§ 46 and 50. Mr. Donnellyasked the Prime Minister (1) whether he will make a further statement on the Korean truce talks before the House adjourns for the Whitsun Recess;
(2) what further consultations he has had with the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding a Three-Power conference.
§ 47. Mr. A. J. Irvineasked the Prime Minister whether he will make representations to the United States Government and other member States of the United Nations that the latest proposals made by the United Nations in the truce negotiations constitute a rejection of the expressed views of Her Majesty's Government; and if he will impress on them that British public opinion is gravely disturbed thereby.
§ 49. Mr. Beswickasked the Prime Minister if, in view of the protracted nature of the negotiations at Panmun-jom, Her Majesty's Government will suggest that the eight point peace proposals put forward by the Communists should be referred to an appropriate meeting of the United Nations organisation.
§ The Prime MinisterAt the request of the United Nations Command, the meetings have been further adjourned until Monday, 25th May.
The point of honour concerning no forcible repatriation has been conceded by the other side, and the following two points of substance are outstanding:
In my speech of the 11th which I have several times quoted, I said:
- (a) The proposal that the five members of the neutral commission should send considerable forces to Korea.
2254 - (b) The failure to lay down a time limit for detaining prisoners who refuse repatriation.
… the United States, as mandatory for the United Nations, has borne nineteen-twentieths of the burden in blood and treasure. The matter is not one which we have either the right or the responsibility to decide, but it is our duty, without separating ourselves from our great ally, to express our opinion frankly and plainly to them as occasion offers."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th May, 1953; Vol. 515, c. 888.]On this basis, I have not hesitated to express our views through the regular channels to the United States Government, and the most careful consideration has been given to our representations. I am sure that the United States Government are as anxious as we are to bring the negotiations about prisoners to an early end, and earnestly desire an effective armistice in Korea. The House must, however, realise that very great practical and administrative problems are involved. The proposal, for instance, that two Communist States, Poland and Czechoslovakia, should each send powerful armed forces into South Korea raises obvious difficulties in which the opinion of the South Korean Government, which has at present more than 20 well-armed divisions employed, cannot be treated as negligible. It is also very doubtful whether the Swiss would be willing to send such powerful forces to the Far East. No indication has yet reached me of the attitude of the Swedes. The Government of India remain the most hopeful factor in this form of settlement, but this would be to throw a very heavy burden on them.These are practical difficulties of high consequence on which divergencies of opinion may well arise. If no way of surmounting disagreements can be found we must patiently seek alternative methods.
The second point of substance also raises serious issues. The idea of keeping men indefinitely in captivity because they will not agree to go home to the country that sent them out is not one that can be accepted. A time limit must, therefore, be found. All these issues are being studied, and it is probable that new proposals of a constructive character will be made by the United Nations Command when the talks are resumed on the 25th of this month.
2255 Meanwhile, I do not wish to make any further statement on the other points raised in various Questions, and I hope I may be excused from doing so. I have another statement to make to the House at the conclusion of Questions which has its bearing on the matters concerned and on other larger matters.
§ Mr. DonnellyIs the right hon. Gentleman aware that the harder he presses the point of view expressed by him this afternoon and in the foreign affairs debate —that all matters of principle have been settled and that it is only a question of method—the more united will be the support he receives from this country? May we wish the Prime Minister well during the period of the Recess, and hope that he will have a satisfactory and successful conclusion to his negotiations to tell us about on his return?
§ Mr. BeswickIn the event of the Prime Minister's personal views not carrying sufficient weight, does he not think it might be useful and helpful, in the event of a deadlock, for this matter to be re-submitted to the United Nations in order to get an authoritative opinion from that body again?
§ The Prime MinisterIt is always better to jump one fence at a time.
§ Mr. A. HendersonHas the Prime Minister now given consideration to the question whether the broad basis of the United Nations position should rest upon the Indian Resolution? The Prime Minister said the other day that he would give that matter consideration. Apart from the two points to which he referred this afternoon, does the broad basis of the United Nations position rest upon the Indian Resolution?
§ The Prime MinisterYes, Sir; I think I might reply in the affirmative to that, with all necessary reservations; but there are very difficult practical questions, and, if either side chose to make difficulties about them, they would find plenty of material on which to work. I am sure that the United States earnestly desires, as we do, the end of all this wrangling about the repatriation of prisoners.
§ Mr. StracheyWould not the Prime Minister agree that the two differences of method which he has just defined cannot really be regarded as sufficient justification for the sacrifice of further British 2256 lives and the continuance of the Korean war, with all its immeasurable consequences? Could we not ask our opponents, if the practical difficulties are too great, to suggest their way out, because the issues of principle, as the Prime Minister has re-emphasised today, have now been settled?
§ The Prime MinisterIf the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting that either the United States should accept whatever be the final terms which the Communists insist upon or the British will desert them. I should differ from that.
§ Mr. StracheyThe right hon. Gentleman must not imply that I made any such suggestion. Would he not agree that, having settled the question of principle, as he has reiterated, we might ask for suggestions as to overcoming what are essentially administrative difficulties, because it is very difficult to support the continuance of the war, with all that it means, on what are essentially administrative points?
§ The Prime MinisterI am sure that, if the other side wished for a settlement, they could have had it long ago. I thought it was a mistake myself for the United Nations to agree to the armistice at that time, when General Ridgway was about to gain further great successes. However, 18 months have passed since then, and this debate might be endless. We are doing our best to find reasonable means. Our allies are doing their best under the authority of the United Nations, and, personally, I am quite clear on this —that we have every intention of standing firmly by the allies with whom, under the late Government, very rightly and properly, and with the full assent of Parliament, we entered this war.