§ The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden)I beg to move, "That this House do now adjourn."
As the statement which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister proposes to make will take some little time, I propose to move the Adjournment of the House. But I understand that there is no general desire for a Debate, so as soon as my right hon. Friend has finished I will ask leave to withdraw the Motion and proceed with the ordinary Business of the day.
§ Mr. StokesMay I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, if he desires not to have a Debate to-day, he will give us an assurance that there will be a general Debate on the war as soon as the House resumes after Whitsuntide?
§ Mr. EdenI can only give the assurance that we shall do our best to meet the desires of the House. I have taken soundings to-day and have learned without surprise that there is no general desire to have any Debate to-day.
§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill)As the Allied war effort passes into the offensive phase and its scale and pace grow continually, more frequent consultations between The staffs and those concerned with the high control become necessary. In January, 1942, broad agreements on principle and on our joint or respective tasks were reached by our conferences in Washington. In the June meeting these took a sharper point, and, among other things, the operations in North Africa began to shape themselves. In October and November, action occurred. At Casablanca, in January of this year, the President and I, with the combined British and United States staffs, were able to survey new scenes and wider prospects. Plans and programmes were approved which have by no means yet 561 been accomplished. Nevertheless the progress of events became more rapid, and the Armies marched faster than had been foreseen. It became necessary to explore new fields. To have the initiative is an immense advantage; at the same time it is a heavy and exacting responsibility. Left to itself, opportunity may easily lead to divergency. Therefore, having consulted the President I thought it necessary at the beginning of May to go with our Chiefs of the Staff and a very large body of officers and secretaries—nearly 100—for a third time to Washington, in order that the success then impending in Tunisia should be examined and comprehended from a common viewpoint, and then turned to the best possible account.
At Washington the entire expanse of the world war, on which the mellow light of victory now begins to play, was laid open to the British and American leaders. We have shown that we can work together. We have shown that we can face disaster. We have still to show that we can keep ourselves at the height and level of successful events and be worthy of good fortune. Perhaps that may be the hardest task of all.
It would not be right, of course, for me to attempt to give, even in outline, an account of the decisions which were reached. All I can say is that we have done our best. A complete agreement about forward steps has been reached between the two Governments. There have been no sort of differences, such as occurred in the last war inevitably on account of the forces at work, between the politicians and the military men. I shall make no predictions as to what will happen in the future, and still less in the near future. All I can say is that Anglo-American policy, strategy, and economy were brought into full focus and punch in these 15 days' talks at Washington. The elaboration of modern war renders these prolonged discussions necessary. A conference lasting a day or two, such as sufficed in previous wars, is no longer sufficient to cover the ground and test the different propositions. As I said, very large numbers of officers, expert in their particular branches, are required at the various levels to be in close consultation. This gives the best chance to the troops, the sailors, and the airmen, wherever they may be, from Gibraltar to New Guinea 562 and from the Aleutian Islands to the Burma Road. In so vast and diverse a scene many questions of emphasis and priority arise, even where principles are agreed, and beneath them lie all those problems of transportation, of munitions industry, of the food of nations, of the distribution and application of resources, most of which questions can best be settled, and many of which can only be settled, at the summit of war direction, and which at that summit present themselves in fairly simple and yet at the same time in somewhat awe-inspiring forms.
After we had completed our task at Washington, I thought it well to go to North Africa, and I was very glad that the President decided to send along with me General Marshall, the Chief of the United States Army and Air Force, a man of singular eminence of mind and character. We flew together across the Atlantic to Gibraltar and Algiers, in order to deal more particularly and precisely on the spot with the problems of the Mediterranean theatre. There, for another week, we had the advantage of full discussions with General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, with General Alexander, Admiral Cunningham, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, Air Marshal Coningham, General Montgomery, General Spaatz, and General Bedell Smith, and other high British and United States officers directly concerned with the execution of plans which I can best describe as directed to the application upon the enemy of force in its most intense and violent forms. I can assure the House that the most complete concord and confidence prevailed at General Eisenhower's headquarters, and that the Forces of the two great nations of the English-speaking world are working together literally as if they were one single Army. I was told by officers of both countries that in the movement of troops or in the distribution of supplies no questions of national origin arise between the staff officers who are interleaved at every stage and tier of the vast organisation. It is just a question of what is the best thing to do—that and no more. The commanders are men in the full tide of successful experiment. They are proud of the troops they lead, and they are resolute in the plans they have made. In travelling about these armies, seeing perhaps 20,000 troops and airmen in a day, I sustained the impres- 563 sion of their extraordinary ardour and zeal to engage the enemy again at the earliest moment. Very fine Armies have come into being in this African war, and to be conscious of their spirit is an ennobling experience for a visitor. Cheered by remarkable victory after many bafflings and disappointments, the British and American Armies, and now the new French Army, have become a most powerful and finely-tempered weapon. They have full confidence in themselves and also in the High Command and in the general war direction. This is also true of the more numerous and powerful forces, British, Canadian, and American, which have formed and are forming in the United Kingdom.
It is evident that amphibious operations of peculiar complexity and hazard, on a large scale, are approaching. I can give no guarantee, any more than I have done in the past, of what will happen. I am sorry that a few days ago, in the press of travel and affairs, I let slip the expression, "Brilliant prospects lie before us" I should prefer to substitute the words, "Brighter and solid prospects lie before us." That, I think, would be more appropriate and becoming in such anxious days. Yet, all the same, I have good hopes that neither Parliament nor the Congress of the United States will find themselves ill-served by the Forces whether in the British Isles or on the African shore. At any rate, I can assure the House that on neither side, British or American, have any narrow or selfish motives entered into the common task. The rest, I must leave to action and to the march of events.
When I visited Tripoli in January, I had the pleasure of seeing the troops of the Eighth Army whom I had met beforehand in the now far-off Alamein position, before their victory and marvellous advance across the desert. I was particularly glad on this last occasion to meet men of the First Army who after a very hard time in the rainy winter have come into their own and who had the honour, with their comrades of the 2nd United States Army Corps, of striking the final blow.
The British losses in 'Tunisia have been severe. The Eighth Army, since they crossed the frontier from Tripolitania, have sustained about 11,500 casualties and the First Army about 23,500 casualties, in all 564 35,000 killed, missing and wounded during the campaign in the two British Armies.
The total number of prisoners taken who have passed through the cages of all the Allies, now amounts to over 248,000 men, an increase of 24,000 on the previous published total, and there must certainly have been 50,000 of the enemy killed, making a total loss of about 300,000 men to the enemy in Tunisia alone. More than half of these men are Germans. In fact, of the 37,000 prisoners taken by the United States 2nd Corps—actually it was more of the size of an Army than a Corps—33,000 were Germans. The French 19th Corps also led tens of thousands of German and Italian captives to the rear and must have felt that after all their country had gone through, they were once again reliving the great days of Foch and Clemenceau. All this takes no account of the very heavy toll taken of the German and Italian forces as they crossed over the seas, or passed through the air. This toll was taken by the Allied Air Forces and by the British submarines, cruisers, destroyers and motor torpedo boats. These British naval forces at the same time cast an impassable barrier between the enemy in Tunisia and all prospects of escape. During the later phases, a continuous patrol was maintained in forces which would have prevented any attempt at escape except by individuals. In fact, I believe only 638 persons have escaped, and these for the most part by air, from this scene of surrender.
We cannot doubt that both Stalingrad and Tunisia are the greatest military disasters that have ever befallen Germany in all the wars she has made, and they are many. There is no doubt from the statements of captured Generals that Hitler expected his Tunisian army to hold out at least until August and that this was the view and intention of the German High Command. The suddenness of the collapse of these great numbers of brave and skilful fighting men, with every form of excellent equipment, must be regarded as significant and in a sense characteristic of the German psychology which was shown after Jena and also at the very end of the last war. Though this fact should certainly be noted and weighed, no undue expectations should be based upon it. We are prepared to win this war by hard fighting, and if necessary by hard fighting alone.
In years of peace, the peoples of the British Commonwealth and those of the 565 United States are an easy-going folk, wishing to lead a free life, with active politics and other opportunities of innocent diversion and of national self-improvement. They do not covet anything from others, perhaps because they have enough themselves, and they have often failed to keep a good look-out upon their own safety. They have many martial qualities, but they certainly do not like drill. Nevertheless, when they are attacked and assailed and forced in defence of life and liberty to make war and to subject all their habits of life to war conditions and to war discipline, they are not incapable, if time is granted to them—and time was granted to them—, of making the necessary transformation. Indeed, a great many of them are taking to it with increasing zest and zeal. Such nations do not become exhausted by war. On the contrary, they get stronger as it goes on. It is an error on the part of certain neutrals to suppose that the previously unprepared and ill-armed Anglo-Saxon democracies will emerge from this war weakened and prostrate even though victorious. On the contrary, we shall be stronger than ever before in force, and I trust also in faith. It may well be that those guilty races who trumpeted the glories of war at the beginning will be extolling the virtues of peace before the end. It would certainly seem right, however, that those who fix, on their own terms, the moment for beginning wars should not be the same men who fix, on their own terms, the moment for ending them. These observations are of a general character but not without their particular application.
I must not neglect to make it clear that the operations now impending in the European theatre have been fitted into their proper place in relation to the general war. I am very sorry that we have not yet been able to bring into council Marshal Stalin, or other representatives of our great Ally Russia, which is bearing the heaviest burden and paying by far the highest price in blood and life. But I can assure the House that taking some of the weight off Russia, giving more speedy and effective aid to China and giving a stronger measure of security to our beloved Australia and New Zealand, these were never absent for one moment from our thoughts and aims.
This war is so universal and world wide that it would take several hours to make 566 an exposition of what is happening in the various theatres. Each of the Allies naturally sees these theatres from a different angle and in a somewhat different relation. We British must continue to place the anti-U-boat war first, because it is only by conquering the U-boat that we can live and act. The might of America is deployed far over the Pacific and is laying an ever stronger grip on the outlying defences of Japan and offering at every moment to the Japanese fleet the supreme challenge of sea-power. The Russian Armies, as I mentioned to the Congress the other day, are in deadly grapple with what we estimate to be 190 German and 28 satellite divisions along their 2,000 miles front. It is here that the greatest battles seem to impend.
Then there is the war in the air. The steady wearing down of the German and Japanese air forces is proceeding remorselessly, The enemy, who thought that the air would be their weapon of victory, are now finding in it instead the first cause of their ruin. It is necessary for me to make it plain that, so far as the British Government and the Governments of the Dominions, and also the Governments of the United States and of the Russian Soviet Republic are concerned, nothing will turn us from our endeavour and intention to accomplish the complete destruction of our foes by bombing from the air in addition to all other methods. Loud and lamentable outcries are being made by the enemy now that this form of warfare by which they thought to obtain the mastery of the world has turned markedly to their disadvantage. This outcry will only be regarded by us as a very satisfactory proof of the growing efficiency of our attack. Compared with this time last year we British alone can now drop more than double the weight of bombs at 1,500 miles range there and back.
In the summer of last year, as Minister of Defence, I set on foot a policy of increasing our bomber effort, which, of course, entailed certain sacrifices in other directions. All that is now coming into hand. At the same time we took the measures which have thrown the long-range aircraft—the very long-range aircraft—the V.L.R., as they are called—, effectively in to the anti U-boat struggle. All this is now being brought to bear. The month of May is, from every point of view, the best month we have ever had 567 in the anti U-boat war since the United States was attacked by Japan, Germany and Italy. At that time we gained much greater combined resources, but we exposed much larger targets. We made at that time a budget of sinkings and buildings on which we knew we could survive indefinitely. The sinkings have been a good deal less than we apprehended, and the buildings have more than made good the prodigious programme undertaken by the American nation. This month of May has been one of the very best for the imports carried safely into this Island since the end of 1941. Our combined new building has exceeded our losses by more than 3 to 1. This first week in June could not possibly be taken as a criterion, but, as a matter of fact, it is the best ever for many, many months past.
During the last few months the enemy has made very heavy attacks on our convoys. These have given us the opportunity of hitting him hard in open battle. There are so many U-boats employed now that it is almost impossible not to run into one or other of these great screens of U-boats which are spread out, and therefore you have to fight your way through. But there is no reason why we should regret that. On the contrary, it is around the convoys that the U-boats can best be destroyed. New weapons and new methods and the close co-ordination of effort between surface and air escort have enabled us to inflict casualties which have surpassed all previous records. My right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty made a statement of a very reassuring character upon this subject the other day, and I can only repeat that, in May, for the first time our killings of U-boats substantially outnumbered the U-boat output. That may be a fateful milestone. The Germans seem to be staking their hopes upon the U-boat war, as we may judge by the appeals made to them. They are encouraged to bear the evils—"terrors," they call it, perhaps not an ill-chosen word—of the air bombardment by the hopes that on the sea the U-boats are taking their revenge. If it should be made clear that this hope has failed them, they may be seriously disappointed; and they are people who, when seriously disappointed, do not always find the resources to confront approaching disaster, once their reason tells them that it is inevitable. Again I say, I 568 make the observation in passing but do not let us build on such deductions.
It would be foolish to assume that the good results of a single month are a guarantee of a continuing process. We may have set-backs, though I have always looked forward to this summer as being a period which would be favourable to us. Moreover, of course, the enemy may decline battle, or he may look only for the most tempting opportunities. In this case we shall have fewer killings but more imports, and the freer movement of troops and munitions will be possible to all the various theatres. I must say I feel confident that the U-boat war will not stand between the United Nations and their final victory, while all the time the air war will grow in weight and severity. I might well speak with more emphasis upon this point, but it is prudent to forbear.
It happened at the time when I was in Algiers that General de Gaulle and his friends arrived, and I thought it would be well if my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary were on the spot in case it should prove in our power to help. We did not in fact intervene at all in these tense discussions between Frenchmen. But, like General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, we watched them closely and vigilantly in the light of British and United States interests and of the well-being of our Armies in North Africa. We all rejoiced that agreement was made and that the French National Committee of Liberation was set up and constituted as the single and sole authority over all Frenchmen seeking to free France from the German yoke. When we met these seven men by and around whom the new French Cabinet has been formed we could not but be struck by the many different aspects of French energy and capacity to resist which they represented and also by their high personal qualities. The gravest responsibility lies upon these men, and opportunity shines brightly before them. They have only to act together in good faith and loyalty to one another, to set aside sectional or personal interests and keep all their hatreds for the enemy—they have only to do this to help regain for France her inheritance, and in so doing to become themselves the inheritors of the gratitude of future generations of Frenchmen. The formation of this Committee with its collective responsibility supersedes the situation created by the correspondence between General de Gaulle and my- 569 self in 1940. Our dealings, financial and otherwise, will henceforward be with the Committee as a whole. There is a further and larger question, namely, the degree of recognition of this Committee as representative of France. This question requires consideration from the British and United States Governments, but if things go well, I should hope that a solution satisfactory to all parties may shortly be reached.
Let me now sum up the two predominant impressions I have sustained from this journey. The first is the spirit, quality and organisation of the British and Allied Armies in North Africa. The second is the intimacy and strength of the ties now uniting the British and United States Governments and the British and American peoples. All sorts of divergences, all sorts of differences of outlook and all sorts of awkward little jars necessarily occur as we roll ponderously forward together along the rough and broken road of war. But none of these makes the slightest difference to our ever-growing concert and unity, there are none of them that cannot be settled face to face by heart-to-heart talks arid patient argument. My own relations with the illustrious President of the United States have become in these years of war those of personal friendship and regard, and nothing will ever happen to separate us in comradeship and partnership of thought and action while we remain responsible for the conduct of affairs.
The reason why I have not had to make a longer speech to-day is that I have already given to the joint Session of the Congress of the United States the statement which I should have made to this House on the victory in Tunisia had I been in this country. That, I think, is a valid explanation. Certainly, when I found myself walking into that august Assembly, the free Congress of the most powerful community in the world, and when I gave them, exactly as I would do in this House, a businesslike, stocktaking survey of the war and of our joint interests, even touching upon controversial matters or matters of domestic controversy over there, and when I thought of all our common history and of the hopes that lie before us, I felt that this was an age of memorable importance to mankind. For there can be no doubt that whatever world organisation is brought into being after this war, that 570 organisation must be the richer and the stronger if it is founded on the friendship and fraternal relations and the deep understanding prevailing and now growing between the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States of America.
I have one thing more to say before I sit down. I must acknowledge with gratitude the extraordinary kindness with which I have been treated in the House and out of doors throughout the land. That is a very great help in these days of continuing crisis and storm. Let me, in return, record the fact that this House, a democratic institution, based upon universal suffrage, which has preserved its functions and authority intact and undiminished during the war and has shown that it can change, correct and sustain Governments with equal constancy of purpose, has proved itself a foundation and an instrument for the waging of successful war and for the safety of the State never surpassed in modern or ancient times.
§ Mr. Arthur Greenwood (Wakefield)Let me, in a few words, say that I am sure the House and the country warmly welcome the safe return of the Prime Minister and earnestly hope that the decisions made will lead to larger and ever-growing achievements. While I share the view of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House that there will be little purpose served in continuing the discussion to-day, I would ask him to bear in mind that there is a strong feeling that at some convenient date there should be a full-dress Debate on the war situation.
§ Mr. A. Bevan (Ebbw Vale)I would like if I may to reinforce the statement which has just been made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood). I also wish, if I may be permitted, to congratulate the Prime Minister upon his safe return and to felicitate him upon the last few sentences of his speech. The House of Commons last year made its own contribution towards the successes we have, achieved in North Africa, and the House would desire to make its own contribution to the events which are about to take place in Europe. Therefore, I want to suggest to the Leader of the House that immediately after the Whitsun Recess an opportunity 571 should be afforded to the House to have a general Debate upon the war situation, because it must not be thought that as we have said nothing during the Prime Minister's absence we have no contribution to make, or any observations to put forward, upon the conduct of the war. Indeed, many of us have some guidance to give to the Government on this matter at the present time—guidance which may not be acceptable to the Government but which will, I hope, be as fruitful as the other guidance which some of us have given in the past. While felicitating the Prime Minister upon his safe return and congratulating him upon the joint achievements of the House of Commons and the Government, I hope that when the House re-assembles after the Whitsun Recess we shall have a full opportunity of reviewing the whole war situation.
§ The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. James Stuart)I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.