HC Deb 23 January 1963 vol 670 cc67-8
20. Mr. Swingler

asked the Minister of Defence what is his estimate of the increase in Britain's defence budget in the next few years involved in the decisions taken at the Bahamas meetings.

Mr. Thorneycroft

The strategic nuclear deterrent is expected to take about 10 per cent. of the defence budget next year. It is too early to say anything about subsequent years.

Mr. Swingler

Does that mean that the decisions were taken at the Bahamas meeting without any estimate being made of what the cost would be to Britain in the next few years?

Mr. Thorneycroft

Forward costings of projects as complex as this are not too reliable, and I would rather not tie myself to a precise percentage.

Mr. Swingler

What was the right hon. Gentleman's estimate, on the basis of the decision taken at the Bahamas meeting, of the cost of the defence budget for the next five or ten years?

Mr. Thorneycroft

I did not think that a firm estimate could be made.

Mr. Bellenger

In pinning his faith to this weapon, is not the Minister himself indulging in a great deal of speculation?

Mr. Thorneycroft

Speculation, and intelligent anticipation.

Mr. H. Wilson

In view of the recent reports of the Public Accounts Committee about the appalling miscalculations of the Defence Ministry on costs connected with missiles and atomic weapons, will the Minister think again about giving the House some information? Is it not a fact that when he came bouncing back from the Bahamas and appeared on television he was prepared to make sweeping categoric statements about what it would not cost? Could not the House of Commons be taken into his confidence?

Mr. Thorneycroft

It is easy to say what it would not cost, but I was asked to compare the cost of this with the cost of Skybolt. As one of the principal reasons for the Americans abandoning Skybolt was that it was impossible to cost it, it is obviously difficult to make a comparison between the two.