HC Deb 23 July 1947 vol 440 cc1421-39

Lords Amendment: In page 49, line 27, at end, insert: (6) In any proceedings under this Section before the Arbitration Tribunal established under Part VIII of this Act the burden of proof that an undertaking is such an undertaking as is specified in the last preceding Section shall be upon the person contending that the undertaking is such an undertaking.

2.15 a.m.

The Solicitor-General (Sir Frank Soskice)

I beg to move, "That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

This Amendment deals with what is to happen when the matter comes before the Arbitration Tribunal, and it is to be decided whether a particular undertaking is a long-distance haulage undertaking within the meaning of Clause 39 of the Bill. What the Amendment seeks to do is place the whole onus of proof on the Commission that the undertaking is such an undertaking. We seek to leave out that Amendment and to restore the Clause to what it was before it went to another place, because we feel that the Amendment is based on a misconception of what has been done by this Clause.

The Amendment is based upon the view that when the matter comes before the Arbitration Tribunal, it is a law suit between rival claimants, and that the Commission is perfectly free to make a claim for certain relief against the owners of the undertaking or not to make that claim before the Arbitration Tribunal, and that it is perfectly free to establish that claim or not. That is a complete misunderstanding as to the system upon which this Clause is drafted. After all, it is the policy of the Bill that when undertakings which comply with the description under Clause 39 are to be taken over, the Commission is not in any sense in the position of a free litigant voluntarily going before a court seeking relief, for which it is free to ask or not. The Commission is charged with a certain duty, and it is the duty of the Commission to form a certain opinion. If that opinion is that the activities of an undertaking come within Clause 39, the notice of acquisition has to be served. It is quite wrong, in my submission to the House, to place the Commission in the same position as a free litigant when it has, perforce, a duty placed upon it, which it has no option to, refuse. It is not right in those circumstances to try to assimilate the position of such a body to the position of a perfectly free litigant.

It is not perhaps unreasonable to say that a private litigant, when he is seeking relief, must frame a case that he is entitled to that relief. The position vie are considering here is entirely different, and if hon. Members will look at the Clause, they will see that it is founded on a different assumption. What happens when a matter comes before the Tribunal? The Tribunal is charged with the duty of making inquiries to order to ascertain whether the requirements of Clause 39 are fulfilled or not. The key to the thing is in Clause 41. If hon. Members will look at Clause 41, they will see how the plan is to be worked out. Clause 41 (1, a and b) sets out two alternative tests which are to be applied. If they are applied and the tribunal is satisfied, then the undertaking is deemed to carry on a long-distance haulage business.

This Clause then deals with the case in which it is not possible for the Commission to arrive at a complete and absolute certainty as a result of the application of those tests and other factors. If hon. Members will look at the concluding words of Subsection (1), they will see that the Tribunal is charged with the duty of doing what it thinks right in all the circumstances which obtain, after an inquiry into all the circumstances. That is how it is meant to work. The position, in other words, is that the Bill sets up a Tribunal, and if a certain eventuality arises, the Tribunal is charged with the duty of making inquiries. Therefore, the Tribunal is really the sponsor of the investigation. The two parties, the Commission and the undertaking, are represented, and it is for the Tribunal to inquire into the circumstances. There is no reason in these circumstances why the onus should be placed on the Commission to do what a private litigant might well be expected to do. It is for the Tribunal to apply these tests, and if it cannot arrive at some decision by these two tests, then it has to do what is reasonable and fair in the circumstances.

It may often be extremely difficult to ascertain from records that do exist pre- cisely what the application of alternative tests may be. There may not be adequate records. Some records are not kept for a long period of time. It may be extremely difficult, as a matter of fact, to obtain the necessary information. The Tribunal will be in a much better position than the Commission to do that, because the Arbitration Act will be applied to the appreciation of the circumstances. Under the 1889 Act, the Tribunal have powers to require both sides to submit to investigation and power to require the production of documents, and it is perfectly competent for the Tribunal to do what it may be extremely difficult for the Commission to do.

It may be extremely difficult for the Commission, in the position of a plaintiff claiming relief, to produce evidence very often entirely in the possession of the undertaking. If the Commission is charged with the duty of discharging beyond any reasonable doubt, the onus of showing that the undertaking has carried on long-distance haulage, it will over and over again fail to discharge that duty. In point of fact, the evidence is there, and if it can be produced by the Tribunal, then it can be shown perfectly clearly to be an undertaking as contemplated under the 1939 Bill.

I hope I have satisfied hon. Gentlemen opposite. I believe they feel most strongly on this point. I believe our side is in agreement with the view I am advancing. I hope hon. Gentlemen opposite also share the same view, but if they do not, I urge on them that if we want the object of the Bill to be carried out, if we want to make it possible for long-distance haulage undertakings to be taken over without obstruction, without delay and without difficulties being placed in the way owing to defective records, and if we want the purpose of the Bill not to be hindered, it is obviously reasonable to say that it shall be the Tribunal that will be charged with the duty of conducting the investigation. If hon. Members do not share that view, they will put the Commission in the position of a petitioning plaintiff and will bring about the result, over and over again, through a deficiency of proof when there is available evidence if it could be produced, that the Commission will fail in making out its claim, so that one after another haulage undertaking which should be brought under public ownership will be left out for that reason.

I strongly urge the House that the correct view of what is happening in this case is not that it is a suit as between two contending private parties. It is not. It is a Commission charged with exercising a duty under the Measure, and it is a Tribunal which is charged with certain duties, including the duty of making an inquiry into a doubtful issue. It is for that reason that Clause 41 (1) is framed as it is, to put the whole matter in the discretion of the Tribunal—as it does in its concluding sentence—where the result of the two tests in Subsection 1, a and b does not lead to certainty in the matter. I hope the House will think that is right.

Mr. P. Thorneycroft

In some ways, in view of the wealth of legal talent on the Bench below me, it may appear a little inappropriate that I should reply to the Solicitor-General. I am not put up as an insult to the Solicitor-General, but because the point of law involved is of such an elementary character that my right hon. Friends think that even I can deal with it. Perhaps it would be most convenient if I first dealt with the principle that we are seeking to establish, and then went on to deal with the reasons that the Solicitor-General advanced why the principle should not apply in this case.

The principle is a simple one. It is that the onus or burden of proving any particular fact should normally rest with the person who asserts the fact. That is the principle we are trying to establish. I think it will commend itself to all sides of the House. It certainly did so a few hours ago. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Combined English Universities (Mr. H. Strauss) was alleging that Lord Latham had been offered a post. Immediately hon. Members opposite challenged him on the evidence on which he put that forward. One could take that example or many others. If a man does murder, it is the duty of the Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute him, but the onus is on the prosecution to prove their case. It is the duty of the Minister of Pensions to provide those pensions which are laid down by Parliament, but if I claim a pension from him, I have to establish that I am a widow, or whatever it may be. I cannot understand what the Solicitor-General's point was about the onus being somehow different if there was a duty on some body. There is a duty on the Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute in a case of murder, but that does not shift the onus of proof. There is a a duty on the Minister of Pensions to provide pensions, but that does not shift the onus of proof. The argument is wholly irrelevant to the issue we are discussing.

2.30 a.m.

What we say here is simply that the principle shall apply in this case—that where the Commission is of the opinion that a firm is a long-distance firm and claims that it should be taken over, then the Commission should be in the same position as an individual, and the onus or burden of proving that fact should be placed upon it. Why should the State be put in a different or more advantageous position than the individual? This is a matter of common justice. If you try a man for his life, or if his liberty is involved, the onus is upon the prosecution. The same rule should apply where his livelihood is to be taken away. It is not only a matter of common justice, but of common convenience and common sense.

As to the task which is going to confront the Tribunal, we have already discussed some of the considerations which will come before it—whether over a particular period a certain number of lorries travel a certain distance, whether they will travel outside a certain radius, and the rather complex provisions, to which the Solicitor-General referred, in Clause 41. All these complex facts come out at some stage of the proceedings before the Tribunal. It is inevitable that there will be cases in which it will not be easy to say on which side the balance of advantage will lie, and when it will not be easy to say on which side the Tribunal should come down. It is just to provide for cases of that kind that the doctrine of the onus of proof has been introduced. When any tribunal or court finds itself in the position in which the arguments on both sides are nicely balanced, it says: "Whose job is it to prove this?" Failing such a course, some instructions have to be given to the Tribunal; even the Solicitor-General admits you cannot leave that matter in the air. What he has done—or what the draftsmen have done in consultation with the Law Officers of the Crown —has been to introduce something really novel and really remarkable in substitution of the Common Law rule for the onus of proof. This substitute for 100 years of Common Law is worth reading: Provided that if the information available in any such proceedings is insufficient to enable the tribunal to conclude either that one or other of the said conditions was satisfied as aforesaid or that neither of the conditions was so satisfied, the tribunal shall determine that the activities of the undertaking in the said year, so far as they consisted of the carriage of goods in goods vehicles in respect of which licences were in force, consisted to a predominant extent of ordinary long distance carriage for hire and reward, if it appears to the tribunal, from the information available in those proceedings, that those activities ought, in all the circumstances, properly to be regarded as having consisted to a predominant extent of such carriage. May I translate it? What it means is that if that Tribunal has not the faintest idea whether the undertaking is long-distance or short-distance, it will have a case. It will take into account information and circumstances which, ex hypothesi, are not that information and circumstances which Parliament has laid down for the proceedings, but other information and circumstances the nature of which we are not informed. I think that is a terribly poor substitute for the ordinary rules laid down in the courts and arbitration tribunals of this country, the straightforward principle of onus of proof. I think the Solicitor-General will bear me out when I say that they have never been introduced into any code before. They are wholly novel. I do not think the Solicitor-General understands them, and I am quite certain that I do not understand them, and I do not think that anyone in the House understands them. In the circumstances we are placing a wholly unwarranted burden on the Tribunal.

I pass now to the arguments which were advanced by the Solicitor-General as to why this onus of proof could not apply in this case. The same arguments were advanced by the highest legal authority in this country in another place. He said that this is quite different from any ordinary case where you have two contending parties before an arbitration tribunal. He said—and I have his exact words here—that there is no choice in the matter, there is no option. Well, that is not quite true. I was under the same delusion as the Solicitor-General. As a matter of fact, there is an option. It escaped my attention that an Amendment had been introduced in another place which, in fact, gives the Commission an option as to whether they take over or not, and the introduction of that Amendment knocks the bottom completely out of the case of the Lord Chancellor and the Solicitor-General. There is nothing left of that case. The whole basis of that argument now disappears.

I think that the final point the Solicitor-General made was that in some cases it is difficult for the claimant to make out his case as he has not access to all the evidence. I know that there are cases in law where Parliament in its wisdom has deliberately shifted the onus. One case occurs to me. When a man is found in possession of goods proved to be recently stolen, the onus is upon him in such circumstances. But these road transport hauliers are not men in possession of goods recently stolen. These are road hauliers carrying on a perfectly respectable business. Why should they be put into the narrow class of criminals who, for one reason or another, have been put into a particular position under criminal law?

Briefly, I would say that we want the ordinary common principles of the Common Law introduced into this matter. We say that if a man's livelihood is to be taken away, it is up to those who want to take it away to see that the case against him is established. The substitute phrases introduced by the Parliamentary draftsmen and the Law Officers are misplaced and we reject the excuses put forward by the Law Officers who have sought to distinguish this case from an ordinary case. If there was any substance in the Law Officers' case at all, it has been wholly swept away by the Amendment that the Government themselves have accepted and introduced into this Bill, which gives the Commission an option in this matter; so that the whole of the argument of the Solicitor-General is defeated. I doubt whether any hon. Member who has consulted his intellect and conscience in this matter can doubt that the Amendment should be accepted.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter (Kingston upon Thames)

As he so often does, the Solicitor-General put in a most reasonable manner a wholly unreasonable case. After all, the attitude which the Government are taking has this significance, that the un- fortunate Tribunal is not going to know one way or the other how it is to decide if the evidence, either one way or the other, is insufficient. I think the House is entitled to be told what the Tribunal is to do in these circumstances. The Solicitor-General knows perfectly well, and so do most hon. Members, that if there are cases in which, for one reason or another, there is insufficient evidence for a decision to be given one way or the other, to lay down this onus of proof would permit the Tribunal to come to a reasonable decision. By throwing out the Lords' Amendment, the Government would throw the Tribunal into great difficulty. When the evidence either one way or the other is insufficient, what is the Tribunal to do? Is it to find that the concern involved is a long-distance enterprise or not?

The hon. Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorneycroft) riddled the Solicitor-General's argument that because a duty is laid on the Commission, therefore the Commission should not have to establish its case. The Solicitor-General knows perfectly well that throughout this country there are officials and institutions on which duties are laid. My hon. Friend referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Duties are laid upon him, and the Solicitor-General knows quite well that duties are laid on the Treasury Solicitor; but the Solicitor-General surely does not suggest that the Treasury Solicitor is completely free from the onus of making out his case in all cases.

There is another aspect of the matter. We have here a conflict with regard to the point of view of an undertaking which is being taken over and the Commission. It is possible that it is a small undertaking. The Solicitor-General knows that in the courts, other things being equal, it is a good thing to have money and legal resources behind one, and that they are helpful. In a dispute it is sometimes an advantage to be represented by the Law Officers of the Crown. We have heard of the possibility of a dispute between the Commission, with all the resources of the Government behind it, and a concern fighting for its life. If there is one case more than another where the onus should be on the Government, or the Government's representative or monopoly, to prove its case, surely this is it. Whatever else is not clear, it, surely must be apparent to the House that the matters to be decided by the tribunal may be matters of the greatest difficulty. Let me give an example. If an undertaking is engaged in the removal of furniture, it is apparently exempted from the risk of being taken over, but it may be a matter of considerable difficulty to ascertain one way or the other whether the particular undertaking is to be classed as a furniture-moving undertaking.

It is no argument for the Solicitor-General to say, as he did, that it may become more and more difficult for the Commission to prove its case, and therefore it must be freed from the duty of proving its case. Surely, that is not the way to legislate. We are providing in this Clause a means of settling disputes, and it is right that we should so provide, but surely it is absolutely wrong to take away most of the value of that provision by taking away the ordinary common law principle of onus of proof. It is really making a fool of the people concerned to say that they shall have the right to go before the Tribunal, but if the Transport Commission's case against them is not particularly strong, or if, as the Solicitor-General said, there is insufficient evidence, instead of giving them the chance of getting away with it, the common law principle of the onus of proof is to be removed. That is not good legislation, and it is not playing fair either with the transport concerns or with the country. I hope that the Solicitor-General will, even at this late stage, reconsider the attitude which the Government are taking, and will abandon this attempt to allow something which is very unfair in this Clause.

2.45 a.m.

Mr. Butcher (Holland with Boston)

As this is so much a lawyer's matter, I almost apologise for intruding into the Debate, but unless we can agree with the other place in this matter, we shall perpetrate a great injustice on the many people to be called before the Tribunal. Common justice and commonsense work hand in hand here, and wisdom should be shown in this House. The Lords have had much wisdom on their side in this matter. The Solicitor-General said that the Commission are not a free litigant in these matters. The Commission, however, are very much more free than the road transport undertaking, because the Commission have to be of the opinion, in respect of an undertaking, that that undertaking should be taken over but if they decide that it is inexpedient, they need not serve their notice. If the Commission are an unwilling litigant, how much more unwilling is the poor transport undertaking which is to be taken over? It is compelled to go into court. Hon. Members opposite think that this Commission will be the most magnificient thing, but it has been attacked continually, and not one of them has risen to defend it.

What is the position? The learned Solicitor-General says this is not a case in which two parties are compelled to make a case against a defendant, but the moment the undertaking comes before the Tribunal, entirely different results are sought. The Commission will appeal for a decision that the undertaking is long-distance and, on the other hand, it will be endeavoured to show that it is short-distance. In every other similar case which I can discover where property of this character is to be taken, somebody has to assume the burden of proving certain matters to the satisfaction of a tribunal. We have many members of the learned profession here, and they would, I believe, rapidly rise if they could find an instance where no onus a proof was put on one party or the other.

The alternative is in those terrible words read out by the hon. Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorneycroft). I do not know how anybody preparing a case for a road haulage undertaking could say, "Come before this body because we cal succeed." Surely, it is wrong that an undertaking should be left in the position where the Commission makes a vague guess and makes a decision on the passing impulse of the moment. This is one of the worst cases which the learned Solicitor-General has ever had the task of putting from the Front Bench, and I say that with the knowledge of all the bad cases which he has had to put on behalf of this Government. Perhaps, he will ransack his mind and let us know of similar cases where a tribunal is required to determine facts in such a strange and arbitrary way.

Mr. Henry Strauss

I wish to add only a few words to those of my hon. Friends. I think that all the lawyers present, at any rate, wilt have considerable sympathy with the hon. and learned Solicitor-General in having to argue an extremely difficult proposition. I do not think that the test can conceivably be whether there is a duty on the Commission to put their case forward. Surely, the test must be this. The Bill makes it clear that there is an issue of fact to be determined by the Tribunal. Some guidance, surely, should be given as to where the onus of proof is to lie.

If the hon. and learned Solicitor-General would refer to the opening words of Clause 39, which were quoted in another place by the only Government supporter who spoke in that place on this issue, he would find that it is obligatory on the Commission to put forward a claim where they are of opinion that certain facts apply. But it is made absolutely clear in that and the following Clause that their opinion, though amply justifying them in putting forward a claim, is an opinion which the Bill well recognises may be wrong. The Bill makes it quite clear that in forming that opinion they may be wrong, and the issue whether or not they are wrong is precisely that which has to be tried. If the hon. and learned Solicitor-General will look at the grounds of objection in the next Clause, in Clause 40, the Clause in which this Amendment is sought to be made, he will find in Subsection (3) what the Tribunal are to do if satisfied that the contention of the person carrying on the undertaking is correct. It is quite clear, in other words, in these two Clauses, that there is an issue of fact to be determined, and according to the way in which it is to be determined the man's undertaking will or will not be compulsorily acquired. Why should not the onus lie where on ordinary principles it ought to lie?

The only point where I differ trom my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorneycroft) is that I think he was wrong in law in suggesting that the provisions of Clause 41 are an alternative. No Amendment is, in fact, being put forward to Clause 41, and the provisions in Clause 41, quoted by the hon. and learned Solicitor-General, will apply even if the Lords Amendment to Clause 40 is adopted. It was never suggested by any of the learned Lords in another place, and I am sure it will not be suggested by the hon. and learned Solicitor-General here, that it is impossible to adopt the Lords' Amendment on the ground that it is inconsistent with Clause 41. The words quoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth are most remarkable and they go a very long way in cone ding to the Government something very much in favour of the Commission in presenting their case before the Tribunal. But, nevertheless, in this Amendment they are not being questioned. What is being said is that, while they will enjoy the benefit of Clause 41, it shall, nevertheless, be necessary for the Commission to prove their case, to the satisfaction of the Tribunal, before a man's property is compulsorily taken from him.

The Solicitor-General would not argue for a moment that what is being done in the action of which we complain is not novel. In this Clause—he will not dispute it—power is taken to do something quite novel in our law. The principle of the onus of proving an essential fact resting on the person asserting that fact is so deeply embedded in our proceedings, civil and criminal, that I am sure the Solicitor-General will say that it should not be lightly discarded.

What are the reasons why he says it should be discarded in the present case? The fact that the Commission is under a duty cannot possibly be a good reason. He put forward another possible reason, which was that the Commission might be under great difficulties in obtaining the necessary evidence, though that evidence were available, whereas the 'Tribunal would be under no such difficulty. In other words, the Tribunal could obtain discovery which the Commission could not. I have not examined that matter as closely as the Solicitor-General, and therefore I am prepared to accept from him, for the purpose of my argument, that what he says is quite correct—that there would be such difficulty. But what is the remedy if such a difficulty exists. It is surely to give the Commission better powers of discovery and not to shift the onus; to give them the necessary powers in order to prepare their case—which he says the Tribunal have under the Arbitration Act.

I am assuming that the Solicitor-General's contention which I have quoted is sound in fact. But, if it is, the shifting of the onus or leaving it vague where the onus lies, cannot be the right remedy. I wonder whether the Government proposal in this Clause is even convenient. I should have thought very great difficulties would arise on procedure in deciding the order of speeches and other questions of that kind. Everyone knows that it is possible for other systems of law to have quite different views about presumptions of innocence, guilt, the burden of proof, and so on. But I do not think the hon. and learned Solicitor-General would dispute for one moment that a country whose legal system is so deeply wedded to the system of the onus of proof being on the claimant, applicant, plaintiff, or prosecution—that such a country with such a legal system should reverse it, as it is reversed under the Bill, would be to take a most serious step.

For these reasons, I hope the Government will think again about this matter, and I hope that, in any event, if they do not, hon. Members of this House, whether they are lawyers or laymen, will consider this matter carefully from the point of view of the interests of justice. If they do I am certain they will come to the conclusion that, if this Amendment is resisted, the interest of justice will not be served.

3.0 a.m.

Mr. J. S. C. Reid

I hesitate to detain the House, but demonstrably there was one further particular fallacy in the Solicitor-General's arguments. He started his argument, if I understood him aright, by saying there was nothing here in the nature of a lawsuit, there was nothing to dispute or contend. Obviously, that was not the view of the draftsman of this Clause. If he will look at Subsection (2), he will see: If a person on whom notice is served by the Commission with respect to an undertaking desires to contend that the undertaking is not such an undertaking.… It is a very odd thing if you have one side contending but the other side not contending, and quite frankly the draftsmen thought that both the undertaking and the Commission were going to contend before the Tribunal. There is no possible dispute about it. The Solicitor-General, in his argument, has thrown over the draftsmen, and in so doing has forgotten to amend his Bill in order to bring it into line with his argument. Frankly, I prefer the Bill to his arguments.

What does the Solicitor-General really seek to argue? I cannot help feeling that he expects the Tribunal to take the view that if the matter is not crystal clear, it is for the undertaking to get out of the clutches of the Commission if it can. That is the only interpretation I was able to put on the Solicitor-General's statement, and I put that interpretation forward for this reason. It is true, he said—at least, I think he said—that the Tribunal had discretion when there was difficulty, but he went on to say that, as a leading example, he thought it would he possible to prove the case one way or the other unless there was obstruction. If it is merely a question of a refusal to produce records, then the remedy is perfectly simple—the Commission appeals to the Tribunal in order that an order may be made upon the undertaking ordering them to produce all their books and records. I do not know whether there is in the Bill provision for this. If there is not, it is a lamentable oversight, but I took it from his remarks that it was so.

If the fear is that undertakings will destroy records, all I can say is that there are black sheep in every country and in every section of the community, and there may be one or two here. Personally, I should not object to a proviso that if the Tribunal is satisfied that evidence has been destroyed, then it shall presume all things against the wrongdoer. That is an ordinary and proper principle of law, and therefore it would perfectly simple if the Tribunal and the Commission were armed with these simple powers, first, to call for the production of all records, and secondly, to presume everything against a person who could not produce records and not give a satisfactory reason for not producing them. If there were provisions of that sort, stringent and drastic, I would not say that they were contrary to the genius of our law or our justice.

But here one has something very different. If it is not possible to come to a conclusion one way or another, then it is apparently left to the Commission to do exactly as they choose. There will be the necessity for the Commission to create their own onus of proof and their own rules, because Parliament has given them no rules. The result is that Parliament is asked to delegate to the Tribunal the decision on this vital and important point as to what are the relevant circumstances when it cannot reach a conclusion on the evidence and where the onus then lies. The Tribunal must establish for. itself the onus of proof in dealing with those borderline cases. Therefore, the Bill is deficit in two details, first, how to deal with any proof which ought to be taken into account; and secondly, how it is to deal with the final number of cases still left in the balance. I think the circumstances that ought to be taken into account in those cases are lack of records. That is an important question. Records will be called for before a case is dealt with, and if, having got the records, it is found they are defective, it is natural to ask, why are they defective? No doubt it will be agreed that

Division No. 327.[ AYES. [3.5 a.m.
Adams, Richard (Balham) Evans, John (Ogmore) Kinghorn, Sqn.-Ldr E.
Adams, W T. (Hammersmith, South) Evans, S. N (Wednesbury) Kinley, J.
Allen, A. C. (Bosworth) Ewart, R. Lang, G.
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe) Fairhurst, F. L[...]vers, S.
Attewell, H C. Farthing, W. J. Lee, F. (Hulme)
Austin, H. Lewis Fernyhough, E. Lee, Miss J (Cannock)
Awbery, S. S Field Capt. W. J Leonard, W.
Ayrton Gould, Mrs B Fletcher, E. G. M (Islington, E.) Levy, B. W.
Baird, J, Foo[...], M. M. Lewis, A. W. J. (Upton)
Balfour, A. Ferman, J. C Lewis, J. (Bolton)
Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J Fraser, T. (Hamilion) Lindgren, G S.
Barstow, P. G. Freeman, Maj. J. (Watford) Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.
Barton, C. Freeman, Peter (Newport) Logan, D. G.
Bechervaise, A. E. Gaitskell, H T N Longden, F.
Beswick, F. Gallacher, W Lyne, A W.
Bing, G. H. C Ganley, Mrs C S McAdam, W.
Binns, J. Gibbins, J McAllister, G.
Blenkinsop, A Gibson, C. W. McGhee, H. G
Blyton, W. R. Gilzean, A. Mack, J. D.
Bowden, Flg.-Offr. [...]. W. Glanville, J. E. (Consett) McKay, J (Wallsend)
Bowles, F G. (Nuneaton) Gordon-Walker, P. C. Mackay, R. W. G. (Hull, N. W.)
Braddock, Mrs. E. M. (L'pl, Exch'ge) Greenwood, A W J (Heywood) McKinlay, A. S
Braddock, T (Mitcham) Grey, C. F McLeavy, F.
Bramall, E A. Grierson, E. MacMillan, M. K (Western Islet)
Brook, D (Halifax) Griffiths, D (Rother Valley) Macpherson, T. (Romford)
Brown, George (Belper) Griffiths, W. D. (Moss Side) Mallalieu, J. P. W
Brown, T J. (Ince) Guest, Dr. L. Hade[...] Mann, Mrs. J.
Bruce, Major D W T Gunter, R. J Manning, C. (Camberwell, N.)
Buchanan, G Guy, W. H. Manning, Mrs. L. (Epping)
Burke, W. A Hale, Leslie Mathers, G.
Butler, H. W. (Hackney, S.) Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. R Medland, H. M
Carmichael, James Hannan, W. (Maryhill) Mellish, R. J.
Chamberlain, R. A Hardy, E. A. Middleton, Mrs. L
Champion, A. J. Hastings, Dr. Somerville Mikardo, Ian
Chetwynd, G. R Haworth, J Millington, Wing-Comdr E. R
Cocks, F S. Henderson, Joseph (Ardwick) Mitchison, G. R
Coldrick, W. Herbison, Miss M Moody, A. S
Collins, V. J Hewitson, Capt. M Morris, P. (Swansea, W.)
Co man, Miss G. M Hobson, C. R. Moyle, A.
Cooper, Wing-Comdr. G. Holman, P. Murray, J. D
Corbet, Mrs F. K. (Camb'well, N. W.) House, G. Nally, W.
Cove, W. G. Hubbard, [...] Nichol, Mrs. M. E. (Bradford, N.)
Crawley, A. Hudson, J. H. (Ealing, W.) Nicholls, H. R. (Stratford)
Crossman, R. H. S Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.) Noel-Baker, Capt. F. E. (Brentford)
Daggar, G. Hughes, H. D. (Wolverhampton, W.) Noel-Buxton, Lad[...]
Daines, P. Hutchinson, H. L. (Rusholme) O'Brien, T.
Davies, Edward (Burslem) Hynd, H. (Hackney, C.) Orbach, M.
Davies, Ernest (Enfield) Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe) Paget, R. T.
Davies, Haydn (St. Pancras, S.W.) Irving, W. J Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)
Deer, G. Janner, B, Palmer, A. M. F.
Delargy, H. J. Jay, D. P. T Pargiter, G. A
Diamond, J. Jeger, G. (Winchester) Parkin, B. T
Dobbie, W Jeger, Dr. S W. (St. Pancras, S E.) Paton, J. (Norwich)
Dodds, N. N. Jones, D. T (Hartlepools) Pearson, A.
Driberg, T. E. N. Jones, Elwyn (Plaistow) Peart, Thomas F.
Dumpleton, C. W Jones, P. Asterley (Hitchin) Piratin, P.
Durbin, E. F M Keenan, W. Platts-Mills, J F. F.
Ede, Rt Hon J. C Kenyon, C. Poole, Major Cecil (Lichfield)
Edwards, John (Blackburn) King, E. M Porter, E (Warrington)

the number of cases will not be a large proportion, but it is a significant proportion. The ordinary rule which every decent Englishman and Scotsman has regarded as such from time immemorial, that there must be proof against a man before his property is taken away from him, should apply, for it was a universal rule until this Government came into office.

Question put, "That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

The House divided: Ayes, 262; Noes, 96.

Price, M. Philips Sorensen, R. W Wallace, G. D. (Chislehurst)
Pritt, D. N. Soskice, Maj. Sir F Wallace, H. W. (Walthamtow, E.)
Proctor, W T Sparks, J. A Watkins, T. E.
Pryde, D J. Stamford, W Watson, W M
Randall, H. E Steele, T. Weitzman, D.
Ranger, J. Stephen, C. Wells, P. L. (Faversham)
Rees-Williams, D. R Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E) Wells, W. T (Walsall)
Richards, R Strauss, G. R. (Lambeth, N.) West, D. G.
Ridealgh, Mrs. M Stubbs, A. E. White, H. (Derbyshire, N.E.)
Robens, A. Swingler, S. Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire) Sylvester, G. O. Wilcock, Group-Capt. C. A. B
Robertson, J. J. (Berwick) Symonds, A. L. Wilkes, L
Rogers, G. H. R. Taylor, H. B. (Mansfield) Wilkins, W. A.
Ross, William (Kilmarnock) Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth) Willey, F. T. (Sunderland)
Royle, C. Taylor, Dr. S. (Barnet) Willey, O. G. (Cleveland)
Sargood, R. Thomas, D. E. (Aberdare) Williams, D. J. (Neath)
Scollan, T. Thomas, Ivor (Keighley) Williams, J. (Kelvingrove)
Segal, Dr. S. Thomas, I. O. (Wrekin) Williams, W. R (Heston)
Shackleton, E. A. A. Thomas, George (Cardiff) Willis, E.
Sharp, Granville Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Ed'b'gh, E.) Wills, Mrs. E. A.
Shurmer, P. Thorneycroft, Harry (Clayton) Wise, Major F. J
Silverman, J. (Erdington) Tiffany, S. Woodburn, A.
Silverman, S. S. (Nelson) Timmons, J. Woods, G. S.
Simmons, C. J. Titterington, M. F Wyatt, W.
Skeffington, A. M. Tolley, L. Yates, V. F.
Skinnard, F W Ungoed-Thomas, L. Younger, Hon. Kenneth
Smith, C. (Colchester) Usborne, Henry Zilliacus, K.
Smith, S. H. (Hull, S.W.) Vernon, Maj. W. F.
Sclley, L. J. Walker, G. H. TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Mr. Snow and Mr. Popplewell.
NOES.
Agnew, Cmdr. P. G. Gridley, Sir A. Orr-Ewing, I. L.
Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. Grimston, R. V. Osborne, C.
Astor, Hon. M. Hare, Hon. J. H. (Woodbridge) Peto, Brig. C. H. M.
Baldwin, A. E. Haughton, S. G. Pickthorn, K
Barlow, Sir J. Hinchingbrooke, Viscount Pitman, I. J
Beamish, Maj. T V. H Hurd, A. Poole, O B. S. (Oswestry)
Birch, Nigel Hutchison, Lt.-Cm. Clark (E'b'rgh W.) Prescott, Stanley
Bossom, A. C. Hutchison, Col. J. R. (Glasgow, C.) Prior-Palmer, Brig. O.
Bower, N. Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W. Rayner, Brig. R.
Boyd-Carpenter, J. A. Lambert, Hon. G. Reid, Rt. Hon. J. S. C. (Hillhead)
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T. Langford-Holt, J. Roberts, H. (Handsworth)
Butcher, H. W. Law, Rt. Hon. R. K. Roberts, W. (Cumberland, N.)
Byers, Frank Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H Robinson, Wing-Comdr. Roland
Clarke, Col. R. S. Lennox-Boyd, A. T. Ropner, Col. L.
Clifton-Brown, Lt.-Col. G. Linstead, H. N. Snadden, W. M.
Conant, Maj. R. J. E. Lloyd, Selwyn (Wirral) Spearman, A. C. M
Corbett, Lieut.-Col. U. (Ludlow) Lucas-Tooth, Sir H. Spence, H. R.
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E. McCallum, Maj. D. Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.
Crowder, Capt. John E. Mackeson, Brig. H. R. Strauss, H. G. (English Universities)
C[...]thbert, W. N McKie, J. H. (Galloway) Teeling, William
Davidson, Viscountes[...] Maclay, Hon. J. S. Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)
De la Bère, R. Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (Bromley) Thorneycroft, G. E. P. (Monmouth)
Digby, S W Macpherson, N. (Dumfries) Thorp, Lt.-Col. R. A. F.
Dodds-Parker, A. D. Manningham-Buller, R. E. Touche, G. C.
Dower, Lt.-Col A. V. G. (Penrith) Marlowe, A. A. H. Turton, R. H.
Drayson, G. B. Marshall, D. (Bodmin) Wadsworth, G
Elliot, Rt. Hon. Walter Marshall, S. H. (Sutton) warn, Hon. G. R
Foster, J. G. (Northwich) Mellor, Sir J. Wheatley, Colonel M. J.
Fraser, Sir I (Lonsdale) Mclson, A. H. E. Williams, G. (Torquay)
Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir D. P. M. Morrison, Maj. J. G (Salisbury) York, C.
Gage, C. Neven-Spence, Sir B. TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Galbraith, Cmdr. T. D. Nicholson, G. Commander Agnew and
Grant, Lady Noble, Comdr. A H. P. Major Ramsay.
Mr. Chater (Bethnal Green, North-East)

On a point of Order. May I ask your guidance, Mr. Speaker? On arriving at the Division Lobby door I found that it was locked, before you gave the order to lock the doors. May I ask if that is in order?

Mr. Speaker

I am not quite sure of the hon. Member's point. Was the door locked when he went to vote?

Mr. Chater

Yes.

Hon. Members

We saw it.

Mr. Speaker

If the hon. Member had raised the matter before the numbers were counted I could have said that his vote could be counted with the "Ayes" or "Noes," whichever way he had desired to vote. I did not know that the doors were locked, but I do not think that we need have another Division.

Mr. Chater

Several hon. Members here can corroborate the fact that the door was locked before you gave the order, Sir. I only inquire whether that is the usual course, or whether the door should not be locked until you gave the order.

Mr. Speaker

As a matter of fact, I hesitated a good deal before I gave the order to lock the doors, because I saw the hon. Member going round the corner, but I did not gather that the door was locked then. In any event, I hope it will not happen again.