

I ask hon. Members opposite to go about the country, as I did in Carlisle over the weekend, and they will find that shop steward after shop steward and ordinary worker after ordinary worker going to their managers and saying, "We do not want a strike", and, if they do so, being threatened with disciplinary action in district committees, and so on.

Mr. Orme

The exception proves the rule.

Mr. Ron Lewis (Carlisle) rose

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris)

Order. Will the hon. Member resume his seat?

Mr. Carr

If hon. Members go about the country and visit the factories they will find that the great majority—

Mr. Ron Lewis

On a point of order. The Secretary of State made certain allegations about shop stewards in Carlisle over the weekend during his speech when he addressed mostly 500 old ladies—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. Is the hon. Gentleman seeking to raise a point of order or to get at the Minister?

Mr. Lewis

Will the Minister name the shop stewards so that we know who they are?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

That is not a point of order.

Mr. Carr

Of course I shall not name them because the hon. Gentleman knows that if I were to do so they would be at risk. [HON. MEMBERS: "Disgraceful."] It is not disgraceful. It may be rare, but it does happen. That is one of the things which the Clause is about. All of us have had cases brought to our attention—certainly most of us on this side of the House have—but they are rare. On the whole, the occasions on which employers act with gross unfairness are also rare. But this is one of the things which justice and proper machinery for justice is about—to deal with the rare cases.

Hon. Members opposite ask for examples. Was not Mr. Rookes an example? He was sacked by B.O.A.C. because of union pressure. I shall deal later with other aspects of the Rookes v. Barnard case which gave the trade union movement cause for genuine fear. But the sacking of Mr. Rookes, by intimidation, on the basis of union membership was, in the view of at least all hon. Members on this side of the House, unfair, and we believe that people should be protected from that sort of intimidation.

Mr. Orme

The right hon. Gentleman talks as if the trade union was a monolithic block on one side and Mr. Rookes was a small poor individual on the other side. Will he tell us who financed Mr. Rookes' appeal right through to the House of Lords?

Mr. Carr

I imagine—and I believe it to be true—that it was financed by legal aid.

Mr. Joseph Ashton (Bassetlaw)

The employers backed him.

Mr. Carr

Is it wrong that someone should be backed in order to get justice? It is wrong that he should have to be backed in that way. When the Bill is on the Statute Book people will not need backing in that way. They will have access to courts which are cheap and informal and where they can get justice on the rare occasions when it is needed. That surely is right.

The hon. Member for Penistone talked about Fords. His charges about what members of the Treasury Bench are saying are grossly untrue.

Mr. John Mendelson

Wholly true.

Mr. Carr

I do not believe that the hon. Gentleman can substantiate them in any way. Industrial dislocation in the motor industry and in its supplying industries has been very severe for some years. The Labour Party knew that when it was in power. Dislocation was very bad last year, and it is very bad this year. Because of strikes and threats of strikes in the factories of the motor car manufacturers and in the supplying industries, the motor industry lost many tens of millions of pounds worth of production last year. This is extremely bad. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about the exports?"] The exports were good, but how much better would they have been without the strikes? How much smaller would have been the amount of motor car imports last year had the situation been better?

Let us consider what has happened at Fords this year. On 29th January, a full month before the current Ford agreement was due to run out, the management made an offer in the proper way to the negotiating committee. It was not accepted. But instead of negotiating about the offer, instead of waiting to see whether it could be improved by negotiation, the instantaneous and unofficial reaction was a complete walk-out at all Ford factories.

Mr. Orme

Without any encouragment.

Mr. Carr

It was not backed by official union action. However, no attempt was made by the official union leadership to say, "Go back to work while we negotiate. If we negotiate and fail to get an offer which, in our view, is satisfactory, we will have official strike action". Surely that is the sort of solidarity and constitutional action on which British trade unionism has been based, and it is the exact opposite of what has happened at Fords in the last few weeks. What has happened there is total unconstitutional action—

Mr. Orme

Made constitutional.

Mr. Carr

Made constitutional afterwards, precisely. That is irresponsibility writ large, and people are paying a very heavy price for it.

Mr. Harold Walker

Will that situation be ruled out after the Bill becomes law? Will it be made an unfair industrial action or illegal by the right hon. Gentleman's Bill?

Mr. Carr

That depends entirely on whether the Ford Company has a binding procedure agreement. The Bill provides opportunities for that to happen.

Mr. Orme

That agreement is at an end now, anyway.

Mr. Carr

The Bill will deal with it if and when the Ford Company has a binding agreement, as it has in other countries. It has not one here, and that may be why the British company is tending to fall behind Ford Companies in other countries.

What is also true about the situation is that Mr. Ford has said seriously and publicly that the company finds increasingly that more and more of its customers throughout the world—the agents who sell motor cars to the public—prefer not to take supplies from this country because they feel that, if they become dependent on British supplies, there is not the same degree of reliability as from other countries, and that is true. If on compares the production figures of the Ford Company in West Germany with those of the Ford Company in this country—

Mr. Orme

They have higher labour costs in West Germany.

Mr. Carr

This, too, is a point—[Interruption.]

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. The Secretary of State must be allowed to make his speech. Hon. Members on the Opposition benches excel in the cut and thrust of debate. They must enjoy it when it comes to them and take it in reasonable silence. They will always have a chance to reply.

Mr. Carr

What is also true is that, when Mr. Ford talked about bad quality, he was not making any charge about the carelessness or lack of skill of the British worker—

Mr. Orme

That is interesting.

Mr. Carr

He was saying that, when there are constant interruptions of production, with half-finished cars having to be parked in a field because, perhaps, there are no brake shoes or windscreens and having to be brought back to be finished afterwards, the inevitable result is variable quality and a degree of poor quality. It is because of that loss of quality, caused by interruptions and not by bad or careless work by individual British workmen, that the quality of Ford's output has also deteriorated in the last few years relative to the quality of output of other countries.

It is this combination of uncertainty of delivery and uncertainty of quality stemming from it that is beginning—Mr. Ford did not exaggerate, and I do not want to—to cause customers who have an opportunity to take delivery of the same or almost similar models made in Britain, Germany or some other places, to say that they would prefer the supply not to come from Britain.

Mr. John Mendelson

Why does the right hon. Gentleman rush in and accept the statements that an American employer makes about British working people? How does he reconcile the statement about people not wanting Ford cars produced in Britain with the excellent export performances of other motor firms which we had to drag from him earlier today? Is not it the right hon. Gentleman's duty to begin any talks with Mr. Ford by stressing the company's export record? Does not he realise that there are many firms abroad who do not agree with Mr. Ford and who are eager to see British Ford taken into their countries?

Mr. Carr

If the hon. Gentleman studied the available figures, he would see that there is substance in what I say—

Mr. Orme

Has your master gone back yet?

5.45 p.m.

Mr. Carr

The hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) can very easily make remarks of that kind. If he spent a little more time facing facts instead of putting his head in the sand, members of his union and all other industrial workers in the country might be further along the road to increased prosperity. There is no need to exaggerate the position, and I am not exaggerating it. I am saying that there is a trend, and it is a very serious matter if we merely turn it aside and say that that sort of trend—

Mr. Orme

Did the right hon. Gentleman ask Mr. Ford why Ford of Britain pay lower wages for higher productivity than any other British car firm?

Mr. Carr

The hon. Gentleman should look at the statistics—[An HON. MEMBER: "This is a diversion from the Bill."] The hon. Member accuses me of trying to create a diversion from the Bill. I remind him that the Ford Company was not mentioned from this side of the House. It was referred to by hon. Members opposite.

Mr. John Mendelson

Henry Ford's name was introduced deliberately by the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell), and I replied to him.

Mr. Carr

I fully accept that. I had forgotten that. However, the hon. Gentleman followed my hon. Friend in full measure, and I suspect that a reference to HANSARD will reveal that he devoted more column inches to the Ford Company than did my hon. Friend.

These are matters that the country cannot disregard. They must be taken seriously. They are not all that irrelevant to the Bill because only if we achieve some greater degree of stability, confidence and good order in the conduct of our industrial relations shall we be able to win the prosperity which our natural skills and opportunities deserve and which is available for the taking.

I want now to say a word about the Rookes v. Barnard case and the 1965 Trade Disputes Act to which reference has been made. It is true that this legislation will repeal that Act. There was a substantial and important point in the Rookes v. Barnard case which worried the trade union movement. As I understand it, the case raised doubts about whether it was lawful for a trade union to threaten a strike, whatever the objective of that strike, be it good or bad, fair or unfair.

We are saying that it is definitely legitimate to threaten a strike. We are, therefore—if hon. Members look at, I think it is, Clause 119, they will see this—clearing up what was that legitimate area of doubt relating to the trade unions. We are also removing the possibiltity of what we at least, and I believe the great majority in this country, think was the unfair and wrong aspect of the Rookes v. Barnard case—namely, that Rookes was sacked in the way that he was under the pressures which gave rise to it. We are saying that it is not unfair for a union to threaten a strike provided that the objective is fair, but it is an unfair practice to threaten a strike to achieve one of the limited number of what we define as unfair industrial actions. Amongst those, and particularly germane to the debate today, is the unfair action of obtaining a dismissal on wrong grounds. That is the position about Rookes v. Barnard.

I should now like to turn to the point raised by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) about the word "induce". As a non-lawyer, I have over the years had considerable difficulty about the word "induce". Therefore, I start with some initial sympathy for the hon. and learned Gentleman. But the more I study the alternatives, the more difficult it becomes. I think that words such as "compel" or "force" are almost too simple, too unsubtle, for the needs which we have in mind. What is more important is not the word in subsection (3) which expresses the intention, but the methods used to put that intention into practice; in other words, to induce by using any of the methods described in subsection (2). We attempt to define there what inducing would mean in an unfair sense. It would be inducing only by the methods described in subsection (2).

This brings me to the answers to the two questions asked by the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker): what is fair or unfair. What is reasonable or unreasonable; and when does persuasion spill over to compulsion? I shall come to those later.

The hon. Gentleman asked: what does subsection (3)(c) mean? Indeed, he asked what all subsection (3) meant. The hon. Gentleman said that all this could get a person into trouble merely by peacefully trying to persuade people to do the various things listed. I can only reaffirm the answer given by my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General, which I gave a moment ago to the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery, namely, that peaceful persuasion is perfectly legitimate.

The only things which are not legitimate are the methods laid down in subsection (2), which states: This section applies to action of any of the following descriptions, that is to say—

  1. (a) calling, organising, procuring or financing a strike, or threatening to do so;
  2. (b) organising, procuring or financing any irregular industrial action short of a strike, or threatening to do so."
That does not stop peaceful persuasion by trade union officials, district organisers, propaganda leaflets, discussion or persuasion by shop stewards. All these things are in order and are in no way threatened by anything in the Clause or in the Bill.

Whilst I must admit that there may be some complexity about the structure—this, along with other sections of the Bill, will be properly covered in the explanatory booklets and leaflets which will be prepared when the Bill is on the Statute Book—in this case at least the meaning is clear. Nobody reading this Clause could say that it is not in plain English. The key part is subsection (2) which applies to action of any of the following descriptions", and I have just read the following descriptions. That is in plain English. Anybody who does not do any of those things will not be covered by the Clause.

Mr. Orme

That is everything.

Mr. Carr

I do not believe that persuading is the same as calling, organising, procuring or financing a strike". I believe that large measures of peaceful persuasion come long before one reaches the threshold of anything described in subsection (2).

I must say to the hon. Member for Doncaster, although I am sure that it is unintentional in his case, that this whipping up of fear about the Clause, without taking the trouble to read what is in pretty clear English, is an example of the misrepresentation or distortion of which we are complaining. It is not right to say that the Clause threatens a shop steward or anyone else with any kind of dire action because he actively goes about the place trying to persuade people to join a union or to join in any other proper union aim.

The Government have put down Amendment No. 8, on page 2479, to which I cannot refer because it is on another Clause, specifically to make clear that it is not an unfair practice even for an employer, or a person acting on his behalf, actively to persuade his employees to join a union. That surely is saying categorically that if an employer goes about trying to persuade employees to join a union that is not unfair.

I turn now to the questions asked by the hon. Member for Doncaster: when does fair spill over into the unfair, when does reasonable become unreasonable, and when does persuasion degenerate into compulsion? These are difficult questions. That is why we are setting up machinery. We believe that this is the kind of matter which, in the end, is best settled in a court.

Hon. Members


Mr. Carr

Yes indeed, in a properly constituted court. That is the basic system under which this country lives and has lived for many centuries.

Mr. Orme

In a court?

Mr. Carr

It is something of which we are proud. In the end, we have a reasonably peaceful and orderly and, at the same time, free society, because in the last resort when people cannot solve their problems, when they cannot decide these matters, they go to a British court so to do.

Mr. Orme

As the last resort.

Mr. Carr

There is, after all, some historical reason for a magistrate being known as a justice of the peace. There is a long history behind this matter which shows that the courts are there to deal with the grievances of the individual citizen and to solve them in a peaceful manner when no other manner is available.

Mr. Orme

The right hon. Gentleman has just mentioned the magistrates' court. The right hon. Gentleman must know that the most difficult case for a magistrate to adjudicate upon concerns differences between neighbours when it is almost impossible to elicit the facts. If there is a ruckus in a machine shop during a morning or afternoon and all kinds of industrial difficulties arise, how, at a subsequent date, can a court of law adjudicate upon it?

Mr. Carr

It is a difficult question. I do not suggest that the solution will always be perfect. But we are providing courts, as well adapted as can be, because, as well as a lawyer, there will be two people with real life experience of these matters to try to deal with them. They may not always succeed perfectly, but the answer is not to do nothing. Although a magistrate may find it very difficult to sort out the differences between two quarrelling neighbours, at least we do not leave them to fight it out.

6.0 p.m.

This brings me to the phrase which the hon. Member for Penistone used, when he referred to the Solicitor-General using the words "crude and destructive action". Precisely—crude and destructive as a method in relation to the objective being sought. We are saying, and we are not ashamed of saying, that, in the 1970s, strike action or the threat of it to solve very difficult personal questions about unfair dismissal or an individual's rights against his employer or in relation to his fellow workers are very difficult and may not ever be capable of complete and perfect solution, but at least we should provide machinery for their solution less crude and destructive than strike action.

We are, in effect, saying that at least these less crude and destructive and more peaceful methods of resolution should be tried first. That, I believe, is right and sound and is the overwhelming wish of those who work in industry, as much as the rest of the country. That is what these new Clauses are about. They provide machinery for dealing with this sort of grievance in court, rather than by industrial war. I believe that peaceful methods in court should at least take precedence over industrial warfare and that industrial warfare should be outlawed, at least until the peaceful methods have been tried.

The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery was right to say that one of the basic principles of the Bill—perhaps the basic one, although the one which I just mentioned is pretty basic, too—is that we are to some extent altering the balance between personal freedom and group freedom, not from one extreme to the other, but we believe that the time has come in our economy and our society when it is both possible and right to make some shift in that balance towards more personal freedom vis-à-vis group freedom.

Therefore, the Clause says that, when there is a right of appeal for unfair dismissal—surely this is common ground—it should first, rightly, be the employer who has to face the responsibility for that charge and to meet it, and if it is found that he has unfairly dismissed an employee, he should take first responsibility for the compensation, or whatever the penalty may be for that action. But we are also saying that, if an employer has been driven to take that unfair action by the unfair pressure put on him by other people and organisations, it is in turn fair that he should have some remedy against those other persons and organisations. I believe that that is unexceptionable, and that is the principle which we are sticking to.

Mr. Heffer

Last night, I referred to the Secretary of State as being irresponsible. I meant at that time that he was irresponsible because he was introducing a Bill of this kind. I had not realised exactly how irresponsible the right hon. Gentleman is, but he has completely proved his irresponsibility today. The mask slipped and the reality behind his thinking came out in the course of his publicity-seeking remarks about Ford, and, of course, in his attitude towards the shop stewards at Carlisle and elsewhere.

If the right hon. Gentleman genuinely believes that we should have good industrial relations, he should stop making statements of that kind. He used emotive language throughout. He even talked in terms of the degeneration into compulsion, when a shop steward is trying to get 100 per cent. trade union organisation into a factory.

Let me explain to the right hon. Gentleman exactly why it is essential that the trade unionists must have the right to use their strength to get 100 per cent. organisation. It is almost unknown to meet the employer who says, off his own bat, "From tomorrow, I will peacefully persuade all the workers in my factory to join the union." In practice, that does not happen. That is why the strength of the organisation has to be used, to urge the employer to use his methods of persuasion to get workers into the union. But the right hon. Gentleman and his friends are trying to take that strength away from the unions: that is what this Clause is all about.

Yesterday, a minor concession was made. The concept of the approved closed shop is given, but the conditions are laid down in this new Clause which will make it almost impossible for a union to bring it into operation. Under new Clause 2(3)(c), it is not right to induce an employer or an employers' association to join in making an application under Part I of the Schedule which is concerned with the concept of the approved closed shop.

So it becomes quite wrong for a union legitimately to apply pressure to an employer to ask that there should be a joint application for the approved closed shop. If they should threaten to take any action merely to get a joint application, they will be acting contrary to the Clause and that will be an unfair industrial practice. I said yesterday that this meant that the unions were fighting this battle with one hand tied behind their backs. And that is what this is all about.

Right hon. Gentlemen opposite always give the impression that they are so fair and so amenable, so decent, but then the mask slips and the reality comes out, and we see precisely what is behind their thinking.

Mr. Tom King

The hon. Gentleman may recall that, in our earlier debates on the Clause, in support of their case, the Opposition cited the number of employers who wanted a closed shop. Now the argument is stood on its head, and we are told that it would be impossible to get any employers to agree to a joint application.

Mr. Heffer

In the first place, the application for the proposal for a closed shop, 99 times out of 100, comes from the workers on the shop floor. But having got a closed shop in existence, one then finds that some of the very employers who opposed the idea of a closed shop realise its benefits. That is why those employers then become advocates for the closed shop.

I do not want to get involved in the diversionary argument about Ford's raised by the Secretary of State and his hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mr. David Mitchell). The case of the Joint Negotiating Committee at Ford was presented by Mr. Moss Evans on 27th November, 1970. The negotiations were going on from that time. I urge the hon. Gentleman to read the evidence of Mr. Moss Evans. He should also examine the facts which Mr. Peter Wilsher put in the Sunday Times.

Mr. Orme

The Minister made the Ford issue the central feature of his case today. Is it not extraordinary that this strike has been in progress for six or seven weeks but the right hon. Gentleman has taken no action, has made no representations to Parliament, and has done nothing to bring about a settlement in an industry which is vital to our exports?

Mr. Heffer

It is absolutely extraordinary. We had almost continuous statements about the Post Office dispute, but we have had nothing about the Ford dispute. The reason for the right hon. Gentleman's shyness is simple. He is here not dealing with a trade union which has never before conducted an official strike. My hon. Friend raises a valuable point because it demonstrates the inactivity of the Government to deal with real issues of this kind.

Mr. A. E. Cooper (Ilford, South): rose

Mr. Heffer

I do not want to lengthen my speech by giving way further.

Mr. R. Carr

The hon. Gentleman said that I had not mentioned figures put forward by Mr. Moss Evans. That was not the point I was making. My point—the House and the country would be interested to have the hon. Gentleman's comments on it—was that those figures might have been the basis, from the trade union point of view, of hard and serious negotiating and bargaining. Instead of negotiating with the employers, everybody walked out on the announcement of the first offer, although that offer was made a full month before the agreement was due to end; and the union leadership, instead of trying to get its members back to work to allow negotiations to take place, legitimised the unofficial action 10 days later by issuing strike pay.

Mr. Heffer

First of all, the employers rejected the claim put forward by the trade unions. Secondly, it was perfectly understandable that they were nearing the position when there would have been a complete walk-out in any case, the workers deciding that they had had enough of the lengthy negotiating procedure. They decided to walk out and, in my opinion, they acted perfectly legitimately.

In any event, if the right hon. Gentleman felt so strongly about it, why did he not make a statement in the House? I do not want to become involved in this sort of diversionary argument, which the right hon. Gentleman has deliberately introduced to try to avoid a serious discussion of the new Clause.

The Solicitor-General described new Clause 4 as providing some fresh thinking. This provision is concerned with a contribution being made not by a trade unionist or a trade union official but by a trade union in compensation cases where there has supposedly been an attempt to get 100 per cent. trade unionism by, for example, the dismissal of non-unionists.

The Government obviously came to the conclusion that the trade unions were not being caught sufficiently under the

Bill. In other words, wherever the Government find a slight loophole, however small, through which the unions might scud, they block it up. Previously it was the question of an unfair industrial practice to have a joint application under pressure from a trade union. This is not good enough and I advise my hon. Friends to vote against the new Clause.

Mr. Cooper rose

Mr. Robert Mellish (Bermondsey) rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.

Question, That the Question be now put, put and agreed to.

Question put accordingly, That the Clause be read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes 292, Noes 245.

Division No. 240.] AYES [6.16 p.m.
Adley, Robert Coombs, Derek Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash) Cooper, A. E. Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.
Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead) Cordle, John Grylls, Michael
Archer, Jeffrey (Louth) Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick Gummer, Selwyn
Astor, John Cormack, Patrick Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)
Atkins, Humphrey Costain, A. P. Hall, John (Wycombe)
Awdry, Daniel Critchley, Julian Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone) Crouch, David Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Baker, W. H. K. (Banff) Curran, Charles Hannam, John (Exeter)
Balniel, Lord Dalkeith, Earl of Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford) Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere
Batsford, Brian d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry Hasethurst, Alan
Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, JamesMaj.-Gen. Hastings, Stephen
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay) Dean, Paul Hawkins, Paul
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport) Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. Hay, John
Benyon, W. Dixon, Piers Hayhoe, Barney
Berry, Hn. Anthony Dodds-Parker, Douglas Heseltine, Michael
Biffen, John Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec Hicks, Robert
Biggs-Davison, John du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward Higgins, Terence L.
Blaker, Peter Eden, Sir John Hiley, Joseph
Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.) Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton) Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)
Body, Richard Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.) Hill, James (Southampton, Test)
Boscawen, Robert Emery, Peter Holland, Philip
Bossom, Sir Clive Eyre, Reginald Hooson, Emlyn
Bowden, Andrew Farr, John Hordern, Peter
Braine, Bernard Fell, Anthony Hornby, Richard
Bray, Ronald Fenner, Mrs. Peggy Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia
Brewis, John Fidler, Michael Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)
Brinton, Sir Tatton Finsherg, Geoffrey (Hampstead) Howell, David (Guildford)
Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton) Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)
Brown, Sir Edward (Bath) Fletcher-Cooke, Charles Hunt, John
Bryan, Paul Fookes, Miss Janet Hutchison, Michael Clark
Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N&M) Fortescue, Tim Iremonger, T. L.
Buck, Antony Fowler, Norman James, David
Bullus, Sir Eric Fox, Marcus Jessel, Toby
Burden, F. A. Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone) Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)
Butler, Adam (Bosworth) Fry, Peter Jopling, Michael
Campbell, Rt. Hn. G. (Moray&Nairn) Galbraith, Hn T. G. Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith
Carlisle, Mark Gardner, Edward Kaberry, Sir Donald
Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert Gibson-Watt, David Kellett, Mrs. Elaine
Cary, Sir Robert Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.) Kershaw, Anthony
Channon, Paul Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.) Kilfedder, James
Chapman, Sydney Glyn, Dr. Alan Kimball, Marcus
Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B. King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Chichester-Clark, R. Goodhart, Philip King, Tom (Bridgwater)
Churchill, W. S. Gorst, John Kinsey, J. R.
Clark, William (Surrey, E.) Gower, Raymond Kirk, Peter
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe) Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.) Knight, Mrs. Jill
Clegg, Walter Gray, Hamish Knox, David
Cockeram, Eric Green, Alan Lane, David
Cooke, Robert Grieve, Percy Langford-Holt, Sir John
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry Orr, Capt. L. P. S. Steel, David
Le Marchant, Spencer Osborn, John Stewart-Smith, D. G. (Belper)
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland) Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.) Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)
Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone) Page, Graham (Crosby) Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.
Longden, Gilbert Page, John (Harrow, W.) Stokes, John
Loveridge, John Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.) Stuttaford, Dr. Tom
McAdden, Sir Stephen Peel, John Sutcliffe, John
Mac Arthur, Ian Percival, Ian Tapsell, Peter
McCrindle, R. A. Peyton, Rt. Hn. John Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
McLaren, Martin Pink, R. Bonner Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy Pounder, Rafton Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)
McMaster, Stanley Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch Temple, John M.
Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham) Price, David (Eastleigh) Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret
McNair-Wilson, Michael Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L. Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest) Proudfoot, Wilfred Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)
Maddan, Martin Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)
Madel, David Quennell, Miss J. M. Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy
Maginnis, John E. Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James Tilney, John
Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter Trafford, Dr. Anthony
Marten, Neil Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.) Trew, Peter
Mather, Carol Rees, Peter (Dover) Tugendhat, Christopher
Maude, Angus Rees Davies, W. R. Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.
Mawby, Ray van Straubenzee, W. R.
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J. Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David Vaughan, Dr. Gerard
Meyer, Sir Anthony Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon Vickers, Dame Joan
Mills, Peter (Torrington) Ridley, Hn. Nicholas Waddington, David
Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.) Ridsdale, Julian Walder, David (Clitheroe)
Miscampbell, Norman Roberts, Wyn (Conway) Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)
Mitchell,Lt.-Col.O.(Aberdeenshire, W) Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks) Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke) Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey) Wall, Patrick
Moate, Roger Rost, Peter Walters, Dennis
Molyneaux, James Russell, Sir Ronald Ward, Dame Irene
Money, Ernie St. John-Stevas, Norman Weatherill, Bernard
Monks, Mrs. Connie Scott, Nicholas Wells, John (Maidstone)
Montgomery, Fergus Scott-Hopkins, James White, Roger (Gravesend)
More, Jasper Sharples, Richard Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm. Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby) Wiggin, Jerry
Morrison, Charles (Devizes) Shelton, William (Clapham) Wilkinson, John
Mudd, David Simeons, Charles Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
Murton, Oscar Sinclair, Sir George Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard
Nabarro, Sir Gerald Skeet, T. H. H. Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher
Neave, Airey Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington) Woodnutt, Mark
Nicholls, Sir Harmar Soref, Harold Worsley, Marcus
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael Speed, Keith Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.
Normanton, Tom Spence, John
Nott, John Sproat, Iain TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Onslow, Cranley Stainton, Keith Mr. Hector Monro and
Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally Stanbrook, Ivor Mr. Victor Goodhew.
Abse, Leo Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles) Eadie, Alex
Albu, Austen Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.) Clark, David (Colne Valley) Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Allen, Scholefield Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.) Ellis, Tom
Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis) Cohen, Stanley English, Michael
Armstrong, Ernest Coleman, Donald Evans, Fred
Ashley, Jack Concannon, J. D. Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.
Ashton, Joe Conlan, Bernard Fisher, Mrs. Doris(B'ham, Ladywood)
Atkinson, Norman Corbet, Mrs. Freda Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Bagier, Gordon A. T. Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.) Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)
Barnes, Michael Crawshaw, Richard Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Barnett, Joel Cronin, John Foot, Michael
Beaney, Alan Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony Forrester, John
Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.) Fraser, John (Norwood)
Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton) Dalyell, Tam Galpern, Sir Myer
Bidwell, Sydney Davidson, Arthur Garrett, W. E.
Bishop, E. S. Davies, Denzil (Llanelly) Gilbert, Dr. John
Blenkinsop, Arthur Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.) Ginsburg, David
Boardman, H. (Leigh) Davies, Ifor (Gower) Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. G.
Booth, Albert Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.) Gourlay, Harry
Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur Deakins, Eric Grant, George (Morpath)
Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland) do Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)
Bradley, Tom Delargy, H. J. Griffiths, Eddle (Brightside)
Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.) Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund Griffiths, Will (Exchange)
Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan) Dempsey, James Hamiton, William (Fife, W.)
Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury) Doig, Peter Hamling, William
Buchan, Norman Dormand, J. D. Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)
Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn) Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.) Hardy, Peter
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green) Douglas-Mann, Bruce Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.) Driberg, Tom Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith
Cant, R. B. Duffy, A. E. P. Hattersley, Roy
Carmichael, Neil Dunn, James A. Healey, Rt. Hn, Denis
Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Northfield) Dunnett, Jack Heffer, Eric S.
Horam, John MacPherson, Malcolm Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas Mahon, Simon (Bootle) Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)
Howell, Denis (Small Heath) Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.) Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
Hughes, Bt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey) Marquand, David Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)
Hughes, Mark (Durham) Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.) Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy Sillars, James
Hughes, Roy (Newport) Meacher, Michael Silverman, Julius
Hunter, Adam Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert Skinner, Dennis
Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur(Edge Hill) Mendelson, John Small, William
Janner, Greville Millan, Bruce Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)
Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n&St.P'cras, S.) Miller, Dr. M. S. Spearing, Nigel
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney) Milne, Edward (Blyth) Spriggs, Leslie
Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford) Molloy, William Stallard, A. W.
John, Brynmor Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire) Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)
Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.) Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe) Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.) Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw) Stoddart, David (Swindon)
Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.) Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon) Strang, Gavin
Jones, Barry (Flint, E.) Moyle, Roland Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.
Jones, Dan (Burnley) Murray, Ronald King Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.) Ogden, Eric Swain, Thomas
Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen) O'Halloran, Michael Taverne, Dick
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.) O'Malley, Brian Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)
Judd, Frank Oram, Bert Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Kaufman, Gerald Orbach, Maurice Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)
Kelley, Richard Orme, Stanley Tinn, James
Kerr, Russell Oswald, Thomas Tomney, Frank
Kinnock, Neil Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton) Tuck, Raphael
Lamond, James Palmer, Arthur Urwin, T. W.
Latham, Arthur Parker, John (Dagenham) Varley, Eric G.
Lawson, George Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange) wainwright, Edwin
Leadbitter, Ted Pavitt, Laurie Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred Walker, Harold (Doncaster)
Leonard, Dick Pendry, Tom Wallace, George
Lestor, Miss Joan Pentland, Norman Watkins, David
Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham N.) Perry, Ernest G. Weitzman, David
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle) Prescott, John Wellbeloved, James
Lipton, Marcus Price, J. T. (Westhoughton) White, James (Glasgow, Pollock)
Lomas, Kenneth Price, William (Rugby) Whitehead, Phillip
Loughlin, Charles Probert, Arthur Whitlock, William
Lyon, Alexander W. (York) Rankin, John Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.) Reed, D. (Sadgefield Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.) Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
McBride, Neil Rhodes, Geoffrey Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)
McCartney, Hugh Roberts, Albert (Normanton) Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)
McElhone, Frank Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon) Woof, Robert
McGuire, Michael Robertson, John (Paisley)
Mackenzie, Gregor Roderick, Caerwyn E. (Br'c'n&R'dnor) TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Mackie, John Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees) Mr. John Golding and
Maclennan, Robert Roper, John Mr. Joseph Harper.
McNamara, J. Kevin Rose, Paul B.

Clause accordingly read a Second time.

Mr. John Fraser (Norwood)

I beg to move Amendment (w) to the proposed Clause, in line 4, after 'reason' insert: 'as defined in subsection (1) of section 22'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris)

With this Amendment it will be convenient to take the following:

Amendment (x), in line 8, at end insert: 'where the question is one to be determined between the worker and his employer it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the employee was unfairly dismissed where that is the issue and'. Amendment (y), leave out lines 27 to 29.

I understand that the Opposition would like a Division on Amendment (w) when we reach that stage.

Mr. Fraser

The handling of this Bill resembles the handling of a dangerous radioactive substance, which can never be done safely without a leaden barrier. It is through the leaden barrier of the Government's foolish guillotine that we have to probe a Clause which we have never discussed, which we never will discuss, but which ought to be discussed. I refer to Clause 22, which deals with fair and unfair dismissal. Subsection (1) of the Clause sets out four reasons which justify a dismissal, and it states that dismissals shall be regarded as fair if any of those reasons are satisfied. The important paragraphs are (a), which relates to capability, and (b), which relates to conduct.

The first thing to notice is that the Clause states that a dismissal shall be fair if it relates to a person's capability or conduct; it does not put it the other way round and say that a dismissal shall be unfair unless it relates to his lack of capability or to his misconduct. That being so, the Clause gives no clear protection to the employee against the employer who tells the tribunal, "This is the reason, and therefore it is fair that the burden of proof should shift to the worker." The lack of protection arises from the positive wording of subsection (1), and the risk is that a bald statement of reason will constitute justification for dismissal. The position would have been much better if the reference had been to lack of capability or to misconduct.

Much worse is subsection (4), which allows dismissal for what it calls "a good reason", and there is no connection between the four reasons set out in subsection (1) and the good reason referred to in subsection (4), Therefore, the employer may dismiss a man even if the reason for dismissal does not relate to his capability, to his conduct or to his redundancy; he may still dismiss him if he gives a "good reason" to the tribunal. We say that those words ought not to appear in Clause 22 unless their meaning has been clearly defined in the Bill and has been approved by the House.

6.30 p.m.

Here are some comparable examples showing where such a definition has been given. In Table A of the Companies Act, the reasons for being able to dismiss a director are clearly set out. For instance, if he has missed a number of meetings, if he becomes bankrupt, or if he commits a serious offence, a director may be removed from office. But the Companies Act does not go on to say in respect of directors of large public companies, "or if the company has some other good reason". Indeed, the Solicitor-General knows that, if a director is dismissed without good reason, he has ample compensation.

I take further examples from the Bill introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle). My right hon. Friend not only spelled out the fair reasons for dismissal, related to capability and conduct but phrased the other way, but in Clause 36 she set out a number of reasons for dismissal which were stated to be disqualified reasons. There was no reference to "good reason" and the other vaguenesses which we find in Clause 22 of the present Bill. She put it the other way, setting out a number of disqualified reasons, for example, that the employee has re- fused to become a member of a house union, or that the employee professed or practised, or did not profess or practise, a particular religion or religious doctrine". She said that it was a disqualified reason if a man were dismissed because he was of a particular colour, race or ethnic or national origin". Further, it was a disqualified reason that the employee is a man, or that the employee is a woman, as the case may be". There were other disqualified reasons relating to whether a person was married, unmarried, a widower, and so on.

The matter was clearly spelled out in my right hon. Friend's Bill, whereas "good reason" is not defined in Clause 22 of the present Bill. Because it is not defined, an employer might go to a tribunal and give as his "good reason"—especially if it happened in Northern Ireland—that the man was a Catholic and he did not want him working with Protestants, or vice versa. Or, because the Race Relations Act does not apply in Northern Ireland, it could relate to a man's ethnic origin. Because the definitions in my right hon. Friend's Bill are omitted here, an employer could give such reasons as that and try to convince the tribunal.

Mr. Gower

I am following the hon. Member's argument with interest. Is it not a possible shortcoming of that sort of procedure that, by naming a certain number of valid reasons, one could, as a result of failing to include one or two others which are equally valid, necessitate amendment of the Act later? I put that as a question.

Mr. Fraser

I shall come to that. When we come to the words "unfair industrial practice", the ingenuity of the Solicitor-General knows no limits. There is no precedent or dictionary into which he will not quarry and burrow in order to define, with inordinate prolixity, what is meant by an "unfair industrial practice". Here, on the other hand, with notable brevity, we have "good reason" and nothing else. We cannot leave it like that. The reasons why a man may be dismissed must be defined with a good deal more clarity than we find at present.

A further difficulty arises under Clause 22(4). It appears that, if an employer states a "good reason", the burden of proving that the man was unfairly dismissed shifts to the employee. I shall come to that on the next Amendment.

What kind of good reasons would an employer advance? He could say—I recognise this—that the man had committed a serious crime and that, because of the place in which he worked, he should be dismissed. Obviously, that would be a good reason. Why not spell it out in the Bill? He could say that a man in a position of trust had been convicted of dishonesty. Again, like a director in such circumstances, he could be dismissed.

But what of other reasons? It could be because of a man's political views. In my right hon. Friend's Bill, political views were a disqualified reason. In this Bill, on the other hand, they could be a qualified or good reason because nothing is spelled out. It could be that an employee disagreed with the policy of the company. I have come across cases of dismissal like that. An employee may conscientiously believe that the company is not properly serving the public interest and disagree with its policy. It might be a "shark" company, and he was dismissed for that reason.

Mr. Gower

Will the hon. Gentleman consider this case, ridiculous though it may seem at first sight? A person working for a local Labour Party turns out to be a keen Conservative. In such circumstances, no doubt, the local Labour Party would wish to dispense with his services. That is an extreme example, but it is none the less valid, is it not?

Mr. Fraser

As I recall it, that point was dealt with in my right hon. Friend's Bill.

Mrs. Barbara Castle (Blackburn)


Mr. Fraser

That is a perfectly reasonable case, and it ought to be spelled out in the circumstances.

Here are other "good reasons". Salesmen are frequently dismissed because they will not accept transfer—this is the euphemism adopted when the company wants to get rid of a man—from one section to another, perhaps a section in which he will be unhappy, in which he will not work with people whom he understands or in which he will earn less money in the long run.

Unless these things are spelled out, the protection which Clause 22 is supposed to give to an employee may be lost.

A man is further disadvantaged under this Bill, in comparison with my right hon. Friend's Bill, because he does not have the right of reinstatement. Even when it has considered the matter, the tribunal will not be able to reinstate him even if the reason for dismissal is proved to be unfair. One cannot allow this to pass without challenge.

If the Solicitor-General wants to find someone to sit down and think of some definitions and reasons, I suggest that there is someone available in the Department of Employment, the Minister of State himself, our "country salesman" who never appears on the Front Bench when we are discussing these matters but who makes the odd statement to the newspapers on Saturdays and Sundays. He could set to work—we do not see a great deal of him here—while the Solicitor-General is kept busy.

The purpose of Amendment (x) is the ensure that in all cases the burden of proving that a man was not unfairly dismissed lies on the employer. This is by no means clear from Clause 22(1). If the employer states a reason which is specified in the Bill, the tribunal may accept that the burden has shifted to the employee. Under subsection (4), if the employer states a "good reason", again, so it appears from the wording, the burden of proof shifts to the employee.

The matter is made even worse by Clause 24, which deals with the dismissal of a person who has taken part in a strike. As I read it, the burden of proving that a person was unfairly dismissed lies upon the employee. Under subsection (2), the dismissal shall not be regarded as unfair unless it is shown —those words, "it is shown", seem to indicate that the showing must be done by the employee, and the following words confirm that view— unless it is shown … that one or more employees of the same employer … were not dismissed for taking part —in a strike— or that one or more such employees … were offered re-engagement.". That is fair enough; that is easy to prove even if one is the worker having to discharge the burden of proof. But it is the next one which gives the difficulty, and that the reason … for which the claimant was selected for dismissal … was his having taken action to which the next following subsection applies.". Under subsection (3), he has to prove that the reason he was dismissed was not that he was exercising his trade union rights under Clause 1(5). If the burden of proof lies on the employee, it is difficult to prove that the employer did not dismiss him because he was exercising his trade union rights but he was selected for some other reason.

But even worse, one comes to the proviso and sees that … this subsection does not apply to any such action on the part of the claimant in so far as it consisted … —I am paraphrasing it—of his exercising his rights as a trade unionist by taking part in trade union activities after the strike had commenced.

Therefore it seems that under Clause 24 not only is the burden of proof throughout the proceedings firmly placed upon the employee but, what is worse, if he has been a member of the strike committee and taken part in union activities before the strike broke out—perhaps the principal reason for the employer wanting to get rid of him—then he can be dismissed.

The Solicitor-General

The hon. Gentleman will no doubt bear in mind that the provisions of Clause 24 of the Bill follow almost precisely in line with the provisions of Clause 47 of the right hon. Lady's Bill, where exactly the same words appear: … the tribunal shall dismiss the claim unless it is shown …". The burden of proof is upon the employee there, and it is he who has to show that he was selected for a disqualified reason, and if it were a reason relating to trade union activities, that it related to matters which occurred before the strike began. Precisely the same formulation is adopted in a slightly different way, but the reason which has to be shown by the employee in Clause 47(1)(b) of the right hon. Lady's Bill was that the reason selected related to matters which occurred before the strike began. Had it not been for the precedent of Clause 47 of the right hon. Lady's Bill, Clause 24 would not have been in our Bill.

Mr. Fraser

The hon. and learned Gentleman seems to have admitted to the House that the burden of proof, in Clause 24 of his Bill, lies upon the employee. His right hon. Friend was fond of saying that the Bill had been misrepresented because we on this side of the House had said that that was so. The burden lies with the worker, and that seems to be wrong. First, the worker has no legal aid at the tribunal. The Solicitor-General has not given that away. Second, he is fighting against the might of a large organisation. Third, the Solicitor-General, as a lawyer, knows that it is extremely difficult to prove a negative proposition. That is what the employee will have to do.

It seems quite extraordinary that the Solicitor-General justifies Clause 24, which we have not discussed in full—we shall never have a chance to discuss it in full—by reference to a Bill which did not even have a Second Reading. If that is the standard of justification which the Solicitor-General produces, he ought to be ashamed of himself.

The Solicitor-General

I do not suggest that this provision lacks justification in this way. I am saying that in that provision of Clause 24 of the Bill, as in the provision of Clause 47 of the right hon. Lady's Bill, and only in the corresponding Clause, the burden of proof is upon the dismissed employee. It is not so anywhere else, and to suggest that it is disreputable for us to follow the precedent of Clause 47 of the right hon. Lady's Bill only because it had not had its Second Reading, and to imply that it would have been torn limb from limb by the right hon. Lady's hon. Friends when it came before the House, is a disingenuous suggestion. The House is entitled to take into account the parallel between the two.

Mr. Fraser

The Solicitor-General was praying that in aid. The burden of proof ought to be on the employer. The Solicitor-General says that the proviso in the Bill about taking part in trade union activity after a strike had commenced is not taken from my right hon. Friend's Bill. But he has to look at this Clause again to honour the impression—not an undertaking—given to the country that in these cases the burden of proof would lie with the employer, and unless he does so one would certainly have to bring these matters to a vote and try to challenge them on some other occasion, and to discuss very important issues later on in the Bill, to which only a scant amount of time will be given.

6.45 p.m.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins

I wish to address myself in the main to Amendment (y), being discussed in association with Amendment (w). Amendment (y) seeks to remove lines 27 to 29 from new Clause 2. The effect of those lines is to make it an offence or an unfair industrial practice, which is much the same thing to induce an employer or an employer's association to join in making an application under Part I of Schedule (Provisions as to certain closed shop agreements) to this Act. In other words, it makes it an offence for a trade union to induce an employer to do something which presumably the employer does not want to do.

In explaining this Clause on Second Reading, the Solicitor-General and his right hon. Friend tried to suggest that it was all very simple. But when one notices that the question of inducement is qualified, as the Solicitor-General rightly says, by subsection (2), in order to discover what "induce" means, as mentioned in subsection (3)(c), one has to revert to subsection (2) to discover that the words existing in subsection (3), … to which this section applies … import subsection (2) to apply to subsection (3)(c).

I have hardly even seen anything more complex than this piece of legal drafting within a Clause, one subsection relying upon another, which the right hon. Gentleman had the impertinence to suggest was the most simple English and could be easily understood by any shop steward. I thought that that was most extraordinary. My hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) gave an extremely convincing explanation of how it would be impossible for the ordinary person to grasp the meaning of the Clause. The explanation from the other side of the House, that this was a piece of simple English which could be understood by anybody, was extremely unconvincing. It seems that one has only to look at the Clause to see that it is extremely complex, and the idea that it is easily comprehensible without very close reading is a complete nonsense.

It seems that in the event of the Bill becoming law in its present form, in practice all existing closed shops would become invalid in law, or at least challengeable in law. Therefore, trade unions would be forced to the choice of enforcing the continuation of their closed shops by extra-legal means. They will do this, because many of them will not go through the procedure of registration without which they cannot even try to maintain the law as laid down in the Bill.

Therefore, what will be forced upon the trade unions is either the maintenance of their existing position, by means which the hon. and learned Gentleman would regard as unconstitutional, or an application will have to be made by the unions for a fresh closed shop with any employer who can be found ready to agree without having to be induced, as stated in the Bill.

The limitations and complicated procedure placed upon the union in order to try to achieve that are so great that it is made virtually impossible for any union to jump over all these stiles and finally to arrive at a closed shop through the four or five different stages. If the unions do not fall down on one stage, they are bound to fall on another. I cannot see any situation arising in which it would be possible for a trade union to achieve a closed shop. The pretence has been put forward that the new Clause, and new Clause 1 moved yesterday, are Clauses designed to assist unions who will be in special difficulty in this area. They in no way succeed in doing that.

It is time that we dropped the absurd pretence that hon. Members on both sides are seeking a way in which to assist unions to achieve their objectives. There is no such intention on the part of hon. Members opposite. For this reason, I am delighted to have the support of my right hon. and hon. Friends in Amendment (y), which makes it absolutely clear that it is only hon. Members on this side who are concerned to strengthen the unions and that hon. Members opposite are concerned only to weaken the unions, although they constantly pretend that they want to strengthen them. Their pretence does not stand up to serious examination.

Perhaps some employers recognise the benefit of the closed shop. As soon as the Bill is enacted, if it is enacted in its present form, other employers will begin to find that they can employ non-union labour if they wish. In the area which I know best, an employer could set up a company of students, perhaps, or of models, together with one or two dissident Equity members, perhaps with somebody who has been prevented from performing in South Africa because of Equity's rules about racial matters. Such an employer could employ them without going through the complex procedures which, as I said yesterday, a former Conservative Government established to provide the reality of trade union authority in this area.

Once that has happened in a single company in a single place, all other managements will complain of unfair competition, because they will say that the conditions imposed upon them by the London Theatre Council procedure and by the standard Esher contracts are being eroded. The trade union will be unable to do anything to impose, as it does at present, the union shop upon that employer; because that employer will be the last employer who will go with the trade union to the C.I.R., to fix up a closed shop. The object of such an employer is to break the closed shop.

Let there be no misunderstanding about this. If the Bill is enacted, there will be employers all over the country in all sorts of occupations who will set themselves the specific task of breaking closed shops. That will be their object. It will be extremely difficult by any legal means to prevent them from succeeding.

If the power which the union now has to enforce compliance with minimum standards is removed, managers will see it as their duty to their shareholders to secure the minimum conditions, which will be much lower than the minimum conditions previously provided under the closed shop agreement. In the sphere which I know best, within weeks of the first non-Equity company being formed and of the association proving powerless to prevent it, the Esher standard contracts could become so much waste paper and the Theatre Councils and the other protective institutions unable to function effectively.

I have with me a copy of an Esher standard contract. I shall refer to this, because yesterday the Solicitor-General referred to the Theatre Council procedure. I thought that the confusion of what the Solicitor-General said and his complete lack of knowledge of the subject were exceeded only by the convincing manner in which he presented it. I have seldom heard balderdash presented in such a convincing way. I should not have known that it was balderdash but for the fact that I recognised, having some knowledge of the subject, that the Solicitor-General was confusing a casting agreement with an Esher standard contract.

The truth of the situation is quite different. The truth is that one of the predecessors of the Secretary of State—Oliver Stanley, when he was Minister of Labour—set up the Theatre Councils. In every contract which is issued under a Theatre Council there appears this clause: Neither the British Actors' Equity Association nor any of its members shall take any action to impede or endanger the production or run of the play, provided that all Artists engaged are registered as approved Artists at the time of making the engagement … Strictly, it is a pre-entry closed shop. An "approved artist" is a member of Equity. If he is not a member of Equity, he is not an approved artist. This gives the Theatre Council the power to enforce a closed shop in London theatres, and it is also operated throughout the business.

So this was an ingenious means whereby the substance of a closed shop was conceded without the appearance of it. A successor to the Government who conceded that situation because they recognised its necessity are proceeding to do the exact opposite. By this Clause the Government are proceeding to give the appearance of a closed shop without conceding the substance of it. It is the complete opposite.

I ask the Secretary of State to consider what happened at that time, to look again at new Clause 2 and to see whether it would not be better, if he is serious in recognising that there are areas in which the existence of the closed shop is necessary—the area to which I am referring is by no means the only one—to import some such wording as is provided here—in other words, to provide that the union has the power of enforcement, a power exercised by the trade union and not made dependent upon the consent of the employer.

If the Secretary of State is serious about what he is doing and wishes to give the trade union the power to enforce the conditions and standards which it has hitherto enjoyed, he will accept this wording and will not rely upon the wording which he at present has, which is of no value but which would be improved if we were to take out the provision which makes it an offence to induce an employer or an employers' association to join in a closed shop agreement.

So the balance of the law will have been changed. Despite all the hypocritical smooth talk we heard yesterday, the situation will be grave indeed. I speak mainly for a union which has a proud boast that no member of it has ever broken a contractual agreement with the consent of the union. People have asked: why was it that during the Equity television strike people with long-term contracts to make a series continued to perform? The answer is that they continued by the direct instruction of the union, because they were under contract Therefore, they continued to perform, against the interests of the union, and the strike probably continued for two or three weeks longer as a result of that.

I forecast that a consequence of the passing of the Bill will be a rash of unofficial strikes throughout the industry. It will be the only way in which Equity will be able to protect its interests. Although hon. Members opposite hold out the Bill as a means of securing industrial peace, it will actually be the cause of industrial war. What we shall have during the forthcoming years in the way of industrial disputes and industrial strife will be very much greater than what has been happening, even in the last six months, and that has been enough since this lot have been in power.

My advice to Equity must be that the law, unless these Amendments are accepted, will no longer help it and it must safeguard its funds in one or two ways which I shall have pleasure in recommending. Equity must see whether there are ways other than legal methods of enforcing the Equity shop. It will have to consider what other sanctions are open. It will have to have its own lawyers ready to see what loopholes can be burrowed in the legislation. There will be a great deal of legalistic activity as a result of the Bill. Equity must be ready, if necessary to strike and strike again in the preservation of the union shop which is essential to the maintenance of its members' livelihood.

There will be no industrial peace until Labour returns to cast out this iniquitous Measure and all the horrors of corruption and, perhaps in some areas even physical enforcement which must follow the loss of the natural and legal rights of trade unionists which are to be stolen from them by the stupidity and the viciousness of the party opposite.

7.0 p.m.

Mr. Tom King

I find it extremely difficult to comment on the speech of the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins), who usually makes a rational and serious contribution to these discussions. In the middle of his speech, he was dealing with serious matters, but there then followed an unfortunate lapse from his usual standards, and he indulged in some unnecessary and unjustified accusations against my right hon. Friends and their intentions, and he made some regrettable comments about the possible implications of the Bill. He is not the only Member concerned with the problems of Equity and he is not the only person concerned with some of the difficulties which exist in this respect. His speech would have been more appreciated if he had concentrated on the real difficulties.

Amendment (y) proposes to omit the provision dealing with inducing. The closed shop is recognised in industry as having advantages. I have worked with the pre-entry closed shop and I recognise its advantages, and I know that the companies with which I have worked and other companies will not forswear those advantages within five minutes of the Bill's becoming law. They will wish to appear to be progressive in their negotiations with the unions, but there are also advantages for the employers in certain situations.

Mrs. Castle

The hon. Gentleman says that employers will not readily forgo the advantages of the closed shop. Is he not aware that under new Clause 1, for which he voted yesterday, they will be forced to forgo those advantages, unless they can become approved under the narrow definition which the Government said they intended to enforce under that Clause?

Mr. King

They may be forced to forgo the advantages of the closed shop, but they will not be forced to forgo the advantages of the 100 per cent. union shop, because that depends entirely on the attitude of the employees.

Mrs. Castle

The hon. Gentleman is labouring under a misunderstanding about his own Government's Bill. We have been attacked by the Secretary of State this afternoon for misrepresenting the Bill, but it is the Government who are misrepresenting the Bill to their own supporters. What the hon. Gentleman does not realise is that there cannot be a 100 per cent. union shop, except within the narrow definitions of new Clause 1, which was passed yesterday, and with the approval of the Industrial Court.

Mr. King

By referring to the 100 per cent. union shop, I mean simply that all the employees are members of the union. In what sense could that be lost? If at the moment there is a closed shop and all the employees are members of the union, if none of the employees applies to leave the union when the Bill is passed, will there not continue to be a 100 per cent. union shop?

Mrs. Castle

The definition of a 100 per cent. union shop when membership is made a condition of employment means that that condition can no longer apply.

Mr. King

I accept what the right hon. Lady says, but she will accept my contention. The right hon. Lady may believe that there will be a wholesale desire to leave the unions, a desire which I should regret, but where there are good relations and responsible trade unionism and good shop floor representation, I do not expect wholesale resignations.

An impression is fostered by some misleading propaganda that people will be encouraged to leave the unions. In future, they will have the right to do so, but it is a right which may or may not be exercised. If, in the example which I have given, the employees choose not to exercise it, there will be a 100 per cent. union shop. But it will be on the best basis, because it will be a voluntary union shop composed of people who have freely chosen to be members of the union, recognising the benefits which that can bring.

I hope that hon. Members will stress to union leaders that they have to start changing their rôle and to recognise that they now have to sell the benefits of their unions. There is tremendous scope, particularly with the agency shop contribution, for selling the benefits and advantages of union membership, for pension entitlement, sickness benefits, strike benefits. That will make it a calculated act of disadvantage in an individual if he pays the agency shop contribution but is not a member of the union.

Mr. Charles Loughlin (Gloucestershire, West)

The hon. Gentleman would not want to misrepresent the position. It may be true, and I concede this, that an employer sees the advantages of 100 per cent. trade unionism, through the operation of the closed shop, or voluntarily; but under the Bill he will not be able to give any instruction to a newcomer. The great difficulty will be in the maintenance of a 100 per cent. union shop.

Mr. King

The new Clause provides that an employer will be able to make it clear that he encourages union membership. I agree that the balance will be slightly changed and that it will be up to the union, instead of telling an employee that he is obliged to join, to sell the benefits of joining. If employers recognise that there are benefits in having the closed shop, and I believe that they do, it is hardly necessary to have a provision to make it an unfair practice to induce.

The hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) made an interesting speech, but it was totally irrelevant. The preamble to the Clause merely sets the scene for what is the point of the Clause, which is that no account shall be taken of pressure. To try to enlarge subsection (1) when the main attack has been that the Bill is too long and too complicated, for the Opposition now to seek to add yet another sentence or another insertion adding nothing to the sense of the Clause and making no contribution when the matter is covered elsewhere, is merely over-egging the pudding.

The much more serious issue concerns Amendment (x). If the hon. Member is right about this, we should be genuinely concerned. I hope that my right hon. Friend will reconcile the point about Clause 24 with the clear statement in Clause 22(4), which establishes the very important principle that the onus will be on the employer. It is a fair point that there must always be a problem for the employee facing such tribunals, even with all the safeguards with which we have tried to surround him. I hone that Clause 22(4) will be the over-riding condition, making it clear that the onus of proof is on the employer, and that the Amendments will be rejected.

Mr. Loughlin

It is very difficult for hon. Members on either side fully to comprehend the Clauses of the Bill. The hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Tom King) made a snide remark, but I will not repeat it about him. I can understand his not being too clear about the full implications.

It is true that, broadly, we deal with two types of employer. Some are good and will want to see full trade unionism in the shop because they recognise that by having it, and having a high degree of co-operation between the two sides in the establishment, they are more likely to obtain higher productivity than if they have antagonisms on the shop floor. Those good employers will be sorely disappointed by the Government's performance. They will not now be able to continue the policy of having 100 per cent. voluntary trade unionism in their establishments. That is a pity, because the Bill is supposed to be about industrial relations.

Mr. Adam Butler (Bosworth)

When the hon. Gentleman talks about 100 per cent. voluntary unionism, is he referring to the voluntary agreement between the union and the employer or voluntary action on the part of the member who can work at the factory only if he belongs to the union?

Mr. Loughlin

I am dealing with the point made by the hon. Member for Bridgwater. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman was here when his hon. Friend made the point.

This is not a question of a formal agreement for 100 per cent. trade unionism or of a written closed shop agreement. When I was a trade union official a number of employers saw the advantages of full co-operation with the trade unions. Whilst we had no formal agreement with them, they took every step possible to persuade employees coming to the factory for the first time to join the union, including the distribution of a trade union application form. The personnel department would try to persuade the worker to fill it in then, so that it could be passed to the shop steward. That is the kind of employer I am talking about.

As long as his work force is static, he can continue to maintain a 100 per cent. voluntary trade union shop, presumably. But unfortunately people die, and there is a wastage of labour. In many industries the annual wastage even in good firms is about 30 per cent., and it is much higher in some of the bad firms. When this happens it enables 20 per cent. of the workers to challenge the operation of even an approved closed shop in the first year. That is what we were talking about last night. There is no provision in the Bill which will encourage or in any way assist the good employer to maintain a 100 per cent. trade unionism even on a voluntarly basis, because it is not physically possible.

Mr. Tom King

No compulsion.

Mr. Loughlin

I am not talking about compulsion. Perhaps I am expressing myself badly. I am saying that there is no longer an opportunity for an employer even to persuade the work people to be in the trade union. If there is a wastage rate of 30 per cent., in the first year 20 per cent. of the employees could object to any approved application for a closed shop.

We are not dealing with good employers only. I had a very mixed bag. Most of the employers with whom I dealt were good, but some I could not trust further than outside the shop door. They are the people who will take full advantage of the provisions of the Clause and the Clauses to which it relates.

Amendment (w) seeks to insert after "reason" in line 4 the words: as defined in subsection (1) of Section 22 Strangely enough, this would be an improvement in the Bill. I said last night that while Clause 22 might constrain employers in some way I did not believe that it gave any protection to employees against unfair dismissal. Even though I am advocating the inclusion of those provisions, because they might be better than nothing, we see how futile the four items in Clause 22(1) are. The first two speak of reasons for dismissal

  1. "(a) related to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, or
  2. (b) related to the conduct of the employee, …"
I know what some of the bad employers are like.

7.15 p.m.

My hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) talked about the possibility of transfer. Many employees are subject to transfer from one area to another. Accommodation is often let to the employee in connection with his employment. He could be dismissed under these provisions for refusing to be transferred. There is no definition of "conduct". It would depend entirely on those hearing the case, who are not associated with the industry. Where accommodation was let, a worker would lose not only his job but his house because there is no protection in regard to accommodation let in connection with his employment.

The trade union movement has had some very bitter struggles over the capability of the individual. We have often had to tell an employer who has argued that he should dismiss someone for inability to do his job, even though he might have been there ten years, "If you dismiss him we shall take the lads out." That was the only possible way in which we could compel the employer to toe the line. I do not think that any trade union could take a risk to secure the retention of an employee when "capability" is defined as it is in the Bill: 'capability' means capability assessed by reference to skill, aptitude, health or any other physical or mental quality; I know scores of employers who could get away with that one.

Mr. E. Fernyhough (Jarrow)

God help you if you wear glasses or have dentures.

Mr. Loughlin

If the worker has glasses like mine and is doing a job that is relatively fine work, the employer could argue that his physical condition does not allow him to do the job.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis (Rutland and Stamford)

Get a better pair of glasses.

An Hon. Member

They are too expensive.

Mr. Loughlin

I do not want to be sidetracked on to the prescription charges being introduced in April.

The employer could well argue that even with the glasses the worker still could not do the job. The burden of proof is on the employee, not on the employer.

What about mental qualities? If I were a militant trade unionist, it could be argued that my mental quality was the determining factor in my actions, and on the basis of that definition—

The Solicitor-General

Before the hon. Gentleman goes any further in his interesting definition of capability, he might like to be reminded that it is taken gratefully from the corresponding definition in Clause 35 of the right hon. Lady's Bill. It is exactly the same definition.

Mr. Loughlin

The hon. and learned Gentleman has got into the habit of floating up to the Box like the Holy Ghost. He frightens me. I never know what he is going to do. He does not even put his hand up in the customary practice of the House. He just stands up and in his usual snail's gallop says, "Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that it relates to a Clause of the Bill that the right hon. Lady introduced?" I do not give two hoots who was to present the other Bill. It is not before the House. I am dealing with this Bill. The hon. and learned Gentleman has been here long enough to know that we are dealing with this Bill and that, even if there were defects in the Bill presented by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) that is no excuse for him to say, "This might be defective but we shall put it in".

The Solicitor-General rose

Mr. Loughlin

No. Sit down. If the hon. and learned Gentleman will request me to give way, I will willingly do so.

The Solicitor-General

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. It is not easy for him to ride off and denounce the right hon. Lady's Bill as irrelevant in that way. That Bill was produced after a very long period of trial and tribulation and its provisions were said by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) to be warmly supported by the entire Labour Party. Surely on these terms we are entitled to look with some respect at provisions in the right hon. Lady's Bill.

Mr. Loughlin

What the hon. and learned Gentleman forgets is that there was tremendous discussion on that Bill inside the Labour Party in this House and outside. After that discussion had taken place, the decision, rightly or wrongly, was that we would not proceed with the Bill. There is no question but that, if the Labour Party has a full discussion on an issue of that kind and then the Bill is not proceeded with, there can be no criticism.

The Solicitor-General

I am grateful again to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. The Bill to which I am referring, and to which we have been referring throughout, is not the interim Bill that was never produced but the Bill tabled on 29th April, 1970, with the entire support of the Government of which he was a member. It was the declared intention to put it on the Statute Book by the following autumn. It is that Bill to which we are referring.

Mrs. Castle

Perhaps I may step in to help settle this. My hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin) is making an entirely valid point. The Solicitor-General keeps quoting from the Bill which I presented to the House and the principles of which were, as my hon. Friend says, endorsed by the trade union movement and the Parliamentary Labour Party. But the hon. and learned Gentleman is constantly quoting out of context a Bill which was never examined by the House. The House never had a chance of weighing the relative merits of my proposals in their context. My hon. Friend is right. What we are concerned with now are the Government's proposals.

Mr. Loughlin

I never dreamed that the hon. and learned Gentleman was talking about the Bill that we were going to present to the House. I should have thought that it would have been elementary of him to know that a Bill is subject to discussion in Committee, on Report and on Third Reading, as this Bill is. I thought that he was pursuing his usual political tactic of criticising us for "In Place of Strife". I never dreamed that he was so impudent as to argue the case that, apparently, he was arguing.

If he thinks that his interventions are going to lead me down a side path, I can tell him that he will not succeed. I am going to return now to the point I was arguing—about the definitions to which I have referred creating a hole in the Bill through which one could drive a train and not just a coach and horses. The Bill and the new Clause mean that it will be relatively easy for an employer with the slightest antagonism towards trade unionism to get rid of any active trade unionist. The hon. and learned Gentleman knows it, and so does the Secretary of State.

7.30 p.m.

Mr. Gower

I endorse what my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Tom King) said. There are indeed great opportunities ahead for effective trade unions to enlarge their voluntary strength, and to do so they will have to give ever better services. There should be a healthy competition among them.

I am sorry that the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) has just left the Chamber. I hope that the excellent members of Equity will not follow the advice in his peroration. It was misguided. He referred to all sorts of unconstitutional steps he might recommend to the members of Equity after the passing of the Bill. I hope that they will reject such counsel, which is not in their best interests.

As the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) herself pointed out, we have amended the Bill to permit a relatively small exception which might enable a closed shop arrangement in the activity covered by Equity and which might also permit a similar arrangement in the mercantile marine. We did not do it with wild enthusiasm. I am glad that the hon. Member for Putney has now returned because I am commenting on his remarks in relation to the closed shop and the new Clause. Yesterday, on new Clause 1, we permitted the exceptions which might be made in the activities covered by Equity and also in the mercantile marine, where there is an analogous situation. I was telling the House that we did not make the exception with wild enthusiasm.

In an engaging passage in the Daily Telegraph today, its parliamentary correspondent states, quite rightly, that my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls) and the hon. Member for Putney appear to regard the closed shop arrangement in Equity as a bastion of our constitution. May be it is, but I do not think so. We feel, however, that there may be a special case here. It appears to us that this is a special situation. But the unions and managements concerned will still have to satisfy the conditions laid down in new Clause 1.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins

The point I was making was that the concessions did not exist—that they were completely bogus.

Mr. Gower

That is a comment with which I do not agree. If the case is put fairly, it may well be, on the evidence adduced to us, that such an arrangement will be deemed proper by the Commission. The hon. Gentleman is asking that we should include in the new Clause, by excluding subsection (3)(c), the possibility that such a closed shop should be introduced by compulsion on the employer, through the threat of a strike or by a strike. I hope that we shall entirely reject such a proposal. The hon. Gentleman, like my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough, made out a reasonable case for a closed shop in this context, and we hope that it will be established on its merits, but the hon. Gentleman has made out no case for it to be imposed by brute force. I hope that his utterly irresponsible suggestion will be rejected by the Government.

I turn to Amendment (x). The remarkable thing about the speech of the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) was that he appeared to want to include in the wording of the new Clause the wording at the beginning of Clause 22, yet spent most of his time demolishing that wording, as did the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin).

Mr. Loughlin indicated dissent.

Mr. Gower

They both criticised it.

Mr. Loughlin

The hon. Gentleman cannot get away with that one. I said clearly that it was preferable to nothing. I said that, poor though it was, I should like to see it included. Then I proceeded to show why it was poor.

Mr. Gower

The hon. Member for Norwood went further and criticised the wording because it was in the affirmative rather than the negative. I am not misrepresenting him, I am sure. He said that the wording should have been "lack of capability or qualifications" rather than simply "capability or qualifications". I think that he laboured the point. I think that the present wording adequately covers the main point. It would be difficult to introduce a complete category to cover every possible exigency. It has to suffice to put in about five separate categories which would satisfy the case as being fair.

Similarly, the hon. Gentleman dealt in some detail with the phrase "sufficient reason" later in Clause 22. He wanted to add an exhaustive list of categories, including one which he himself seemed to regard as an absurdity—that the person has a particular religious belief or persuasion. I pointed out to him that it might be legitimate for a local Labour Party to wish to dismiss an employee who happens to be a keen Conservative. No matter how exhaustive one made a list, something would be left out that would be basically fair or sufficient reason. The present wording is the best in the circumstances and we must remember that a responsible body will be considering this. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State will agree that this matter will be considered responsibly in judicial considerations. The words "sufficient reason" will be capable of definition by a body which will have an accumulated experience over the years ahead. The Amendments should be rejected.

The Under-Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Dudley Smith)

The hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) is one of the most forceful speakers in the House. He said that we had had no chance of discussing the unfair dismissal provisions in the Bill. Of course it is true that the guillotine does bear some responsibility, but that responsibility does not lie entirely on this side. We have had many detailed debates in these weary, long days and nights on the Bill, and I think that even some of his hon. Friends would agree that the time has not always been best spent on some of the items discussed. It has been in some respects a matter of selection by the Opposition of what we should discuss.

I agree that the unfair dismissal provisions are very important, and this has been emphasised by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Barry (Mr. Gower). We tend to overlook the fact that, at present, there are no safeguards for the individual who is unfairly dismissed, over and above the question of being able to sue in the civil courts for breach of contract. These provisions spell out the rights of the individual in this situation. With all humility, I say to the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West that, while he may think that some employers will try to use these provisions as a weapon to get rid of some employees, the Bill gives protection to the individual.

These four important points in Clause 22 are open to interpretation, to judgment on the part of the employer who may be seeking to dismiss his employee. They are open to judgment by the industrial tribunal. Every decision in the land is a legal decision, presided over in the High Court by a judge. The very word means that judgment is being used. We know that quite often judgment is improperly used but in this industrial framework I would say that the individual has a very good chance of getting proper justice. These four provisions are relevant because they relate to capability, qualifications, conduct and redundancy.

The hon. Member for Norwood took us to task about Clause 22(4). He does not like the subsection (4(a) and (b) which said:

  1. "(a) the dismissal of an employee shall be regarded as having been unfair if no good reason for it is shown, and
  2. (b) where a good reason for the dismissal is shown (whether it is a good reason falling within subsection (1) of this section or not), the dismissal shall nevertheless be regarded as unfair if in the circumstances the employer acted unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee."
The hon. Gentleman asked why "any other good reason"? I would say because there may be other good reasons beyond conduct and capability and it is quite impossible in such a Bill to provide a fully comprehensive list of reasons. We can all think of examples and there is one very important one, incompatibility. This could well be something open to interpretation by the industrial tribunal.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins

And mental cruelty?

Mr. Smith

The hon. Gentleman jokes about mental cruelty but if force is being used on an individual it does not have to be physical force. If he is being treated very unfairly I should have thought that this was a reason, for making out a case that he was being unfairly dismissed.

Mr. Loughlin

I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman has used the word "in-compatibility" and I hope that it will be scrubbed from the record. Frankly any employer could say this about any employee and if incompatibility is a good reason under the Bill, then it is even worse than I thought.

Mr. Smith

Under the Bill the employer would have to show that there was sufficient reason for making the allegation. This is the whole basis for the provision. The case would have to be proved before the industrial tribunal. We can all think of examples where there is incompatibility.

It can be unfair, I agree, it can be a trumped-up charge but it could be a perfectly genuine situation where there is incompatibility because of the abtuseness of the individual or because he is not harmonising with his colleagues or the company employing him. I would submit that it is impossible to provide a comprehensive list to be written into the Bill.

The Bill does not necessarily restrict unfair dismissal to those grounds I have mentioned. The hon. Member for Norwood said that the employer might say that the four provisions did not suit his book very well and that he would get rid of someone on the grounds of colour, sex—if it is a woman—or religion—[Interruption.]—perhaps that was an unfortunate remark. Hon. Gentlemen know what I mean about well-known discriminatory points such as racial discrimination, religious discrimination or sex discrimination. No industrial tribunal would begin to consider such a thing if that sort of case was brought before it. These provisions are not therefore starters, they are not relevant provisions in the debate. No one before an industrial tribunal defending discrimination against an employee on those grounds would have any chance of succeeding.

We have given consideration to the provisions of I.L.O. recommendation 119 and to the recommendations of the Donovan Commission. They recommended that in addition to trade union membership and activities certain other reasons should be specifically declared to be unfair with respect to dismissal. They listed these as race, colour, sex, marital status, religious or political opinion, national extraction or social origin. The Bill does not include these because we do not believe that the list could ever be really comprehensive and anyway those items would never stand the test if they were brought before the industrial tribunal.

7.45 p.m.

The Bill is right as it is drafted on these questions of unfair dismissal. The hon. Member said there were good reasons, spelled out in his party's Bill—which was not discussed and which people do not even like being mentioned. I believe that there are something like eight reasons for dismissal spelled out in the Bill of the right hon. Lady and four of these were subsequently disqualified. I am sure that she is not pretending that there could not be more than those actually included in the Bill.

It is important that we should be able to leave the door open for other examples to be brought before the industrial tribunal. The hon. Member for Norwood dealt with the question of reinstatement. I know that reinstatement was mentioned in the right hon. Lady's Bill, but as far as I can remember, although it in some ways went a little further than ours, there was no machinery for carrying through the reinstatement, and this is surely the most important point. I agree that there is, ideally, a good case to be made out for reinstatement of the unfairly dismissed man but in many respects it is not practical, it does not work out and often it is hard to police and supervise.

In the circumstances, it is sensible to allow this recommendation to be made and to try to persuade the employer to take back an employee who has been unfairly dismissed and not to provide an official sanction although we are allowing that to be taken into consideration when damages are assessed.

Mr. Orme

It is because it is impossible to quantify this sort of problem that when workers take action to get reinstatement by stopping work they do it only when there is justification. That is the only way in which reinstatement can be achieved and trade union organisation maintained.

Mr. Smith

That is the sort of thing we have not sought to describe as an unfair industrial practice. We have been urged to do so but we have not. The hon. Member for Norwood raised the question of the burden of proof. If we are fair about this Bill and what it seeks to do, it is inappropriate to spell out precisely where the burden of proof lies at each stage. I would refer him to the passage he has quoted in Clause 22(4) where there is a good deal of the onus of proof placed on the employer who appears before an industrial tribunal. It will have to be for the industrial tribunal to work out the onus of proof in dealing with cases. We will make them as informal as possible and it is in the interests of both parties that there should not necessarily always be a situation where the burden of proof must be placed on the employer.

I turn to the point made by the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) who has been such a frequent contributor to these debates, not least on the subject of Equity. I do not want to raise the temperature in what has been a fairly equable debate, but I have heard the hon. Gentleman many times and I think that his rather intemperate language was uncharacteristic. He usually makes a good argument, even if we do not agree with him, but I felt he was a little out of character today. Maybe he did feel rather strongly about it.

The hon. Gentleman saddened me because my hon. and learned Friend and my right hon. Friend have gone to a great deal of trouble to try to meet the case of Equity and the National Union of Seamen. They have laboured for long hours, not only in the Chamber but outside, to try to find a solution for Equity. They produced the new Clause which we debated yesterday. The hon. Gentleman is entitled to his view that it does not meet the case, but I should have thought that it was the best compromise in a difficult situation. The hon. Gentleman gives us very little credit by indicating that this is merely a pretence and that we have brought this proposal forward purely for political reasons. It was introduced because of the very good and well-argued speeches which he and some of his colleagues and some of my hon. Friends have advanced in favour of it. The hon. Gentleman is being unduly pessimistic when he says that he cannot see anybody getting a closed shop—

Mr. Hugh Jenkins

My point is that hon. Members opposite have made it clear that they will not allow the Government Front Bench to make any real concession. As soon as they thought that there was even the possibility of a concession being made, hon. Members opposite have started to rebel. The Government have put forward a bogus proposition because they knew that if it was a real proposition their hon. Friends would not support them.

Mr. Smith

That is entirely untrue, and the hon. Gentleman knows it. His right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) yesterday seemed to think that we had made a complete volte face. She said that we had gone away from the agency shop provision and had now accepted the closed shop principle. We have made no secret of the fact that the Clause has been tightly drawn and that it is not an open door for the introduction of the closed shop.

There is a clash of philosophy between the two sides of the House. The hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) is in favour of the closed shop. I respect his view. I am not in favour of it. This is not an open door; it is a narrow gateway.

The hon. Member for Putney says that he does not believe that any trade union will be able to get the qualification. I do not agree. I think that they will be able to do so. But admittedly the provision is very narrow and has been drawn with the special cases in mind. Others who might seek to create a closed shop, even if there is a joint approach between employers and employees, will not be able to establish their case. The provision has been drawn to deal with the specially difficult cases, like the Equity case, for which there has been general sympathy on both sides of the House.

I know the great interest of the hon. Member for Putney in Equity and his advocacy of its case, but it is only a tiny part of the general trade union complex, and we must not get our eyes so fixed on Equity that we forget other sections. It is not the Government's wish or desire to introduce the closed shop principle for trade unions as a whole. In those circumstances, we cannot possibly accept the hon. Gentleman's Amendment. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has stressed many times, we believe that the right of the individual is fundamental and that there should be a shift of emphasis towards the individual. This is very important, even allowing for the special cases about which there are admitted difficulties.

We think that the drafting of the Bill is right on the question of unfair dismissal and that it gives a fairer chance to the individual than the Bill of the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn, which would have become law if her party had remained in power because it had a majority. We believe that the question of judging the onus of proof should be left to the industrial tribunals. We think that if we were to accept the Amendment we would throw open the door for all trade unions. Yesterday the House accepted new Clause No. 1, which allows special cases to be registered.

For these reasons, I must advise my hon. Friends to reject all three Amendments.

Mrs. Castle

The speech of the Under-Secretary of State has confirmed all our worst anxieties about the Bill's proposals for dealing with unfair dismissals. We have had about the sloppiest explanation of a vital part of the Bill that has ever been given from the Government Front Bench.

Let me take only one phrase in the hon. Gentleman's speech. He said that the onus of proof would lie with the tribunals. That showed that he did not know, and certainly did not care, what he was talking about. I do not like to be offensive to the hon. Gentleman, who is a very nice chap, but the fact that he was put up to answer this debate is proof of how little importance the Government attach to this matter. The hon. Gentleman has been allowed to participate three times on minor issues in our debates. It is clear that the Government thought that this was a minor issue and that the Solicitor-General and the Secretary of State could take a little rest.

This short debate shows what a tragedy it is that we have had no opportunity, either in Committee or effectively on Report, to discuss Clauses 20 to 32, to say nothing of the enforcement Clauses, which are supposed to embody for the first time in law in this country what the I.L.O. convention defined as a basic human right. I know that the Government have put it in only as a fig leaf. That is the reason for the sloppy wording in the Bill and why we have had a sloppy explanation from the Under-Secretary of State. But it is not just a fig leaf to us. It is an important development of people's rights as workers and citizens.

The Under-Secretary of State says, "But we could have had a longer debate if only the time had been better spent". That comes very badly from a member of a Government which last night deliberately organised a filibuster to waste time so that hon. Members opposite could get back from their dinner engagements by 10 o'clock. May we please have no more of that nonsense from the benches opposite?

Mr. Kenneth Lewis rose

Mrs. Castle

We want to divide on the Amendment soon and to move on to another debate. Therefore, I shall not give way on an established point.

The avidity with which the Solicitor-General has floated to the Despatch Box from time to time to say, "What are you complaining about? It was all in her Bill" emphasises what a pity it is that we did not have the chance in Committee to examine Clauses 20 to 32 to see how they hung together and, if the Government wished, to see how they compared with my Clauses—although I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin) that it is impudent of the chief legal spokesman for the Government on the Bill to base his case, as he has done so many times, on quotations made in connection with a Bill which did not even receive a Second Reading, let alone go to Committee.

8.0 p.m.

Mr. Dudley Smith

Will the right hon. Lady confirm that, in the business scheduled for the week before Parliament was dissolved, her Bill was down for Second Reading on the Monday to which we did not come back because the General Election was declared in the interim?

Mrs. Castle

Of course. I am glad to have the hon. Gentleman's endorsement of our genuine intention to legislate on the lines of my Bill. I do not retract anything from my Bill or from the fact that the previous Government seriously intended to go ahead with that legislation had the General Election not intervened.

We intended to legislate, and my hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) worked very hard on the drafting of the Bill. As the hon. Gentleman pointed out, it is extremely difficult to get matters right at the first attempt. We did not pretend that we had discovered the ultimate truth in every line or found the perfect wording in every case. That is what a Committee stage is for. It enables hon. Members to examine a Bill in detail. Unlike the present Government, we should have been prepared to listen and we should have taken seriously any argument from any side of the House which was able to demonstrate that the wording which we had chosen would not fulfil the purpose of our Bill. That is in contrast with what we had this evening, when my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) pointed out in great detail what we believe to be only one of a number of flaws in this group of Clauses. However, we cannot deal with all of our criticism in this debate because we are bound by the limits of the new Clause. We have to concentrate on one flaw, but it is a serious one. It occurs in Clause 22, and it represents a flaw in the Government's approach to this unfair dismissal point.

My hon. Friend gave a number of hon. Members opposite grounds for anxiety as a result of his carefully constructed arguments. We believe that, taking Clause 22(1) and (4) together, one faces a situation in which an employer can drive a coach and horses through a worker's right to protection against unfair dismissal. As my hon. Friend said, Clause 22 does not spell out the reasons which would be unfair, which was the way in which I tackled it in my Bill, thus putting the onus of proof clearly and inescapably on the employer. This Clause stands my approach on its head. It says that the dismissal would be fair for one of the reasons given in subsection (1). Then we are given a formula in subsection (4) whereby a dismissal could be held not to be unfair if a good reason were shown by the employer. In terms, that good reason need not be one of the reasons listed in subsection (1). Therefore, the Clause enables an employer to plead a whole range of unspecified reasons, and the Government do not deny that, in this situation, the onus of proof clearly shifts to the worker.

The Under-Secretary seemed to dismiss that as being unimportant. He said that there will be a "good deal of onus of proof". Those are meaningless words. Then he said that the onus of proof will be a matter for the tribunal. The whole question is who has to prove what. That is what matters in these cases, and that is what the I.L.O. Convention says. The hon. Gentleman at least paid me the courtesy of recognising that, in building into my proposals a list of disqualified reasons, I was adhering to the I.L.O. Convention in a way that the Government's formula does not. Therefore we say that we have proof that these Clauses on unfair dismissal are so weak as to be practically meaningless in the view of many independent legal observers.

We have proof, too, that the Government do not care about it and are not prepared to consider improving their wording. They have not even said that my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood may have a point, that they will look at it and that, if he is right, they will seek to introduce an Amendment in another place. The Under-Secretary says that the Government think that it is right to be at large about what is a good reason because "anything might crop up". Incompatibility might crop up. What else might crop up? As one hon. Member said, mental cruelty, or what? I can imagine no better reason for incompatibility between an employer and his employee than that the employee is very active in his trade union. That is a very good basis for incompatibility.

Mr. Tom King

The right hon. Lady and her hon. Friends have taken exception to the word "incompatibility". In earlier debates we discussed group interests as against individual interests, and it was the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) who made the point about the incompatibility of a union member to justify the action of his union in expelling him.

Mrs. Castle

I agree. We cannot get right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite to realise that, when we talk about trade union rights, we are talking about the existence of groups in our society which we think contribute to the democratic life and vitality of the society, and the group interest must be preserved.

These Clauses are concerned with the rights of an individual worker, and they are the kind of rights that, years ago, the I.L.O. said should be embodied in the law of every civilised land. In this case, the I.L.O. Convention is incompatible with the legislation in the form brought forward by this Government. There is no list of disqualified reasons. Clause 22 contains a circular argument that an employer can say that he is not unreasonable because he has a good reason which need not be a reason spelt out in Clause 22(1). There was nothing like that in my Bill, and the hon. Gentleman knows it.

We say that this provision makes a farce of the Bill, and it is only one of our objections to this group of Clauses. The other great safeguard lies in the right to reinstatement and, here again, we have had only confused waffle from the Under-Secretary. We have had no chance to examine the Clauses and, if necessary, to compare them with mine. My Bill said that the tribunal could issue an order to reinstate. The Government's Bill says that it will issue a recommendation. But what if the employer defies that recommendation? It is an easy way out for an employer to get rid of militants and, if we are talking about industrial realities, certainly that is a reality of industrial life. It will be cheap for many employers to pay the compensaton—

The Solicitor-General rose

Mrs. Castle

I see that we have at last brought the hon. and learned Gentleman to his feet to help his hon. Friend.

The Solicitor-General

There is some provocation which I can endure and some which goes beyond endurance. Does not the right hon. Lady acknowledge that in her Bill, as a matter of sequence, the tribunal could make an order for reinstatement, but that Clause 52 went on to deal with the situation in which the employer did not comply with such an order? It was the same at the end of the day as our provisions for recommendations. In the right hon. Lady's Bill, as in ours, the only sanction that one can have against an employer who declines to accept a recommendation or order for reinstatement is that of additional compensation. It is fruitless for the right hon. Lady to pretend that her Bill could secure reinstatement. In her Bill and in ours an employer could buy off someone who was unfairly dismissed. In Clause 52 of her Bill there is no alternative to accepting that proposition.

Mrs. Castle

The hon. and learned Gentleman is proving my point about how tragic it is that we have not had the opportunity of examining these Clauses. If what the Solicitor-General says is true, no doubt he would have accepted our Amendment to substitute "order" for "recommendation". If the hon. and learned Gentleman says that there is no difference, will he undertake to make that substitution in another place and thus prove his point? If not, the hon. and learned Gentleman is proving my point. We shall watch what happens in another place.

The Solicitor-General

The right hon. Lady must understand that one does not advance the argument at all by describing as an order something which cannot in fact be enforced as an order. The reality of the situation is that one cannot make anything beyond a recommendation. The order for reinstatement in the right hon. Lady's Bill was in the end unenforceable and amounted to no more than a recommendation. It could be enforced only to the extent of providing for additional compensation. It would not have helped in the right hon. Lady's Bill, nor in ours, to describe something as an order which has not the force of an order.

Mrs. Castle

This proves how grossly unfair it is that the hon. and learned Gentleman and I should be having this argument not in the context of the Clauses concerned. We cannot, because of the guillotine. My answer is that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not use the word "order" because he did not intend it in the last resort to be enforceable. But what my hon. Friend and I provided in my Bill was that the tribunal must have some freedom at the end to decide in a particular situation whether reinstatement would be unworkable. That is very different from saying that the employer shall decide whether it is unworkable. My hon. Friend and I argued this for hours. Our purpose was to safeguard the right to reinstatement without which this is meaningless. I repeat, an employer in a particular situation will gladly buy himself out of having to go on employing a person whom he calls incompatible or, in brackets, a troublemaker.

It is essential to have some reality behind reinstatement. Equally, being practical people, we have to imganie how this might apply in a particular situation where the right to reinstatement would, in the opinion of the tribunal, be unworkable. That was the difference between us.

I repeat, it is a tragedy. Because I am not in a position to move Amendments tonight on "reinstatement" or to move the word "order" instead of "recommendation"—

Sir Harmar Nicholls (Peterborough) rose

Mrs. Castle

I do not want to give way or to protract the debate. I put it to hon. Gentlemen opposite that in Amendment (w) there is a perfectly reasonable proposition. It is not a debating or party political point about which we are talking. It merely asks the Government to say that in this new Clause after the words "good reason" there should be inserted the words 'as defined in subsection (1) of section 22'. That is the Government's subsection in their Bill.

What is the objection to making the position clear by putting it in here after "good reason"? I will tell hon. Gentlemen the objection. It was given to us by the Under-Secretary of State when he said, "Because there may be other good reasons like incompatibility." I therefore ask hon. Gentlemen to do a bit of practical Committese Amendment work tonight. We have had none so far.

If this had been my Bill and I had been on that side of the House I should

have had a whole pack of critics behind me rightly saying, "Barbara, alter this. Do you realise what that means, do you realise what this means? "On every Bill which I introduced—Equal Pay, Transport, and the rest—I listened to my hon. Friends, because they were there to improve my Bills. My hon. Friends and I never believed that just because we were stuck in No. 8 St. James's Square we had a monopoly of good sense, knowledge and experience. We were ready to listen and to learn. I suggest that instead of being rubber stamps for this reactionary Government some hon. Gentlemen opposite tonight become men, independent men, and vote for the Amendment.

Question put, That the Amendment be made to the proposed Clause:—

The House divided: Ayes 245, Noes, 285.

Division No. 241.] AYES [8.15 p.m.
Albu, Austen Davies, Ifor (Gower) Houghton, Rt Hn. Douglas
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.) Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.) Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Allen, Scholefield Deakins, Eric Huckfield, Leslie
Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis) de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Ashley, Jack Delargy, H. J. Hughes, Mark (Durham)
Ashton, Joe Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)
Atkinson, Norman Dempsey, James Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Bagier, Gordon A. T. Doig, Peter Hunter, Adam
Barnes, Michael Dormand, J. D. Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)
Barnett, Joel Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.) Janner, Greville
Beaney, Alan Douglas-Mann, Bruce Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n&St.P,cras,S.)
Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood Driberg, Tom Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton) Duffy, A. E. P. Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)
Bidwell, Sydney Dunn, James A. John, Brynmor
Bishop, E. S. Dunnett, Jack Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Blenkinsop, Arthur Eadie, Alex Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)
Boardman, H. (Leigh) Edwards, Robert (Bilston) Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)
Booth, Albert English, Michael Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur Evans, Fred Jones, Rt. Hon. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)
Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland) Fernyhough, E, Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)
Bradley, Tom Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood) Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)
Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.) Fitch, Alan (Wigan) Judd, Frank
Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan) Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston) Kaufman, Gerald
Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury) Fletcher, Ted (Darlington) Kelley, Richard
Buchan, Norman Foot, Michael Kerr, Russell
Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn) Forrester, John Kinnock, Neil
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green) Fraser, John (Norwood) Lamond, James
Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James Galpern, Sir Myer Latham, Arthur
Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.) Garrett, W. E. Lawson, George
Cant, R. B. Gilbert, Dr. John Leadbitter, Ted
Carmichael, Neil Ginsburg, David Lee, Rt Hn. Frederick
Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Northfield) Golding, John Leonard, Dick
Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles) Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C. Lestor, Miss Joan
Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara Gourlay, Harry Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold
Clark, David (Colne Valley) Grant, George (Morpeth) Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.) Grant, John D. (Islington, E.) Lipton, Marcus
Cohen, Stanley Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside) Loughlin, Charles
Coleman, Donald Griffiths, Will (Exchange) Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Concannon, J. D. Hamilton, James (Bothwell) Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)
Conlan, Bernard Hamilton, William (Fife, W.) Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Corbet, Mrs. Freda Hamling, William McBride, Neil
Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.) Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill) McCartney, Hugh
Crawshaw, Richard Hardy, Peter McElhone, Frank
Cronin, John Harrison, Walter (Wakefield) McGuire, Michael
Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith Mackenzie, Gregor
Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.) Hattersley, Roy Mackie, John
Dalyell, Tam Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis Maclennan, Robert
Davidson, Arthur Heffer, Eric S. McNamara, J. Kevin
Davies, Denzil (Llanelly) Hooson, Emlyn MacPherson, Malcolm
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.) Horam, John Mahon, Simon (Bootle)
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.) Price, J. T. (Westhoughton) Taverne, Dick
Marquand, David Price, William (Rugby) Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)
Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard Probert, Arthur Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Mason, Rt. Hn, Roy Rankin, John Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)
Meacher, Michael Reed, D. (Sedgefield) Tinn, James
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.) Tomney, Frank
Mendelson, John Rhodes, Geoffrey Torney, Tom
Millan, Bruce Richard, Ivor Tuck, Raphael
Miller, Dr. M. S. Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon) Urwin, T. W.
Milne, Edward (Blyth) Robertson, John (Paisley) Varley, Eric G.
Molloy, William Roderick, Caerwyn E. (Br'c'n&R'dnor) Wainwright, Edwin
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire) Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees) Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe) Roper, John Walker, Harold (Doncaster)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw) Rose, Paul B. Wallace, George
Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon) Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock) Watkins, David
Moyle, Roland Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne) Weitzman, David
Murray, R. K. Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney) Wellbeloved, James
Ogden, Eric Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.) Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
O'Halloran, Michael Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford) White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)
O'Malley, Brian Sillars, James Whitehead, Phillip
Oram, Bert Silverman, Julius Whitlock, William
Orbach, Maurice Skinner, Dennis Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Orme, Stanley Small, William Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)
Oswald, Thomas Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.) Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)
Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton) Spriggs, Leslie Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
Palmer, Arthur Steel, David Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)
Pardoe, John Stewart, Donald (Western Isles) Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)
Parker, John (Dagenham) Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham) Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred Stoddart, David (Swindon) Woof, Robert
Pendry, Tom Strang, Gavin
Pentland, Norman Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Perry, Ernest G. Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley Mr. Joseph Harper and
Prescott, John Swain, Thomas Mr. Ernest Armstrong.
Adley, Robert Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe) Goodhart, Philip
Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash) Clegg, Walter Goodhew, Victor
Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead) Cockeram, Eric Gorst, John
Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian Cooke, Robert Gower, Raymond
Archer, Jeffrey (Louth) Coombs, Derek Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)
Astor, John Cooper, A. E. Gray, Hamish
Atkins, Humphrey Cormack, Patrick Green, Alan
Awdry, Daniel Costain, A. P. Grieve, Percy
Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone) Critchley, Julian Grylls, Michael
Baker, W. H. K. (Banff) Crouch, David Gummer, Selwyn
Balniel, Lord Crowder, F. P. Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)
Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony Curran, Charles Hall, John (Wycombe)
Batsford, Brian Dalkeith, Earl of Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford) Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay) d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry Hannam, John (Exeter)
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport) d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, JamesMaj.-Gen. Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Benyon, w. Dean, Paul Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere
Berry, Hn. Anthony Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. Maselhurst, Alan
Biffen, John Dixon, Piers Hay, John
Biggs-Davison, John Dodds-Parker, Douglas Hayhoe, Barney
Blaker, Peter du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward Heseltine, Michael
Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.) Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke) Hicks, Robert
Body, Richard Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton) Higgins, Terence L.
Boscawen, Robert Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upore-Tyne, N.) Hiley, Joseph
Bossom, Sir Clive Emery, Peter Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)
Bowden, Andrew Eyre, Reginald Hill, James (Southampton, Test)
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John Farr, John Holland, Philip
Braine, Bernard Fell, Anthony Holt, Miss Mary
Bray, Ronald Fenner, Mrs. Peggy Hornby, Richard
Brewis, John Fidler, Michael Hordern, Peter
Brinton, Sir Tatton Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead) Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia
Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton) Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Rolgate)
Brown, Sir Edward (Bath) Fletcher-Cooke, Charles Howell, David (Guildford)
Bryan, Paul Fookes, Miss Janet Howell, Ralph (Norfok, N.)
Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N&M) Fortescue, Tim Hunt, John
Buck, Antony Foster, Sir John Hutchison, Michael Clark
Bullus, Sir Erie Fowler, Norman Iremonger, T. L.
Burden, F. A. Fox, Marcus James, David
Butler, Adam (Bosworth) Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone) Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Campbell, Rt. Hn. G.(Moray&Nairn) Fry, Peter Jessel, Toby
Carlisle, Mark Galbraith, Hn. T. G. Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)
Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert Gardner, Edward Jopling, Michael
Chapman, Sydney Gibson-Watt, David Kaberry, Sir Donald
Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.) Kershaw, Anthony
Chichester-Clark, R. Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.) Kilfedder, James
Churchill, W. S. Glyn, Dr. Alan Kimball, Marcus
Clark, William (Surrey, E.) Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B. King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
King, Tom (Bridgwater) Neave, Airey Spence, John
Kinsey, J. R. Nicholls, Sir Harmar Sproat, Iain
Kirk, Peter Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael Stainton, Keith
Knight, Mrs. Jill Normanton, Tom Stanbrook, Ivor
Knox, David Nott, John Stewart-Smith, D. G. (Belper)
Lambton, Antony Onslow, Cranley Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)
Lane, David Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.
Langford-Holt, Sir John Orr, Capt. L. P. S. Stokes, John
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry Osborn, John Stuttaford, Dr. Tom
Le Marchant, Spencer Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.) Sutcliffe, John
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland) Page, Graham (Crosby) Tapsell, Peter
Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone) Page, John (Harrow, W.) Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Longden, Gilbert Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.) Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)
Loveridge, John Peel, John Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)
McAdden, Sir Stephen Percival, Ian Tebbit, Norman
MacArthur, Ian Pink, R. Bonner Temple, John M.
McCrindle, R. A. Pounder, Rafton Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret
McLaren, Martin Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy Price, David (Eastleigh) Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)
McMaster, Stanley Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L. Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)
McNair-Wilson, Michael Proudfoot, Wilfred Tilney, John
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest) Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis Trafford, Dr. Anthony
Maddan, Martin Quennell, Miss J. M. Trew, Peter
Madel, David Raison, Timothy Tugendhat, Christopher
Maginnis, John E. Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.
Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest Rawlison, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter van Straubenzee, W. R.
Marten, Neil Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.) Vaughan, Dr. Gerard
Mather, Carol Rees, Peter (Dover) Vickers, Dame Joan
Maude, Angus Rees-Davies, W. R. Waddington, David
Mawby, Ray Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David Walder, David (Clitheroe)
Maxwell-Hystop, R. J. Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)
Meyer, Sir Anthony Ridley, Hn. Nicholas Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek
Mills, Peter (Torrington) Ridsdale, Julian Walters, Dennis
Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.) Roberts, Michael (Cardiff, N.) Ward, Dame Irene
Miscampbell, Norman Roberts, Wyn (Conway) Weatherill, Bernard
Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C.(Aberdeenshire, W) Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks) Wells, John (Maidstone)
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke) Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey) White, Roger (Gravesend)
Moate, Roger Rost, Peter Whitelaw, William
Molyneaux, James Russell, Sir Ronald Wiggin, Jerry
Money, Ernie St. John-Stevas, Norman Wilkinson, John
Monks, Mrs. Connie Scott, Nicholas Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
Monro, Hector Scott-Hopkins, James Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard
Montgomery, Fergus Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby) Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher
More, Jasper Shelton, William (Clapham) Woodnutt, Mark
Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm. Simeons, Charles Worsley, Marcus
Morrison, Charles (Devizes) Sinclair, Sir George Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.
Mudd, David Skeet, T. H. H.
Murton, Oscar Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington) TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Nabarro, Sir Gerald Soref, Harold Mr. Paul Hawkins and
Mr. Keith Speed.

Question, put That the Clause be added to the Bill:

The House divided: Ayes 286, Noes, 243.

Division No. 242.] AYES [8.25 p.m.
Adley, Robert Boytl-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John Cormack, Patrick
Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash) Braine, Bernard Costain, A. P.
Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead) Bray, Ronald Critchley, Julian
Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian Brewis, John Crouch, David
Archer, Jeffrey (Louth) Brinton, Sir Tatton Crowder, F. P.
Astor, John Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher Curran, Charles
Atkins, Humphrey Brown, Sir Edward (Bath) Dalkeith, Earl of
Awdry, Daniel Bryan, Paul Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)
Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone) Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N&M) d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Baiter, W. H. K. (Banff) Buck, Antony d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, JamesMaj.-Gen.
Balniel, Lord Bullus, Sir Eric Dean, Paul
Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony Burden, F. A. Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.
Batsford, Brian Butler, Adam (Bosworth) Dixon, Piers
Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton Campbell, Rt. Hn. G.(Moray & Nairn) Dodds-Parker, Douglas
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay) Carlisle, Mark du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport) Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)
Benyon, W. Chapman, Sydney Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Berry, Hn. Anthony Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Biffen, John Chichester-Clark, R. Emery, Peter
Biggs-Davison, John Churchill, W. S. Eyre, Reginald
Blaker, Peter Clark, William (Surrey, E.) Farr, John
Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.) Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe) Fell, Anthony
Body, Richard Cockeram, Eric Fenner, Mrs. Peggy
Boscawen, Robert Cooke, Robert Fidler, Michael
Bossom, Sir Clive Cooper, A. E. Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)
Bowden, Andrew Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland) Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
Fookes, Miss Janet Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone) Ridsdale, Julian
Foster, Sir John Longden, Gilbert Roberts, Michael (Cardiff, N.)
Fowler Norman Loveridge, John Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Fox, Marcus McAdden, Sir Stephen Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Fry, Peter MacArthur, Ian Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Galbraith, Hn. T. G. McCrindle, R, A. Rost, Peter
Gardner, Edward McLaren, Martin Russell, Sir Ronald
Gibson-Watt, David Maclean, Sir Fitzroy St. John-stevas, Norman
Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.) McMaster, Stanley Scott, Nicholas
Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.) McNair-Wilson, Michael Scott-Hopkins, James
Glyn, Dr. Alan McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest) Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)
Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B. Maddan, Martin Shelton, William (Clapham)
Goodhart, Philip Madel, David Simeons, Charles
Goodhew, Victor Maginnis, John E. Sinclair, Sir George
Gorst, John Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest Skeet, T. H. H.
Gower, Raymond Marten, Neil Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)
Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.) Mather, Carol Soref, Harold
Cray, Hamish Maude, Angus Speed, Keith
Green, Alan Mawby, Ray Spence, John
Grieve, Percy Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J. Sproat, Iain
Grylls, Michael Meyer, Sir Anthony Stainton, Keith
Gummer, Selwyn Mills, Peter (Torrington) Stanbrook, Ivor
Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley) Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.) steel, David
Hall, John (Wycombe) Miscampbell, Norman Stewart-Smith, D. G. (Belper)
Hall-Davis, A. G. F. Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C.(Aberdeenshire, W) Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury) Mitchell, David (Basingstoke) Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.
Hannam, John (Exeter) Moate, Roger Stokes, John
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye) Molyneaux, James Stuttaford, Dr. Tom
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere Money, Ernie Sutcliffe, John
Haselhust, Alan Monks, Mrs. Connie Tapsell, Peter
Hawkins, Paul Monro, Hector Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Hay, John Montgomery, Fergus Taylor, Frank (Moss side)
Hayhoe, Barney More, Jasper Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)
Heseltine, Michael Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm. Tebbit, Norman
Hicks, Robert Morrison, Charles (Devizes) Temple, John M.
Higgins, Terence L. Mudd, David Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret
Hiley, Joseph Murton, Oscar Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)
Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.) Nabarro, Sir Gerald Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)
Hill, James (Southampton, Test) Neave, Airey Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)
Holland, Philip Nicholls, Sir Harmar Tilney, John
Holt, Miss Mary Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael Trafford, Dr. Anthony
Hooson, Emlyn Normanton, Tom Trew, Peter
Hordern, Peter Nott, John Tugendhat, Christopher
Hornby, Richard Onslow, Cranley Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.
Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally van Straubenzee, W. R.
Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate) Orr, Capt. L. P. S. Vaughan, Dr. Gerard
Howell, Denis (Guildford) Osborn, John Vickers, Dame Joan
Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.) Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.) Waddington, David
Hunt, John Page, Graham (Crosby) Walder, David (Clitheroe)
Hunt, John Page, John (Harrow, W.) Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Iremonger, T. L. Pardoe, John walker-smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek
Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.) Wall, Patrick
James, David Peel, John Walters, Dennis
Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford) Percival, Ian Ward, Dame Irene
Jesse, Toby Pink, R. Bonner Weatherill, Bernard
Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead) Pounder, Rafton Wells, John (Maidstone)
Kaberry, Sir Donald Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch White, Roger (Gravesend)
Kilfedder, James Price, David (Eastleigh) Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William
Kimball, Marcus Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L. Wiggin, Jerry
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.) Proudfoot, Wilfred Wilkinson, John
King, Tom (Bridgwater) Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
Kinsey, J. R. Quennell, Miss J. M. Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard
Kirk, Peter Raison, Timothy Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher
Knight, Mrs. Jill Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James Woodnutt, Mark
Knox, David Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter Worsley, Marcus
Lambton, Antony Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.) Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.
Lane, David Rees, Peter (Dover)
Langford-Holt, Sir John Rees-Davies, W. R. TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Legge-Bourke, Sir Marry Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David Mr. Walter Clegg and
Le Marchant, Spencer Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon Mr. Tim Fortescue.
Albu, Austen Beaney, Alan Bradley, Tom
Aliaun, Frank (Salford, E.) Bonn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)
Allen, Scholefield Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton) Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis) Bidwell, Sydney Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)
Ashley, Jack Bishop, E. S. Buchan, Norman
Ashton, Jack Blenkinsop, Arthur Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Atkinson, Norman Boardman, H. (Leigh) Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Bagier, Gordon A. T. Booth, Albert Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Barnes, Michael Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)
Barnett, Joel Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland) Cant, R. B.
Carmichael, Neil Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey) Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)
Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Norlhfield) Hughes, Mark (Durham) Palmer, Arthur
Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles) Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.) Parker, John (Dagenham)
Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara Hughes, Roy (Newport) Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.) Hunter, Adam Pendry, Tom
Clark, David (Colne Valley) Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur(Edge Hill) Pentland, Norman
Cohen, Stanley Janner, Greville Perry, Ernest G.
Coleman, Donald Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n&St. P'cras, S.) Prescott, John
Concannon, J. D. Jenkins, Hugh (Putney) Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Conlan, Bernard Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford) Price, William (Rugby)
Corbet, Mrs. Freda John, Brynmor Probert, Arthur
Cox, Thomas (Wandworth, C.) Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.) Rankin, John
Crawshaw, Richard Johnson, Waiter (Derby, S.) Reed, D. (Sedgefield)
Cronin, John Jones, Barry (Flint, E.) Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)
Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony Jones, Dan (Burnley) Rhodes, Geoffrey
Cunningham, G. (Islintgon, S.W.) Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.) Richard, Ivor
Dalyell, Tam Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen) Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Davidson, Arthur Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.) Robertson, John (Paisley)
Davies, Denzil (Llanelly) Judd, Frank Roderick, Caerwyn E. (Br'c'n&R'dnor)
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.) Kaufman, Gerald Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)
Davies, Ifor (Gower) Keffey, Richard Roper, John
Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.) Kerr, Russell Rose, Paul B.
Deakins, Eric Kinnock, Neil Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)
de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey Lamond, James Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)
Delargy, H. J. Latham, Arthur Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund Lawson, George Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)
Dempsey, James Leadbitter, Ted Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
Doig, Peter Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick Sillars, James
Dormand, J. D. Leonard, Dick Silverman, Julius
Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.) Lestor, Miss Joan Skinner, Dennis
Douglas-Mann, Bruce Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold Small, William
Driberg, Tom Lewis, Ron (Carlisle) Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)
Duffy, A. E. P. Lipton, Marcus Spriggs, Leslie
Dunn, James A. Lomas, Kenneth Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)
Dunnett, Jack Loughlin, Charles Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)
Eadie, Alex Lyon, Alexander W. (York) Stoddart, David (Swindon)
Edwards, Robert (Bilston) Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.) Strang, Gavin
English, Michael Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.
Evans, Fred McBride, Neil Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley
Fernyhough, E. McCartney, Hugh Swain, Thomas
Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood) McElhone, Frank Taverne, Dick
Fitch, Alan (Wigan) McGuire, Michael Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)
Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston) Mackenzie, Gregor Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington) Mackie, John Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)
Foot, Michael Maclennan, Robert Tinn, James
Forrester, John McNamara, J, Kevin Tomney, Frank
Fraser, John (Norwood) MacPherson, Malcolm Torney, Tom
Galpern, Sir Myer Mahon, Simon (Bootle) Tuck, Raphael
Garrett, W. E. Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.) Urwin, T. W.
Gilbert, Dr. John Marquand, David Varley, Eric G.
Ginsburg, David Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard Wainwright, Edwin
Golding, John Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C. Meacher, Michael Walker, Harold (Doncaster)
Gourlay, Harry Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert Wallace, George
Grant, George (Morpeth) Mendelson, John Watkins, David
Grant, John D. (Islington, E.) Millan, Bruce Weitzman, David
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside) Miller, Dr. M. S. Wellbeloved, James
Griffiths, Will (Exchange) Milne, Edward (Blyth) Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
Hamilton, James (Bothwell) Molloy, William White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.) Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire) Whitehead, Phillip
Hamling, William Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe) Whitlock, William
Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill) Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw) Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Hardy, Peter Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon) Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield) Moyle, Roland Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)
Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith Murray, Ronald King Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
Hattersley, Roy Ogden, Eric Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)
Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis O'Halloran, Michael Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)
Heffer, Eric S. O'Malley, Brian Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)
Horam, John Oram, Bert Woof, Robert
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas Orbach, Maurice
Howell, Denis (Small Heath) Orme, Stanley TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Huckfield, Leslie Oswald, Thomas Mr. Joseph Harper and
Mr. Ernest Armstrong.

Clause accordingly added to the Bill.

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