HC Deb 30 July 1935 vol 304 cc2531-8

Lords Amendment: In page 43, line 23, at the end, insert: (2) No person shall be a member both of then Federal Legislature and of a Provincial Legislature and if a person is chosen a member both of the Federal Legislature and of a Provincial Legislature, then, at the expiration of such period as may be specified in rules made by the Governor of the Province exercising his individual judgment that person's seat in the Provincial Legislature shall become vacant, unless he has previously resigned his seat in the Federal Legislature.

5.42 p.m.

Mr. BUTLER

I beg to move, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

This Amendment raises a small point. It reproduces the provisions of the electoral rules made under the existing Act, by which no man can sit at the same time in a Provincial Legislature and the Central Legislature. I quite understand that there can be two points of view on this Amendment, but it has been represented to us from India that, in view of the circumstances there, no man can do the two jobs in a satisfactory manner. There are great distances, for example, which he may have to cover, and as the Budgets are considered in both legislatures at the same time he could not be present for both. In view of the representations which have been made to us and the decision taken by another place, it is, on the whole, the wiser course that no person should be a member of both the Federal Legislature and a Provincial Legislature.

5.43 p.m.

Mr. ATTLEE

This Amendment will make a distinction between the representative of a Province and the representative of a State. I should have thought that as there are now second chambers in the Provinces the objection would not be so strong, and that it was rather a wise thing to have a link between the Provincial Chambers and the Central Legislature.

Viscount WOLMER

I wish to record my dissent from the Government's deci sion in this matter. It seems to be a great deal more important than would be gathered from what was said by the Under-Secretary of State or in another place. The reasons given by the Under-Secretary were not adequate. In these days of aerial transport, distances which a few years ago might have been prohibitive are no longer prohibitive. The whole situation has been revolutionised in that respect, and it will become increasingly possible for people to travel great distances in very short periods of time. But that is not really the point. The point is that if the circumstances which the Under-Secretary adduced obtained in any case, the electors ought to be relied on not to elect such a person. If a person is already a member of a Provincial Legislature or of the Federal Legislature, as the case may be, that ought to be taken into consideration by the electors, who are the proper judges on that point and not this House.

Where, however, the matter seems to be serious and important, is that the Government are constantly telling us that the great danger and difficulty in working their scheme will arise from the centrifugal tendencies—the danger of the Provinces breaking away. That is the reason which they have given for the whole of their Federal structure. I submit that there is no more potent link than the presence of a large number of members who hold responsibility both in the Provinces and at the Centre, and it seems to me that the. Government here are deliberately severing what might be a very useful link. Surely we have experience of that in this House. What would the House of Commons be like if no Member of Parliament might be a member of a local authority—of a county council or a great municipality? It would introduce a fundamental change in the nature of the House of Commons, and I do not hesitate to say that it would destroy a great deal of the usefulness of the House of Commons.

The presence in the Federal Legislature of men with provincial experience—of men not only representing the Provinces as elected representatives, but men with a personal right to speak on the problems of the Provinces because they have taken part and are taking part in the legislatures of those Provinces—is a consideration compared with which, it seems to me, the reasons advanced by the Under-Secretary are altogether insignificant. I cannot help feeling that there must be some reason which he has not given to the House, and, if that be so, I should very much like to know what that reason is. If the only reasons that have prompted the Government to make this change in the Bill are that distances are great in India and that the legislative bodies frequently sit at the same period, then I say that that is a matter which will be increasingly overcome by aerial transport, and one on which the electors are entitled to judge. It seems to me that grave injury might be done to the Constitution by putting this provision into the Bill, and therefore I desire to protest against it.

5.48 p.m.

Mr. ISAAC FOOT

The Under-Secretary has only spoken of one argument in favour of the Lords Amendment, namely, the difficulty of distance. If there is any other argument, anything that he submitted would weigh with us. I do not remember this matter being discussed in the Joint Select Committee. If it was, I do not think that much importance was attached to it at the time. I cannot recall that in the earlier discussions of the Committee we dwelt on the point. If I can be corrected with regard to that, I will give way at once. When the Joint Select Committee discussed the question of Indian constitutional reform over a period of nearly two years, the intention was to deal with all these matters, and I do not know what points can now arise on which we cannot have the guidance that came from that prolonged consideration. I think that the only course we ought to take is to leave this matter to the good sense of the electors, who are the people most qualified to judge. I can quite understand a man who is only a member of the central body being more disqualified from serving at the Centre by reason of heavy business interests in the Provinces, which demand a great deal more of his time than membership of the provincial Parliament. A man with heavy claims upon his time, with huge business responsibilities or other very close ties, might be more disqualified from carrying out this double responsibility than another man who is a member of a provincial chamber as well as of the Central chamber.

If some urgent request has been put forward from some quarter, if some strong representation has been made on behalf of Indian opinion, I am sure the House would like to have regard to it, but if the only point is that of distance and the disability that would arise from difficulty of communication, I think that that is an issue which ought to be left to the electors, who would be very well able to decide whether a man who was seeking their support was in a position to carry out the pledges that he gave with regard to his services. That is the sort of criticism that would be expected here, and anyone who has gone through an election knows that his opponents would never hesitate to remind the electors of any inability to carry out the pledges that are so freely given at those times. In the circumstances I do not think that the Government ought to press the Amendment unless they are able to make a stronger answer than that which has just been put forward.

5.52 p.m.

Mr. A. SOMERVILLE

It is rather difficult to follow the Government in this ban against the possibility of a member of a Provincial Legislature becoming a member of the Federal Legislature. We know that one of the difficulties which lie ahead in India is that of finding a sufficient supply of capable men for the various legislatures, and that seems to me to be a strong argument against the imposition of this ban. My Noble Friend the Member for Aldershot (Viscount Wolmer) has pointed out that air travel has shortened distances very considerably, and I would add that it is not our custom here to ban a Member of the House of Commons in Belfast from being a Member of this House. Therefore, I would suggest that it is not wise to persist in this Amendment, but that it should be left to the decision of the electors.

5.54 p.m.

Brigadier-General Sir HENRY CROFT

I would urge the Government to consider the views which have been expressed from various parts of the House on this matter. It is not a question on which personally I should desire to have a contest with the Government, but at the same time it would appear hardly wise to make it impossible for a distinguished statesman in India to exercise these dual functions, and I would express the hope that the Government will consider very seriously whether they could not forbear from pressing this Amendment.

5.55 p.m.

Mr. AMERY

I desire to join in the appeal that has been made to the Government not to insist on a hard-and-fast rule which would preclude members of Provincial Legislatures from being also eligible for the Central Legislature. After all, the value of the new form of Federal Legislature with which India is being equipped is that it is going to keep the Provinces in close touch with central problems, through the delegation by the Provinces of representatives to the Centre and by the close control which will result from the intimate connection between the representatives of the Centre and the small body of provincial members so delegated to serve in the Central Assembly. It would be quite in consonance with that principle that in certain cases, where the circumstances allowed it, the members at the Centre might also be members of provincial legislatures. I suppose that that could hardly be a general rule, but I should have thought that it would be a pity to lay down an absolute bar against such a possibility.

5.56 p.m.

Sir JOHN WARDLAW-MILNE

So much has been said against agreement with this Amendment that perhaps the House will allow me to express a contrary view. I feel that the House perhaps does not quite realise the history of this matter. So far as I know, from the earliest days of the legislative assemblies and legislative councils in India it has always been a rule that a member of a provincial council should resign his seat on being elected to the Central Council at Delhi. Apart from the question of the difficulties, which are very real, there is, to my mind, a great advantage in that rule. In the first place, I think it is essential that we should not encourage the growth of, so to speak, professional politicians in India, and there is a distant danger of that if you make politics so much an engagement for people that they can do no other work. In my view there is a great advantage in confining a man's political activities either to the Provinces or to the Centre, and not allowing them to extend to both. It does not put the same demand upon his time, and, therefore, there is a larger number of people from whom to choose. There is a very real difficulty in regard to attendance both at the Centre and in the Provinces. As the Under-Secretary has said, the two bodies generally meet at the same time. It is not a question of meeting for a day, but very often for weeks, and although no doubt aerial transport has improved enormously, and enables people to travel much more quickly than in days gone by, that does not alter the fact that no person, particularly in the climate of India, could undertake the enormous physical strain of continually going backwards and forwards between two bodies mostly meeting at the same time.

The other argument that has been advanced is that this matter should be left to the electors. That might be a very sound argument in this country, but I think that Members in all parts of the House will agree that India is not yet at a stage at which the electorate is capable of judging on a matter of that kind. It does not affect them personally; they do not have to make these journeys themselves; but they will elect people, as is done to some extent in other countries, in their name and reputation, and it would be impossible in present circumstances to expect an electorate in India to say that they would not elect a candidate because he had a great deal of work to do elsewhere. I think that this is a matter on which the House might decide. It is not a vital matter, but, on the whole, the arguments are in favour of preventing a member from sitting both in the Central Legislature and in a Provincial Legislature.

5.59 p.m.

Lord E. PERCY

I recognise that this is a point on which considerations may be very evenly balanced. I appreciate what has been said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) and by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bournemouth (Sir H. Croft). I have considered the point myself for some time, and I, too, have varied in my opinion. It was, as a matter of fact, discussed in the Joint Select Committee, and various views were expressed upon it. It is true that one or two individual statesmen in India may be invaluable members of two Legislatures, and might be able to discharge the duties, simply because their regular and invariable attendance in one of those Legislatures would not be essential; but if this became anything like a general practice the position would become impossible. My hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) has been through the mill himself. I have only watched it for a very short period from outside. But anyone who has seen both the Central Legislature and all the Provincial Legislatures, at the same period, in February and March, in the throes of a Budget session, will realise that, in the most important business of the year, it would be quite impossible for anyone to be an effective and efficient member of the two Legislatures at once.

The question then is whether the matter should be left open so that a Provincial Legislature could elect its own members as members of the Federal Legislature as a more or less general rule, or whether you are to have a general prohibition. You cannot have it both ways. If you leave the door open, it must be left wide open. I think there would be a great deal to be said for my Noble Friend's view that you should leave it to the electorate if both Legislatures were directly elected, but in fact—I know the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Foot) does not like the fact—we have decided that the Federal Legislature shall be indirectly elected. Therefore the electors of the Provincial Legislatures will not know whether they have elected a candidate and he will not know himself that he is going to be a member of another Legislature. But then he may elect himself to go on to the Federal Legislature. On balance I think the argument inclines very strongly against dual membership, and if to that you add that this is and always has been the law in India—

Viscount WOLMER

My Noble Friend has pointed out how badly the present Constitution works.

Lord E. PERCY

I have never said that everything that is is bad. I leave that kind of Conservatism to my Noble Friend. Finally, this view that it is undesirable to have dual membership is a view taken, I think, by most of our official advisers in India. I think the balance is definitely in favour of this Amendment of another place and I would ask even such of my hon. Friends as doubt whether this is really necessary to accept the law of the land.

Subsequent Lords Amendments to page 54, line 2, agreed to.