DEFENCE (AIR) ESTIMATES, 1969–70, Vote A

HC Deb 19 March 1969 vol 780 cc581-630

Mr. Speaker

We now come to Vote A of the Defence (Air) Estimates. May I announce, with regard to Amendment to the Motion on Vote A in the name of the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) and the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), that I cannot forecast whether either of those hon. Members will be successful in catching the eye of the Chair during the debate on Vote A. If either of them is successful, he will have an opportunity of moving that Amendment, as indeed any other hon. Member would.

Mr. Cranley Onslow (Woking)

On a point of order. Some hon. Members are under the impression that this debate has to end at 12 o'clock. Can I ask you to confirm that it is the case that, provided the Motion for the suspension of the Ten o'clock Rule is carried, the debate can continue thereafter and there is no particular set time at which it must end?

Mr. Speaker

. I cannot foretell the future. All I can say is that on the Order Paper is a Suspension Motion which suggests that the debate might go on "… at this day's Sitting at any hour …". Whether that "any hour" needs to be taken literally will depend on circumstances over which I have no control.

7.44 p.m.

The Minister of Defence for Equipment (Mr. John Morris)

I beg to move, That a number of Officers, Airmen and Airwomen, not exceeding 118,000, all ranks, be maintained for Air Force Service, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1970. This is, I know, one occasion when my noble Friend, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force regrets that he may not stand at this Dispatch Box. For me, however, it is a particular pleasure to handle this Air Estimates Debate at this point in time. Last year was an occasion for looking back with pride on the 50 years of achievement which the Royal Air Force completed on 1st April. This year we can look forward again. And I am sure we can be confident that the Royal Air Force will acquit itself with the same distinction in its vital rôle in the future.

In addition to summarising the position on Air Votes for 1969–70, I propose to deal with four main themes affecting the Royal Air Force—equipment, operational effectiveness, organisation and personnel.

First, a brief word about the money figures themselves. The total of Air Votes for 1969–70 is up on last year. By comparison with the original provision in 1968–69 Estimates, there is an increase of about £38 million. However, we took a Winter Supplementary for an extra £9,500,000, so, by comparison with the adjusted total, the increase is about £28,500,000. If pay and price increases are discounted, the increases in real terms are £13,500,000 as compared with the original Estimates, and £4 million as compared with the revised Estimates.

The greater part of the increase is on Vote 7, the Vote which covers all the Royal Air Force's production requirements, and this is accounted for by the major aircraft re-equipment programme on which the Government embarked a few years ago. Payments for British aircraft will be higher next year, as will payments under Subhead 7H for the American Phantom and Hercules aircraft purchased under the credit arrangement. The provision under this subhead is based on the assumption that all the progress payments falling due in 1969–70 will be covered by credit, but I should mention that the existing credit arrangement does not take us beyond the end of the current American fiscal year, that is 30th June, 1969. We hope to have discussions shortly with the American authorities about our credit requirements for the following fiscal year.

I think that only two of the other Votes call for special comment. On Vote 1, there is a reduction of £3,250,000, which reflects the lower personnel numbers, mainly resulting from the general rundown in the size of the Force, following the decision to withdraw from east of Suez. On Vote 9, covering pensions and gratuities, there is a reduction of £3,500,000 because we expect to have to release rather fewer men this year under the redundancy scheme.

Now to the first of my main themes— equipment. I do not intend to dwell too long on this this afternoon—partly because I spoke at some length in last week's defence debate about the position on combat aircraft, both as regards the re-equipment starting in the coming year with Phantoms, Harriers, Buccaneers and Nimrods, and as regards the Jaguar and the multi-rôle combat aircraft of the future; and partly because I have a lot of other ground to cover as well.

There are, however, several other important future projects which will make their contribution to the Royal Air Force's capabilities and of which I must make brief mention.

There are, for example, two missile projects—Rapier and Martel. From 1972, when delivery of Rapier to the Royal Air Force will begin, it will be operated by the R.A.F. Regiment and will provide defence against low-level air attack. Martel is, as hon. Members will remember, another project which we are undertaking with France, we expect it in service in 1971. This is an advanced stand-off weapon, that is to say, it is launched some way from the target, while the launching aircraft remains outside the range of the defences. It is being developed in two forms—the anti-radar version, and the television version, which is controlled visually through its television guidance system. The weapon is designed to have a very high order of accuracy, and will be used by the Nimrod and Buccaneer.

The Royal Air Force also has SA.330 helicopters on order. This project is part of the Anglo-French helicopter package deal; the package consisting of the SA330, which is where the R.A.F.'s main interest lies, and the SA340 and WG13 helicopters. Deliveries of the SA330 to the R.A.F. were due to start in 1970–71. The R.AF will employ it in tactical support of the Army.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (West Lothian)

On 28th February, the hon. Gentleman said in reply to a Parliamentary Question that it was not the normal practice to reveal unit costs of aircraft like the SA330 and the SA340. Will he explain why not? Are there good reasons for this?

Mr. Morris

As I explained to my hon. Friend in the answer that I gave on that occasion, it is not the practice traditionally to reveal details of this kind or of the ranges of weapons of the forces. This practice has been in existence for a long time, and I am sure that my hon. Friend is well aware of the reasons for it.

Before my hon. Friend intervened, I was dealing with the SA330. The Royal Air Force will employ it in tactical support of the Army. In this rôle it will operate beside the Wessex, although compared with the latter it has a much improved performance. Of particular interest is the fact that the SA330 has been designed to be air-portable and can be prepared for deployment by air, and reassembled at the other end, much more quickly than our existing helicopters.

Having mentioned a new helicopter to be used in the transport rôle, it would be wrong if I did not remind hon. Members that, with the completion of deliveries of the Hercules and the buildup of the Belfast force, the general re-equipment of the R.A.F's transport forces which has been in progress now for the last few years, will then be complete.

So, with four fine new combat aircraft, with the re-equipment of the transport force virtually complete, and with a number of new projects still to come, the Royal Air Force is in a healthy state to start its second half century.

The Royal Air Force is acquiring further responsibilities as well as new equipment; this year it will start taking over the tasks of maritime air defence and strike, and it will assume these in their entirety by 1972 when the carrier force phases out. Maritime support is not new to the Royal Air Force, but it recognises its great responsibilities to the Royal Navy when the carriers will be out of service. Much planning and discussion are already taking place between the two Services to ensure smooth and ready co-operation. The R.A.F's first Phantoms and Buccaneers will give new impetus to training with the Royal Navy on air defence and strike operations in support of the Fleet, so that, when the carriers go, the support that the R.A.F. can offer in these areas will be in the fine tradition established by the Fleet Air Arm.

Mr. Patrick Wall (Haltemprice)

Will the Minister explain how these aircraft can support the Fleet or convoys which are well out of range of land bases?

Mr. Morris

We have on several occasions traversed this ground. We have gone into it at Question Time and during debates, and I do not think that I can add anything to what we have discussed this year and last year in some detail, as the hon. Gentleman will recall.

Turning now to the second of my main themes, I should like to pay tribute to the high standards of operational effectiveness which the Service achieves with its present aircraft.

The Royal Air Force has a highly-developed capability for mobility and speed of deployment, which are of the essence of air power. This capability will be further developed as new aircraft are brought into service but, meanwhile, "V"-bombers, Canberras and Lightnings continue to contribute a formidable strike and air defence force which can be rapidly deployed both in and beyond the N.A.T.O. area, whenever we may have a part to play in deterring or facing aggression.

Mr. Emrys Hughes (South Ayrshire)

Will my hon. Friend say to what extent the Royal Air Force has co-operated in the operation in Anguilla? What aircraft of the Royal Air Force were used, and will he give an idea of the cost?

Mr. Morris

My hon. Friend has raised the issue of the Caribbean. As he will recall, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs this afternoon made a full statement about the Anguilla operation, and I do not think he will expect me to deal with the broader aspects of that in my speech on the Air Estimates.

While I cannot, and he does not expect me to, give figures of what exactly is involved, I can tell him that what has been done today underlines the fact that this operation is yet another demonstration that we have at our disposal an effective general capability, based on a powerful air transport force, which enables us to deploy forces with great speed and at short notice to remote parts of the world. He does not expect me to fill in the details of what was employed in this operation.

Mr. Eric Lubbock (Orpington)

Why not?

Mr. Morris

This operation, as the hon. Member knows, has taken place during today. We have had from the Foreign Secretary a report of what has happened to date, and I do not think it would be right for me now to spell out in detail the strength of the forces and the type of aircraft used.

Mr. Lubbock

What possible harm would there be in giving the House the information which the hon. Gentleman has asked for? What aircraft were involved in the operation? There cannot be any security reasons for withholding the information.

Mr. Morris

I have dealt with the general issue of what has been done today as an indication of the use of our general capability. I will consider during the debate whether it would be right for me to spell out the details of what exactly was involved. Traditionally, ranges and costs are not given, and I would like to consider how far I can do this. This operation has taken place only within the last few hours, but if I can fill in further details I will seek to accommodate hon. Members.

Mr. Emrys Hughes

I am sorry to press the point. I do not expect my hon. Friend to give exact details, but surely when our finances are in such difficulty, to put it mildly, the Royal Air Force must get an approximate estimate of the cost of operations such as this. I want only an approximate estimate of what it will cost to take the troops there.

Mr. Morris

My hon. Friend is asking his question while the operation is continuing. It would be much more advantageous, if this figure can be given, if he were to ask it after the operation has been completed. I will during the debate consider what material can be given within a matter of hours after the operation has taken place. I do not know if it would be right and proper for me to do so, but if I can, I will, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept my assurance.

Mr. Onslow

The hon. Gentleman has said that the operation is continuing. Surely there will not be a need for reinforcements?

Mr. Morris

The hon. Member knows exactly what I am saying. He is being frivolous, and he knows it.

If I may be allowed to continue, we have recently had a first-class example of the R.A.F.'s mobility in Exercise Piscator. The purpose of this exercise was to reinforce the Royal Air Force in Singapore with ten Lightning fighters from No. 11 Squadron, which is stationed at Leuchars in Scotland. The first pair of aircraft covered the 8,000 miles journey in three days: they left Scotland on 6th January and arrived in Singapore on the 8th. All the aircraft were in the Far East by 11th January. The total flying time of each aircraft was about 17 hours. This very rapid deployment was made possible by the use of a force of tanker aircraft. On the outward journey, each Lightning was refuelled twelve times in flight and, in consequence, had to land only twice during the flight— at Bahrein and Gan.

This journey to Singapore was completed in two days less than was taken by the only previous deployment of a Lightning force of this size from the United Kingdom to the Far East, and in an emergency we could cut down on this still further and get the same number of aircraft there using the same tanker force in four days.

When the aircraft got to Singapore, the force was turned round immediately and was ready for operational flight within an hour of completing the journey from the United Kingdom. The Lightnings stayed in the Far East for a month, and during this time they undertook operational training with the resident Lightning Squadron. They returned to the United Kingdom at the beginning of February.

We plan to carry out similar exercises in the future.

Mr. Victor Goodhew (St. Albans)

Surely the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that, after 17 hours' continuous flight, the pilots would have been ready within an hour to enter into engagement?

Mr. Morris

No. I was saying that the aircraft, in terms of flying time, took the time which I have specified to fly there. But it was staggered over a number of days. From the time that the whole flight was there, the force was ready to operate within the hour that I have mentioned, if it were necessary. I am indicating the general capability that we have, and this is an illustration of it.

While paying tribute to the operational efficiency of the Service for which my noble Friend has particular responsibility, I should not forget the Meteorological Office, the cost of which is borne on Air Votes, though it gives a service to the whole community. I know of the interest of my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, North-West (Mr. Ellis) in this area.

In 1968, the number of inquiries for weather forecasts, warnings and other services from the public and industry rose by 11 per cent. to a new record total of 1.4million. Inquiries from agriculture rose by 22 per cent., from the building industry by 18 per cent. and from surface transport by 13 per cent. A new service of particular value to shipping has been the introduction on a routine basis of weather routing for vessels using the North Atlantic. Over 100 ships have been routed during the year, and considerable success has been achieved in diverting them from the areas of worst weather, with consequent savings in time, fuel and damage to ships and cargoes. Climatological investigations in connection with problems of agriculture, hydrology, civil engineering, building and roads have also increased.

Mr. John Ellis (Bristol, North-West)

It is clear from the figures that the vast amount of money spent by the Meterological Office is directly for Service use. However, it also saves the country many millions of £s, especially in terms of agriculture. In view of that, should we not consider spending more on these branches of the service?

Mr. Morris

The Meteorological Office serves the whole community, and the figures which I have given indicate the growing use of its services by the various sections of the community. As regards the financing of it and responsibility for it, if my hon. Friend catches your eye, Mr. Gourlay, I am sure that on the basis of his interest and experience he will develop the point. I am prepared to try to deal with what he has to say in the course of my winding-up speech.

I now turn to the tasks of organising and modernising the Royal Air Force so that it obtains maximum advantage from its new aircraft and weapons and can best fulfil its rôles in the 1970's— rôles which reflect our withdrawal from east of Suez and the increasing predominance of our N.A.T.O. commitments and the European theatre.

First, organisation, the third of my main themes. The streamlining of the Royal Air Force's Command struture in the United Kingdom continued last year. Bomber and Fighter Commands merged to form Strike Command on 30th April, 1968, and Signals Command became part of the same Command as No. 90 Signals Group, on 1st January this year. Flying Training and Technical Training Commands combined to form a unified Training Command on 1st June, 1968; as a result, we were able to disband No. 25 Group on 1st July. The number of R.A.F. Commands in the United Kingdom has thus been reduced from eight to five, and will be further reduced to four when Coastal Command becomes part of Strike Command. As the former Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force explained in last year's Air Estimates debate, the revised Command structure will provide the streamlined system of operational control, required by the Royal Air Force of the 1970's; it will also enable us to achieve savings of at least £1½ million a year.

Further progress has been made with our policy of concentrating Royal Air Force units on the smallest number of stations consistent with R.A.F. requirements, and, when possible, with regional economic planning interests, and of closing those less well-equipped stations for which we have no further use. We have decided to carry out navigation, air electronics and air engineering training at a Combined Aircrew Training School to be established at Royal Air Force Finningley; this will enable us to close two R.A.F. stations and substantially to reduce a third. In addition, we have decided that, with the contraction of the Royal Air Force, we no longer need to retain as many as four equipment supply depots and that the one at Hartlebury should be closed. As a result of these changes, we shall achieve savings of £2½ million a year.

We continue to take full advantage of the use of computer techniques. The Meteorological Office has begun a major programme of modernisation and automation. The Supply Control Centre at Hendon is the hub of the R.A.F.'s automatic data processing system for the control, the provisioning and the distribution of equipment throughout the Service. The computer control system was brought into operation in January, 1966, and more than half the total inventory of R.A.F. stores is now under computer control—some 530,000 items out of a total of 900,000.

How does this affect storekeeping personnel at a Royal Air Force station? The airman storekeeper no longer has to prepare umpteen copies of demand forms for items of equipment which are under computer control—for example, spares for airframes and aero engines, Normal replenishment of station stocks is done automatically by the computer as stores are consumed by the squadrons. Urgent requirements are notified to the Supply Control Centre at Hendon, where the computer determines where the stocks are held and arranges to make the issue.

Army aviation stores are now provisioned under R.A.F. arrangements, and, when fixed-wing operational flying by the Fleet Air Arm comes to an end, naval air stores will also be integrated with R.A.F. air stores. We shall then be able to rationalise the provisioning, stock control and stock holding of air stores for all three Services.

We are making plans to introduce a next-generation replacement computer for the R.A.F. Supply Control Centre, and we shall exploit the use of automatic data processing in the supply organisation to maximum advantage. As a complementary part of the centralised computer system, computer control has been introduced in the equipment supply depots. These will also provide modern automatic data processing methods for dealing with such depot tasks as storage and issue of equipment.

This comprehensive computer control system will enable us to improve the accuracy of provisioning and stock control, to improve supply effectiveness—by meeting demands for equipment more quickly—and to prepare more detailed costing information. Improved supply support to units is already apparent, and this and the other benefits will increase as we advance to complete computer control of all stores.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths (Bury St. Edmunds)

I am very interested to hear about this extremely important development. However, before moving forward to new computer techniques in storage for the R.A.F., would the hon. Gentleman examine the system in use in the American Strategic Air Force, especially the one which exists at Mildenhall, in my constituency, where he will find some extremely important advances which are well worthy of examination before embarking on new systems for the R.A.F.?

Mr. Morris

I will consider the hon. Gentleman's suggestions. In my previous post, I acquainted myself a good deal with the computer systems of the coal, oil and power industries. I have seen some of the systems of the Services. I have not seen anything nor have I been told anything of the one referred to by the hon. Gentleman.

Some 500 non-industrial posts have already been saved as a result of these computers at the depots, and, with the introduction of modern storage methods there, we expect to save some 500 industrial posts during the coming year.

We have also recently completed the transfer of 100,000 airmen's personal and pay records and personal records for 20,000 officers to a computer at the Royal Air Force Records and Pay Office at Gloucester. These accurate records are now readily available for a variety of purposes, including manpower allocation, career management, pay matters, and statistical information for manpower and establishment forecasting. This project, which has aroused great outside interest and has taken us ten years to develop from feasibility studies to full operation, is a highly sophisticated aid to management and will result in greatly increased administrative efficiency. Much clerical drudgery will be eliminated and there will be a reduction of some 700 Service and civilian staff. While the Service will benefit considerably as a whole from this speedy and efficient source of precise data. I must, of course, stress that the all-important decisions which affect an airman's career as an individual will continue to be taken by a Royal Air Force officer, warrant officer, or senior N.C.O., and not by a machine. The employment of computer on routine calculations will, in fact, enable even greater care to be taken of this aspect.

At the same time, the next stage in the employment of this advanced system is already being planned. The Royal Air Force intends to develop the use of the store of personnel data held in this pay and records computer for long-term planning and forecasting of the manpower requirements of the Service as a whole.

Now, at last, I have reached the fourth of my main themes, that of personnel. I want to pay particular attention to this this evening.

The Statement on the Defence Estimates reminds us that, with the reorientation of our defence policy completed, the Armed Forces can look forward to a period of stability and progress. Dependant as we are on an all-regular volunteer force, we cannot relax our efforts to ensure that the Royal Air Force will have officers, airmen and airwomen in the quality and numbers it needs.

As regards the picture in 1968, recruitment of officers for aircrew duties was good, although towards the end of the year there were signs of a decline in interest; the targets for feeding pilots and navigators into training were met, and internal recruiting of serving noncommissioned aircrew provided the relatively small numbers required for training as air electronics and air engineer officers. The number enlisted during the year as N.C.O. aircrew, however, was barely satisfactory, and most of those recruited were serving as airmen in ground trades. There was a particular shortage of trainees as air electronics operators, which possibly reflects the somewhat higher standard of academic qualification that we require for this category.

In general, officer recruiting to the ground branches, for both the Royal Air Force and the Women's Royal Air Force, showed a slight improvement over the previous year, but we are still experiencing difficulty in recruiting professionally qualified men, especially for the Engineer and Medical branches, where a considerable shortfall persists. I shall come back to the problem of officer recruiting a little later, as it is a subject to which we have devoted a great deal of thought; but I should just say now that we expect to have available within a few months the results of a study of the possible need to make changes in the officer career structure.

During the year, we continued to make vigorous efforts to recruit airmen to the various ground trades of the Royal Air Force. The programme of reorganisation of the Careers Information Service continued, and we lost no opportunities of taking space at shows and exhibitions throughout the country with the help of large trailers. Nevertheless, increasing competition from industry—including the effects of the Industrial Training Act— resulted, in the first part of 1968, in a fall in the level of recruitment. However, by seizing every possible chance of putting the Royal Air Force before the public and by capitalising to the maximum extent on the 50th anniversary publicity—and here I would pay particular tribute to the valuable rôle played by the Press, radio and television—this adverse trend was halted, and since August recruiting figures have shown some improvement. The situation is still far from ideal, and there are serious shortages in some trades, but the rate of enlistment in some others has shown a great improvement.

I am happy to say that the recruitment target for engineering technician apprentices was largely met, and we considerably increased our intake of craft apprentices, although their numbers were insufficient to meet an increased requirement. It was not possible to enlist sufficient administrative apprentices, however.

I am sorry to say that the number of airwomen recruited to the W.R.A.F. was lower last year than in 1967, but again there was an improvement towards the end of the year. Although we obtained a satisfactory number of student nurses for Princess Mary's Royal Air Force Nursing Service, the number enlisting as state enrolled nurses was disappointing.

The retention of trained men is vital to maintain experience levels and to man the force, especially in times of recruitment difficulties, and I therefore welcome, as I am sure the House does, the satisfactory number of applications for re-engagement. Nevertheless, we have to keep a balance in each trade in the age and rank structure to ensure a healthy promotion flow, which bears comparison between trades. This balance is controlled by selection boards operating against re-engagement quotas for each trade. The system is having a significant impact in correcting imbalances which existed previously.

Extensions of service have increased in comparison with previous years, although there is a tendency to accept commitments for shorter periods of service where there is a choice—for example, extensions from five years to nine years rather than to twelve.

We continue to seek to improve our methods of training, and new methods of visual presentation, including closed-circuit television, programmed instruction and the use of video-strips, are constantly being introduced. We pride ourselves on an apprentice scheme that offers a first-class course of instruction, but we are also increasing the opportunities for both men and women entrants to receive training in skilled trades. This will improve their value to the Service and their individual career prospects.

I turn now to the all-graduate direct entry scheme and the future of Cranwell.

In the field of officer recruiting and training, one major and significant change in policy of which hon. Members are already aware is that, as my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Administration announced on 20th December last, the Royal Air Force has decided as a basic policy that all direct entrants to the General List of the main officer branches of the Service must have a degree or equivalent basic qualification.

I should like to devote a few minutes to explaining the reasons behind this change of policy and the way in which it will be implemented. I think that it might be of some assistance to the House.

It has become clear, I think, to all three Services in the last two or three years that our future permanent officers will increasingly require a high level of general education if they are to cope successfully with the ever more complex problems of defence, involving, as they do, contacts with industry, commerce, the universities and the other professions outside. At the same time, it is becoming clearer and clearer that with the growing opportunities for university education the good quality boy whom we have hitherto recruited through Cranwell will be reluctant to forgo the advantages of a university education which will be available to his contemporaries.

It is for these reasons that we have decided upon an all-graduate direct entry scheme. Because of the demands of flying training, it is desirable that a Royal Air Force officer should have completed his general education before he starts upon his flying training course. For this reason, we have decided that the degree course should be completed before entry into the Service, and we have also decided that the sensible thing to do is to utilise the resources of the civilian universities and colleges rather than attempt to set up our own degree courses within the Service. We shall hope to get our graduate entrants partly by recruiting direct from the universities and colleges and partly by greatly extending the university cadetship scheme under which suitable boys are sponsored through their university course by the Royal Air Force.

But this new policy does not mean— and I repeat this—it does not mean that there will be no place in the Royal Air Force for the able young man who does not want or, for some reason or other, cannot get, a university place. He will continue to be able to come into the Royal Air Force as at present on a Supplementary List commission from which there will be very good opportunities to transfer to a permanent commission. The R.A.F. will continue to be a Service open to the talented from every source.

The new all-graduate direct entry policy will, of course, have profound consequences for Cranwell. With the disappearance of the traditional cadet entry in favour of a graduate entry, Cranwell will cease to be a cadet college. It will instead become the post-graduate and professional training college of the Royal Air Force. It is our intention that all graduate entrants will come into Cranwell for their basic officer and professional training. At the same time, we are examining plans for moving in other branches of officer training, with the object of using to the full the excellent facilities at Cranwell.

The new policy is already in full swing. Wherever possible, those boys who were due to enter Cranwell have already been diverted to universities or colleges to take their degrees. In the interim, those cadets entering Cranwell who are able and willing to go to a university will be given a special academic course to assist them to obtain university places after one year at Cranwell. We have taken special steps to ensure that those boys who nevertheless elect to stay at Cranwell for the full present course will not suffer in their career compared with the others, and they will follow the traditional cadet course.

Provided that graduate entries build up as planned, it is our intention that the October 1970 cadet entry into Cranwell will be the last cadet entry and that, allowing for engineering cadet entries, by 1975 Cranwell will have turned over completely to post-graduate training.

I need hardly say—I am sure the whole House is aware of this—that we are embarking upon a bold policy. We believe it, nevertheless, to be the right one, and we have been much fortified by the immense support which we have been given by those connected with education outside. My noble Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force has written individually to the vice-chancellor of every university, to the principals of the colleges of technology and to the headmasters of public schools and grammar schools. The overwhelming response has been in favour of our proposals. I know that the House will wish us well in our policy.

Mr. Lubbock

What about comprehensive schools?

Mr. Morris

I am not sure that all the individuals were written to personally, or whether the associations were written to, but my noble Friend attempted, in the way I have set out, to contact each person responsible for an educational establishment. If I have not covered the matter comprehensively, I apologise.

I should like to touch on the University Air Squadrons. The House will be aware that for many years the Royal Air Force has had these squadrons established in most of the larger universities. Their purpose is basically to link the Royal Air Force with the university world and at the same time to give as many undergraduates as possible an opportunity to fly with the R.A.F., with the obvious hope that some of them will ultimately want to come into the Service.

In practice, over the years, we have been lucky enough to have a steady flow of high quality entrants from the air squadrons, and many of them have subsequently made their mark in the Service. As we have repeatedly made clear, the Royal Air Force has a growing need for good quality graduates in all its branches and the importance of the University Air Squadrons remains undiminished.

Nevertheless, as part of the general search for economy in our defence effort, we have thought it right to look at the University Air Squadrons to see whether they can be made even more cost-effective. As a result of very careful examination, we have come to the conclusion that we could and should make a number of changes which will have the effect of saving ultimately about £400,000 a year. The main ones are, first, to restrict the initial period of flying membership to two years, with only a small proportion being allowed to stay on for a third year. This will allow us to make some reductions in the establishments of the squadrons. As part of this process, we have amalgamated the Edinburgh and St. Andrews University Air Squadrons, and the Hull and Leeds Squadrons, to form two large squadrons. Second, we are making some changes in the flying syllabus, thus enabling us to reduce the number of flying hours per member without, however, affecting the overall value of the training. Finally, since we hope that membership of the squadrons will become even keener, we are abolishing the entitlement to pay and allowances. Members will continue, however, to be eligible for an annual bounty and, of course, to receive out-of-pocket expenses.

These changes do not in any way reflect any slackening of our interest in the squadrons or the universities. As I have said, and as the House already knows from other statements, our need for graduates is going up, and the University Air Squadrons have therefore an increasingly important part to play.

I turn from undergraduates to other young people. Hon. Members will recall that the former Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force referred in his speech last year to the work of the Committee, set up under Air Marshal Sir Douglas Morris, to review the whole organisation, administration and training of the Air Training Corps. It made a searching examination of all aspects of the A.T.C. with the object of fitting it to meet the needs of the 1970s. It made some 30 recommendations, of which perhaps the most important was a proposal that the corps should be reorganised on a regional basis, with a regional commandant and regional headquarters in each region, similar to the organisation which already exists in Scotland. The Committee's conclusions were discussed fully with the representatives of the Air Training Corps itself, and following that we started to implement the various recommendations. I am glad to say that we have made very substantial progress and already the results are beginning to show themselves in the corps. In the past 12 months, the cadet strength has risen from 28,000 to just over 31,000, and there is every indication that this trend will continue.

As I have said, the core of the Morris Committee's most valuable report was the proposal to reorganise the A.T.C. on a regional basis, and the successful implementation of many of its other recommendations depends basically upon this particular piece of reorganisation. All the new regional commandants are already in post and the organisation is expected to be fully operational by the middle of April.

Other recommendations which have already been implemented include a reduction in the minimum age limit for cadets, improvements in the scales of accommodation, the introduction of new training syllabi and the introduction of an increased training and administrative grant.

Naturally, we are anxious to combine these improvements with a reasonable degree of stability, and therefore some of the recommendations—for example, the reduction in the upper age limit for officers—will be implemented only very gradually, as and when officers come to the end of their normal periods of service.

I make no excuse for emphasising once again the importance which the regular Air Force attaches to the well-being of the Air Training Corps. Many hundreds of ex-A.T.C. boys join the Royal Air Force each year and provide an extremely valuable entry of the high quality which we shall continue to need for as long as we can foresee. At the same time, the corps is providing a youth training service, with a measure of discipline which is increasingly valuable. Like the other cadet forces, the A.T.C. is basically run by voluntary, unpaid effort and I am sure that the House would wish to join me in thanking all those who carry out this sterling work on our behalf.

My treatment this evening has inevitably been selective, but from it hon. Members will, I hope, have realised the tremendous efforts which the Royal Air Force has made and is making to ensure that its record in its next half century will justify the same pride as does that of its first 50 years. Those efforts deserve to succeed. I believe that hon. Members on both sides of the House will be proud to play whatever part they can in ensuring that success.

8.30 p.m.

Mr. F. V. Corfield (Gloucestershire, South)

I suppose that after the Minister's speech I ought to be feeling an outsize inferiority complex, being a mere product of the Royal Military Academy, but, looking at the benches opposite, I do not.

I know that my right hon. and hon. Friends would wish wholeheartedly to be associated with the Minister's confidence that the Royal Air Force can be completely relied on in the next 50 years to carry out its duties with the same loyalty, gallantry, and efficiency that it has in the past. Indeed, it is due to these virtues in all our Services that we are here today. It is also due to them perhaps that we have the less exciting duty year after year of listening to the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes).

When the Secretary of State for Defence wound up the debate on the Defence White Paper on 5th March he concluded with the warning that … once we cut defence expenditure to the extent where our security is imperilled, we have no houses, we have no hospitals, we have no schools. We have a heap of cinders." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1969; Vol. 779, c. 551.] Those are dramatic words, but they express a sentiment which I think will be echoed by everyone on my side of the House, and they are words which identify the question that is, and must be, central to the issues that we discuss in these annual debates on the Defence White Paper and the Service Estimates.

That question is quite simply this: what is the minimum level of our Armed Forces at which it can reasonably be said that our security is not imperilled? That, after all, is what these annual debates are essentially about, although, of course, it is the duty of the Government to achieve that level with the maximum economy, just as it is the duty of the Opposition to probe and question their account of their stewardship. But if a reduction in defence expenditure imperils our security there can be no economy, for if, in the words of the Secretary of State, the result is a pile of cinders, then defence expenditure is a defenceless extravagance. This is the crux of the matter. Is the level at which our Armed Forces are currently maintained, or planned for the immediate future, above the threshold below which, as the Secretary of State put it, our security is imperilled? The evidence that it is is sadly lacking. The arguments which the Government have employed cast doubt rather than give reassurance, and increase rather than allay anxiety.

What is abundantly clear is that the Government have not even set out to determine the minimum level of defence consistent with reasonable security, and then to provide the requisite forces as efficiently and as economically as possible. All the evidence of successive White Papers, of successive pronouncements by Ministers, and in particular by the Secretary of State for Defence as he abandons one final curtailment after another, is that they have done precisely the opposite. Setting this wholly arbitrary reduction in costs, they have proceeded to argue that the forces which that enables them to supply must necessarily be adequate for our security. If that were so, it would be a coincidence far too unlikely to be accepted by any reasonable person in the absence of evidence that is irrefutable, and argument that is convincing, and neither of these is noticeable in the Government's case so far.

But there are other causes of anxiety. As the Secretary of State himself has said, "We must avoid isolating the military problem from the political context in which it is presented in real life". That is precisely what the Government are doing. That N.A.T.O. should be able to prolong the conventional phase of military aggression in Europe sufficiently to allow time for last-minute diplomatic effort to avoid a nuclear holocaust is clearly a worthy objective, but at a time when N.A.T.O. has been abandoned by France and when the United States is heavily committed elsewhere, on what ground does the Secretary of State believe that that objective is currently obtainable?

Faced with the ever-increasing potential of the Warsaw Pact Powers—which, we are told in the Defence White Paper, have over 1 million men in air forces and strategic rocket forces—it is difficult to accept that the marginal extra contribution which Britain is making to N.A.T.O. could lengthen a conventional struggle sufficiently, by days rather than hours, to mount such a diplomatic offensive which, in the nature of the situation, would have to be built on the ashes of diplomatic failure.

Whatever may be the changes in military thinking, no responsible body of opinion denies, or is likely to deny, the supreme importance of command of the air in time of war. It is worth reminding ourselves from time to time that in none of the operations in which British and American forces have been engaged since the last war has command of the air ever been in doubt. It was the key to the six-day war in the Middle East. It would be a brave man indeed who would speculate on the outcome of any of those operations, let alone on their cost, had that not been the case.

In the European theatre it is both right and necessary to look to N.A.T.O. rather than to the British contribution alone. I do not think that anyone with an appreciation of the enormous cost of modern defences would contemplate an effective all-round defence of Britain alone. Here at least we can not only agree with but applaud the Government in expressing their determination to strengthen the Alliance.

However, it is not particularly reassuring to learn from the Military Balance, 1968–69, published by the Institute of Strategic Studies, that the Warsaw Pact countries probably have more than twice as many tactical aircraft in operational service as N.A.T.O. The figures given are 8,130 on the one hand and 3,750 on the other. A recent report of the United States Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub-Committee confirms that superiority, although the Sub-Committee believes that N.A.T.O. probably has a qualitative advantage over the Warsaw Pact countries in aircraft primarily designed for the strike rôle; or, as the Americans put it, aircraft having as their primary mission … the air to ground delivery of ordnance".

Mr. Emrys Hughes

rose—

Mr. Corfield

No. I will not give way.

That Sub-Committee appears to have little doubt that, in terms of the number of "interceptors and air-superiority aircraft", the latter have a "substantial majority". Ominously the report adds: If the airspace is not controlled, the tactical aircraft designed for air to ground rôles will be relatively ineffective. Only the Phantom is considered to equal, though not to be superior to, the MIG21 in air combat, and this Sub-Committee believes that the Soviet Union has already flown a number of aircraft more advanced in type than the MIG21.

Three fundamental requirements seem to follow from this state of affairs. First, the R.A.F.'s imperative need for a genuine all-weather multi-rôle aircraft as opposed to a short-range day strike aircraft; in short a multi-rôle combat aircraft of the right specification. That includes terrain-bombing capabilities such as were disastrously thrown away with the TSR2. Secondly, it implies the continuing need for research so that the quality of the equipment in the R.A.F. and other N.A.T.O. air forces keeps pace with Soviet advances and ensures a reasonable chance of survival in time of war. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, is the overriding need for continued United States commitment in Europe.

In none of these spheres can the Defence White Paper, the Estimates or the speeches and actions of Ministers be regarded as reassuring. I do not doubt that the concept of co-operation with our European allies in the manufacture of military aircraft is sound. It has many potential advantages which I need not recapitulate, but we should not underestimate the difficulties and dangers; and there certainly are difficulties.

The West Germans, occupying as they do the potential battlefield, can hardly be expected fully to share the Secretary of State's enthusiasm for flexible and graduated response as opposed to a continued and overt willingness on the part of N.A.T.O. to go nuclear immediately since they believe it is on that that their security depends.

Prolongation of conventional war is therefore less attractive to them than it may be to us, but it is an objective to which the Secretary of State is committed, and we really cannot afford another of these abrupt changes in strategy that have so disrupted the equipment of the R.A.F. and placed such a strain on the morale of officers and men. This requirement, therefore, is an essential corollary to the Secretary of State's own strategy; it is not one that existing types, lacking all-weather equipment seem capable of satisfactorily fulfilling while at the same time maintaining superiority in the air.

There is also the further difference of outlook between Britain and West Germany that, whereas the West Germans are interested in their own theatre only, Britain's geographical position and our dependence on seaborne communications has committed us, in my view quite rightly, not merely to the central European front but to the flanks of N.A.T.O. as well. In these circumstances, a joint Anglo-German project inevitably will be something of a compromise. I hope that the Minister in replying to the debate will assure the House that in no circumstances at all will the R.A.F. be deprived of the aircraft that the strategy to which it is to be committed by the Government demands.

I hope that it will be possible to embark on a joint co-operative venture but I trust that for once there will be a firm determination on the part of the Government to retain if need be our own capability to meet our own requirements. For far too long talk of abandoning that capability has passed to foreign Governments, notably the French—the ability to veto our requirements and inhibit our technological advance.

The outcome of the Anglo-French variable geometry project, so long regarded by the Secretary of State as the vital linchpin of the R.A.F.'s weaponry only to be dismissed as of minor importance when the French withdrew is not a happy augury; nor are the reports that the French are now exerting pressure on West Germany to abandon the M.R.C.A. and take the Mirage 3G instead. Again, I hope the Minister will be able to assure the House that if this R.A.F. requirement cannot be provided by co-operation it will be provided by Britain. In my view it is absolutely vital to the country and the British aircraft industry that we should neither lose our capability in military aircraft design and construction, nor opt out of technological advance and the employment and other things that such projects involve.

I have expressed doubt as to the practicability of the Secretary of State's strategy of flexible and graduated response, but I doubt whether in the long term even the trip-wire philosophy can be effectively operated without an aircraft of this kind. East European defences will become increasingly elaborate and their penetration will require increasingly sophisticated aircraft. I have mentioned the probability that the Russians are already flying more advanced aircraft than the Mig 21. Perhaps most important of all, we must recall that Phantoms need a great deal of concrete.

Denied bases in France, forward bases in Germany and the Low Countries will become increasingly vulnerable to preemptive attack and our aircraft may have to operate from bases as far afield as the United States, thereby greatly reducing their operational efficiency. In the ground attack-reconnaissance rôle, as we know, the Harrier very largely overcomes this problem but there are at present two limitations to its flexible and most effective employment. First, there is the question of numbers. We welcome the increase from last year to a total order of 90 but it still seems dangerously low. Nevertheless, we have been encouraged to hear that the Government at least have not a closed mind as to the possibility of further orders for Harriers primarily adapted for the maritime rôle now that the Pegasus engine can be upgraded, with a higher thrust.

Mr. Dalyell

Will the hon. Member elucidate his remark about operating from bases in the United States?

Mr. Corfield

I am sorry if I said bases in the United States; I meant in the United Kingdom.

I hope that the Government will not delay in coming to a conclusion on this matter. There cannot be any doubt that a larger order would have a very salutary effect on the cost per aircraft and would give the firm concerned the ability to meet export orders without undue delay and at the same time without depriving the R.A.F. of its most urgent requirements. This I have no doubt would greatly increase the attractiveness of this aircraft for export sales.

The second limitation to the full use of the Harrier seems to arise from our inability to relate the potential flexibility of this aircraft to equal flexibility in providing the ground services. When are the Government to turn their attention to the urgent need for a V.T.O.L., or short take-off and landing transport aircraft able to deliver personnel, weapons and supplies to keep the Harrier in action in frontline areas, independent of static and highly vulnerable base facilities? Is this not a project in which we could usefully renew our collaboration with West Germany either in the development of a completely new project or in the development of the Rolls-Royce powered Dornier DO31?

International co-operation, particularly in military projects, is very largely based on mutual trust and confidence between the partners, but far from creating that mutual trust and confidence the Government have done much to undermine it. Whatever the merits of decisions on E.L.D.O. or the airbus, there cannot be any doubt that the way in which the Government have presented their case to their partners has been deeply resented and has left in their minds nagging doubts about our reliability as partners. We cannot afford the dual disaster of exclusion from European cooperation and a Government policy which denies to our own aircraft industry the opportunity to supply our own requirements by ourselves.

Mr. John Morris

The hon. Member has thrown some cold water on the possibility of getting some understanding on the M.R.C.A. and has now attacked the Government on a number of scores. He is giving only one side of the picture. Perhaps he forgets the progress which has been made in the development of the Jaguar and also the collaboration which we have with France on the three helicopters. It would be of assistance to the House if the hon. Member gave the whole picture, not one side.

Mr. Corfield

It is not my job to defend the Government. It is my job to probe. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be able to answer my anxieties when he winds up the debate. Of course I am aware that the Jaguar was a very successful co-operative effort, but it does not follow that we can make the same success with the multi-rôle combat aircraft in which we are not in co-operation with France. I find Chapter 6 of the Defence White Paper a little like the curate's egg, good in parts but begging some of the more important questions. With the exception of the first paragraph, it is not what the chapter contains which causes me concern but that which is omitted or, to be more accurate, what is mentioned, so to speak in passing, with a positively tantalising lack of detail. I take issue with the first paragraph. In the light of the enormous pace and, indeed, the cost of technological advance a confession that no dramatic changes in the types and characteristics of our future weapons is foreseen and that The total expenditure on research and development is to fall, inevitably gives rise to some suspicion.

For example, I note a cutting from The Guardian announcing the American invention of something called the subsonic cruise armed decoy, which has one of these revolting shorthand names "SCAD", which, according to The Guardian, is revolutionising the whole concept of the bomber. The Americans, therefore, are turning back their attention to bombers rather than strike aircraft.

Is that included in the word "dramatic"—perhaps it is all a matter of the interpretation of that word—or is it something we have not heard about? It certainly seems to be a considerable advance on Martel and we should like to hear more about it.

I should like to think that reductions in the cost of R and D reflect, not so much a reduction in effort, as a more sensible accounting system. I greatly welcome the recognition in paragraphs 7 and 12 of the importance of civilian spin-off engendered by defence research and of the importance of identifying results that can be used for the benefit of the civil economy". There is no doubt whatever that the spin-off of defence research continues to be very substantial.

The same applies to very advanced civil projects such as Concorde. The Daily Mail is much to be congratulated on producing a very good article on 27th February listing and describing some of the remarkable and immensely beneficial adaptations of Concorde development techniques in spheres of ordinary everyday civilian usage, ranging indeed, as was pointed out in the article—it was by no means complete—from better life-saving equipment for premature babies to what was described as perfect plumbing. These things should be more widely known. I hope that the Government will ensure that information about these techniques developed as by-products of the defence research programme are not confined merely to firms which are capable of applying them to some civilian production. There are bound to be some security problems, but I hope that as far as security permits the Government will try to make information available to the House and to the public on it.

I hope that they will go further and at least try to put a monetary value on some of these technological by-products and persuade the Treasury to allow an appropriate credit to the defence budget. There appears to be no allowance of any sort for this item under Subhead Z of the Central Vote, headed "Appropriations in Aid", nor does there appear to be very much credit for overseas sales of R.A.F. equipment. The Minister pointed out that apparently the defence budget does not get credited with what the Services have done in the meteorological field for other people.

Turning to the question of R.A.F. sales, an article in The Times on 6th February estimated that exports of this type of equipment probably stood at about £20 million for 1968, with prospects of very substantial increases in the current year. We know, for example, that there have been sales of Lightnings to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and of Canberras to Peru. There have certainly been many inquiries for Hunters, though I do not know whether it will be possible to fulfil any orders. Presumably some part of the proceeds finds its way back to the Exchequer, either in the form of levies on new aircraft or cash for second-hand R.A.F. aircraft which are re-purchased by manufacturers for modernisation and re-equipment for sale abroad. The entry under subhead Z5, which is only £7½ million and which covers all disposals of surplus defence equipment, certainly does not seem adequate to cover aircraft sales of this sort of magnitude. I therefore hope that the Minister will tell us precisely how such items are accounted for because it seems right that they should go to the credit of the defence budget and that we should not go on carrying items in the defence budget without any recognition of their value to the civilian economy.

Perhaps the Minister will give us up-to-date information about the proposal to sell Hunters and Harriers to Malaysia. Is it true, for example, as has been announced in the Press, that the deal depends upon our agreeing to station aircraft on Labuan Island, at least till 1971? If it is, it would, surely, be sensible to accede to that request, bearing in mind not only the strategic value of forces in that part of the world but the value to this country in supplying the initial needs of an air force which is likely to return to the same source for replacements in the future?

While on the subject of military exports, I return for a moment to a subject which I raised last year. Disastrous as was the replacement of the TSR2 by the subsequently cancelled F111, the Government at least, in negotiating the latter contract, also negotiated an offset agreement which has been of considerable value to this country. May we be told whether in the case of other purchases which we make from the United States a similar agreement applies or is being negotiated?

I was a little disturbed to read in an influential and normally reliable source of aero-space news, Aviation Week, of 21st October, the following headline, U.K. 10-year Defense outlay in U.S. may hit 2.5 billion dollars". The article went on: Britain is expected to spend about 2.5 billion dollars on major U.S. defence equipment in the 10 years to 1977, according to Raymond S. Brown, defense sales head of the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense. 'And this is without taking into account purchases of standard equipment of about 40 million dollars a year', he said. 'We shall probably spend a considerable sum in addition for civil aircraft, engines and equipment'. According to Brown, 13 per cent. of Britain's annual defense equipment purchases are made from the U.S., or 230 million dollars per year of a 1.5 billion dollar budget. A little later in the article, Mr. Brown is reported to have referred to United States purchases of United Kingdom-manufactured defence equipment and indicated that it would be less than one-tenth of 1 per cent. of United States defence purchases, or about 200 million dollars through the 12 years of the 1966–67 offset agreement between the two Governments.

Is this really the way to do business with the United States? The first essential is to try to make clear that, although we are prepared to put these valuable orders in the way of United States manufacturers, we can do so only on the basis of an equivalent opportunity for British manufacturers of defence equipment in the United States market. I hope that the Minister will look into that and reassure us that the offset factor is not being ignored. After all, 2.5 billion dollars over ten years, even by American standards, is a fairly valuable order.

Mr. Robert Howarth (Bolton, East)

The hon. Gentleman will be aware of the United States Marine Corps' interest in the Harrier, which, though it went out at one stage, has now reappeared in a modest way and, we hope, will go ahead.

Mr. Corfield

I deliberately left that out because it was indicated to me that too much publicity might be embarrassing for the deal. I fear that that account in Aviation Week to which I have referred gives an impression that such cards as we have are not being played with either skill or determination, and this impression, I am sorry to say, is confirmed by some of the contacts which I have had with Americans who have been involved in these matters. Too often, the reaction of Americans is surprise at our readiness to agree to American terms, even on occasion failing to win a concession which the Americans came to the negotiating table ready to make.

I hope that we shall be able to renegotiate an offset agreement and that, if necessary, in so doing, we shall bargain toughly, as toughly as the Americans expect us to do.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. However, speaking with some small experience of the American aircraft industry, I am sure that he recognises that the crucial need is to have the equipment which they want. If we go about cancelling our advanced projects, then, automatically, we shall have nothing to offer competitively with the Americans.

Mr. Corfield

My hon. Friend is right. On the other hand, in the electronic sphere we have a good deal they do want, which is more competitive with their own product. The difficulty is that there is a very strong tariff advantage for the United States-produced product. We need some sort of offset agreement, under which Britain can get over the tariff barrier.

I return to the question of research, particularly procurement. There is here an immensely difficult and inevitable conflict. On the one hand, the Treasury has this fiduciary position vis-à-vis public money, and that engenders caution at the outset, check and counter-check throughout production and development and, in consequence, delay. On the other hand, there is a military or, in the case of commercial aircraft, a commercial and industrial need for quick decisions and continuity. Government, and I make no distinction between parties, has yet to find the answer.

The Government are right to place greater emphasis on the detailed definition of a project before commitment and, where possible, avoiding over-elaboration of operational requirements. If, as I suspect, the corollary to this is that by and large a new aircraft and its equipment would be produced within the knowledge of the art, instead of allowing each new aircraft to develop into a major research operation of its own, as has happened in the past, it follows that it will fall more and more to the research budget to ensure that the knowledge of the art is progressively widened. In other words, the further corollary is that the research budget will require to be increased. That seems to be the inevitable quid pro quo for what should be very much more economic development and production of the operational aircraft.

That is one of the reasons why I distrust the first paragraph of Chapter 6. In my search for ideas as to how we can resolve this conflict between Government as trustee and Government as customer, I have also been attracted by the concept of the project team and project controller which is borrowed from America. I would ask the Government to try to arrange for information, either in the form of a White Paper or of reports on specific projects, to be deposited in the Library or for the House to be given details of these developments and Government assessments of their efficacy from time to time. We have had a lot of valuable information on this subject disclosed to the Select Committee on Technology.

It is not always in a readily assessable form, and certainly not in a form easy for reference purposes. There is no arrangement whereby progress reports can bring us up to date. There are many details that would be of great interest to a number of hon. Members. For example, from what source will these project officers be recruited? Will they be exclusively civil servants or will the Government experiment by securing secondment from industry or the universities, as is done extensively in America?

Again, will the project officers devise their own monitoring machinery, or will this be laid down by the Government? It would be unfair to expect the hon. Gentleman to answer such questions, but I hope that I have said enough to indicate what I have in mind, and also that he will agree that something on these lines would constitute a useful stimulus to discussion and ideas on what is a difficult problem. It probably changes in character from time to time, and from project to project, but it is always with us. It is one on which more knowledge, more discussion would be valuable.

I conclude with the wider issue. It is probably true that the two sides of the House are in broad agreement on the central facts but in fundamental disagreement on the conclusions to be drawn from them. I think it generally agreed that probably the most powerful deterrent to Russian aggression in Europe is likely to be the certain knowledge that the immediate consequence will be war with the United States.

If that be so, as I believe it is, then provided the United States retains a substantial deployment of military force in Europe, this threat probably remains amongst those which are least likely to develop. It follows, therefore, that, where there can be a British military presence outside Europe which strengthens the alliance between Britain and America, and therefore the American commitment to Europe, such a presence is every bit as much in the interests of N.A.T.O. as an equivalent British military effort in Europe itself.

Where British forces continue to be welcome, as in the Gulf, Malaysia and Singapore, it is their presence which, in my opinion, constitutes a real guarantee to any potential aggressor that they can and will be reinforced. That really is the deterrent. It is of an entirely different order to any statement of intent to come to the support of local forces if the need should arise.

Moreover, the political context in which the military problem has to be presented in real life is, as the Secretary of State said, one in which the most immediate threats to peace are outside N.A.T.O. and outside Europe. I refer, of course, to the Middle East and the Far East. The Secretary of State dismisses the objectives of Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and probably by now in the South Atlantic as merely political. What does he mean by "political" in this sense? I suggest that we can only judge by looking at the actions of the Russians themselves.

These actions are an increasing political and economic influence, highly detrimental in many cases to Western trade in the Middle East, Africa and many parts of Asia; they are the build up of the forces, particularly air forces, in these countries with Russian arms, Russian military instructors and sometimes Russian pilots; they are the creation of tensions which, certainly in the Middle East, could at any time erupt into major military action with all the possibilities of escalation.

Why does the right hon. Gentleman believe that our security is in no way imperilled by inability to counter these so-called political ramifications of military force? What reference to that vital question has the proportion of gross national product devoted to defence by other N.A.T.O. Governments? What justification has Europe, with its vast industrial wealth and population larger than that of the Soviet Union and the United States, for relying so heavily on the latter?

It is in these non-N.A.T.O. areas that the Government have left us so critically weak, particularly in the numbers of maritime aircraft. We welcome the possibility of maritime carriers but are 38 Nimrods, for example, adequate replacement for seven squadrons of Shackletons at a period in our history when we are more, rather than less, dependent on seaborne trade than ever before? Can the Royal Air Force, whose front line combat strength will, according to the estimate by the Air League, be under 500 aircraft by 1975, fail to cause anxiety? Where are the resources of men and material essential to the concept of flexible and graduated response?

I give place to no one in my admiration for the Forces. Neither their integrity nor their loyalty is for one moment in doubt. But the Government and the Defence Secretary in particular delude themselves if they mistake that loyalty to Crown and country for confidence in themselves.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins (Putney)

On a point of order. May I ask your guidance, Mr. Deputy Speaker? At what point will it be proper for me to move the Amendment in my name?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harry Gourlay)

Mr. Speaker indicated earlier in the debate that the Amendment had not been selected. If the hon. Gentleman succeeds in catching the eye of the Chair he may move the Amendment then.

Mr. Jenkins

I am grateful.

9.10 p.m.

Mr. John Ellis (Bristol, North-West)

The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) spoke for a long time but did not mention the aspect of the Estimates about which I wish to make a few remarks—the Meteorological Office.

In the Session 1966–67 we had a Special Report from the Estimates Committee, which did a very valiant job of looking into the amount of money spent on the Meteorological Office and how we are served by it. I do not disagree with the Committee's findings in general. I shall have some critical remarks to make later, but in the Meteorological Office we have a service costing less than £10 million a year while individual types of aircraft cost much more than that sum. In addition to serving aviation, it makes a great contribution to many facets of our national life, and overall, having regard to the difficulty of weather forecasting, it does a reasonable job.

The Select Committee said: In the immediate future important decisions will have to be made to determine to which particular research projects priority should be given with the resources available. A prime consideration in the making of such decisions should be an assessment of the amount of likely economic value to the country as a whole of progress in any particular field of meteorological research. This seemed to me to be common sense, because one does not study meteorology always as a pure science but because, in its day-to-day application specific and accurate forecasts are of enormous use to human beings, and we have still barely realised the potential of the forecasts to save money.

Therefore, I was very disappointed when we had the Departmental observation on the recommendation, which flew directly in the face of it. It said: It is accepted that the overall programme of research projects should pay attention to its long-term economic value to the country as a whole. The Meteorological Office must however undertake a broad based programme of fundamental research in order to fulfil its functions of advancing the science of meteorology. This will involve some work which does not offer prospects of immediate or identifiable economic gain. This does slightly less than justice to what the Committee said, which was that more attention should be given to this aspect of development.

Another recommendation of the Committee was: In order to try and ensure that the Meteorological Office retains a higher proportion of trained staff in the scientific assistant grade, the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence should carry out a review of the Abnormal Hours Allowance payable to those in the grade employed on roster work. I suppose that I should declare some interest, because for 15 years I was in that grade. The people in it do the observations hour after hour. They are at work for 24 hours on the roster, and go to work at Christmas and on Sundays, providing all the basic information on the weather. Very often the decisions taken on visibility determine whether or not aircraft fly. It is therefore important that there should be experienced staff. This cadre has always lacked experienced observers and experienced assistants because the rates of pay have been abnormally low.

I was disappointed to find in the Departmental observation a proposal to review the Committee's recommendations on the wastage of assistant scientific officers. This is not good enough. These are the men who man the ocean weather ships. I have never served on an ocean weather ship and I think that I should have refused that duty. I have seen Press reports about a great liner suffering damage when I have known that an ocean weather ship has been just south of Iceland in the path of the North Atlantic gales, where it was laying to in order to take observations. The laconic message would come over the teleprinter: "Waves 60 feet from top to bottom"—and the ship would be hove to—"Am unable to maintain position; will steam a grid course". This meant that the conditions were so bad that the ship could no longer hold its position. This is the kind of work that is done by these men. Some are on remote airfields miles from anywhere. I hope that the Department will get on with considering this problem.

I wish to touch on one other matter which was part of my intervention. The Meteorological Office has been closely identified with the needs of the Services and most of its budget is used to this end. One can understand why it is thought necessary to have a staff of forecasters and assistants at a fighter station which may have 40 aircraft airborne, costing millions of pounds. A very good service is given. I often wonder why this kind of service cannot be made available for civilian application, although there are some local weather centres in major towns. Building sites have been mentioned, but there are also enormous potential savings in agriculture. Many millions of pounds have been saved for a minimal outlay. We should consider setting up specialist offices on the sites of important building projects, with, say, a team of six assistants and forecasters to provide detailed information. This has been neglected in the past, and I hope much more will be done on this in the future.

The Select Committee touched on the amount of money which will be spent on the new computer. The Director-General, in the foreword to the Annual Report of the Meteorological Office for 1965, said this: High among the more important events of the year were the commissioning in July of the English Electric-Leo-Marconi KDF9 computer, and the introduction of routine numerical forecasts on 2 November. He goes on to say: These computered forecasts are already as good as those produced by an experienced forecaster and will almost certainly form the basis of operational forecasting in the near future. During the time when the Select Committee sat, the hon. Member for Sudbury and Woodbridge (Mr. Stainton) inquired of the Director-General about feasibility studies when the computer was installed.

He asked him: Have you been able to refer back to those studies to satisfy yourself as to how accurate they have proved to be in the event? He got a very different answer: … I think we have been overtaken by events and the next computer will have to be much bigger. In other words, things were not quite as rosy. The hon. Gentleman went on to ask if a howler had been committed when the computer was bought. The reply came: … It would have been better if it had been bigger and more powerful, but really, without personally going through all those exercises and being wise after the event, I would hesitate to express an opinion … of these remarks. But with respect, I would say that an opinion had been expressed in 1965. That was very different later.

I want to issue a warning to my hon. Friend. If there are those who advance the theory that with a bigger computer it will be possible to forecast where the last raindrop will fall, I think that the events of 1965 will be repeated with the new computer. That is not to say, however that it should not be purchased, but some assessment should be made.

In Questions, I have asked about the results of the computer. So far, I have received only flimsy replies. Quite an amount of money has been spent here, yet we are told that it is too early to say that the computer has affected the correctness of forecasts, and so on. That is not good enough. We should have more details from the Meteorological Office.

I turn now to the correctness of forecasts, and here I intend to be somewhat critical. In 1967, I asked a Question about the accuracy of forecasts. The Answer that I was given was that for forecasts issued at 6 o'clock in the evening for the evening of the next day, the general accuracy varied between different years but was generally about 77 per cent. correct. For the forecasts issued at 8 o'clock in the morning for the next day, which is the one to which many people listen, I was told that the remarkable figures of between 83 per cent. in 1963–64 and 85 per cent. in 1966–67 were deemed correct.

I asked what was meant by "correct" and how the assessment was made. The Meteorological Office was good enough to supply me with the criteria for checking. It is one of the most remarkable documents that I have ever seen. Here is a scientific service using a huge computer and employing scientists and others doing observations with remarkable accuracy and care. The object of the exercise is to prepare forecasts, and the proud claim is made that 85 per cent. of them are correct.

The document reads: A few rules are given below on the standards of marking, but they do not and cannot cover every possible wording or situation. In most cases the checker will have to exercise his discretion. When in doubt he should make whatever assessment he feels is most appropriate, without attempting any elaborate reasoning—remembering, that he is trying to arrive at a layman's estimate which is really a closely reasoned one. For a scientific discipline, I would have thought that a more scientific approach to the accuracy or otherwise of forecasts was called for.

The list of marking standards giving the various elements is very poor. It does not mention fog and how accuracy should be judged in any way. One of the items is headed "Showers and thunderstorms", and it is remarkable. It says: Such transient phenomena present the most difficult problems of checking. If the forecast refers to 'a risk of', 'scattered', 'in a few places' or some such phrase, it is a good forecast even if no showers occur. But it is 'bad' if showers etc. are frequent (say more than two moderate showers in the day) or very prolonged. (Note that to the public a fall exceeding about an hour is not a shower, so that any forecast of showers is bad if such long falls occur.) If the forecast is for widespread showers, or even 'showers in many places' it should be treated as bad if none occurs. I think that was self-evident. I make a serious point. I have pursued this question with my right hon. Friend, suggesting, in the kindest possible way, that we should give more thought to it. So far I have had a negative response. I think that we should take as much care in checking to see how our accuracy is increasing as we do elsewhere in scientific disciplines.

I jotted down what I thought was a reasonable forecast, and I guarantee that I will get 100 per cent. marks for being correct. This is how it goes: "Most areas will be cloudy with occasional outbreaks of slight to moderate rain. At times outbreaks may be heavy locally. Winds westerly, moderate or fresh, rising to gale force in exposed places. Winds will be light and variable in sheltered places where frost may occur. Temperatures are expected to be variable but to generally be below average for the time of year. Further outlook unsettled."

All that terminology is in use in forecasting today. What does it mean? "Most areas will be cloudy with occasional outbreaks of slight to moderate rain." In the areas where it is not cloudy there could be sunshine, so I cover for sunshine and slight to moderate rain.

"At times outbreaks may be heavy locally." That throws in heavy rain as well.

"Winds westerly …" This is always a good one. "Westerly" includes a 180 degree cycle, so one has only to be right within half the range, which is good going. "… moderate or fresh, rising to gale force in exposed places." The other day a tile blew off my house. I could not be faulted on that, because if the wind blew a tile off the roof of my house, it must be in an exposed place. "Winds will be light and variable in sheltered places where frost may occur."

Another point is that they are talking about what is average all the time: "Temperatures are expected to be variable but expected to generally be below average for this time of year". There is no criterion here. These are general terms which vary widely from year to year. If one asks the man in the street, he will say, nine times out of ten, that it is cold for this time of year.

I will close on this point. Rarely do we have an opportunity to discuss something so intimate to most people's lives as the weather. It is a subject of constant concern. Therefore, I hope that the House will be patient with me.

I looked at the 30-day forecast in The Times for this Monday. I hope that no one will think that I am exaggerating. This is the 30-day forecast that was issued: The Meteorological Office issued on Saturday the following forecast for the next 30 days. During the next few days it will probably remain cold, with occasional rain or snow in northern districts. At the time that was written snow was covering some of the North of England and there was rain in the South, so the odds were that it would occur during the next few days. Farther south, milder and unsettled weather, with heavy rain in places, is likely. I would say also occurring. Later marked changes in weather are probable"— that is on the basis that it cannot go on raining and snowing all the time, so they were on a good thing— with one or two fine, anticyclonic spells in all areas … We usually find that such spells are to do with ridges of high pressure, so if we get a bit of sunshine during the next 30 days on one or two occasions they are on a good bet there. Night frost is expected from time to time everywhere and it will probably occur more often than usual in Scotland, especially in the West. Scotland is in the North, and it follows that it is more likely, the further North one goes, the more frost will be found. Some further snow is expected in northern districts"— and again we note— Monthly mean temperatures are expected to be below average in most places, but near average in South-East England and South Wales, and much below average in Eastern Scotland, North-East and East England. Rainfall during the period is expected to range from average in South and South-East England and East Anglia to below average in Scotland. No ordinary man knows what these averages are, because in one month one can, for instance, get three months' rainfall, and in another month get hardly any. I hope that the Meteorological Office will reconsider its attitude to 30-day forecasts.

I hope that the Minister has taken note of what I have said. I think that we could do with a good deal more information. I spent many years in this service, and worked with good forecasters. Forecasting is a difficult job. We have a fine Meteorological Service, but I think that it should inquire more fully into what has happened in the past, because in that way better scientific estimates can be made for the future.

Mr. Speaker

I remind the House that we have had three speeches in aproximately the first two hours of this debate. I am almost inclined to say that, weather permitting, I hope to call everybody who wishes to speak. Reasonably brief speeches however will help.

9.32 p.m.

Wing-Commander Sir Eric Bullus (Wembley, North)

I shall not attempt to follow the hon. Member for Bristol, North-West (Mr. Ellis) into the vagaries of the weather. During my service with the Royal Air Force I had a great regard for the weather man. He was not always right, but on the other hand he was not always wrong.

I think that courtesy demands that I should congratulate the Minister of Defence for Equipment on what I think are his first Estimates, but having said that, I must add that I am rather sad that this is the first time during my service in the Royal Air Force, and during my long service in this House, that the Air Estimates have been introduced by someone who is not a Minister for the Royal Air Force.

I have taken part in Air Estimates debate for 20 years. They have always been thoughtful and useful debates, and it is interesting to read the reports of some of the earlier discussions. But it is rather different today, and I think it is rather sad that, instead of noting the increasing power and growth of the Royal Air Force, we are witnessing a gradual, almost perceptible, run-down.

I shall perhaps be told that the morale of the Royal Air Force is high. My reply is that it could, and should, be higher. Whereas in past years we have discussed new British aircraft and enthusiastically anticipated new British types which would soon be coming into service, today we have no major military aircraft on the drawing board, and this in a country which can match anything in the world.

All that might be justified, and even acceptable, if we were moving into an era of peace, looking forward to sustained peace when war shall be no more, but would anyone say that war is less likely today than at any time since the end of the last war? While dangers remain we have a vital responsibility to see that our defences are strong, and that while we work for peace we are still prepared in defence.

Is this really the time for reducing our expenditure on defence? The Secretary of State has almost gleefully told us that the Estimates this year are considerably down on last year. The Minister of Defence said that the Estimates are up slightly. Is this in real terms? Real defence must always be expensive, and real defence must always be a prime priority for a nation such as ours.

In this uncertain and unstable position, can one wonder at the general uneasiness and the disappointing recruiting figures? During the years I have always maintained that we shall require manned aircraft and trained pilots for years to come, but the administration of our Defence Forces today causes the would-be recruit to think very seriously about the future.

Is everything possible being done to attract the best of our youth to enter the R.A.F.? Every effort should be bent to this end. I commend the Minister's statement that the standard for future entrants for officers is to be raised, but I deplore what I consider the false economy in the case of university training. Similarly, I commend the scheme of the Daily Express and the Air League which will encourage youth to build their own aircraft. Such schemes as this could be very helpful in recruiting.

For years to come we shall also require first-class aircraft and an efficient aircraft industry. But what are our plans? It is estimated that the R.A.F.'s front line combat strength will, by 1975, be under 500 aircraft. That would be less than the available aircraft at present possessed by North Korea, with 590, by Japan, with 570, and by Poland and Sweden. Except for the Harrier, we shall still be dependent on fixed and known concrete runways at bases vulnerable to instant destruction by rocket or other attack.

British air power as at present planned is inadequate even for a European rôle. I believe that we should be planning for double strength—for a front line combat force of 1,000 aircraft—which, by 1975, should be mainly vertical take-off and landing types, capable of operation with equal ease from mobile bases ashore or afloat. We should have a transport support force with the emphasis upon close support of the forces in the field, in particular V.T.O.L. air forces operating from mobile bases.

At the moment, we have a rather big transport force. Is it being streamlined into an efficient support force? The commitment of all our aircraft to Europe leaves some of us in grave doubt as to whether we could call upon them independently in a situation of sudden dire need. Can the Minister give a categorical assurance on that?

The Government hope to conclude an agreement with West Germany to provide a swing-wing combat plane. What is the French antagonism to this? Are they helping or obstructing in the hope that we shall become dependent on their Mirage G? The Government should tell both West Germany and France, and Europe generally, that, if sensible arrangements and agreements are not forthcoming very quickly, we shall go it alone. Of course, this would be expensive and of course it would be cheaper if we could get joint production of the planes we require. But the certainty is not the same in a joint production effort.

We must have a firm decision and quickly—either a firm agreement of joint arrangement or rapid preparation to build our own aircraft. If we have to go it alone, we must above all stick to the decision and build the 300 combat planes the R.A.F. requires. We could then compete for orders in Europe with a fair chance of getting them, for we could build a fine aircraft.

The Conservatives have been chided for the money lost in defence projects during their 13 years of office, but we were told recently in a Written Answer that R.A.F. projects cancelled between 1st October, 1964, and the end of 1968, just over four years, numbered six and that the total expenditure was expected to be about £225 million. Presumably this covers the TSR2, the P1154, the HS681, the AFVG, the F111K and the Chinnock. What Britain would now give for the TSR2! I hope that the lesson has been learnt.

Government policy is not helping the British aircraft industry, which earned £300 million in exports last year. Its capacity to earn in the next 10 years depends on what the Government do now to help. Unless the Government help, Europe could decide the destiny of our aircraft industry and France could take the leadership in the building of aircraft.

We want our own aircraft orders. We want to see expansion and extension of our factories. We do not want to see them closing down, as the Rolls-Royce factory in my constituency will do in a few weeks' time. The same story can be told in other parts of the country, for the aircraft and other industries. Design teams are being dispersed when we know how long it takes to build them up.

The Government should have another think about the whole matter and about the valuable "know-how" which is an off-shoot of aircraft production and which is invaluable for commercial interests. Do we want to forego these in this technological age? We must get and give work to our aircraft industry, thereby giving security to our skilled workers and a morale boost to the R.A.F. The defences of this country demand it, the people require it, the R.A.F. deserves to be given the necessary hardware.

9.42 p.m.

Mr. Robert Howarth (Bolton, East)

I wonder if the hon. and gallant Member for Wembley, North (Sir E. Bullus) is really suggesting that we should not only double the proposed strength of our front line aircraft in Europe but also keep a capability east of Suez, which I understand is official Conservative policy? If so, it would so increase the defence budget as to put it way beyond our economic capability. The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) did not suggest that course; he was far more guarded in his comments.

The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South criticised my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence by suggesting that because, in his view, we were not making sufficient effort in the face of increased Russian naval activity in many of the world's oceans, there would be a diminution of United States support for ourselves and the Western Alliance. He made a fair point which must be taken into account, but I was surprised that he did not mention that we are not the only member of the Western Alliance.

If, as the hon. Gentleman suggested, it is in our interest to consider considerably stepping up surveillance by reconnaissance aircraft, what does he consider should be the position of other Western European countries which also depend a great deal on merchant ships to bring in their oil and raw materials? In other words, why did he pick on the defence effort of the United Kingdom? What about the effort that should be made, according to his thesis, by other members of the Western Alliance?

I believe that the effort being made by Her Majesty's Government in concentrating our defence in Europe is correct. This matter was debated last week, and this is neither the place nor the time to go over that ground.

The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South also criticised the Government for what he described as their lack of effort in attempting to sell military equipment to the United States. Although I drew his attention to the Harrier, I could have mentioned the fact that engines are being bought by American aircraft manufacturers for military aircraft; and, of course, the Handley Page Jetstream is being bought by the United States Air Force. I think it is the only foreign aircraft which will be in service with the United States Air Force. Prospects for the Harrier are quite good according to American journals, which may be seen in the Library.

The last 12 months have been an exciting, demanding and rewarding period for the R.A.F. The first squadrons of the Phantom, an American aircraft with Rolls-Royce Spey engines, is giving the R.A.F. outstanding aircraft. The Harrier squadrons will be formed later this year and will come into more numerous service in 1970, and similarly there will be the Buccaneers specially ordered for the R.A.F. or transferred from the Naval Air Force.

These three aircraft, the Phantom, Harrier and Buccaneer, represent a strike and defence force of first-class capability, and I am sure that in the hands of the R.A.F. they will give considerable service and protection to this country, in Europe and in adjoining areas. I have in mind the Mediterranean areas. These aircraft are joining the Hercules transport aircraft, the V Bombers, Lightnings, VC. 10s and Belfasts. Coming along from 1970 onwards, we have the Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft, which will replace the Shackleton. It is an aircraft of exceedingly long range, high speed and great reconnoitre capability. The Jaguar will also be coming into service from about 1971 onwards. That is an outstanding supersonic strike aircraft. We have had details of the Anglo-French helicopters, which also will be coming into service.

All this I recount, because it should be set against the tale of woe which we have heard from the Opposition. The R.A.F. at the moment has first-class equipment, and in the next 12 months to two years it will have equally outstanding aircraft which will have many years of service ahead in the hands of the R.A.F. This is first-class equipment of which we can be proud. Many of these aircraft have great export potential. Not only is the United States interested in the Harrier, but so also are other countries. This presumably will firm up when the Harrier comes into R.A.F. service in squadron numbers, and the Jaguar is expected to be an aircraft with great sales potential. It is believed that this will prove attractive to many friendly air forces throughout the world. This is true also of the Anglo-French helicopter and the B.A.C. 162 training aircraft. There is no doubt that, as we see from export figures, the British aircraft industry is making a great contribution to the export effort. On the decisions which have been made, and which I hope will quickly be made, it will continue its contribution to the export performance of the country.

On the equipment side, I want to comment on the multi-rôle combat aircraft. This is an issue of outstanding importance, not only to Britain and her defence and to her Alliance, but also to the industry. When considering, on the one hand, the aircraft that need replacement by the multi-rôle combat aircraft, if this is what we are to have, we must also consider the potential opposition to an aircraft which we hope that the R.A.F. will have in the mid-1970s.

To this end I want to refer to the equipment made available by the Soviet Union to her own air forces and to other air forces in various parts of the world. The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South mentioned a number of the very advanced aircraft available to the Soviet Union. Only this afternoon I took the trouble to look up a reference book in the Library. It was a salutary lesson of which I hope that my hon. Friends the Members for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) and for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), who have tabled this unfortunate Amendment, will avail themselves. They will see there the range of equipment available to the Soviet Union, equipment which is not being made just for the glorification of the Russian aircraft industry but which clearly has a purpose.

The Soviet Union has in the Mig 23 an all-weather fighter which for some time has held height and speed records and which is thought to be capable of speeds of Mach 3. It is an aircraft which is already in service in large numbers in the Soviet Union, it is thought. Similarly, there is the Subhoi twin-jet single seater, a Mach 2.5 plus aircraft. There is the Yak-28 and other supersonic combat aircraft. The list is long and impressive. I hope that my hon. Friends who have tabled this fantastic Amendment will take the trouble to inform themselves on the type of equipment which is available to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Emrys Hughes

I am very well acquainted with the Soviet Union and its development in the air.

Mr. Howarth

I wonder.

Mr. Hughes

I think that I have travelled in the Soviet Union more than most Members in the House, and travelled more by air. I do not doubt that the Soviet Union has tremendous air potentiality for destruction. If the two forces met, there would be nothing for it but the destruction of Western Europe. What is the point of the argument? Nobody denies that the Russians have a very powerful air force. The question is: what lesson is there for the people of Britain? If that powerful air force gets into action, we are destroyed.

Mr. Howarth

One of the lessons which I draw is that I wish I could think that there was a debate such as this going on at present in the Soviet Union with Soviet Deputies moving an Amendment of the type that my hon. Friends have tabled. That does not happen. In view of what happened recently in Czechoslovakia, I can only express my repeated amazement that my hon. Friends should table this Amendment, remembering the activities of the Warsaw Pact countries against one of their own numbers, never mind us.

Mr. Emrys Hughes

How could the possession of a powerful air force by Britain possibly help Czechoslovakia?

Mr. Howarth

I am not suggesting that it would necessarily have helped Czechoslovakia. I know, however, that the Soviet Union could not make the same sort of move against ourselves or any other member of the Western Alliance precisely because we have forces available to us capable of making a very firm and clear answer to any threat from the Soviet Union.

It is interesting to note also, in connection with Eastern European forces, that Yugoslavia, which herself has been under threat on a number of occasions from the Soviet and her allies in Eastern Europe, has made it clear that she will militarily resist any move against her of the type made against Czechoslovakia. So far at least, fortunately, no such move has been made.

However, let me continue on the point I was making about the equipment which the potential opponents of the Western Alliance have available to them.

I was discussing some of the very advanced fighters, first-class aircraft, available to the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Soviet Union has supersonic bombers as well as the giant TU20 with stand-off missiles available. As regards transport aircraft, the position is probably well known to hon. Members present this evening. The Soviet Union has also—this is interesting—a maritime reconnaissance aircraft which is in squadron service and has been for several years, a pure jet aircraft. At the moment, there is nothing comparable to it in the West, though there will be when the Nimrod comes along. This aircraft, the MYA 4, has capabilities well beyond those available to the Western Alliance at this stage.

Remembering the prototype aircraft displayed over two years ago, we see that the Soviet Union is experimenting with variable geometry aircraft, with VTOL and STOL aircraft, and there is little doubt that we shall see these aircraft coming into squadron service in the next few years.

In considering the Royal Air Force, its present equipment and the equipment which we hope it will have in the next few years, it is necessary to understand what equipment is available to those who could, perhaps, represent a threat to our whole way of life in Western Europe.

The point I make in connection with the importance of advanced combat aircraft to our industry—I agree with other hon. Members here—is that, if agreement cannot be reached shortly on a joint project with certain of our allies in N.A.T.O., a firm decision should be taken that we shall build on our own account an advanced military aircraft to replace those which are now becoming quite old and are outclassed easily by equipment not only of the Soviet Union but of other countries to which she has supplied equipment, even Arab countries as well as countries in the Far East.

We know what the capability of the industry is. It is the third largest aircraft industry in the world and is well able to build an advanced military aircraft. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence will come quickly to a decision, since time is of the essence here. It will take about four years before we see such an aircraft flying in prototype form, and another two years before it is in squadron service. By then, we shall be well into the mid-1970s. I trust that a decision will be forthcoming in the next few months.

It is a happy circumstance that we are able to have this debate near the 50th anniversary of the Royal Air Force, a Service which has an outstanding record in the defence of this country. I hope that hon. Members will do as the two Front Bench spokesmen did and take this opportunity to express our thanks for its service in the past and our confidence in the service which it will render in the future.

9.58 p.m.

Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles (Winchester)

I hope that the hon. Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Robert Howarth) will excuse me if I do not follow him, save to agree very largely with the strictures which he passed on the inadequacy of the Government's defence programme.

The Government's defence policy now involves drastic new responsibilities for the Royal Air Force, particularly maritime responsibilities, and it is to these that I shall direct special attention to night. The Royal Air Force will take over entire responsibility for the air de fence and air support of the fleet and our merchant navy except for the helicopter element of this task. Similarly, this year the navy formally takes over the strategic deterrent rôle from the Royal Air Force. These are major changes, representing a watershed in our maritime history. The moment is therefore appropriate to discuss the relationship between the Royal Air Force and the Navy. There has been, to say the least, healthy rivalry between the two Services for 50 years. It started in 1918 when the Royal Air Force, on its formation, incorporated the Royal Naval Air Service, and it continued through the 1920s and 1930s—

It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.