HC Deb 09 April 1918 vol 104 cc1345-7

The next step to which I should like to call the attention of the House is the material and dramatic assistance rendered by President Wilson in this emergency. It is one of the most important decisions in the War. In fact, the issue of the battle might very well be determined by that decision. In America there was a very considerable number of men in course of training, and the Allies look forward to having a large American Army in France in the Spring. It has taken longer than was anticipated to train those soldiers into the necessary divisional organisations. If America waited to complete these divisional organisations, it would not be possible for these fine troops, in any large numbers, to take part in this battle—in this campaign—although it might very well be the decisive battle of the War. This was, of course, one of the most serious disappointments from which the Allies have suffered. It is no use pretending it was not one of our chief causes of anxiety. We depended upon it largely to make up the defection of Russia.

For many reasons—reasons, perhaps, of transport, reasons connected with the time it takes, not merely to train troops and their officers, but to complete the necessary organisation—it was quite impossible to put into France the number of divisions which everyone had confidently expected would be there. Under the circumstances, we, therefore, submitted to the President of the United States of America a definite proposal. We had the advantage of having the Secretary of State for War for America in this country within two or three days after the battle had commenced. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Balfour) and I had a long conversation with him upon the whole situation, and we submitted to him certain recommendations which we had been advised to make to Mr. Baker and to the American Government On the strength of that conversation, we submitted proposals to President Wilson, with the strong support of Monsieur Clemenceau, to enable the combatant strength of the American Army to come into action during this battle, inasmuch as there was no hope of it coming in as a strong separate Army. By this decision, the American battalions will be brigaded with those of the Allies. This proposal was submitted by Lord Heading, on behalf of the British Government, to President Wilson, and President Wilson assented to the proposition without any hesitation, with the result that arrangements are now being made for the fighting strength of the American Army to be immediately brought to bear in this struggle—a struggle which is only now beginning—to this extent, and it is no small extent. It has stirred up the resolution and energy of America beyond anything which has yet occurred.

I must also call the attention of the House to another important decision taken by the Allied Governments. It became more obvious after the battle even than before that the Allied Armies were suffering from the fact that they were fighting as two separate Armies, and had to negotiate support with each other. Valuable time was thus lost. Some of us had for some time been deeply impressed by this peril and had done our best to avert it. But the inherent difficulties to be overcome are tremendous. I have repeatedly pointed thorn out to this House. There are national prejudices, national interests, professional prejudices, traditions. The inherent difficulties of getting two or three separate national armies to fight as one are almost insurmountable. It can only be done if public opinion in all these countries insists upon it as the one condition of success. Versailles was an effort as a remedy. How were the Versailles decisions carried out? The extent to which they were or were not carried out—this is not the time to inquire. I respectfully suggest to the House that no good would come at this stage in discussing that question. If anyone needed conviction as to the wisdom of that policy, this battle must have supplied it. The peril we passed through by establishing that conviction without challenge may, I think, be worth the price we have paid for it.