§ Having given the House a general picture of the effect of the submarine campaign on the tonnage position of the United Kingdom and the world, I would like, before dealing with the question of output of tonnage in United Kingdom yards, to ask the House to consider and try to envisage the task of the Controller's Department and the results, which have already been obtained. When the Controller took over there were over fifty large merchant vessels in various stages of construction definitely stopped for lack of sufficient material or labour to complete them. These vessels had already absorbed over 50,000 tons of steel, and many of them had been occupying valuable slips for long periods, some ever since the beginning of the War. It was necessary not only to clear the slips of those vessels, but also to absorb the material, which was in many cases congesting the whole shipyard. In one instance, which I have heard in various 1019 forms frequently quoted against the Department, there was a very large passenger vessel which could not be completed even as a cargo vessel under about two years, and it was decided to remove the material from the berths to make way for standard ships which could be of use within a reasonable period. I may add that one such vessel has already been launched from the slip, and another is nearly ready to launch. That instance, as I have said, in one form or another, has been frequently quoted against us, but I think the answer which I have given is entirely satisfactory, and I do not doubt that in other specific cases there would be equally satisfactory answers. For the first two years of war or more the shipyards of the country had lost their men and the work had become dislocated; hulls had been on the slips for very long periods and there was no material to finish them. Some yards had been filled with unsuitable work, and other vessels were lying in the water awaiting engines, but the engines had never been built, because in the early days of the War, and right up to 1917 the Admiralty had made use of the capacity of the engine shops for naval work of various kinds. Men who would row have been invaluable had enlisted in the Army or the Navy or had gone to munition works, and it is a fact—I do not think it will be denied—that there was great confusion in the shipbuilding industry, not due to the fault of the industry, but really due, not really due to anyone's fault, but owing to the circumstances existing from the conditions of war.
§ Output had been checked owing to urgent work to which firms were unaccustomed being placed with the same firm by different Departments, It is true that the urgency for naval vessels had, in the early days of the War, and, indeed, as late as 1917, made it necessary to place various types of these in practically every shipyard in the country. With the introduction of the Controller's Department it was immediately realised that this policy was bad for output as a whole. It was accordingly arranged to allocate yards, or to separate sections of yards, to one class of tonnage only. The result is that at the present day forty-seven large shipyards containing 209 berths are wholly engaged on ocean-going merchant vessels. Apart from the large private warship building establishments, which 1020 are obviously most suited for naval work, there are, in addition, eleven other shipyards suitable for large merchant tonnage which have at the present time some naval craft on the stocks. Wherever the accommodation is suitable, for ocean going merchant ships it is being cleared off gradually. When it is remembered that in the more poorly equipped shipyards such vessels are frequently fifteen months or longer under order before they are launched, it will be realised that much progress has been made in the way of simplifying the work of individual shipyards, and that the progress can only be gradual.