HC Deb 04 May 1960 vol 622 cc1200-26

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.— [Mr. Brooman-White.]

9.13 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg (Dudley)

A week ago tonight I sat through the whole of the debate on Blue Streak. To my chagrin I was not called but previous to the Easter Recess I had submitted my name to Mr. Speaker in the hope that I might get an Adjournment debate on the Britannic SC5. I am glad that I put "SC5", because the similarity between Britannic and a name that I am going to use often in this debate, the Britannia, might have confused my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) into thinking I was not talking about aircraft but about a ship, and that would have been most unfortunate.

I do not propose to talk about ships but about aircraft qua aircraft. I am interested in the defence of this country, particularly at this time. The subject of the Britannic has a relation to the debate on Blue Streak, but I am not going to inflict on the House the speech that I should have liked to have made on Blue Streak. That is a pleasure for which the House must wait, but it will come in due time.

There are one or two things arising from that debate that need to be said because I do not think either the House or the country have realised the full significance of the Blue Streak decision.

As we have plenty of time, let us go back to 1957. I do not complain about the loss of money on Blue Streak. I never complained about the concept which the Prime Minister asked the present Minister of Aviation to put into effect. It was a perfectly honourable and straightforward conception of getting rid of National Service—no more V-bombers, no jet fighters, a force which was to be an atomic, streamlined force with a high degree of mobility.

The central piece in the story was Blue Streak, which was to deliver the missile, and the logistic aircraft, the Britannic, which was to provide the mobility. If hon. Members doubt that, let them think back for a moment to two operations. The first was Suez. Suez, whatever the moral of it may be, failed because it could not be carried out at an August week-end, because there was not a brigade to ship and, even if there had been, there was not the mobility to transport it.

The next operation was Jordan. It is a great pity, and a cause for shame to both Front Benches, that the military implications of Suez and Jordan have never been discussed in the House. Our military thinking is the worse for that, and the great mass of our population are inclined to go awry on defence matters because the full significance of those operations is not understood.

I assert positively—and these statements are to be read in the dispatches of General Keightley which were published in September 1957—that we were short of aircraft. Look at Jordan. It is popularly assumed that we went into Jordan with ease, that we stayed there at will and that we were masters of the situation. Nothing could be further from the truth. We went into Jordan armed as we went into Suez—with an American anti-tank weapon. The Americans complained biterly that at Suez we used the 106 m.m. without their permission. Of course they did not complain about it in Jordan, but the fact is that from 22nd July onwards, our very small force in Jordan was sustained by the Lockhead C.130. If hon. Members doubt that, they should look at HANSARD of 15th July last year when I put Parliamentary Questions to the Secretary of State for Air to establish that no less than 1,500 tons of stores—a vast amount of stores for so small a force—were conveyed by American aircraft and that the Jordan operation could not have been carried out without this logistic assistance.

It is a matter of some interest that a pamphlet called "The Missile Years" was produced by a group called the Bow Group and written by a gentleman named Mr. Timothy Raison. I notice that he is an Etonian. This is a companion volume to that written by my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey). Hon. Members in all parts of the House who are connoisseurs in defence matters should acquire a copy of this pamphlet and of my right hon. Friend's pamphlet on the bomb before they go to be pulped. They axe worth the expenditure of a few coppers. If I ever lost my seat in the House I should try to earn my living by selling copies of both pamphlets at half price.

What do we read in the pamphlet by Mr. Timothy Raison on behalf of the Conservative Party? He refers to the strategic reserve and adds, with the aid of charter aircraft which the Government are able to use and which provided the whole of the airlift for the Jordan operation in 1958". Mr. Timothy Raison, like my right hon. Friend, is an Etonian. Who am I to challenge his intelligence? I can only assume that he knew the facts and that for party political reasons he preferred the public to be deluded into thinking that this country has mobility in its capacity to lift a force. It is obvious to any hon. Member, even if he is not interested in this subject, that if we are to cut down the size of our force at a time when its commitments tend to increase, then mobility is x in the equation, and if it cannot be solved, then the military inevitability of what happened at Suez or what might have happened in Jordan awaits us.

I turn to the Britannic and to the Minister of Aviation, formerly Minister of Defence, who I am sure is ably represented tonight by his Parliamentary Secretary. When he was Minister of Defence he informed the House on 11th February last year of a most important decision—as important as that about Blue Streak and as the decision to abandon it. He announced that the Government had decided to place an order with Short Bros. and Harland of Belfast for the Britannic, and it is worth while having a look at the words which he used.

He was answering a number of Questions which had been put down by right hon. and hon. Members opposite, some of whom represent Belfast constituencies, and with whom I have great sympathy. I have even more sympathy with their poor constituents—[Laughter.]—indeed, I have. I am discussing the defence aspect of this matter, but at the same time I am mindful of the thousands of people in Belfast and Northern Ireland as a whole who depend for their livelihood on the prosperity of Short Bros, and Harland, and anything that I can do to further their prosperity and see that they are provided with work, the better. I must say in parenthesis that the gods help those who help themselves and the first thing that the workers in Northern Ireland should do should be to get rid of their representation and get a representation based on facts.

Let me return to that very controversial figure, the late Minister of Defence. He said: In order to carry especially heavy and bulky loads, it has been decided to buy a number of long-range freighter aircraft for Royal Air Force Transport Command. The type selected is the Britannic 3, a freighter version of the Britannia to be built by Short and Harlands of Belfast."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th February, 1959; Vol. 599, c. 1163–4.] This was a decision that staggered me, but the reasons that the right hon. Gentleman gave staggered me even more.

I am not an expert in this subject. I have only such knowledge as I have been able to acquire by the limited means at my disposal. But I knew enough about the subject to know that the Britannia was a low-wing aircraft. Therefore, to suggest that the Britannic—to give it its new name—was a derivative of the Bri- tannia seemed to me most odd. What I did was to do what I always do. I tried to acquire such information as was open to me, and the first thing I got was a copy of a brochure relating to the Britannia and drawings of the Britannic. I want to give the House the advantages of my researches and we shall hear from the hon. Gentleman the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Aviation whether he agrees or disagrees. If any hon. Members would like to further their own studies, I would be glad to lend them the drawings of the Britannic and the brochure of the Britannia.

It is said that one is a derivative of the other. What do I find when comparing the Britannia with the Britannic? In the Britannia the wing location is low; in the Britannic it is a high wing. The fuselage length in the Britannia is 124 ft. and in the Britannic it is 136 ft. The fuselage diameter of the Britannia is 12 ft. and of the Britannic 17 ft. The cabin volume in the Britannia is 5,877 cu. ft. and in the Britannic 10,000 cu. ft. The tail height of the Britannia is 36 ft. and of the Britannic 48 ft. The gross weight of the Britannia is 175,000 lb. and of the Britannic 218,000 lb. The payload of the Britannia is 28,000 lb. and of the Britannic 85,000 lb. The landing gear of the Britannia is wing-mounted and of the Britannic fuselage-mounted. The gear tread in the Britannia is 31 ft. and in the Britannic 19 ft. The engines in the Britannia are Bristol Proteus and in the Britannic Rolls-Royce Tyne.

In fact, the only basic similarity between these two aircraft—and this was enough to convince the right hon. Gentleman—was the name. That was enough. This is not unimportant because if one was, in fact, a derivative of the other, then one could look forward to a spread-over of the development costs and, above all, one could look for a stepping up in time.

If we had failed in Jordan and at Suez because of logistic and air lift deficiencies, and we had only gone into Jordan on sufferance because the lift was provided by the United States Air Force, were we then to remain for years without any air lift at a time when Blue Streak was nothing more than a gamble and the right hon. Gentleman—and this is part of my case—knew a year ago that Blue Streak had failed, and that, therefore, the mobility of our conventional forces was absolutely vital. The time scale is indeed most important.

Again, with non-expert knowledge, but relying on such researches as I could undertake, I turned to an article that appeared in The Times of 12th February, the day after the right hon. Gentleman answered the Question in the House, and in the Manchester Guardian for the same date—12th February—in the magazine Flight of the 20th February, in The Aeroplane of the 20th February, and in an article entitled "The Short Britannic", which appeared in Shell Aviation News, for which I have not got the date. The dates that were put out at the time— that is, fifteen months ago—were that the prototype would fly by April, 1961, and that production would start in 1962.

Here we come to the second of the reasons given by the right hon. Gentleman. After being questioned by hon. Members on both sides of the House, including a direction question by the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton), and after giving the reason why the order was placed to my hon. Friend who also interjected on the same question, the Minister said that the reasons were that— it is a complicated requirement, which had to be considered very carefully not only inside the Government Departments concerned but also with the industry. The second is that we thought it right to try to choose an aeroplane which would not only meet military requirements but also might have a civilian market."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th February, 1959; Vol. 599, c. 1165.] This is a perfectly right and honourable reason, if it was practical, but I want again to inflict on the House the results of the inquiries which I have made and, if any hon. Gentleman wishes, I am quite willing to show him the papers, for what they are worth.

I have gone into the production of what I think is the most successful aeroplane that is now flying—the Lockheed C130—and hon. Gentlemen can judge for themselves whether what I say is correct or not when I tell them that 300 of these machines have been produced and are being operated. This company got to work on it in 1951 and were in production in a period of four years. I want to point out that it cost Lockheeds £200 million in development costs and 22 million man-hours of engineering and tooling effort, and they did the job in four years. Here is the Minister saying that we expect to get the prototype in 1961and be in production in 1962, but the prototype of this aircraft, the Britannic, is not yet flying, and it took Lockheeds 200 million dollars in development costs and 22 million man-hours.

Sir Arthur Vere Harvey (Macclesfield)

The hon. Gentleman said "pounds".

Mr. Wigg

I am much obliged, but I always get confused about millions of dollars, and I trust that I may be forgiven for nothing more than a slip of the tongue. I must not, however, get away from my argument. Lockheeds, with all their resources, did the job in four years, so that I suggest that we want to hear from the hon. Gentleman when he expects the prototype to fly and when it will come into production. My guess is that the most he can expect is that the prototype will fly in 1962 and that the aircraft will come into production in 1966.

Against that background, let us examine the possibility of it having a civilian market. Lockheed spread the development costs over 300 aircraft ordered up to the present time, and the demand is continuing. Probably, at the end of the day, the total will be spread over 500 or 600 aircraft. I have the price here of the Lockheed aircraft. It it 2.1 million dollars. The hon. Gentleman, presumably, after contact with the Minister of Aviation, without a blush tells us that the Government intend to order ten Britannics. That is the sum total of the order over which the development costs can be spread.

Now, let us consider what competition the Britannic will meet, not in 1961 or 1962but when it comes into production in 1966 or, if I am a little wrong, in 1965. By that time, the Lockheed company will have won through with the C130 and will be producing the G207. But, of course, far more important—the House and the Armed Forces must face this—is that the Britannic is a turboprop aircraft. It is not a jet. By 1966, this obsolescent aircraft will be obsolete by current standards, and it will have to meet competition from the Douglas DC 8 and Boeing 735, both of which are swing-tail jets having a far greater range and a far greater lifting capacity. Moreover—again, I repeat only what has been said to me in response to my inquiries—the Boeing 735 has already acquired orders for 400 aircraft. So it is at least two generations on, and the cost of development can be spread over 400 aircraft.

The Government, after months and months of vacillation, messing and mucking about, have still not placed the first order, yet they come to the House of Commons and with brazen-faced audacity suggest that they will order ten. One hon. Member today suggested that he would like to impeach one of his right hon. Friends. Very kindly, I did not press him about whom he meant. If I had a candidate, I should not mention his name now but hon. Members could guess who he was. Having played ducks and drakes and gambled with the defences of this country in terms of Blue Streak, he has —this is infinitely worse—played ducks and drakes with the mobility of the Army and its capacity to meet any emergency which may arise.

But even this is not all. The announcement was made on 11th February. On 2nd May, we still had not got a decision. The hon. Lady the Member for Belfast, West (Mrs. McLaughlin) and the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster) may well ask themselves why. I have tried to understand the matter and it seems extremely difficult. Again, I offer my conclusions to the House as the conclusions of a non-expert who has done no more than spend a little time on the subject. If I am wrong, I hope the hon. Gentleman will give me specific answers and put me right.

This aircraft, about which the announcement was made to the House fifteen months ago, has had three different lengths. Short Bros, announced its length as 132 ft. in October, 1958, as 148 ft., in March, 1959, and, in June or July last year when I was doing my own work after the announcement, the length was 136 ft.

Again, even that is not the whole story. When I make inquiries in informed quarters, I am told that it is a matter of astonishment that the claims made for this aircraft not by Short Bros, and Harland—I do not blame that concern—but by the Minister are regarded as quite fantastic, not only inside the aircraft industry but even by the technical staff of the Air Ministry. I am told that the Air Ministry advisers openly challenged the statements made about the possibility of flights in 1960. We now know that no flights will take place in 1960.

We know even a little more about this matter. Even on the eve of this decision, inquiries were being made in the United States, through the British Joint Services Mission in Washington, to have a look at comparable American aircraft which are so vastly better as even to defy comparison. If hon. Members doubt what I say, I will tell them the name of the member of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington who made formal inquiry. It was Mr. Douglas Robson. I make this statement because again the House ought to be aware of the serious nature of this decision if it is continued, not only for the Army, but for the defences of this country as a whole.

Let me repeat that I have the utmost sympathy with the hon. Members who represent Belfast constituencies, with the workers in their constituencies and all those whose livelihood depends on the prosperity of Short Bros. and Harland. But they ought to learn. They are not serving the interests of their constituents in encouraging the Government, particularly the present Minister of Civil Aviation, whose obstinacy and infinite capacity to maintain a wrong decision up to the point of his getting the "sack" are now recognised on an international basis in this piece of nonsense. What is wanted in Short Bros. and Harland is a piece of successful equipment so that the skill of the workers in Belfast can be used to further their prosperity and serve the national interest.

I regret that this aspect of the problem centred around Blue Streak. I would never have approached the Blue Streak problem nor this problem in terms of wasted money. I do not play golf, but I understand that no sensible golfer ever bases his game on the possibility of holing in one. A person holes in one once in a lifetime, and then it is by accident. But the policy of the right hon. Gentleman, when he was Minister of Defence, was based on the calculation that he could bring off Blue Streak and the Britannic, a double event which could be measured only in terms of light years because the chances are so astronomical.

I will give hon. Members a couple of very simple figures. The total amount of the United States' defence budget for 1961 is 41,000 million dollars. The amount spent on missiles—and I will convert it into sterling—is £1,893 million, a sum larger than the whole of our defence budget. The amount they spend on aircraft is £2,320 million. This is some 50 per cent. in excess of our budget.

If sums like that are being spent, they are being spent because there is no certainty. One has to pick several horses at the start of a race and then hope that one of them may pull it off. Therefore, as far as I was concerned Blue Streak was always bound to fail. I say without any arrogance but with grave humility that, having seen the 1957 White Paper, I could sit back and be absolutely certain about that. I was alone on these benches in my opposition to it on the basis of the 1957 White Paper. This was because of my mathematical genius in being able to add two and two together and get the right answer, and to recognise the answer when I got it. For those reasons, I was absolutely certain that Blue Streak could never be successful.

Nor could the Britannic. I did my homework fifteen months ago and I knew with absolute certain knowledge that this was an obsolete aircraft which was ordered in Northern Ireland for no reasons of defence but because the General Election was pending and the Government wanted to deal with a possible difficult political situation there. Blue Streak was continued for the same reason.

I pay my tribute to the scientists, the technicians and the business executives who produced Blue Streak, for it was a great British technical success, but it was also a military disaster. I pay my tribute to the small number—they were a very small number—who engaged in the production of the Britannic. Again, that is a military disaster, and it is on the military disaster that I lay the emphasis tonight.

The alternative at this stage is for the Government to recognise the facts of life. The Minister of Aviation ought, of course to resign. If he had any decency, he would behave like a Japanese gentleman and go and commit hara-kari. He certainly should never show his face here again in view of what he has done and what he continues to do.

Yet who can point the finger of scorn at any man because he makes a mistake in this field? The dice are loaded against him. One cannot succeed every time with this sort of project. We hear a great amount about the Russian successes, but we do not hear about their failures, and their failures must be just as great as anybody else's.

When I look at the way the Britannic problem has been handled and the way the Blue Streak problem has been handled, I am astonished at the success of British enterprise and am absolutely certain that if the resources which were available in the United States or the Soviet Union were available here they would still not see the way we went for dust. I am sure of it. The tragedy about all these things is that the margin between our success and our failure is to find the will, establish the priorities and then follow them through even when they are politically unpopular.

There are many hon. Members opposite—I would say that there is an increasing number—beginning with the right hon. Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head) and the right hon. Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch), and there are many others, who know full well that I am speaking the truth and that the conception which I am putting to the House is sound and is based upon facts. They know also in their hearts and minds that if this country does not face up to the facts it will sooner or later be not only Blue Streak but catastrophic disaster. One cannot go on with this game throwing away one's limited resources and then relying upon friendly public relations, at which there is no greater champion and master than the Minister of Aviation. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman was, I think, born to be a plumber, because his leaks are innumerable. Hon. Gentlemen who doubt that should have a look at the Daily Express for 12th February and at the White Paper dated 16th February. The Daily Express honoured us by giving a direct quotation from the Defence White Paper four days before the White Paper was published. That is not done at a very law level. It is done at Ministerial level. It is done by an interested party. I have a pretty shrewd idea of what goes on.

I do not apologise to hon. Members for keeping them tonight on this very important subject. I do not expect the Government to announce forthwith that they are going to abandon the Britannic, but I will make the prophecy that just as I was sure that the Government's conscription policy would fail and just as I was sure that the Blue Streak would ultimately go, so this will go.

I will tell the House and I am prepared to eat my words if I am wrong. I have proved beyond doubt that the derivation of the Britannic from the Britannia exists only in the Minister's imagination. I will go further and say of his hopes of selling the Britannic in the civilian market that he will sell exactly none. It has no civilian market. As a military instrument, it is useless. There are better-known projects, like the Vickers VC10, all of which could be phased in if there were the will, but the responsibility for this does not rest on this side of the House. Hon. Members opposite have no excuse for not knowing the facts, because none of the information that I have given tonight is not available to them if they only take the trouble. If they do that, they will avoid at least one more major scandal in defence.

9.46 p.m.

Mr. Stanley R. McMaster (Belfast, East)

I have sat here intrigued by the speech of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). It was a very fine political speech, but I am afraid that his verbosity carried him away. He says that he is mainly interested in the defence needs of this country, but how could we better serve those defence needs than by providing our Services with a plane produced here in the United Kingdom rather than with one, as the hon. Member suggested, built in America?

The hon. Member produced a great number of facts and figures and said that he had done a great deal of research into the comparative payloads and ranges of the different planes that are available. I have also done some research because I have quite a considerable constituency interest in this plane. After studying the alternative planes available, I have no doubt at all that the Britannic is very much better than any other that is available in the world or any other which, as the hon. Member admitted, would be available within the next five or six years.

The Britannic was based on the Britannia. It is a four-engined turboprop plane and a high-wing rather than a low-wing plane. This is a very necessary modification in a freighter aircraft. It brings considerable advantages. It opens a wide, clear, unobstructed fuselage from front to back with special loading facilities at the back right through to the front which enables all kinds of military equipment to be loaded, from medium-sized tanks to heavy trucks and oil tankers. Even four Whirlwind helicopters can be taken inside the massive fuselage of the Britannic.

It is useless to compare it with a swing-nosed jet aircraft to be built in America. A jet aircraft is a much slimmer, sleeker and faster plane, but it has no fuselage capable of taking the items of military equipment which our forces may require when they are engaged in operations in various parts of the world. We have to fly troops, tanks, and even supporting helicopters to the Middle East and Far East.

I should like to quote some comparative figures relating to the Britannic and contrasting it with some of the planes mentioned by the hon. Member for Dudley. The maximum payload of the Britannic is 84,600 lb. That is a very high payload. It has a fuselage capacity of 11,700 cubic feet. The dimensions inside are over 12 ft. square. The maximum height in the centre of the fuselage is 13½ ft., but nowhere throughout the length of the fuselage is there less clearance than 12 ft. both ways, unobstructed by spars at the bottom or at the side.

Reference was made to the Lockheed. The payload which a C130B will take is 35,000 lb. as opposed to the maximum payload of the Britannic of about 85,000 lb. The maximum range of the Lockheed is 3,000 nautical miles. The Britannic, varying with the payload, has a range which is considerably greater than that of the Lockheed.

Mr. George Chetwynd (Stockton-on-Tees)

Will the hon. Member give the range with the maximum payload?

Mr. McMaster

The range with maximum payload is 750 nautical miles. If it has a payload of 50,000 lb., which is still considerably larger than that of the Lockheed, it has a range of 2,100 miles. The graph of its payload as against range is considerably better than that of the Lockheed. In addition, the Lockheed has been in production for some time. Over 300 of the planes have been built, and it has been modified and improved, and the present Lockheed is at the end of its development.

Mr. Wigg

The hon. Member must be reasonably fair. He is making comparisons between the Britannic in five years' time and the Lockheed 130, which is at the end of its tether. He must make comparison between the Lockheed G207, which will be obsolete by the time those aircraft are flying.

Mr. McMaster

I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because he makes the point that I am trying to make. The Lockheed is clearly at the end of its tether. The Britannic is not at the end of its tether.

Mr. Wigg

What about the delivery date?

Mr. McMaster

If the hon. Gentleman will not anticipate my remarks, I will come in a short time to the delivery date. For the moment I am restricting myself to the comparison. I do not accept the delivery figures suggested by the hon. Gentleman. The Lockheed G207 product has a maximum payload of less than 80,000 lbs. In other words, it is about 7,000 lbs. less than that of the Britannic. The fuselage of the G207 has not the same capacity as that of the Britannic. It has not the same clearance, nor can it take the same type of equipment as the Britannic aircraft. Also, the Britannic, which is a turbo-prop and has 20 ft. clearance between each of the engine pods, is capable of development with the use of larger propellers which will place it far and away above the Lockheed, the DC8, or the Boeing 735, which has been referred to tonight.

What are the advantages of the Britannic? The Britannic has very great flexibility as an Army freighter plane. It has a take-off distance of 2,430 ft. In other words, it is capable of taking off from even the smallest temporary airfields.

Comparing the Britannic with larger jet aircraft, one must remember that while jet aircraft have a lower cubic capacity they are also very much heavier planes, weighing half as much again as the Britannic and some of them twice as much. The cost would be equivalently higher, because the cost of a freighter aircraft is directly related to its weight and if the weight of a jet freighter is 50 per cent. higher than that of a Britannic, the cost would be 50 per cent. higher.

The Britannic could be used both as a strategic and tactical freighter. It is capable of carrying not only important items of equipment, such as tanks, but also the ballistic missiles which we have been debating recently, Thor and Jupiter.

Mr. Wigg

Except that they do not exist.

Mr. McMaster

It could also carry other items of equipment which, unfortunately, it is impossible to mention in detail because they are on the secret list.

Its engines are capable of great development and, with new and better engines, not only for military purposes but in the civil market, the Britannic would be capable of reducing air-freight costs considerably. It might reduce air-freight costs by as much as 50 per cent.

Mr. Wigg

I gave my forecast of the number of aircraft which would be sold and I said nil. Will the hon. Gentleman give his estimate of the number which will be sold to the civil market?

Mr. McMaster

That is a question which I would not venture to answer, because I do not have the expert knowledge which, in spite of his protests, the hon. Member has. Certainly the potential of this aircraft for the civil market, with the figures which I have quoted of its range and its capacity, is very much better than that of any other aircraft likely to be produced.

The hon. Member mentioned production dates. I press the Parliamentary Secretary to use all his weight with the Government to see that the contract is signed expeditiously so that production of the plane can be expedited, but if the contract is signed with reasonable expedition then the plane can be in production in 1964 and not 1965 or 1966 as the hon. Member suggested. The first planes can be flying by the end of 1963 and the plane itself can be in production in 1964.

This plane will be a world-beater and will have a potential as a turbo-prop aircraft which, because of its ease of loading and unloading, its capacity and size and the great economy and power of its engines, is very much more suited to freighter work than is a jet plane.

For those reasons, I add all my weight to opposing all the comments of the hon. Member opposite, comments which can do no good to the aircraft industry in this country and Northern Ireland and to the people who work in Short and Harlands.

9.59 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes (South Ayrshire)

If the arguments of the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster) are correct, then his criticism should be directed against the lethargy of the Minister, and so should the wrath of the other Members from Northern Ireland.

It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Chichester-Clark.]

Mr. Hughes

If the arguments of the hon. Member for Belfast, East are so strong, then he should have attacked the Minister with a far greater vehemence than did my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). There is some mystery about this, because according to the hon. Member this is one of the most wonderful aircraft that has ever been produced and it would have solved, or partially solved, the unemployment problem in Belfast. For two reasons the Government stand condemned, so there can be no excuse for the Government.

I suspect that, behind this mystery, there is something that demands a greater measure of public inquiry and investigation. If the facts are as stated by my hon. Friend and by the hon. Member opposite, then there is surely a demand for an inquiry. I suspect that this is only one of a series of scandals connected with the aircraft production industry and the Ministry of Aviation. I would like to see not only an inquiry into the financial and military implications of Blue Streak and of the Britannic, but also into the Swift. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Yes. I am not arguing in a partisan manner at all. I have been arguing about waste on military aircraft under both Governments.

I would like to see a Select Committee investigating the whole range of how much money has been spent on aircraft which have become obsolete and which have been started since we came to the conclusion that it was necessary to enter into an arms race with the Soviet Union. If a fraction of this money which has been spent on missiles and military aircraft had been put into civil aircraft and the development of our civil aviation, we would now have had an asset of advantage to the people of this country.

An enormous amount of money— whether tens or hundreds or thousands of millions of pounds, I do not know—has been wasted on military aircraft and is to be wasted on missiles. When we talk about our programmes being continued until 1965 and into the next decade, and when we are told that we are to invest such a large amount of our national wealth in this completely futile attempt to compete with the Soviet Union or the United States, then the time has come to say that it should stop.

I suggest that both from Belfast and from Dudley we have had a prima facie case for a thorough-going inquiry into the ramifications of this industry. The right hon. Gentleman, who was formerly Minister of Supply, knows something of the technological progress in the Soviet Union and of the new progress that is coming along there. It is completely futile to imagine that we can ever take part in this kind of arms race—either in aircraft or ballistic missiles—with any prospect of success. I suggest that the lesson to be learned from the present situation is that it is time to call a halt. We have had the Blue Streak scandal, the Britannic scandal and the Swift scandal —and I suspect that there are many more unsavoury scandals lurking behind the scenes somewhere.

My hon. Friend has put a case which is very difficult for the Minister to answer. This matter should be pressed perpetually upon the Minister and the Government until the policy is changed.

10.6 p.m.

Sir Arthur Vere Harvey (Macclesfield)

It is clear that the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) did not brief himself on this subject, whereas his hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) went to great trouble. I only wish that he had taken his researches back a year or two, when the Labour Government were in power. During the period of the trouble at Abadan we could not even borrow American aircraft. The troops were transported by aircraft carrier and took 14 days to get through the Mediterranean. The party opposite has something to answer for in respect of that period, and if the hon. Member talks about inquiries and scandals I would remind him that there is plenty to inquire about on his own Front Bench in relation to defence matters.

There are one or two aspects of the Britannic aircraft situation about which I should like to be reassured. Fifteen months ago we were told that the order was to be placed, but the contract has still not been signed. Last week the Parliamentary Secretary gave us a reason and talked about the question of costing. I have been connected with the aircraft industry for thirty years, and I should like to know how many modifications have been asked for by the Air Ministry since the announcement was first made. If we knew that, we might be nearer the truth of the matter.

Although the Government hold the majority of the shares, in the meantime Shorts are financing this contract themselves, and it seems unfair that the firm should be supplying the money. I should like to know whether any progress payments are being made in the meantime. The former Minister of Supply told us last year that the airlines required an aircraft of this type. Ten aircraft means nothing at all. If development costs were spread over that number of aircraft they would be astronomical. What are the civil prospects for this aircraft when it is in production? Will the Government place a further order, to bring the number of aircraft up to twenty?

Now that we are going back to the manned bomber—the V-bomber with the Skybolt—there is a greater necessity than ever for this type of transport aircraft, if it is available in the next year or two. In fact, we need such an aircraft today. I hesitate to suggest that we should buy foreign aircraft, but I would suggest that we try to hire a dozen or 20 American aircraft for two or three years in order to ensure that we have the lift available to move our troops about and so give them mobility.

If the V-bombers are to carry the Sky-bolt, I should like to know whether turbo-propeller aircraft are fast enough to move the equipment and men to service the V-bombers when they are dispersed throughout the world. From the economical point of view, the turbo-propeller aircraft may eventually come into fashion for civil use. Trans-Canada ordered another three Vanguards last week, and when this aircraft is in operation I believe it will prove so economical that people will want to travel in it. They will quite happily travel cheaply and safely at 410 m.p.h., as opposed to 600 m.p.h. The Government may be right in this respect, but I am unhappy about the number of aircraft ordered. It does not make sense to order only ten aircraft.

I have a great regard for the management of Shorts and the people in the factory, but there is no doubt that when one is developing a modern aircraft today one needs a tremendous staff. One cannot put on 100, 150, or 250 draughtsmen. One needs a thousand draughtsmen. A big effort is needed and one wonders whether it would not be advisable for Shorts, whom we know are controlled by the Government, if not to amalgamate, at least to work in partnership with one of the big airframe groups, either Vickers or Hawker Siddeley, and put their full weight behind the project to get it out in the shortest possible time.

I am certain that it will not be flying for a long time even if Shorts do everything that they can. I know that the firm is doing its best, and I ask my hon. Friend to represent to his right hon. Friend that more effort should be made to help the project. The sooner it is produced, the sooner we shall have a transport aircraft, and the sooner we shall have something to sell in foreign markets. It could be a good commercial proposition if it were not delayed for too long.

Mrs. Patricia McLoughlin (Belfast, West)

Does my hon. Friend agree that in this case it would be of great help if a larger number of aircraft were ordered so that we could get on with in it a bigger way and have a greater possibility of making it an economic success?

Sir A. V. Harvey

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. She is dead right. The hon. Gentleman says that development costs need to be spread over 300 aircraft, but it is not a question of 300. One could spread them satisfactory over 100 with the cost of labour in this country. If 100 were produced, that would probably be an economic number, or maybe even 75.

I hope my hon. Friend will realise that we are not happy about the way in which this project has progressed. I should like to see more decisions taken, and more ginger put behind the whole effort, because at the moment it is dragging on. An order for ten for this vital requirement for our services is insufficient. We must be able to move men and equipment rapidly—

Mr. Emrys Hughes

Where to?

Sir A. V. Harvey

To different parts of the Commonwealth, and in support of our obligations in N.A.T.O. I know that the hon. Gentleman does not believe in N.A.T.O., but the rest of Europe does. I ask my hon. Friend to see what can be done to get behind this problem, because the House will not be happy while this matter drags on.

10.13 p.m.

Mr. George Chetwynd (Stockton-on-Tees)

My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has done a public service not only for the defence of this country but for the well-being of Northern Ireland, and we share the desire that the work will be carried on there.

I shall be grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary if he will answer the questions that have been asked. The most important one seems to be, when will this plane be available? Why is it that we have lost two years in its development? Does he expect that it will be in operation by 1964 at the earliest? My view is that it will be rather later than that. How many will be ordered? What are the prospects for civilian use? Finally, will he say whether the contract has been settled, and what the cost will be?

It is no good dealing with all the wonderful intentions of what this plane will do. We are dealing with realities, and I want to know what stage it is in and when it will come to our aid in the transport world.

10.14 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Aviation (Mr. Geoffrey Rippon)

I am glad that the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) raised this important matter, together with Blue Streak, Jordan, Eton, the Bow Group, and Northern Ireland. In the short time available to me I will try to answer the many questions that he asked on the subject of the Britannic SC 5, now known more frequently as the Britannic 3A.

This debate gives me the opportunity to clear up a number of misapprehensions which the hon. Gentleman has voiced from time to time, and which evidently have not been entirely eliminated by repetition of the facts at Question Time. I should like first to clear up the history of the project and to try to straighten out the hon. Gentleman on the matter of dates. First, there has been no delay in the advertised programme. I hope that what I have to say will also answer the question put by the hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. Chetwynd).

On 11th April this year, and not for the first time, the hon. Member for Dudley alleged that when my right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation, then the Minister of Defence, made his first announcement on 11th February, 1959, he said that the aircraft would fly in 1961 and that it had been indicated that it would be in operation by 1962.

On 6th July last year the hon. Member, in a supplementary question to the Minister, said that the Minister of Defence had made a statement that the prototype would fly in 1961 and that it would be in production at the end of 1961 or 1962. We now know that that timetable is out of date."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th July, 1959; Vol. 608. c. 886.] I should like to make it clear that it is on the record that the hon. Member's recollections are not based on the facts. No Minister has said at any time that the Britannic would fly in 1961. On 11th February, 1959, my hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) put a supplementary question as follows: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Blackburn 107 could be in the air in five years? Can he say whether the new Britannia will be flying within the same period of time? That is, within five years from 1959. My right hon. Friend replied, Yes, roughly."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th February, 1959; Vol. 599, c. 1164.] That seems to be a very fair estimate.

On 29th June, 1959, in answer to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey), the then Minister of Supply said, The prototype should be flying in 1962 and is expected to enter service in 1964."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th June, 1959; Vol. 608, c. 6.] That, broadly speaking, is the timetable.

Mr. Wigg

I agree that the right hon. Gentleman the Minister for Aviation is much too smart to use those words himself, but if the hon. Member will be kind enough to read the Guardian of 12th February and The Times and other papers he will find in each case the same dates, given on the authority of the company.

Mr. Rippon

The only excuse, and in my view a very thin excuse, for the way in which the hon. Member has repeated statements which he knows to be inaccurate is that he can look to certain Press reports which he himself admits are not inspired by the Minister and which were put out at a very early stage—

Mr. Wigg

They are inspired by the Minister.

Mr. Rippon

—and before the detailed specifications had been agreed. It is quite wrong of him to found an allegation of the kind which he makes against my right hon. Friend on the basis of those newspaper cuttings. He has said in the House time after time that the Minister made a statement on 11th February, 1959, to that effect when it is perfectly clear to anyone who reads HANSARD that he did not.

Mr. Wigg

He did.

Mr. Rippon

The second allegation which the hon. Member tends to make is that the order was not placed on military considerations but on economic or financial grounds. I would say clearly that it was decided that the Britannic was the best of the designs which were submitted —and that which was likely to be first in the field—to meet our military requirements. Following detailed studies of long-term military requirements in transport in 1956–57, the Government examined some eighteen months ago alternative suggestions for a prototype strategic freighter to be introduced into service in the mid-sixties. This examination was made against the background that although it was clear that for some considerable time the main strategic transport aircraft for carrying troops and freight over long distances would remain, as far as we were concerned, the Britannia, this aircraft was unsuitable for the transport of certain bulky items of equipment. That is a matter to which my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster) referred, in particular. It was also apparent that additional large freighter aircraft would be needed.

Against that background, the Government examined the proposals for the supply of a long-range freighter aircraft which were submitted during 1958 by a number of aircraft manufacturers. From the operational viewpoint the main considerations which had to be taken into account were capacity and scope of pay-load, ease of loading, range—taking into account the various kinds of payload —length of runway required and the operating costs. There was obviously the important question as to the probable time scale of development and production and the cost likely to be involved.

I have said that operational characteristics were not the sole considerations, but they were the main considerations which had to be taken into account. Economic, industrial and commercial considerations also had to be weighed, and obviously the Government had to have in mind from the outset that it would be a great advantage if the military aircraft could also be developed for commercial use. The Britannic was selected to meet the R.A.F.'s long-range freighter requirement following submissions by a number of aircraft manufacturers. Following the announcement which was made on 11th February, 1959, further studies in consultation with the design staffs of Short Bros, and Harland indicated that certain design changes would make possible considerable improvements, such as an increased wing span, the widening of the engine centres and the substitution of the developed Rolls-Royce Tyne 12 for the Tyne 11 engine.

Mr. Wigg

In fact, a new aircraft.

Mr. Rippon

These changes not only have an advantage from the military operational point of view but also make it possible for the design to be stretched by further developments in the light of technological progress. They were designed to make possible lower operating costs and thus improve, as my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield indicated that they might do, the prospect of civil sales. All that can be achieved within the time scale to which I have referred.

My hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield particularly asked what modifications had been made. I have time to list the main ones only. The main ones were the increase in wing span by 16 ft., brought about by the addition of the new centre portion. Secondly, the engine centres were moved further apart so that larger propellers can be fitted later if it is desired to take advantage of improved versions of the Tyne engine. Thirdly, the maximum all-up weight was increased to 218,000 lb. and the maximum fuel capacity to 81,000 lb.

Mr. Wigg

The only thing which remained was the name.

Mr. Rippon

This enabled the Britannic 3A to meet the Air Staff requirement of a range of 3,600 nautical miles with a payload of 30,000 lb., with variations according to mileage and payload.

The hon. Member for Dudley says that this aircraft is not a development of the Britannia, that it is a new aircraft. I would say that the completely new components on the Britannic are the fuselage, the wing centre section, the main undercarriage, and the engine installation. The remaining sections of the wing, the nose, undercarriage, fin, rudder, elevator, tail planes and flight deck are closely related to the Britannia.

Probably an indication of how closely it is related to the Britannia is found in the fact that it will be possible to make extensive use of only slightly modified Britannia jigs and tools, which represents a great saving. It is also significant that the Air Registration Board is willing to waive many of the tests on the Britannic wing for the reason that it regards it as similar in many respects to the Britannia wing for the Board's purpose.

I would say in answer to the hon. Member for Dudley that the Britannic design has not been derived from the American aircraft, although the general shape and function are similar, The hon. Gentleman had a lot to say about American aircraft. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, East has already answered some of those points. The hon. Member for Dudley referred particularly to the Lockheed C 130 series, particularly the 130A and 130B known as the Hercules. It is clear that the range and payload of the Britannic 3A is superior to that of the Hercules. It is not therefore fair to make a comparison between these two aircraft. It has also been compared by some people to the Super Hercules—the Lockheed development of the earlier C 130A and B, but that is smaller in capacity than the Britannic. It is still a paper project and one for which I am told there is no customer yet.

There is the C 133 Douglas Cargo-master which is somewhat larger, but it is quite ridiculous for the hon. Member against that background to talk of American aircraft being vastly superior to ours. As the hon. Member for Belfast, East said, it is a curious argument to come from the hon. Member for Dudley that it is better to buy an American aircraft even though we have one of our own which meets our own requirements and which can be produced in the time scale that we want. I agree that there is much more to be said during an interim period for a proposal to hire, but there is nothing whatever to be said for the proposal to buy.

The hon. Member for Dudley changed his tack again and said that it would have been much better to have bought an American aircraft than to relieve unemployment in Northern Ireland. He said that he had the utmost sympathy with the representatives of Northern Ireland, but that it was quite wrong to choose an aircraft, not on its merits, but in relation to the economic situation. I think that is what he was saying. Here is another example of where hon. Members opposite are so much at variance. The then Minister of Supply received this telegram on 3rd January, 1959: Following talks with workers here I very much hope Britannic freighter contract will be given to Shorts, thus preventing already serious unemployment position being greatly aggravated. That telegram was signed by the Leader of the Opposition.

Mr. Wigg

I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman. I knew of the existence of this telegram, and I was utterly sure that if my case were sound the hon. Gentleman would produce it. Knowing that the telegram was there, I still say— Leader of the Opposition or not, and I have opposed him before and shall oppose him again—that the consideration must be the best for this country and not one of political expediency.

Mr. Rippon

I leave this as one of the very many matters on which the Opposition are divided. That is perhaps as far as we can take it. I think I have said enough to make it clear that the main reason for adopting this aircraft was a military one, but even supposing that one of the factors taken into account was the need to alleviate unemployment in Northern Ireland, I should not have thought that it was something to be criticised by hon. Members opposite. It is perfectly clear that we can produce in our own country an aircraft which meets our requirements.

Mr. Chetwynd

We made it perfectly clear at the time the decision was taken that if there was a better aircraft and it did not originate at Shorts, there was no earthly reason why it should not be sub-contracted to Northern Ireland to provide employment.

Mr. Rippon

I have made it clear that the Britannic was the best available in this field.

I want to refer to the question of the contract, which was not one with which the hon. Member for Dudley was concerned, and therefore I thought it right to deal with it last, although I appreciate that it is extremely important. I do not think I can add very much to what was said in answer to a very recent Question —only on Monday, in fact. It is appreciated that what we have in mind is a fixed price contract, and that necessarily entails a great deal of work in relation to an aircraft which will cost well over £1 million. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] As I have said, we hope that these contract negotiations will soon be completed, but if unexpected difficulties arise, my right hon. Friend would consider the point which has been raised about the desirability of an interim contract.

I think that the important thing—and this answers the question of the hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees—is that we are assured by the company that there is no hold-up because of the contract negotiations. Some five hundred design staff and technicians are already employed on the project. The whole effort is building up according to plan, and a start has been made on tooling for production.

In conclusion, we expect the Britannic to be a most valuable addition to Transport Command's strategic airlift resources, and we also hope that the company will be able to obtain its share of the world market in civil freighters. I cannot, of course, say what the company's prospects are. The company can state that better than I can, but it is confident of the future of this aircraft and it clearly believes in it, in the same way as my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, East believes in it. My hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield has himself said that he believes that it has great commercial possibilities.

One other point I might add in relation to this aircraft. It will be the first military transport aircraft designed to have automatic blind landing facilities, of which an improved version is being developed, and I hope that that system will be widely adopted for civil operation. I can assure the hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. Chetwynd) and the House that the Government will take all possible steps to bring this aircraft into service as soon as possible and within the time scale which has already been announced.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes past Ten o'clock.