HC Deb 31 May 1956 vol 553 cc558-64
Mr. Watkinson

I beg to move, in line 32, to leave out "section ten (speeding)".

Clause 18, as originally drafted, contained a provision to increase the maximum fine for exceeding the speed limit from £20 to £30, and to make it possible for disqualification to be imposed on a second offence for speeding. It was not in my time, but I understand that this proposal came under heavy criticism in the Standing Committee, and I believe was eventually negatived. The Amendment, therefore, quite properly deletes the reference to speeding in this Clause, and is, therefore, a consequence of the Standing Committee decision not to increase penalties for exceeding the speed limit. It implements a pledge which I understand was given at that time.

Mr. Speaker

The following Amendment in the names of the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Royle) and the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl) will fall if this Amendment is carried, but it could be discussed with this one.

Mr. MacColl

I share with the Minister ignorance about what happened upstairs in the Standing Committee, and therefore he and I start to look at this matter dispassionately and objectively, without any knowledge of what happened before. I quite agree that as these words are suspended in the Bill and have no proper function they ought, from the point of view of the drafting, to be deleted.

9.45 p.m.

My hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Royle), a very distinguished official of the Magistrates' Association, my hon. Friend the Member for Accrington (Mr. H. Hynd) and I tabled an Amendment to provide for disqualification in the event of a conviction for speeding. That seemed to be a more satisfactory way of rounding off the matter than leaving these words.

I have listened to a fair amount of discussion on the Report stage, and it has seemed to me that the tenor of the discusion has been that, by and large, people take these offences a little too lightly and feel that it is too easy to get off in front of a jury, that magistrates are a little too reluctant to impose adequate sentences, and that, on the whole, one of the most effective ways of dealing with motoring offences is by imposing periods of disqualification.

The exemption of speeding from disqualification for the first two offences seems to me to be a hangover from oldfashioned ideas about motoring. There was a time when people took considerable pride in the number of convictions that they had for speeding. It was regarded as a sign of the speed and efficiency of one's car and the skill and energy of one's driving to have convictions. A great deal of satisfaction was derived from having a collection of the primaries that one had won. These days the appalling figures for road accidents hang like a cloud over all our discussions and we worry continually about how to tackle the problem. Against the modern background of the situation on the roads, the point of view which I have been describing is one which ought to be resolutely stamped upon.

If hon. Members are serious about this and really feel that the purpose of the Bill is to strengthen and tighten the powers of the courts in relation to traffic offences, surely here is a means of bringing that about by allowing discretionary disqualification. Much has been said about the dangers of mandatory orders about disqualification and the fact that they have sometimes led to the dismissal of a case where there ought to have been a conviction. My hon. Firends and I are not suggesting that there should be a mandatory direction to disqualify. What we say is that power should be given to magistrates to impose disqualification, for, after all, it is the magistrates who hear the evidence and they might wish to follow this course when confronted by a particularly gross and flagrant type of case.

Prevention is what matters. It is more important to stop accidents than to deal with them after they have taken place. Stopping speeding is prevention. After there has been an accident, people sit around and argue about how it happened. It is too late. One may then bring terrific charges and indictments of reckless driving, and so on, but all that will not bring to life the person who has been killed. The time to tackle the problem is before the incident takes place which leads to a charge.

One thing that the House ought to be anxious to make clear is that in this day and age speeding is reckless and ought to be regarded as a criminal action rather than a genial kind of escapade which is winked at as being fairly harmless.

I am disappointed and sorry that the Government seek to make this deletion from the Bill. My hon. Friends and I in this matter speak for many magistrates in the Council of the Magistrates' Association. We are sorry this has happened and regret that our Amendment will not come before the House

Mr. Ede

I want to support the plea which has been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl) for giving the magistrates some discretion in this matter. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Southwark (Mr. Isaacs) who earlier today said that the one thing which impresses people in a court is the obvious effect which they find that a short period of suspension has on the person who has been convicted. I am certain that it is the punishment which is most felt. For many people, the kind of fine imposed for speeding is almost immaterial, and it is very rarely that the motorist feels any punishment of that kind.

I object to it being made mandatory that a suspension must follow a conviction. Of course, at present the power to suspend on the third or subsequent conviction is in the discretion of the magistrate, but the fact that it exists generally has a pretty powerful effect on the person who regards himself as unfortunate enough to have been caught out three times. It is the only punishment which has any effect on a motorist who keeps his car mainly for pleasure purposes, or on rich people who use a car for business purposes. If the Minister gave magistrates this discretion, it would be a very valuable reinforcement of their powers and would have a far greater effect in reducing the number of offences than anything else in the Bill.

Mr. Molson

The Amendment is somewhat in line with the original thinking of my Department. When introduced, the Bill provided for increasing the penalties for speeding. The present law provides that disqualification for an offence under Section 10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, cannot be ordered in the case of a first or second offence. The Amendment would stiffen the law by authorising courts to disqualify a convicted offender for up to one month for the first offence and three months for a second or subsequent offence.

As originally introduced, the Bill contained a provision making it possible for a court to disqualify for a second offence under Section 10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, provided that the lapse of time between the first and second offences was three years or less. We did not contemplate disqualification for a first offence. Even those more moderate proposals put forward by the Government did not meet with approval in Committee upstairs. This was no party matter and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance at an early stage indicated that this was a matter on which the Government were prepared to accept the guidance of the Committee and the Amendment which my right hon. Friend has moved gives effect to what we understood to be the general view of the Committee. I therefore hope that the House will not go against the view expressed after a very full and long debate in Standing Committee.

Mr. G. R. Strauss

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary has asked me to intervene, possibly to express—as he hoped—a view which would support his action and disagree with the views of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) and my hon. Friend the Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl). In this matter, as in all these matters affecting road safety, we have spoken our individual views without party considerations, and upon many matters there has been disagreement among Members on our side of the House as well as upon the other.

I fully appreciate the fact that there are some Members—we have heard their voices tonight—who believe that it would be desirable, and would reduce the number of accidents, if disqualification were permitted in respect of those who were convicted for exceeding the speed limit either upon the first or second occasion. We discussed this matter at length in Committee, and it was certainly my view that such a provision might act exceedingly harshly and unfairly upon persons in very many cases. The attitudes of magistrates in different parts of the country might vary, and the effect it would have upon the offence of exceeding the speed limit would be negligible.

Many of us came to the conclusion that, on balance, it would not be wise, or serve any useful purpose—and might, indeed, create very real difficulties and unfairness—if we did as suggested in the Amendment. For that reason I and many of my colleagues take a different view from that which has been expressed this evening, and we support the view put forward by the Joint Parliamentary Secretary.

Mr. Isaacs

I am completely opposed to any suspension for a first offence of speeding, but I think that we should have power to act further. In the court where I sit we had 18 cases of speeding today. In respect of one offender it was his third offence within two years. For his first offence he was fined £2 and for his second £5—although in my court the fine in respect of a second offence is rarely more than £3—and we had toconsider the question whether we had power to suspend his licence. This offender did not even trouble to turn up. He forwarded his licence and pleaded guilty.

A court should be given power to suspend a licence after a second offence, if necessary. The offence of speeding varies according to circumstances. Sometimes a car travelling at 40 miles an hour—10 miles above the limit—may be doing so upon a road which a police officer says was dry, where the traffic was light, and there was no danger, but in another case the police officer may say that visibility was poor, the road surface was wet, and there was a lot of traffic about. Discretion in these matters must be left with the magistrates. I am convinced that a suspension for a month will stop more speeding than a fine of £10.

Mr. Watkinson

I am in a somewhat difficult position, because I was not in the Committee at the relevant time. However, my right hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary and I have gone through the matter very carefully, and I have studied the discussion which took place. I think that the decision which I announced in moving the Amendment to delete Section 10 of the principal Act fairly reflects the majority opinion in Committee. Although I am deeply conscious that other hon. Members hold different views. I feel it is only right, at this stage, for the Government to stick to what was the majority decision in Committee.

Amendment agreed to.