HC Deb 05 July 1955 vol 543 cc1083-5

Where at the conclusion and determination of the trial of any case tried in the county court either party gives notice of appeal and satisfies the county court judge that he desires to appeal on a question of law upon which an appellate court has already given a ruling, the county court judge may give leave for the appeal to be taken direct to the House of Lords and the rules relating to an appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords shall thereupon apply to such appeal from the county court.—[Mr. Hale.]

Brought up and read the First time.

Mr. Hale

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

This new Clause has the attractive title of "Leapfrogging Appeal," which is a phrase coined by the Evershed Committee, which rejected the proposal for permitting the leapfrogging appeal, which I had better define for the benefit of those hon. Members who have not had time to study the Report.

A leapfrogging appeal is an appeal which permits the by-passing of a court which has already determined on the matter. If one wishes to test a long existing, or indeed a recent, decision of the Court of Appeal, and brings a case in the county court on the point, it is obviously a waste of time to go to the Court of Appeal under the germs now existing.

However the arguments may go on in the Court of Appeal and however much time may be taken, the Court of Appeal will inevitably say that it is bound by the existing decision, that it can do nothing about it, and that the only hope lies in going to the House of Lords. The leapfrogging appeal would permit, in appropriate cases and under the certificate of the judge, an appeal being made direct from the county court to the House of Lords, and thus saving a fantastic waste of time and money.

There are two arguments that are advanced against it. The first is that if one goes to the Court of Appeal, one says, "We will not argue the matter at length, because we are here on the way up and we are really going to the House of Lords," and that not much expense is incurred. That is true, but there is an item of expense and delay which is incurred, and there is a good deal of unnecessary work.

The Evershed Committee—and I quarrel very strongly with it—has said that the reason why one cannot do that is that the county court would not give such careful consideration of the facts and the notes as the House of Lords would need for the consideration and determination of the case. I see no reason for that at all, and I am talking only of cases in which the parties know beforehand that there is a determination before the thing is started to take the case to the House of Lords. These things do not arise by chance.

This is an attempt to test the existing law for the benefit of other cases. In those circumstances, the county court is certainly adequate, the case is carefully prepared and argued and there is no reason why adequate shorthand notes could not be taken and all the other steps taken. I cannot understand a county court judge not giving a leapfrogging decision in such circumstances, and I suggest that the matter is one for serious consideration of the learned Attorney-General.

The Attorney-General

I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Member for Oldham. West (Mr. Hale) at this hour of the evening, when we are nearly reaching the end of our labours and I think we may be able to finish the Committee stage by ten o'clock. This matter has been very fully considered by the Evershed Committee, which reported against it.

Mr. Hale

That Committee did not hear me on the subject.

The Attorney-General

That is its misfortune, but it is not a misfortune that we share.

The hon. Gentleman knows that the arguments on this question have been the subject of debate for years and have been well developed and stated. If he will look at paragraphs 561, 500 and 498 of the Evershed Report, he will see that they really are substantial. One of the difficulties always is in deciding whether a case before the county court is precisely covered by the decision of the Court of Appeal, and, when we get to the House of Lords, we might find that it was not. I therefore hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for not expanding the reasons. I can only conclude by saying that we cannot accept his new Clause.

Mr. Hale

In view of what the Attorney-General has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.