§ Having given that description as to the yards which the Controller took over, I would now like to give some figures as to the output of the yards. In the fourth quarter of 1914 the merchant tonnage produced in the United Kingdom was 420,000 tons. This steadily fell, and it must be noted it was concurrent with the commencement of our great munition effort, until the fourth quarter of 1915, when it had fallen to 92,000 tons. It then began to rise, and the rise is as follows:
| Quarterly, 1916— | |
| 1st quarter | 95,000 tons |
| 2nd quarter | 106,000 tons |
| 3rd quarter | 125,000 tons |
| 4th quarter | 218,000 tons |
| and in 1917 — | |
| 1st quarter | 246,000 tons |
| 2nd quarter | 249,000 tons |
| 3rd quarter | 248,000 tons |
| and | 426,000 tons |
§ in the last quarter of 1917.
§ These figures refer to output in the British Isles alone.
§ In the fourth quarter in 1917, foreign construction was 512,000 tons, giving a total output for the world, excluding enemy countries, for the last quarter of last year, of 932,000 tons (Allied and enemy world). Now against that we have the losses due to enemy action and maritime risks, because it docs not matter which way we lose the tonnage, for the last quarter of last year of 1,200,000 tons, which was by far the lowest quarter of sinkings since the intensive submarine warfare was begun, far the lowest, and it looks as if this quarter was going to be lower still. So we have the fact that by an increase in output and by a decrease in sinkings, we reached in the last quarter 1021 of last year, on the average per month, the position that the Allies were within 100,000 tons a month of making good the world's losses due to enemy action and marine risk. Considering British losses and output alone, the proportionate deficiency was somewhat higher. We lost on the average 261,000 tons per month during the last quarter of 1917, that is British alone, and built 140,000 tons per month—a deficiency of 121,000 tons. We must all regret that the British position has suffered most among the Allies, but we have contributed the greatest naval effort of the Allies, and have sustained the greatest attack; and both these have made enormous demands on our shipyards—how enormous will be shown by this statement; and I do not think we will as a nation bemoan our scars or our naval efforts in this great War. I therefore repeat the crucial figures of this part of the statement. Hon. Members will find them in much more detail in the White Paper which is to be issued. I repeat that the net result of maritime risk and enemy action, whether by surface, air, or submarine craft, from the commencement of the War until the end of last year, is a net reduction of 2,500,000 tons of shipping, and that for the last quarter of last year, the Allied and neutrals are replacing 75 per cent. of the lost tonnage, or only 100,000 tons a month below losses from all causes. It is well within the capacity of the Allied yards—yes, even of our yards before very long—with the proper supply of material and of manpower, to entirely make good the world losses on present-day figures. I think on the whole that these figures will be more reassuring than the country expected, and indeed much more reassuring than the enemy people had been led to expect. The House will recollect that I have previously insisted that the shipbuilding and ship-preparing effort, both naval and mercantile, should be considered as a whole. The labour, material and plant are to a very large extent interchangeable. It is not sufficient to look at the output of tonnage only.