FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HC Deb 19 February 1959 vol 600 cc556-601

3.42 p.m.

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell (Leeds, South)

The combination of the negotiations on Cyprus and the ravages of influenza have changed the day and, to some extent, altered the character of this debate. I am sure that all right hon. and hon. Members appreciate the reasons why the Foreign Secretary could not be here to speak first for the Government. We agree that, in the circumstances, it was his duty to try to conclude the negotiations on Cyprus, even though that meant that he could not be with us this afternoon.

I understand that the Prime Minister will be here before long and that he will be winding up the debate on behalf of the Government. I am sure, too, that all hon. Members regret the absence of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) on account of influenza. He was to have opened the debate for our side.

Nevertheless, despite these important absences, it is most desirable that the House of Commons should have an opportunity of discussing foreign affairs before the important visit of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to Moscow. The Prime Minister has, perhaps, played down the significance of this visit, and I can well understand his desire that hope should not be unduly raised, in view of past disappointments.

The fact remains, however, that this is the first time that either he or any other Prime Minister in office has visited Moscow. He is not going entirely unaccompanied. I believe that he will have 30 officials or other persons with him, and I cannot suppose that all his time will be taken up by bear hunting and sight seeing. There is no doubt that the Press is taking the greatest interest in this visit and I think that he himself would agree that however much he may try to depreciate its importance, people as a whole in this country will certainly hope that out of it some improvement will come.

The right hon. Gentleman has not revealed very clearly to us the reasons why he chose this moment to go to Moscow. He was invited, following the invitation to Sir Anthony Eden, at least two years ago. Naturally, we accept his statement that he did not have in mind any possible internal considerations. We know that he was thinking entirely in terms of the benefits to the international situation which might result, but if we then ask ourselves why he chose this moment to go to Moscow, I would suppose that the only possible reason would be the situation which has arisen as the result of Mr. Khrushchev's statements on Berlin and the decision of the West to agree, indeed to propose, a four-Power conference on Germany. It is for that reason that we thought it well that the debate today should be confined to the problem of Germany and Europe rather than range over the Whole scope of world affairs.

However, that does not mean, in my opinion at least, that the question of Berlin and Germany is the only or necessarily the most dangerous problem facing the world today. It may well be that the situation in the Middle East, tolerably quiet as it is for the moment, will prove to be rather more dangerous before many months have elapsed. Certainly, the exchange of Notes between the Soviet Union and Persia is not entirely reassuring, quite apart from the problems which confront us, particularly in our concern with the sheikhdoms on the Persian Gulf.

Moreover, there is still unsettled the difficult question of the Far East and particularly the occupation of Quemoy and Matsu. There is always the possibility that trouble may flare up again there. As the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs knows only too well, we are far from through with the Geneva talks on tests. The other day he denied that there was any deadlock, and I hope that he is right, but, certainly, it is of immense importance that an agreement on that issue should be reached.

Quite apart from these political questions, we on this side of the Committee attach great importance to the two other matters to which the Prime Minister specifically referred in his statement— trade on the one side and information and cultural relations on the other. We very much hope that as a result of the Prime Ministers visit there will be a substantial expansion of trade between the Soviet Union and this country. We hope that the Prime Minister will not only press for additional Russian orders, but will be willing, if he is asked so to do, to look at the list of strategic or so-called strategic commodities which are banned, if this is genuinely an obstacle to further trade.

On the cultural side, I am sure that all hon. Members will welcome any steps which increase the amount of cultural exchanges which take place between Russia and Great Britain. Nothing but good can come of throwing open the frontiers and allowing more people from Russia to come here and having more people from here go to Russia. We hope that on these matters progress will be made.

Today, I shall concentrate on Berlin and Germany. It is worth debating this subject, because, although the Prime Minister has been careful to explain that he is not going to Moscow to negotiate on behalf of the West, I can hardly imagine that he will spend so much time with Mr. Khrushchev and confine himself simply to asking questions. Of course, it is possible that Mr. Khrushchev might be able to occupy the whole of the time by making speeches, but I do not believe that the time would be so profitably spent as it would be if there was a genuine interchange of views between the two Governments. Indeed, the Prime Minister said, in his announcement: … we hope that our conversations with the Soviet leaders will give them a better knowledge of our point of view and make it easier for us to understand what is in their minds."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th February, 1959; Vol. 599, c. 578.] At that time I asked what "our point of view" was, and I did not get a very clear answer. I am not sure whether, in using that phrase, the Prime Minister was speaking of the British Government's point of view or the point of view of the West as a whole. That point can be clarified later. But it is worth while anyhow discussing what our point of view should be before the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary leave on Saturday.

I begin with the question of Berlin. It is not necessary to spend a great deal of time on it, because there does not appear to be any great disagreement between the two sides of the Committee. We on this side have rejected—as have the Government—Mr. Khrushchev's proposal to make West Berlin an open city and the withdrawal of the Allied forces from it. We have done so because we believe that if that were to happen it would be extremely probable, to put it no higher, that within a fairly short time West Berlin would be swallowed in East Germany— and that we are not prepared for. That would be to sacrifice our friends in West Berlin, and hon. Members on this side have a particular concern in the matter because of the Socialist majority in Berlin and its Socialist Lord Mayor, that fine man, Willi Brandt.

This issue has been posed by some people as being a question either of accepting what Mr. Khrushchev has proposed or going to war. I totally disagree that those are the alternatives. I do not believe that we need look at the matter in such stark terms. Let us remind ourselves at the outset that nobody has threatened armed aggression. Some rather fiery statements have been made on both sides, but these have always been on the presumption that somebody else starts the aggression. So far as that goes, any intention of going to war over Berlin was specifically denied by Mr. Khrushchev in November.

Nor, so far, has there been even any threat of a blockade. There has been much talk and some anxiety about it in the West, but nobody has said that there is to be a blockade. If it were attempted deliberately and by force to interfere with our communications with Berlin and, in effect, to try to starve West Berlin, as in 1948, we have our rights, arising out of the unconditional surrender of Germany, and we are entitled to maintain them as we did in 1948. Not only have we rights; we also have obligations to the people of West Berlin. I am convinced that the leaders of the Soviet Union fully appreciate this. It would be very surprising if men as intelligent as they are on issues of this kind—and no one will deny that— failed to realise the clear point of view of the West in this matter.

What has been threatened is not a blockade—still less a war—but the handing over, six months from the date when the announcement was made, which, I believe, will be 27th May, by the Soviet Government to the East German Government of the responsibility for maintaining and handling the communications between the West and Berlin. I would emphasise that if that were to happen— and it is by no means certain—it would not of itself involve either the use of force or any attempt at a blockade. To be sure, it would present us with a difficult and delicate diplomatic problem. It would certainly be a breach of the wartime agreement. But Mr. Dulles was perfectly right when he hinted that if this were to happen it might be possible to regard the East German representatives as representing the Soviet Union.

This is such an important matter that I venture to read what Mr. Dulles said at the Press conference when he made this statement. Mr. Dulles was asked, … if the Soviets go ahead and turn over to the East German authorities the check points on the autobahn and control to the land, sea and air routes, … the question would arise: would we deal with the East German officials who would man the check-points? Mr. Dulles answered: Well, we would certainly not deal with them in any way which involved our acceptance of the East German regime as a substitute for the Soviet Union in discharging the obligation of the Soviet Union and the responsibility of the Soviet Union. The next question was: Does that mean that we might deal with them as agents of the Soviet Union? Mr. Dulles answered: We might yes. There are certain respects now in which minor functionaries of the so-called German Democratic Republic are being dealt with by both the Western Powers, the three Allied Powers and also by the Federal Republic of Germany. A very similar statement was made by the Foreign Secretary in answer to a Question in the House.

If this should happen I hope that every possible effort will be made to handle this matter in the diplomatic fashion indicated by Mr. Dulles, and that no provocative action will be taken by us any more than by the Soviet Union or the East Germans. At the same time, we must realise that the present situation in Berlin is, as it always has been, not without its dangers. In standing firm on the issue of Mr. Khrushchev's proposals and contending, as we do, that Berlin cannot be dealt with in isolation, we have a special obligation to make a serious effort to reach agreement on the whole problem of Berlin, Germany and European security.

What can be done? So far as I am aware only one specific solution has been proposed to the Berlin problem, though it also impinges upon the other problems. This is a proposal put forward by a group of Germans belonging to a society or association called "Indivisible Germany", in which it is suggested that a zone should be created composed equally from East and West Germany and covering, in effect, the whole of that area of Germany which includes the approaches to West Berlin. They suggest that such a zone should be placed under United Nations administration, so that United Nations officials would be responsible for the communications.

I do not propose to discuss this plan in any detail. I would simply say that it is something which should not be entirely ruled out. There are difficulties about it. That the United Nations might not be able to do the job may be an argument against it, and it is open to doubt, to put it no higher, whether the Russians themselves would be likely to agree to it. But I do not think that it should be ruled out altogether as something that might come up during the course of the discussions.

Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne)

It would make three Germanys.

Mr. Gaitskell

For the time being it would make three Germanys, but this group of people say—though I have no reason to speak for them—that out of this particular little disengagement may come a wider disengagement.

I now move to the major question of Germany as a whole, and I repeat the axiom that, in our opinion, the problem of Berlin cannot be solved except through the problem of Germany, because only with a reunified Germany can we get rid of the problem—and the problem of Germany cannot be solved without tackling the problem of European security.

This may be acceptable in theory to all of us, but I must say so far as the practical propositions advanced by the West are concerned they never seem to me to have taken it fully into account. After all, what is the attitude so far of the Western Powers on this vital issue of Germany? They have stood pat in demanding German reunification with free elections—I shall make one reservation on that later, but until recently they have been standing pat on German reunification and free elections—and certainly have given the impression that free elections must be one of the very first steps to be taken before reunification becomes at all possible.

Secondly, and even more important, they have again and again emphasised that a reunified Germany must be free, if it desires, to remain in or to join N.A.T.O. Thirdly, so far as disengagement is concerned, the plans they have put forward, running from those advanced by Sir Anthony Eden in 1954 and 1955 to the later proposals mentioned by the Foreign Secretary for a demilitarised zone in East Germany, have all been extremely limited and certainly very much to the advantage of the West and to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, the real weakness of the point of view of the West in this matter is that they have failed to observe what must be —and I repeat it—a cardinal principle for both sides if they are serious about negotiations in this matter, namely, that the balance of security must not be upset. It is useless to deny that if we say to the Russians, "We want a reunified Germany which is free to join N.A.T.O.," if we know—as we do know—that there is every prospect it would, in fact, join N.A.T.O., the inevitable result of reunification is to strengthen the West at the cost of the East. It means, in effect, that East Germany comes into the N.A.T.O. orbit.

Nor is it enough to couple this with an offer that we will demilitarise East Germany. That is still demilitarising something which, at the moment, is in the Soviet orbit. It is not, therefore, a balanced proposal. That is why even the disengagement suggestions of Sir Anthony Eden are from this point of view unsatisfactory, because all of them insisted that the thinning out, the disengagement, the demilitarised zone, started from the German Eastern frontier instead of taking both sides in at the same time.

I must admit straight away that the Soviet proposals suffer from the same disadvantage. They equally upset the balance of power, the balance of security to the advantage of the Soviet Union. The proposal, for instance, in the peace treaty recently put forward by Mr. Khrushchev that Germany should be neutralised although there is no assurance of reunification, is a proposal which is to the advantage of the East because Western Germany is far larger and far stronger than East Germany. If, therefore, we simply take out that area and even do not concede reunification in exchange it is bound, I think, to be rejected by the West.

Equally, on procedure, I must confess that their attitude so far in insisting that Berlin is a separate issue, of insisting that reunification is for the Germans alone and not for the four major Powers, is not particularly helpful. I do not necessarily take a pessimistic view about this, because experience has shown that the Russians very often do change their ground. I think that a lot of this is a bargaining counter and does not mean at all that it is their last word, but nevertheless, the fact is that their proposals as well as ours are in breach of this fundamental principle which must be observed if there is to be any chance of progress.

Time and again from this Box we have asked the Government to work out and put forward positive proposals which, as far as they can see, leave the balance of security unimpaired. Time and again we have put forward our own constructive proposals to this end. I must say that we have had very little satisfaction indeed from these exchanges, now going back over the past two years. Again and again the Government have simply rejected our suggestions, with more or less discourtesy, according to the speaker.

The furthest they have gone is to say that they will try to work out a common policy. This is not a recent statement. This is a statement made by the Foreign Secretary as long ago as February, 1958, that we shall try to work out a common policy. Yet there has been no advance whatever. On the Rapacki Plan, orginally rejected out of hand by the United States, all we now have is a statement— and this was made some months ago— that the Government will consider it, but nothing positive has emerged.

There is a preliminary question one must ask at this stage. Do the Government regard a plan which leaves the balance of security unimpaired and yet does create some relaxation of tension, some advance towards settlement, as a complete impossibility? I know that there are people who think that it is not only inconceivable that there can be a plan equally to the advantage or disadvantage of both sides and yet which would make for peace, but that any such thing is positively dangerous because in the last resort it would mean putting the West, putting our side, off our guard. It would mean that we relaxed and, therefore, were less inclined to take defence seriously, and so on.

I must say that at times, from the Foreign Secretary's statements, one has feared that this was the Government's view—when, for instance, some time ago, he informed us that our proposals either meant the break-up of N.A.T.O. and, when I intervened to say that they meant no such thing, added, "Well, then, the Russians will not have them." That implies, of course, that there is no possible solution that the Russians will agree to, no change which does not involve the break-up of N.A.T.O.

This attitude, and I very much hope that it is no longer the view of Her Majesty's Government, presumes two things which I do not believe to be true. It assumes, first, that the status quo is such that we need not worry so long as we stand where we are now and maintain our defences. If there were any doubt about the unwisdom of that view, what has happened over Berlin is a sufficient answer.

It assumes, secondly, that the Russians never make agreements. Patently, that is not true. They made an agreement on Austria. Admittedly, it is much less important than the German question, but they made it, although it took them a long time. They also made an agreement on Indo-china. Six Anthony Eden played a notable part in negotiating it. Indeed, in that case the Russians might reasonably have complained that certain parts of the agreement were not really carried out by the West, but they did not, in fact, follow the point up.

Mr. S. Silverman

There was the question of free elections.

Mr. Gaitskell

That is what I had in mind. It is wrong, therefore, to assume that the Russians are absolutely unwilling to make agreements. For these reasons, I think that that extreme point of view is a wrong and a dangerous one. I can only say that if the Prime Minister goes to Moscow in anything like that state of mind there really is no hope of any successful outcome to these talks.

Fortunately, in the last few weeks there have been signs of change in the point of view of the West, not so much in this country but—perhaps it is more important—in the United States of America. We now have two very influential Democrat Senators, Senator Fulbright and Senator Mansfield—Senator Fulbright is now the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Mansfield is a prominent member of that Committee—giving their support to disengagement and including in disengagement, not only the Eden Plan, not only the Rapacki Plan, but other similar plans, with even a mention of the name of Mr. Kennan—whose disengagement plan, I may say, goes a great deal further even than our proposals. Then, also, one has Mr. Dulles' notable remarks about free elections in connection with German reunification, in which he said that perhaps there were other methods as well as free elections.

Therefore, with this support from across the Atlantic for a more flexible attitude, I suggest that we might now take another look at the problem. The first question that I want to ask the Government in this new look is this. Would they agree that the Russians are most unlikely to accept a solution to the problem of Germany that involves a lack of balance from their point of view and, in fact, makes them less secure? If the Government agree with that, are they not bound to recognise that, if we continue to insist that Germany must be free to remain a member of N.A.T.O. after reunification, there is really no hope of making any progress with reunification?

If the Government agree with that—and I find it difficult to see how they can escape the logic of the argument—I ask: what, then, have the Government in mind? What are their proposals, alternative to ours and other people's, for trying to achieve reunification? Is it not better at this point to ask under what conditions the West could agree to this possible sacrifice, namely, the withdrawal of Germany from N.A.T.O.? That it is a sacrifice I have never denied for a moment, but, as I think that only some sacrifice of this kind is likely to lead to, or be consistent with, reunification, it is better to ask the further question: under what conditions might we agree to it?

Certainly, we should not agree to it for nothing. If we were simply to say, "We do not mind. We will let Germany go", as I have already said that would, in my opinion, be to the disadvantage of the West and would be a very heavy price to pay. That was one of the reasons why, in our plan, we brought into the picture, as well as East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This is a balancing factor. It is for this reason that we developed the Five Point Plan, which hon. Members will be familiar with. It was a plan for the withdrawal of foreign forces from this area, including the three satellite States, a plan for the reunification of Germany, a plan for the establishment of a specific disarmament zone covering these five territories, with full controls, a plan for a mutual security pact, underwritten by the great Powers, and a plan for the withdrawal—if, as I think, this was a necessary price to pay—of Germany from N.A.T.O. and of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Warsaw Pact.

We put forward this plan in all seriousness, because we believed that it was a balanced proposal which did not leave the West or the East better or worse off. That is the essence of it, and that is why it is a serious proposal. I think that the case for it is clear enough. It has been stated many times. It would surely be an enormous advantage if we could have a local disarmament zone, under full control, covering this very dangerous area of Europe. It would be an advantage if we had reunification and not only the gain thereby which is obvious to the Germans, at any rate, but also the removal of the dangers which will continue to exist so long as Germany is divided. It is an advantage because of this balance. We lose Germany from N.A.T.O. We pay that price. The Russian troops withdraw to Russia. They withdraw from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

There are arguments the other way which have been frequently put forward, but I would plead once again that the Committee and the Government should ask seriously whether they are very powerful arguments. It is said for instance—and it was said again at Question Time only recently—that one could not have any agreement by which Germany in advance announced that she would withdraw from N.A.T.O.; she must be free to decide. If a country desires, of its own free will, to withdraw from a particular alliance in order to achieve another object, namely, the reunification of the country, surely there is no juridical or moral objection to that. If it were to be imposed on Germany, that would be another matter, but we have always said and recognised that it has to be discussed.

What we want the British Government to do is to argue in favour of it in the circles of the West, to begin with, and to try and persuade them that this is the best way of dealing with the problem.

Mr. S. Silverman

I must apologise to my right hon. Friend for interrupting him, but is it not worth while, in this connection, to point out that every nation in the world that accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter to that extent voluntarily imposes limits on its freedom of action in international affairs?

Mr. Gaitskell

Certainly. I fully agree with my hon. Friend.

Then it is said—the Foreign Secretary said this, amazing as it may seem—that we cannot have controls to keep Germany down. That kind of statement makes one despair. First, it is quite inconsistent with certain parts of the Eden Plan which involved a demilitarised zone in part of what is now Germany. Secondly, to say that we cannot have controls to keep Germany down is surely either to give up the whole idea of controlled disarmament, or to say that it must be universal. Why? This is a specifically dangerous area. What is wrong with a local disarmament scheme with controls? Indeed, is it feasible or sensible to think in terms of the Russians conceding reunification unless they are absolutely sure that there is no danger of aggression from Germany? How can they be sure of it without disarmament under control?

Then, more closely, it is said that this would involve the break-up of N.A.T.O., and the withdrawal of United States, and perhaps British, troops from the Continent of Europe. Frankly, that is just not true, unless the Americans insist that it is true. If the American Government do not accept this proposal, the proposal will not be put forward on behalf of the West. Our object is to try to persuade the American Government to accept this proposal. We are very happy, as I have said, at the progress that is being made, at least so far as the Senate is concerned.

Provided that the American Government thought the plan worth while, there is no reason on earth why this should involve the withdrawal of all American troops from Europe.

That it would involve some extra expense is true. The transfer of divisions to the Low Countries, to France and to this country which might be involved certainly would be an expensive matter, but I do not envisage, and I have never envisaged, that this would happen quickly. Moreover, if we were to get an agreement of this kind, the implication is that there would be such a relaxation of tension that I would hope that, while there should be —and I have always said this—some American troops in Europe, the numbers involved could be, at this point reduced.

Then it is argued that it would be very dangerous, because once one had this great area, this neutralised area, this area of disengagement, the Russians would march in again if there was any trouble in Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary. I cannot see that they are any more likely to do that than to make trouble now. It is quite true that, if one had a treaty of this kind, one would have to lay down quite specifically the conditions in which re-entry was, if at all, possible. Even if one assumes the worst, the Russians would be 550 miles back from where they are today, and they would have to advance a very considerable distance. Presumbably, at that point the West would be free to advance as well. Once the Russians agreed to a proposal of this kind they would hesitate just as much to advance again into these countries as they would hesitate—and do hesitate now, I am sure—to commit any act of aggression.

Finally, there is the argument that it is dangerous if we do not have these forces face to face, machine gun against machine gun, more or less in sight of each other. Must we really take that point of view? It is not really consistent with the Government's own proposal for the demilitarisation of Germany. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale pointed out, the Government have proposed a demilitarised zone which goes further in that respect than our particular plan, and yet apparently that is permitted, but there must not be a larger zone of disengagement.

It just does not make sense. It does not make sense when we look around the world. It is not true that all over the world Russian, or for that matter Chinese, troops are face to face with American troops. It is not true in the Middle East or in Scandinavia, but only in this very small part of Central Europe. I understand the anxiety, but, really, when one thinks it out I cannot see that there is any substance in it.

I admit that this proposal of ours, a comprehensive proposal which is called "disengagement", though it is really a proposal for political settlement, is a long-term proposal. I freely admit it, having argued about it in a great many places over the last two years. I think that there has been a move towards it, but the suspicions on both sides at present are still very great. I think it unlikely that at present either the Russians or the Americans would agree to withdraw their forces from the zone in question. Time will be needed, but it does not mean that we should not put it forward and try it out, and see the Russian reaction to it, or the Polish reaction, for that matter.

Meanwhile, we come back to what the short-term solution should be. Is there not something we can do, short of the more elaborate plan which might emerge from the Moscow talks? I believe that there is one particular proposal which offers a real chance of agreement between East and West. That is the part of our proposals which deals with controlled disarmament in the area in question. This proposal is in some respects similar to that which was put forward by Sir Anthony Eden, in 1954, although the area covered is different. It is also similar in some respects to the revised version of the Rapacki Plan, so similar, that we would have a basis for discussion out of which a fruitful agreement might emerge.

Of course, Sir Anthony Eden's proposals for disengagement were conditional upon reunifications. We have to face the question whether we should be prepared for a disarmament zone short of reunification. I have thought a great deal about this. I asked myself in what way should we be disadvantaged if we could get a local disarmament plan of this kind. Unless we take the view that reunification will be achieved by force, I cannot see that we suffer any disadvantage, and we have the advantage, first, that there would then be in existence an actual disarmament plan, in operation. It might well be—there is no harm in saying it— that both Russians and Americans would be more ready to agree to the establishment of international controls over armaments in this area than they would in their own countries. This may be called unfair, but we should not be persuaded to reject or neglect any chance of reducing tension on the basis that it is some kind of discrimination.

The Foreign Secretary's objections to this were that, first, it involved discrimination against Germany. My right hon. Friend pointed out at the time that this was a ridiculous argument. There is already discrimination against Germany as between different members of the Atlantic alliance. The Americans have the key to the cupboard but we have not. We British have a cupboard of our own to a certain limited extent.

Mr. S. Silverman

There is nothing in it, though.

Mr. Gaitskell

That is a point for the defence debate and my hon. Friend can pursue it there.

My point is that there is, on the face of it, discrimination here. One must take account of geographical factors. I discussed this point with Dr. Adenauer when he was here and his only answer was, "Why pick on Germany?" The answer is "Because of history and geography." That is a perfectly legitimate thing to do. Moreover, we include Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary as well.

The other argument of the Foreign Secretary was that if there were no nuclear weapons the United States would have to leave Europe. I cannot take that argument seriously. The number of nuclear weapons on German soil now is not very large; if missiles are included, certainly not very large. If it is desired to have missiles and nuclear weapons in Europe, there are other places as well as Germany where they can exist. I do not want to pursue here the details of this argument. We have always taken the view that, until a Summit Conference has taken place, we should not proceed with nuclear rearmament of Germany, and we still hold that view. Suppose we get an agreement; is it really so fatal if Germany does not have nuclear weapons?

The second advance that might be made as well as controlled local disarmament is possibly towards reunifica- tion. I put this point forward with much greater diffidence and doubt, because I still think that the Russians are most unlikely to go any distance at all in this direction unless and until Germany is outside N.A.T.O. There are certainly things that are worth trying for two reasons. First, if we have our arms control, and if the zone were under control, some of the objections from the East, from the Poles, for instance, to reunification would be modified. Secondly, we have this new statement of Mr. Dulles that other methods could be considered.

Let me say straight away that I cannot see how one can depart from free elections as an ultimate object. I would not be prepared to abandon them. I do not think that reunification of Germany would, in the last resort, be effective unless and until we had free elections. But we need not start with them and insist upon them as a basis. We can see whether there is any other form of advance. I do not think that it would be wise for me to try to speculate here. This is a difficult matter, on which we all, and the Germans, in particular, ought to be thinking a good deal.

But I will say just this: The test of whether any advance in this direction would be possible will probably come on how far the present frontier between East and West Germany can be open. If it can be open, one ought to be prepared to go quite a long way for a time in regional autonomy. If the frontier is to remain closed it is difficult to see that there is much of an advance towards reunification. That is the only comment I make on the subject.

Nobody will deny the difficulties which confront us in this field. But I think that we can say that today, because of the ideas of greater flexibility which have been put out in different places, particularly in the United States, the prospect is somewhat brighter than it has been for a long time. We all deeply regret the illness of Mr. Dulles. Whatever we may have felt from time to time about his policies, no one could withhold admiration for the staunch and courageous manner in which he has discharged his duties in the way he thought was best. In his absence, the Prime Minister has a great opportunity and a great responsibility. He may not be negotiating in Moscow, but he may be doing something else; he may be breaking the ice. Some time ago I suggested that there was a case for a Summit Conference for ice-breaking purposes alone. Well, this is a sort of Summit Conference, and I think that the prospects for a thaw, as I have said, are a good deal better than they have been.

It is with the sincere hope that these talks will yield positive results in the form of a real advance towards a solution of the German problem, and to the building up of a greater mutual confidence and understanding between the Soviet Union and ourselves—because that is vital—that we wish the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary God-speed in this important mission.

4.31 p.m.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. D. Ormsby-Gore)

My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary has asked me to apologise for his absence from this debate. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said he well understood the reasons for his absence. Very important discussions on the Cyprus question are now taking place. Of course, my right hon. and learned Friend hopes to be able to arrive in the Committee later on this evening. I should also like to express from this side of the Committee our sorrow that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) is not with us this afternoon. He always enlivens these debates and I think that we shall miss him during our discussions.

My right hon. and hon. Friends are, indeed, grateful to the Opposition for making this debate possible today, and they welcome the opportunity of hearing the views of the Committee about Germany and about European security before the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary leave on their visit to the Soviet Union. We shall not, of course, be expected to accept all the views which we shall hear this afternoon. But it will be useful to know what different sections of the Committee are thinking about these vitally important matters.

As has already been stated, my right hon. Friends are not going to Moscow to conduct negotiations. But they do hope that their conversations with the Soviet leaders will improve the prospects of the negotiations which must certainly follow.

The Committee will have noted the terms of the Note of 16th February suggesting that there should be a conference to deal with the problem of Germany in all its aspects and implications as raised in the recent correspondence between the East and West. I think that these proposals of ours should be particularly welcome to those hon. Members opposite who signed the most popular of the original Motions on the Order Paper. We do not require that any pre-conditions should be satisfied before the conference takes place. We therefore hope that the proposal will be accepted. I do not think that anyone in his senses could take exception to the terms in which our proposal has been put forward.

It may help the work of this conference if, during the forthcoming visit to Moscow, the Soviet leaders are able to explain why they have rejected all the proposals for a settlement in Europe which have been made by the West and in which we believe—though the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition apparently does not—that full account was taken of their legitimate security consideration. On the other hand, it will also be possible to tell them why their proposals, which have not taken account of our legitimate requirements, have not been acceptable to us. Perhaps they will also be able to explain why they have chosen this particular moment to precipitate what is—we must face it—a crisis about Berlin, in spite of the dangers which they themselevs admit to be inherent in the situation surrounding that city.

I would now like to say a word about Berlin itself. Yesterday, Mr. Khrushchev made a somewhat bellicose speech and it has been answered in the most restrained manner by the President of the United States. The Soviet leaders should, however, be in no doubt on one point. We are determined, as the right hon. Gentleman said, to remain in Berlin and to preserve our right to have free access to the city and to continue to discharge our duty towards its 2¼ million inhabitants. The Soviet Government have contracted to make sure that we continue to enjoy the right that I have mentioned, and the future course of events will depend very largely on their own actions.

Her Majesty's Government have been pressed in the House of Commons during the last few weeks, and, indeed, on many occasions in the past, to state what precise proposals they intend to put to the Soviet Government when a conference is eventually convened. I do not think that anyone who wishes these negotiations to be a success can expect us to reveal these. That is not because our consultations with our Allies have not made considerable progress. In fact, they have proceeded very far and very satisfactorily. But it would not be wise for us to make a statement in advance of the conference which would indicate the way in which we propose to play our hand. I do not think that the negotiations would be helped if we did that.

But it is right, of course, that we should set out the general considerations which govern our thinking. We inherited, to some extent, and intend to carry forward, the policy first formed by Mr. Ernest Bevin and later developed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison). The essence of this policy is that Germany should share the burden of defending Western Europe against Russia. It is designed to avoid the mistakes made between the wars which had the effect of creating the Nazi movement. The Versailles Treaty made Germany into a pariah, and as her grievances festered so Europe became doomed to the advent of Hitler. Hitler then overthrew the restrictions which we had thought to impose on Germany, and nearly succeeded in destroying us all.

For eleven years now we have sought to integrate Germany into the institutions of the West. We have also sought to bring about German reunification in freedom and to restore to her the full attributes of sovereignty, without which there is always the risk that the old grievances will begin to develop again. This policy has kept the peace for eleven years. It would seem to us to be folly to destroy it simply for the sake of doing something new.

So far from the policy I have described being inconsistent with Russia's legitimate security requirements, it is our view that the reunification of Germany in freedom should be accompanied by all sorts of arrangements, about which we would negotiate with the Russians to make sure that the balance of advantage was not upset in the event of Germany choosing to remain in N.A.T.O. We shall continue to strive for the reunification of Germany in view of the great contribution that this would make to European security. It should be as much in the Russian interest as in that of the West that it should be accomplished.

We have never insisted that a reunited Germany should join N.A.T.O. All that we have ever said is that a free nation should be free to decide its foreign policy. It is not our position that free elections throughout Germany must be the first step in any process leading to reunification and that acceptance of this is a pre-condition for progress of any kind. Naturally, as the right hon. Gentleman said, there must be free elections at some point, but there is room for negotiation about the exact point at which they should have to take place.

We therefore entirely accept that part of the Motion now on the Order Paper which calls for … German reunification within a framework to be agreed and guaranteed by the four Powers … including free elections … The authors of the Motion have added that in their view ways and means could be settled by the Germans themselves. In our Note of 16th February we proposed that German advisers should be called to the conference from both sides to be consulted. I have no doubt that the method of reunification could be one of the topics upon which their views would be listened to.

Mr. S. Silverman

The right hon. Gentleman has quoted part of the Motion for which some of us are responsible. I did not quite follow his point on this and I should like to understand it. He says that he accepts that part of the Motion which says that, including free elections, the reunification of Germany must be worked out by Germany itself within the framework of conditions agreed to by the four great Powers, including the U.S.S.R. It is known—and my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell) has made it abundantly clear again—that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to agree any such framework except on the basis that Germany is not allowed to become part of a political and military alliance which might be directed against the Soviet Union.

Is the right hon. Gentleman therefore saying, or not saying, that the Government would be prepared to agree to a reunification of Germany in a framework agreed by the four Powers one of whose terms would be non-alignment on a unified Germany?

Mr. Ormsby-Gore

I think that my statement was a great deal clearer than the hon. Gentleman's. What I said was that we accepted these words on the Order Paper: … German reunification within a framework to be agreed and guaranteed by the four Powers … including free elections … I then went on to point out that some other parts of the Motion are not so agreeable to us, and I also pointed out that to some extent we had met their point about having consultations with the Germans themselves.

I can appreciate that the hon. Gentleman feels that the kind of proposals that we are putting forward will never be agreed by the Soviet Union and, therefore, it is not worth putting them forward; but, as I shall try to show in the course of my remarks, we do not take such a gloomy view of the prospects and we think that if we can give the Soviet Union sufficiently good security guarantees the kind of proposals we shall put forward will be acceptable to them.

As to the other parts of the Motion, 1 find no reference in it to the three criteria which were laid down in the statement issued by the Labour Party and Trades Union Congress on 23rd April last. We have repeatedly stated that we accepted these criteria and I would like to remind the Committee what they are. The first is that the balance of military security should not be changed to the disadvantage of either side; the second is that any proposals for the withdrawal of N.A.T.O. forces from part of their present area should be consistent with the retention of N.A.T.O. itself; and the third is that nothing should be done which would be inconsistent with the continued presence of United States forces on the Continent.

The proposals in the Motion for what is called "disengagement" are not qualified by any suggestion that they must be consistent with these criteria. In the naked form in which they now appear, they would, I believe, be totally unacceptable to other Western Governments, and they are certainly totally unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government. Any policy that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to support in Europe must pass these three essential tests that I have mentioned. If there were any suspicion on the part of our Allies that we might be thinking of doing otherwise the effect would be to split the Alliance.

The main features of our policy in Europe can be set out very simply. These main features are not likely to change. First, we intend to uphold our rights in Berlin, but we are prepared to discuss the whole problem of Berlin with the Russians in the context of a discussion about Germany as a whole. Secondly, we believe that Germany should be reunited, that free elections must have a place in the process of reunification, and that the united Germany should have the right to decide its own policies, both internal and foreign, in accordance with the democratic principles that are supported by all parties in this House. Thirdly, we should negotiate with the Russians about measures of security that would allay any fears they might have about the effect on their security if a reunited Germany chose to remain in N.A.T.O.

We reject the view that peace and safety are to be sought by working for the neutrality of Germany. We believe that the idea of German neutrality is a serious delusion, for to so-called "neutralise" Germany might well increase the tensions that exist in Europe. One of the elements in a system of security that would offer the Soviet Government relief from their apprehensions could be a control system to guard against surprise attack. The larger the area covered, the better it would be. There could also be a system of agreed numbers and agreed levels of armaments—again, over as wide an area as possible. Both these systems, one to provide against surprise attack and the other to provide for a controlled limitation of armaments, could be established before there was a general European political settlement—

Mr. Gaitskell

Does that mean that the right hon. Gentleman would be prepared to support the proposals for controlled disarmament of East and West Germany—and Czechoslovakia and Hungary—without any agreement on German reunification?

Mr. Ormsby-Gore

I have said that a proposal for a zone of limited and controlled armaments is something that we can see as forming part of a process of reducing tension in Europe, and it would be part of a process for improving the present situation with regard to European security. I think that it would be a mistake for me to try to say this afternoon precisely at what stage this zone of limited armaments would be set up, but this, together with, perhaps, a much wider zone guarding against surprise attack, would, we believe, make a very definite contribution to allaying the perhaps reasonable apprehensions of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Gaitskell

But the right hon. Gentleman does not rule out agreement on this particular point, supposing we could not reach agreement on the wider issues?

Mr. Ormsby-Gore

I think that it would be a mistake to say where one would go if one did not get exactly what one would wish to get at any conference, but I have stated in fairly precise terms that we do favour a zone of controlled limitation of armaments such as I have described. Special measures could also be subscribed to by the West to ensure that if Germany joined N.A.T.O. after reunification the West did not take military advantage of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Soviet Zone. All these matters were dealt with, I know, in some detail by my right hon. and learned Friend during the debate of 4th December, and I would only add two points which I think we should ponder very deeply.

I have tried to indicate why disengagement in the sense of a far-reaching settlement involving political reorientation of a number of countries in Central Europe, and of Germany in particular, is unacceptable. Apart from the fact that there is no prospect, in practice, of such a major political development, since none of the Governments primarily concerned intends to become neutral and it is also a policy rejected by all our Western Allies, I believe that, viewed in the context of recent history, it could be highly dangerous.

What are the two most significant features in the history of post-war Europe? I suggest that they are these.

First, the United States, after a century and a half of isolation, has become intimately involved in world politics, and has, in particular, identified herself closely with the fate of Europe. Any policy that ran the risk of reversing this process might put us all in the gravest peril. Secondly, after generations of strife and jealousy between the countries of Western Europe, a new path towards unity and co-operation has been charted. Old rivalries have been laid aside, and Germany has been welded into the community of Western Europe. We must ask ourselves whether it would really be wise to reverse this process. Would it be wise to prise Germany apart from her present friends and Allies, and so begin a new and unpredictable chapter in our history?

I cannot feel that this would be a hopeful development and, above all, I would have the most fundamental doubts about a policy that involved the prospect both of American withdrawal from Europe and German isolation from her Western European partners. I would, therefore, suggest that we would be making a grave mistake if we sought for a short cut to German reunification and Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe by means fraught with such tremendous risks.

Finally, I would say that it seems to me axiomatic that our course of action in the months ahead should largely depend on an assessment or Soviet motives and intentions. Put in its simplest form, there are, I submit, two schools of thought on the matter. There are those who base themselves on the Communist scriptures and much subsequent history. They suggest that the Soviet leaders have not given up, and will not give up, their objective of world revolution and their belief in the inevitability of a war between the Communist world and what they choose to call the capitalist world; that internal and external events have had little or no effect on the Kremlin's philosophy. If one accepts this view wholeheartedly it is not likely that any of us would be able to obtain any agreement with the Russians except one that they felt was disadvantageous to the West.

Then there is what might be broadly described as the other school of thought that suggests that the Kremlin leaders, who are very clever people, are certainly clever enough to understand that a world nuclear war would not bring victory to the Communists or anyone else. The so-called victor would preside over nothing more than the scattered remnants of humanity ekeing out a miserable existence on a largely radioactive dustbowl.

If this is accepted by the Soviet leaders, they may well be genuine about desiring some agreement to coexist. If victory for Communism can no longer be had by force, it must be achieved by stealth, and its leaders will be as anxious to avoid a head-on clash as we are. The first school of thought feels that the Communists have taken little account of the changes in the world over the last forty years; the second school feels that this is a most unlikely supposition. The first school is frankly pessimistic; the second is more optimistic.

Putting aside, so far as I can, all wishful thinking, I am very much inclined to the second school, but I am convinced that the more hopeful prospect such a conviction opens up for us all is not just the result of mere chance. I believe that in great measure it has been brought about by the policies of the West, and these policies have, of course, been consistently pursued over the last ten or eleven years.

The opportunity that we now have presented to us for negotiations which may lead to a more stable order in Europe is in no small measure due to the support for the conception and the policies of N.A.T.O., sustained and encouraged by successive Governments in this country. If the Soviet Government will now agree to the conference that we have proposed, a new and brighter chapter may open in the history of Europe and in the relations between East and West.

4.57 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Henderson (Rowley Regis and Tipton)

I am sure that those of us on this side would at least agree with the desire of the Minister of State that the Soviet Union will participate in the proposed Foreign Ministers' meeting, but I thought that the right hon. Gentleman did less than justice to the powerful case made by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. Indeed, I hope that our representatives in Moscow will be more convincing in their presentation of the Government's policy than the Minister has been today.

The right hon. Gentleman referred to my right hon. Friend's proposal in support of the policy of disengagement and drew from that the possibility of the United States being driven away from Europe as a result of that policy being put into operation. The Minister of State knows perfectly well that the Leader of the Opposition made it abundantly clear that there could be no question of a policy of disengagement being adopted except with the approval and agreement of our Allies, including the United States.

The Minister also talked about Germany being isolated. He ignored the proposal for a European system of security that would include a reunified Germany. Surely Germany would not be driven into isolation if she were a full and equal member of any system of security for the whole of Europe.

I want now to deal for a few minutes with the visit of our Ministers to Moscow. My right hon. Friend commented on the great importance of this visit. No one can suppose that the Prime Minister will secure anything in the nature of a settlement with the Russians. He himself has categorically stated that he is not going to Moscow to negotiate, but merely to express the views of our own Government on international questions, and also to return the visit of Mr. Khrushchev to this country. None the less, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are going at a critical time, and their visit will be profitable if it throws some light on Soviet intentions, and, indeed, if the Prime Minister can convey to the Russian leaders some clear exposition of the policy for which the three Western Governments stand. It seems to me that this is an essential step towards the opening of effective negotiations between East and West, first, at the proposed Foreign Ministers' Conference, and then, I hope, at a Summit Conference later on.

I wish to draw attention to the speech made yesterday by Mr. Khrushchev. According to The Times, he is reported as saying, An airlift could not be tolerated, if the Russians hand over to the East Germans control of access to Berlin. It is becoming increasingly evident that, failing an agreement with the West, the Soviet Government will withdraw from Berlin and hand over their responsibilities 10 the East German authorities This would undoubtedly create a dangerous situation. Would the situation be eased if the Western Governments were to hand over their responsibilities for West Berlin to the Federal German Government as their agents? What would the Soviet reaction be to that proposal? It might be a good thing if the Prime Minister were to endeavour to find out during his visit to Moscow whether it would be regarded by the Soviet leaders as a first step towards peace. Moreover, as the German problem will have to be settled in the last resort between the two parts of Germany, might not this be a good starting point?

I make the suggestion because Mr. Khrushchev has made it quite clear that, in certain circumstances, the Soviet Government will hand over their responsibilities to the East German authorities. There can be no justification for such unilateral action on the part of the Soviet Government. It would constitute a breach of the international agreement entered into in 1945, and certainly could not terminate the responsibilities imposed not only upon the three Western Governments but also on the Soviet Government itself by that agreement.

Mr. Khrushchev goes further. He now issues his warning that an airlift to Berlin could not be tolerated. This is an astonishing attitude for him to take. The Soviet Prime Minister claims the right to interfere with the lawful responsibilities of the three Western Governments to take peaceful action in discharge of their international obligations. Surely, this is something which the Western Governments cannot possibly accept without surrendering completely to Soviet pressure. Presumably, Mr. Khrushchev seeks to deny to the West the right to send in food supplies for the people of Berlin. Surely, he would not expect the people of the West and their Governments to stand by and leave the 2½ million people of West Berlin to starve unless they bow the knee to Soviet pressure.

I hope that the Prime Minister, when he goes to Moscow next week will tell Mr. Khrushchev that the British people want peace, that they want good relations with the Soviet people, and they want a just settlement of the German problem, but they are not prepared to sacrifice the people of Berlin to placate the Soviet Government.

Mr. K. Zilliacus (Manchester, Gorton)

On what basis has my right hon. and learned Friend said that there is any question of starving the people of Berlin? There is no question of cutting off communications but merely of having East German officials stamp the official documents instead of Soviet officials. Is that worth a world war?

Mr. Henderson

No, I am not suggesting that there should be a world war. What I say is that there is no reason why the Western Governments should not be allowed to exercise their responsibilities towards the people of West Berlin, just as Russia claims the right to look after the people of East Berlin.

In 1948, when the Soviet Government blocked all land communications into West Berlin, the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force, for which I then had Ministerial responsibility, organised the greatest and most successful airlift in history. The 1948 airlift did not infringe any part of the 1945 quadripartite agreement to which Russia was, and is, a party. The Western Governments would equally be within their rights if they were compelled by the Soviet Government to organise an airlift. I do not suggest that the Soviet Government will push things to the point where an airlift is essential, but, in view of what the Soviet Prime Minister said yesterday, we ought to make it quite clear that we consider that we should be entitled, if circumstances justified it, in organising an airlift to go to the help of the people of Western Berlin once more.

Mr. John Hynd (Sheffield, Attercliffe)

At least.

Mr. Henderson

At least. But something more than an airlift is required. Berlin is only one aspect of the German problem. Sooner or later, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will have to meet with the East German authorities round the conference table to negotiate a settlement. We should not be realistic if we took any other view and still hoped to see a settlement of the problem. They will have to meet at the conference table. To my mind, questions of de jure or de facto recognition are not of overriding importance or even a necessary preliminary.

The United States Government negotiated with representatives of the Chinese People's Republic in Korea, yet neither then nor today have they afforded either de jure or de facto recognition to that Republic. If agreement were reached at the conference between the West German Government and the East German authorities to hold free elections and to establish an all-German Republic, both the Government of Western Germany and the Government of Eastern Germany would disappear and be replaced by a freely elected all-German Government, which surely would be in the best interests of the German people as a whole, and indeed, of Europe also.

There remain the wider aspects of the problem. As my right hon. Friend made quite clear, Berlin is only part of the wider problem of Germany. The problem of Germany, in my opinion, is only part of the wider problem of European security. There remain, therefore, certain vital problems which call for an agreement sooner or later between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Western Governments on the other, if we are ever to secure stable conditions in Europe.

My right hon. Friend made out a very powerful case, I thought, for disengagement, the separation of the forces of East and West. He made a very powerful case for a system of security for the whole of Europe which would guarantee the independence of a reunified Germany. I should like it to be much wider. I should like to see a system of security for the whole of Europe covering every nation of Europe, whether it belonged to N.A.T.O., to the Warsaw Pact, or to neither. I believe that the problem of Germany would take on an entirely different complexion if it were a question of a reunified Germany being fitted into a system of collective security for the whole of Europe. I believe that the question of a demilitarised zone in Central Europe, the Rapacki Plan—all these concepts-would take on an entirely different complexion if we could build up this system of security covering the whole of Europe. I hope that in spite of what has been said this afternoon the Prime Minister will discuss fully and freely with the Soviet leaders the possibilities of working out this new concept for Europe, which would mean that instead of talking about N.A.T.O., on the one hand, and of the Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, all the nations concerned in Europe would be bound together in this organisation to safeguard peace for Europe.

I know that that is not likely to emerge from the Prime Minister's visit. What I am saying is that many of us consider that to be the way in which we should make progress towards a stable Europe. Like my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, I would equally attach great importance to a successful outcome of the conferences now taking place in Geneva. I have no doubt that the Minister of State has come back somewhat frustrated by his experiences at Geneva. I was glad to hear him say that he did not regard the present situation as a deadlock. A great deal turns upon it.

The Minister of State would, I believe, agree that if we could secure success at both conferences at Geneva we would open the door to much wider agreement on disarmament covering both nuclear and conventional weapons. If we can get agreement on disarmament, we can create greater trust and confidence between East and West, the lack of which is at present a great obstacle to making any advance.

I therefore hope that the Prime Minister will go to Moscow to seek the co-operation of Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues in the achievement of these objects. It is along these lines that, I believe, the peace of Europe will be secured.

5.12 p.m.

Mr. F. M. Bennett (Torquay)

I trust that the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) will forgive me if I do not comment specifically upon the points he has raised other than generally in the course of my remarks. One thing on which I should have thought we were all agreed in the great issues of peace and war in this twentieth century, with all the horrors that the latter would mean, is that we should so regard the subject and respect the integrity of hon. Members on both sides, as above the playing of party politics.

I was glad that the Leader of the Opposition, contrary to certain suggestions made elsewhere in the country, conceded at the outset of his remarks that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in his latest initiative was not activated by any pre-electoral considerations. Equally, just as no responsible person should contemplate that possibility, it would be quite wrong for those opposed politically to the Government to try to play up what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is likely to achieve in Moscow and then try to make capital subsequently out of the extent to which he had failed to obtain the objectives they have attributed to him. Like my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, I do not think we should imagine that very much immediately effective will come out of the meeting. As my right hon. Friend has said, it is a reconnaissance.

Moreover, there is at least one hon. Member opposite—the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget)— with whose views on one matter I know I am in agreement. The hon. and learned Member has said that he distrusts summit meetings. I also have considerable historical suspicions of supposed advantages that flow from these much-vaunted occasions. However, I should be as delighted as no doubt would be the hon. and learned Member were we both to be proved wrong on this occasion.

The only further point about the impending visit to Moscow which I should like to make is that I have some slight apprehension in the interpretation of its timing by the Soviet Union. The fact remains that some little time ago the Russians issued what was, in effect, an ultimatum and threat about what would happen if we did not take a certain course by the end of May. I hope that the Soviet Union will not be so misguided as to believe that because our Prime Minister is now going to Moscow he goes consequent upon that threat. If the Russians were to believe that, it would be a dangerous precedent for the future, for they might quite wrongly imagine that if they wanted to get their way with the West they had only to make threats. In 1939 we learnt to the immense cost of the world and its peoples how dictators are misled to behave when they bully democracies and continue to do so until one day unexpectedly the democracies stand up to them. By then, however, it is too late and there is war. I hope that the Soviet Union will not be as misguided as that on this or any future occasion.

Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)

In the light of what the hon. Member says, is it not much better that everybody should realise that the Prime Minister's visit is purely a matter of internal politics here? In that case, it will not alarm our Allies, as it would do otherwise, and it will not cause the Soviet Union to be under the delusion feared by the hon. Member.

Mr. Bennett

I am sorry that after the compliment I have just paid the hon. and learned Member he should now say something which is not worthy of him. Hon. and right hon. Members opposite generally have for months past pressed my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to take the initiative. Therefore, if my right hon. Friend is now guided by the considerations which he now declares, all I can say is that he has had considerable support in doing so from a large number of hon. Members opposite. Not for the first time in his political career, therefore, the hon. and learned Member again stands rather alone.

I turn now to Berlin. Like the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton, I was distressed to read the terms, if they were correctly reported, of Mr. Khrushchev's speech yesterday. They appear to go a great deal further by way of threat than anything we have yet heard. The right hon. and learned Member was interrupted by the hon. Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus), who now seems to have left the Chamber, having made a rapid entry and exit. Clearly, the hon. Member had not heard the earlier part of his right hon. and learned Friend's speech or he would have realised that he was talking about the threat that if we resorted to an airlift it would not be tolerated by the Soviet Union in alliance with Eastern Germany. This certainly develops a dangerous situation if Mr. Khrushchev has been correctly reported.

Some people in this country and among our Allies have suggested that if the threat to try to cut off Berlin is implemented, it may be wiser to use an airlift than to try to use force on the ground. If we are now to be told by the Soviet Union in advance even that an airlift simply will not be tolerated and military action will be taken to prevent it, it seems to me that the Soviet Union has gone a great deal further than hitherto. This hardly portends a favourable atmosphere for the Prime Minister's conversations in Moscow. In those circumstances, I was particularly glad to hear the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon reaffirm the determination of the party for which he was speaking that we are not prepared to tolerate the cutting off of Berlin. This point was reiterated in forthright fashion by the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton.

The remarks attributed to Mr. Khrushchev are particularly interesting since the Leader of the Opposition, on his recent visit to Germany, was reported as saying that there were considerable advantages in the use of an airlift to break a blockade. Only a matter of days afterwards, the leader of the Soviet people warns that even this moderate approach will be treated with military force. We can only hope that Mr. Khrushchev was not conveying a real determination. For one must again repeat the warning, which, I believe, has had more or less unanimous support in the country, that we are not bluffing and that we and our Allies are determined not to be robbed of our rights and obligations in Berlin.

If we gave way in this matter, or if there is any suggestion that we should give way, I believe it would be as fatal to peace in the course of history as when we gave way when Hitler went into the Rhineland, which started the first drift towards the last World War. If we give way on this occasion to just as unjustifiable a military threat and do not stand up to our rights and obligations, it will not be long before fresh demands and ultimata are issued and we shall once again be on the steep decline towards war which we had to endure in the 'thirties.

Apart from Berlin, much talk today has been rightly concentrated on reuniting Germany. I always find myself a little diffident about pushing this matter too far, because, although it is obviously desirable for European security and only right that the Germans should be reunited, we could play up this matter in a way which could lead to too big a price being paid for it. The Germans are always among the most ready to realise that, much as reunification of their country is desired, this could be achieved at too great a cost.

Thus suggestions have been made that something short of free elections, some kind of federal or confederal relationship, should be established between the two countries and those who support such a policy in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, insist that there should be equality of representation on both sides. In the first place, of course, it is ludicrous to contemplate that a nation of 55 million, which is growing every day through fresh refugees coming across the border from East Germany, where there are between 15 and 16 million left, should be treated in a federal structure with precisely similar rights as those of East Germany compared with the Federal Republic.

Mr. S. Silverman

The hon. Member should go and tell them that in Wales.

Mr. Bennett

I do not think the hon. Gentleman has made a very pertinent interruption. Incidentally, I should certainly be prepared to give a much wider degree of freedom to Wales if it meant that some of the hon. Gentleman's hon. Friends would stay in Cardiff rather than come to Westminster.

If the federal solution were adopted and one were to contemplate equal representation between a free democracy and an authoritarian State, one could obviously see a situation arising in which all the delegates of an authoritarian East Germany would be Communists, all following one line, whereas the West Germans would all be elected freely. Under those circumstances, it is possible to envisage that one, two, three or four West German Communist or extreme Left M.P.s might be elected to the Federal Parliament. There would be then an even more ludicrous and a very dangerous situation in that under a federal legislature as proposed the views of East Germany would be more strongly represented than those of West Germany, which could lead to serious implications for the latter's free future.

Hence, from the Germans' point of view, I should have thought they would be well advised, before following too violently the idea of federalism, to ensure that the price which they might pay is not too great and that it would be better to be patient for a little longer, however difficult it may be.

On disengagement, there has been a good deal of discussion about the balance of advantages of any particular method. There have been rival Motions on the Order Paper which have lately become reunited—I do not know whether by a system of free elections or otherwise among hon. Members opposite— into one composite whole in the last day or two. I find it impossible to understand how the sponsors of the Motion or the Leader of the Opposition can believe that there is an equality of balance or sacrifice of advantages by what is proposed in the resultant compromise Motion. It proposes that we should give up our military alliance with Federal Germany and in return the Russians should give up their so-called allies in the Warsaw Pact, every one of which is unreliable and could make no contribution in time of war and would only be real nuisances and sources of trouble.

The proposal is that we on the one hand should give up an effective and loyal ally and in return the Russians should move their troops from countries which it is difficult and expensive for them to occupy. How can that be regarded as an equality of balance of sacrifice and advantage between the parties concerned? To reiterate, as it now stands on the Order Paper the Opposition proposal is that West Germany should be demilitarised and forced to leave N.A.T.O. and in return the great sacrifice which is made by the U.S.S.R. is that Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia should go out of the Warsaw Pact, which their people have not wanted to be in anyway and would be delighted if they were relieved of their obligations. So, regarding any deterioration of respective strengths of East and West, it is nonsense to suggest that the proposals would mean anything in the way of a weakening of the Russian position, which could compare with what the loss of Germany would represent to the West.

I fully agree with my hon. Friend the Minister of State on the caution with which we must approach any suggestions for disengagement. As far as one can see, nearly every one of them is fraught with worse potential dangers than the present position. It is all very well to talk about the need for change and flexibility, but I do not see very much advantage in change just for the sake of change, and being flexible for the sake of flexibility if the end result is worse than the present-day position. And I have not seen one proposal likely to be accepted by the U.S.S.R. which, looked at calmly, would not represent a serious disadvantage for the West in future.

Finally, to revert to the earlier part of my speech, and, in particular, to the discreditable remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton, a letter was published in The Times of 9th February from hon. Members opposite, including the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), in which a most astonishing proposition was put forward. It sets out certain things which the signatories demand the Prime Minister should do while he is in Moscow, and lines of policy are set out which he should and must adopt because, as the five authors of the letter say, if he does not do what they want him to do he must, ipso facto, be guilty of pre-electoral trickery. The effect of the letter is that unless the Prime Minister obeys the dictates of a small section of the Opposition he must be playing party politics.

There is only one other point in that silly contemptible letter which is worth mentioning, and that is to note the masterly degree of logic shown by the authors when they point out that, if only we give way to all the demands of the Russians which they have made in their various Notes about disengagement in Europe, agreement with the Soviet Union should readily become attainable. I should have thought that that was a self-evident proposition.

In contrast I am confident that when he goes to Moscow the Prime Minister will content himself with the purposes which he has already announced in the House, namely, that he will treat his visit as a reconnaissance, and, although he will on every occasion utilise the opportunity of talking to the Russian leaders to try to get them to understand that we in the West want peace in security and nothing else, he will not convey any impression that there is any weakening by the West in its determination to defend, not only our interests in Berlin, but the freedom and security of Western Europe and the whole free world as well.

5.30 p.m.

Mr. Reginald Paget (Northampton)

The other day Vicky had a cartoon in the Evening Standard which showed Mr. Dulles, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and behind them on the wall the Gallup Poll chart which showed Labour support overtaking Conservative support. The caption underneath was, "How can you ask us whether our journey is really necessary?" I am no supporter of summit meetings, but if we are to have them they are probably far best held in circumstances in which they can be ascribed to domestic needs. If they were not so ascribed by our Allies, our Allies would be very much more disturbed than they are now. If they were not also so ascribed by our enemies, our enemies might be rather more triumphant at having brought the meeting off.

My feelings about a summit conference are these. Firstly, it is said, and I think that my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell) to some extent indicated this in opening the debate, that it is a sort of ice-breaking process, that if the great men meet they will find that they are nice, friendly, peaceable chaps and have no occasion to be frightened of each other. I feel always that there is a certain element of dichotomy when I hear people who also support our policy of the deterrent putting forward that argument. After all, our policy of the deterrent is based on making other people believe that we are the sort of people who would use the bomb.

Which impression do we want our leaders to make? Do we want them to convince Mr. Khrushchev and his friends, as Sir Anthony Eden and President Eisenhower were so successful in doing at Geneva? Do we want the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to convince Mr. Khrushchev that he is such a peace-loving chap that he is no danger to anybody except perhaps some poor bear? That is what happened at Geneva. What was the result? Sir Anthony and President Eisenhower were tremendously successful. They so convinced the Russians that they were very harmless people indeed that the Russians went home and decided to do something which they had never thought it was safe to do before, and that was to play hell in the Middle East. I am doubtful which of these two impressions—the lamb or the bombardier—we are desiring to put across. Whilst we are in doubt about these two impressions, perhaps there is a case for staying at home.

The second objection I have is that it is said that when there is a summit meeting it is, after all, a meeting of people who are in a position to agree. But, of course, they are not. The President of the United States cannot agree. His Constitution does not enable him to do so. Mr. Khrushchev cannot. He has to go back to his Praesidium. The only unfortunate person who can agree is our Prime Minister, and that causes me considerable anxiety, because when there is the question of prestige which these great meetings involve then, as happened at Yalta, there is apt to be agreement for the sake of agreement on things which ought never to be agreed to. Either prestige is committed to agreement or, if we do not have agreement, prestige has been committed to disagreement and, as circumstances change—because the great men disagreed—it is infinitely more difficult later on, in circumstances that arise to make it desirable, to come to a teal agreement.

Finally, there is a greater objection than all these to this summit idea. This summit idea is based upon the conception of peace as being something normal, something simple, something natural, something which will arise if only misunderstandings can be swept away. That is not what peace is like. Peace is the most complicated, the most unnatural and the most unstable of all human relations. Its price is infinite patience and eternal compromise.

There can never be such a thing as final peace. Peace is an eternal adjustment of relations. One can only achieve peace as long as one realises that there is no finality in these relations and that only by eternal willingness to negotiate and agree and move by small things can one adjust in the unnatural way by peaceful means, instead of in the natural and simple way by bloody means. It is that which we have to realise if we are to achieve peace.

The process should be thought of as eternal negotiation working towards agreement, and only letting the big men meet, if they have to meet at all, when negotiation and agreement have been fully reached and it is simply a matter of ratification. Do not let us try to work from the top. We shall not get the right results that way. I urge this very much because, in the long term, I take a very optimistic view indeed, and the real "bull" and fundamental reason why I am profoundly optimistic in the long term is because the Russians are getting rich. The richer they get the better I am pleased, and the more we should co-operate and trade in every kind of way to get them rich.

The one lesson which all history teaches us is that faith never survives riches, and I do not think that the Communist faith will survive them either. I think that this is a good thing, for faith is the bane of humanity. I look forward to the time when the Russians will be as Communist as we are Christian, that is to say, when they will recognise that it is something not worth fighting about, and that that is a very good thing. We have only to allow time and patience and not do something silly meanwhile for that to happen.

How should we conduct ourselves in this middle period, foreseeing in the future a very rosy prospect indeed? The first lesson about the Russians—and this is not only true of Communist Russia, it has been true right through Russian history—is that the most dangerous manoeuvre one can make in front of a Russian is to step backwards. The whole policy of the Russians, all through their history, has been to push on into weakness and stop when they meet resistance. The last thing one should do with the Russians is to negotiate under threat. I do not believe for one moment that the East Berlin proposals have been put forward by the Russians with any serious idea that we will accept them. They were put forward in order to force negotiations. I feel very strongly that we should make it clear to the Russians that we are not going to negotiate under those terms and under threats. I do not think that we shall have satisfactory negotiations on those terms.

After having cleared that out of the way, surely all the case is for disengagement. If we take an optimistic long-term view, then the advantages are in drawing aside, leaving the Russians with hands pretty free and getting rich as quickly as possible, and relieving them of what is a considerable burden, their position in their satellites. But remember, when it is said, "Ah, we are asking the Russians to leave something that hates them, whereas we are leaving something that loves us," that is not a sole disadvantage, because that which hates the Russians is apt to join that which loves us and become a total area which, even if it is prevented from taking an active part in alliances, will pursue its natural inclination to look and turn our way.

I feel that all the advantage is in disengagement, because this is not a situation in which two sides, longing to get at each other, have only to step back to enjoy a bigger jump at each other's throats. That is not the reality of the situation. There are two persons nervously hanging on to each other because neither will give way, and if we get a mutual step back, the need for the present level of armaments ceases.

With the greatest respect to my right hon. Friend, I have little faith in disarmament agreements. I believe that we have to remove the cause for which people seek arms, and then they will put the arms away themselves. We have seen a measure of that happening in the last year or two. If we get withdrawal over this area, I believe the cause, the need of confrontation, will become much less. We shall get the lowering of our armaments we all desire and the increasing wealth of the Russians. Remember that Communism is a highly satisfactory policy for a country whose problem is existence, but once it passes that stage, once the problem is not to live but to make living worth while, then Communism ceases to be an adequate faith.

This Russian situation will have resolved itself if we get away from the tensions, and I believe that all argument and reason is on the side of this disengagement policy, and I only pray that we can bring it off.

5.42 p.m.

Mr. Gilbert Longden (Hertfordshire, South-West)

The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) will forgive me if I do not enter into an undignified wrangle with him about the motives of the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow. I shall leave that point by saying that I utterly disagree with the hon. and learned Gentleman's assumption about those motives and that I have no faith in his judgment. That he will at least appreciate. With the rest of his speech I find myself in a great deal of sympathy, but I have to recognise with sadness that he speaks practically only for himself.

Sir Gordon, I am grateful that I have caught your eye this evening, because it is very long since I was in a position to do so. I will ask the indulgence of the Committee now, because soon after I have sat down I shall have to leave it. When we thought we were to debate some other subject this evening, I entered into a commitment which I must honour, and I intend no discourtesy to the House in so doing.

The questions we are discussing this evening were not raised at the Thirteenth Session of the United Nations from which I have just returned. Of course Germany is not a member of the United Nations, and there is also Article 33 which enjoins upon Member States the duty of trying to solve their differences by negotiation. The question would have been raised in New York if Mr. Khrushchev had not gone back on his own proposal that there should be a summit meeting under the aegis of the Security Council. I think it is a pity he went back on it, because that is the place for the meeting, and until this takes place somewhere we shall never solve the two problems we are discussing.

The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) made the interesting suggestion that we should hand over the Western sector of Berlin to the Federal Republic, but I do not think that would meet the case. If all their Allies left them they would be an enclave in a hostile country, and in any event it would be only a temporary solution. The most urgent of the problems is that of Berlin, and the reason why it is the most urgent is because the Soviet proposals of 27th November last are in the nature of an ultimatum. The Note states: If this proposal is not acceptable to the Government of Great Britain then there remains no subject for talks between the former Occupying Powers on the Berlin question. That is an ultimatum, and it is due to expire on 27th May. So it is the more urgent of the two problems. It is not a German problem, it is essentially a Russian problem. With Soviet co-operation, the problem could be solved tomorrow. As the Leader of the Opposition said, it will not be solved satisfactorily until we can solve the second of the two problems, the reunification of Germany. Berlin is one of the main reasons, or so I have always hoped, why we regard the reunification of Germany as "an essential element in European stability", to quote my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary. But perhaps because the Soviets are not ready for that, or because they want to engage our attention upon Europe so that we are blind, or blinder, to what may be happening elsewhere, as the Leader of the Opposition said—say in Persia or Finland—the Kremlin threatened unilaterally to abrogate the lawful rights of the Allies unless we agree to their proposals. Let us at least be clear about one thing. If hostilities should break out. which God forbid, as a result of our insisting upon our rights of communication with West Berlin, it will not be we who are the aggressors, it will not be we who drag the world into war over Berlin.

Mr. Zilliacus

Yes, it will.

Mr. Longden

I thought I would hear that intervention. There are very few causes of war which cannot be made by the pusillanimous and the specious to appear trivial. No doubt we will hear this cry, is Berlin worth a war? It means that those who shout it have forgotten the 'thirties.

Mr. Zilliacus

May I interrupt the hon. Gentleman? Does he acknowledge the obligation of the Charter which prohibits resort to force to support our own view of our rights in a dispute, and will he accept the idea of referring any dispute on this matter to the Security Council and refraining from the use of force?

Mr. Longden

It may be that the hon. Gentleman has just entered the Chamber, said at the beginning of my remarks that it may yet come to the United Nations. It has not yet come there for the reasons I gave, but it may well have to do so. It will be vetoed in the Security Council no doubt, and then it will have to come before the General Assembly by way of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, but at any rate we and our Allies have stated our position clearly: The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States once more reaffirmed the determination of their Governments to maintain their position and their rights with respect to Berlin, including the right of free access. That has been ratified by the whole of the N.A.T.O. Council.

Mr. S. Silverman

May I intervene? The hon. Gentleman posed the question and said that it might be put in this form, whether Berlin was worth a war. But let us suppose that it is not quite the question, let us suppose the question is that of access to West Berlin, free, uninhibited, unlimited—except in so far as it is limited now by physical conditions. Supposing it is the price of dealing with East German officials or officials who were resident in East Germany rather than dealing with Soviet officials. Would the difference between those two propositions be worth a war whose results the hon. Gentleman appreciates, I am sure, as well as anybody else?

Mr. Longden

In my view, for what it is worth, that is another question.

Mr. Silverman

It is the only question.

Mr. Longden

No, it is not the only question. The question whether Berlin is worth a war has already been asked in this Chamber this afternoon by the hon. Gentleman behind the hon. Member, and will no doubt be asked again. The question now is whether, being faced, as we are, with a further ultimatum by the Soviet Union, do we force our way through? It is not merely a question of which people on the frontier will take the tickets; but that we shall be shot down.

Mr. Silverman

If I concede to the hon. Gentleman that, for the purposes of clarity and argument, the question I have put to him is a new question, will he now give us a new answer? Will he answer the question I have asked him? Would he go to war for that difference?

Mr. Longden

If the hon. Gentleman will excuse me, I should prefer to be allowed to make my own speech in my own way. I may come to his point later.

Mr. Silverman

The hon. Gentleman has only to say "Yes" or "No".

Mr. Longden

In any case, what value is my opinion to the hon. Gentleman?

Mr. Silverman

I would not have asked for it if I did not value it.

Mr. Longden

I am much obliged. I give the hon. Gentleman the answer now. It is "No".

I hope that the determination shown by the right hon. Gentleman opposite up to now will be endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the people of this country. I greatly welcome what the right hon. Gentleman said, because I believe that it would be unparalleled perfidy for us to allow the gallant Herr Willi Brandt and his fellow citizens to be smothered by the Iron Curtain. I also believe that it would be the beginning of the end of free Europe. We should not be fighting for Berlin and the Germans, but for Europe and the Europeans.

There can be no solution of the Berlin problem, as the Leader of the Opposition said, until Germany is reunited, and the next question is how that can best be done. The West have suggested free elections, but, as the Leader of the Opposition has reminded the House, Mr. Dulles has recently made another speech. I should like to echo what the right hon. Gentleman said about the American Secretary of State. I echo entirely what he said. Though we may not always have agreed with all his policies, I do not think anybody can withhold admiration from a man whose steadfastness and courage have triumphed so constantly over every physical disability.

The Leader of the Opposition gave part of what Mr. Dulles said the other day, but I should like to be allowed to quote the whole of it: If there is any other way to bring about reunification"— that is, other than free elections— we will be glad to explore it; but before we give up a way which is a good way, and the agreed way"— a reference to Geneva, 1955— —we would like to see what the alternative is, and so far we have not found one. Certainly, the Soviet suggestion of a confederation between a Communist and a capitalist State is not a likely solution, for the reasons clearly given by my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Mr. F. M. Bennett). Even if Germany would contemplate it, the Opposition parties in West Germany would not. It would merely perpetuate the division, and, as the Manchester Guardian correspondent in Bonn wrote the other day, it would set up a Korea in Europe.

I am therefore glad to read in the composite Motion on the Order Paper this reference to free elections, and also the reference to effective international control of disarmament. This Motion is obviously one which calls for careful study, and I am quite sure that my right hon. and learned Friend will give it that, but what of the advice that we should agree upon the gradual withdrawal of foreign forces of all kinds from East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary? What of the advice about the withdrawal of the countries in that area from N.A.T.O. and from the Warsaw Pact. Dr. Adenauer has said that we must give no concessions without counter-concessions, and, certainly, there would be counter-concessions if these proposals were carried out, assuming—and it is a big assumption—that the Kremlin will agree to them.

But would they be enough? Is it really fair to equate Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary with the whole of a reunited Germany? Why should Germany, whether neutral or not, leave N.A.T.O.? Why should she? Why should the great German nation be allowed to be neutral in this struggle? Why should she not play her part with others in the defence of the Western civilisation to which she herself has contributed so much? How can Germany be kept neutral, even if it were desirable? How can we treat a nation of 70 million like a nation of 8 million people? If Germany were to leave N.A.T.O., and if the remaining N.A.T.O. forces were to come back on this side of the Rhine, I believe that it would mean that the Americans and ourselves would leave the Continent of Europe, and that, I believe, would mean the break up of N.A.T.O.

Why do I believe that? I believe it because of what General Norstad has said, what Field Marshal Lord Montgomery has said, what every other soldier I know on this or the other side of the Atlantic has said, and also what M. Paul Spaak has said. They have said that there would then be insufficient depth in which to make the shield of N.A.T.O. efficient. At any rate, as my right hon. Friend the Minister of State said, it is a risk, and are we justified in taking that risk? Indeed, are we ready to take it? Would we be justified in deliberately jeopardising the security of the one part of the world, and that the most important part, where our Western policy has triumphantly succeeded?

If I am accused of being only destructive, I should like now tentatively to advance an alternative. Firstly, I believe that there should be free elections, followed by a united, independent sovereign Germany. Secondly, I would advocate most strongly that such a Germany should renounce for all time all claims to territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Thirdly, I believe that such a Germany, ex hypothesi, should be free to choose her own policy, and, if she chose to remain allied to the West, then, fourthly, she and she alone would be responsible for the defence of Germany. All foreign troops would be withdrawn from the United German soil and all Soviet troops from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. After all, they have no right whatever to be there. Finally, by all means, let there be a nuclear-free zone in Europe, though whether that would be such a safeguard as it would once have been seems to me to be doubtful. Certainly, there is no harm in having one, and I would agree to fetter a united, independent sovereign Germany to that extent.

I believe that the Soviet fears of a reunited, armed Germany are genuine, but I believe that it is impracticable, even were it desirable to keep a great nation like Germany disarmed forever. I believe that it would be better in the circumstances to rope her into the Western defensive alliance. The Soviet Note to which I have already made reference, asks this question: Can the inspirers of the present policy of the Western Powers on Germany themselves guarantee that the German militarism which they nurture will not again turn against its present partners. The answer is, "No, we cannot guarantee it". It is impossible to do so. It is impossible to guarantee such a thing, but that is surely the best insurance we have against it happening, and the Soviet Note itself goes on to talk about how peace-loving the inhabitants of the Eastern Sector now are.