§ A few days after the battle commenced; not merely the Government, bat the Commanders in the field—we had not merely the Field Marshals, but all the Army Commanders present—were so convinced—and the same thing applied to the French—were so convinced of the importance of more complete strategic unity that they agreed to the appointment of General Foch to the Supreme Direction of the strategy of all the Allied Armies on the Western Front. May I just say one word about General Foch. It is not merely that he is one of the most brilliant soldiers in Europe. There is this to be said about him: General Foch is a man who, when we were attacked, and were in a similar plight at the first battle of Ypres, rushed the French Army there by every conceivable expedient—by buses, cabs, lorries, anything he could lay his hands upon. He crowded French divisions through, and undoubtedly helped to win that great battle. There is no question about the loyalty and comradeship of General Foch, and I have no doubt that this arrangement will be carried out not merely in the letter, but in the spirit. It is the most important decision that has been taken in reference to the coming battle. This strategic unity is, I submit to the House, a fundamental condition of victory. It can only be maintained by complete co-operation between the Governments and the Generals, and by something move than that—by unmistakable public opinion behind it. Why do I say that? For this reason: A Generalissimo in the ordinary and full sense of the term may be impracticable. There are three functions which a Generalissimo wields—the strategical, the tactical, and the administrative. What does the administrative mean? It means the control of the organisation, the appointment and dismissal of officers and generals, and that is a power which it is difficult, or almost impossible, to give to a general of another country with a national army. Therefore, in spite of all the arrangements made, unless there be not merely good will, but the knowledge that the public in France, Great Britain, and America will assist in co-ordination 1348 and in supporting the authorities in the supreme strategical plans chosen by the Governments, and in supporting the Governments in any action they may take to assert their authority, any arrangements made will be futile and mischievous. I make no apology for dwelling at some length upon this point. I have always felt that we were losing value and efficiency in, the Allied Armies through lack of co-ordination and concentration. We have sustained many disasters already through that, and we felt that we should encounter more unless this defect in our machinery were put right. Hitherto I regret that every effort at amendment has led to rather prolonged and very bitter controversy, and these difficulties, these great inherent difficulties, were themselves accentuated and aggravated. There were difficulties of carrying out plans and other obstacles, and, what is worse, invaluable time was lost. I entreat the nation, as a whole, to stand firm for a united control of the strategical operations of our Armies-at the front. We know how much depends upon unity and concentration. We are fighting a very powerful foe, who, in so far as he has triumphed, has triumphed mainly because of the superior unity and concentration of his strategic plans.
§ Mr. BILLINGNo political interference!