HC Deb 11 December 1968 vol 775 cc465-86

After paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of section '53 of the Representation of the People Act, 1949, there shall be inserted the following' nor, after the issue of the writ in a Parliamentary election, or the publication of the notice of election in a local government election, shall any person incur such expense with a view to influencing persons to give or refrain from giving their votes to a candidate or a group of candidates at that election, otherwise than by or through a candidate's election agent'.—[Mr. Strauss.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. G. R. Strauss (Vauxhall)

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

May I anticipate one criticism which may be made against the Clause, and that is that it is imperfectly worded. I have no doubt that that is so, as I have not had the technical help which the Government receive to word complicated and difficult legal provisions effectively. I hope that as a result of what I and some of my colleagues say the Home Secretary will agree to my proposal in principle, or will agree anyhow to consider it, and then, when it comes to Report, to put into proper, water-tight, legal form.

I must go back in history to explain the purpose of the Clause. The 1944 Speaker's Conference came to the conclusion that the existing provisions for limiting expenditure during elections was in sufficient, and that something more was necessary than to lay down the maximum amount which candidates were entitled to spend. The conference came to the conclusion that it was desirable that expenditure by outside bodies should be limited, and that such expenditure should have to go through the ordinary machinery, in other words, it should be returned by the election agents in the ordinary way.

That principle is very important. It was accepted by Parliament and during the debates in 1948, which preceded the 1949 Act, it was clear that everyobdy—the Government, the Opposition, and all hon. Members who took part—accepted the principle that outside bodies should not have unrestricted freedom to spend such moneys as they wanted in support either of a candidate or a political party during the election campaign. That was the general concensus and it is a principle which everybody must now accept. I am sure that the Home Secretary does.

The result of that general agreement was the passage of Section 63 of the Representation of the People Act, 1949, and I should like to read to the Committee the relevant part of it. Subsection (1) says: No expenses shall, with a view to promoting or procuring the election of a candidate at an election, be incurred by any person other than the candidate, his election agent and persons authorised in writing by the election agent on account

  1. (a) of holding public meetings or organising any public display; or
  2. (b) of issuing advertisements … "
Everybody thought that that was clear and simple, carrying out the intention of Parliament and the generally accepted principle that money must be limited in the weight which it is allowed to carry in an election. Otherwise, the parties which have the greatest funds or who have friends and supporters with the largest resources would be at an unfair advantage. As I say, it appeared that the principle was enacted in that way, and so everyone thought until 1952. In 1951, Tronoh Mines Ltd., after the Writ had been issued and during the election campaign, caused an advertisement to be inserted in The Times supporting the Conservative Party. That advertisement was perfectly clear and blatant, and, when the subsequent case was heard, it was accepted that the advertisement was one supporting the Conservative Party. A prosecution was brought by the Crown against Tronoh Mines for offending against Section 63 of the Representation of the People Act. Having studied the Act carefully, the judge came to the conclusion, in short, that the wording of the Section did not carry out Parliament's obvious intention and that the words which I have quoted— No expenses shall, with a view to promoting or procuring the election of a candidate at an election, be incurred"— referred to a single candidate, it being legitimate for anyone, any organisation or outside group, to spend as much money as they liked on propaganda supporting two or more candidates, so long as—I think that this is the supposition which was accepted—the actual name of a candidate or a constituency was not mentioned. In other words, general propaganda supporting one or other party could be issued by any outside body during an election campaign, and any such body was perfectly entitled so to do.

This was wholly contrary to Parliament's intention when it passed the 1949 Act. Moreover, it put outside bodies at an advantage over candidates or political parties. Candidates cannot do it. The political parties do not do it, During an election campaign, any money which they spend has to be allocated and put in the election agents' returns.

To fortify myself on this point, I inquired from my own party what its procedure was and what happened about election propaganda costs during a campaign. This is what I was told: During the period of a Parliamentary general election, all expenditure that could be regarded as an election expense, that is to say, advertising, printing and publicity, speakers' expenses, posters, etc., becomes chargeable to the election agents against their written authorisation or order. After the issue of the writ, nothing is supplied by head office unless it is ordered by an election agent. All national advertising is stopped and all publications are withdrawn from general sale, except for single copies. Even the expenses of the Leader or Prime Minister or other main speakers are charged to the election agents of the candidates whose constituencies they visit. I am sure that the Conservative Party adopts the same procedure. Thus, it is clear that the political parties accept Section 63 in the letter and spirit intended.

But now we find that other bodies need not do so. A Co-operative society, the Aims of Industry, or any other organisation is free to carry on any propaganda during an election campaign unrestricted and not required to make returns. They can do it to any extent they like.

I give an example of what might happen. At a hard-fought election cam- paign in Birmingham, the outcome in many constituencies might be in doubt. After the Writ has been issued, any propaganda and any election activity which costs money from the headquarters of the Conservative Party—I take it as an example—or any activities organised locally by candidates or agents would have to be returned in the election agents' figures. All comes within the limit laid down by Parliament in the 1949 Act, and, now, in the present Bill, in Clause 8. Thus, the parties both locally and nationally may spend only the limited sum authorised by Parliament.

5.15 p.m.

If we do not remedy the flaw in the law which was disclosed as a result of the Tronoh Mines case and Mr. Justice McNair's judgment, the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, for example, might well say, after the Writ has been issued," We are prepared to spend £20,000 in Birmingham on advertisements in newspapers, on posters, on organising meetings, and so forth, in general advocacy of the cause of the Conservative Party". That would be lawful, yet I cannot imagine that any hon. Member on either side would regard it as right or just.

Can this situation be satisfactory? Does my right hon. Friend consider that such a body as Tronoh Mines should be entitled to indulge in unlimited expenditure, after the issue of the Writ, asking people to vote for a particular party? The party headquarters cannot do it and local candidates cannot do it without returning the expenditure. Does my right hon. Friend consider that such a situation as I have suggested could happen in Birmingham would be defensible? Would it be in accordance with our democratic principles and the general agreement among all parties that the amount of expenditure during an election should be limited?

That is the purpose of the Clause. On occasions in the past—not many, but some—outside bodies have taken part in an election. One thinks of the Freedom Movement, the National Socialist Movement and the like. They have not done so on a big scale yet, but when the import of the McNair judgment in the Tronoh Mines case is appreciated people will realise that there is no reason why all sorts of bodies indirectly interested in politics should not undertake vast expenditure after the Writ has been issued.

There has been some argument about whether there ought to be a limitation on expenditure during the period proceeding an election, whether moneys spent by the parties or outside bodies during the weeks and months leading up to an election should be limited in some way, on grounds of fairness. The case for that is arguable. It has been turned down on the general ground that it would be impracticable and would be an improper limitation on freedom of speech and freedom of advocacy for any cause which any individual or body wishes to put forward. But there is no case for having no limitation after the Writ has been issued and the election campaign is on.

I ask my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to consider this matter care fully. Perhaps he will not want to give an answer today, but I hope that he will assure us that he will consider the matter sympathetically and amend Section 63 of the 1949 Act so that it conforms with what was intended by all sections in Parliament at the time, no longer permitting the abuse which could occur as a result of the judgment in the Tronoh case which permits outside bodies of great wealth to participate to an unlimited ex tent by propaganda during an election campaign.

Mr. A. P. Costain (Folkestone and Hythe)

I listened to the right hon. Member for Vauxhall (Mr. Strauss) with care and attention and I have a great deal of sympathy with his case, but I am in some difficulty to know exactly what he means by an advertisement. For instance, we read in the papers today that the British Steel Corporation is considering putting up the price of steel. Suppose that that coincided with a General Election and the Corporation wanted to publish an advertisement to say that the cost would be increased by the 7½ per cent. which is being discussed. Would the right hon. Gentleman make it clear whether that would be an advertisement in favour of the Socialist Party or one in favour of the Conservative Party? Frankly, I see it as a splendid advertisement for the Conservative Party. Does he contend that this could be charged to the advertising of the Conservative Party?

Would the Minister make it clear what is meant by an advertisement? I find it difficult at the moment to think of any article or comment in a newspaper which is not an advertisement for the Conservative Party. Would the right hon. Member assure us that any news items or advertisement would not be considered favourable to the Conservative Party, even though it is difficult to see how they can be favourable to the Socialist Party?

Mr. Strauss

I am grateful to the hon. Member, as this enables me to add a sentence which I had intended to include in my original speech. Of course, this would be for the judge to decide, but I must make it clear that the acceptance of my Amendment would in no way restrict newspaper comment, letters to news papers or the ordinary freedoms now enjoyed. But if any question arose as to whether some announcement was an advocacy of one party or another, that would be a matter for the court to decide.

Mr. Costain

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that partial explanation, but it does not answer my question. The G.P.O. recently advertised about the rise in postal charges. We are used to so many announcements at the moment of increased charges because of the Socialist Government. Would the right hon. Gentleman make it clear that his proposal would exempt them from being charged to the Conservative Party? They are against the Socialist Party be cause of that party's performance, but they should not be charged to the Conservative Party because of the failures of the Socialists.

Mr. Mendelson

In supporting this Amendment and the powerful case which my right hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Mr. Strauss) has made, I am immediately up against the main difficulties which the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) has raised—although his first example was more amusing than his second. It did not gain by repetition.

First, I support the important principle which my right hon. Friend has introduced. It is, I think, common ground in all Parliamentary democracies that it is a desirable and fundamental aim of constitution making and amending to ensure as far as humanly possible that every elector has an even chance to support his point of view publicly. For instance, there is a great deal of trouble from time to time in the United States about the precise conditions under which funds have been contributed and campaigns run on behalf of one party or another or on behalf of particular candidates. A great deal of legal work has been done on this subject, far more than in this country.

Indeed, to hold a fair balance between various capital interests and people disposing of great financial resources in the United States has often made up the entire Presidential campaign: towards the end of the campaign, people are arguing not about foreign policy or taxation but about the purity of the campaign. This teaches us a lesson. We do not suffer from so much of this nowadays, but there might well be a good deal of it in the future. That is why this is a very important Amendment which my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary should sup port in principle.

I now come to the important difficulty raised by the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe. To put it in the form of a formula rather than of an example, it is the difficulty of limitation and definition. In all debates in recent years on this subject—Mr. Speaker's Conference also discussed this matter—the problem of limitation and definition has been the central point of argument. As a matter of principle, his subject is not unique in presenting this difficulty. It is Parliament's experience over the years and the centuries that, while a principle is not in dispute, there is often a difficulty of limitation and definition. If we were to throw up our hands every time this difficulty arose, the amount of legislation—some hon. Members might regard this as highly desirable—passed by the House would be reduced to a tiny minimum.

Therefore, it cannot be sufficient, as the hon. Member has done—I say this in all friendliness and in no polemical spirit—to produce two absurd examples and say that he has thereby killed the case—

Mr. Costain

I gave two examples of advertisements which would, in all innocence, be to the benefit of the Conservative Party. Would the hon. Member give the Committee the benefit of opposite examples which might be to the benefit of the Socialist Party, since I can think of none?

Mr. Mendelson

I do not intend to do that, since I am rejecting as sufficient to kill the case the production of two absurd examples. If I were to follow his tempting invitation and produce another two examples, I should have accepted his underlying argument that he had killed the case—and I do not.

To proceed with my argument, which is rather different, where this difficulty arises, Parliament is not guided by absurd examples. It rejects them and then tries to limit the case and recommends legislation to do this as far as is humanly possible. After that process, it is left to the courts to determine what Parliament meant and to say, "This is our judgment", thus creating a body of case law, or, as sometimes happens, the judges might say, "Parliament has not put into the correct words what it obviously intended, so we must judge differently, and if Parliament takes a different view, it must pass amending legislation, upon which we will act accordingly". This is not an unprecedented situation.

On the hon. Member's two examples, it would not be beyond the wit of man, the Parliamentary draftsmen and my right hon. Friend and his advisers to find a definition which clearly excluded that type of case. There is a real difference between publishing a routine statement about the price of stamps or steel and publishing a statement for which one would buy space in a news paper for £5,000, saying," We appeal to people to vote for Mr. X", or, in this case, since they would not be allowed to do that, "to vote for the Labour Party or the Conservative Party". Anyone who argues that no form of words could be designed to make clear the distinction for the courts to apply between an advertisement calling upon people to turn out the present Government and vote Conservative and one which announced an increase in the price of steel by 3 per cent., is not making a very serious case.

My point, which remains, therefore, is rather different. The danger is very great that more and more interested groups might move into this field and that those who are skilfully preparing campaigns in the three years "run-up" to the General Election might not wish to be identified too openly with the continuation of the campaign.

5.30 p.m.

A firm or organisation might be running a campaign for two years prior to the General Election campaign actually beginning and prior to writs having been issued. At that point an advertising company might be hired to take over the job, and we know what could happen then. Advertising agencies are becoming more prominent in the political process and in a recent case a foreign Government hired an advertising company for this purpose. Only through the ineptitude of one of the directors of that company did the facts come to light, and the campaign end. However, one must not assume that all advertising companies will be as amateurish as that one. I am referring to a case involving the Greek Government. Other people may not writer semi-secret reports only to have them discovered and the facts published in the newspapers.

At this time, when advertising companies are becoming more important in political activities—when the indirect approach is being preferred to hide political intentions—there may be a real danger, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall pointed out, that if we leave the law as it stands and is now being interpreted, the whole election process as we have known it may come to an end.

Elections are for the electors and candidates. They play the essential rôle. However, we live in an age of television when a great deal of mechanical reporting is occurring. This has already created the danger of reporting being regarded as more important than the election campaign itself. There is also the danger of campaign incidents being staged in such a way that they will become more important in the eyes of some people than the discussion and debate between the electors and candidates. This is a danger which Parliament must consider.

If this trend is not stopped in time, it may result in the present balance between candidates and electors being seriously upset; whilst the expenditure of candidates, parties and electors is strictly limited interested groups from out side are free to spend vast sums to influence people to the detriment of our political life.

[Mr. BRYANT GODMAN IRVINE in the Chair]

Miss J. M. Quennell (Petersfield)

I had not intended to intervene at this stage, but certain issues have been raised which need careful consideration.

My hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) raised that the problem of defining an advertisement. How would the new Clause affect the freedom of the normal democratic processes to express opinions? The right hon. Member for Vauxhall (Mr. Strauss) said, in effect—the hon. Member for Pennistone (Mr. Mendelson) said the same thing—that the courts had to decide these matters and that if Parliament had to spell everything out in detail and be pernickerty over every piece of legislation, we would never get anything done.

Ignorance of the law is no defence in Britain. It is, therefore, incumbent on Parliament to ensure that legislation is clear, precise and as well defined as possible. Woolly law is bad law and there are already far too many judicial decisions awaiting the consideration of eminent gentlemen in wigs and gowns. Although judges make some excellent decisions, we must be precise.

I admit that the right hon. Gentleman has drafted the new Clause clearly. It says that … after the issue of a writ in a Parliamentary election … such expense … may be incurred only with the permission of … a candidate's election agent".

Mr. Strauss

I do not understand the difficulty which the hon. Lady is emphasising about definition. I am merely attempting to extend the present law. This contains the necessary definitions and these have been in operation for many years. At present they cover only the election of individual candidates in individual constituences. I want to use the same definitions to cover candidates in a large number of constituencies, or candidates generally. The present law is already wide. I wish to make it wider.

Miss Quennell

That may be true, but let us consider the situation today. The business of Government covers a wide sphere. A body might be in existence for the discussion of economic affairs and these activities might be held to have a political connotation and be applicable to one or other of the parties. One might say the same of social affairs.

A large number of Motions appear on the Notice Paper and hon. Members receive letters urging them to sign some of them. At election time the societies concerned with the promotion of the objectives of those Motions circulate people in the constituencies telling them whether or not certain hon. Members have or have not signed certain Motions. If the new Clause as drafted becomes law, it will not be possible for them to circularise people without writing to the election agents of every candidate—with 630 constituencies, and about three candidates fighting each one, a great many letters would have to be sent out—before being able to pursue their aims. In our democracy those aims are perfectly legitimate. I hope that the Home Secretary will bear in mind the possible impediment which this could place on the free expression of opinion, which, in our democracy, we consider to be perfectly legitimate.

The right hon. Member for Vauxhall attached great importance to the con sequences of the Tronoh Mines judgment, but that was some years ago and I do not believe that the lack of this new Clause would result in the Measure suffering.

Sir Stephen McAdden (Southend, East)

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Petersfield (Miss Quennell), I had no intention of taking part in the debate until I was stimulated by the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Vauxhall (Mr. Strauss) and the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson). As one would expect, the proposition put forward by the right hon. Gentleman was reasonable and sensible—and, perhaps, a very good idea—but in advocating it he drew upon our experience in earlier legislation. He pointed out that in 1949 Parliament had drafted legislation which had the blessing of all parties. They all thought that they knew what they were up to, only to discover subsequently that Parliament had not tied things up as tidily as they had thought. The right hon. Gentleman has tabled a new Clause which he thinks will improve the position, but I am not so sure that it will.

As I understood him, the hon. Member for Penistone said that we need not worry too much about niceties of drafting because it will be for the courts to decide whether what is done is against the intention of Parliament—

Mr. Mendelson

No. I said that, quite apart from two absurd examples, we still have to wory about the drafting, but that I do not rgeard it as being beyond the wit of the Home Secretary's advisers and of the Parliamentary draughtsmen to produce watertight drafting.

Sir S. McAdden

I heard the hon. Gentleman say that later, but earlier he said that it would be for the courts to decide what Parliament meant. I am not a lawyer, but I do not think that his is true at all. It is not the job of the courts to decide what Parliament meant but what Parliament said. The Home Secretary will recall that in earlier gaming and betting legislation Parliament meant all sorts of things. We thought that we had got it all nicely sewn up, only to discover that Parliament's intentions were not accurately translated into the Measure, and subsequent legislation became necessary.

Mr. Mendelson

All I said was, and I repeat it now, that if the judges feel that what Parliament meant is not absolutely clear they are entitled by long constitutional and legal practice to go through the arguments in order to discover Parliament's intention.

Sir S. McAdden

That may well be, but it is not the judges job to go contrary to the law, and if the law lays down some thing in imprecise terms it is not the duty of the court to decide the matter.

I was intrigued by the example which the right hon. Gentleman gave of some of the consequences that might ensue unless his Clause was incorporated. He said that at a General Election the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce might, without naming any names, take several thousand pounds worth of space in the Birmingham newspapers advocating the cause of a particular political party. That might be so.

The Southend, Westcliff-on-Sea and District Chamber of Trade, which covers my constituency, has recently taken space, and has issued posters headed, Don't blame the shopkeeper for rising prices. It lists under the causes of rising prices, Selective Employment Tax, increases in Purchase Tax, and so on and so forth. That seems to me to be a perfectly reason able activity for a chamber of trade to engage in; to call the attention of the population to the fact that the increases in prices which the shopkeeper can charge are not his fault but arise out of a series of impositions placed on them by the Government.

But if I understood him aright, the right hon. Gentleman would not, in the course of a Parliamentary election, allow any such truthful statement to be made by anyone unless it had the imprimatur of the election agents—

Mr. Strauss

We are, of course, only talking about the period between polling day and the issue of the writ. If, during an election, a chamber of trade issues in his constituency such a circular as the hon. Gentleman has mentioned, which was blatantly Conservative propaganda, it would be committing an offence, and could be prosecuted.

Sir S. McAdden

I very much doubt whether the issue of a truthful statement that the shopkeeper is not to blame for high prices can be described as blatant Conservative propaganda. The statement may not even mention the Socialist Government. The chamber of trade just lists the increases in taxation with which the shopkeeper has been loaded—

5.45 p.m.

Mr. Costain

Has it escaped my hon. Friend's notice that when I put two perfectly reasonable examples before the Committee the hon. Member for Penistone said that they were absurd, but when he put a case the right hon. Gentle man said that it was propaganda—when can we get at the truth?

Sir S. McAdden

That is one of the difficulties in trying to lay down in the new Clause what is and is not to be permitted. As my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) has pointed out, since the celebrated case to which the right hon. Gentleman referred there has not been any wide spread abuse by people using vast sums of money to distribute propaganda on behalf of Conservative Governments, or Liberal Governments or Socialist Governments. So we must not worry too much about that.

Whilst, superficially, the right hon. Gentleman's idea may appear to be attractive, it imposes some fairly severe limitations. The way in which the right hon. Gentleman rose at once to say how wicked it was that the Southend, Westcliff-on-Sea and District Chamber of Trade should issue a poster drawing the attention of the public to the sufferings imposed upon them by Government, without mentioning the Government, seems to indicate a fairly drastic curtailment of the rights of free speech. It comes rather oddly from the right hon. Gentleman, who I understood was opposed to censorship in all its form, that he should now want to stop people from speaking out as they have to those with whom we are inflicted at present.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. James Callaghan)

My right on. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Mr. Strauss) first indicated that he did not want me to say anything that would destroy his Clause on grounds of inadequate wording. I hope that he has known me long enough to know that I will not rely on any such argument. It would not be worthy argument to say that because the wording was defective we should reject the Clause, because if the arguments were good it would then be for the Government to find wording that would fit in with his objective. My right hon. Friend need have no fears on that score.

As I understand the Clause, its general intention and effect is to prohibit general political propaganda after the issue of a Writ in a Parliamentary election or publication of a notice of election in a local Government election.

At present, general political propaganda is not an election expense. Election expenses are defined in Section 103 of the Representation of the People Act, 1949, as expenses incurred … on account of or in respect of the con duct or management of the election … Therefore, expenses incurred by an adopted candidate in promoting and disseminating the political opinions of the party to which he belongs and in holding meetings merely for that purpose are not expenses in the conduct and management of his election, even though the candidate may be incurring those expenses with reference to his future election, because he hopes, if he can establish the principles of his party, to be in a majority in the constituency so that when he comes to be the actual candidate he will get elected. In a case decided some time ago it was held that ward and other meetings held during the period of 16 months be fore the election to promote the interests of the Conservative Party were not election meetings, and that the expenses of such meetings were not incurred in the conduct and management of the election. I am sure that most of us are relieved to hear that.

It is on this principle that hon. Members and prospective candidates are free to address meetings on political subjects before the election campaign commences. When an election is deemed to have commenced for the purpose of election expenses incurred by a candidate has to be determined in the light of all the circumstances. A candidate knowing that an election is bound to occur in the near future may incur election expenses before the date of a General Election is announced or the Writs are issued. It is as well that we should remind ourselves of what the position is.

Section 63, to which my right hon. Friend wishes to attach his Amendment, widens the scope of election expenses by requiring certain expenditure to be authorised by a candidate's election agent thereby bringing it within the definition of election expenses. The case of Rex v. Tronoh Mines in 1952 related to an advertisement in The Times which was designed to promote the election of candidates other than Socialist candidates in the General Election of 1951.

The judge took the view that Section 63 (1) is not intended to prohibit expenditure incurred on advertisements designed to support, or having the effect of supporting, the interests of a particular party generally in all elections, at any rate at the time of a General Election, and not supporting a particular candidate in a particular constituency. He ruled that the Section does not prohibit expenditure the real purpose or affect of which is general political propaganda even though that propaganda does incidentally assist a particular candidate. I think that states the law as it is understood to be at present.

We now come to an interesting point, the case in which a former Prime Minister was involved, the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home). In that case it was decided that expenses on party political broadcasts are not within Section 63, I assume on the ground that they are general political propaganda. That leads me to the point about difficulty of definition in this matter. I share my right hon. Friend's view about this. The hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) has mined an unsuspected vein of humour in his make-up this after noon, but I hope that he, too, will share the general sentiment that it is wrong that great organisations should be able to throw the whole of their financial weight behind individual candidates in an election. That is the reason why Parliament lays down the maximum limit that may be spent on elections.

Those figures and those limitations have been born out of our experience in the past. So, despite the hon. Member's fun, I hope he will appreciate—

Mr. Costain

May I interrupt the hon. Gentleman?

Mr. Callaghan

No, not for the moment. The hon. Member had his joke once and a second time. A third time would be getting a little tedious. He will appreciate that there is a real problem which has to be met. It is one which most of us, on reflection, if we are not advancing our party's interest, would agree is for the health of democracy. It is that individuals should not be sup ported to a tremendous extent by great corporations, or indeed by individuals—that they should not be bought. This is one of the reasons why we must put these limitations on and why we should endeavour as far as possible to define them as closely as we can.

I agree with the hon. Member for Peters-field (Miss Quennell) that there have not come to light any great abuses since 1952. The case was decided and it might have been thought that following from that there would have been a whole spate of this kind of thing, but that has not in fact happened.

Mr. Strauss

I mentioned a number of interferences by various bodies, not on a vast scale, it is true. Application was made on several occasions by the Labour Party to the Director of Public Prosecutions to take action on one, but the party was informed that in view of the wording of Section 63 it was impossible to do so.

Mr. Callaghan

I am aware that there was the recent case in connection with the organisation called Aims of Industry, but I said that there were not many cases of this sort. Although my right hon. Friend may have mentioned one, or even two, there is not a great number in view of the size of the problem and the difficulty which would arise if we were to adopt this proposal.

The purpose of the new Clause is to forbid general political propaganda after the issue of the Writ in a Parliamentary election. This would bring us up against quite formidable difficulties which have to be weighed against the principle I have enunciated. The new Clause would permit general political propaganda incurred after that date only through a candidate's election agent. One minor consequence would be that candidates who now incur personal expenses which do not at pre sent have to be incurred by or through the election agent would under this rule have to incur them through the agent in future. That is a minor point and no more, but it is worth mentioning that a candidate is entitled at present to certain expenses which do not have to be vouched for by the agent.

The let out for general political propaganda incurred by or through an election agent raises problems concerning the election agent's consent and the apportionment of expenses between the candidates concerned. The difficulties can be posed by considering again the question of party political broadcasts. Does the expense of the broadcast fall solely on the candidate or the candidates taking part? This would have to be apportioned in some way.

Suppose it was a by-election and the broadcast coincided with the by-election. General political propaganda would not be possible unless it had been sanctioned by the candidate's agent. It would be necessary therefore to avoid political propaganda during that period. That would be unfair when party political broadcasts are laid down according to a strict schedule. These are things which would have to be considered and taken into account. Suppose there was a broad cast during a by-election—I give an extreme example—in which only their Lordships took part. Which candidate would have to vouch for the expenses? It clearly could not be done. Would it be all the candidates supporting the party concerned, or all those who approved the broadcast, or a sufficient number who were prepared to foot the bill?

We are in a difficult field here. Similar difficulties would be faced when deciding whether to prosecute. Suppose that an expense had been incurred on the under standing that part of it would be met by one or more of the candidates. The problem is different from that which arises under section 63 (1) since under that Section it is limited to the election expenses of one candidate.

Mr. Strauss

I am not sure whether my right hon. Friend is aware that national party broadcasts during an election are at present excluded from election expenses which have to be accounted for by individual agents. National propaganda in newspapers and on posters is not excluded, but television or radio talks are already excluded, so no problem arises there.

Mr. Callaghan

That was exactly the point I was making. Perhaps my right hon. Friend did not hear it. I said that under his new Clause it would be necessary to apportion those expenses, but it would be physically impossible to do so.

I come to what I regard as the important part of the new Clause. That is the question relating to support of candidates. My right hon. Friend mentioned support of candidates by the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce. He said, correctly, that at present election agents supplied by Transport House with literature during an election have to pay for it. I dare say the same is true of the Conservative Central Office. The argument by my right hon. Friend that the law at present prohibits the major political parties from incurring expenditure on general political propaganda after nomination day but does not likewise prohibit the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce is thought to be incorrect.

Mr. Strauss

No.

Mr. Callaghan

I am giving my right hon. Friend an opinion. The major political parties can incur expenditure in connection with party political broad casts precisely because they concern general political propaganda not related to the particular election of some person.

6.0 p.m.

I do not think that the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce should take too seriously what my right hon. Friend said or be tempted into the political field too quickly, because I am advised that expenditure by a more local body like the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce might be held to be so closely allied to the activities of the candidates it was supporting in some or all of the Birmingham constituencies as to come within Section 63 (1) as incurred with a view to promoting or procuring the election of those candidates. This would be a matter for the courts to decide. In such a case, the elections would be set aside.

I think that the major parties are wise at the moment to discontinue a great deal of general political propaganda unless it is channelled through their local election agents, as soon as an election is declared, because the law is uncertain on this subject. Even though the law is uncertain as to the extent to which general political parties can undertake general political propaganda—it is not ruled out, but the law is uncertain as to how far they can go—it would certainly be very unwise for a chamber of trade or commerce to insert advertisements or take up space somewhere or other to advocate policies so closely related to policies being put forward by the local candidates that the chamber could run the risk of having the elections invalidated.

Perhaps the protection is greater than my right hon. Friend thinks. I agree that the matter has not been decided in the courts, but it is right to utter this warning, because if this is the view which is held at present it would be wrong not to state the view as it is held, and as I understand it, and as I think that Parliament wanted it to be under the original Act.

Mr. Sharples

The Secretary of State has referred to the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce. Would not his warning also apply to any body which might be connected with a particular group of would-be Parliamentary candidates?

Mr. Callaghan

Certainly. This is another reason why we have to be careful. What I have said could be held to apply to a trade union which supported and named a particular group of candidates and asked for support for them. It could be held to apply to a co-operative party which did the same. I mentioned the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce because that was the illustration used by my right hon. Friend. The hon. Member for Southend, East (Sir S. McAdden) referred to his own chamber of trade. I hope that he will not get subscriptions from that chamber on a false prospectus. He may find when it comes to an election that the chamber will not be able to deliver the goods in the way he would hope.

I believe that the whole Committee would want us to narrow, as far as we can, the circumstances in which expenditure of this sort can be incurred. It is certainly my desire. I resist the Clause only because I think that it would not be possible to administer it in a way which would meet Parliament's desire without inhibiting the expression of legitimate public opinion during the course of an election.

My right hon. Friend is right to be vigilant. This is something which Parliament should continue to watch. In rejecting the Clause now I would not feel myself bound to reject a fresh approach to the subject if the kind of circumstance which led to the 1952 case was to be repeated in circumstances which were clearly opposed to the will of Parliament when it enacted this Section.

Mr. C. Pannell

My right hon. Friend said that he did not think that there had been any case before the courts since the Tronoh Mines case in 1952. Our party has referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions, unsuccessfully, from 1955 the activities of Aims of Industry, Martell's attack on the Prime Minister by a newspaper advertisement in 1964, and the British National Party's activities in the famous Leyton by-election. In the opinion of many people, those activities cut completely across the original Legislation, but the Director of Public Prosecutions has taken a very narrow view. This matter was raised during the proceedings in Mr. Speaker's Conference. We say that in the Tronoh Mines case the court took a narrower view that that which Parliament took when it enacted the legislation. This case caused great surprise. I am sure that in fairness my right hon. Friend will agree that we are talking not merely about the cases which have come out into the open. It is whether political parties have felt that there are grounds for such cases.

Mr. Callaghan

I know that my right hon. Friend has some information on this. I said that cases had been referred to the Director. I think that the Labour Party is more likely to suffer as a result of this than the Conservative Party. My right hon. Friend, therefore, will not think that I would look at this with an unsympathetic eye. I would tend to look at it in rather the reverse way, consistent with my responsibilities as Home Secretary. Having looked at the matter in an endeavour to meet it, I am not satisfied that we would not create more problems than we would solve. Therefore, I rely on my general warning about the consequences of carrying the examples given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall too far in a particular case, town or area.

Mr. Strauss

It is pointless to pursue the matter. I am sorry that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has not gone further than to utter a warning. It was held in the Tronoh Mines case that an offence is committed only when the propaganda is directed to a particular candidate in a particular constituency. The warning my right hon. Friend gave about what might happen in Birmingham does not hold water, because according to Mr. Justice McNair's judgment—there has been no further judgment on the matter—Birmingham Chamber of Commerce would be perfectly entitled to issue propaganda dealing with the whole of Birmingham, because that would be directed to a large number of candidates in a large number of constituencies.

Mr. Callaghan

My right hon. Friend is entitled to his interpretation of the law. I am entitled to mine. I do not claim to be correct. I can only give the Committee the best advice I have. I repeat that I hope that my right hon. Friend will not encourage the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce to indulge in this sort of thing by telling the Chamber that his view of the law is correct, that I hope he is wrong in this matter, and that I hope that no candidate's election will be invalidated if it is challenged in the courts and the Chamber is found to have been involved in expenditure which is found to be ultra vires.

Question put and negatived.

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