HC Deb 03 December 1942 vol 385 cc1319-21
Mr. Silverman

I desire to raise with you, Mr. Speaker, as a matter of Order, a question which I think may have been as much of a puzzle to other hon. Members as it has been to me. I understand it is your intention to-day to call the Amendment in the names of my hon. Friend the Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern) and his colleagues. On Tuesday last there was a discussion in which you gave a further explanation of the Rule which prevents the repetition of Debate in the House on matters already concluded within the same Session. It might be worth while to read again the quotation from Erskine May which was the main point in the Ruling: It is a wholesome restraint upon Members to prevent them from reviving a Debate already concluded; and there would be little use in preventing the same question or bill from being offered twice in the same session, if, without being offered, its merits could be discussed again and again. The Amendment to the Address which the House was discussing in the last two Sitting Days reads: And, while welcoming the declaration of the United Nations endorsing the principles of the Atlantic Charter, humbly represent to Your Majesty the urgent necessity of Your Majesty's Advisers reaching practical conclusions, in co-operation with the United Nations, to fulfil these undertakings, and taking the necessary legislative and administrative action to implement without delay the pledges given to Your Majesty's subjects in the United Kingdom. The Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern) and others reads: But humbly regret that the Gracious Speech while expressing the highest aspirations for the future peace and welfare of the peoples of the world, makes no concrete proposals for the realisation of these desirable objects and for removing the cause of war; and fails to promise legislation to remove the grave social inequalities of the present order, which in many cases have been intensified by the war, and offers no prospect of a new order for the common people here, in India and in the Colonies. It is very difficult to imagine what kind of subject, what kind of fact, what kind of comment or what kind of argument in support of that Amendment can be advanced which was not equally relevant to the Debate that has been proceeding in the last few days. If that is so, it would appear to be a fair inference that the Amendment which the hon. Members desire to move to-day is the subject matter of the Debate which was concluded last evening. That being so, I think the House would be interested to know how this case can be distinguished from other similar cases, and from the most recent one on Tuesday, and how therefore this Amendment and the discussion of it come to be in Order to-day.

Mr. Speaker

I am rather surprised that the hon. Member has raised this question to-day. The actual difference that there is between the Debate on which I gave a ruling the other day and the one that is going to take place to-day is crystal clear. There is all the difference in the world between a narrow, mainly personal issue, such as the one on which I ruled earlier in the week, and the subjects which can be raised by the Amendment to which the hon. Member refers. They are, to say the least of it, comprehensive. In other words, one is the subject of many questions of great importance and interest, and the one upon which I gave a Ruling was a small one chiefly on a personal matter and which obviously could not be repeated again and again. The subject-matter of the Amendment on the Paper might be debated half a dozen times or more within the next few weeks.

Mr. Silverman

I cannot find in the quotation from Erskine May which was the basis of your Ruling, Sir, any such distinction between narrow personal questions and wider ones. It is true that both Amendments cover a very wide range, and the subjects of them would be open to debate whenever the House is able to debate them, but there is nothing that the hon. Members want to say to-day which could not have been said yesterday or the day before in the Debate then before the House, and I do not see any ground for the distinction that you have drawn.

Mr. Speaker

I think the House will realise that there is all the distinction in the world. If the hon. Member reads further on in Erskine May, he will see that the House and the Speaker will judge in each case how often the Rule may fairly be relaxed.