HC Deb 11 February 1959 vol 599 cc1155-63
6. Mr. Frank Allaun

asked the Minister of Defence if he will make a statement on tactical atomic bombs, explaining in what circumstances they might be used, the current expenditure on them, their kiloton power, and area of destruction; and to what extent it is intended to increase the present stock.

36. Mr. Mellish

asked the Minister of Defence what new arrangements have been made in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to ensure the issue of clear political directives to the military commanders on the use of nuclear weapons.

3 and 4. Mr. Hale

asked the Minister of Defence, (1) what thermonuclear or atomic weapons are now classified as strategic, tactical and defensive; and in which cases is special cabinet, or ministerial or supreme headquarters authority required for their use;

(2) what is the present estimated maximum area of total destruction for strategic and tactical thermonuclear and atomic weapons, respectively.

Mr. Sandys

The question whether a weapon is being used in a strategic or a tactical rôle depends not upon its explosive power, but upon the nature and location of the target. I have no fresh information to give the House about the size of our stock of nuclear weapons or about their cost and explosive power, or about the procedure for authorising their use.

Mr. Allaun

Does the Minister seriously believe that a British atom bomb could be dropped without starting a hydrogen bomb war; or that the potential enemy would have the time to measure the area of devastation before deciding the nature of the bomb responsible for it? Their standard of defining a tactical bomb might differ from ours.

Mr. Sandys

I think the hon. Gentleman prepared his supplementary question before he heard my reply, in which I made it clear that there is no way of drawing a line between what is a tactical and what is a strategic weapon except in relation to the target against which it is used. If, for example, an H.E. bomb were to be dropped on Moscow I would consider that to be a strategic weapon.

Mr. Mellish

Surely, the potential of these weapons is so tremendous that the whole question of directives given to military commanders in the field is of paramount importance. Can we not have an assurance from the Minister that a clear directive is in existence that these weapons cannot and must not be used until political permission has been obtained? After all, some of these tactical weapons have two and a half times the power of the bomb that was dropped over Hiroshima. Surely we must have political command concerning this.

Mr. Sandys

Again, I would not distinguish between the two classes of weapons. Naturally, there are proper arrangements for ensuring that these weapons are not loosed off without due consideration.

Mr. Mellish

Are there proper arrangements? What are they?

Mr. G. Brown

It is difficult at first sight to understand why the Minister has joined Questions Nos. 6 and 36, which deal with entirely different situations. I wish to ask a supplementary question on Question No. 36. Is it not a fact that there were no clear political directives to the military commanders at S.H.A.P.E. as recently as a few months ago as to who would decide the weapons to be used in the event of a conflict and about who retained effective control over any decision to bring any kind of nuclear weapon into play? Question No. 36 asks the Minister whether any clear political directives have now been given. As I understand the right hon. Gentleman to be saying that they do exist, they must be new, because they did not exist formerly. Will he tell the House what these clear political directives are?

Mr. Sandys

It is not a matter to be discussed in public. The right hon. Gentleman should not assume that he is in possession of all the facts.

Mr. Brown

That is the whole point of asking Questions. If I were in possession of the whole of the facts, I would not need to ask. This is not a private game for the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues, but involves all the rest of us in Western Europe. On behalf of people who will be affected, am I not entitled to ask what political directives the Ministers in N.A.T.O. have Issued to the military commanders in the field?

Mr. Sandys

All I am saying is that it would be very helpful to anybody who was planning an act of aggression against the West to have just that information.

Mr. Bevan

It would be exceedingly helpful to us also if we had confidence in the right hon. Gentleman's clarity of mind. In the first instance he told us that there would be directives about these weapons. At the same time he said that it was not easy to define the weapons. In Question No. 6 he was asked to state the destructive power of the tactical atomic weapon. He has not told the House. He has not defined a tactical atomic weapon as against a strategic weapon, although he thinks that he has special directives for categories which he is unable to define.

Mr. Sandys

I will not comment on the right hon. Gentleman's clarity of mind as revealed in his question. [Interruption.] He suggested that I was not very clear in my own mind. I thought I had made it quite clear that there was no possible definition in terms of explosive power as between a tactical and a strategic weapon. It depends on the purpose for which it is used and the target against which it is used. The reason why I coupled the two Questions together was that they were coupled also with Question No. 3, which was not called because the hon. Member for Oldham. West (Mr. Hale) was not present. This Question dealt with both these subjects and it was difficult to separate them.

Mr. Bevan

Is the Minister aware that the statement he has made to the House is not supported by any general; and that the generals have indeed defined, with respect both to explosive power and to target areas, what they consider to be tactical atomic weapons as against strategic weapons? The right hon. Gentleman's answer makes nonsense.

Mr. Sandys

I am glad to hear that for the first time the right hon. Gentleman always regards what generals say as gospel truth.

Mr. Mellish

In view of the thoroughly unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment and shall hope to get some information.

7. Mr. Swingler

asked the Minister of Defence whether it is still the Government's policy, as laid down in paragraphs 12 and 23 of the 1958 Defence White Paper, to use strategic nuclear weapons against a major attack with conventional arms involving any country covered by the collective defence provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, and the Bagdad Pact.

9. Mr. Harold Davies

asked the Minister of Defence to what extent the Government still base their defence policy on the principle that the West can and should rely for its defence primarily upon the deterrent effect of its stockpile of nuclear weapons and its capacity to deliver them.

17. Mr. Zilliacus

asked the Minister of Defence whether, in view of the opinion expressed by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe, at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Conference last December, to the effect that if tactical atomic weapons were used on opposite sides in a local conflict the result would be a nuclear world war, he has now modified the policy, announced in the 1956 and 1957 Defence White Papers, of using the Royal Air Force armed with tactical atomic weapons to help put down alleged Communist or alleged nationalist risings in the territories of countries whose rulers ask for such assistance.

18. Mr. Rankin

asked the Minister of Defence whether it is still the Government's policy, as declared in the Defence White Paper, 1958, to resort to strategic nuclear weapons against what they deem to be a major attack with conventional arms against a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or Bagdad Pact country in Europe or the Middle East or against a South-East Asia Treaty Organisation country in the Far East.

32. Mr. W. Griffiths

asked the Minister of Defence whether it is still part of the Government's defence policy, as proclaimed in the 1956 and 1957 Defence White Papers, to use British forces, including the Royal Air Force armed with tactical atomic weapons, against subversion, whether allegedly Communist, or allegedly Nationalist, in the territories of other countries.

Mr. Sandys

I have no new statement to make about the policy of H.M. Government in regard to the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Swingler

Does that mean that the 1958 White Paper stands? Has the Minister reflected on this policy? Does he not now consider that it is a policy of utter madness for this country to threaten to initiate hydrogen bomb warfare, which would be suicide for these islands? Is that not a policy of lunacy?

Mr. Sandys

If it is a policy of lunacy, that lunacy is widely spread. [Interruption.] I do not believe it to be lunacy. I believe that it is because of the existence of the nuclear deterrent during these past years that we have had a reasonable prospect of peace in the free world.

Mr. Rankin

Is the Minister telling us that he accepts a policy, and proposes to apply it if necessary, that will result in the obliteration of these islands? Is that what he is determined upon?

Mr. Sandys

I really do not know what the hon. Member is talking about. He seems to suggest that we have enunciated a policy of aggression.

Mr. Rankin

Has the Minister read Question No. 18, which appears in my name?

Mr. Sandys

I have read all these Questions and almost every one of them contains an inaccurate summarising of the White Paper.

Mr. Rankin

Where?

Mr. G. Brown

Is the Minister aware that every time since 1957 when he has tried to meet requests for information in the House on nuclear weapons he has retired into both this obtuseness and this rudeness? Is it significant that this year's White Paper contains no reference whatever to this problem? It is not mentioned from beginning to end. Does that mean that the Minister has given up trying to clear his own mind?

Mr. Sandys

Last year the right hon. Gentleman complained that we said too much.

Mr. Bevan

Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that he is creating a painful impression on the House by what he is saying? We understand that for security reasons it is sometimes difficult for Ministers to give precise information, but we do expect clarity of mind. It was always considered that to use strategic weapons against conventional attack would be suicidal. That is why the idea of tactical atomic weapons was devised. The right hon. Gentleman does not seem to have cleared his mind about the field of operation for the tactical atomic weapon.

Mr. Sandys

I would not myself refer to the right hon. Gentleman for clarity or advice upon strategy. So far as the general issue is concerned, I thought I had made it crystal clear. I was asked if there had been any change in our policy in regard to these matters, and I said that I had no further statement to make, implying—I will make it clearer—that there has been no change in our policy.

Mr. Zilliacus

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that at S.H.A.P.E. last December it was pointed out that any local conflict would develop into a world war if both sides used tactical atomic weapons? In those circumstances does he really maintain the claim of the Government to use tactical atomic weapons, contained in paragraph 27 of the 1957 White Paper and in paragraph 8, subparagraph (ii) of the 1956 Defence White Paper, against alleged Communist subversion or alleged Nationalist subversion, or on the occasions mentioned by the Prime Minister on 17th July last?

Mr. Sandys

First of all, the hon. Gentleman's reference to what he alleges is said in the White Paper is very far from an accurate summary of what the White Paper did contain. As for the statement at the beginning of his Question, on which the whole Question is based, I have made inquiries at Supreme Allied Headquarters. They cannot trace any statement or opinion of the kind.

Mr. Zilliacus

On a point of order. As the right hon. Gentleman doubts the accuracy of my reference, may I read the relevant passage?

Mr. Speaker

No.

8. Mr. Swingler

asked the Minister of Defence whether, in the light of the facts known today, his policy is still based on the assessment expressed in the 1958 Defence White Paper that Soviet progress In rocket development has not upset the balance of military power and that the Western Powers are still superior in this field and their overall superiority is likely to increase rather than diminish.

10. Mr. Zilliacus

asked the Minister of Defence to what extent Her Majesty's Government's defence policy is still based on the assumption, declared in the 1958 Defence White Paper, that Soviet progress in rocket development has not changed the military balance of power and that alleged all-round Western superiority in nuclear weapons is likely to increase rather than diminish.

Mr. Sandys

I see no reason to modify the assessment of the military position, as set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Defence White Paper of 1958.

Mr. Swingler

Does that mean that the Minister of Defence is now asserting, in spite of all that has happened in the past few months, that we have superiority in rocket development? Does it mean that, in the face of all this evidence, he is now asserting that our superiority is increasing rather than diminishing? Is that the assertion he is making?

Mr. Sandys

I will not try to summarise several paragraphs in the White Paper. All I would say is that there can be no doubt that the West still possesses indisputable superiority in nuclear hitting power.

Mr. Zilliacus

Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that military authorities, for example, General James Gavin, former chief of the United States Army Research and Development, and Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, have pointed out that it is no longer the case? Does he not think that the safety of this country would be better served by facing these facts in a spirit of realism and drawing the appropriate military and political conclusions for our defence policy—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speech."]—than by a defence policy based on the day-dreams of a nuclear Walter Mitty?

Mr. Speaker

I called the hon. Member to ask Question No. 11, which is in his name.

The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:

11. Mr. ZILLIACUS

To ask the Minister of Defence, how far it is still the policy of Her Majesty's Government, as announced in the 1957 Defence White Paper, to rely on United States protection, since this country cannot be defended against nuclear attack.

Mr. Speaker

Mr. Zilliacus—Mrs. McLaughlin.

Mr. Sandys

With permission, I will answer this Question and Question No. 30 together.

The practical limitations of air defence, as explained in the Defence White Paper of 1957, still remain valid.

Mr. G. Brown

On a point of order. Which Question has been answered? I thought the right hon. Gentleman was answering a Question about freight aircraft. The answer did not seem to be related to that at all.

Mr. Zilliacus

Question No. 11.

Mrs. McLaughlin

On a point of order. May I ask for your guidance, Mr. Speaker? I do not believe that the answer given by my right hon. Friend can be the answer to my Question No. 12.

Mr. Speaker

The Question which was asked was No. 12. Has the right hon. Gentleman given an answer to it?

Mr. Zilliacus

On a point of order. May I ask a supplementary question on my Question No. 11?

Mr. Speaker

Mr. Zilliacus.

Mr. Zilliacus

Does not the right hon. Gentleman know that in the view of Field Marshal Lord Montgomery—

Mr. Speaker

That is not a point of order at all. Will the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence consult his papers to see whether in fact he has answered Question No. 12?

Mr. S. Silverman

On a point of order. In the commotion, Mr. Speaker, I am not quite sure that I heard the right hon. Gentleman correctly. Did I understand him to say he was answering Questions 12 and 30 together? If so, will he kindly explain what possible connection there is between the two?

Mr. Speaker

The answer was to Question No. 12. Mrs. McLaughlin asked it: Is the Minister ready to make a statement about the long range troop and freight aircraft which is to be ordered.

Mr. Rankin

The answer was the answer to Question No. 11.

Mr. Sandys

The reason why I answered Question No. 11, Mr. Speaker, was because I thought that you had allowed a rather late intervention by the hon. Member. I will answer Question No. 12.

Mr. Zilliacus

On a point of order. Whether my Question has or has not been answered, I have not asked a supplementary.

Mr. Speaker

I called the hon. Member and he did not ask it.