§ 43. Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Prime Minister what consultations have taken place between the British and United States Governments regarding the supply of Polaris missiles to West German forces under the control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
§ 48. Mr. Fletcherasked the Prime Minister what consultations have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and the United States of America with regard to the proposal that the Polaris missile should be made available to the West German Government as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation defence arrangements.
§ The Prime MinisterAs I said in my reply to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) on 12th July, there have been some informal discussions regarding the question of making Polaris type missiles available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
There is no proposal before the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to make this type of weapon available to the Federal Republic of Germany.
If agreement were reached that Polaris type missiles should be made available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, their general deployment and allocation would be determined by the North Atlantic Council in the light of the recommendations from the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Nuclear warheads for such missiles would of course remain under United States custody and control.
§ Mr. AllaunWill the Prime Minister give the House an undertaking that when the proposal or offer of America to sell these 1,500-mile nuclear missiles to N.A.T.O. or to West Germany comes before N.A.T.O., and preferably immediately, the United Kingdom will oppose this latest, craziest and most dangerous encouragement to the West German militarists?
§ The Prime MinisterI do not think that this has anything to do with the West Germans. What I said and what is the fact is that the question will in due course be discussed by the N.A.T.O. 1597 Council as to whether it is a good or a bad thing militarily to replace in due course the various bomber and other forces by a weapon of this kind. If the matter comes up, it will be discussed by the whole N.A.T.O. Council. It will have to be considered first upon its military merits as to whether it is a good plan and, secondly, upon its political merits as to how it could be carried out. Therefore, our position is that we are ready to consult and discuss with the other members of the alliance and reach whatever seem to be the best conclusions.
§ Mr. FletcherMay we take it from what the Prime Minister has said that he agrees that it would be highly dangerous and provocative to let the West German Government have independent control of these essentially offensive Polaris weapons and that, when the matter comes before N.A.T.O., the influence of the United Kingdom representative will be against any such step?
§ The Prime MinisterOf course, there is no question of any other Government, whether the West German or any other, having independent control, because, as I have said, if this plan were put forward as a joint N.A.T.O. plan, the control of the nuclear warhead of the missile would be in the hands of the United States Government.
§ Mr. HealeyWould not the Prime Minister agree that missiles with a range of 1,500 miles, if based in Germany, would be almost impossible to reconcile with the stated aim of the N.A.T.O. shield forces? For this reason, will not the Prime Minister now publicly state Her Majesty's Government's opposition to this proposal?
§ The Prime MinisterNo, Sir. First, there is not a proposal and, secondly, if there is one, it will be discussed in the N.A.T.O. Council. I do not think we could operate effectively in the spirit of the alliance if we are to make premature decisions or pronouncements before we know, first, what the proposal is, secondly, whether it is recommended on military grounds and, thirdly, what would he the political characteristics of the plan.
§ Mr. HealeyWhen the Prime Minister is considering the prematurity of this proposal, will he not bear in mind that the American Secretary of Defence has 1598 already publicly announced that the West German Government has declared its interest in obtaining these missiles? In view of these facts and the great public interest created by these and other statements in both Washington and Bonn, will not Her Majesty's Government put in a word for Britain?
§ The Prime MinisterIf the hon. Member had read the communiqué issued on 5th July, he would have seen that it was made quite clear by the Federal Government that it was not contemplating the establishment of such a weapon system and that it was confirmed by a statement that there was no question of the German Army wishing to buy the Polaris missile or of the Federal Government having agreed to station them in the Federal Republic. I am sure that this question—there have been doubts and there have been discussions and statements about it—must be dealt with as a N.A.T.O. question by all the members of the N.A.T.O. alliance.
§ Mr. ShinwellHas the Prime Minister not been wrongly informed about this matter? Has he not observed that Herr Strauss, the West German Federal Government's Minister of Defence, has said that the provision of the Polaris weapon to his Government would depend upon the decision of the N.A.T.O. Council, as the Prime Minister has himself said? As, also, the Council of Ministers, in which we are represented, has to come to a decision, can we know what our representative will urge upon the Council and whether our representative will agree to the provision of this weapon to West Germany or will decline to give consent for this provision being made?
§ The Prime MinisterThe right hon. Gentleman first said that I was ill-informed and then stated exactly what I had said. The Federal Ministers have made it quite clear that they do not wish to acquire this weapon as a German weapon. That is in the statement made by Herr Strauss on, I think, 5th July. This is a N.A.T.O. question. As hon. Members know, the unanimity rule manages our affairs in N.A.T.O. and it surely has to be considered first, from a military point of view, whether the provision of this or some other missile about five or six years ahead is necessary to 1599 replace the present tactical bomber force. That is the first question. It is a military one.
Then, there is the second question of what are the political problems involved if it were adopted and whether it would be a collective N.A.T.O. responsibility with a collective N.A.T.O. control or whether certain countries should be asked to allow it to be deployed in their territory. All these matters will have to be discussed, probably not until the end of this year or the turn of next year. I I think it very unwise for me to make a decision now of precisely what advice we would be likely to offer.
§ Mr. GaitskellIs the Prime Minister aware that this is an extremely significant and important proposal which has political as well as military importance? Would he not agree that it is one thing to have a tactical Air Force in Europe with small calibre weapons but it is quite another to have a missile carrying a thermo-nuclear warhead which travels 1,500 miles?
Would he not agree that this is a completely new proposal since at present the strategic weapons are not under S.H.A.P.E. at all and that to put them under S.H.A.P.E. creates a new situation which many of us feel is highly dangerous?
§ The Prime MinisterThe right hon. Gentleman has repeated exactly what I have said. I said that there is first the military aspect which we have to consider and then the political aspect which we have to consider. The present tactical bomber force will continue for some years. It is not true to say that these are small weapons. They are very powerful nuclear weapons — thermo-nuclear weapons.
§ Mr. GaitskellNot thermo-nuclear.
§ The Prime MinisterNuclear weapons, certainly. It is a military question—we have had it often in our debates—whether in five or six years' time these aeroplanes will become so easily attacked or counterattacked that they can no longer play their rôle. Then it is a question of what is to take their place, and that military discussion is going on and will continue. When that is completed and military advice is available we have to discuss what are the political implications and 1600 by what political method replacement could take place. All that is going on. Anyway, it does not arise for several years, because the bomber force is still effective. We shall have to discuss then what we should best do. But it is not in the spirit of the alliance that now in July, before even hearing the discussion, I should say what instructions we shall give to our representatives.
§ Mr. GaitskellDoes not the right hon. Gentleman agree that this has considerable political significance as well? Would he agree that it would be highly undesirable if the stationing of these missiles in Europe were to create, as we believe it would, a serious deterioration in the international situation? Does the right hon. Gentleman not agree that any idea that they should be placed in Germany is something that should be ruled out from the start?
§ The Prime MinisterAgain the right hon. Gentleman has repeated exactly what I have said. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] There is first to be studied the military value or lack of value of the proposal for replacing the bombers by missiles, and secondly, by what kind of missiles, whether this or some other. Thirdly, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly says, there are the political implications of placing missiles rather than a bomber force under the control of S.A.C.E.U.R.
§ Mr. Gaitskell rose——
§ Mr. SpeakerLet us have a change in the batting order for a moment. Viscount Hinchingbrooke.
§ Viscount HinchingbrookeCould we not forestall the rather undesirable development, as I see it, of putting Polaris in the hands of N.A.T.O. by offering to put the British hydrogen deterrent, as far as its use in Europe is concerned, in the commission of N.A.T.O.?
§ The Prime MinisterThat means that we should hand over our deterrent force to N.A.T.O. That is a proposal which my noble Friend has made, but it is not in our power to do it without the agreement of the Americans, because we have developed some of the weapons that we have under the agreement negotiated with the Americans with the approval of Congress.
§ Mr. GaitskellIs the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is time that the British Government really made up their mind on questions of this kind? Is he aware that instead of fobbing off the House of Commons and the country with evasive replies he should come clean and tell us what the Government intend to say in N.A.T.O.?
§ The Prime MinisterThe right hon. Gentleman, of course, has considerable experience of making up his mind on a number of problems and then retreating from them. There is Clause Four—and, as I understand it, the defence policy of the party opposite depends on the chance vote of a delegate conference of the N.U.R.
§ Mr. GaitskellIs the Prime Minister aware that that cheap sneer may elicit approval from his own side but it will not impress the country with the Government's reliability?
§ Mr. MendelsonIn view of the Prime Minister's expressed opinion that it would he desirable to resume negotiations and achieve limited agreement with the Soviet Union, would he not agree that it would be undesirable to decide and discuss plans to put these strategic weapons, which would point at the heart of Russia, into Germany at a time when the right hon. Gentleman hopes to resume these negotiations?
§ The Prime MinisterWhat we have to do in the course of this year, probably towards the end of it, is to discuss plans to replace a weapon which may become obsolescent in four or five years' time. Nothing could possibly happen under that time. Much as I am impressed by the point made by the hon. Member, and anxious as I am to reach negotiation, this particular question is remote in the distant future and could not in any way make that negotiation easier or more difficult.
§ Mr. PagetIs there not a matter of principle involved here? Up to now the strategic deterrent has been exclusively the responsibility of the American Government. N.A.T.O. has not been responsible as far as the strategic deterrent is concerned. Are we on principle now in favour of handing a strategic deterrent to N.A.T.O., or are we not? That seems to me the question to which we ought to have an answer.
§ The Prime MinisterI think that it is a very important question. If the hon. and learned Member will allow me to correct him, at present the strategic deterrent is in the hands of the British Government and the American Government. The question is: should it be handed over to N.A.T.O.? I understand that that is the policy of the party opposite. [Interruption.] Whether it is the right one or not, I thought that it was. Some of those opposite do not want any deterrent, some want an American one but want to make it as difficult as possible for the Americans to operate, and some want it in N.A.T.O. What we want to do is to go on as we are and study with our allies what should be the position when in four or five years' time the present weapon becomes obsolete.
§ Mr. SpeakerWe cannot have more of this now.
§ Mr. ShinwellOwing to the unsatisfactory nature of the Prime Minister's reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter at the first available opportunity.