§ 13. Mr. GEORGE HALLasked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will state the time of receipt at Fort Blockhouse of the reported absence as overdue of submarine M 2; the name of the officer on duty at Portsmouth Dockyard at that time who had executive control of all measures of rescue work; the nature of the latter's immediate action, if any; on whose authority, and on what grounds, all rescue work was confined to surface craft; whether, in view of the nature of the discretion allowed under King's Regulations in such an emergency to officers commanding and of the known reliability of methods of sound detection for use by submarines in underseas conditions, he can state why such a step was not ordered forthwith by the officer commanding; and whether at the official inquiry this aspect will be particularly inquired into, and opportunity provided for competent engineering and commercial authority other than officers of the Royal Navy, to assist the inquiry on this point?
The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Lord Stanley)As the reply is rather long, I will, with the hon. Member's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
§ Mr. HALLCan the Parliamentary Secretary tell me whether the first part of the question will be the subject of particular inquiry?
Lord STANLEYI think the hon. Member when he reads the answer will find that the specific question to which he refers does not arise. I can give him an assurance that the inquiry will be very comprehensive.
§ Following is the reply:
§ His Majesty's Submarine M.2 was exercising from Portland and her Commanding Officer, before leaving Portland, had expressed his intention of carrying out a long endurance dive for the purpose of training the crew. The report from the Captain-in-Charge, Portland, that Submarine M.2 was overdue was made owing to the fact that the M.2 had neither returned to harbour nor been sighted and the "Titania" was unable to establish communication by wireless telegraphy. The report was received at Fort Blockhouse at 7.47 p.m. on 26th January. The Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, who is the officer responsible, put into operation forthwith, the measures laid down for such an emergency; these comprise the despatch of salvage craft, minesweeping and anti-submarine vessels and aircraft to the scene of the reported position.
§ The Captain-in-Charge, Portland—the responsible officer on the spot—at the same time as he made his report to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, ordered two submarines, minesweeping and antisubmarine craft, all normally stationed at Portland, to sea without waiting for the order from the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, which was received later. The implication in the question that the rescue work was confined to surface craft is thus without foundation as also the suggestion that steps were not taken immediately by the Commanding Officer on the spot. The fullest use was made, moreover, of all methods of detection. The last part of the question accordingly does not arise.