OVERSEAS AFFAIRS

HC Deb 15 November 1963 vol 684 cc488-587

11.8 p.m.

Mr. Gordon Walker (Smethwick)

I start by congratulating the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary on his appointment to his present high office. It is, I think, the only high office he has not previously held. He may be relieved if my congratulations are a little less fulsome than those of the Prime Minister at the Guildhall dinner. I do not know what the right hon. Gentleman thought about them, but I thought that they were being laid ona bit thick. When the television cameras settled on the right hon. Gentleman's face at the height of the Prime Minister's praise and I noticed his Buddha-like mask and I wondered whether, like me, he was thinking that the Prime Minister's hyperbole wasdue to a mixture of electioneering and bad conscience—the fact that the right hon. Gentleman has been twice so roughly handled in a leadership crisis. At any rate, I congratulate him. The right hon. Gentleman is undoubtedly the best Prime Minister—I beg his pardon—the best Foreign Secretary that the Conservatives have.

I come straight away to the issue which the Prime Minister has apparently decided to make the main issue in the election, that of the so-called independent nuclear deterrent. Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) in a splendid speech earlier in the debate, I welcome this issue being taken to the electorate. We intend to argue this issue on a much higher level than the Prime Minister so far has argued it. It is a very serious issue, which involves the whole question of the best defence policy for the country and how to increase Britain's influence in the world. It involves the question of the reorganisation of N.A.T.O. and the whole nature of the Western Alliance. It is a very serious issue, and people expect it to be argued seriously and not reduced to cheap and oversimplified slogans and trick questions.

An example of the trick questions was given when the Prime Minister said, speaking of my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson), Would he go round the country now as Leader of the Opposition, and possibly later as Prime Minister, questioning the good faith of Britain's greatest ally?".—[Official Report, 12th November, 1963; Vol. 684; c. 50.] I could hardly believe my ears: because what else have the Conservatives been doing? During the whole period that the Prime Minister was Foreign Secretary the argument for maintaining the so-called independent nuclear deterrent was the nuclear blackmail argument. This was that there might be some great British interest in which America would not stand by us. The nuclear blackmail on which the Government relied for so long means that on the one hand we must put absolute trust in the United States to get the weapon and to maintain it and, on the other hand, we use the argument for having it that we cannot trust the Ameri- cans. The nuclear blackmail argument presupposes simultaneously American solidarity and American perfidy, and it seems to me extraordinary that the Prime Minister used that argument.

The Government case for maintaining the independent nuclear deterrent is the Gaullist case without the logic and consistency of General de Gaulle. General de Gaulle knows that if one wants an independent nuclear weapon one must stay in the missile race. One must not abandon it, as Britain did with the cancellation of Blue Streak and the decision to depend on America for the provision of the weapon.

Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper, I think that General de Gaulle and France will find that this effort is beyond their means, but in any case both Britain and France in their various versions of the Gaullist argument base themselves on a false strategic assumption.

The truth is that if any country wants to be a nuclear Power it must have a complete nuclear armoury. A small second-strike weapon based on Polaris missiles—which is the very most we can hope to afford, and I do not believe that we can afford them—is wholly inadequate, because—and this must be strongly emphasised—these are relatively inaccurate weapons. They cannot be used for firing at enemy missile bases, for they have insufficient accuracy. If used at all, they must be fired upon cities. If they were fired alone by us even as a second-strike weapon—and the Government lay great stress on the fact that this is an independent deterrent at our disposal—they could hit only Soviet cities and would not reduce Soviet retaliatory power by one jot.

If they were fired alone and did not reduce the Russians' retaliatory power, that would invite suicide. Even if the United States had only their Polaris fleet, which is many times the size of ours, and no Minutemen, no accurate counterforce weapon, they, too, would not be an effective nuclear Power, even with many times the size of our Polaris fleet. That is why the United States do not rely solely upon a Polaris fleet.

The Government must answer this question. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will do so. If this Polaris fleet were used by us alone it would invite suicide for this country. If it were used as par of the complete second-strike capacity of the West, it would make only a minimal and insignificant addition to that second-strike power.

What, then, is the military argument for maintaining a force which could not be used alone and which, if used with the rest of the Western second strike deterrent, would make no significant addition to it?

The Government have abandoned all military arguments for the Polaris weapon and they advance now only what can be called the status symbol argument—that without this nuclear deterrent Britain would be unable to go to the conference table. The Conservatives ask the question, if a Labour Government had been in power at the time of the Moscow negotiations about the Test Ban Treaty, whether we could have been at the conference. This is a trick question. We have never said that we should throw away our weapon. The Conservatives always seem amazed when we make this statement but we have made it a score of times: we should not throw away our weapons. If it is true—which I do not believe—that we were at that conference only because we possessed nuclear weapons then a Labour Government at that time would have had these weapons and would therefore have been at the conference.

I also ask the right hon. Gentleman a further question about the argument that we must have this ticket of entry. Why did it win us no influence during the Cuban crisis, which is the one that really mattered?

Colonel Sir Tufton Beamish (Lewes)

We had a lot of influence.

Mr. Gordon Walker

We were not in the great discussions at the critical time—certainly no more than were France and Germany, who had no nuclear weapons.

The status symbol argument is the only argument advanced by the Government. The Prime Minister never advances military reasons; he uses only the status symbol argument. But to test it, we cannot look at this in isolation, as he does. We must project it into the future and see it in the context of the developing world situation and particularly in the context of developing East-West relations. These I read somewhat differently from the Prime Minister, whose speech I heard at the Guildhall and again in the House.

I agree with him that the Cuban crisis was the turning point, but I see it like this: at this crisis both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev looked over the abyss into the real possibility of nuclear war, and both of them, with great political courage, with their various different internal problems which they had to face, drew back. Thus Cuba was a turning point.

Both these men, in command of the great forces in the world, recognised fully and for the first time that nuclear weapons cannot be used because they involve mutual suicide. They realised that nuclear weapons cannot be used of intent—leaving aside for the moment accidents—to start a major conflict between major Powers. Simultaneously—because it is the same thing—they recognised that there is a field of common interest between them as well as the remaining great conflicts. This was shown in the Test Ban Treaty which not only, thank Heaven, removed the danger of the pollution to the atmosphere, but also, and in a sense primarily, stopped experiments upon which depended further serious technical advance in the development of nuclear weapons.

The real significance of the Test Ban Treaty is that both Russia and America realised that it was in their interests to stabilise the nuclear balance where it was and, to stop the experiments which could enable it continuously to develop at ever higher and more dangerous levels of equal terror. They also, again as part of this, recognised that they have a common and mutual interest to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, because they cannot enforce the test ban agreement if other nations are testing, and they cannot extend the common interest between them unless each of them retains an effective monopoly of nuclear weapons.

It is this, as I see it, that makes the Conservative Party's and Prime Minister's status symbol argument so dreadful an argument, because this argument of a ticket of entry is an open invitation for the spread of nuclear weapons.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Gordon Walker

No. I am in the middle of a difficult and connected argument. If this status symbol argument continues to be brandished in the way the Prime Minister brandishes it. he is really saying that any other country that also wants a ticket of entry must do likewise. This applies in the end especially and particularly to Germany. The Prime Minister cannot brush this aside by saying that the Germans have renounced nuclear weapons.

I do not think—I do not agree with the Americans in this—that there is any early or immediate or even short-run danger of the Germans wanting nuclear weapons, but I am absolutely convinced that, if Britain and France say, "It is all right for us to have nuclear weapons, but it is not right for Germany because they are a different sort of people that cannot be trusted", sooner or later the consequence of this argument is that Germany, or indeed any other nation of that sort of size put in that sort of discriminatory second-class category, will assert the claim to nuclear equality. This seems to me to be an absolutely inevitable and inescapable consequence of the Government's policy. This is one of the things about this argument that the Labour Party intends to put to the electorate.

Sir T. Beamish

I have genuinely found it very difficult to follow the twists and turns of the Labour Party's attitude to some of these questions. This is a terribly important question. The right hon. Gentleman has been saying that the Government want Polaris weapons only as a status symbol and that, in his opinion, they are militarily and politically useless. There is only one conclusion to draw from that assertion, which is that if the Labour Party formed an Administration it would cancel the order for Polaris weapons. Is that so, or is it not so?

Mr. Gordon Walker

This question was completely and fully answered on Wednesday by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper. [Interruption.] I do not expect the hon. Gentleman to understand our arguments. That would be asking too much. I believe that the public will understand them, and that is the important thing.

Hon. Members

Answer.

Mr. Gordon Walker

I have stated this and will state it again. As a matter of fact, though, this wastes time. I think that the House knows me well enough—

Hon. Members

Answer.

Sir T. Beamish rose—

Mr. Gordon Walker

No, I will not give way. I am in the middle of a sentence. Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman kindly sit down?

Hon. Members

Answer.

Mr. Gordon Walker

I think the House knows me well enough to know that I shall not dodge any of these questions or issues. I shall come to this point absolutely specifically and I will not dodge issues. I do not dodge issues. If I am not interrupted, I am sure that I shall deal with the point. When I come to the end of this part of my argument, if I have not dealt with it I will willingly sit down and try to deal with any question that is then raised.

The real question is how, in the light of the facts of the world, we can evolve the best defence policy to increase Britain's influence in the world. This is the argument. Nobody wants to decrease Britain's influence in the world. We believe that we have a better way—the Government believe that they have a better way—to increase Britain's influence in the world, in military and other terms.

I believe that two outstanding facts emerge from the situation. One is that we are now in a new epoch in which it has been recognised by the super-nuclear Powers that nuclear weapons cannot be used, because they involve mutual suicide. A conclusion follows from that which hon. Members opposite are very reluctant to draw, but it seems to me inevitable that influence will increasingly pass now to those countries that command and dispose of first-class conventional forces. Even the United States have usable military power only because they have very fine conventional forces, stationed in Germany and elsewhere, and because they have a nuclear capacity—shown in the big lift and such things. The usable power of the United States is also a conventional power.

The second fact is that we must face the realities of nuclear power. The United Kingdom weapon, plus the French weapon, plus the multilateral force, would amount to only a small proportion of the total nuclear power of the Western Alliance. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will say something about the multilateral force, because this is one of the issues that the Government have continuously dodged. They dodged it at their Blackpool Conference. It is not mentioned in the Gracious Speech. It was not mentioned by the Prime Minister. The Government always dodge making clear what their attitude is on this. The nuclear capacity of Britain, France and the M.L.F., if it ever comes about, will amount to about 5 per cent, of the total nuclear power of the Western Alliance. Ninety-five per cent, of the nuclear power of the Western Alliance will remain in United States hands. Whatever we do or say, whatever postures we strike, this is the fact.

If we are thinking in terms of increasing and raising Britain's influence in the world, we should not concentrate our interests on these relatively minor weapons which cannot be used alone. Our interest should be to secure the closest possible association with and share of control in the real weapon in the West, the weapon that matters—the weapon that matters for our destiny, for our security, or even for our destruction. It is with this weapon that we must get ourselves associated, and we must not concentrate all our effort upon the maintenance of these relatively minor weapons.

The Conservatives will not face this issue, because they are so caught up in the status symbol idea. The Labour Party does face these realities. We draw the conclusions from them. It is not true—I come now to the hon. and gallant Gentleman's question—that we will throw away any weapons that are in existence. That would be a stupid thing to do. We will not throw away weapons on which a great amount of money has been spent. We may consider assigning them, and so on. We will not throw away nuclear weapons that are in existence. We have always said this. I do not know why this question is always asked as if it were a smart question to ask. We have said this over and over again. This is the question we have to face: what do we do when the existing nuclear weapons in the course of some years become obsolete? This is the question.

Sir T. Beamish

rose—

Mr. Gordon Walker

No. I will not give way now. I am sure that the hon. and gallant Gentleman would only anticipate something I shall say now. I have stated what the question is. We say—let me put it clearly—that we do not think that the weapons that exist now should be replaced when they become obsolete in the course of some years.

Sir T. Beamish

That does not exactly answer my question. The right hon. Gentleman said that I could put another question.

Mr. Gordon Walker

I have not yet finished my argument. I believe that two things are necessary for a serious andproper, policy to increase Britain's influence in the world. One is to use the time, while the weapons last, in order to negotiate with the United States a reorganisation of N.A.T.O. and the Western Alliance which will give us a real share and participation in the weapon that matters, the real weapon. We must try to reach a point at which the President's decisions—because those are the decisions that matter in the world—can be made only on the basis of an agreed, continuously worked out and elaborated nuclear strategy and nuclear doctrine. If we can reach a point such as that, we shall get, over the real weapon that matters, the greatest possible share of control that is within our power, given our size and our resources.

I want to say a few words about the use of nuclear weapons. I think that we must be clear about this. I do not believe that they will be fired. I think that we should consider the question of the use of nuclear weapons now as concerning the deployment and targeting of the weapons used as a part of our general strategic policy. This is the way in which nuclear weapons are used. It is where they are concentrated, where they are targeted, where they are deployed. I have no doubt whatever that we could have a complete share with the United States in settling such matters as these.

The Prime Minister (Sir Alec Douglas-Home)

We have now.

Mr. Gordon Walker

That is totally untrue. We simply have not got real access. We rotate, with Italy and other countries—at Omaha and things of that kind—but that is all. I have talked this out at great length with members of the administration in the United States and, as I say, we do not have real access. We would be asking for something quite new and important from the United States, as my remarks show.

That is the first conclusion. The second is that we should use the money saved to build ourselves the best possible conventional forces, as mobile as possible. The cost of the Government's status symbol is the neglect of our conventional forces, and this cost must be faced. No Government have the right to ask British soldiers to stay in a post of danger if they are less well equipped than they could be. They should not be asked to face better forces who outgun them, are more mechanised and more mobile. No Government have the right, if it can be avoided, to put British soldiers into a position which makes them so weak that if they are attacked they have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons and thereby commit suicide. It is not right for any Government to do this, but that is what this Government are doing because of their status symbol argument. They are spending money on this weapon and thereby neglecting our own men.

Sir John Eden (Bournemouth. West)

What about the V-bombers and so on?

Mr. Gordon Walker

As well as the V bombers there is Polaris and heaven knows what. I am merely pointing out that the Government's status symbol, involving the neglect of our men in the Rhine Army and elsewhere, is one of the major questions that we shall take to the electorate.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing (Hendon, North)

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the running cost of the Polaris submarines, when they are at sea, represents only about 3 per cent, of our defence Vote? Is he arguing that the £54 million a year would make an enormous difference to our conventional forces?

Mr. Gordon Walker

I have learnt not to accept the Government's estimate of this sort of expenditure. They have been miles out in the past and the money we shall spend on the Polaris weapon—which, again, is only a Government estimate and it will probably be a great deal higher before we are finished—would involve a great neglect of our conventional forces. After all, even 3 per cent, of the defence budget, if put into conventional forces, would make a considerable difference—that is, if one accepts the Government's estimate of 3 per cent., which I do not.

The policy of the Labour Party is to check the spread of nuclear weapons. The policy of the Government will encourage that spread. Our policy would enable the field of common interest between the United States and the Soviet Union to be enlarged, and this must be one of our prime aims. I agree that no doubt the most important hopeful next step is in the sphere of arms control, measures against surprise attack, and so on. If we can get inspection established and accepted by both sides we will be able to go a great deal faster thereafter and move towards disengagement. Arms control, however, is not disarmament. One must keep the two things constantly distinct and we should now make efforts to renew the advances that have been made towards disarmament. We should try to reconvene the 18-nation Disarmament Conference at the Foreign Minister level.

The leadership of Britain and her influence must be moral as well as based on a sound weapons policy and we must give leadership in the United Nations. There were some deplorable developments there when the Prime Minister was Foreign Secretary. We became increasingly isolated on race issues. The Commonwealth was increasingly split along racial lines, a most dangerous thing. Nor can one get away from the fact that the right hon. Gentleman at Berwick-upon-Tweed made a speech in which he radically criticised and attacked the whole composition and nature of the United Nations.

The most important sphere in which we can give moral leadership is in the context of relations between the northern and southern parts of the world—the Northern Hemisphere with its developing countries and the Southern Hemisphere with its hungry countries. We must do our utmost to bring more to the attention of the peoples of the world the importance of this North-South division of the world and relatively less attention to the East-West division. Naturally we must keep up our guard, but if nuclear weapons will not be used to settle major conflicts, then these conflicts will move more and more towards competition for the friendship of these peoples, because it is only in that part of the world that one could get a shift in the balance of power. It is vital for the West that this should be borne in mind—and Britain has a special role to play because of her relationship with Commonwealth countries in all continents.

Any approach to this problem of the relationship between ourselves and the peoples of these hemispheres must be approached with confidence. We should not be scared of Communism all the time. I have no doubt that democracy can make a more powerful appeal than Communism, which, after all, is imperialism. Communism believes that it knows better how people should live and that it has a duty to force them to live in that way. It is an imperialist doctrine. But nations which have got their independence will cling to that independence above all and at all costs and I do not think that what is fundamentally an imperialist appeal from the Communists will in the end appeal to these peoples. Democracy believes in independence, not only of individuals but of peoples, and that can make a far more powerful appeal.

Nevertheless, democracy must be true to itself, truer than it has been. We must find ways of giving aid without strings. If aid is given with political motives—in relation to the cold war, Communism and so on—it will be self-defeating, just as the Communists are self-defeating. Aid is necessary but we must—and the Labour Government will certainly try to do this—move as far as possible towards raising the prices of the primary commodities on which these countries in the main depend.

In recent years all of Western aid has been negatived by the falling prices of the commodities sold by the developing nations. If these prices can be raised aid could be given in ways that would exempt it from any political strings. We must do our utmost to obtain world commodity agreements as a part of revolutionising our relationship with the northern and southern parts of the world. A Labour Government would do its best to secure these.

It is not only politically and morally right that we should do this, it is also in our interests. We shall never solve the problems of automation, unemployment and so on unless we are able to tap new resources of purchasing power—and these exist in the Southern Hemisphere.

We must, as well as achieving these things, get our attitude right. We must be unambiguous in our policy towards apartheid and towards Portuguese colonial rule, and we must stop treating the new nations at the United Nations as if they are children and need lecturing. This is the mistake the Prime Minister makes. He takes an attitude of superior wisdom and lectures them, and this is a fatally wrong attitude to take.

A valuable contribution to getting the right attitude would be to launch an imaginative scheme to get large numbers of volunteers from Britain, young people from all walks of life, to work wealth countries, but not exclusively so. Good work has been done, and we are directly and personally in the developing countries—primarily the Common-by no means altogether behind in this sphere, but it needs a new drive if we are to draw on all the resources available to do this excellent work. We must supply Government money to do this but, in doing so, we must preserve the complete independence of any body that may beset up to do this work.

We are not at the moment dealing properly with the training of our young people who go out to do this work in conjunction with overseas Governments. Any body which we set up should be independent but should have Government money. It should be given only broad directives, perhaps to work through the United Nations, with other voluntary bodies and also on its own.

I am sure that if this is properly organised, and if there is proper drive and imagination behind it, we will get thousands of your young people ready to volunteer to train and go out to work alongside young people in developing countries in a way that would, perhaps, do more than anything else to revolutionise the relationship between the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. In such an undertaking Britain, with its long tradition of this kind of overseas work, has an absolutely indispensable and unique contribution to make.

As I said before the Prime Minister entered the Chamber, we are very eager to meet his challenge about the so-called independent nuclear weapon. I think that people will see—and they take these things more seriously than he imagines—that the ticket-of-entry argument, which is the only argument on which he relies, misconceives the true source of Britain's greatness in the world. In terms of defence, we must have the closest possible association with the nuclear weapon that matters, we must build up first-class conventional forces—better than we have now—and we must give moral leadership in the United Nations and in relations between North and South.

The place of Britain at the peace table is the Prime Minister's slogan but, in the last resort, it is Britain's unique place in the world and our unique relations with Commonwealth countries in every continent that gives us our claim to sit at the peace table. It is not possible for the world to make great peace settlements—the Prime Minister's phrase—from which Britain is excluded, because the world cannot make great peace settlements to which Britain is not committed.

Britain's place is not due to some minor nuclear weapon. It is Britain's real place, and unique place, and important place in the world—which can be more important than it has been—that gives us our right.

I cannot imagine, though the Prime Minister may, great peace settlements being made from which Britain is being excluded just because it has not some minor nuclear weapon. He may underrate Britain in this way, but I do not. The Labour Party believes much more in Britain than does the Prime Minister. We understand much better than he the true sources of British greatness in the world.

11.42 a.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. R. A. Butler)

I have taken full note of the observations of the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker). I will not treat this as a defence debate, because I have certain observations to make about foreign policy, but I shall be answering some of the points he made in the earlier part of his speech when I come to our attitude to N.A.T.O., the multilateral force, and so on. If I may take them in my own way, I shall thereby answer some of his points.

I do not think that I have any comment to make on the right hon. Gentleman's personal introduction. I thought that both the Prime Minister and I got off quite lightly, and we are very gratified that we should be worthy of a mention from the right hon. Gentleman in the course of a debate. At any rate, we are very well satisfied to work together on the lines recommended by the Prime Minister at the Guildhall and in his speech to the House on Tuesday in the debate on the Address. I know that I shall greatly profit by the Prime Minister's own experience and great skill as Foreign Secretary in conducting my own duties as Foreign Secretary in succession to him. I think the fact that our joint wisdom is available to the House of Commons is probably unique in the history of the conduct of foreign affairs.

I am sure that in rising for the first time as Foreign Secretary I enlist the help and sympathy of all hon. Members in believing that our first task as a country is, as the right hon. Gentleman said in his concluding remarks, the maintenance of peace. The full power and authority of this country in the councils of the world have been, and will be, devoted to this purpose. Second, our main objective should be the well-being of the British people, and this is indissolubly linked with a steadily advancing world economy.

Third, and here I take up immediately what was said by the right hon. Gentleman, this very well-being should, and must, evolve to the advantage of the developing areas in the world, not only because we intend to do our duty in the world and by the world, but because only thus can we guard against subversion and the ultimate isolation of the West in an otherwise hostile world; and only so can we ensure that the poorer peoples of the world can enjoy a fair share of the increasing wealth which the technological and other revolutions of our time have put within the compass of all mankind. I mention this because it is a cardinal feature of the work of the Foreign Secretary as I see it, and I certainly accept anything said by the right hon. Gentleman in relation to what has to be done towards developing relations between the North and the South.

I was glad that my first international engagement as Foreign Secretary was a meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the six countries of the European Communities in the Western European Union, and what I want to say to the House this morning about East-West relations and other matters springs naturally from that meeting. I was able to reaffirm to the Six that it remains Her Majesty's Government's policy, in the words of the Gracious Speech, to …continue to seek harmonious relationships with the European Economic Community and its member States. and, further to …work for the strength and unity of Europe … I should make clear, in answer to questions put on the air and in other places by the Leader of the Opposition, that the question of renewed negotiations for British membership of the European Communities did not come up at the Hague, and is not an issue at the present time, but we continue to believe, as I explained at the Hague, that the interests of Britain and the West as a whole will best be served by a wider political and economic unity of Europe in which we can all play a full part. And Europe must be outward-looking, as I tried to explain in my many interventions, as well as united. In the long run, the political, economic and defence problems of the West can be solved only by a close partnership between North America and Western Europe, and this must be based on a close identity of views and interests between the European members and the Alliance. I think that only in this way can Europe develop the wealth and power, and play the part in the world, to which her resources and history entitle her.

With these objectives we seek to work with the Six through our direct relations with them and through the various international organisations to which we all belong. That is why the meeting of the Western European Union, after a lapse of well over a year, was so important, and that is why we ranged over all sorts of international affairs from Latin America to the Middle East, South-East Asia, and so forth. In passing reference to South-East Asia, I should like to remind the House that Her Majesty's Government decided to recognise the new Government of Vietnam on 8th November.

It may be safely said that on the political side definite progress can be registered in the Western European Union. On the economic side, I was able to report that the European Free Trade Association is developing into a free trade area for the industrial goods of 90 million people. I do not know whether hon. Members realise that it already has a share of world trade roughly as large as that of the United States, and only slightly less than that of the European Economic Community. Here is a very wide area of European economic co-operation in which we participate.

I explained the importance, and this was accepted by my colleagues, the Foreign Ministers in Europe, of close contact between the E.F.T.A. and the E.E.C. This will be especially important in the Kennedy Round of negotiations in the G.A.T.T. Here, Her Majesty's Government look for a 50 per cent, linear cut in tariffs together with the greatest liberalisation of trade and, in response to the right hon. Gentleman, I would say that the Kennedy Round can play an important part in helping the developing countries because, under the most-favoured-nation rules of the General Agreement, they will benefit from the reduction of tariffs.

Mr. Gordon Walker

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that we have to find some arrangements in agricultural products as well as industrial products if we are to help the developing countries?

Mr. Butler

Yes, Sir, and of course we are all watching what the agricultural negotiations will be in Europe before we proceed into the next round, which is the Kennedy Round. I have discussed that with the various Governments concerned and it is impossible to see exactly how things will develop. But it was encouraging to have general support for the approach to the Kennedy Round and, in particular, to hear a powerful speech from the German Foreign Minister, Dr. Schroeder. I had a wide-ranging talk with M. Couve de Murville. The French reserve their position on East-West relations and other matters, but at any rate we have got closer to understanding each other's point of view, which I hope may be of mutual advantage to us and to Europe as a whole.

Elsewhere in Europe of course we must work together in O.E.C.D.—when I was chairman it was called O.E.E.C.—and in the Council of Europe where members of the European Free Trade Association and of the European Economic Community and all the free countries meet together. I look forward to attending a meeting of the Ministers of the Council of Europe in Paris next month when we hope to carry on the good work that has been done by Parliamentarians and others.

With this short description of what happened at The Hague and the outlook of the Kennedy Round I want to go at some length into the prospects of East-West relations. We find general support for our view that it would be valuable to probe for further progress in resolving, at any rate in the first place, the peripheral problems between the Soviet Union and ourselves. I must make clear that the discussions with the Soviet Union are subject to three conditions of the highest importance. The first is that the West can agree to nothing which would have the result of upsetting the military balance to our disadvantage. Our very survival may be at stake here.

Secondly, no agreements can be reached with the East and no negotiations conducted which are likely to impair the cohesion of the Western Alliance, for unless the Alliance remains clearly united it cannot fulfil its prime function of deterring aggression. And the unity of the Alliance could not survive the suspicion that the interests of its members were not being fully considered.

Thirdly, the Western position in West Berlin and the objective of self-determination for the East Germans are of vital interest to the free nations.

Negotiation does not imply one-sided concessions, nor could agreement be ever reached which was at the expense of the vital interest of any member of the Alliance. These three conditions impose the need for the fullest possible inter-allied consultation as a basis for all negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's fundamental aims remain unchanged, and we must recognise that.

In attempting to judge the future, it may be valuable if for a moment we get a clear idea of what the nuclear Test Ban Treaty signifies and what it does not.It is an important and valuable measure in itself, and all credit goes to the ex-Prime Minister and the ex-Foreign Secretary and others who did so much in the international scene to make this possible. Its signatories can no longer pollute the atmosphere. It should make it more difficult for nuclear weapons to spread to countries which do not possess them at present. Although it is not a measure of disarmament I think that it prevents yet another spiral of costly competition.

We cannot be sure of Soviet motives in deciding to conclude the Treaty but, as the right hon. Gentleman for Smethwick said, it seems that during the Cuban crisis they were brought face to face with the full dangers of trying by sudden means to alter the strategic situation between East and West. In passing, in reply to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Smethwick in relation to Cuba, I should say that I was very close to my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) throughout these discussions, and I think that the right hon. Gentleman gravely underestimates our influence and contact during the course of the Cuba crisis. The strength of our voice, through the decision on policy and weapons which we had already adopted, was clear, in contra-distinction to the right hon. Gentleman and his friends.

The Soviets have come to see that high-risk policies only have the effect of strengthening Western will and defence capability. Besides this, there is a serious conflict of priorities on the use of Soviet resources. There are agricultural problems and increasingly powerful consumer and investment demands. Mr. Khrushchev himself has spoken about these problems.

It is also possible to speculate about other factors. Certainly the quarrel with China had gone so far that there was nothing to be lost by an agreement with the West. Indeed from the point of view of the other Communist parties there were advantages to be gained from having something to show for the policy of peaceful coexistence. Since the signature in Moscow and in subsequent discussions with the representatives of the Soviet Government, we have encountered a greater readiness to listen to the Western case even when they have disagreed.

Unfortunately, the Soviet military on the Berlin Autobahn have not shown the same reasonable spirit. Since 10th October three American military convoys and one British military convoy have been held up for long periods because Soviet checkpoint officers tried to introduce new and more stringent procedures. Eventually the Russians dropped their demands and the convoys went through.

We trust and hope that there will be no more such incidents. I should like to make clear that there is no need for incidents, since the established procedures are well known to both sides and have not been changed by us. If the Soviet military do make more difficulties we shall be forced to wonder whether the Soviet Government intend to cause renewed tension over Berlin despite the more hopeful signs elsewhere. I trust therefore that there will be no more incidents. In any case, we shall continue to work in close consultation and concert with our allies.

Mr. Arthur Henderson (Rowley Regis and Tipton)

In view of the statements made from the Russian side, disputing the factual basis of established procedures, is there not something to be said for the Government publishing a short statement setting out exactly what was agreed upon in these established procedures?

Mr. Butler

We have already explained in a Note to the Soviet Government what are called the harmonised procedures of the allies in relation to convoys on the Autobahn. Certainly every consideration will be given to everything said by the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but I cannot go further than that at this moment.

Against the background of the factors which I have described, it may be possible to discover other areas of agreement besides the Treaty. At least the question can now be raised, and that is already an important advance. There are two topics of particular interest as subjects for possible future agreements, such as the stationing of observer posts in the area of N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact, and a non-dissemination agreement. There has been already considerable discussion about these matters.

If observation posts under proper conditions could be set up over a wide area, stretching from the U.S.S.R. on one side to the United States on the other, there would be some gain to our security, but it is in the political and psychological aspects that the advantages would be greatest. An agreement would enable the nations in these two military alliances to have more confidence in the intentions of the other side, and it would help to diminish the fears which undoubtedly exist about the dangers of conventional attack in Europe.

I believe that such an agreement would be very useful. But, so far, the Soviet Government have insisted upon linking this subject with other measures, such as the thinning out of forces in Central Europe. They know this to be unacceptable and this illustrates some of the difficulty in concluding an agreement on observation posts, but I hope that the Russians will come to see its advantages.

Another possibility is a non-dissemination agreement by which the nuclear Powers would undertake not to allow control of nuclear weapons or nuclear knowledge to pass into the hands of third countries, and non-nuclear countries would undertake not to manufacture nuclear weapons or otherwise acquire control over them. This again would not alter the balance of power but would forestall the kind of development which might alter it in a most dangerous way. The United Nations Assembly unanimously adopted a Resolution in this sense as long ago as 1961, and the time seems to us to have come to put it into formal effect.

There are therefore two possibilities. A suggestion of a different character which has been raised is a non-aggression agreement. This would not, of course, contain any new obligation which is not contained in the United Nations Charter. It would be important that any arrangement involving the members of N.A.T.O. and the signatories of the Warsaw Pact should not appear to enhance the position of the East German authorities or endanger the position of Germany and Europe.

It is not quite clear how far non-aggression should be related to the Berlin problem. I have in mind that the Western Powers must always be concerned with the possibility that the freedom and viability of Berlin could be undermined by acts on the Communist side which could not be classified as aggression. There may be some way round this difficulty and efforts to find one are continuing. If these difficulties are surmounted, then non-aggression arrangements might make their contribution towards the relaxation of tension which we are now seeking.

I have deliberately given the House some indication of some of the problems for negotiation. It would be wrong to raise false hopes. The Russians are stubborn negotiators and these are difficult matters, but I think we may draw encouragement from the fact that the United States of America and the Soviet Union have agreed not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space, an agreement which has been welcomed and endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In response to what the right hon. Gentleman said at the start of his speech, we intend to pursue the 18-Power Disarmament Conference in Geneva, and we shall continue to urge forward an examination and further progress of what is called the American plan in relation to the Soviet plan. I have listened to what the right hon. Gentleman said about the importance of the Foreign Secretary himself taking an interest, but I should here like to pay tribute to the work which the Minister of State;—who is sitting on my left—has already done, and to his recent speech in New York, in making progress in this matter.

Before I come to some of the military matters referred to by the right hon. Gentleman, I would sum up our attitude to East-West relations and negotiations as follows. Some people fear that this process of discussions with the Soviet Union is in some ways dangerous to the West. Of course it would be so if the West spoke with different voices, but flexibility, which I intend to see should prevail, is not synonymous with weakness. We are determined to uphold the vital interests which the overwhelming military power of the Western Alliance has been created to defend. I hope I shall have the support of the House therefore in further steps which we may take in these or other directions in the months which lie ahead.

This brings me to the organisation of Western defence in the light of the evolving strategic and political situation. This is proceeding steadily in N.A.T.O. I shall be going to the N.A.T.O. Conference in December and only last week I discussed these questions with Dr. Stikker, the Secretary-General, whom I had the pleasure of entertaining while he was in London. We are determined that N.A.T.O. should continue to perform its full functions. Her Majesty's Government took a big step towards strengthening N.A.T.O. when they assigned the V bomber force to the Alliance as the contribution to a N.A.T.O. deterrent which will be responsive to the needs of the Alliance as a whole.

This was warmly welcomed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, when he spoke to the Conference of N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians on 4th November. I was glad to see, and indeed to hear, that the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said in his speech in the debate on the Address that the Opposition have never been committed to destroying the V bomber force. The right hon. Member for Smethwick repeated that today. I shall not go into great detail on defence matters because my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal will be winding up this debate on Tuesday. He will have a further opportunity therefore of going into these matters, but I should have thought that what I should make quite clear today is that the choice before the House is already manifest.

On the one hand, there is the Government who have a policy, a policy which is understood and welcomed by our allies. On the other hand there is the Opposition who deem it impossible to define their policy in advance of their ever coming to power. This is made clear. It was made quite clear today by the speech of the right hon. Member and was made clear in a more muddled manner—if I may mix my metaphors—by the right hon. Member for Belper in his speech on the Address the day before yesterday. I was somewhat intrigued by the argumentation of the right hon. Member for Belper as reported in column 196 of the Official Report in referring to the power which this Government have in negotiation, and which was referred to by the right hon. Member for Smethwick this morning.

At one point in his speech the right hon. Member for Belper rejected the argument that Britain as a nuclear Power exerted greater influence at the conference table, but later he recognised, as reported in column 196, that the weapons that his Government—if they ever reached the position of being a Government—would inherit, would be of assistance in his negotiations for what he described as a genuine Atlantic alliance nuclear organisation.

I am sure the right hon. Member and his Friends will need all the help they can find because the aim that the Opposition have set themselves is ambitious. It is, to use the words reported in column 196, to obtain greater control for this country over the weapons provided by others while diminishing substantially, as it would appear, the scale of our own contribution. This seems to answer most of the points put by the right hon. Member for Smethwick today. The only other point which is not answered, I think, is his remark about the inadequacy of our conventional forces. I absolutely repudiate this. I think he has no justification for saying it, and the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Sir I. Orr-Ewing), in his intervention on the relative size of the Polaris submarine budget compared with our total defence budget, show that we are not only not neglecting conventional forces but are determined to maintain them and be fair to our soldiers overseas and at home.

Now I say a word in response to a request by the right hon. Member about the American proposal for a N.A.T.O. multilateral force. There has been no ambiguity whatever either in statements by the Prime Minister or any other member of the Government in relation to a multilateral force. The position as I can state it is absolutely clear. We are in no way committed to take part in the eventual force, but we have decided to take part in discussions about this proposal.

Mr. Gordon Walker

Are you in favour?

Mr. Butler

Hon. Members will see if we are in favour when we have had discussions. I do not see how before we have had discussions with our allies on the nature, scope and cost of this force we can make up our minds.

Mr. Gordon Walker

When the right hon. Gentleman says that he is not in possession of all the facts, why does he blame us for saying that we must wait until we are in office before we can make up our minds? Even he does not know all the facts about the multilateral force.

Mr. Butler

Not only do Her Majesty's Government not know all the facts about the mixed-manned force, but neither do our allies know all the material facts. It is precisely in order to clarify the situation that we are entering discussions to discover what this means and all that it implies. I should like to make quite clear to the House that while we reserve our position, quite rightly, until we have been able to ascertain what all this comes to, the multilateral force is a fact which we cannot ignore in our foreign policy. It has been put forward by the Americans and its origins lay in the vital relationship between Germany and the rest of the Alliance.

I entirely reserve the position of Her Majesty's Government in relation to this force, but on my visit to Europe it was put to me as a matter which some of our allies regard as worthy of close and urgent consideration.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker (Derby, South)

The right hon. Gentleman says that he reserves the Government's position. Am I to understand that there is absolutely no commitment in regard to this force?

Mr. Butler

There is no commitment on the part of Her Majesty's Government to go into this force.

I want to turn outside Europe and to consider our attitude to the underdeveloped countries as the right hon. Member for Smethwick asked me to do. We are to discuss this at the trade conference organised under the auspices of the United Nations to help underdeveloped countries. Before I say anything about this I should like to take up what the right hon. Gentleman said about the United Nations itself. I should like to stress that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister rightly emphasised at the General Assembly this Autumn the importance of strengthening peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations.

I should like also to stress our loyal support of the United Nations. We want to see this organisation grow in strength and influence, and to see its influence soberly and usefully directed within the bounds of what it is competent to carry out. That means that we have much gratification in supporting the efforts which we honestly think are within its competence, and we have pleasure in supporting the efforts of its distinguished Secretary-General, U Thant.

The only occasions that we have had to adopt isolated or minority positions in the United Nations was when we found that it was trying to intervene in matters beyond its competence, which it was not possible to carry out.

Now it is clear that military efforts, whether national, multilateral, or organised by the United Nations, cannot alone provide the answer to the problems of peace and stability. We can only go to the root of the matter by efforts to improve conditions of life of the underdeveloped countries. I was deeply struck by two facts when I was in charge of Central Africa.

First, the increase in our own overseas public aid which has now risen to a figure of at least £160 million this year, and it may well be appreciably higher. But, second, that despite our efforts, that is the efforts of ourselves in particular, but of the industrial nations as a whole, there still remains a gap between the industrial countries of the world and the less developed.

According to the United Nations, the exports of the industrial countries to each other rose by nearly 35 per cent, between 1959 and 1962. This was three times as fast as the rise in exports of the developing countries, which was only 11 per cent, over the same period. We have therefore a considerable task before us, and we realise that if the Governments of these countries cannot earn from trade and obtain from aid and attract from the private investor, the resources that they require, they are bound, sooner or later, to turn in despair to the methods of tyranny, whether Communist, or Nationalist or racialist.

Mr. A. Fenner Brockway (Eton and Slough)

Will the right hon. Gentleman say something on the point raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) about the fall in the prices of the commodities coming from the developing countries, which has meant that their standard of life has fallen more than it has been able to be raised by all the aid?

Mr. Butler

Yes, Sir. I was just about to endorse the importance of commodity arrangements as mentioned by the right hon. Member for Smethwick.

I was about to add that we shall have to pursue a forward-looking policy in the Kennedy Round, in the United Nations trade and development conference next spring, on which I hope to get further enlistment of European support when the Ministerial Council of W.E.U. meets here in January. I hope that in the United Nations' programme we may make further advance, and thus do something to help what I think is a most vital feature of our foreign policy.

Not only on the economic side are there anxieties and troubles among theemerging nations, but on the political side the emergence of so many independent countries has set up certain turbulent currents. I should like to make quite clear that it would be dangerous if we allowed ourselves to be deflected from counsels of prudence any firmness of purpose which have animatedus as we have brought our colonial Empire to a close. We have no intention of being deterred by anyone from continuing our assistance and support to the Federation of Malaysia.

Not only we, but the United Nations Secretary-General, have convincing!) shown that this Federation came into being with the full support of a sizeable majority of its peoples. Its Government and population want to develop their own democratic form of Government, strengthen their economy and live at peace with their neighbours These are worthy aims, and we shall hope to do our best and everything in our power to assist in their achievement

Our future relations with Indonesia depend on whether that Government is willing to adopt a more peaceful and realistic policy. Her Majesty's Government must meanwhile combine firmness in upholding Malaysian independence with patience in the face of provocation We shall not give way to threats, but we shall also avoid any move that might increase tension. Subject to our overriding agreement with Malaysia, we shall do all we can to restore to normal Anglo-Indonesian relations. I am glad to tell the House that the Indonesian Government have now offered compensation for the damage done to some of the property of the British Government. In order to secure a comprehensive agreement, we are continuing negotiations covering all British property damaged.

It is possible, and I remember this from the days of the great Ernest Bevin to continue what is called the tour d'horizon indefinitely by covering ever; country in the world, and I do not propose to follow his estimable example in that respect. I do not therefore propose to cover other countries, but I wished to make those remarks about our relations with Indonesia and out determination to support Malaysia. I have ranged somewhat wide and, I hope, covered many of the points raised by the right hon. Gentleman. I have I ranged wide because the foreign policy of Britain is the foreign policy of a country of great material interests and solemn obligations in every part of the globe. Against the complicated background of the modern world—its shrunken distances, its terrible weapons, I the multiplicity of its societies, the immensity of the demands and the opportunities—against all this the theme which animates our foreign policy is simple and clear. It is this: security and prosperity for the people of this country and for the great company of friends and free peoples with whom we seek together to build an ampler and more peaceful world.

Let me say in conclusion, do not let us listen to those who tell us that Britain is now a relatively small European nation, that we should scale our ambitions down and resign ourselves to a more limited part in international affairs.

I would remind hon. Members of our great assets. We still possess under this Government at any rate world-wide strategic power from our possession of nuclear weapons. We have a unique record of stability at home, and I believe that over the years Britain, from the store of her wisdom, has made, and will continue to make, a striking contribution to world peace which few nations can surpass.

12.20 p.m.

Mr. James Griffiths (Llanelly)

I intervene in the debate today because I have recently returned from a visit, with some colleagues in the House, which took us for some days to India and to Malaysia to attend the C.P.A. conference, where it was our privilege to have the opportunity of discussing some of the problems raised in the debate with representatives of 60 countries in the Commonwealth. I shall have something to say about Asia and about Africa.

I have listened to the argument which has gone on about what my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) has called the status symbol. I have heard what the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are saying, that if we want a place in the world we must have nuclear weapons, since, otherwise, we become a second or third-class nation. As one who has no special knowledge in this field but who has pondered these questions deeply, I wish to put a very serious consideration to the Government.

In common with everyone else, I have been following with very great interest the argument between the Soviet Union and China. I ask the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to consider very carefully what they say in relation to that dispute. I remember 1917, and I remember all that happened afterwards. I happen to think—] may be on my own in this—that the quarrel between the Soviet Union and China, if it goes to the length of isolating China, will not be in the best interests of the world. That is an unorthodox view, perhaps, but I hold it. The dispute, which takes the form of an argument in ideological terms, had as one of its origins the fact that, at some time, perhaps in 1957, China made a request to Russia for aid to make an H-bomb. Russia refused, and I think that it is a great tribute to Mr. Khrushchev that she did.

Let us suppose that China were present at this debate of ours. What would China be able to say to Mr. Khrushchev? What is it that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are saying? Put in China's terms, it amounts to this: "Unless we, China, can have the H-bomb, we shall have no place of importance in the world". Is that the lesson which we wish to impart? It is frightfully dangerous. If the Prime Minister wants to argue it in the country, I will argue it. That is the effect of what he maintains. What a prospect for the world!

The November celebrations are generally regarded as an opportunity for Communist parties all over the world to be brought together to discuss their problems. If there is a break—this is a possibility being discussed by the newspapers now—and if the Communist world is divided in two, with China and those countries which adhere to China being put outside the pale, the situation will be fraught with danger. China is a country of 800 million people, perhaps 1,000 million soon, an ancient people, with a great civilisation, now making desperate efforts to pull themselves up. Sometimes there are failures, as there was just a year or two ago. Is it our wish to isolate China?

I was a member of the Government when the Peking Government was formed, and our Labour Government then was among the first to recognise it. I remember that, in our discussions at that time, Ernest Bevin said to us—we were of his generation or slightly younger— "Let us not make the mistake which the Tories made in 1918 at the time of the Russian revolution". Who knows?—if we had then, instead of sending arms and armies to fight the new force in Russia, welcomed the new Russia to the comity of nations, what might the situation have been today? Let us not make the same mistake about China.

I am glad that Her Majesty's Government's representatives have voted for the admission of China to the United Nations, and I hope that they will go on doing so. Very shortly, I am confident, the present Government will be replaced by our Government, and I hope that we shall exert might and main to bring this great nation into the United Nations, for continued exclusion can only create great danger for the whole world. Let us not be too sure in Europe that we shall always be the centre of the world. The centre of gravity may shift, perhaps to Asia.

Now a few words about my experiences in India and Malaysia and our discussions with the representatives who attended the C.P.A. conference. I have in mind not only the public discussions but also the private discussions. Those of us who are democrats, who believe in representative Government, who believe, as I do, that the only enduring kind of freedom is democratic freedom, know that India and Malaysia are of enormous importance in the continent of Asia. If democracy breaks down and fails in India and Malaysia, Asia will be lost, no matter how many H bombs there are in the world. Asia now contains 52 out of every 100 human beings on the earth, and the population there is increasing each year at a net rate of 37 million.

Asia is poor. In fact, the gap between the rich countries and the poor countries is widening all the time. It is all the more important that the gap should not continue to widen at this time when, all over the world, new nations are emerging and there is what Harry Truman rightly described as the revolution of expectations. If the democratic Governments of Asia cannot fulfil the expectations of ordinary people, it may be the end of democracy in the world.

I have been deeply impressed by what I have read and still more impressed by what I have seen of the heroic efforts made by the Indian Government to raise the standard of life of their people. I have been particularly struck by what they are doing in the villages. India is a land of villages; 80 per cent, of its people work on the land and live, as peasants, in villages. If one really wants to see the work at the grass roots, one must go away from the industrial towns and visit the villages. Wonderful things are being done.

There are 600,000 villages in India. What a job! I saw in just one village what it means in terms of very simple things, for instance, sinking a well and providing clean water for the first time in the history of the village, or tilling the soil with better, but still simple, tools.

I was most impressed by India's plans in this, the fourth five-year plan. But here lies the danger. Because of recent happenings, the Indian Government are having to divert to defence resources which are badly needed for the development programme. In spite of all their efforts to avoid it, it is quite likely that they will have to cut back. I put this consideration to the British Government, and to the United States Government, too. If, as a consequence of having to divert resources to defence, India's programme of development is seriously cut back, the results may be truly disastrous. Therefore, if we are really anxious to maintain the centres of democratic life in the world, we must be generous to India, generous in our aid. I should like us to be big enough in the West to say to India, "Do not cut your development programme; we shall make it up."

Now, a word about Malaysia. It was a great personal pleasure to me to go back to Malaya, thirteen years after I was last there. I was there in May, 1950. It was the first visit I made to any of the territories for which the Colonial Office was then responsible after I became Secretary of State. At that time, the emergency, as it was called, was at a crucial stage. My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who was Minister of Defence, remembers it very well. It was touch and go whether we should win or lose. I went out with my colleague John Strachey, then Secretary of State for War, for whom all of us had such a deep regard. We took with us General Briggs, He surveyed the situation and produced what was called the Briggs plan. He never received the credit which was his due. General Templer and others did a very fine job, but it was Briggs who thought out the plan. I was glad to find in Malaya that he was not forgotten. Sometimes, in listening to our debates about Malaya, I have had the impression that he was forgotten.

We held out and we won. I was sometimes criticised by my own party for holding out in Malaya. I, therefore, found—I hope that I may say this without immodesty—some personal pleasure in returning there this year. I came to the conclusion that it was worth holding out in 1950 as we did. I saw the beginnings of the building of a new nation—the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Saba. I knew their leaders before. They are men of great ability and character. The Prime Ministers of Malaya, the Federation of Malaya—now Malaysia—and of Singapore, as well as those whom I met for the first time, including the Chief Ministers of Sarawak and Saba, are men of different moulds, temperaments and gifts, but what pleased me immensely was that they were working together, which is extremely important, in this multi-racial community of 10 million Malays, Chinese, Indians and others.

I was glad to see that there was a resolve among all of them, not only among Ministers and others, but widespread among the people, that here was an opportunity, which they would seize, to build a democratic nation. I believe they realise, too, that this will depend in the main, in their country as elsewhere, on the Kampong or Malayan village. That is the heart of the country. I therefore come back to this House and say that we have every right to be proud of the part we played as a country in saving Malaya in 1950 and the years which followed, and now in taking our part in bringing about this new nation and helping it.

There is one danger about which I want to say a word, and that is Indonesia and the danger of guerilla warfare. This can grow. I do not profess to have the answer, although I have a suggestion or two to make, but it is important to try to stop it as early as possible. It is significant that this kind of guerilla warfare is taking place mainly in Sarawak and Saba. If it goes on, who knows what may result? I remind the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations that the emergency in Malaya began exactly like this, too. I hope, therefore, that every step will be taken to stop this guerilla warfare. First, I hope that the people will be helped in every possible way. They, too, face the problem of having to divert to defence resources which are so badly needed for development. That would be a bad thing.

Now, a word about Indonesia. It is a great tragedy and pity that this has happened. I remember, during 1950 and 1951, when I was Secretary of State, discussing both here and in Malaya, whenever I had the opportunity, with young Malays how they saw the future of their country. I knew the problems and the importance of keeping a racial balance, otherwise we would not build a nation there at all. Most of the young Malays with whom I spoke saw the future as a union of Malaya, Singapore, Saba, Sarawak and Indonesia. They are all Malay people. They told me that for generations there had been movement between Sumatra, Malaya and Singapore, that they could go across from one to the other and that apart from an occasional word, the language was the same. There was intermarriage between them.

What has happened is a great pity. Why it has happened, I do not know. I do not know Sukarno, I have never met him, but I have met many people who have. Most people have told me that the economic situation in that country is desperate. What a pity. Many people think—I do not profess to know —that one of the reasons why this guerilla warfare is taking place is to divert attention from conditions at home.

If one could speak to Sukarno and the Indonesians, I would say to them that many of the Malay people are Muslims with the same language and religion, and is it not in the best interests of them all to work together? What danger can the 10 million population in Malaysia be to the 100 million in Indonesia? Why do they not work together?

The United States of America has poured money into Indonesia. I saw an estimate—I do not know whether it is true—that the size of the American contribution to Indonesia is 800 million dollars. I read this in an American magazine when I was in Kuala Lumpur. Most people think that were it not for being propped up by United States money, Sukarno would have already gone down. I do not know.

We pride ourselves upon our alliance with America. Have Her Majesty's Government discussed this with the U.S.A. and put the question to them? A statement was made yesterday in another place—I do not know whether it is true, but it will be noted—about the use of American 'planes. Everyone to whom I spoke agreed that the one influence which could be brought to bear upon Indonesia is the United States of America.

Through the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, I would put this to America: "If what you are anxious about and what you want to use your money for is to sustain democracy in South-East Asia, you are not doing it in Indonesia. "I would not for one moment ask the Americans not to send aid there to people who are in desperate need. Everyone agrees that there is real hunger. I suggest strongly, however, that the Foreign Secretary should discuss this matter with his opposite number.

I understand that American policy on Indonesia is being reconsidered. I heard out there that the United States Ambassador in Djakarta has been recalled. Responsible people in Malaysia said to me that they believed that if the United States used its influence, the guerilla warfare could stop. That is what I was told and I thought that I should say it. to the Foreign Secretary and to the House.

I say a word now to the secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Every Commonwealth country in Africa was represented at the conference. I was glad to meet so many of them whom I had known. I remembered them as students here. I recall saying to people some years ago, "Please remember that when you see these young men in the street, you may be speaking to men who may be ministers in five or six years' time. You are speaking to the ministers of the new world."

I met and talked with them, particularly about two problems which are very much in their minds and in ours. The first is Southern Rhodesia. If Her Majesty's Government grant independence to Southern Rhodesia on the basis of the present Constitution, they will do it against the wishes of every Commonwealth country in Africa. I leave that thought with the Secretary of State and the Government. There were delegates present from Southern Rhodesia and we talked about this freely. They know it, too. That is the position. I am sure that it is known to Her Majesty's Government and to the Secretary of State. I beg the right hon. Gentleman to realise that an act of that kind might have serious consequences for our relations with the rest of the countries in Africa.

Next, I have a word or two to say about South Africa. The best way I can present this as it was conveyed to me in my conversations with young Africans is to say that at the end of one long evening of discussion, one of them—one of the kindest, a responsible man who is a Minister, whom I have known for years and for whom I have a deep regard—said to me about South Africa: "We cannot go on much longer standing idly by whilst our kith and kin are persecuted and oppressed in South Africa. I hope you will ponder those words."

I am not, I hope, a pessimist by nature—I am a Welshman by temperament—but I was disturbed by that. Everybody seemed to have made up his mind that nothing but conflict, violence and catastrophe are to be expected in the Republic of South Africa. In recent months I have found some people with light skins in South Africa who have not given up hope. Years ago I had to speak for my party executive at our conference on a motion that South Africa be expelled from the Commonwealth. I have met many of the people who have been battling for a sane racial policy in South Africa. At that time they said, "We hope that we will not be expelled from the Commonwealth. We hope that your Government will not do that. The inclusion of South Africa in the Commonwealth is our only hope". But South Africa is out of the Commonwealth now and these people have given up hope.

May I put two or three things to the Government. The first is very important. If we do not come absolutely clean on our attitude to South Africa we may lose the Commonwealth. I am very blunt about this, and I must say it. The first thing that we must do is this, and if the Government do not do it I know that my own party, which will very shortly be in power, will do it. We must ban the export of arms to South Africa at once. No one believes the talk about giving South Africa arms which she can use in her defence against external aggression. I ask the Government not to waste their breath on putting that forward.

I suggest that we should bring the Commonwealth together. This is a topic which could be discussed at a Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference and a Defence Minister's conference. It is said that an economic boycott, unless applied generally throughout the United Nations, would have no effect. However, I hope that my colleagues, when they are in power, will not rule that out, and I should like to see the Commonwealth countries come together in order to find out what other steps can be taken before it is too late. There is not much time left.

I end by repeating the words which were spoken to me by my young friend from Africa: "We cannot stand idle much longer while our kith and kin are persecuted and oppressed in South Africa." Also, we cannot stand idle much longer if we want to save the Commonwealth.

12.43 p.m.

Mr. Ronald Russell (Wembley, South)

I must resist the temptation to take up some of the points made by the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths).

First, I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary on his appointment and wish him all success in the difficult task which lies ahead of him and in continuing the policy so successfully pursued by his predecessor the present Prime Minister. As one of the delegates to the Council of Europe and Western European Union, may I say that I hope we shall have the privilege of seeing him at those Assemblies from time to time expressing British policy to the members of them. I know that he will be as welcome and successful as his predecessors and other British Ministers like my hon. Friend the Minister of State. I am sure that he will do Britain a great deal of good if he visits Strasbourg and Paris from time to time.

I wish to speak on a rather different aspect of Commonwealth affairs from that dealt with by the right hon. Member for Llanelly. I start by welcoming most warmly the third paragraph of the Gracious Speech. As I do not think it has been read since you, Mr. Speaker, read it on Tuesday, I should like to read it again. It states: They"— that is, the Government— believe that the Commonwealth has a significant part to play in ensuring stability and peace in the world, and they will continue to take all possible steps to strengthen the links between the Governments, and peoples, of the Commonwealth. In their efforts to expand world trade, My Government will continue to attach great importance to the maintenance and development of commerce between Commonwealth countries. I welcome nothing more happily in this Gracious Speech or in any other than those sentiments about Commonwealth trade. There has been too little about this subject in most recent Gracious Speeches,

In the last year or so there have been far too many detractors of the Commonwealth who claim that it is finished and that no Commonwealth country wants any more co-operation or expansion of Commonwealth trade. I believe that that is a. complete fallacy and that the Commonwealth will not come to an end unless we in this country are stupid enough to let it. I have yet to meet the Commonwealth Minister who wants less trade between his country and ours. On the contrary, I think that all Commonwealth Ministers want us to go on taking their exports, even if they are trying to acquire additional markets in other parts of the world. In return, if we ask them, they will do what they can to stimulate the import of British goods into their countries.

Yesterday, my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) suggested that we should form a Commonwealth Export Council in this country just as we have formed a European Export Council and a Dollar Export Council. I support my right hon. Friend most warmly and hope that the Government will give his suggestion their most serious consideration.

I also support my right hon. Friend's suggestion that, if agreement can be reached with other Commonwealth countries, a Commonwealth Economic Development Council should be formed on the lines of that formed by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer. I think that the time has come, as my right hon. Friend suggested yesterday, when we should think about revising one or two items of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Like him, I hope that the Kennedy Round of tariff reductions which is to be negotiated in a few months' time will be successful. It will be a great tragedy if it is not.

However, I have a certain scepticism about how far tariff reductions can go, in view of what has been achieved in the past, without some amendment of the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause in G.A.T.T. which makes it imperative that every tariff reduction made by one country to another should be passed on to every other country having an agreement under the most-favoured-nation clause with it. I should like to see a revision take place, on a fairly minor basis, to broaden this non-discrimination to a certain extent and not to make it imperative that every country should be favoured with a tariff reduction unless it can offer something in return.

Yesterday, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Industry and Trade said that he thought that Commonwealth countries did not want any new exclusive trading arrangements. I am prepared to accept that, but I suggest that trading arrangements should be made on a more mutual basis, not only between Commonwealth countries, but between foreign countries and, if necessary, between Commonwealth and foreign countries.

One thing of which I am quite certain concerning the attitude of Commonwealth countries is this. They still stand by what was stated in the Report of the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference at Montreal only five years ago, which was attended by my right hon. Friends the present Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, among other British Ministers. While it is true that they said that Commonwealth countries should continue to work in no exclusive spirit towards a multilateral trade and payments system", they also said that Commonwealth participation in the preferential system has proved to be of mutual benefit and we have no intention of discarding or weakening it. That was five years ago, but I have seen no statement by any Minister of any Commonwealth country, even those which have become independent since that paragraph was drafted, which contradicts it. It was reaffirmed only two years ago by the meeting of Common-wealth Finance Ministers under the auspices of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council which took place at Accra in September, 1961, when consideration was given to the effects of this country joining the European Economic Community.

Therefore, it is in no exclusive spirit that I would suggest that we give due consideration to amending the G.A.T.T. so that mutual tariff reductions can be made between one country and another without their having to be extended to everybody else. It would mean that two countries could negotiate reductions whether they were between two Commonwealth countries or between two foreign countries, or possibly between a Commonwealth country and a foreign country, or a Commonwealth country and, say, a group like the Euro- pean Economic Community. On a bilateral basis it would give them much more freedom of manoeuvre than is possible under the present system of multilateral reductions under a completely unconditional most-favoured-nation system. I know that possibly from the point of view of the Americans this would be a rather revolutionary step, but I do ask my right hon. Friends to consider it, particularly if there is not the success we all hope for from the Kennedy round, in view of the reductions which have already been made.

It is rather strange that this ban on bilateral negotiations and mutual concessions in trade seems to apply to tariffs. In almost every other matter of trading they are used on a very wide scale, and certainly by the United States. In fact, I think I am right in saying that the United States tops the list in the number of bilateral agreements which they have made with foreign countries in recent years—for instance, in the disposal of surplus foodstuffs. They made an agreement, for example, to supply wheat to Brazil and gave the Brazilians no shorter term than 40 years to pay for the wheat, and they were permitted to pay for it in cruzeiros and not in dollars. If ever there was a better example of a bilateral agreement exclusive to the United States and Brazil I should like to find it. Another example of that was the agreement which the United States made with India in recent years to supply 17 million tons of wheat over a period of four years on condition that half of the wheat was conveyed in American ships. That was another very discriminatory agreement completely out of keeping with the spirit of G.A.T.T.

Mr. Paul Williams (Sunderland, South)

The half my hon. Friend refers to is the minimum requirement. Because of the preferential rate which is already obtained the actual commitment is very much more than half, and this is working to the detriment of British shipping.

Mr. Russell

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for amplifying what I said. I shall not try to compete with him in his great knowledge of the shipping industry. I know that flag discrimination is carried out by the United States on a very wide scale whenever it suits their convenience to do so.

Surely any agreement like that, while it may not be a violation of the actual legal clauses of G.A.T.T., is certainly a violation of its spirit, and, of course, we have to recognise the fact that really the whole concept of the European Economic Community is a violation of the spirit of G.A.T.T., and perhaps still more is the concept of the European Free Trade Association, because that is working for free trade in manufactured goods only and not in agricultural goods. I am only too glad it is doing only that, but it is still more, I think, a violation of the spirit of G.A.T.T. than is E.E.C.

One of our problems and one of our duties surely is to help to provide markets for the exports of our friends in Commonwealth countries. Somebody said yesterday—I think it was my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton—that our object ought to be trade and not aid. Why are we having such a procession of Commonwealth immigrants here from countries like the West Indies? Surely, because they cannot find enough work in their own homelands to give them employment. Surely one of the best ways of giving them employment—and perhaps checking them coming to a more uncongenial climate than that which they are used to—is to undertake to buy the produce of the West Indies, and that is one respect in which we have failed, I think, over recent years. Why do we still try to buy so many cigars from Havana and not from Jamaica? That is only a minor point, but every little helps, and if we were to buy more Jamaican cigars, at least we should give employment to some more people in the West Indies.

Again, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton mentioned yesterday, in the last six years our imports of certain foodstuffs like cereals, meat, dairy produce and fruit from foreign countries have increased by no less than £153 million worth, while our imports of those foods from Commonwealth countries have decreased by £15½ million worth. To my mind, that is all wrong. It used to be part of our policy to give first preference in our markets to the home producer and secondly to the Commonwealth pro- ducer, and over the last six years that seems to be something that we have not done.

If anybody is fainthearted still about the Commonwealth I would ask him to look at the enormous potentialities of the Commonwealth if only we can develop it—the huge areas, for example, of Canada and Australia, very vast, largely under-developed countries, with massive resources and yet very small population. They need both manpower and money. Again, and here I know I shall carry the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Llanelly with me, look at the opportunities for markets if only we can raise the standard of living of the people in Asian countries like India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, and in African countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, to give only a few examples. We are pledged to try to help to raise the living standards of those countries. By doing so I believe we shall help ourselves as well, and I do believe that we can do it much better by concentrating first on trade, before aid.

12.59 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Henderson (Rowley Regis and Tipton)

I hope I may be allowed to associate myself with the good wishes which were expressed to the Foreign Secretary on his new appointment. He knows, as I know, that many years ago now he was Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office at the time when the then Prime Minister was seeking to act both as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. I am quite sure that the right hon. Gentleman will be what he is in name, Foreign Secretary, at least so long as die present Government continue in office.

The Prime Minister on Monday last, when he was, so to speak, placing his mantle on the right hon. Gentleman, said that the Foreign Secretary would be undertaking the biggest diplomatic operation perhaps of all time, and that his aim would be to seek a reversal of the minds and actions of men. I think it would be advisable if the right hon. Gentleman sought to achieve that aim not only in the international field but in his own Cabinet, because it seems to me an extraordinary attitude for the Government that they should seek to relate our position and influence in the councils of the world with the possession of a nuclear weapon.

One's mind goes back over the last twenty, thirty or more years when there was ample evidence that the moral influence of this country was out of all proportion even to the armaments which we then possessed. I should say, perhaps in fairness to the present Government, that I do not accept the view that our influence in the world today is any less than in bygone days. But I certainly cannot accept the thesis that it depends upon our possessing even the modest nuclear weapon which we have today. I say "modest" in relation to the gigantic weight of nuclear destruction at the disposal of the United States or the Soviet Union.

I am quite sure that the Foreign Secretary realises the magnitude of the task in the international sphere given to him by the Prime Minister. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to look at the position resulting from the disarmament problem. As he knows, the preamble to the Test Ban Treaty which he quoted this morning states that the principal aim of the three signatory Governments is the earliest possible achievement of an agreement for general and complete disarmament. That objective, I hope, will be accepted by every hon. Member and by all right-minded men and women in every country in the world.

But we must look at the background. For ten years now this Government have been in almost continuous negotiation with other Governments in an effort to achieve disarmament. The need for a reversal of the thinking and actions of men, not only in this country but in other countries, is illustrated when we realise that, side by side with those ten years of negotiations the nations of the world have been engaged in an increasing arms race; and that after ten years of fruitless effort to achieve a disarmament agreement more than £40,000 million a year is expended on armaments and there are about 20 million men in the armed forces in the countries of the world.

Although we are all well aware that the stockpile of nuclear weapons—apart from those in our own country—in the possession of the United States and the Soviet Union is sufficient almost to destroy the universe, more and more effort is being devoted to the development of even more deadly weapons of war. Certainly this biggest diplomatic operation which the Foreign Secretary has undertaken is absolutely essential, and one can hope that it is not too late for its achievement.

It is true that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in July has contributed to easing international tension. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the suggestion for agreement on the stationing of observers on both sides of the Iron Curtain; the agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, I hope, the suggested non-aggression pact between N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact countries may contribute to a further relaxation in international relations.

The disarmament conference, the 18-Power conference is to resume in January and as I understand it the right hon. Gentleman looks favourably on the suggestion that the next meeting should be at Foreign Ministers' level. I was not happy about his reference to the intention of Her Majesty's Government to pursue the consideration of the American plan. At present there is a complete deadlock. There are two plans before the conference, the American plan to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, and the Soviet plan. I had hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would follow up what was said by the present Prime Minister a year ago, that an attempt should be made to produce a compromise document based on those two admirable disarmament plans. But if the Foreign Secretary is going to the January conference bound, so to speak, to the American plan, that would seem to me to run counter to this great peace mission which he has undertaken. But he will have the support of every hon. Member on this side of the House so long as he seeks to establish and maintain world peace under the conditions set out in the policy for which my party stands.

I have a proposal which I wish to ask the Foreign Secretary to consider. If we can get a compromise plan based on those two plans, so much the better. It would involve, over an agreed period of years, complete and general disarmament in three stages. But we must be realistic, and I am very doubtful whether that is likely to be achieved at present. In the meantime no progress is being made in the sphere of disarmament because, as the right hon. Gentleman would be the first to agree, the collateral agreements to which he referred do not constitute disarmament. I wish to suggest to him that consideration could be given to taking a partial step in connection with what I would call the first stage of disarmament. For example, why not have a 20 per cent, reduction in the present levels of manpower and armaments, including nuclear vehicles—to which reference was made the other day by the Prime Minister—and financial expenditure on armaments?

The United States has proposed a transfer of fissile material and I suggest, as a second head, a transfer of fissile material by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom Governments to the United Nations atomic organisation for use for peaceful purposes. It would not be put forward in competition with the American and Soviet plans, but as an indication that the Government are determined to break the present deadlock and launch the world on the road to disarmament.

I ask the Foreign Secretary whether it is not time that the British Government took their own initiative in this matter, put forward their own proposals and did not merely bind themselves to the plan already put forward by the United States. It is not a question of giving up the American plan but of preparing the road and easing the way into the more general disarmament to which these plans refer.

The position concerning Indonesia is becoming extremely serious. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary will take his stand, as part of the basis of his policy, on loyalty to the United Nations. I suggest that consideration be given to proposing in the Security Council that, in the very dangerous situation developing in that part of South-East Asia—the infiltration of troops from Indonesia into North Borneo and elsewhere—United Nations observers be sent to North Borneo and other places so that we can know exactly what is going on and who is responsible for the trouble.

The right hon. Gentleman and I have had correspondence about the "development decade", but I am disappointed with the Government's resolution, tabled at the United Nations, which is to be discussed in the next few days. The right hon. Gentleman knows that the difference between us is that the resolution puts the responsibility on non-governmental bodies, whereas we should like to see Governments working in partnership with them. I do not know whether it is too late for him to do so, but I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will look at this again with a view to amending the resolution, in agreement with other Governments, so that member Governments of the organisation can be brought into this great scheme.

It is along these lines that he can seek success for the great mission he has undertaken. If he will show boldness and imagination in the conduct of our foreign policy along those lines which we believe will bring about international co-operation and stability, he will have our good will in the endeavours he is to make in future.

1.14 p.m.

Sir John Eden (Bournemouth, West)

The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson)—I do not mean this patronisingly—is a very generous man and he and the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) spoke with great feeling on subjects close to their hearts and with the interests of their country before them.

I could not say the same thing about the speech of the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) today, nor about the speech of the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) on Wednesday. But I am glad that both these latter speeches were made, because in many ways they have helped more clearly to sharpen and define the differences which exist between our two parties, and, since we are inevitably moving into a period where differences are highlighted, it is a good thing that we should be debating the major points of policy which separate our parties.

The Opposition attack, if I can put it that way, seems to be directed towards four major points of policy. They have been criticising the Government for their attitude at the United Nations, their attitude concerning racial conflict, their attitude towards the degree of assistance to developing countries, and their attitude affecting British policy and other questions relating to the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. For a short while, I want to concentrate on each of these four points which in all the main Opposition speeches so far in these debates have been highlighted by them as indicating failures in some way or other in the administration and record of the Conservative Government.

First, there is the charge about the Government's attitude towards the United Nations, with references to the Prime Minister's speech at Berwick-on-Tweed. There are one or two points here which should be cleared up. It has been emphasised time and again by Government spokesmen that we stand by the Charter of the United Nations. We have always, throughout these difficult years, loyally paid our dues. Indeed, some of us, myself included, have been inclined to feel that we have done this rather too loyally in some instances by paying dues to back policies we wholly deplored.

However, we have, in loyalty to the United Nations and in recognition of the financial difficulties in which it finds itself, played our part to the full in backing it with money. We have heeded many of its requests and we have helped it, as an organisation, in many of its ventures.

But what we are not prepared to see is British policy being submitted to blackmail by the United Nations or by any other body in the world and if, as the Prime Minister has said, members of the United Nations apply double standards we must say so. In fact, it is our duty to say so as a member of the organisation, and the use of the veto was deliberately put into the working of the organisation in order to enable members to do just this sort of thing and protect their major national interests when threatened.

It would, in any case, be a curious form of support of an institution if we were ready to pass without comment any attempt to challenge the principles of the Charter and abuse the purposes for which the organisation was founded. Membership of an organisation does not mean abject submission to whatever the majority of its members may dictate when that dictation is in direct contradiction to the principles which founded the organisation.

The second point of attack is that concerning racial conflict and our attitude in these very difficult situations which arise, particularly in Africa. The right hon. Member for Belper had little to say on this subject beyond trying to imply that the British Government have been consistently opposed to liberty and have sided with the forces of oppression. That is hardly a statesmanlike contribution to helping towards a solution of the many problems created by the biggest evolution of all time—the gradual translation of a dependent Empire into a Commonwealth of sovereign nations.

We have at this time, more, probably, than at any other, an urgent need to exercise such influence as we can towards restraining extremism in every form. To the best of our ability, we must also ensure that we secure protection of minority interests. In many of these territories, in all of those for which Britain has had responsibility and those for which we still hold responsibility, British rule has been a shield and a prop. If it is removed too rapidly, collapse and chaos will almost certainly follow. It is our responsibility to ensure that it is not removed too rapidly.

After all, we have obligations towards all the citizens of the emerging nations and not just to one section. The charges of racial partisanship which emanate from the benches opposite might well cause hon. Members opposite to reflect with greater consideration on the needs and requirements of minority interests in those territories. Do right hon. Gentlemen opposite accept no obligation towards those people from this country who have gone to countries like Kenya and Rhodesia and built them up and made them prosperous and brought to them the elements of law and order and made it possible for us now to contemplate handing over to them independent power and control of their own destinies?

Do right hon. Gentlemen opposite have no regard for the other minority interests, not necessarily white, but of other colours, represented in those territories and which have to be safeguarded and cared for? It would be well if the Labour Party were to be a little less concerned with the sometimes rather loud and bullying voice of the apparent majority and to consider a little more carefully how to champion the more genuine rights of the less vocal minorities.

To turn to the third question, that of our attitude towards the developing countries and Commonwealth aid in particular; much has been made by the Front Bench opposite of this, but it is a fact that when this Government came to power, in 1951, aid from the Government to Commonwealth developing nations was about £60 million, while in 1961, as my right hon. Friend said this morning, the figure was £160 million and this year will probably rise to between £180 million and £220 million. The significant point about this figure is that a larger proportion is free and untied aid than that given by any other country.

Technical assistance, also highlighted by the right hon. Member for Belper, is costing us this year six times what it was costing us six years ago, and 1,400 specialists, including 660 qualified teachers, were sent last year to work in Commonwealth countries. About 15,000 overseas service officers are helping Commonwealth Governments, at a cost to us of at least £15 million a year. The right hon. Member for Smethwick made a passing reference to the necessary effort made by individuals through organisations such as Voluntary Service Overseas. I agree with him that this is something to be encouraged by every means possible, but he did not recognise that we are already sending some 500 young men and women to do their valuable work in these territories and that that number will increase to about 800 next year. It is almost always forgotten when criticisms of this kind are made that there are about 40,000 Commonwealth students in this country and that we are spending about £3 million a year to give them direct financial assistance. In addition to the few figures which I have quoted, private investment in the Commonwealth is running at the rate of about £300 million a year.

Hon. Members will say that this is not enough and I agree that we must have more. Of course we need more effort in this direction and in every aspect of it, but it is to do less than justice to themselves and to the Gov- ernment—although that does not matter—and to the country, and that does matter, if hon. Members opposite do not at least pay tribute to the great efforts being made and to the great advances over the past few years and welcome the steps which are being taken and, by positive criticism, seek to encourage them.

The fourth attitude which the Opposition have chosen to criticise most actively is what the right hon. Member for Belper called the attitude towards our policy and other questions concerning the Atlantic Alliance. The right hon. Member for Smethwick had a great deal to say about this this morning. Both were somewhat devious in the presentation of their arguments. I must admit that I do not altogether blame them, for they have to cater for a most curious mixture in their own party. I rather admired the skilful way in which the right hon. Member for Belper barged his way through an intricate maze of conflicting views. Members opposite make up a very uneasy co-existence and it must sometimes be difficult, as is apparent on an issue such as this, for their so-called leaders to come to any clear-cut definition of policy.

It is terribly important that they should make up their minds what their policy is. If they are to come before the country as a party pretending to be capable of forming a Government one day, they must make up their minds on the main issue affecting the security of the citizens of this country. Hon. Members on this side of the House may be forgiven if they do not quite understand what on earth the policies of the Opposition are on these matters. After carefully studying the speech of the right hon. Member for Belper, I wondered whether it was a case of his wanting more nuclear strength, in order to be more influential, or less nuclear strength, in order to present himself in some moralistic pose. I could not make out what it was he was after.

On his case for increasing conventional strength, I sometimes wonder what he means by increasing conventional strength. Do he and the right hon. Member for Smethwick mean by that that they will equip our forces with tactical nuclear weapons, should they have responsibility for doing so? Or did I detect from what the right

hon. Member for Smethwick said on this subject that he felt that even the existence of tactical nuclear weapons was wrong and to be deplored?

Having heard so many attacks made on the fine, new, important weapon system, the TSR2, now becoming available to our forces, attacks from right hon. Members who speak on the benches opposite about defence and foreign affairs, as well as the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, am I to understand that they mean to say that they would not proceed with the programme of equipping our forces with the TSR2? If that is their case, how are they to provide adequate support for the conventional forces? Where are they to produce the shield, which our present nuclear strength provides, to support and protect our conventional forces? If no tactical weapons are to be used, what will our conventional armies be equipped with? Hon. Members opposite deplore the possession by this country of the nuclear weapon but, at the same time, readily proceed to conduct policies of associating as closely as they possibly can with the nuclear strength of the United States. There is a curious conflict of attitudes here if ever there was.

Hon. Members opposite, too, through the mouths of their Front Bench spokesmen, have been careful persistently to pour ridicule on the contribution which we already make to the overall nuclear strength of the West. The country at least, if not hon. Members opposite, will be happy to be assured by the fact that this country's nuclear contribution is certainly not ridiculed by our allies, nor is it ridiculed by N.A.T.O. As my right hon. Friend pointed out, it is certainly not ridiculed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who welcomed the addition of the V-bomber force to his command and was extremely impressed by what he saw when he visited Bomber Command. I doubt very much whether the strength which we would be able to employ, should the need ever arise—the nuclear strength which we have in our possession—is altogether ridiculed and ignored by the Soviet Union.

The right hon. Member for Smethwick this morning did not come clean on the question of Polaris. I do not accuse him of deliberately trying to dodge—I do not for one moment expect that he was doing so—but he simply does not have a view or a policy upon this. He does not understand what the deterrent means in any event. That was abundantly clear from his speech.

The right hon. Member for Smethwick spoke in scathing terms about the Polaris missile when it comes into being as being virtually useless as a second strike weapon because it could not pinpoint targets. What does he mean in this context by a "second strike weapon"? If he does not understand it, he had better go back and read the books again and learn something about it, because if he pretends to be capable of being Foreign Secretary of this country, he has a long way to go.

On the whole question of the nuclear strength which Britain is now capable of deploying, the country should note the significant fact that only the British Labour Party in the whole world belittles the capacity of Britain's force to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor. Only the British Labour Party time after time goes out of its way to belittle the effectiveness of British military power.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu (Brigg)

They did in 1939, too.

Sir J. Eden

Hon. Members opposite have done tremendous damage already and I do not need to be reminded by the hon. and learned Member for Brigg (Mr. E. L. Mallalieu).

That is something that the country must have well in the forefront of its mind during the crucial months ahead, when the people might contemplate handing over authority in these critical areas of power to a party which is so divided amongst itself on these basic issues and which, during recent months, has gone out of its way to pour scorn on the efforts of this country to provide towards the nuclear strength of the West.

The right hon. Member for Smethwick this morning also said something about the danger of proliferation. Whatever he, the right hon. Member for Belper or the Leader of the Opposition says, France will still go on developing her own nuclear weapon. I suspect that China will do the same and, possibly, other countries will do so, too. The main difference between those countries and ourselves is that we already possess this weapon system. We have it in being. For us it is a question, not of not starting something new, but of dismantling something which we already have and which already makes a vital contribution to the defence of the West.

I agree that we must move towards sharing our strength in joint command structures with our allies in the West, and that is what we have been doing. That is why the V-bomber force was assigned to N.A.T.O. following the Ottawa talks. I do, however, express my view that I do not consider it necessary to carry this quite so far as to create a completely new force in the form of multilaterally-manned surface ships. I was glad that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made a statement on this in his speech today. I was glad that he made it clear that this country is under no commitment towards this force.

I take my view not so much because we are not clear what is in the minds of the proponents of such a force, not so much because we do not know what it will cost, even though we know that it will cost a lot of money, but because I believe that the proper way to secure the type of co-operation which I desire to see is already being done at N.A.T.O. through the existing machinery and organisation there.

At Omaha—the right hon. Member for Smethwick made a fairly scathing remark about this and I do not quite know why he did—there already exists a most important liaison group concerned with strategic nuclear planning and targeting. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to ridicule this. The Opposition ridicule everything, and yet the people most concerned—the commanders on the spot—welcome this and applaud, and value it.

We also have a special deputy at S.H.A.P.E. for nuclear affairs and there are operating in Europe under N.A.T.O. joint mobile land and air forces. These are truly multi-national forces, to which we have already assigned troops and air squadrons. These multi-national forces, coming now directly under N.A.T.O. command, are the proper way for us to proceed in trying to build up political confidence between the member nations.

At least I do not support those who feel that we should encourage some separatist European faction. Over the years that the Government have been in power, we have always striven to build up the confidence, cohesion and strength of the West. This we have done supremely well in these last twelve years. Hon. Members will recognise from the speeches which we have heard from the benches opposite during the course of the debate on the Loyal Address so far that if a Labour Administration were to come into power, it would divest much of that strength and thereby create a dangerous vacuum in the very heart of the Western strategic position, in the very heart of the freealliance of nations. We must ensure that in years to come, as in the past, Britain continues to play its part and continues to exercise its influence. Whether hon. Members opposite like it or not, it is a fact that influence will be effective only if it is backed by power. That is something which we on this side of the House do not shirk and which, I am sure, the people will recognise. They will ensure, therefore, that we continue to hold responsibility for these important matters.

1.40 p.m.

Mr. Emlyn Hooson (Montgomery)

I am sure that the hon. Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden) will forgive me if I do not follow him in his four points. I intend to say something about the fourth point with which he dealt. I want to take up the time of the House for a very short span this afternoon to deal with the question of N.A.T.O. Recently I had the privilege of going as a delegate from the House, as did the hon. Member for Bournemouth, West, to the meeting of N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians at Paris. This does not give me any justification or excuse for setting myself up as an expert on N.A.T.O. It was my first visit. What it did for me was to enable me to concentrate my mind for a time on the problems of N.A.T.O. and to consider its efficacy and its future in this troubled world.

There is no doubt that N.A.T.O. has been a remarkable achievement. Not only has it been the shield of the West. It is perhaps the most formidable example of collective security that there has been in this century, probably in any century. The impression I had already gained from reading was heightened when I was there, that we are approaching a remarkable crisis of confidence in N.A.T.O. This may not be particularly important at the moment, but it could be of extreme importance. Indeed, unless arrested, it could lead to the partial disintegration of N.A.T.O. itself.

At Philadelphia just over a year ago, on 4th July, 1962, President Kennedy made a famous speech in which he spoke in optimistic terms of the possibility of the integration of Europe and at die same time of a partnership of the Atlantic peoples. But, looking back over the past year, the whole process towards the gradual integration of Europe and an Atlantic partnership appears to have been halted. There seems to be a new desire manifest in Europe to break away from the converging lines of our common interest. This led to the breakdown of the E.E.C. negotiations, the lack of confidence in, or the doubts that have been expressed about, N.A.T.O. itself, and so on.

It is not difficult to find a reason for this. There is virtually a new manifestation of nationalism to be seen in Europe. Its great champion is France. We should deceive ourselves if we did not realise that, though France may be its most articulate champion at the moment, she is to a very considerable extent championed by our own country. Basically, France's attitude towards having an independent nuclear deterrent is exactly the same as ours. I think that this constantly emphasised determination to hold the ultimate control entirely in national hands is about as relevant to the threat of Russia as were the separate aspirations of the Spartans and the Athenians to the great threat and power from Rome which overwhelmed them all centuries ago.

France has adopted a policy which follows almost exactly our own policy. At the plenary session of the meeting of N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians the hon. Member for Bournemouth, West, and I heard the Leader of the French delegation, General Bilotte, put forward the French point of view. He quoted the British Prime Minister as justification for France aspiring to have her own nuclear weapons. What is the British Government's attitude towards this? Do they view with equanimity the emergence of France as a fourth nuclear Power? Would they view with equanimity the emergence of Germany in five or six years' time as the fifth nuclear Power? Can we look forward to the day when the leader of the German delegation to the meeting of N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians will quote the French President as justification for Germany having an independent nuclear deterrent?

Indeed, the French attitude is that France needs this prestige symbol. The French argue that, if Britain is entitled to sit in at the higher councils of the nations, so also should France. Surely this is a process of inviting country after country to aspire to membership of this club. Where does it end? In theory, certainly, this argument is the justification for Nicaragua having the bomb in order to have her place at the councils of the nations.

I do not for a moment belittle the power of the British nuclear deterrent. Compared with the American or the Russian deterrent, it is obviously very small. However, I think that the hon. Member for Bournemouth, West, was right in saying that it might inflict upon a potential enemy—or upon an enemy—wholly unacceptable damage. I accept that. I am not concerned to argue the contrary. My argument is not a military one. It is the political argument with which I am concerned.

Not only did General Bilotte quote the British Prime Minister in justification of France's attitude. On 9th September, following an interview with the Minister of Defence, this passage appeared in The Times: in the field of nuclear weapons the British Government's policy remains unchanged. The official view which bears a remarkable similarity in essence to that of General de Gaulle is that the American guarantee of European security may possibly lose at least in Russian eyes its force and effectiveness at some time in the future. Until effective political union can be achieved either in European or Atlantic terms—and British defence planners believe the latter at least to be some way off—national nuclear capabilities are regarded as valuable. The Minister of Defence there equated Britain's own attitude to that of General de Gaulle. There is no other justification for it.

Where does this lead? Nobody in his right senses can contemplate Britain embarking on an adventure of her own involving nuclear weapons without the assistance of the United States of America, because clearly no country can use nuclear weapons—strategic nuclear weapons, at any rate—without there being an escalation to total nuclear war. What makes the Western deterrent credible is the American deterrent. Do we really contribute anything towards the solidarity of the West or the defence of the West by maintaining our own independent force? I have already said that the hon. Member for Bournemouth, West, was right in saying that our nuclear force is still a considerable force in itself, though not when compared with the American force.

While our nuclear force is still not completely out of date, would it not be worth while for Britain to make an approach to France, for example, to see, possiblyusing our V-bomber force as a bargaining counter, if we can try to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries in Europe? Once France has it, as day follows night Germany will want it. Where will the process end but in a nuclear war? Is it not better for this country to concentrate on making other contributions to the defence of the West—conventional forces and so on—and using the money saved to make sure that our conventional forces are brought up to date?

Sir J. Eden

With tactical nuclear weapons?

Mr. Hooson

No. We would have the same arms as any other N.A.T.O. country. Our forces would be armed the same as the German and French forces. Our arms would be the same as those provided by N.A.T.O. to the other countries.

Mr. Paul Williams (Sunderland, South)

Is the hon. and learned Member suggesting that the tactical nuclear weapons which at present exist in N.A.T.O. should be withdrawn?

Mr. Hooson

No. I said that our forces would have exactly the same tactical nuclear or other arms as the other members of N.A.T.O. have, but not the nuclear deterrent. At the heart of the present lack of confidence in N.A.T.O. is uncertainty about the future, about what N.A.T.O. is to become. Is it simply to be an old-fashioned pre-1914 alliance of independent sovereign States, virtually each one with control over her own arms, or are we moving towards something much greater?

Britain should give up her independent deterrent. My party has never made any bones about this. We have not prevaricated like the Labour Party, although I am glad that we have converted Labour hon. Members after some years of trying. The V-bomber force which we have now allocated to N.A.T.O. with certain reservations should be allocated completely to N.A.T.O. with no reservations. We should try to move towards supranational control of all forces in the N.A.T.O. alliance.

I was glad to hear the Foreign Secretary say that we were entering talks about the mixed-manned nuclear force. I do not pretend to be a military expert, and in what I say I am not attempting to put forward the military merits or demerits of the proposal. It seems, to me, on political grounds, that this proposal needs careful examination because it may be that it is in this direction that we shall solve the question of the control of nuclear weapons and the participation of countries in the N.A.T.O. Alliance in the nuclear deterrent, which is, after all, their umbrella. A mixed-manned nuclear force—and again I am not considering its military advantages or disadvantages—is far preferable and less dangerous politically than a series of independent nuclear forces in Europe.

An urgent and in many ways unenviable task confronts the Foreign Secretary. He must be concerned with increasing the political will of N.A.T.O. and the preservation of its cohesion. This is easier to do when we are under strain or stress in the West. When Russia puts on pressure it is relatively easy to do this, but the relaxation of pressure by Russia in the past twelve months or so has made it more difficult to maintain cohesion and an effective political will of N.A.T.O.

N.A.T.O. is completely indispensable to the West. We must move towards greater integration in Europe. This should be fostered in all ways and the Government should always take a lead in doing this.

N.A.T.O. rests on two pillars, one in North America—a solid pillar because it consists of only two countries, the United States and Canada—and the other in Europe. Our pillar will never have the same solidarity as the North American one until we make greater efforts to bring about more economic, military and political integration in Europe. There is always the danger that America will be tempted at some time in the future to pull out of Europe. It would clearly not now be in her interests to do so and it would seem extremely unlikely that a situation would arise when she would be tempted to. Nevertheless, European inactivity, the growth of nationalism once more in Europe, internal quarrelling among the nations of Europe and similar trends, could tempt the American administration to resort once more to the traditional American foreign policy of isolationism. That would be disastrous.

1.56 p.m.

Mr. Charles Doughty (Surrey, East)

I listened to the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) with interest. He always speaks pleasantly and with the charm one has come to expect from him. However, if I may say so without disrespect, he has today made the woolliest speech I have heard him make in this House. He was, no doubt, bound by the views, such as they are, of those few hon. Members of the party he represents. Despite this, I noticed that his leader, the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond), left the Chamber in the middle of his speech, as if he disapproved of some of the things he was saying.

Mr. Hooson

No.

Mr. Doughty

The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland was in the Chamber, rose from his place and left. One can quite easily see why.

Mr. Hooson

He left for his constituency.

Mr. Doughty

The inconsistencies were obvious. The greatest danger of the Americans pulling out of Europe would be that this and other countries in Europe did not play their part. One way in which we can play our part is to take the full burden and liability of arming ourselves with the most modern weapons. The Americans would rightly say, "If you cannot look after yourselves we will not do it for you".

I have listened to criticism of this Government and of the actions we have taken. That criticism came a long time before we knew what the Liberal Party would do. It is doubtful that their numbers will rise above six or seven in this House. We now know their attitude towards nuclear disarmament—their method of national suicide, for that is exactly what their policy would mean. Fortunately, they are not within an ace of a chance of gaining power. They would destroy the V-bombers and nuclear weapons. That is the only logical consequence of what they would do.

At least the Labour Party are in difficulty and speak with two voices. One says that they should have complete nuclear disarmament while the other says that they will maintain the weapons left them by the Conservative administration; that is, should they ever get to power.

Mr. Hooson

Is the right hon. Gentleman really suggesting that Germany, which does not have nuclear weapons, is facing suicide?

Mr. Doughty

I will deal with that matter later, as I will with the question of nationalism. Germany is in a very dangerous position, but we are still bound to defend her and I agree that there may come a certain proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whatever this country does or does not do will not make any difference to that. In so far as it will make any difference at all, the destruction of Britain's nuclear weapons by Britain would make other countries more anxious to have nuclear weapons more speedily because they would say, "One of our potential friends has deliberately weakened herself and we must therefore strengthen ourselves as soon as possible."

I cannot add more to what my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden) so rightly said about the policies of the Labour Party. I do not wish to repeat the arguments which my hon. Friend used so forcefully, so I will not say more on this topic, except to reiterate that I thoroughly agree with everything he said. Quite frankly, the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery terrifies me, but as fortunately his party's numbers in this House will be reduced below the present six or seven after next year, I can rest happily in my bed at night.

I agreed with the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) when he spoke of Malaysia, but I could not agree with what he said about Africa. His speech was inconsistent. He said that the Minister of a recently-independent Commonwealth State had said to him in effect that his and other such States would no longer sit and watch South Africa, and that that was one matter in which they would wish to take armed action. Yet, in the same sentence, the right hon. Gentleman said that he would stop sales of arms to South Africa. I can only say that the matter is too dangerous for joking. He must look at these things from the point of view of those living in South Africa. We have a very different state of affairs in this country. This is still a peaceful and pleasant country in which one can walk about in every part in complete safety.

I do not agree entirely with everything that the South African Government have done but to talk about stopping the sale of arms to one of the most prosperous nations of the world is to advance a most dangerous proposition. Those who do not think so should remember what happened when fighting broke out in an African country. Do they want South Africa to be in the same position as the Congo was a short time ago? That is the only logical consequence that would follow from their policy.

Mr. Gordon Walker

I take it that the hon. and learned Gentleman disagrees there with his own Government? His Government say that no arms for internal use should be sent to South Africa.

Mr. Doughty

Arms for South Africa must be sent, because—

Mr. Gordon Walker

No—the Government have said that they would not send arms.

Mr. Doughty

I am expressing my own views, and I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will listen to them.

Referring to nationalism in Europe, there has never before been a time when the nations of Europe, with the possible exception of France, have been working more closely together. The right hon. Gentleman will find more cooperation and international agreement between the E.F.T.A. countries than there has been in my lifetime, at any rate, and for many years before that. I am glad that (his is so, and I hope that it will continue.

The Gracious Speech omits any reference to ratification of the Report of the first Conference on the Law of the Sea, which was held in 1958. Hon. Members may ask what that has to do with the matters we are discussing now, but it relates to the discovery of oil and natural gas in the North Sea. Geography has treated this country in such a way that it is very short of natural resources. In 1931, when it was thought that petroleum might be found here, the Government of the day passed an Act regulating the power to grant licences for drilling. Many Statutory Orders were made up to 1957, but the results of drilling have continued to be disappointing. Many drillings have been made, but the quantity of oil and petroleum discovered is negligible, and much money has been lost in the process.

There have quite recently been discovered in Holland and Germany large commercial deposits of natural gas and oil. Those who understand these things, and I do not pretend to, believe that those deposits extend into the North Sea—and it is just as easy nowadays to drill down through the sea bed as it is to drill through the land. With this in mind, in 1958 there was an international convention whereby the Continental Shelf, which we call the North Sea, can be divided between the countries bordering on to it. I have, perhaps, taken the matter a little shortly and have not read out the words of the agreement. Two conditions were necessary before the Agreement could be entered into; first, that 22 nations should ratify the Convention and, second, that after 30 days the nations bordering on the North Sea should meet to draw the lines of the portions of the Shelf over which they would have jurisdiction.

Many companies are anxious to search for that oil and natural gas. I do not think that I am wrong in saying that the Gas Board has entered into an agreement with one company to purchase from it whatever may be found. Everyone is anxious to get moving to discover and, if possible, use what would be an enormous asset to this country—the supply of natural gas or oil and, perhaps, of both.

Up to a year ago 14 nations had ratified the Convention, and I think that many more have since ratified it. The figure must be approaching 22. One country that has not ratified is the United Kingdom. I do not think for a moment that we are against the idea; it is just the old story of Governments always saying, "We haven't got the time". When ratification takes place and the agreement with the nations bordering on the North Sea has been concluded, the Minister of Power would be able to issue licences to those companies of whom he approves to drill in areas designated in the licence. At the moment, everything is held up.

I ask the Government to find time to introduce the necessary legislation. The Gracious Speech does not mention it directly, but does state: Other measures will be laid before you. I hope that this will be one Measure we shall have. As the matter concerns foreign affairs it is properly introduced into this debate. We must take the necessary steps so that the Minister of Power can issue the necessary licences.

When I put down two Questions to the Minister on 10th December last year dealing with the need for speed in these matters, my right hon. Friend assured me that he was well aware of the facts but could not then say whether it would be possible to introduce the necessary legislation. I was led to believe, perhaps wrongly, that such legislation would be introduced during the present Session. I ask for a Government assurance that legislation will be introduced so that these licences can be issued and we can know whether or not this country will be enriched by the discovery of raw materials, if I may so describe them, that can so easily be brought to us.

It will not cost the country anything, because once the licences are issued the prospecting and drilling will be done at the expense of those holding the licences. This legislation can hardly be controversial, because I am sure that no one wants to stop ratification or the Minister having power to issue licences. Nor, I am certain, would anyone wish to reject these substances if they are discovered.

I should like to add my congratulations to those voiced by others to the new Foreign Secretary on the important task he has undertaken. It is a very difficult task, because we have interests all over the world that can be affected by a number of matters.

I entirely agree with what was said by the right hon. Member for Llanelly about Malaysia. I go further than he does. There is another danger from Indonesia, and that goes down to Australia and with Australia to New Zealand. Our white Dominions have not been mentioned sufficiently in this debate and they are the most important parts of the Commonwealth. Although Indonesia at the moment may be rather occupied with its own northern territories there is great possibility of conflict in New Guinea and on the northern shore of Australia. I hope that whoever replies to the debate for the Government will repeat the assurance that we will not only support Malaysia in its difficulties with Indonesia but will support our white Commonwealth in the southern hemisphere in the same way in dealing with its difficulties.

2.11 p.m.

Mr. G. A. Pargiter (Southall)

While we are discussing the Commonwealth, there is one matter connected with persons who come into this country from the Commonwealth to which I should like to refer. I have tabled an Amendment to the Address which indicates the importance with which I regard this problem, but I take it that it will have the same fate as most of the unofficial Amendments and therefore the only opportunity I have to refer to this matter is in the course of a debate on Commonwealth affairs.

I speak quite unashamedly, and especially from a constituency point of view, although what I have to say affects a number of other constituencies. It is by the very nature of things that people coming from other countries to this country, or people going from this country to other countries, have a tendency to congregate together. It is almost inevitable, but it creates problems. I tabled my Amendment because there appears to be no concern on the part of the Government or any of its Departments about the problems which are thus created. Local authorities are left to paddle their own canoes in matters which are clearly beyond their capacity and in which they need Government guidance and assistance.

My own local authority adopted a resolution requesting me to seek from the Government some action to prevent further immigration into towns which are already overcrowded. I appreciate that this is a difficult problem but it is nowhere near as difficult as the problem with which local authorities have to deal in trying to assimilate people into their communities. It is probable that we have in my area now an immigrant population of between 10 per cent, and 12 per cent. They have come into an area which has a housing waiting list of between 2,000 and 3,000 among people who have been in the borough for many years. It can be appreciated, therefore, what this pressure means to the housing situation alone. It means overcrowding and it means that local authority resources are stretched in trying to deal with the legal aspects of overcrowding. As for dealing with the practical and physical aspects of overcrowding, this is an impossibility. The local authority has not the resources nor the land, and the Government are not prepared to do much about it.

The Ministry of Labour will do little in respect of the spreading of persons in employment over a wider area. The Ministry pays lip-service to the idea, but when I wrote to the Minister about the unemployed in my constituency, of whom about two-thirds are coloured, he said that he appreciated that it was a serious problem but that there were towns where there were more coloured unemployed than there were in Southall. This did not appeal to me as an answer to the problem which I had raised.

This matter involves social problems as well, because it is no use dispersing people unless something is done on the social side. It is up to the Government to do something about the social aspects of immigration, so that people can secure a better chance of becoming assimilated into the areas where they may settle. The figures show that this immigration has created educational problems. I must thank the Minister of Education for the steps he has taken to make it quite clear, despite a good deal of local agitation to have some form of segregation, that he was putting his foot down firmly and that in education, at any rate, integration would be the Government's policy as it is our policy on this side of the House.

To that extent I was glad that someone had recognised that aspect of the problem, but it is not recognised and accepted always in the locality that these people are here to stay. They do not come into this country in the same way as indentured labour, for example, goes to South Africa from Nyasaland. These people have brought their families here. In the next generation, no doubt, there will be a considerable amount of integration, but the difficulty is to deal with that problem now.

As this is a problem which affects more than one Department of Government and involves not only the Commonwealth aspects of immigration into this country but also health, housing, local government, education and labour problems, would it not be possible to have some sort of inter-departmental committee which would keep the position under review with a view to seeing that all possible help should be given to local authorities? In this way they might have at least some hope that something might be done to ease their problems.

A point which might be of little comfort to hon. Members opposite in future local elections is that in the last local election in my constituency two British Union candidates polled more votes than the Tory candidates. This indicates not a political basis but a racial basis to the problem which is even more dangerous than the low poll secured by the Tory candidates on that occasion. I am also told that there will be a Fascist candidate at the next General Election. The whole thing is part of a Fascist campaign to keep Britain white and is carried out with a desire to create not integration and harmony but racial dis- cord, the Government must do something about this.

I ask that some consideration shall be given to these problems in order that locally we may feel that something can be done. Local councils and public bodies have committees working towards racial integration and friendship, and the churches are attempting to do something about it, but it all comes back to the basic problem of the large concentration of these people in one place. A concentration such as we have in Southall creates almost insuperable problems for these local bodies.

Apart from a few who have established a so-called residents' association, to keep coloured people out of certain roads and areas, the vast majority of my constituents do not look upon this matter from the point of view of colour at all but from the point of view of social and economic problems created as a result of this mass influx.

It is almost inevitable that once a few come here others come because they want to be with people who know them and to have a roof over their heads, even though the accommodation is overcrowded. Having regard to the position throughout the country, I should have thought that it would not be beyond the power of the Government to survey the whole problem inasmuch as they have control of immigration. To the extent to which vouchers are issued, they could place a limitation on the vouchers so that people could not go to places which were already overcrowded.

I would not bar these people from coming here; the last thing I want to do is to seek to place any bar against them. They could be told, however, not to go to certain areas. The important thing would be to establish them somewhere and not to leave them to fend for themselves when they arrive at Waterloo Station. It is the duty of the Government to see that people coming to this country are properly dealt with in order that they may be assimilated into the community.

Every country has a right to limit the number of people coming into it from the point of view of its size, capacity for absorption, economic conditions and so on. What I object to is that at the moment this is dealt with on a colour basis. I strongly object to the colour basis being employed for people coming into the country. Any Government would be entitled to place an overall limit on immigration without regard to whether the people were black, white or brown. Nothing I say should be interpreted in any way as meaning that I object to immigration to this country, but I am concerned about the way in which it affects certain areas.

If the Government are prepared to consider the possibility, at least for the time being, of giving areas such as my constituency an opportunity of assimilating people already there, it may be that we shall have some hope for the future. Otherwise, I can see racial antagonism growing and I cannot see the possibility of our being able to reduce it at present. This might be used by some hon. Members opposite as in excuse for stopping immigration, but that would not be the answer.

These people come from the Commonwealth, in many cases because they are invited here. Employers have sought labour from Commonwealth countries, but, unfortunately, they accept no responsibility for the circumstances in which people come here. So long as they get the labour they are not very much concerned with the social conditions under which those people will live. I suppose that strictly that is not an employer's responsibility, but it is the responsibility of the Government. If the Government cannot do better than they have done, it is time that they recast the whole of their thinking on this problem.

This Government have not very much longer to go. We look forward to another Government creating the right atmosphere for proper integration and racial friendship as compared with the problems which are being created at the present time.

2.24 p.m.

Mr. Peter Tapsell (Nottingham, West)

Although he has left the Chamber for a moment, I should like to join other hon. Members in congratulating the Foreign Secretary on his appointment. In the whole of his long and distinguished political career, I doubt whether the respect in which he is held by his fellow countrymen has ever been as high as it is today. I wish to say a few words about the Middle East, from which I have recently returned. Travelling around the Middle East, I was struck by the remarkable degree of respect and liking I found the Arabs to have for this country. We have had a very long association with Arabia, and many of our finest spirits have found Arabia an exciting, romantic and attractive part of the world. I think many Arabs appreciate this. I think we are trusted more than any other non-Arab race.

One sign of this is that a number of Arab States which are now starting national banks of their own come to this country for men to manage their banks. Indeed, they follow our example even more closely by usually choosing Scotsmen. There is a growing recognition that British interests are complementary and not opposed to the interests of Arab nationalism. In particular they are aware of two things. One is that there is no reason for any fundamental conflict to arise between Britain and the Arab nationalists. Secondly, Britain is the best market for Middle Eastern oil. The Arabs want to sell the oil. We want to buy it. I concluded from my visit that the unhappy phase in our relations with the Middle East should now be regarded as over.

I should like to say a few words about both Arab nationalism and oil. Although they find it extraordinarily difficult to translate into political terms, the Arabs are nevertheless inspired by the idealistic goal of Arab unity. I believe the United Kingdom should welcome this and should co-operate in trying to bring it about. It is very much in our own interests that Arabia should be a stable and prosperous part of the world.

The Federation of Southern Arabia, which the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations has played a large part in bringing into being, is one of the most constructive steps towards the unity of Arab peoples which has been taken in recent years. I hope that, despite all the difficulties, we shall gradually work towards a Federation of the Trucial States also.

I should like to see us also actively encouraging the establishment of an independent Arabian Monetary Fund to enable the oil revenues of the Arab countries to be more evenly spread throughout Arabia as a whole. Kuwait has already set a fine example to other Arab States in this respect. If this could be put on to a more institutionalised basis and we could have an Arabian Development Fund which was genuinely independent, I think that many of the stresses and strains in Arabia, which arise from the extreme wealth of some parts of the peninsula and the extreme poverty of others, would be resolved. I should like this country to make it clear and emphatic that we support the Arabs in their search for unity and concord.

In the nineteenth century, particularly when Lord Palmerston was Foreign Secretary, although we were the greatest Power in the world, we succeeded in identifying ourselves to an extraordinary extent with the emergent nationalisms of Europe. The Greeks, the Belgians and the Italians all looked to us for support and felt great gratitude for the support which was forthcoming. We subsequently derived very considerable commercial and political advantages from this fact. Since 1945 no country has, in practice, done more to help the emergent countries all over the world to achieve their nationalistic aspirations, yet all too often we have failed to derive the benefits from that which we deserve.

All too often when we have been helping these people we have managed to give the impression that we have been opposing them. It is a matter of presentation. I hope that in Arabia from now on, when no British interest is adversely affected, we shall make it absolutely clear that we are on the side of those Arab patriots that genuinely want to work towards greater Arab unity.

On the question of oil, it seems to me that the commercial security of a willing buyer and a willing seller entering into a bargain between themselves provides a more stable basis than any degree of military support or military pacts. I believe that the oil-producing countries of the Middle East have learned the lesson of Abadan and I do not think that any of them will readily again cut off their nose to spite their face. If one wanted evidence of that fact, one would not have to look further than Iraq during the régime of General Kassim. In Iraq, although there were no British troops on the spot to protect the oil fields from which we were buying oil, and despite the fact that General Kassim was acknowledged to be both personally unstable and violently anti-West in his views; nevertheless, throughout that period the oil from Iraq continued to flow to this country. It was in Iraq's interest to sell it and it was in our interest to buy it. I think that sort of commercial relationship is much the most satisfactory and much more likely to survive all future political upheavals. I hope we shall bear that in mind when viewing other parts of Arabia.

In the Yemen there is a very curious position. It is, I suppose, potentially the broadest based economy in Arabia. The question of whether or not this country should have recognised the Republican regime must have been a very difficult one to take. At the time I had misgivings about the decision that the Government took not to recognise it. I have now come to the conclusion that they were almost certainly right. Even with 26,000 Egyptian troops to help them and large-scale foreign financial aid, it is clear that the Republican regime is not in effective control of large parts of the Yemen.

One of the strange things about the Yemen is that Egypt, the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China all seem to be on the same side. They are all in different degrees helping the Republican regime. Egypt is supplying it with troops. The United States, through her large financial aid to Egypt, is supplying the Yemen with money, Russia is supplying it with equipment, and Red China with personnel for development. I do not know whether there is anywhere else in the world where one would get such a strange selection of bedfellows.

The irony of it is that this apparently formidable alliance is not being conspicuously successful in wooing the Yemeni bride. It is a pity we cannot liaise better with the United States over the Yemen, because it is a potentially dangerous situation and might prove to be a major flashpoint.

Finally, I should like to say a word about the Persian Gulf, or, as everybody in Arabia insists on calling it, the Arabian Gulf. It is symptomatic of the degree of Arab nationalism that it is regarded in that part of the world as offensive to describe it as the Persian Gulf. Because of its proximity to the Soviet Union, the richness of its oil deposits and its political instability, the Arabian Gulf is an area which must present very great problems to the Foreign Office.

Clearly it is a vital British interest. We should be absolutely clear in our minds what that interest is. Our main concern must be to maintain the uninterrupted flow of oil which we are buying at commercial rates and which the producing countries wish to sell. In view of this, in the light of what I said earlier about Iraq, I wonder whether our present position and policy may not deserve re-examination by the Government. I am not sure that the present situation is necessarily the one best calculated, in the long-run, to maintain the uninterrupted flow of that oil.

Certainly, so far as the internal affairs of many of the Gulf States are concerned, it seems to me that we have responsibility without having effective power to execute it. Our influence on the internal affairs of the Gulf States is certainly greatly exaggerated outside the Gulf, although I was much impressed by the high quality of our political officers there and the great degree of personal influence which many of them had because of the friendship and trust which they had established.

Nevertheless, we do not have the effective power to persuade the States in the Gulf to do things internally which they do not want to do. I feel that this may well lead to difficulties in the future. I wonder whether we should not think of extricating ourselves from all responsibility for the internal policies of the Gulf States. We have in fact done this in the case of Kuwait, and I wonder whether this is not an example that we should follow elsewhere in the Gulf. By all means let us hold the ring through defence treaties with these countries as at present, so that outside Powers cannot interfere with their internal affairs. Let us also by all means continue to offer advice as between old friends. I should like us to seek international recognition of the validity and integrity of the States concerned and to give up our special internal privileges, such as separate jurisdictions and the like.

Changes are bound to come in the Gulf as in the rest of Arabia. Our role, I think, should be threefold: to maintain the best possible commercial relationship with those countries; to prevent outside interference or aggression; but to make it clear to the Gulf States that they must work out their own internal problems in their own way and according to their own traditions. I think that if we stick to those three principles, we can continue to have very satisfactory relations with the Arabian Gulf.

2.38 p.m.

Mr. A. Fenner Brockway (Eton and Slough)

I am sure that all hon. Members will have listened with the very greatest interest to the hon. Member for Nottingham, West (Mr. Tapsell). Sometimes we may have agreed and sometimes we may have disagreed, but the contribution of first-hand knowledge which he has given will be of value to us all. I hope, therefore, that he will not think it discourteous on my part if I do not follow him into the particular arena which has been his mark.

This debate has covered a very wide ground. We have discussed the problems of conventional and nuclear weapons, and many aspects of foreign policy. We have been almost an encyclopædia on questions relating to overseas, directly and sometimes remotely. I want particularly to deal with the problems which come under the authority of the Minister for Commonwealth and Colonial Relations. But foreign affairs overlap this sphere, and I wish to begin by making some reference to what is more particularly within the sphere of the Foreign Office.

When we discuss armaments, whether conventional or nuclear armaments, we sometimes forget that the major question is the question of foreign policy of which they are a reflection. We hope now that the conflict between the two power blocs has been eased, but there is still danger of accidental war, even if there is telephonic communication between the White House and the Kremlin, and always the danger of local wars extending into a world war. In this situation, the most hopeful contribution which can be made to the peace of the world is to bring about disengagement in the danger areas and disengagement in those parts of the world where the peoples desire to be uncommitted to either of the power blocs. I believe that this part of Labour Party foreign policy is the most constructive contribution to peace which can be put into effect today.

I begin by discussing one sphere which is particularly related to the problem of disengagement, that is, South-East Asia. I consider that South-East Asia may well be the most dangerous part of the world today in the issue of war and peace. To the north, there is China with its 600 million people, a China still committed to policies of war. In the south, there is Indonesia with its 100 million people, which now feels largely isolated in the understanding of the world. Between them, there is that area which includes Laos, which the Prime Minister has said recently brought us to the brink of war, Viet Nam, where there is still civil war, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand and the Federation of Malaysia.

I have a question to put, and I hope that there will be an answer to it although the Foreign Office is not to reply to the debate. Is it accurate that the spokesman for Viet Cong, the Communist rebels in South Vietnam, has now offered peace in Vietnam on the basis of its unification, on the basis of democratic elections and on the basis of a Coalition Government? Has Mr. Ho Chin Minh, the leader of the North Vietnam State, endorsed these proposals? If it is true that these proposals have been made, however cynically they may be viewed, an effort should be made to discover their sincerity. They are the very proposals which were first made at the Geneva conference. I believe that, if there is to be peace in South-East Asia, we must follow the policy which has been pursued in Laos, where the Americans first thought that the country should be identified with the West but came to the conclusion that it should be neutralised. We should examine the position in Vietnam and see whether a similar development can take place there.

The second problem in South-East Asia is the problem of of Malaysia, to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) referred. Those of us who have sat through the debate wilt regard my right hon. Friend's speech as the most impressive, the most moving and the most constructive which we have heard, at least from the back benches, during the debate. Those who have had long association with him very deeply admired it.

My right hon. Friend spoke of the time when the people of Malaya and the people of Singapore were seeking a basis of unity with Indonesia, as peoples largely of the same race, largely with the same language—a natural association of peoples. I shall not delay on the issue of Malaysia, but I remind the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, who had some difficulty in reaching his conclusions, that the warnings which I sounded during the debate in the House when the Federation of Malaysia was established have been fulfilled. He declined then to say that there should be any delay. In fact, there was a delay. He probably realises now that it would have been much better if there had been fuller consideration before Malaysia was established.

Our aim in that area should still be a natural association of all its peoples, and we must at this moment seek to discourage any conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia which would make achievement of that aim more difficult. My criticism of the right hon. Gentleman is that, in negotiating for the establishment of Malaysia, he destroyed the spirit of good will and the agreements which were reached at the Manila conference. At Manila, the representatives of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia decided that they would aim at a great confederation of those territories to include them all, but the methods which the right hon. Gentleman pursued, even in announcing the date for the beginning of Malaysia before the United Nations investigation had been completed, destroyed the spirit and hope of that occasion. However, despite that, I hope that now, even in the midst of all the difficulties, every effort will be made to bring about a reconciliation among the peoples of the area, particularly between Indonesia and Malaysia.

I turn now to quite another part of the globe in order to put to the Secretary of State some questions about the conclusion of the conference on the Constitution of British Guiana. At that conference there was overwhelming agreement among the representatives of British Guiana on the issue of independence. The two main parties, the Government party and the party of Mr. Forbes Burnham, together polled 83 per cent, of the votes at the last election. They both asked for immediate independence. I do not hide the fact that there were big differences between them, but those differences were not on the issue of independence but upon issues concerning the electoral system and the balance in any coalition Government.

Is it true that the Prime Minister of British Guiana made the following proposals: first, that there should be an international undertaking, with an authority similar to the Treaty on Austria, on the neutrality of British Guiana; second, that, in order to maintain that neutrality, there should be Commonwealth or United Nations officers for the defence force; third, that there should be a coalition Government before the election, during the election and for the five years after the election? Finally, is it true that he offered to compromise with those who demanded proportional representation by saying that it should be applied to the election of the members of the Upper Chamber? If those offers were made, an agreement should have been reached at that conference which would have satisfied the demand both of the Government and of the Opposition for independence.

From British Guiana I move to Africa and first to Southern Rhodesia. I will not take up time on Southern Rhodesia except to ask the Minister to underline today the principle which the Prime Minister laid down in his speech on Tuesday and which all of my hon. Friends welcome. When challenged about Southern Rhodesia, the Prime Minister cited principles, which he had previously expressed, which declared, first, in favour of majority rule and, secondly, in favour of protection for minorities. I ask the Minister, when replying to this debate, to say that the Government will insist on majority rule in Southern Rhodesia before Southern Rhodesian sovereignty is recognised. I assure him that those who have stood for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia are equally concerned to see that the rights of minorities are maintained.

From Southern Rhodesia I pass further south to South Africa. Again, because of the time factor, my reference to South Africa will be very brief. I do not think it possible to exaggerate the danger of the situation there. As I see it, there are two possibilities. The first is that there will be growing violent conflict within South Africa itself which in time will be supported by volunteer forces from other African States. I see the possibility of a repetition of the Spanish civil war. If that occurs, it may be a prelude to world war by the intervention of the Communist countries and of China, just as the Spanish war became a prelude to world war.

I am not sure that the House will believe it, but I am not in favour of drastic action for the sake of it. But I believe the situation in South Africa demands drastic action. This can come about only by common action by the majority of the countries in the United Nations which have carried resolutions not only denouncing apartheid but asking that arms shall not be sent and, now, that oil should not be sent. Only by effective international action will we avoid a physical racial war centred on South Africa.

I should now like to add a few words about the Protectorates. I have always taken the view that the most effective way to influence South Africa is to make our Protectorates models of racial equality and African advance. Two issues immediately arise. The first is the Constitutions of Basutoland and Swaziland. I would only say about them that I hope that the Minister will insist on the greatest possible extension of multi-racial democracy within those areas.

The second issue is the need for economic assistance. I appreciate the Government's difficulty. They are constantly hearing demands for aid for here and aid for there. In view of the situation in South Africa, I believe that aid for our Protectorates should be a priority in the allocation. In the past the Protectorates have been treated as Cinderellas. If we are earnest in our determination to maintain their independence and to influence South Africa, thought should first be given to enabling the Protectorates to become economically viable.

Lastly, I wish to express my disappointment about Her Majesty's Government's policy concerning refugees in the Protectorates. Can the Minister justify his insistence on refugees from apartheid accepting the restrictions on speech and writing which are not demanded of the supporters of Dr. Verwoerd's régime when they enter the Protectorates? Can he really justify the fact that refugees who have left Basutoland for Bechuanaland have been returned to Basutoland on reaching that other Protectorate? Can he justify the decisions made by paramount chiefs, who have not a sense of identity with the view of the African people, that refugees shall not to stay in those territories? If we are sincere in our opposition to apartheid, we must be very generous to those who are refugees from, and have been humiliated by, that system.

I have tried to cover a number of urgent issues. I have done so because I believe that they are important for the peace and liberty of the world. I hope that when the Secretary of State replies he will be able to give us some satisfaction on them.

2.58 p.m.

Mr. A. G. Bottomley (Middlesbrough, East)

My right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) confined his remarks mainly to foreign affairs. I shall deal mainly with Commonwealth and colonial affairs. When this debate was opened by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, in his remarkable and brilliant contribution surveying international and domestic affairs, he also paid particular attention to Commonwealth affairs. During his speech, he pressed for a debate on Commonwealth trade, and I hope that the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations will do what he can with his right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House to see that time is arranged for a debate.

The Commonwealth Secretary should not find it difficult to persuade his right hon. and learned Friend, because no sooner had his right hon. and learned Friend left the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer than he made a major speech in the country emphasising the need for Commonwealth economic development. I hope that he will show the same enthusiasm for this now that he is back in the Government as he did when he was out of it. If we can strengthen the economies of the Commonwealth, this would have a greater influence on the world than the so-called independent deterrent.

In the Queen's Speech, the Government said that they aimed to strengthen the links of the Commonwealth. Our contention is that that is what the present and past Conservative Governments have failed to do. There has been a tendency to play down the Commonwealth. It was the Labour Government which laid the foundation of the new Commonwealth and we believe that Labour is best fitted to build on that foundation and to strengthen the Commonwealth.

It was only sixteen years ago that that foundation was laid. Before that, the Commonwealth was joined together by a common allegiance to the Crown and common citizenship. Both of those have gone. We have within the Commonwealth independent republics with presidents. They accept the Queen as Queen of the Commonwealth, but not as Queen of their country, and all these Commonwealth countries now have individual citizenship.

We do well to remember that it was only six years ago that power was transferred to one of the African countries. It is, I suppose, natural that these colonial Governments, where they still have the recent memory of Britain as a colonial Power, are concerned occasionally to demonstrate their independence. This happened in the earlier days of Commonwealth development. We have to remember this when, sometimes, we tend to be a little too critical of the leaders of those emerging nations.

The Commonwealth is held together by mutual self-interest. We all share common ideals and interests. One of my criticisms of the Government is that they have never been prepared to look the future in the face. Nobody can be sure about the exact time when countries are ripe for independence, but one can be sure that sooner or later something will happen. The Government have not faced these issues until they have been forced upon them.

The Commonwealth has a great future, but the Government have failed to give the lead to this group of nations which, combined together, represent one-quarter of the world's population and one-quarter of the land surface and contain within them every kind of skill and raw material known to man.

Under pressure, the Government announced some vague kind of cooperation concerning development plans at the last meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers. An announcement was made that Ministers had agreed that there should be a joint study of supply and demand for primary products and manufactured goods. No co-ordination of policy was suggested and no planning machinery was provided. I should like to know from the Commonwealth Secretary what has taken place and what all this means. For my part, the Government seem to have shown very little enthusiasm for that constructive suggestion which was made at the conference.

The Government should pursue the creation of an economic secretariat. We have talked about this before, but I believe that we could get a Commonwealth economic secretariat—one which was acceptable to all—evolved gradually on a sufficiently experimental and modest basis with its functions strictly confined.

For example, we have heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) about India's five-year plan. It may be that under their present five-year plan, the Indians are working towards sending more textiles to this country as a means of improving their economic position. At this very moment, our own economic machine—N.E.D.C.—may be doing exactly the reverse and finding out how to stop textiles coming into this country. There is no co-operation. If an economic secretariat existed merely for the sharing of such information, it could do a useful job and, perhaps, from this modest beginning, we could ultimately find a secretariat which, in time, could become a very effective organ for use in the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth countries between them conduct a huge part of the international trade in primary products. Of course, everybody pays lip-service to the need to stabilise and, if possible, to raise the prices of primary commodities, and nobody will dispute that the best way of doing this is by having world commodity agreements, but my view is that if the Commonwealth cannot set the pattern of trade in primary products, so much of which takes place within the Commonwealth, there is little chance of negotiating the wider, global agreements which people hope for.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) referred earlier to the United Nations development decade and its campaign for help against hunger, disease and ignorance. Our own Government suggest we should pass that responsibility on to private charity. This really is not good enough, and I hope that the appeal made to the Foreign Secretary can be answered by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations when he replies to the debate.

It might have been said that at this late stage in our colonial history the remaining problems would have been simple ones, that it would be just a question of applying, in a few remaining dependent territories, the procedures worked out elsewhere. Unfortunately this does not prove to be the case. I believe that in Central Africa we are faced with what could be described as Britain's most intractable colonial problem. It is one which requires to be handled with the utmost care.

We on this side of the House welcome the decision to terminate the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It is quite clear that the Federation was doomed when it failed to get the support of the African peoples. It is the intention of the Government to lay before the House Measures to bring about the dissolution of the Federation, I think the principal point at issue will be about the division of the debts and assets of the Federation, and one cannot ignore the fact that this will be a very difficult operation. It is not easy to work out exactly how much each of the territories has contributed to the Federation or how much each has profited by it. It is essential, therefore, that the arrangements finally brought before the House should have the support of all the territorial Governments in the Federation.

I think that the most controversial issue will, of course, be the future of the Armed Forces of the Federation. We have not yet been told officially by the Government on what basis these Armed Forces are to be distributed. It is true that details made known at the Victoria Falls conference were not discussed in the House, and the principles upon which the division was to take place have been only sketchily outlined. It now appears that there has been a statement made in the Federation, setting out the detailed distribution it is intended to effect, but, as far as I know, no Government statement has yet been issued in this country. I think the House is entitled to have presented to it a White Paper which sets out in detail and provides an explanation of why this particular distribution has been suggested. These are intricate matters, and if the House is to be able to reach a decision in a responsible and well-informed manner this White Paper is necessary. After all, the House of Commons is not a rubber stamp.

The House will have seen that the major part of the Federation's air force under the distribution is to go to Southern Rhodesia. This will give to Southern Rhodesia Canberra bombers, Hunter fighters, and some troop-carrying helicopters. The constitutional status of Southern Rhodesia is one of a self-governing Colony without responsibility for external relations or external defence.

In these circumstances I cannot understand why the Government of Southern Rhodesia requires modern jet bombers and fighters. Surely these are essential weapons for external operation or for defence against external attack and, by definition, responsibility in both of these categories rests with Her Majesty's Government. But let us be frank about this matter. Before 1953, before the Federation, Southern Rhodesia did have a defence air force and the criticism I am making now could have been made then, but I think we have to recognise that then it was anticipated that Southern Rhodesia would advance towards the same status as Canada or Australia as a full Commonwealth country. Hon. Members would delude themselves if they thought that was now possible. The march of events in South Africa as a whole has stopped the progress of Southern Rhodesia to independence as a white-dominated State.

We are left with this anomaly, that the Government of Southern Rhodesia is in possession of an advanced air force suitable only for an independent State. What is more, this air force is under the direct and complete control of the Southern Rhodesian Government. I suggest to Her Majesty's Government that is wrong for us to equip Southern Rhodesia with weapons which are in part unsuited to the present responsibilities of Southern Rhodesia and in part usable for oppressive purposes in conflict with the way in which we hope that that country will develop.

I know it will be argued that these are local affairs and we have no moral reason to interfere with any reversion to Southern Rhodesia. But the aircraft are not the same as those which were inherited by the Federation ten years ago. These are greatly improved aircraft and this has been achieved partly as a result of assistance—not direct defence assistance but general assistance. It is certain that if Southern Rhodesia were to keep these forces going, the Government would need more help from Britain. I suggest that if Britain pays the Bill we are entitled to satisfy ourselves that this equipment is required and that it will not be used for oppressive purposes and that it will not tend to exacerbate relations between the races in Southern Rhodesia. So I urge the Government to make clear to the Southern Rhodesian Government that Britain cannot undertake to give aid which, directly or indirectly, would allow her to keep this quite unsuitable air force.

On the last occasion when I addressed the House I referred to the opposition of the Labour Party to granting independence to Southern Rhodesia before democratic rule had been established. In my opinion Britain would be acting in an irresponsible manner by giving independence to a Government in Southern Rhodesia which had been elected in the same manner as the present Government If this were done, what would be the effect? The African population would immediately assume that its prospects of majority rule had been terminated. It would probably resort to violence. A white-dominated Government would react by toughening up the police services, restricting political meetings and so on. The constitution would deteriorate until finally there was an explosion. Who can doubt that out of that catastrophe the majority African population would emerge as victors?

That is the kind of situation for which our Government would be setting the stage by giving independence to Southern Rhodesia without making sure that the majority rule at some time in the near future would go to those forming the largest section of the community. The fear has been expressed that if independence is not granted, Southern Rhodesia will proclaim itself an independent State. The danger of this proceeding would be that the United Nations might step in and call for economic or even military sanctions. The Southern Rhodesia Government would gain little support in the United Nations Assembly. Dr. Verwoerd's Government might give Southern Rhodesia some economic aid, for it is doubtful whether South Africa would wish to have her frontiers contiguous with the independent African States. South Africa's interest in Southern Rhodesia, I think, is in having it as a buffer State.

The Southern Rhodesian economy is in a very difficult situation and if she cannot establish economic links between herself and Northern Rhodesia, then she will lose her best market. This in itself, I hope, may discourage her from proclaiming immediate independence. It would be far better for Southern Rhodesia not to try to hold back the tide by every conceivable means but to rescue her economy and put her house in order by the introduction of representative government as soon as possible.

Britain certainly must not become involved in attempts to entrench the powers of the white minority Government. Such a course would be disastrous to the security of the white peoples themselves and it would involve Britain in a hopeless struggle against the majority of African opinion and the rest of the world.

Mr. Victor Goodhew (St. Albans)

The House might get the impression from what the right hon. Gentleman is saying that white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia was entrenched in the present Constitution, but that is not so. The present Constitution has built into it an ultimate African majority.

Mr. Botromley

All too little. We have to move much faster now and that is what I am urging the Government to do. T was going on to say that Southern Africa as a whole is in turmoil and that the Government must repeat what they very nearly said once before, when the present Foreign Secretary, as First Secretary of State, commented in this House that independence for Southern Rhodesia could not be considered until there was a democratic constitution which gave the same rights for ultimate democratic control of the country as we have in our own land.

I want to put two questions to the Government. Will they give an assurance that they will see to it that there is a broadening of the franchise, giving effective representation to all races, and will lay this down as a condition of independence? Secondly, will the Government consider summoning a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting to discuss the question of Southern Rhodesia?

I should not like to end without commending those Europeans who are prepared to accept and work with the tide in Africa and those who have played their part, or have tried to do so, as equals in this new society. We also must pay tribute to those Africans who are showing great patience and restraint during these difficult times.

There is much that one would like to talk about but time limits us, so I will confine myself to two other matters. First, there is the problem of the High Commission Territories. The Government record on the Territories is deplorable. It is a disgrace to Britain generally. Britain, which normally has an enlightened colonial policy, in this respect has fallen behind.

I am surprised that the Secretary of State has not been able to say that he will do more to help the Territories. First, there must be an effective development programme for all three. Bechuanaland can potentially produce more food than she does at the moment. An immediate survey of water resources is of basic necessity. In Swaziland there have already been remarkable finds of mineral resources. In Basutoland there is immense potential for the supply of water and hydro-electric power.

There is far too much readiness to accept that these three countries must for ever be poor and dependent on the Republic. I am fairly certain that if a really vigorous search were made finds would be made which would surprise the pessimists. These could become very rich territories and I urge the right hon. Gentleman to do everything possible to assist them.

I should like the present position, whereby the High Commissioner in the Union of South Africa is responsible also for the High Commission Territories, changed. We ought to have either a governor for each of the High Commission Territories, or one governor for all three, a colonial governor with the drive and imagination which would help to do something for the people in the High Commission Territories. I know that the High Commission Territories are looking to us for all the help we can give, and I think that this should be done.

I should also like to say a few words about the refugee problem in this part of Africa. My hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr Brockway), who speaks with so much authority on African affairs, raised this matter, and T should like to pursue it a little further. For many months now, hon. Members, certainly from this side of the House, both privately and publicly, have been pressing the Government to define their attitude towards the question of refugees from South Africa into the High Commission Territories, but the Government have not done so. They ought really to do so in order that we can make sure that these people are given succour and comfort.

It is said that South Africa is within her legal rights in what she does, but has Britain no legal weapon to use against South Africa to stop it exercising these restrictions? If not, that says very little for our diplomacy towards that country. We can fly into Berlin and we can refuse to drop the tail boards of trucks going up the autobahn. Is it suggested that we cannot ensure that flights between one British territory and another can take place without interfer- ence by another Power? This is a sad reflection on the Government and shows a policy of appeasement towards the South African Government which would not be shown in any way to any other Government, and I hope that the Government will do something about it in order to keep up with the high standard which the British people have always shown in the rights of political asylum to refugees from other lands.

It was once said of British policy that it was "Get on, or get out. "We cannot get out of the Protectorates immediately for we are needed there, but there is one big job to be done and I earnestly ask the Secretary of State to get on with the work which it is his privilege to do. The Secretary of State recently took a bold decision about the electoral system in British Guiana. I wish that I could believe that that decision was as wise as it was bold. I wish that I could believe that its consequences will be a satisfactory result for that country. However, I am afraid that the position has been worsened by the Secretary of State's action and that his decision will be remembered as a blatant piece of constitution making for political ends.

Nobody would deny that the situation in British Guiana is difficult. The two principal leaders have apparently found it impossible to compromise with each other. The Opposition feel that Dr. Jagan would use his majority in the Legislature to ride roughshod over any opposition, however much following it might have in the country. I confess that there is some justification for the feeling. On the other hand, Dr. Jagan says that the man elected to form the Government has the right to govern, and this we have to concede.

However, by now the Colonial Office ought to have acquired considerable experience of devising constitutions and should be able to prevent a Government from riding roughshod over the Opposition. In other parts of the world such constitutions as Britain has passed on to the former Colonies have sometimes been ignored or torn up. If a Government has the physical power to do so it can, as we all know, simply ignore any written constitution. This seems to be the American view, but it ignores the principal feature of the political situation in British Guiana, which is that the present Opposition has very strong physical power. It brought the economy of British Guiana to its knees earlier in the year. It has considerable control of the capital of British Guiana, Georgetown. It substantially controls the police force. British Guiana is not a Cuba. The problem in British Guiana is to devise legal safeguards which would give the Opposition legal backing for resisting any attempt by the Government to resort to arbitrary action.

The Secretary of State has not solved the problem by his recent decision. It does not matter whether Dr. Jagan or Mr. Burnham is in power; British Guiana needs a strong constitution which ensures that the Opposition, from whichever party it is drawn, can stand its ground.

I, too, had talks with the Prime Minister of British Guiana, and I impressed upon him the need to entrench in a constitution a supreme court, composed of members of the Commonwealth, as a means of ensuring fundamental human rights. I also spoke to him as a trade unionist and told him that he must come to terms with the trade unions, make some compromise and entrench safeguards for the trade unions in the constitution. I believe that these things might be acceptable. At least they were worth trying.

In my opinion, the action of the Secretary of State can be justified only if he rejects what I have said. To play with a constitution, certainly at this stage of its development, with the blatant object of securing a new party political set-up, is in my opinion a very serious and a very dangerous practice. I hope that it will not prove a precedent. May I refer to the statement which the right hon. Gentleman made at the end of the conference, which is printed in Command Paper 2203? He admitted that he felt that the problem was to rearrange political alignments, and he even said that the decision not to require any party to obtain a specified minimum percentage of the vote was adopted because he saw no advantage at present in restricting the creation of new parties. But he said that it might be desirable after the first election to introduce such a minimum percentage, presumably to freeze the situation once the Secretary of State's new parties had come into existence.

What kind of political jiggery-pokery is this? Since when has a British Secretary of State devised constitutions in order to produce the political parties which he thinks best? Sir Charles Arden-Clarke once said that the only reason that Britain always passed on the Westminster type of democracy to its ex-colonies was that that was the only one which we understood well enough to be able to devise and give some tuition about. If we are departing from this rigorous protocol, we shall get into deep water.

I respect the Secretary of State's boldness, but I cannot say that I respect his judgment. In this matter I think that he has done a great disservice to the impartial standing of the British Government in its development of advanced colonial constitutions. Most dangerous of all is the fact that the Secretary of State's decision is likely to lead not to the termination of racial antagonism in British Guiana but to a worsening of racial relations. It is now quite likely that there will be a proliferation of more and more small parties, but this does not mean the end of racialism. Indeed, it is likely that each party will seek the votes of racial groups and finally we shall in the end find the races just as bitterly divided as they are now.

For this reason I think that the Secretary of State's decision is bad and I am very sorry that he has taken it. He assured me that he was under no pressure from the United States, but perhaps the United States' argument rather influenced him. I am bound to say that this will not bring the best results, and in my opinion he will leave to whoever has to succeed him as Secretary of State a situation, probably some time next year, perhaps more acute than that which confronted him this summer.

On Commonwealth and colonial questions as a whole, the Secretary of State has very heavy responsibilities if the desire of all of us is to be achieved that we should build up this great Commonwealth of nations as a bulwark for freedom and democracy in the world. It is because the Government have failed in this and have given second place to Commonwealth matters that I think that they stand condemned for their handling of Commonwealth and colonial affairs, as well as for other matters.

3.30 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies (Mr. Duncan Sandys)

First, I should like on behalf of my colleagues to express our appreciation of the congratulations and good wishes which were conveyed by so many hon. Members to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. I am sure that they will be a great encouragement to him.

This has been a very wide-ranging debate. I cannot answer all the questions, but I will do my best to answer as many as possible. The right hon. Member for Middlesbrough, East (Mr. Bottomley) advocated the creation of a Commonwealth Economic Secretariat. As far as I am concerned, he is pushing at a very open door. This is something which we would warmly welcome. This idea has been discussed on a number of occasions at various Commonwealth meetings, but unfortunately it has so far not commended itself to other Commonwealth Governments. However, I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that we will miss no opportunity which may occur to pursue the idea further.

The right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) stressed the importance of encouraging our young people to serve overseas in the underdeveloped countries. Again I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that the Government recognise the very high value of this work. Voluntary Service Overseas and other similar organisations are now a very steadily growing movement which the Government are doing everything they can to encourage. As the House knows, this includes young men and women who have obtained university degrees and other technical qualifications, and also younger boys and girls who have just left school. This movement started in a typically British way through the initiative of voluntary societies. The Government have now brought them together in a co-ordinated effort, and we are backing the scheme with substantial funds.

The House may like to know that 250 graduate volunteers went out this year, 500 are expected to go out next year, and a still larger number the year after. In addition, school-leavers are going out at the rate of about 300 a year. These British volunteers receive a warm wel- come in the developing countries. As teachers and as workers in community development, agriculture and social welfare, they are undoubtedly making a most effective contribution, which is much appreciated. This kind of service is not only of value to the overseas countries. It is immensely valuable to the volunteers themselves in the development of character and in the widening of experience. The Government will continue to encourage this movement in every possible way.

The right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) rightly deplored the hostile and irresponsible attitude of Indonesia towards Malaysia. He referred to the bankrupt condition of Indonesia. It is indeed a tragedy that the leaders of Indonesia are so completely absorbed with thoughts of military grandeur and imperialist expansion, instead of devoting their energies and the limited resources of their country to improving the lot of their people.

The right hon. Gentleman also referred to American aid to Indonesia. I can assure him that we have been in constant, indeed daily, touch with the American Government about every aspect of our policies towards Indonesia. We explained our views to them clearly. As the right hon. Gentleman will realise, the aid which any Government gives must be decided by that Government. The United States fully understand—and there is no doubt about this—ourviews on this whole problem, and the right hon. Gentleman will have seen that, apart from the question of aid, they have expressed their strong support for Malaysia.

The hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) and the right hon. Member for Middlesbrough, East had some criticism to express, to put it mildly, of the decisions which I took in regard to British Guiana. Firstly, let me remind the House that from the very start I have made my intentions perfectly clear. In my talks with the party leaders in Georgetown, in my broadcast to the people of British Guiana before leaving, in my statement in the House of Commons upon my return from British Guiana last July, and in my talks with the leaders last month I emphasised time and again that, in my opinion, the root of the trouble lay in racial politics, by which I mean the organisation of political parties on racial lines.

Nobody, therefore, had any reason to be surprised that, in coming to my decision, I set myself the task of finding a radical solution to this racial problem. I ask the right hon. Gentleman, who accuses me of jiggery-pokery, jerry-mandering or whatever it was, to consider whether perhaps my intention was not, as I say, to deal with the racial problem rather than to try to further the prospects of any particular party.

Mr. Brockway rose—

Mr. Sandys

I hope the hon. Member for Eton and Slough will allow me to develop this argument, because I intend to go into detail on this matter. My task, as I saw it, was to try to put an end to racial politics in British Guiana if that was humanly possible. That is precisely what I have tried to do. My decisions have been criticised on a number of grounds, and I will go into as many of them as I can now. The hon. Member for Eton and Slough asked a number of questions. He asked whether it was not true that Dr. Jagan had proposed that there should be an Austrian type Treaty, that the police force should be placed under the control of Commonwealth officers from outside—

Mr. Brockway

The defence force.

Mr. Sandys

The primary job of the defence force is as a security force—and did he not suggest that a new Upper House should be elected on the basis of proportional representation. The hon. Member for Eton and Slough also asked whether Dr. Jagan had not suggested that there should be a coalition Government before, during and after the elections. He went on to say that if he had—and by and large I do not think that this is an unfair summary of some of the many proposals which were exchanged across the table—agreement should have been reached which should have satisfied all parties.

Mr. Brockway

If—

Mr. Sandys

I hope the hon. Member will allow me to develop this. He says "if", but one of the ifs was the proposal for a coalition before, during and after the elections. When I was in Georgetown last July I did everything I could to bring the parties together and almost to force them into a coalition. I said, "It does not matter whether or not you have common policies. Get together and form a coalition, if only for the simple purpose of stopping the bloodshed", but I could not bring it about. I would agree with the hon. Gentleman that there should have been an agreement. There is no reason why the parties should not have reached agreement, but the fact is that at the conference a year ago they failed to reach agreement. I gave them time to try to settle their differences; they failed to do so. Again, in London, I tried to get them to agree, but from the very start of this conference there was no more hope of agreement than there was a year before—

Mr. Brockway

Is it not the case that the only disagreement was about the proportion they ought to have in the coalition Government? Consequently it was agreed that the righthon. Gentleman should decide the issue of representation in the Government, P.R. for the Upper Assembly, and so on.

Mr. Sandys

That is what I did decide, and that is what the hon. Gentleman complains about. I am accused, among other things, of bad faith because I did not fix a firm date for independence. I have gone through the whole of the record since then, and there is no question of it there. It is said that it was implicit in the request for me to arbitrate that I would fix a date for independence. The letter addressed to me by the three leaders went in considerable detail into the points they wanted me to consider—it can be seen in the White Paper—but there was not a word about fixing the date for independence. I have looked into the record of the meeting at which they asked me to arbitrate and, again, nothing was said by anyone about fixing a date for independence.

If they had made that a condition of my arbitrating I would most certainly have rejected it, for the simple reason that the British Government could not responsibly fix a date for independence until they were satisfied that power could be; transferred in conditions of peace and security. We have no desire—let us be quite clear about this—to hold on to British Guiana for a day longer than is necessary for us to discharge our duty.

We derive no benefit, political or commercial, by prolonging our rule: on the contrary, British Guiana is a financial and military liability. We have everything to gain by getting out as quickly as possible. It is only our sense of duty that prevents us from throwing down our responsibilities as so many of our well-meaning friends are pressing us to do. Since the war, Britain has led 16 countries to independence; except in the case of India and Pakistan, where there were exceptional problems over partition, we have everywhere transferred power under conditions of tranquillity. We intend to do the same in British Guiana.

It is said that I have taken risks—that there is no certainty that my plan will succeed. If the political leaders do not deliberately frustrate it I believe that it will succeed, but there can, of course, be no certainty. But if we had launched British Guiana into independence with the present tension, stress and fear, the only certainty would have been the certainty of chaos.

It is said that I have been told what to do from Washington, and have been rigging the elections against the Jagan party. The right hon. Gentleman said that this was blatant. I naturally expected these criticisms—it was so obvious that it stood out a mile—but I do not think that that should have stopped me doing my best for the people of British Guiana. My plans were worked out during the conference in the light of discussions I had with the parties. I came to my decisions without pressure of any kind from any foreign quarter. I made no secret of my purpose—it is set out in the White Paper. It was not my object to damage the electoral prospects of any party. My sole aim was, as I have said, to put an end to the racial politics which is the curse of British Guiana.

If, as I hope, the new electoral system produces a realignment of political parties on multi-racial lines, as I believe it will, mutual confidence will return to this land of fear and British Guiana will be able to look forward to early independence. Independence under conditions of peace and harmony—that surely is what we all want. That is the object of my plan and nobody has so far suggested any other way of achieving it.

As for the High Commission Territories, it has been said that they are a disgrace. The hon. Member for Eton and Slough said that they were the Cinderellas. It has been said that we have not given them enough money. Of course, I should like to find more money to build up the economies of these three Territories, in the same was as I should like to do with so many other of our Colonial Territories throughout the world. But, as the House knows, there is a limit to the amount of money we can spend on these objects and, that being so, more money for the High Commission Territories means less money for somewhere else. The Morse Report recommended capital expenditure of £7 million over an unspecified number of years. We have spent £4½million over the past four years and we are planning to increase the present annual rate by 50 per cent, over the next three years.

On the question of refugees, criticism has been made by the right hon. Member for Middlesbrough, East and by the hon. Member for Eton and Slough. I am not in the least ashamed of our attitude. It stands up to any examination by any fair-minded person. These are poor countries. They cannot provide employment for their own people, many of whom, as the House knows, have to go to find work in the Republic of South Africa. There are therefore strict immigration laws to prevent outside people coming in and taking jobs which the inhabitants quite rightly think they ought to have.

But in the case of political refugees these immigration rules are completely waived. Provided that the authorities are satisfied that the people are genuine political refugees, they are automatically given temporary residence permits for a period of months, after which they are expected to move if possible to another country. If this is not possible without danger, they are allowed to remain, and in no circumstances are they ever obliged to return to the Republic of South Africa.

The Territories have been criticised for requiring refugees not to engage in politics. This was raised in this debate. I consider it perfectly reasonable that those who are admitted under favourable conditions because they are refugees should not embarrass the country which gives them political asylum. This was looked into by the organisation called "Amnesty International, "which is supported by some hon. Members opposite. This organisation said in a recent report: the condition on applicants for asylum is almost universally applied and is contained by inference in article 15 of the United Nations Convention on Refugees. In our view the enforcement of this condition is not unreasonable. My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, West (Mr. Tapsell) referred to Arab unity. Her Majesty's Government welcome developments likely to contribute to the political stability and the economic and social progress of the Arab world and any movements towards the unity of the Arab peoples which is an expression of the free choice of those peoples.

I turn now to Southern Rhodesia, a matter of great importance. With the creation of Malaysia and the approaching independence of Kenya, Zanzibar, Nyasaland and Malta, the task of converting our colonial empire is well on the way to completion.

I want to stress that the only reason why a certain number of territories have still not achieved independence is that in one way or another they present special problems. In most cases the problem is an economic one. They are too small to become economically viable on their own. This applies in particular to small islands such as those in the Pacific and the West Indies. Where it is feasible we try to encourage them to form a federation or a reasonably sized unit, and, where it is not possible, to consider other solutions.

There are certain territories whose independence is delayed for other reasons. Of these the problem of Southern Rhodesia is undoubtedly the most urgent and most difficult. Southern Rhodesia, we must remember, has for over forty years enjoyed complete internal self-government. Up to the creation of the Federation she was responsible for her own defence—I correct the right hon. Member—and was represented by a High Commissioner in London. I hope that those outside who always tell us that we ought to interfere, and do this or that in Southern Rhodesia, will realise that there is not a single official or soldier in Southern Rhodesia responsible to the British Government. We have long ago accepted the principle that Parliament at Westminster does not legislate for Southern Rhodesia except at its request.

It is understandable that the Government and Parliament of Southern Rhodesia should also wish to see their country take its place without further delay among the independent nations of the Commonwealth. We have made it clear that we are prepared to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia in the same circumstances as we have granted it to other British territories. In particular, we look for a widening of the franchise so as to give greater representation to the Africans who constitute nine-tenths of the population, but have less than a quarter of the seats in Parliament.

The Europeans look with justifiable pride at Southern Rhodesia's outstanding industrial and agricultural achievements and at the rising standards of education and social service which they provide for all races. They fear that this economic development, and the social progress which depends upon it, would be endangered if the control of Government passed into what they decribe as "irresponsible hands". Therefore, whilst most Europeans recognise that in due course there will inevitably be an African Parliamentary majority, it is their policy to restrict the vote to those who, in their opinion, are likely to use it; with responsibility.

The present franchise is based upon a combination of educational and income qualifications. As more and more Africans come out of the schools, and as the general level of earnings rises, the proportion of Africans on the electoral roll is increasing all the time. I am trying to state the position absolutely fairly on all sides. It has been estimated that, without any change, this process will produce a majority of Africans on the electoral roll in ten to twelve years. That might perhaps seem a reasonable rate of progress if Southern Rhodesia were an island in the middle of the Atlantic, but it is part of Africa, and it cannot isolate itself from the quickening tempo of the rest of the continent around it.

We are asked by the Government of Southern Rhodesia, what are your terms for independence? What are the changes which would satisfy you? Our answer is that this is not just a matter of satisfying us. The question of Southern Rhodesia's independence is one in which the whole Commonwealth is acutely interested. Great principles and deep emotions are involved. If we were to give independence to Southern Rhodesia on terms which were unacceptable to our fellow members we would be likely to cause grievous injury to the unity of the Commonwealth and to the image it presents to the world. It is clear, therefore, that the whole Commonwealth will have to be consulted. I am wondering whether we might not go further than that. Might it not perhaps be possible for other members of the Commonwealth to help in a more positive way in the task of finding a generally acceptable solution?

Mr. J. Griffiths

I was going to welcome that suggestion. Might not the Secretary of State put that suggestion forward to the other members of the Commonwealth?

Mr. Sandys

These are perhaps what one might call dangerous thoughts, but I thought that I should mention to the House this afternoon how my mind was moving. I should like not to be pressed to say anything more precise at this juncture.

Finally, I should like to say this. The problem of Southern Rhodesia is a challenge to us all, to Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth, and most of all to the peoples of Southern Rhodesia itself. Somehow, we must together devise an honourable solution which will be fair to all. If we succeed, we shall have removed one of the most distressing and potentially explosive issues in the field of Commonwealth relations and far outside. Our modern multi-racial Commonwealth will once again have proved its importance as a promoter of understanding between the races, as a bridge between the continents, and as the great healer in this divided world.

Debate adjourned.—[Mr Pym.]

Debate to be resumed upon Monday next.