HC Deb 17 June 1968 vol 766 cc872-82

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. McBride.]

11.2 p.m.

Mr. Will Griffiths (Manchester, Exchange)

The first thing I want to do tonight is to make clear that the subject I am raising is, in my opinion, one that deals exclusively with a British interest. I am not discussing the general political situation in the Middle East, nor the continued closure of the Suez Canal. I want to discuss what can be done to release the four British ships trapped with 11 others in the Bitter Lake area of the Suez Canal.

As the House knows, there are 15 ships and eight countries are involved. Last month, during a short visit to Egypt, I was able to visit the ships and had the very agreeable experience of going aboard, meeting British officers and crew, and on that point I am perfectly sure that everything has been done to make their incarceration in the Bitter Lake comfortable. They have characteristically organised recreational activities on an international scale, forming a body which is called the Bitter Lake Association, of which I believe my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) is Honorary President. The crews are changed regularly, and I think they have little to complain about.

Whilst I was there, I discussed this problem with the officers and crews of two of the British ships, the Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, Mr. Riad, the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister, and our Ambassador in Cairo. Since my return I have discussed it with representatives of Lloyds, that is to say representatives of the London insurance market. I have also received a letter from the Merchant Navy Officers Association, and what I have to say tonight is based on my understanding of the information which has been given to me from the sources I have named.

Firstly, I want to say with all the emphasis at my command that I believe the Government of Egypt are sincere in their desire to see the ships free. None of the people I have spoken to have disagreed on this point, and I think it is important to say this in the House because it seems to me that as one reads HANSARD, or is present at Question Time, it is repeatedly assumed that the whole responsibility for this situation is due to Egypt. There is plenty of evidence, as I shall seek to show, that this is not so.

Let me—necessarily briefly—say what the history of this unhappy situation is, apart from the immediate aftermath of the June war of 1967. At the end of that year, as I am sure the House knows, representations were already being made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the United Arab Republic to secure their co-operation in at least getting out the trapped ships.

Finally, on 10th January this year, the permanent representative of the U.A.R. at the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that the Government of the U.A.R. had reached, as he put it, "a favourable decision on the evacuation of the stranded ships".

It was made clear to the United Nations that a survey would be carried out by the Suez Canal Authority to be commenced on 27th January. General Bull, of the United Nations, was provided with a detailed operational plan on 21st January, and on the same day General Bull informed the Israeli Defence Minister, General Dayan, of the U.A.R. intention to carry out a full reconnaissance, commencing on 27th January, of the entire Canal Channel, designed to end on 3rd February.

If hon. Members have read the U.N. Special Report on the incidents that culminated in the firing which brought the survey to an end, they will have seen that General Bull considered—and it is here on the record of U.N. proceedings —that the U.A.R. plan and timetable was, in his own words, both "reasonable and acceptable".

On 24th January, the Israeli Defence Minister objected and said that his Government's position was—and is—that they objected to a survey of the whole canal. He said: The survey and clearance should be of the southern part of the Canal only. It is clear from the U.N. reports that there then followed several days in which the Secretary-General of the U.N. and General Bull sought to persuade Israel to change its attitude and agree to a survey of the whole Canal. This project was simply a survey, involving technicians in small ships locating the blocked ships and considering whether exit would be better to the north or the south.

In a communication to Israel's Defence Minister on 25th January after seeking to persuade Israel to agree to an uninterrupted survey of the northern end, the Secretary-General pointed out that Israel would be kept informed and that if as a result it was decided that exit from the North was more feasible, Israel would have full opportunity to assess the new situation and state its position. The relevant document said that the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative that the commander of the United Nations truce supervisory organisation considered the U.A.R. survey and reconnaissance plan to be reasonable, a judgment in which the Secretary-General concurred and which was later confirmed by two of the naval officers serving at the organisation's office. Israel, of course, was adamant, and said that the Secretary-General should inform the permanent representative of Egypt of Israel's position with regard to the survey of the North, and asked him to convey this to his Government together with advice from the Secretary-General that the survey be confined to the South. The Secretary-General, U Thant, observed that, while he would inform the Egyptian representative of Israel's position, he would not undertake to give the advice suggested. It is clear from these documents that the officers of the United Nations seemed to be satisfied that the U.A.R. were acting in a reasonable manner.

On 28th January, as the abortive attempt to get the ships out was drawing to its climax, the Secretary-General sent a message to the Foreign Minister of Israel, part of which read: I must frankly say that I am disappointed at this development at this early stage."— That is, the rejection of the survey in the North—and went on to argue, even as late as that, that Israel might reconsider the position and allow the survey. It did not happen, and, after the U.N. had failed to persuade Israel to allow the survey to cover the whole area, the matter drew to a climax on 30th January, when General Bull phoned the Egyptian Foreign Minister at 3.30 in the morning to tell him that if the survey proceeded in the North the U.N. organisation could not guarantee to protect the workers doing it. Nevertheless, at five o'clock that morning they went into the Canal area, the firing took place and a civilian employee of the surveying team was killed. That was the end of the survey, there the matter has remained and the ships have remained incarcerated in the Bitter Lake.

I believe that Egypt is willing to get the ships out, but insists that a survey of the north and south exits is necessary to establish the feasibility of the exercise. They say that technically it is probably easier to get the ships out to the north and into the Mediterranean. I am not qualified to make an estimate of these technical arguments. It is said that the bed of the Canal is sandy to the north, so that it would be easier to dig channels —I am not competent to express a view one way or the other about that—while to the south the bed is rocky, which would make the task of removing the blocked ships more difficult and expensive. I understand that seven of the it is difficult for them—which would be blocked ships are in the south.

I gather that most of those with whom I have spoken accept that the task would be easier from the north. This view was expressed to me by the skippers of the ships in the Canal. The Merchant Navy Officers' Association pointed out that all the ships were going north and that it would probably be easier to get them out that way. However, they all say, in effect, "If that is impossible, let us get them out somehow, even to the south." Many competent and thoroughly reputable independent people who are not involved in the Arab-Israel argument also say that it would probably be technically easier to conduct the exercise to the north.

Israel insists that the ships may go, but that the must go south. I do not know why Israel maintains this position. What is the reason? I have heard rumours that they fear that if the Canal is cleared at its northern end Russian ships will move in. I do not know if Israel has said that, but I imagine that there is nothing to stop the Soviet Fleet from going up the Red Sea now and passing around the southern part of the Canal. Whatever the reason, it is unfortunate.

Have any representations been made by Her Majesty's Government to the Government of Israel to seek to persuade them to at least agree to a survey being conducted along the whole of the Canal? Has the assistance of the United States Government been sought? Could they make representations, since one of their ships is involved? Although that ship was bound south, I have been told that a fire broke out in its engine room and that its skipper would prefer, like the other skippers, to go north, if the choice was available, because there are better docking and repair facilities in the Mediterranean.

I hope that the Minister will agree that sometimes the attempts which are made, in the House and elsewhere, to put all the blame for the situation on the U.A.R. are totally unfair. If it is not possible to persuade Israel to agree to have a survey carried out at the northern end, which might lead to the release of the ships into the Mediterranean, I appeal to the U.A.R. to give a demonstration of goodwill—I know that manifest to the world; and, if necessary, release the ships to the south. I appre-cite that there are certain technical difficulties and that the heavy lifting machinery is in the north. But I appeal to them to consider taking this action because they would gain enormously in international respect, although I appreciate how cross they have been at the misrepresentation to which they have all too often been subjected.

I hope, therefore, that the Minister will give a reply which will contain some hope for the shipowners, crews and insurance people so that an even tiny contribution may be made towards a settlement of this problem in the Middle East.

11.15 p.m.

Mr. Colin Jackson (Brighouse and Spenborough)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Exchange (Mr. Will Griffiths) for raising this matter and to the Minister of State for allowing a couple of minutes for me to make an intervention on the question of the Canal situation and the stranded ships. I can bear out the words of my hon. Friend concerning the fine spirit and good conduct of British seamen stranded in the Bitter Lakes area.

After a year the time has come when we need further action. At this stage the United Nations should be asked to intervene. We had an intervention in 1956 when a survey was undertaken and the ships cleared. Now we should have another survey. There should be the fullest consultations with the Suez Canal Authority. The eight nations which have ships stranded there are entitled as nations which have ships sailing the high seas to be able to sail north or south according to the judgment of the United Nations survey team as speedily as possible. Her Majesty's Government have played an enormous rôle in attempting to bring peace to this area. They have consistently done everything in their power to bring about a settlement in regard to the ships in the Canal.

It may be that U.N. intervention may be launched by some other shipping Power with an interest in the area, but 12 months is enough. We have waited long enough and the world is entitled to see the ships sail through. Her Majesty's Government would do the world credit and herself distinction by associating with others in bringing this matter to the United Nations, having a U.N. survey, and having the ships sail through peacefully.

11.17 p.m.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (West Lothian)

As one who visited these ships in the Bitter Lakes, I take the opportunity of saying thank you to the Foreign Office and the Minister of State for the great detail they have gone to in this matter. I support my hon. Friend the Member for Brighouse and Spenborough (Mr. Colin Jackson) in saying that it is now time for the United Nations to intervene. I add the point, is this not also an opportunity when we have to recognise that the relationship between this country and Egypt should become much closer? It is not just a question of getting our ships out, but there is a great deal more to be done in cementing relationships between our two countries.

11.18 p.m.

The Minister of State, Foreign Office (Mr. Goronwy Roberts)

I should like to begin by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Exchange (Mr. Will Griffiths), on having chosen the problem of the blocked ships' as the subject of this debate and thank him for the balanced and temperate way in which he has put his material to the House. I also wish to say how much I welcomed the two brief but valuable and significant contributions by my hon. Friends the Members for Brighouse and Spenborough (Mr. Colin Jackson) and West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell).

This is a problem that many hon. Members feel strongly about, and they are entitled to do so. It seems almost nonsensical that over a full year after the hostilities of June, 1967, fifteen merchantmen of eight nationalities, including four British vessels, should still be trapped in the Suez Canal. Their presence in the Canal in June last year was of course a matter of sheer bad luck: neither then nor now was their presence part of the substance of the Arab/Israel dispute. Yet it is the shippers and ship-owners, together with private citizens unfortunate enough to have luggage in the holds of the ships who are having to pay a heavy price in inconvenience, loss of use, and damage to hulls and cargoes. These considerations, I can assure the House, have been very much in the mind of Her Majesty's Government throughout the past twelve months.

If we are to understand how it is that these unfortunate vessels are still where they are, we need to look at the background in some little detail, and I hope that the House will bear with me if I now do so.

First, there are the plain facts of the ships' geographical positions to be taken into account. Fourteen of them, including the four British, are in the Great Bitter Lake. Normally, they remain moored fairly close to each other, but from time to time they move their locations slightly, for example, to keep their engines in good working order. At all events—I stress this point—the ships are located between the front lines of two opposing armies, though I am glad to say that they have not come into danger in the various exchanges of fire which have taken place in the area of the Canal since last June. One of the United States vessels, the "Observer", is in an even more exposed position, being in the narrower Lake Timsah just south of Ismailia, where the gap between the front lines is thus that much narrower.

Meanwhile, both ends of the Canal, and the stretch which lies between the Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah, are blocked by substantial obstacles, most of them within easy range of both the Egyptian and Israeli forces. The problem is not, therefore, a simple matter requiring only that one of the parties involved should agree to let the ships out. The co-operation of both sides needs to be obtained, and a good deal of dredging and clearance work will have to be done whatever route is used for the release of the ships.

The House is aware that, even before diplomatic relations had been resumed between the United Kingdom and the United Arab Republic, my right hon. Friend the then Foreign Secretary urged the Government of the United Arab Republic to make arrangements for the release of the ships. Diplomatic relations were resumed on 12th December. I should like to say here that Her Majesty's Government attach much importance to this development, and to the subsequent resumption of relations with the Sudan, Algeria and Iraq. Meanwhile, the Secretary General of the United Nations and his special representative in the Middle East, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, had also taken up the matter of the blocked ships.

Towards the end of December, the United Arab Republic Government officially informed us that they were willing to arrange for the release of the ships. On 10th January, they similarly informed U Thant, and on 21st January the United Arab Republic authorities informed General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, of their operational plan. They also handed him a timetable for a survey of the Canal designed to establish what would be the best means for the release of the ships. This decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic won them considerable goodwill here and elsewhere, and was much appreciated by Her Majesty's Government.

The timetable handed to General Bull provided for a survey of the Canal south from Ismailia between 27th and 29th January, and for a survey of the northern part of the Canal from 30th January to 3rd February. The survey of the southern part of the Canal was carried through without incident. However, on 24th and 25th January, the Israeli Defence Minister made it clear to General Bull that any activity in the northern part of the Canal would be opposed by Israel.

On 26th January, U Thant informed the Israel permanent representative in New York—I am drawing here on the Secretary-General's official report—that General Bull considered the Egyptian survey and reconaissance plan to be reasonable, and expressed the hope that the Israel Government would not insist that the survey cover only the southern end of the Canal. However, the permanent representative of Israel emphasised that his Government were firm in their position. Accordingly, on 29th January, General Bull informed the United Arab Republic authorities in Cairo, and U Thant informed the permanent representative of the United Arab Republic in New York, that the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation was not in a position to give assurances that work in the northern part of the Canal could be carried out without risk of a clash. And in fact when in the early morning of 30th January a Suez Canal Authority survey boat moved northwards into the Canal from Lake Timsah warning; shots were fired; and when later in the morning a boat again moved north the Israel Defence Force opened fire on it, wounding a member of the crew. Survey operations thus came to a halt.

I have no wish to try to apportion blame for what happened on 30th January, and I have gone in some detail into the course of events already. Hon. Members who would like to go into the story more fully will find further details in the special report issued by the United Nations Secretary General on 31st January, a copy of which is in the Library.

What I have tried to do is to tell the House enough to emphasise that, as I indicated earlier, it would be unrealistic to regard the matter of the blocked ships as either a simple one or as one over which the responsibility lies on one side. Moreover, it is the shooting incident of 30th January, and the events leading up to it, that provide the background to the situation as it has existed since. On the one hand there are the Egyptians saying that the next move must be the finishing of the incomplete survey, and on the other the Israelis maintaining that the ships can be released to the south without difficulty and extremely reluctant to agree that any work to the north should go forward.

The Egyptian authorities further say that although they had originally envisaged that the southern exit would be less difficult for the ships to leave by, the results of the survey of the southern part of the Canal led them to believe that the northern end would be technically a good deal less complicated; and that accordingly a survey of the northern part of the Canal is needed to determine this for certain. Furthermore, they point out that the Suez Canal Authority's dredging equipment is now in Port Said and will have to be brought down into the Canal whichever end of it is to be cleared. The Israel authorities for their part seem to be afraid that if the stranded vessels were to leave the Canal by the northern route a passage would be left through which warships hostile to them could enter the Canal and a new risk of incidents thus be introduced. I repeat that one should hesitate before apportioning blame to one side or the other in this very difficult matter.

At this point we come up against a link between the matter of the blocked ships and the wider issues involved in the Arab/Israel problem as a whole. Obviously each time there is a setback in the difficult process of working towards a Middle East settlement, each time there is a debate, stirring up passions on either side, the atmosphere for arrangements to release the ships is worsened. But the reverse argument is also true, as my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Exchange said. In the discussions leading up to the work started in January the United Nations believed, as we all did, that the evacuation of the blocked ships would in itself help to improve the atmosphere for Dr. Jarring's mission. Her Majesty's Government for their part believe that there is still considerable force in this argument. Certainly so long as the ships remain stranded they will constitute an extra irritant in an already difficult climate.

There are many points I should like to have made, but in my anxiety to allow my hon. Friends to make their contributions I am afraid that I must truncate my observations.

I should like to conclude with this one point, which is rather important: I was asked whether we are continuing with our efforts as a Government to secure a solution of this problem. I can give the House that assurance freely. We are constantly exploring every avenue that might lead towards the release of the ships. The considerations so fairly set out by my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Exchange have not been ignored.

I was also interested to hear the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Brig-house and Spenborough, who, as many hon. Members know, has a special interest in and knowledge of the Middle East.

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at half-past Eleven o'clock.