Clause 78.—(SPEED LIMITS FOR VEHICLES OF DIFFERENT CLASSES.) (Hansard, 21 July 1967)

§ Mr. Graham Page

Clause 78 deals with the speed limits on vehicles of different classes. I understand that it is a consolidation partly of Statute and partly of Statutory Instruments. It refers to Schedule 5 of the Bill, which again sets out the contents, if I understand it rightly, of Statutory Instruments, and again, in Part II of Schedule 7, those Statutory Instruments are repealed wholly or in part.

This, of course, is not strictly a consolidation of the law, in that a consolidation of Statutory Instruments into a Statute does alter the rights of the subject in taking action for the invalidity or ultra vires nature of a Statutory Instrument if that be so. The inconvenience perhaps, in this case, is that it may be necessary from time to time to alter the speed limits here referred to, so one has to put in another subsection in this Clause giving the Minister power to make those alterations.

It is not a very convenient way to consolidate. Surely the normal way would 2667 be to keep the existing Statutory Instruments in being and effective and to give the Minister power to alter them as necessary by further regulations. Perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman will explain why this course has been adopted of embodying these existing Regulations as part of the Bill, and therefore as part of our Statute law. In the normal course of events, these Regulations may be changed from time to time and might have been better left as Regulations now.

§ The Solicitor-General

I submit that there is an obvious advantage in incorporating the whole of the law in a single instrument, in this case a Statute, rather than in a number of instruments consisting of a Statute and regulations. I appreciate the point which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) has put to me on earlier consolidation Measures. It is true that, whenever Statutory Instruments are made by a Minister in pursuance of statutory powers, these instruments may be open to challenge in the courts as being ultra vires.

If there were instruments which embodied a substantial volume of law and it was proposed to include them in a Statute, I agree that there might in those circumstances be some loss of the rights of the subject. But here we are dealing with Statutory Instruments which merely prescribe speed limits. I cannot imagine that, in these circumstances, anyone would attempt or attempt with any success to challenge such an instrument in the courts. There is no loss to the rights of the subject. What is being done is to incorporate these regulations in the Statute giving the Minister power to vary. That is surely a convenient course for everyone.