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Lord Grey, in his speech last night, said that the whole meaning of British co-operation lies in the work of really pacifying Europe, and he emphasised the importance of the part that we may possibly play. He said:
It was for British public opinion to recognise that the one thing it could do to help the European situation was to make some firm offer to promote European security in which the British Empire can join.
§ I am sure that it is far too early for me to have formed in my own mind and much less to express any idea of the shape which our co-operation should take, but I do say that it is in the spirit of the passages I have read from Lord Grey's speech, that His Majesty's Government, and I, as their spokesman, approach the whole consideration of this subject. We have not merely the general interest of all the world in attaining to a sense of security and a sense of stability in Europe. We have also our own interests. As Lord Grey pointed out.
715§ We are far too near the Continent to rest indifferent to what goes on there.
§ At periods in our history we have sought to withdraw ourselves from all European interests. There have been moments, and in the life of our nation they have only been moments, of isolation, sometimes it may have been splendid and sometimes not, but no nation can live, as we live, within 20 miles of the shores of the Continent of Europe and remain indifferent to the peace and security of the Continent. If our history shows, as it does show, that that is the case, then, as Lord Grey again pointed out, it is more important to-day than ever before that we should not regard ourselves as so protected and so separated from the rest of Europe and its misfortunes by the narrow strip of sea that divides us, as to remain indifferent to what happens, and callous and deaf to any appeal for help. It is not in that spirit that we have exercised when it rested with us alone in the United Kingdom; nor is it in that spirit of selfish and, at the same time, short-sighted isolation, that we shall exercise now, when we speak in consultation with the free self-governing Dominions of a great Empire, our mission and our influence in the world. Our power to help to a peaceful solution of our difficulties, and the use which we may be, in removing from the minds of men the shadow of future trouble, haunts our minds and recalls the agonies of a few years ago. That possibility of usefulness and that influence are a great call to endeavour, to effort and to service for the great British Empire, to which, I believe, that Empire will gladly respond.
Lieut.-Colonel Sir EDWARD GRGGWhile appreciating the force of what the right hon. Gentleman has said in justification of the extreme discretion which characterized his speech, I greatly regret that he has not been able to say more. We appreciate the force of what he said when he pleaded that, as the representative of this country going to a great conference, he should not be asked to tie his hands. But there is an opposite danger, which comes from too much reticence, that you may lose touch with national feeling. If there are examples in the recent past of statesmen who tied their hands in going to conferences by 716 making declarations beforehand, there are also examples of statesmen who have kept too far aloof from the opinions of their country, and were unable to carry their proposals through, or at least unable to carry them with any adequate measure of national support when they came back. While we do not desire to press the right hon. Gentleman to go too far, I think he will agree that it is important that we on these benches should express our views, because I am certain that, whatever arrangements he may have in contemplation for the peace of Europe, he must realise that those arrangements must carry a much larger measure of national consent than mere party consent, and that they must be such as to be understood and, if possible, approved by the whole nation. I therefore make no apology for offering some commentary on what he has said, and asking that, if possible, we should be given a little further information on some points by whoever may speak on behalf of the Government later.
Mr. CHAMBERLAINThe opening of the hon. and gallant Member's speech recalls an omission which I made of something that I ought to have said. He seems to think that what I did say may have left not only him but others under a misapprehension. I am leaving tomorrow, and in passing through Paris I hope to have an opportunity of seeing the President of the Council. Then, I go on to Geneva. I would like clearly to say that it is not my purpose to open negotiations for any particular agreement or to propound any plan. My object is to exchange views and gather information.
§ Sir E. GRIGGI am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for that amplification of what he said, but it causes me some regret that the views of the British Government are still so unformed on this great subject that he is going to Geneva, apparently, without any definite ideas which he can propound. We hoped that, at least, on some of these questions there would be some definite plan. He quoted the admirable statement made by Lord Grey last night, that security is the master key of the European problem. Security is not one problem; it is a network of problems, and the difficulty is to see these problems in perspective.
717 Unless we do try to see them in perspective and get them into some order, both chronologically and in the order of their importance, it is difficult to clear one's mind on the problem of security at the present time. In this network of problems there is the question of the Cologne evacuation in the foreground. Behind it, in the middle distance, there is the more difficult problem of French and Belgian security. And behind that again, in the background, there is the even more complex problem of ensuring peace on the Eastern Marches of Europe and throughout the continent.
On the question of Cologne, I was very glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman's positive declaration, reinforcing that made by Lord Curzon a day or two ago, that the British Government maintain the view that the evacuation of Cologne depends solely on the fulfilment of the disarmament conditions by Germany, and cannot be tied up with the question of security at all. I would like to reinforce the argument he made in that respect. It is generally contended that France stands in a new position to-day in regard to the whole occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads, because the Treaty of Guarantee failed. That is not a fact. The possible failure of the Treaty of Guarantee was foreseen by those who made the Treaty, and actually provided for in the Treaty.
If anybody doubts that he has only to refer to the authentic history of the peace negotiations published some time ago by M. Tardieu. I think that book is regarded almost as an official history of the whole business. M. Tardieu was M. Clemenceau's right-hand man. The book itself is published with a preface by M. Clemenceau, and not only that, but with a preface by Colonel House who paid a special tribute to M. Tardieu's authority and information on the subject. M. Tardieu shows that when the American and British representatives had proposed the pact and the pact had been accepted by M. Clemenceau, he came back to them and said, "What if these pacts are not carried out?" Negotiations followed to deal with the possibility that these pacts might not be carried out, and in the end, after six or seven draft proposals, of which M. Tardieu says he retains the copies, there was finally added, at the end of this very Article 429, deal- 718 ing with the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, the final paragraph which expressly provides that in case France and the Allies are not satisfied regarding French security at the end of 15 years she shall then be entitled to remain in the Mainz area until such time as her security is adequately provided for.
That in itself absolutely dissociates the broader question of French security from this immediate question of the evacuation of Cologne. There can be no higher authority on this than the authority of M. Tardieu. I was very glad, therefore, to hear the right hon. Gentleman's perfectly positive statement that the British Government will not be influenced in its dealing with the Cologne question by any regard for the broader problem of security.
Nevertheless, while we must proceed on this question of Cologne solely under the articles as laid down in the Treaty, every one knows at the same time there is always behind it, in the middle distance, this greater question of French and Belgian security in Europe, and while it does not impose itself of necessity for 10 years, until the final evacuation become due, nevertheless it may colour the whole atmosphere during those 10 years, and if we hope to enjoy a better atmosphere in Europe it is essential to deal with the question of security as soon as possible.
On the wider question I am sure that all on these benches welcome, what the right hon. Gentleman said in approval of Lord Grey's remarks on that subject last night. What I would press on him, even if he can give us no further information on this subject to-day, is that the Government should take into the fullest consideration the proposals which have at last been made by the German Government with regard to French security. The right hon. Gentleman would not tell us whether he would regard the descriptions of those proposals, which have appeared broadcast in the Press, as accurate; but I presume, that they contain at least some measure of accuracy. A good many of them come, I think, from German sources. What is remarkable about these proposals is that they cover not only the question of an invasion across the French frontier, but also include a readiness on the part of Germany to guarantee the complete and 719 permanent demilitarisation of the left bank of the Rhine, and of an area of 50 kilometres on the east bank, as laid down in Articles 42 and 43.
Germany, in fact, consents to become a party to a full guarantee of the existing frontiers under the League of Nations, and to the maintenance for all time of a demilitarised area between herself and Prance. That is a very great advance towards European security, and that such proposals should come from the German Government at the present time is a remarkable instance of the progress that has been made towards a settlement of the question, at any rate, upon that side of the frontier. I would urge upon the right hon. Gentleman that those proposals, if they are correctly described in the Press, are particularly worthy of acceptance for two reasons. The first reason is that they absolutely carry out the spirit of our original guarantee to France. Our original guarantee to France was a guarantee to protect her against unprovoked aggression, and in particular to sec that Germany respected Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty, regarding the demilitarised area, But it was not an undertaking given for all time. It was a limited undertaking, and it was definitely laid down in Article 3 of the original Pact of Guarantee to France, that that Pact should cease to operate as soon as the Allies, by submission, if necessary, of one of them to the Council of the League of Nations, obtained from the Council, if necessary by a majority, a decision that the League of Nations afforded by itself adequate security for the maintenance of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty.
I understand that it is on these lines the German proposals are made. They are prepared not only to guarantee Articles 42 and 43 for all time, but they are also prepared to give the right of inspection in order that it may be determined whether at any time these Articles are being duly respected, or whether there has been an infraction or not. They are prepared to leave that matter in the hands of the League of Nations. This, therefore, is not only a new proposal of great importance but it is a proposal on the lines originally contemplated by the Guarantee Pact of 1919.
720 Another point. These proposals made by Germany are in exact conformity with that contained in Article 9 of the Protocol. That Article reads as follows:—"The existence of demilitarized zones being calculated to prevent aggression and to facilitate a definite finding of the nature provided for in Article 10 below, the establishment of such zones between States mutually consenting thereto is recommended as a means of avoiding violations of the present Protocol." That is the language of the Protocol. It follows that these proposals which are put forward by Germany are on the main line of the advance of European thought towards a settlement of the security question, and can be regarded therefore as in no sense a departure from the lines on which everybody wants to see this question finally established, it is in fact an instalment of security on the lines which we all desire.
What are the alternatives to Indian arrangement? The only alternatives are two. One is that we should cut the painter from Europe, cast loose altogether from all continental relations, and leave France the legal right to remain in the Mainz area of the Rhine for all time. No one in this House believes that that is a solution which would serve the interests of peace in Europe. If there is a danger to peace in Europe it is the continued occupation of the Rhine area. The only other alternative, apart from the proposals put forward by Germany, is an exclusive pact between France, Belgium and ourselves. On these benches we should regard any such arrangement as a reactionary arrangement, and we could not in any way support it. I was very glad to hear what fell from the right hon. Gentleman on that point also. By his approval of what Lord Grey said last night, I assume that he intended to express his opinion on that, as coinciding with that of Lord Grey, and that he is therefore opposed to a separate pact between this country and Belgium and France. Only something in the nature of what is now proposed by Germany therefore remains. I hope that the Government will not only give it most careful consideration, but will endeavour to press it forward on every opportunity which presents itself in the conversations in which the right hon. Gentleman will shortly be engaged.
721 So much for what I have called the middle distance—the question of French security and the Western frontiers. There rises behind that again—it is idle to blink the fact—the question of the Eastern frontiers, which cannot be dissociated from the general question of security in Europe. I do not believe that there is any chance of France consenting ultimately to proposals which do not deal in some way with the Eastern frontiers. Since the Pacts of Guarantee failed, she has made new commitments with Allies to the south and east of Germany, and though we are in no way bound by these commitments, they are facts in the situation, and we have to deal with facts. The Protocol, as it appears to me, does not deal satisfactorily with that question. I will not weary the patience of the Committee—and this would not be the proper occasion—by attempting to deal in any detail with the Protocol. I will only make one or two observations. The first is to hope that in this question of the Eastern frontiers in Europe, whatever else the Government may do, they will sec to it that any pledges which we give to help forward European security are conditional on the acceptance of arrangements for peaceable revision where and when necessary of the Eastern settlements. It appears that Germany has offered to accept some arrangement for peaceful arbitration of any dispute on the Eastern frontiers. If so, it is a great advance. But in any case the provisions of the Protocol are not satisfactory.
6.0 P.M.
I cannot pretend to be a master of the complicated phraseology and cross references which are necessary to a complete understanding of what was in the minds of those who made the Protocol on this point, but it is pretty clear from the explanation accompanying the Protocol, and also from the language of the Protocol itself, that it is not intended to allow for the revision of existing Peace Treaties or peace settlements, and if the compulsory arbitration which it provides was resorted to by anybody with regard to those settlements, all that the Court could do is not to give the suggested revision of the settlement but simply to interpret the law. As the plaintiffs will be appealing against the law, this will not be of much help to them, for the Court will reply that the law is the law. What is required in this matter is some 722 adequate provision for a peaceful revision of the law, where and when it may be found necessary. It may be just worth while to quote the language of the Report attached to the Protocol on this point. In dealing with the questions which may be referred to arbitration, the report says that," from the class of disputes relating to 'the interpretation of a treaty 'there may be excluded, for example, disputes as to the interpretation of certain specified classes of treaty such as political treaties, peace treaties, etc." If that be the interpretation which is properly set upon the Protocol, and I imagine it is—
§ Whereupon, the GENTLEMAN USHEE OF THE BLACK ROD being come with a Message, the Chairman left the Chair.
§ Mr. SPEAKER resumed the Chair.