KOREAN CAMPAIGN (GOVERNMENT POLICY)

HC Deb 25 June 1952 vol 502 cc2332-70

8.6 p.m.

Mr. Nally

Subject always to correction by the HANSARD reporters, my recollection—and, I hope, that of the Committee —is that the last few words I had the honour to say were to the effect that "there must be no misunderstanding." I could not say anything more because it was then 7 o'clock.

Part of what we are discussing tonight is a misunderstanding, and the interruption to my speech—a speech possibly completely unimportant in itself—illustrates that fact. During the war I once had the honour—I emphasise the word"honour"—of discussing with a group of young American officers the British Parliamentary system. I would defy any Member to explain to an intelligent American, or Russian, why it is that the British Constitution, its rules, regulations and procedure, are such that it is necessary—indeed, it is especially provided for in the rules of the House— that a vital debate should be interrupted for one hour or one and a half hours in order to discuss such an admittedly interesting matter as a district heating scheme in Dagenham or wherever it is or was.

Among the municipal leaders in the north-west of England—and the hon. Member for Wythenshawe (Mrs. Hill) may bear me out in this—who understand most about district heating, my father would take a very prominent place; but if one tries to explain how it comes about that we can abandon a debate on matters of life and death in order to discuss district heating, not all the eloquence of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), coupled with that of the Prime Minister at his best, could possibly explain to Americans—or to those who for some reason or other spend their time listening to us in our debates—why that curious Parliamentary system operates.

Mr. Charles Pannell (Leeds, West)

May I give the hon. Gentleman a reason?

Mr. Nally

The point I am seeking to make is that just as it is difficult to explain that sort of thing either to Americans or Russians——

Mr. George Cherwynd (Stockton-on-Tees)

Or Koreans.

Mr. Nally

—or Koreans, so, in a complicated situation such as we were discussing before we came to the question of water heating, it is necessary for us all to exercise a reasonable amount of toleration and restraint in our attitude to the Americans or the Russians, or in their attitude towards us. It sometimes happens that it is the British attitude which is illogical—as is the case with the long interruption to tonight's debate.

I thought that it was absolutely necessary and proper for this debate about Korea to be held. It would, of course, have been far better if we had been able to wait until next week, when the Government would have had time to consult at length and, with a certain amount of leisure, to digest, what was being presented by the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State, and when the Opposition, equally, would have had time to consider the vital events which have been taking place. However, circumstances have been such that we simply have to have this debate now, because of the grave events which have occurred during the past three or four days.

We have a very brilliant Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea. But it is perfectly clear that, in the channels which exist for the conveyance of information about intended acts from the Commander to his own Government, and the transfer of that information either through the United Nations or directly to participating countries in this great and dangerous Korean enterprise, there has been an appalling breakdown, which might easily lead to the most tragic results. It should be made clear that by its very nature modern war tends to produce such breakdowns. I am not using that as an excuse for what has been done, as I shall show in a few moments, but the very circumstances of war under modern conditions may produce exactly the sort of situation we are discussing.

One presumes that the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces in this theatre approved of this action. It must have taken a long time to prepare If one judges it purely from the military context, it was brilliantly conceived. Consider the scale on which bombing was carried out from aircraft carriers, which represents an operation which I think we rarely had, even in World War II. To that extent it was a brilliant action and it may well be justified. The political consequences, however, were so vital— and I do not think there is any dispute about this on either side of the House— that it was a mistake, inadvertent or not —and I believe it to have been inadvertent—that we were not fully consulted and fully informed about this action, and the preparations which were made for it.

I do not want to speak of military misconceptions to hon. Members, many of whom know more about these matters than I do. It is, however, quite ridiculous to talk about conducting any war at all, even if the only weapon in use is a 303, by drawing a straight line across the map and then assuming that once the line has been drawn, nothing must take place the further side of it. Consider the slowest form of aircraft appearing on both sides—we will forget the Mig. 15 for the moment, and leave aside the most modern aeroplanes. Shortly after the beginning of the war, the Chinese were operating reconnaissance and other aeroplanes capable of between 250 and 300 miles per hour. We were using fighters capable of 300 to 350 miles per hour. That means five miles a minute. If an aircraft is over a battle area many thousands of feet up, chasing an obviously enemy plane, how is the pilot to judge whether he is 100 yards or 200 yards on one side or the other of an artificial line, when he is travelling at that five miles a minute?

It is a great mistake, and it is unfair, to pretend that it is possible to restrict operations to that artificial line drawn across the map. What was done, and was sensibly done originally, was broadly to restrict operations, and to make it perfectly clear that, for the time being, we would do nothing which might be or possibly conceived to be an attempt to extend the area of the conflict. That was a sound and wise policy. It still is.

Although my views are not important —and I do not say that from mock modesty—I am certainly not completely pro-American. Many days before President Truman dismissed General MacArthur, I was, I think, the first in the House to put down a Motion on the Order Paper which, whilst paying tribute to the great and gallant and leading part which the Americans had played in Korea, went on to say, quite bluntly, that this House could no longer entrust British forces to General MacArthur's command. If one or two hon. Members accuse me of being too pro-American, I recall that fact in aid.

I think my Motion of that time was entirely justified for it seemed to me that the policy which General MacArthur— not the United States Administration— was pursuing, and which he said he proposed to pursue, in Korea, and indeed in the Far East might be disastrous. He was in the contradictory position of being not only Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces in Korea but also Allied Chief of the Japanese Occupation controlling commercial, economic and social problems. This was not a position which we could possibly have supported any longer. I ventured to say that General MacArthur represented a menace to General Eisenhower, and was endangering the great work Eisenhower was doing in Europe; but, above all, MacArthur was handicapping the United Nations' cause.

General MacArthur was happily and speedily replaced by another distinguished American General, but here I ask the Committee to see that there is no misunderstanding of the position— and here I come back to the exact words I was using before we dealt with Dagenham's heat. Not only every hon. Member but every citizen of the country must make up their minds, and make them up fairly quickly, about some quite simple points. First of all, was it or was it not justifiable to resist aggression in Korea, assuming that aggression came from the North? I think the overwhelming answer of the country would be, if face to face with that question, that it was justifiable—and all our experience in the past and before World War II proves it to have been so.

Equally, hon. Members on both sides must face this fact. I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) is not in his place; I thought he was here. He has a very efficient deputy in the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies), but I should have preferred the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne, as I want to mention him. My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale, if I may say so with respect, must not ride off by saying, "We believed it was right at the beginning but now subsequent contrary information has come to hand"; I notice a certain coyness and reluctance—and it is not my fault that neither my right hon. or hon. Friends are here—to say exactly what is that new information they have. What is worse, however, is a tendency for both my colleagues to allow themselves that degree of manæuvrability that would entitle them a month from now to say," We are for the war," or "We are against the war."

Mr. A. C. Manuel (Central Ayrshire)

I hope my hon. Friend will be fair about the position. He heard the speech of our right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), who made it quite clear that at that time the Cabinet came down on the side that the North Korean Forces caused the aggression. The point he was making was that of containing the war within Korea as the policy of Ernest Bevin which we were carrying out. That was the only point he made arising from the issue.

Mr. Nally

If that was the only point my right hon. Friend was making——

Mr. Manuel

Of course it was.

Mr. Nally

—he had no need to make it at all, because the policy of our party during the whole of the time we were the Government and since has been perfectly clear upon that issue. We wanted to con- tain the war. Of course we did, and do. There is no need to reiterate the obvious. But what was added to that was the ominous postscript to the effect "as we believed then"—I have no doubt that a reading of HANSARD would show to the Committee and my hon. Friend who interrupted me, for whom I have a great regard, that that speech does give the impression that possibly, although it was thought at the time when my right hon. Friend was a Member of the Cabinet that this was a proper war, engaged upon for proper purposes, he subsequently discovered that evidence came from poisoned sources, and that reflection upon events since then had transformed his view of it.

Dr. Barnett Stross (Stoke-on-Trent, Central)

May I ask my hon. Friend a question before he leaves that point? Suppose for argument's sake, purely as a hypothesis, there were ever evidence that in fact all the information given to us was entirely wrong, would he still refuse to change his attitude?

Mr. Nally

Far from refusing to change my attitude I should stand up in this Chamber and advocate the bringing of every British Service man out of that war forthwith. I could far better understand the attitude of some hon. Members if that was what they said—if, in effect, what they said to us was, "Although we may have thought at the beginning that this was right, our original views have been changed by new evidence, and we discover that we were tricked."

If I found myself in that position it would not only be open to me, but it would indeed be my duty to stand up and say, "I believe now it is a war wrongly conceived for improper purposes, and, among others, I have been tricked." That is what I should say, and I should follow through with the consequences. What I should not do, what I think it is wrong to do, is to try still to keep a foot in each camp—to hint that it is a wrong war, but at the same time make certain one does not follow through and be too definite about it.

There are in this country, as elsewhere, and there is proceeding in this country as elsewhere, a campaign whose techniques are not new at all; they date back, for example, to the beginning of the last war. I well remember once making a collection, in my capacity as a reporter, of some leaflets that the Germans sent over in the period of the "phoney" war —the 1939-40 period. What did they consist of? I still have those leaflets.

In the French areas of the Maginot Line they consisted of messages telling the French that they were being made to fight an English war; that they were being used as cannon fodder for Britain, and that this country would seek to collect the loot. The leaflet sent to the British troops—those we had in that area —said that, in reality, the war had been forced upon Germany, that there were far too many British lying dead in France already, and why did not the British go home? Later, when the Americans came in, we had the same sort of thing, playing one against the other.

What we have at the moment is this. The whole foundation on which Soviet policy is based today—and I state it as a matter of fact, without attaching blame— the whole basis of Soviet policy today is the driving of the greatest possible wedge between ourselves and the United States. The second and subsidiary purpose is to create for us both, the United States and Great Britain, as many "running sores" as possible, that may not in themselves be serious, but that add to the ill temper and discontent of those who have to suffer from them.

Therefore—and I am not being wise after the event now—I do not and I never did believe—I said so at the time—in the genuineness of the original truce in Korea negotiations. I do not believe in the genuineness of the Chinese in these truce negotiations now—although I hope, at the same time, to be proved wrong.

What I thought was that a stage had been reached at which it was essential for general purposes for the Soviet Union and its supporters—for one thing they do have which we have not, and that is patience, long-term patience—to have a truce in order that there could be a build-up behind the North Korean line. Well, such a military build-up has taken place north of the 38th Parallel.

Now we have to ask ourselves about the only thing about which it is said there remains a difference. That is the matter of the prisoners. Some people dismiss it as though it were a minor matter. The question of the prisoners is not a minor matter. The prisoner issue is a vital one. As to the screening, there may have been inefficiency. I do not think any hon. Member of this Committee would dare to say that because of mistakes we should forcibly return any prisoners who plead not to be returned. I think that this is vital. I think it would be vital if there were only a few thousand who did not want to return among the many scores of thousands of prisoners that we have.

Suppose there were only 1,000 who did not want to go back. I should still think it an important matter—although to reduce the figure to so small a one in the face of the evidence is to reduce the case to ridiculous extremes. I do not think there is any Member of the Committee who would say we should forcibly return those men who would be shot or otherwise dealt with because they are regarded as enemies of the Communist regime. I do not think anyone would say, "There are wider interests to be considered, so let us return them."

If any hon. Member would say such a thing I should hope that he would be driving one of the lorries with those people being forcibly transferred in it— driving one of those lorries over the line. Some of us have seen the sort of thing that happens. Some of us saw immediately after the war Ukranians who did not want to go back to the Soviet Union, who were forcibly driven back. We do not want to see such sights again. We should not want to see them if only 10 people were returned who objected to being returned. We cannot, any of us, want to see such things re-enacted in Korea.

I am not suggesting that anybody is saying we should do such a thing. The only point I am making is that, whereas some people talk as though it were only a minor matter holding up the truce negotiations, the prisoners issue is an important matter. The lives of men are involved. Moreover, it is well for us to remember that during the whole of these long drawn out truce negotiations every single major concession has been made— by whom?—by the United Nations negotiators. That process cannot go on indefinitely.

Part of what has been happening during the past 12 months, because of difficulties in things like communications, is that the North Koreans have been able to build up what the Nazis were able to build up in some camps in England; to establish in many of the prison camps solid, well-organised and instructed groups, exercising a complete discipline of their own. In the case of Koje Island this was taken to the extent of carrying out their own death sentences, without any fear of the Americans. There is no dispute about this. Even my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne would accept that evidence as overwhelming.

That leads me to a point of complaint about the Americans; a complaint in the right direction. The Americans are not bitter, ruthless, intent on war, as some small sections of people in our country like to paint them. The reverse is true, as I ventured once to say to some of my colleagues in other circumstances.

I remember an occasion in Aachen when the fighting was very fierce. It will be within the recollection of many hon. and right hon. Members that Aachen was very fiercely fought over, and was twice taken. When the street fighting was at its fiercest, involving the sacrifice of the lives of many Americans, within 300 yards of where extensive fighting was proceeding were 150 German prisoners in the charge of two G.I.s—Heaven bless them —whose guns were leaned up against the wall while they were smoking cigarettes. My colleague, another war reporter, and I ascertained that not one of those Germans had even been searched.

The point I am making is that the Americans are invariably careless with prisoners, not because they are hardhearted but because their attitude is largely the reverse. It is part of Dr. Malan's campaign—one of the few things about which he may have a minor case —that during the Boer War the British could run very efficient prisoner compounds. So we did. Do not let us be too anxious to use this prisoner control point against the Americans. They have made grave mistakes and errors, about which we are right to rebuke them, but do not let us use that sort of thing as an excuse for backing out of our major responsibilities. If we do back out of them, do not let us fool our people, or the people of other nations about what the consequences of our action would be.

Much is said about the desirability of telling the Americans where they "get off." I am all in favour of frankness in these matters, but when we get distinguished people arguing that what is needed is not so much preparation for war but preparation for peace and the raising of the standard of living, particularly in the Near and Far East, I would ask: Who is going to raise it? Those distinguished people may possibly be right, but they might recognise that the truth is that in the next 10 or 15 years, if we avoid World War III—and there is not one hon. Member who does not want to avoid it—whether it is for capital goods, food or raw materials, the country that has to be depended upon in the main is the United States.

It is easy enough to make great speeches about raising the standard of living of the Indians and the people of the Middle East. I say that the standard of living must be raised, and already— although this is not a popular thing to say—the United States Administration as it stands at present—there may be changes—and the United States people, can be proud of the part they have played and the contribution they have made to the partial recovery of not only Europe but the world since 1945.

I would add a final word. We know that there are now, and rightly so, doubts and anxieties about recent events in relation to Korea. I would offer three suggestions.

As to the first. It is beyond dispute now that the general liaison machinery, not only between ourselves and the United States Commander and his own Government, but the general relationship between all the nations putting troops in the field under the United States Commander, is radically wrong and that reorganisation must take place at that level.

Secondly, it is an intolerable situation that a Prime Minister of this country should have to come down to this House and, on a matter of major political importance, frankly confess that he really did not know anything at all about it. It is equally bad that the Minister of Defence, a distinguished soldier with a great record, who was sent across there partly because of his military qualifications, could casually say to a Press conference in New York that he knew nothing whatever about an action which carried with it vital political conse- quences. It is perfectly clear that there are some grievous errors here.

Lastly, I would say that if this war continues, as I fear it will, there must be a more regular arrangement for full reports to this House. Not only reports by way of speeches, but regular written reports, in the form of White Papers or otherwise, about every aspect of proceedings in Korea.

I ask the House to realise this: we can, of course, pursue the policy of appeasement with the Soviet Union. That policy will pay no more dividends than did the appeasement of Hitler. What is needed is a firmness, but a genuine readiness to negotiate at all times. That, both the United States and ourselves have shown time and time again. The next move is not with us and not with the United States; the next major political move lies with those who have been opposing us. If that move is not made, the consequences are with them and not with us.

While venturing these criticisms, I hope that the events of the past 48 hours, tragic as they have been, will not lead this House to the sterile desert that is constituted these days in general, vague, anti-Americanism that has become a substitute for hard and honest thinking about the real facts of our present situation and the real responsibility for its dangers.

8.38 p.m

Viscount Hinchingbrooke (Dorset, South)

The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bilston (Mr. Nally) has had a good innings and perhaps he will forgive me if I do not follow him into the intricacies of some of his arguments. At the end of his speech he said that we should be frank with the United States. I agree with him heartily. It is because we have not been sufficiently frank with the United States in the past few years that we are in some of our present difficulties.

I yield to no one in my tribute to the United States for their gallant, effective and even wonderful economic assistance to the Western Nations and also to the depressed and under-privileged countries of the world. However, I am sure that the hon. Gentleman had no thought that we should allow any connection to exist in our minds between our right and moral course in foreign political relations and our expectation of some concessions, economic or otherwise in the future. That would be disastrous.

In not speaking sufficiently frankly to the Americans I believe that we sometimes mistake the quality of mind of the average American citizen. The minds of young nations, like the minds of old gentlemen, are only moved by considerable events. I do not think that the nuances expressed through the quiet corridors of the Foreign Office are sufficiently telling when they reach the turbulent world 3,000 miles across the ocean.

It is all very well for our nation and for Western nations, schooled in an old tradition that established means of communication through chancelleries, to expect appropriate and important reactions to take place in the countries with which we communicate and to expect those countries to understand these nuances and devices. But if we want the United States to move, if we want her to operate in a different field or on a different principle, we have to express ourselves in no uncertain terms by forthright speech in the open and in the House of Commons.

I deplore the fact that for so long in this Korean war we have not had important representatives in the various centres in the Far East. The fact that we have not had them goes right back to the failure of the Socialist Government when the Korean war began. It was their responsibility to set up the appropriate channels of communication with the United Nations and with the United States so that from the very first British policy could be made apparent in the operations in Korea. They failed to do it, and I regret very much to say that in the last eight months of our Government we have failed ourselves to make the correction which ought to have been made.

I cannot quite understand how it is that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who, during the war, saw that in every important field of operations we had the most effective military and diplomatic channels to the very centre of operations, has, through what process of thought I know not, allowed this situation to persist.

We have now reached the point which was brought most forcibly home to the House of Commons yesterday afternoon, when, through a technical device which I will not dispute or enter into, the House was debarred from immediately discussing a matter of vital concern to the course of operations overseas and to the lives and fortunes of our soldiers, sailors and airmen. That we should have got into a situation where we have no more control upon the United Nations in its actions than that, seems to me to be very serious indeed.

I trust most earnestly that as the result of the visit to Korea and to Washington of Field Marshal Alexander and my right hon. Friend the Minister of State, who is present at this debate, important changes will be made so that the British point of view can be securely applied to the scene of operations.

I was, frankly, rather disappointed by the speech of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. It was a speech, if I may say so to him, in his absence, without offence, which was more appropriate to a Secretary of State for War than to a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. That is not to derogate at all from the high quality of the speech, but it was a speech that seemed to me to move almost too exclusively in the military field. It is politics and foreign statesmanship that really govern the question as it confronts us tonight.

My right hon. Friend spoke of the situation in North Korea, where there are these power stations which were overrun originally in the advance and were subsequently repaired, and then have been in the last few days heavily bombed. He said that that bombing action was justified because the power from them was used to supply airfields over the border in Manchuria.

The United Nations have been bombing airfields in North Korea which formerly contained Chinese aircraft. It is not unnatural that the Chinese withdrew their aircraft from those airfields to airfields further back. If we continue to follow them up in this strategic sense, chasing the aircraft wherever they may be on the airfields and chasing the sources of the electrical power which feed their bases and their industries, it seems to me that the whole process is quite unlimited. It may go on for ever. It may go on by longer-ranged aircraft reaching out further over Manchuria through Mongolia until we find some fine day that the Russians themselves are harbouring these Chinese aircraft. Then the full scale war will begin.

I do not believe that in present circumstances in Korea an opening up of the military strategy of the United Nations can possibly result in peace. Peace is of two kinds. There is the kind which comes about through unconditional surrender—and here I thought my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mr. F. Maclean) was, in his arguments, recalling the experience of unconditional surrender of Germany a little too much —or it can come about through a truce. It can come about through the desire of both sides to get together and negotiate. That sort of truce, which rests on the willingness of both sides to come together, can only be obtained by peaceful processes. You cannot obtain a truce by the processes of war. If you want unconditional surrender, if you want to launch a whole scale war against China and bring them to Panmunjon suing for peace, then bomb them, bomb them to hell——

Mr. Emrys Hughes

And we reap the results.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke

But, if you want them to come to the council chamber, negotiating with us in the United Nations for a truce, you must exercise the arts of peace. You must exercise infinite patience—[An HON. MEMBER: "Eleven months."] It is not enough. I would not mind paying negotiators a high salary for a whole lifetime to sit in those tents and in those conditions in order to conclude peace and I will tell the Committee why.

Mr. Harold Davies (Leek)

Thank God for your courage.

Mr. Beverley Baxter (Southgate)

If the other side used those months and months for assembling very highly trained Chinese armies to attack, would my noble Friend still tell us to go on and on?

Viscount Hinchingbrooke

The assumption of the whole argument is that they are also negotiating for a truce. That persists until we have evidence to the contrary. I believe that this truce making rests upon the arts of peace and that we must, therefore, have infinite patience.

I would not be advocating such policies at all if I thought that there was any high and moral advantage in continuing this war coming either to the United Nations or to ourselves. Since we crossed the 38th Parallel it seems to me from the strictly United Nations point of view, based upon the original sanctions and resolutions, that the war has lost its moral content.

As a United Nations endeavour it seems to me to have no purpose now. It is producing an unending series of operations, or seemingly producing them. I have always doubted from the very start —since the San Francisco Conference days—whether the United Nations was ever capable of being made an instrument of war, because it would inevitably divide the world into great groupings of Powers and produce war on a scale surpassing any that have gone before. I have always hoped that the United Nations would remain as a truce-making organisation, devoted to peaceful persuasion and the art of good international relations.

Nor do I think that this war serves the British purpose in any degree. From a strictly selfish point of view we are getting nothing out of Korea. Indeed, since the war started great historical trading ties affecting the lives and fortunes of many of our people have begun to come to an end and may be ended altogether. I do not think that from our own individual point of view there is anything to be had from going on with the war.

For those reasons I earnestly trust that the Foreign Secretary will recall again the splendid words he used when he went to Paris soon after the General Election and said that it would be his aim to conclude a series of definite and limited agreements with the Communist world, that it would be his aim to pacify public relations, to exercise the art of peace. If he will consult those techniques and those opportunities I am perfectly certain that it will serve this nation well, and the cause of the United Nations also.

We are a country which has gone through two wars in one generation. We are in many ways an exhausted country, physically, morally, spiritually and militarily. We need a long period of peace in which to build up our economic strength. We need our statesmen to exercise the arts of peace; and if the United States, in a different phase of development, in a different corner of the world, cannot march with us in those policies, then I think, much as I value the Anglo-American relationship, that we should begin gently but definitely to indicate to them that we cannot face the endeavours, and that it is not in our interest to face the endeavours, which they seem successfully to be able to endure.

The hon. Member for Bilston (Mr. Nally) said that at all costs Anglo-American relations must remain intact.

Mr. Nally

The phrase "at all costs" was once used in a most unfortunate context by the Prime Minister. I did not say "at all costs." I said, as HANSARD tomorrow will show, that the most important factor in preserving world peace is the relationship between ourselves and the United States. But not at all costs, certainly not.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke

I agree that as long as American policy is pursuing what we should regard as an honourable and moral course I am by all means in favour of maintaining a full-scale alliance. But if, for any reason, one began to think that the course of the United States was not in the true interests of world peace, and was not fully alive to our own highly honourable and moral purpose in foreign relations, I would admit of a temporary separation and a different switch in foreign policy.

I think that this debate has done good. I am in very great difficulties about my vote tonight. I must tell the Government that if there is a vote, and no further statement can be made by my right hon. and learned Friend to the effect that immediate discussions will be entered into with the Americans for better representation of this country in Korea and in Japan, that their attitude may not in the course of a few weeks become much firmer than it has been indicated by my right hon. Friend this afternoon, I must, with all the consequences that may flow from it, abstain in the Division Lobbies tonight.

8.55 p.m.

Mr. Michael Stewart (Fulham, East)

We always listen to the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) with much interest and respect, not only because none of us can ever be certain about what he will say next, but also because of the deep sincerity and thought which has obviously gone into the construction of this and other speeches he has made on foreign affairs.

I profoundly agree with the comments he made about the remarks of the Foreign Secretary. Quite naturally, the Foreign Secretary stressed the military importance of the recent raids in Korea, which was, after all, the original subject of our debate. But I would suggest that we have to take into account the coincidence of certain features with regard to those raids; their size, which was not unprecedented but exceptional and their timing at this juncture of the negotiations which was to say the least unfortunate. The choice of objective was one which was not only of military importance, but which must be interpreted as an attempt to show the Chinese people what are our powers to inflict injury, not only on military objectives, but on civilian life as well. And there is further the description of this raid by American spokesmen as the beginning of a new policy of getting tough.

If we add together the coincidence of the size, timing and objective and the descriptive words used, I think we are obliged to conclude that we have here not only a military operation, but a political act designed to affect the course of the negotiations at Panmunjon. It is on that account I think that hon. Members on this side of the Committee are concerned about them. We believe it to be extremely dangerous and undesirable that political acts of this kind, an attempt by a display of power to affect the course of the negotiations, should be conducted by military commanders apparently not even in complete liaison with their own Government and without any consultation with ours.

We believe that to be extremely dangerous; and when the right hon. Gentleman says of this act, "We support it," does that mean he thinks it desirable to go on with further acts of this kind with the object, by a show of power, of altering the course of the negotiations at Panmunjon?

Mr. Edenindicated dissent.

Mr. Stewart

The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. But if that is not what he means by the phrase "We support it," I hope the right hon. and learned Gentleman who will be speaking later will make clear what that extraordinarily ambiguous and difficult phrase does in fact mean. I should say not that we support it, but that we regret it. We must consider these occurrences against the background of the difficulties which have been arising in the relations between the United States and this country.

Before saying anything that is critical of the Government or the people of the United States, I should like to say that I believe there are some criticisms that can and ought to be made in this House; but that whoever makes them ought to set them against the background of the enormous services, both political and economic, that the United States rendered to mankind during and since the war.

Mr. Ellis Smith

May I ask my hon. Friend——

Mr. Stewart

I cannot give way. I have very little time——

Mr. Ellis Smith

But the United States should reciprocate that.

Mr. Stewart

I agree. There were the goods poured out through U.N.R.R.A., some of them to countries behind the Iron Curtain not in sympathy with the United States, and the determination with which they went into Korea, and the immense patience they have shown in the negotiations. But against that background we must notice that these raids, which are systematic of a certain recklessness and a certain belief that nearly everything can be solved by military means, come after the mishandling of the Koje prison camp, after the mishandling of the screening of prisoners; and in the knowledge that there are certain elements in the United States associated with General MacArthur who has said that the way to deal with this is actually to spread the war, and against the background of the attempt by the United States to support General Chiang Kai-shek.

Because of those matters, there is a danger of a growing divergence between ourselves and the United States. More and more, unless the proper steps are taken, people in this country will say that the United States is reckless and people in the United States will say that we are faint-hearted. It is of the greatest importance—I am speaking now of what I consider to be a dangerous growth of opinion in this country—that more and more people are getting worried about what they believe to be the recklessness of the United States.

I give it to the people of the United States that equally they are entitled to make all the criticisms they feel proper of us, but surely our task is to try to heal that breach. It should be the job of any Government in power in this country today to make it clear to the United States what that danger is; to make it clear that, while we stand by them resolutely as allies in the United Nations and in the Atlantic Treaty, for the proper purposes of those bodies, we are not to be taken for granted.

We must not have an atmosphere in which it can be assumed that American military commanders can do anything and that we shall come forward afterwards and support them. If the American Government were to get that idea it would have the most disastrous results on Anglo-American relations. I suggest, therefore, that it is the task of the right hon. Gentleman and those who work with him to represent to the Government of the United States the serious anxiety—perhaps based on misunderstanding—that is steadily growing and to which this raid has contributed.

I believe that it could be remedied if we had either a representative at the truce talks or some other means of closer liaison with the command in Korea; if we could make it clear to the American Government that we deplore and reject their attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek; and stress that the whole purpose and intent of the people of this country is not to engage in any kind of preventive war but that our whole object and desire is the prevention of war.

It would be an immense disaster if any great and final breach occurred between this country and the United States, so great that I can only think of one greater and that would be for the people of this country to find themselves drawn into a conflict which a large number of them could not morally support, simply because the United States had acted in ignorance of the feelings and concern of people here.

It is the task of the Foreign Office to prevent that situation arising. I wish that I could feel that in his phrase, "We support it," and in his handling of this incident today the Foreign Secretary had given us reason to believe that in fact the Government were engaged on that necessary task.

9.4 p.m.

Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington)

My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) who has just left the Chamber——

Mr. Emrys Hughes

He is coming back.

Mr. Shinwell

—made a most interesting speech which, however, as no doubt he would agree, extended beyond the issues in this debate. He declared that, looking back, he doubted whether the decision to support the Security Council over the Korean affair was justified. Moreover, he stated that, in his view, the facts have not been clearly established.

I do not propose to discuss the merits or demerits of those statements. Nevertheless, I must direct the attention of hon. Members in all quarters of the Committee to the fact—and it is a fact—that the House unanimously supported the United Nations decision.

Mr. Hughes

On a point of correction. The hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. S. O. Davies) expressed our opposition at the time.

Mr. Shinwell

The hon. Member who has just interjected expressed opposition to the decision of the Security Council, but there was certainly no opposition in the Division Lobbies. Therefore, I am justified in saying that there was unanimity.

In expressing our unanimous view at the time, we obviously accepted the implications of that decision, and one of the implications was to despatch to Korea bodies of troops, who have rendered very gallant service, as we know, and to associate ourselves with the United Nations Command in all their activities. It is quite futile to come to a decision after careful consideration and then seek to reject the implications of that decision.

I beg hon. Members to appreciate that it is obvious that, at this stage, we cannot contract out of the United Nations activities in Korea. That would mean abject surrender. At the moment, I do not discuss the merits of the situation, but that would place us in a most invidious position, and it might bring about in due course a catastrophe, not only in the Far East but in the West, through a full-scale conflict.

I am impressed by what the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) said about Anglo-American relations, and also by the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart). I would say this. We must not truckle to the United States. We must speak to the State Department, and, if necessary, through the Defence Department of the United Kingdom, to the Pentagon in the most forthright fashion. We must leave them in no doubt as to where we stand. Nevertheless, we must exercise the greatest care in order to prevent any impairment of Anglo-American relations.

I would say to some of my hon. and right hon. Friends who are troubled about events in Korea and who are disposed to criticise the United States, that, as internationalists, accepting all the implications of international co-operation, we must remain on the most friendly terms with the United States. I can only foresee disaster if a different course is taken. Indeed, the case that is presented from this side of the Committee—the case put by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition—is not presented in terms of criticism of the United States. It is an objective study of the situation which has emerged in Korea—no more than that— and upon that objective study we make our comments.

It is clear from what the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary said— and he was most frank in his statements —that the Government cannot be regarded as blameless in relation to what has occurred. That is not using very strong language which might ordinarily be used. On only one occasion since the General Election have we had a statement from the Government on the course of military operations in Korea, and that only as a result of persistent pressure by myself and by other hon. Members on this side, and, I have no doubt, with the consent of hon. Members opposite.

Contrast that position with what happened during the period of office of the Labour Government. Almost every week demands were made by the Conservative Opposition for a statement about military operations in Korea, and responsibility— I ask hon. Members to note—was imposed on the Labour Government in this respect. When these reports were submitted, hon. Members on the Conservatime side always asked for more, and we were very willing to furnish what information was in our possession. No hon. Member can say that we withheld information in our possession.

But the present Government, in spite of the knowledge they possess—and, obviously, they must be receiving almost daily reports from Tokyo and Washington —withheld it from the House. We were not informed. The remarkable factor in this situation is that before the General Election and before the Conservative Party were returned to power, complaints were made that the Members of the Labour Government responsible for foreign affairs, defence, and the like, were quite unable to exercise any influence on the Administration of the United States, and that what was required was somebody like the present Prime Minister, with his remarkable influence and powers of persuasion.

They said in quite plain terms that if only the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) were handling this matter, our relations with the United States would be more friendly, that there would be more effective cooperation and that we would be fully informed and that everything in the garden would be lovely.

What has happened? The Prime Minister went to the United States not long after the Election, and he came armed, no doubt, with information and having exhausted his powers of persuasion. But nothing happened; there were no more effective consultations as a result. Then, after a long time, the Government decided to send the Minister of Defence and the Minister of State to Korea, Tokyo, Washington and Canada to ascertain the facts for themselves. We welcomed the decision of the Government to send these right hon. Gentlemen to those places.

Major Tufton Beamish (Lewes)

Why did not you go yourself?

Mr. Shinwell

The hon. and gallant Gentleman asks why I did not go myself.

The answer is because we were getting the information and were presenting it to the House.

But on this occasion, and because of the circumstances which I have just disclosed, it was decided by the Government to send these two right hon. Gentlemen to find out the facts for themselves and duly report to the House of Commons. The Minister of Defence was welcomed. His visit was appreciated by the commanders in Korea and elsewhere. But what information do we receive? Did he, in fact, ask for any information? Did he go merely for the purpose of paying compliments to General Mark Clark?

He admitted, quite frankly—this is not what we say, but what he said—that he had no information about the events that have caused this debate. I should have thought that in conversation with General Mark Clark, who, at one time was one of his subordinates, he might have been able to ascertain what the intentions and plans of the Commander-in-Chief were. But not a word about it. He went there, and he saw and he returned without having conquered, without having obtained the information which the Committee desire. That is the position.

I must say of the incident which has given rise to this debate that it is incredible that he was not properly informed. There must be some reason for it. It is inexplicable and unaccountable. What could be the reason why the Minister of Defence, who is not merely a politician —I presume that he is a politician now— but a great and distinguished soldier, talking to distinguished soldiers on the other side, was unable to ascertain what was happening? The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary has given the game away, because he said that this particular incident, this air attack involving the use of more than 500 aircraft—no minor affair—was planned, must have been planned in advance.

Mr. Eden

I imagine so.

Mr. Shinwell

The right hon. Gentleman imagines so. All right, I accept his imagination. He imagines that it must have been planned. Of course it must have been planned in advance, and it might have been planned whilst the Minister of Defence was over there. But not a word was breathed to the Minister of Defence about it. He saw what was going on around him, but he never detected any preparations or plans in relation to that air strike which has caused so much trouble.

This is a most incredible affair. It may well be due to the fact that the Minister of Defence knows nothing about politics and, being concerned only with military operations, would never consider for a moment the political implications of an attack of this kind. It is a very deplorable situation. The Foreign Secretary, in what he said about the plan of operations, said that, after all, this was a very minor affair because every day spasmodic and sporadic attacks were being undertaken by the United Nations command.

We read of these things almost every day in the "New York Times." There is there a summary every day of the military operations and hon. Members can avail themselves of that information. But we have not had for many months, certainly not during the course of the truce discussions, an air strike of this character. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman himself said that as regards one particular objective, one particular target, reference was made to Washington to ascertain what their views were.

If that is not a departure from normal policy I should like to know what it is. It is obvious that this was a departure from policy, and it is no use trying to boggle at that. We have to consider the effect of what has happened. I must say —and I represent the views of nearly all, if not all, hon. Members in all quarters of the Committee—that the effect of what has happened is perhaps more important than any other consideration, because it may well be that the Chinese will retaliate. After all, it would not be surprising if they did. All I can say about it now —there is a great deal to be said about it—is that I hope that this debate will convince the Chinese that we in the United Kingdom, whoever we are, where-ever we are, and whatever our views may be, prefer a successful conclusion of the talks rather than a prolongation of the war. I am sure that that represents our attitude.

I go further. I say—and in this I agree with what was said by the noble Lord— that I doubt whether military operations can bring this war to an end. At the very best the air strikes and the land and naval operations may cause a great deal of havoc and may prevent the Chinese and North Koreans from advancing or gaining the victory, as the case may be; but obviously, there is no hope that military operations alone can prove successful. In any event, military operations are bound to be prolonged.

I would go so far as to say that this air strike itself must have been ineffective on the first day, because the aircraft had to return to the attack on the second day. I go further still—and this is within the knowledge of hon. Members opposite who have had experience of this kind— and say that air attacks, even by heavy bombers—and in this case the attack was undertaken by light bombers— although they can cause some damage will not end the war. There is no question about that.

Now I come to the question which is, perhaps, uppermost in the minds of hon. Members, and that is the question of consultation. The noble Lord accused the late Labour Government of having failed in respect of consultations. I was surprised to hear that because I am bound to say that the ex-Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin—not my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), although he undertook the task afterwards—and myself at the Ministry of Defence consistently brought pressure to bear on the State Department and the Pentagon to ensure more effective and closer consultation.

What is the history of this matter? When General MacArthur was Commander-in-Chief we sent out Air Vice-Marshal Bouchier to act as his liaison officer. He was not treated too well by General MacArthur, but subsequently General Ridgway appeared on the scene and Air Vice-Marshal Bouchier was less harshly treated. We were never satisfied with the consultation and co-operation that had been going on. We always pressed for more consultation but for some reason or other the United States Administration resisted the pressure and we never received the satisfaction we desired.

To indicate the attitude of the Labour Government, I should like to quote a statement which was made by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in December, 1950. He said: As a result of my talks with the President,"— it will be remembered that my right hon. Friend went to see the President of the United States— I am completely satisfied that the fullest weight will be given to the views of His Majesty's Government before instructions are issued to the United Nations Commander which have political implications."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th December, 1950; Vol. 482, c. 1356.] Bearing on the same point, Ernest Bevin said that no military action which had political implications should be taken without appropriate consultations with other Governments. The present Prime Minister, following upon a speech from my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South, supported this view by expressing his general agreement with the traditional view that the civilian and constitutional authorities should control the action of the military commanders.

That is the crux of the problem. We have never taken exception to the principle that the commanders on the spot should exercise their discretion in determining what action should be taken— that is, action of a minor character—but where political considerations are involved, it is quite a different story. That is the question to which we have to address ourselves. What are the political considerations which emerge out of this attack? The first is this. I claim that this was a departure from the traditional policy, and secondly, which is much more important, that the action was undertaken at a time when the truce negotiations were proceeding, although temporarily suspended. Surely this was an ill-timed action, to say the very least of it.

The question we have to consider is what is to be done about consultation. I express the view that, first of all, machinery should be devised not unlike the machinery associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This does not mean that the 40 or so countries associated with the United Nations' defence against aggression in Korea should be associated directly with the Command.

In the case of N.A.T.O. the representatives of those countries meet together from time to time and they have their Chiefs-of-Staff Committee, where there is full and effective consultation and where the nations concerned in the struggle are fully informed all along the line. It may well be that that machinery is not appropriate to the situation in Korea, but something like that machinery is required to ensure an effective partnership and co-operation based on terms of equality; and that is the very least that we are entitled to demand.

I should like to direct the attention of hon. Members to a statement which appeared in the "New York Times," I think the day before yesterday, which bears on the subject of consultation. This is an American view of which we should fully avail ourselves. It says: We shall never understand ourselves or form an effective working team with other nations until we are all more adequately informed about the reasons, processes and events that shape our common decisions—and our common destiny. Since we have no choice but to work together, the pooling of information and explanation is as vital as the pooling of arms. There is an instruction to the right hon. Gentleman and, as I say, this in the crux of the whole problem.

This Korean affair may be prolonged, unduly prolonged, unnecessarily prolonged. If that should be the case—and we should all deplore it—it is all the more reason why there should be effective consultation, not necessarily on minor matters, for these can be left to the commanders on the spot, but wherever there is the least likelihood of political implications in the proposed action, there consultation is essential.

I know what the argument is—the argument used by some hon. Members; I am not sure whether it was used today on the other side of the Committee, but it certainly has been used by the Prime Minister—that, after all, the United States have sustained 100,000 casualties— which we all very much deplore, and we offer the utmost sympathy with those concerned—and that they are using large bodies of troops, aircraft and machinery of all kinds, whereas we, the next largest nation concerned, injecting the next largest number of troops and weapons into the struggle, are comparatively insignificant. We have not sustained anything like the casualties which the United States Forces have sustained.

I am bound to say that we cannot determine these problems in terms of mathematics. This can be no question of arithmetic. If we make our contribution —and we have made our contribution earnestly and with a readiness to bring this struggle to an end and to defend the free world against aggression—we must be treated by the United States Administration and by the military commander as equal partners in this affair. That is our demand. What we want to know is what the right hon. Gentleman is going to do about it. [Interruption.]It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to say that he hopes to do something.

Mr. Eden

I said I hoped to do better than was done before.

Mr. Shin well

The right hon. Gentleman hopes to do better than was done before, better than we have done. He has had more than six months in which to undertake the task. [HON. MEMBERS: "The Labour Party had six years."] Well, of course, the Korean affair has not been going on for six years. It has been going on for 18 months. [HON. MEMBERS: "Two years."] All right, two years—whatever hon. Members opposite desire. But we never experienced an incident of this kind during that period.

When there was a prospect of General MacArthur's taking action which exceeded his authority, and which was resented not only in this country but in the United States, we took effective action. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] Well, if we did not take effective action I should like to know—and hon. Members can consult HANSARD about it—why I and other Members of the Labour Government were accused of taking action which brought about General MacArthur's dismissal. Hon. Members opposite cannot have it both ways.

At any rate—for I wish to be fair in this matter—let hon. Members opposite rail against the Labour Government. Let them complain that we were ineffective in persuading the Administration of the United States to provide more consultation. Let them complain. After all said and done, they have always pretended to be more competent than hon. Members on the Labour side. This affords an opportunity for them to provide a demonstration of their competence, and if they fail, as they have failed in the last six months or so, since the General Election —[Interruption.]I cannot understand the right hon. Gentleman's cavilling at what I have said, because he admitted he had not been properly informed about this affair, and, what is more he deplored not having been informed about this affair.

The right hon. Gentleman sought to justify the proceedings; but, of course, he could not do anything else. It was quite impossible to do anything other than justify what happened although he knew nothing about it. He agreed he knew nothing about it, or of the events that led up to it, but, at the same time, he deplored the fact—and it is a fact, an inescapable fact—that he was not informed about it.

Does that mean, in spite of the Prime Minister's remarkable and undoubted influence and powers of persuasion with the people of the United States, that the Government have failed in their task? Is that what it means? It cannot mean anything else. Anyway, we are going to give the right hon. Gentleman a chance. [HON. MEMBERS: "Do not bother."] But—I want to make it quite clear beyond a peradven-ture—we are not going to tolerate a situation in which activities of this kind can be undertaken in Korea without consultation with the United Kingdom Government. We want to make that plain.

I must give way to the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. I want to say, finally, that we propose to take this much further. It may be unnecessary-it depends, of course, on what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has to say —to divide the Committee tonight— [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—although the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South is very anxious to divide the Committee. At any rate, he said he would abstain if there were a Division, but he did not like what the Government said or what the Government did, or failed to do. As I say, it may be unnecessary to divide the Committee, but we propose to take the matter further.

Mr. Eden

The right hon. Gentleman should support us.

Mr. Shinwell

I cannot possibly support the right hon. Gentleman in his lack of information, in his lack of knowledge, and in his lying down to the contempt with which he is treated by the United States.

Mr. Eden

Surely the right hon. Gentleman does not believe that.

Mr. Shinwell

The right hon. Gentleman has to change his tactics. He must be vigorous. He must be more forthright, and if the Minister of Defence is not capable of understanding the political implications of military decisions the sooner he resigns the better. It might be better to have a civilian Minister of Defence who is not afraid to talk to the military commanders or afraid to ask them questions or to offend them occasionally, if necessary. We have not got that kind of Minister of Defence at the moment. Perhaps he is too much of a gentleman. However, there I will leave it.

I wish to make it clear to right hon. Gentlemen opposite that we shall take the matter further. It may be that after the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and that which his colleague the Minister of Defence is to make next week —I believe it is to be next Tuesday— we may require to raise another debate, and it may well be that in the absence of satisfactory replies and assurances we may require to test the feeling of the House.

9.36 p.m.

The Minister of State (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd)

May I make it clear at the very beginning that Her Majesty's Government welcome this debate and will be very glad to have the opinion of the Committee tested upon this matter? So far as I personally am concerned, I would have welcomed it more had it not taken place quite so soon. I was decanted from an aeroplane at Heathrow at only 1 p.m. today, after travelling 25,000 miles by air in 19 days, and after a number of other things, and I might not be quite so clear-headed as hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the other side would like me to be.

In the debate that has taken place there was a remarkable speech from the hon. Member for Bilston (Mr. Nally). I shall not deal with very much of what he said, but I agree very much with his impression of the character of United States' personnel who have to deal with prisoners of war. It might not reassure or satisfy some of his hon. Friends, but I can certainly tell him that I was very reassured by what I saw of conditions out in Korea. This idea of a collection of bellicose, irresponsible Americans thirsting to extend the war is a gross injustice to a very fine body of men.

Certain matters relating to Koje and the screening of prisoners were raised in the debate, particularly by the hon. Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart). Those are matters which will be more properly debated, if there is to be a debate, next Tuesday.

Coming back to the question of the attack by air on the electric light plants near the Yalu river, I would make one point. The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) criticised the present Government because more statements had not been made about the progress of operations in Korea. There has been a rather different type of operation going on in the last six months to what went on when he was Minister of Defence. Those operations were all very complicated and mobile, and it might not have been necessary to make anything like the same number of statements during the past six months as it was during the right hon. Gentleman's period of office.

A tendency has been shown when discussing the matter to underestimate the extent of the operations at present in progress. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said it was agreed between the two sides that fighting should be allowed to fade away, and that was the idea. It is true that we occupy strong positions which I believe can be defended with success, but it certainly is not a quiescent front. Operations are not, in fact, fading away. There has been this steady build-up of the enemy. There has been a steady improvement in their organisation and equipment. There has been a considerable amount of artillery fire on the front.

There has been a great deal of mortar fire, and on the day when we visited the Commonwealth position some positions of ours some distance away from us were being mortared by the Chinese and being mortared very accurately. It is not very pleasant for the people at the receiving end of a mortar bomb to be told that the front is quiescent. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who said that?"] At another position which we visited during the same day we could see a place where some casualties had been incurred that morning, and I know that the son of one of my hon. Friends in this House has been a casualty in Korea quite recently.

There is constant patrol activity, and some actions have taken place recently on, a battalion scale. It is only strong air pressure by the United Nations that has maintained the comparative stability of the front. There has been a constant effort by the Chinese to rebuild their airfields, and those attempts have had to be neutralised by a substantial air effort on the part of the United Nations. That air effort, in turn, has been met with strong anti-aircraft defences which have been improving of late. I tell the Committee quite frankly—and I am certain that my noble Friend the Minister of Defence would agree with this—that if the Chinese were to re-establish themselves on the forward airfields with their aircraft, there would be serious danger to all the United Nations forces in the line.

There is a lot of talk about not spreading the war. Of course there is no desire to spread the war, but no one seems to talk much about the safety of our own troops who are engaged in Korea. I say again that there can be no doubt that their safety at the present time depends in large measure upon the efficiency of the United Nations air effort.

Mr. Emrys Hughes

Bring them home.

Mr. Lloyd

There has been talk during this debate as to whether this was a legitimate military target. I think my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary appeared to convince the Committee that it was a legitimate military target. I am coming in a moment to the question of consultation and to the question of any political impact it might have, but so far as this target being a military target is concerned, I believe that most hon. Members think that it was a legitimate military target because from these plants was coming the power which goes to the airfields, which goes to the munition plants, which goes to the industrial effort that is behind this very large build-up of enemy forces in North Korea.

There is another point which should be considered. Perhaps my noble Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) will remember this when he is considering talking about restraint and a peaceable approach. When flying in North Korea the United Nations airmen can see on these Chinese airfields just over the border the M.I.G.s lined up ready to take off at their pleasure to come and have a shot at the United Nations aircraft, knowing that if they choose not to take off they will be left there in complete immunity. That is a substantial degree of restraint for any command to display.

Then we come to the question of consultation. As my right hon. Friend has said, Her Majesty's Government were not consulted. The Minister of Defence was not informed. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has said that he regretted that fact. If it is any satisfaction or consolation to the Committee to know it, I did have an opportunity of meeting certain officials of the State Department the morning after it had been announced, and I expressed to them quite frankly what I thought would be the feelings of my colleagues on this matter.

Mr. Shinwell

Tell us what you said.

Mr. Lloyd

I said exactly what my right hon. Friend has said, that I thought it was a matter for regret that we had not been informed about this action.

Mr. Ellis Smith

This makes it all the more serious.

Mr. Lloyd

Then we come to the question of planning. Some suggestion was made with regard to the phrase which my right hon. Friend used of this operation having been planned. I have no doubt at all, and I should think that the right hon. Gentleman the previous Minister of Defence would agree, that this operation had probably been planned for many months. It is the sort of operation which any intelligent commander would plan together with a great many other operations which might have to be carried out. [An HON. MEMBER: "You knew nothing about it."] The right hon. Gentleman was quite unfair to my noble Friend the Minister of Defence when he said that he was incapable of understanding any political implications in a matter of this sort.

We were not consulted, and the question has been raised as to how we can get better consultation in the future. That, I think, is the most profitable aspect of the debate. Most people with any experience of these matters would agree that a campaign cannot be fought with a committee. If a committee of 20 nations is told that a target is to be bombed in a week's time if their governments approve, one would certainly find the target surrounded by innumerable antiaircraft guns and very substantial fighter defences when the time came. It is quite impracticable in active operations to hand over the conduct of those active operations to a committee of nations.

Mr. F. Beswick (Uxbridge)

Has anyone suggested that?

Mr. Lloyd

I am simply seeking to rule out certain methods of doing that.

Mr. Shiowell

That has never been suggested by me.

Mr. Lloyd

As long as that particular Aunt Sally has gone, well and good, because there are some people who are suggesting that all these matters should be put to all the nations.

Mr. James Hudson (Ealing, North)

More imagining.

Mr. Lloyd

I am very glad to know, and to have the emphatic and vocal support of right hon. and hon. Members opposite, that they now agree that these matters of operational conduct should not be put to the Governments of all the United Nations.

Mr. Shinwell

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has not misinterpreted what has been said, but he must understand that when we asked for joint consultations and for something more than a single command to determine military operations, we are thinking in terms of the political implications. That is the distinction.

Mr. Lloyd

I agree; I was attempting to take it stage by stage. We have agreed that military operations should not be submitted to all the nations that are contributing forces.

Then we came to the question of what form this other consultation should take. Everybody is very ready to say that there should be consultation, but people are very reticent to come forward and say exactly what form of consultation there should be. Is it to be suggested that the political implications of such a course of conduct are to be put to every government that is contributing forces?

Mr. Harold Davies

My right hon. Friend, on 4th December, 1950, when he was Prime Minister, was given an assurance, as this quotation shows, by the President of the United States: The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation. Our argument is that a change in the situation has taken place without even the President of the United States or our Prime Minister being informed.

Mr. Lloyd

I was attempting to say that no one is very specific in his definition of exactly what form the consultation should take.

The Minister of Defence and I discussed this matter with General Mark Clark, General Van Fleet and, in Washington, with the Department of Defence and the State Department. The right hon. Gentleman suggested that we should have a sort of N.A.T.O. set-up in order to pass information. There is in existence already such a committee. There is regular briefing and information. I say straight away that this does not deal with future events, but so far as concerns what has happened there is an existing body which receives detailed accounts from the United Nations High Command as to what has taken place. [Interruption.It is suggested that that was very ridiculous, but that is the arrangement the right hon. Gentleman approved. I am not suggesting that it should be the only link, but it is certainly one of the bodies we should have.

Then we come to the question, having rejected the idea of everything being put to a committee, and that a committee for information is not enough, of deciding what further machinery for consultation should be invented or improvised. It is when we come to that that the critics are very reticent in putting suggestions forward. My noble Friend and I have made certain suggestions and brought certain suggestions back which we discussed with the American authorities. Those will be submitted to the Cabinet, and, in due course, the House will be informed as to what action is possible and what action is accepted by the United Nations Command. If the hon. Member looks in "The Times" of today he will see one of the matters which was discussed which we believe will improve the liaison.

Mr. Ivor Owen Thomas (The Wrekin)

When will the House be informed?

Mr. Lloyd

As soon as it is decided what the nature of that consultation will be.

Mr. Peter Baker (Norfolk, South)rose——

Mr. Lloyd

I am sorry not to be able to give way to my hon. Friend. I agree with the hon. Member for Bilston that we want to improve the machinery for giving information, not to the Governments but to the public, about some of the events which have taken place. I think that many people are not satisfied with the efficiency of those arrangements at present.

I come to the third matter, the question of the political effect of this action of the bombing of the power plants on the Yalu River. I know that an expression of opinion has been put forward in the newspapers, but I personally do not believe that this bombing took place in order to ginger up the armistice negotiations. There have been varying views on the impact it will have on the armistice negotiations. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) thought it might have a fatal effect upon them. One of my hon. Friends thought it might have a beneficial effect on the armistice negotiations. I think it will have no effect at all.

I think the Communists will have an armistice if they want one, irrespective of whether particular military targets in North Korea are bombed or not. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale appeared to base his argument on this Resolution of 30th November, a Resolution which, he suggested, stated that we pledged ourselves to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Korean and Chinese interests in the frontier zone. That Resolution was dated 30th November, 1950. The Chinese came in in October, 1950. That Resolution was tabled on 10th November to try to get the Chinese to withdraw. They failed to withdraw and the Soviet vetoed that Resolution.

Mr. Bevan

The nations that voted in favour of that Resolution were Nationalist China, Cuba, Equador, Egypt, France, Norway, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Yugoslavia. Have we now run away behind the veto of the Soviet Union?

Mr. Lloyd

We certainly are not trying to run away behind the veto of the Soviet Union, but the suggestion that this Resolution has any relevance at all is completely wrong, because it was an attempt to get the Chinese to withdraw. They have failed to withdraw and, when we have nearly one million Chinese troops prepared to fight our troops, I think that sort of Resolution becomes mere words and of no value at all. I suggest to the House that right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the Committee should have some regard for the safety of our troops. [Interruption.]The Opposition cannot have it both ways, one half shouting "Hear, hear" and the other "Disgraceful."

The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) made what I thought was an extremely wise speech. I entirely agree with two of the points he put forward. The first was on the question of the limitation of the war in the Far East, which is the declared policy both of the previous Government and of this Government. But he also spoke of the consequences of a unified command and the loyalty that must demand.

The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary had given a carte blancheto the United Nations command. That is not so. This Government have continued, so far as that is concerned, as the late Government did. There is agreement as to how certain courses of action should be taken, and there is certainly no kind of blank cheque to the United Nations command to take any action of any sort. My right hon. Friend was speaking of loyalty to the United Nations command in relation to this particular action.

I do remind the Committee once again that we have entrusted the command of these operations to a United Nations command, and that command is entitled to some loyalty from us, and not to action which is calculated to encourage our foes and discourage those people who are fighting for the United Nations in the war. I ask the Committee to approve what my right hon. Friend said this afternoon and to do so unanimously——

Mr. James Callaghan (Cardiff, South-East)

How does the right hon. and learned Gentleman expect to get unanimity when he accuses the Opposition of not caring about the safety of our troops?

Mr. Lloyd

—because I say again that the danger of this sort of debate is that people may think that there is a division —[Interruption.]—I heard a singularly offensive remark from an hon. Gentleman. I was saying that the danger of a debate of this sort is lest it should encourage those people whose one desire is to split the nations which are fighting in the Korean war.

We have said that we regretted that we were not informed about this proceeding. We have said we believe that it was a sound military target and that attacks upon targets of this nature in North Korea are essential as part of a programme to ensure the safety of our troops who are fighting there.

We agree that we will seek to improve the methods of consultation between the Governments contributing Forces to Korea. We have endeavoured to put forward certain suggestions which we have considered with the State Department and the United Nations' command, and I hope that it will be possible to put forward, in due course, certain practical suggestions for the approval of the Committee.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again."—[Mr. Kaberry.]

9.59 p.m.

Mr. Harold Davies

In the one minute left I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman — [Interruption.]— I should like to ask a serious question—[Interruption.]

It being Ten o'Clock the Motion to report Progress lapsed, without Question put andThe CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

Committee report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.

Squadron Leader A. E. Cooper (Ilford, South)

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I would draw your attention to a most offensive remark made by the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) which, I think, is quite out of keeping with the traditions of this House and which you should ask him to withdraw.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew)

I did not hear any remark. If I had heard an offensive remark I should have taken notice of it.