HC Deb 29 March 1962 vol 656 cc1556-9
Q1. Mr. Emrys Hughes

asked the Prime Minister if he is aware of the concern of the people of Japan over the resumption of nuclear tests, that in recent months there has been a marked increase in Strontium 90 in the content of milk and vegetables, that a further increase is expected in the months of April and May, that the Japanese Government are concerned about the possible dangers to the people of Japan if further nuclear tests at Christmas Island take place; and if, in view of these facts, he will make representations to President Kennedy to reconsider the decision to hold further tests in the Pacific.

Q5. Mr. Driberg

asked the Prime Minister if he has considered the newly published minutes of evidence given before the Armed Services Committee of the United States House of Representatives, containing the testimony of Mr. McNamara, United States Secretary of Defence, to the effect that, if nuclear testing is not resumed by the West, the balance of nuclear power will not shift to the Russians a copy of which has been sent to him; and if, in view of this authoritative statement, he will make a new approach to President Kennedy with a view to cancelling the Christmas Island tests.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan)

I am naturally aware of the concern of the Japanese people about nuclear tests. Anyone who had studied the statements that President Kennedy and I have made in the past few months would know that we both deeply regret the situation which has arisen as a result of the massive series of Russian tests last year. Both the President and I have made it clear that we would welcome nothing more than that the Russians would agree to a tests ban treaty which would make these tests unnecessary.

Mr. Hughes

Does the right hon. Gentleman think that that will give much satisfaction to the 94 million people in Japan, who are already fearing the results of the Russian tests and who are afraid of an increase of Strontium 90 in milk and especially in rice and vegetables? Will he read the Reuter report from Japan which appeared in the Glasgow Herald on 20th March so that he will, perhaps, reconsider his opinion?

The Prime Minister

I am aware of the Japanese Government's concern. They protested against the underground nuclear test conducted on 1st March, and they made abundantly clear their opposition to all forms of nuclear testing. In that, we agree with them. We only wish to find some way of bringing tests to an end. The question of Strontium 90 is a very complicated matter. I understand that the amount varies for meteorological reasons from month to month.

Mr. Driberg

With respect, the right hon. Gentleman has not answered the first part of my Question. Does he not agree that there is an extraordinary discrepancy between the testimony of the Secretary of Defence of the United States—who should be, presumably, as well informed about this matter as anybody—to the effect that resumption of tests would be completely unnecessary and the arguments used to justify the political decision to resume tests a week or two later?

The Prime Minister

No, Sir. I read the best report available of what Mr. McNamara said. I understand that he was defending himself against an accusation that the United States Government had ignored their duty in agreeing to a three-year unpoliced moratorium, during which massive preparation for further tests was being made by the Russians. He said that he disagreed with the point of view that this had put them ahead of the West.

This is not inconsistent with the view taken by Mr. McNamara and his colleagues in the National Security Council some months later, which was expressed by President Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy said that the Soviet Union had not gained superiority in nuclear power from its last series of tests but had acquired a mass of data and experience which it could use in preparing for a further test series.

A further Soviet test series, in the absence of further Western progress, could well provide the Soviet Union with a nuclear attack and defence capability so powerful as to encourage aggressive designs. It could endanger the Western deterrent.

The President and I, after discussion with our advisers, regretfully came to the conclusion that we could not risk waiting for the next series of Russian tests, but it is because we are still so anxious to find some way out that this matter is still under discussion, and I still hope that some solution might be found.

Mr. Gaitskell

Should not the representations referred to in Question No. Q1 be made to Mr. Khrushchev, and would the Prime Minister consider making them at a Summit Conference?

The Prime Minister

They are made known to Mr. Khrushchev. What we have to consider is the best method of making progress on this and on other issues which lie in dispute between us. It is not for want of trying, and I am always ready to try again, as I have said, where there is the best possibility of success.

Mr. Gaitskell

Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind the possibility that the Russian Government is unwilling to make any kind of advance towards the Western point of view through its Foreign Secretary and might be doing that in order to force a Summit Conference? If that should be the case, will he accept that position and propose a Summit Conference?

The Prime Minister

If that were so, it would be a very important consideration to bear in mind; but I think that it is a somewhat naïve view of the relations between the Head of the Russian Government and Mr. Gromyko. Certain advances which have been made in other fields clearly could not have been made without the approval of the Head of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Rankin

Can the Prime Minister tell us to what part of the Pacific the people of Christmas Island will be transferred as a matter of safety in the event of tests taking place?

The Prime Minister

There are 60 people on Christmas Island and there will be a very large number of other people who will take part in this experiment—some hundreds, if not thousands. The purpose is to conduct the experiment in such a way as to make the minimum of danger, and that was our experience with those which we made.