§ It shall be unlawful to employ troops in the case of any disturbance arising out of a trade dispute until all the available police forces, ordinary and special, both in the immediate and surrounding districts, have been called into requisition, and, in any case, no troops shall be so employed without the consent or application of three magistrates resident in the town or district in which the disturbance occurs.—[Mr. Keir Hardie.]
§ Clause brought up, and read the first time.
§ Mr. KEIR HARDIEI beg to move "That the Clause be read a second time."
I am very glad that the Chairman has suggested the arrangement of debating the three new Clauses together, otherwise the discussion would have overlapped and would have caused inconvenience. The suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman the Chairman is a good one, and it is acceptable to us. I desire to move this Amendment in as non-controversial spirit as possible, and I shall only refer to passing events in so far as it is necessary to illustrate my argument. It is now a matter of common knowledge that the employment of troops in connection with civil disturbances, whether connected with trade disputes or ordinary rioting, is only permissible when the resources of the civil authorities have failed or are in danger of being overpowered. That is the law and the theory, I believe. But our complaint is that the law is not always so observed. A classic case in support of that statement was the great railway dispute of 1911. On that occasion some 86,000 soldiers were ordered out before the I strike took place, and when there was no 995 disturbance or threat of disturbance as far as anybody knew of any kind. Not only so, but the theory of the law is that when soldiers are called out in connection with a civil disturbance, it shall only be at the request of the duly appointed magistrate, and that the troops, when brought out, shall be more or less under his control and direction. The chief magistrate in boroughs and the justices of the peace in counties have this power. It has never been repudiated, as far as I know, and it therefore stands at present, that not only where the military, in the case to which I have referred, called out before the strike took place, but they were not placed under the control of the proper civil authority. A well-known illustration of that is the case of Manchester, where the civil authorities were opposed to the troops being brought to the city, and where the troops were brought in without the chief magistrate, the chief constable, or any local authority being either consulted or having their favourable opinion obtained. The first part of the new Clause deals with that state of affairs, and proposes that troops should not be called out in connection with civil disputes, or rather industrial trade disputes—because we confine ourselves to that here—until all the available police forces, ordinary and special, both in the immediate and surrounding districts, have been called into requisition.
Those of us who are familiar with trade disputes and with disturbances in connection therewith can testify from our own personal experience that when there is a serious disturbance it is, as often as not, the result of soldiers being called in, and the danger arises from that as much as from any other cause. Therefore I suggest to the War Office that they should so amend the Act that some proof would require to be forthcoming that all the available civil forces have proved, or are likely to prove insufficient before the military are requisitioned. At the present time troops may be requisitioned by one magistrate, and we submit that that is too great a power to place in the hands of one man. There is the case of Featherstone, which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. Asquith) will recollect, and in which troops were requisitioned at the request of one magistrate, who, I understand, was the colliery owner. There was a strike at the colliery; there was some dispute about men loading coal, and one of the owners of that colliery, or 996 the adjoining colliery, as a magistrate, requisitioned for troops to be sent. If it had been an offence under the Mines Regulation Act the magistrate could not have sat on the bench to try the case, because the law provides that no interested person shall try a case. We submit that means should be adopted to prevent one man—who is very likely biassed and prejudiced, or is under nervous strain caused by his fearing damage being done by strikers—from having this power which magistrates now possess; and we, therefore, advise in this new Clause that no troops shall be employed in connection with trade disputes—that is to say, that no troops shall be employed without the consent or application of three magistrates resident in the town or district in which the disturbance occurs. We submit that that would safeguard the position, and prevent the ready resort to troops which of late has become far too common both in this country and in South Africa.
Under your ruling, Sir, I may also refer to the second Amendment, which deals with the equipment of troops during trade disputes. The armed forces of the State are there for the purpose of resisting the invasion of armed troops from some other country. If war is to be engaged in at all, that cannot be objected to. The invaders coming are armed, and those engaged to resist them are therefore entitled to use lethal weapons also, but in the case of a trade dispute, or disturbance arising therefrom, the so-called rioters or strikers are not armed, and therefore what we propose is that when it is necessary to call out the, forces of the Crown, to meet an unarmed mob of people that they shall not use such deadly weapons as modern rifles are known to be. It has happened on two occasions within my recollection that when troops have been called out in connection with a trade dispute, and where shooting has taken place, on both occasions the persons who were killed by shots fired by a soldier were neither strikers nor rioters. The present Secretary for War will remember the case of the two men who were killed at Featherstone. They were a considerable distance away from the scene of the disturbance, and, as a matter of fact, were returning home from a prayer meeting, one of them carrying his Bible under his arm. One of those two men was killed outright and the other died subsequently from his injuries.
In the other case where firing took place, once more the victims were not strikers or mixed up with the crowd. One 997 man was sitting on the wall of his own garden looking on at what was happening, and both men were shot dead. What we submit is that on an occasion such as that, when disturbance is either going on or is threatened, the troops called out should not be armed with rifles and other deadly weapons, but should be armed after the manner of the police. The batons used by the police are sufficient to quell or suppress any rioting that there is likely to be. We further suggest that when troops are so employed they shall not be subjected to military law, but shall be part and parcel of the ordinary civil force, and if they commit an offence that they shall not be tried by military court-martial, but by the ordinary law Courts of the land. We put forward these proposals, not to deprive the Government of its necessary power for suppressing disturbances where those exist, but we ask that instead of the force so used being military, with all that that implies, that it shall be civil. We believe we are thereby humanising the administration of the law, and I hope that whoever replies on behalf of the War Office will be able to give us an assurance that consideration will be given to the proposals which we are submitting, and that, if not now at this moment, at least at some no distant date, such reforms may be indicated as will give effect to the proposals which we are now submitting. I beg to move.
§ The PRIME MINISTERThe point which my hon. Friend has raised, and which is raised by one or two subsequent Amendments, is one the importance of which it is very difficult to exaggerate. As he has reminded me, I have had myself a very painful experience in regard to this matter. When I was Secretary of State for the Home Department, now a great many years ago, a disturbance took place in the West Riding of Yorkshire in connection with an industrial dispute, and the military were called in, the civil power in its ordinary resources being unable to cope with the situation, with the result that I think two persons lost their lives and three were injured. Some of them, at any rate, not only had no complicity in the rioting itself which was going on, but were innocent spectators. I had very little to do with the matter, although, and my hon. Friend has forgotten it now, for some years afterwards he used to lose no opportunity in his genial and agreeable way of describing me on the public platform as an assassin.
§ Mr. KEIR HARDIEI have not changed my mind on that event.
§ The PRIME MINISTERApart from that, it is a most serious and difficult question—that is to say, first of all, What are the occasions on which it is lawful and expedient for the civil power to invoke military assistance; and next, What are the duties and responsibilities of the military when, in response to such a call, they appear upon the scene of the disturbance? Now, Sir, I do not think the law, the common law, on the subject is at present in any doubt. It was stated very clearly in the Report of the Commission, which I appointed after that unfortunate disturbance at Featherstone about twenty years ago, on the authority of one of the greatest lawyers of our time, the late Lord Bowen, who was assisted also by the present Lord Chancellor (Lord Haldane), and I think it is, all lawyers will agree, locus classicus. I am not going to read many extracts, but the effect of their Report was this, and it puts the matter more clearly than it was put before or since:—
By the law of this country everyone is bound to aid in the suppression of riotous assemblages.Not of course in the suppression of trade disputes. It does not matter what may be the occasion that has led to the gathering and the action of that riotous assembly.The degree of force which may be used in their suppression depends on the nature of each riot, for the force used must always be moderated and proportioned to the circumstances of the case, and to the end to be attained.That is the general principle. Then as regards the military.Officers and soldiers are under no special privileges, and subject to no special responsibilities, as regards this principle of the law. A soldier for the purpose of establishing civil order is only a citizen armed in a particular manner. He cannot, because he is a soldier, excuse himself if without, any necessity he takes human life. The duty of magistrates and peace officers to summon or to abstain from summoning the assistance of the military depends in like manner on the necessities of the case. A soldier can only act by using his arms. The weapons he carries are deadly. To call for assistance against rioters from those who can only interpose tinder such grave conditions ought, of course, to be the last expedient of the civil authorities.I pause there to point out to my hon. Friend that in so far as this Amendment is intended to assert the doctrine, that if and so long and so far as the ordinary police resources at the disposal of the civil authority are reasonably adequate for the purpose, the military ought not to be called in, that is a mere affirmation of the common law, which does not require any statutory recognition or sanction. The law is, and always has been the same. On the other hand regrettable, and happily 999 exceptional as are the circumstances under which the aid of the military can be invoked, I must say I regard it as of great importance that it should never be supposed that they are exempt from the duty which lies on all citizens in this country to render assistance to the civil power, if and when the public peace is disturbed. It is a duty, as the Commissioners pointed out, imposed on them not as soldiers but as citizens. It is not because of their military status, it might almost be said despite their military status, but it is a duty which their military status does not absolve them from discharging. They must discharge it, if and when the occasion arises, like every other citizen to the best of their ability and with all the resources at their disposal.
§ Mr. WARDLEIf the military are called in, does not the officer then take charge, and has the military officer not the power to order his men to fire?
§ The PRIME MINISTERVery grave responsibility is thrown on the officer, but it is not enough for the magistrate to say to the military "shoot, use your lethal weapons against this crowd," to absolve the military officer from subsequent civil or even criminal proceedings. Very grave responsibility is thrown upon him, and he must exercise his own judgment, his independent judgment, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Of course, I agree the position of the soldier, who is subject to military law is one of the what has always been regarded, I will not call it an inconvenience, but is one of the incidents of the case. Technically, no doubt, a soldier qua citizen is entitled to exercise the same judgment. The fact that he is subject, to military law makes him, when he is obeying a command from the officer and imposes on him what you may call a double burden of responsibility, which in conceivable circumstances it might be very difficult for him adequately to discharge. But the truth is, in practice, these difficulties between officers and soldiers do not arise, or rarely, happily very rarely, and I do not think that any statutory definition could really render the law plainer or more equitable, or, in the long run, more humane than the law as it has been established by the practice of centuries in this country. In this matter we are all of us really on common 1000 ground. We deprecate the employment of the military as a thing which ought not to be resorted to except in the last extremity. On the other hand, salus populi suprema lex, and if disturbances leading to destruction of property and menace to life cannot be quelled in any other way by the ordinary resources at the disposal of the civil authority, I think in the whole interests of every class of the community it is in the highest degree undesirable to question the sanctity of the immemorial duty of soldiers as well as citizens to take their share in what is really a common burden.
Then my hon. Friend suggests that soldiers ought not to be armed with their ordinary weapons unless they are dealing with a riotous assembly which is similarly equipped. [An HON. MEMBER: "Ulster!"] Do not let us go into particulars. Let us deal with the thing, as far as we know it, in a general way. I confess I cannot agree with my hon. Friend on that point. It would be perfectly impracticable to carry it out. You might have a crowd of which a comparatively small number were armed with revolvers and so forth. Is the soldier then to say, "Only 10 per cent. of these people are armed like myself; therefore, I must not fire"? Or you might have a crowd armed with weapons which, though not small arms and ammunition, are quite as dangerous to life and limb—scythes, knives, and all sorts of things—or resorting, as unfortunately not infrequently happens, to arson on a large scale, burning houses and factories and shops. To say that when persons are engaged in these dangerous and, to the public, most injurious operations, the mere fact that they are not armed themselves or not wholly armed with lethal weapons should prevent the soldier from resorting to such means as are at his dispoal for the purpose of restoring peace, is, in my opinion, in point of reason, absolutely illogical, and, in point of practice, completely unworkable. Therefore, I do not think it is in the interests of any part of the community that a new practice of this kind should be established or recognised by the Statute law of the country. But while I say that, I associate myself, and I am sure we all do in every quarter of the House without any distinction of party, with the desire that the intervention of the military in civil affairs and civil disputes should be as rare and as exceptional as possible.
1001 In this country it is the business of the civil power and of Parliament, which sustains the civil power, to provide adequate resources for maintaining the peace. The police force of this country is happily a very different and a much more efficient thing than it was fifty or a hundred years ago, when most of the cases which are recorded in our books occurred. The power which the law now gives by Statute to the police authority in cases of emergency to borrow police force from other authorities, not only adjacent, but throughout the country, is a power which, when I was at the Home Office, I used constantly to urge on local authorities as the proper means of escape from the difficult situation they were in, and one which, I hope and believe, will be increasingly invoked and exercised by them. We all desire to sec the military kept out as far as possible, and as long as possible, from any intervention in civil affairs; but in the last resort it would be, in the interest of the community at large and of every class of the community, a great mistake to relieve those of our fellow citizens who are soldiers, and subject to the obligations of military law, of the obligations which rest upon every subject of the King in case of necessity to aid the civil power in the preservation and maintenance of the public peace.
I hope my hon. Friend will not press the new Clause. I think he is very well entitled to move it for the purpose of raising discussion and eliciting opinion; but, apart from the merits of the case, it is not really relevant to the Army (Annual) Act. We are dealing here with the discipline of the Army. Although you, Sir, have allowed the new Clause to be taken—and we must assume that it is within the ambit of the laws of order—if any new principle of this kind is to be thought desirable it should not be laid down in the Army Act, but should form the subject of a special enactment having regard to all the circumstances and contingencies which affect the subject-matter. I do not think, however, that this would be the proper time or place to introduce such an innovation. Apart from this more or less technical objection, I think my hon. Friend will agree that the doctrines I have laid down, which are sanctioned by all the great authorities on our common law, are doctrines which, if properly carried out, are intended to protect, and have the effect of protecting, on the one hand, the soldier from unnecessary intervention in civil strife, and, on the other hand, the community, 1002 which, if the soldier could not in the last resort be called in, might find itself at the mercy of mischievously disposed persons. I do not think that the law in this respect could be more satisfactorily formulated than it is at present, though I agree that the execution of it requires on the part, both of the central and of the local authority, the utmost delicacy of adjustment and discretion.
§ Viscount HELMSLEYThe Prime Minister has given us, as he always does, a very clear exposition of the existing law and of the rights of soldiers, and civilians. If I may borrow his own phraseology, we take note of the phrase that the military should be used only in the last possible resort. That, indeed, is the view held in all quarters of the House. Hon. Members opposite have sometimes seemed to accuse the Opposition of being not adverse to the use of troops in times of industrial disputes. That is a great libel on the Unionist party. When I heard an hon. Member on the Labour Benches the other day say that officers had no objection to shooting down trade unionists I had a very strong feeling of indignation at what, I am sure, was the grossest libel. Everyone objects to the use of troops in industrial disputes, except in case of gravest emergency and direst necessity. We all agree that in civil disturbances it is the police force which ought primarily to be used, and that the troops should be brought in only when it is absolutely essential. The Prime Minister has sketched very clearly the grave responsibility which rests upon officers and men in the Army when called out under these circumstances. It ought to be borne in mind that the higher the rank of the officer the greater is his responsibility, because he is responsible not only for his own actions, but also for the orders which be gives to his subordinates. Therefore, although the individual soldier has a degree of responsibility in the exercise of the force which he possesses—that is, by firing the rifle which is in his hand—the sergeant has a greater responsibility than the private, the captain than the sergeant, the colonel than the captain, and so on, because they are ordering a far greater use of force than any one individual can employ. In these circumstances, officers are put in a very difficult position indeed.
The Prime Minister did not make it quite clear what would be the position of, say, a junior officer who thought that excessive force was contemplated by his senior 1003 officer. If the junior officer refused to fire, I do not know whether he would be subject to court-martial, or, if he fired and it was afterwards found that excessive force had been used, whether he would be subject to civil law. If that is the case, and I believe it is, there can be no doubt that officers and men alike are in all matters of this kind in circumstances of great difficulty and responsibility. That being so, I think there is a great deal to be said for the argument raised by the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. Keir Hardie) that the force which they are called upon to exercise should, in the first instance, be limited. It is quite possible that the police, if there were a sufficient number of them, would in ordinary cases be able to cope with the rioting. The difficulty is in most cases that a sufficient number cannot be got on the spot in time, or that they cannot be kept in sufficient strength during the whole of the time—twenty-four or forty-eight hours, or whatever it may be—over which disturbances may take place, and therefore there is sudden need for relief. It seems to me that the calling in of the military, with all the force which the possession of the modern rifle with its very low trajectory involves, with nothing intermediate between the police force with their batons and the soldiers with their rifles, is a weakness, and unnecessarily puts officers and men into a position where they are faced with this great difficulty and responsibility.
It may be, and probably is necessary in the long run, to have the power up your sleeve, or in reserve, of calling upon the soldiers, with their weapons, in case of arson on a large scale, and things of that kind. But I see no reason why the law should not be so modified that that power would be kept in reserve and only brought up at the last extremity. If you had some provision such as the hon. Member suggests for arming the forces with something other than the modern rifle—I do not say whether batons or some other weapon would be the most appropriate arm—it would be more in the way of reinforcing the police force, and the officers would not be faced with the great difficulty of deciding whether or not to shoot. No one can deny that a force of disciplined men using any weapon whatever, even a stick, is probably able to cope with a considerably larger number of rioters, even though they are throwing bottles and glass, and missiles of that kind. I do not think that anything I have said really goes beyond what 1004 the Prime Minister stated. It cannot be controverted that the State must have the ultimate right to use every force in its power to maintain order, but I think it is well worth the consideration of the Government whether this intermediate step could not be taken, so that soldiers, when employed to reinforce the police, might in the first place be armed with weapons less powerful, less destructive, and rather more discriminating than the modern rifle.
§ 7.0 P.M.
§ Mr. WARDLEAs the Prime Minister has justly observed, there is a certain amount of inconvenience in taking this proposal on the Army (Annual) Bill, but this was our only opportunity of raising what, I think, has become a grave problem in these islands. The question is not exactly on all fours with what it used to be, or was in the days when Lord Justice Bowen gave the dicta to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred. Recent events have added a good deal of weight to the opinion, expressed by the Noble Lord opposite amongst others, that when you are dealing with questions of civil disturbance it is not sufficient to point to the fact that the law has said so-and-so for centuries, and that it is inconvenient to alter it at the present time. I cannot conceive even how on the Prime Minister's own statement he can leave the position where it is at the present time. When is the last resort? Who is to decide when the military are to be called in? That is one of the most important parts of the whole question. The Prime Minister, in his capacity as Secretary for War, this afternoon has not touched that point. At present one single magistrate can read the Riot Act and can call in the military. When he has called in the military he has ceased his connection with the dispute, and the whole question with the maintenance of order or of preventing disturbance is handed over to the military commander, with all the responsibility to which the Noble Lord opposite referred. From the point of view of the soldier, the officer, and the community, it seems to me that a change in the law is eminently desirable. This is not exactly a new question. It has been before the House on many occasions during the past few years. I moved a Resolution on one occasion on the Army Estimates which led to the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the use of the military in trade disputes. It led to an Order, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, being 1005 given—that is, that all the available police should be brought in in order to quell disturbances. We have still left the anachronism that one single magistrate can call up the military and be the means by which they can be called up. We have the soldier and the officer put in the anomalous position, a position of exceeding great difficulty—in which they have my utmost sympathy—although they have never yet, so far as I know, been called upon to face the consequences of their actions. [An HON. MEMBER: "Oh, yes!"] I do not know one single instance where a soldier or an officer has been put on trial for the use of unnecessary force, either in a trade dispute or in other similar disturbances. There may have been; I do not know.
§ Mr. J. WARDNot in the last twenty years.
§ Mr. WARDLETherefore, from the point, of view of the officer and the soldier, and from the point of view of everybody concerned, it seems to me desirable that the law should be inquired into, and altered. There is the further point, that although firearms have been used in trade disputes and civil disturbances of recent times it has always been the innocent person who has been the sufferer. Very seldom indeed have even the rioters, so to speak, come to suffer any penalty for any disturbances; it has been the innocent persons who have had to suffer. It seems to me that if by bringing this matter forward to-day we can convince the Government, and the House, that a change in the law is absolutely necessary in regard to this question of trade disputes and civil disputes of all kinds, we shall have done a most useful service both to the House, to the soldiers and officers, and to the community. It seems difficult to bring anyone to book under the present law as defined by Lord Justice Bowen, and also so eloquently by the Prime Minister this afternoon. Take the case of the railway dispute referred to by my hon. Friend. There the soldiers were brought out without a magistrate, without any disturbance, without any provocation of any kind whatever. Actually two days before the strike itself broke out, soldiers were planted all over the country against the wish and desire of many of the local authorities, notably in Manchester. If it be said that there was a twofold object in that, well and good. But the other object was never allowed to appear on the surface—not, at 1006 any rate, in that dispute. They were not used for the conveyance of food or of passengers. They were simply used for the protection of property.
We say that in that case the law was broken. It was broken by the Government by moving troops before there was a disturbance, before there was any provocation, before they had been requisitioned at all. If modern Governments are to support that principle and carry it out in practice in trade disputes, then we shall see the military becoming a force to quell trade disputes. The case I refer to is the only one where I know that it has been done, but having been done in that one case, if it is allowed to become a precedent, we do not know how often, and in what circumstances, troops may be used to overawe strikers or to prevent industrial disputes arising. What, then, is to be the deciding factor as to when troops shall be called in? We quite admit that our Amendment which says that three magistrates shall be consulted may not be an ideal suggestion, but it is certainly better than one magistrate, which is the present law. We submit that this whole question, involving as it has done the lives of innocent persons, and involving as it does the question of civil disturbance in these islands, is one which demands the attention of this House. We say that the military ought not to be called in unless it is absolutely impossible to quell disturbances otherwise, and that when they are called in, they shall not use these murderous firearms to kill innocent people who perhaps come from a distance and have nothing whatever to do with the dispute. It is perfectly true that this House must always reserve to itself the right to quell riot—we have never disputed that—when there are riots, and when there are disturbances force must be used—but let the force used be one which is not armed like soldiers to fire on unarmed mobs.
§ Colonel LOCKWOODI thoroughly agree with what the Prime Minister has said as to the impossibility of embodying any provision that when troops meet rioters they should not be armed unless the rioters were themselves armed. I am quite aware, and I am sure that everybody in the House is aware, of the danger of the small arms weapon of the present day being used in suppressing riots when it becomes necessary to use force. The lower the trajectory the greater the danger—not always perhaps. It is unfortunately the case that the men who 1007 have been killed in the few cases were men—at all events, some of them perfectly innocent. In one case it was a man who was in his own garden. In another, I believe, the man was returning from public worship. I venture to suggest, however, one subject that might be considered by the central authority, and it is this: Never to employ Infantry if that can possibly be avoided. Cavalry should always be used against a mob and turbulent persons. To begin with, the Cavalry frighten the mob, and the little weapon in their hands is not so dangerous as the small-arm rifle. A smaller number of Cavalry are more effective than a larger number of Infantry armed with rifles. I confess I am not sure that this rightly conies under the Army (Annual) Act, but seeing that this discussion has been allowed, the subject I am referring to is one that I have often thought ought to be impressed upon the authorities when they call upon the military to assist them. Again, I would urge that the central authority should, if possible, invariably use Cavalry in preference to Infantry.
§ Mr. WARDThe discussion has been extremely interesting. What makes it more interesting than any previous discussion of similar questions is the peculiar conditions that prevail to-day. We have had on some sixteen occasions, I think, of recent years, the military brought out for the purpose of interfering in civil disturbances. On no one of these sixteen occasions has there been the slightest objection on the part of the officers to use the military to shoot the crowd. No one has ever suggested in this House during the whole of the sixteen occasions that the officers were not doing their duty, a duty they were bound to perform! On each of these sixteen occasions it was poor men that were fired at. Recently—and that is what makes this discussion so interesting—it has been possible that the soldiers might be brought out to fire upon other than poor men.
§ The CHAIRMANThis makes me very doubtful whether I was right in permitting this Clause to be moved. I confess I was guided by a precedent of some years ago. Clearly, I could be proved to be wrong, and perhaps ought not to have allowed the Clause to be put, especially if the Debate goes into matters not pertinent to the Army (Annual) Bill—matters which come up for review in Committee of Supply.
§ Mr. WARD'I only want, Mr. Whitley, to make this point as to the different circumstances prevailing to-day. I am not going into details at all in any way, except to make the point of the extraordinary importance of this discussion on this occasion, because on the sixteen previous occasions in which the military has been brought out no objection has been offered by anybody to their being employed to shoot down those who disturb the peace. Recently, however, a different opinion has prevailed—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh no!"] —and that is what makes this occasion so interesting. There is no doubt that it is interesting further because, as my two hon. Friends have already stated, this seems to be a regular policy of introducing the military into civil disputes. I do not agree with the Resolution that is proposed because I do not see any difference between a labour disturbance and other disturbances. Why these Resolutions are being put to-day is that there does appear to be a policy of calling upon the military to interfere in labour disputes on almost every possible occasion. On 5th July we had the Manchester transit dispute. Police were sent from London and from Birmingham on the day of the dispute. A day later the C Squadron of the Scots Greys, stationed at York, were dispatched by special train without anyone asking for them. Clearly, it must be military heads who decide now what the military shall do.
§ Lord ROBERT CECILCertainly not—the Home Secretary is responsible.
§ Mr. WARDAs a matter of fact, on this occasion, the local authorities protested against the soldiers being introduced, yet they were sent there. A discussion took place in this House, and the Home Secretary said it was not with his assent. If hon. Members will look at the OFFICIAL REPORTS they will see that the Secretary of State for War took the whole responsibility upon himself. Then, in another case, on the 10th July, two squadrons of the i6th Lancers were sent—and it is interesting to know that the 16th Lancers were sent, and that there was no conscientious objection then. In the case of the great London strike, which began on the 11th August, 10,000 troops were held in readiness at Aldershot, and included the 19th Hussars and Irish Rifles, and three battalions of the Worcester regiment. A discussion took place in this House on the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman the 1009 Member for East Worcester, censuring the Government for not sending the soldiers sooner. That is the answer to the Noble Lord opposite, who suggests that the party to which he belongs are not favourable to the employment of soldiers. In this case the right hon. Gentleman was protesting that soldiers were not sent in greater numbers. On the 14th August, again, there was difficulty in the case of Liverpool. A street disturbance took place, and Cavalry were sent there in great numbers, and there were some 200 casualties.
§ The CHAIRMANThat seems to me to be purely a matter for Committee of Supply, as the hon. Member is criticising the action of the War Secretary or of the Home Secretary.
§ Mr. WARDI am drawing attention to a question of policy, and it seems to me I should be almost certain to be ruled out of order if I raised this question on the Estimates. I have said all I want to say about it, not for the purpose of saying anything that was out of order, but saying it within the compass of this discussion. This is a question of policy as it seems to me, and it seems that somebody at the War Office apparently decided on the policy of sending troops in the case of labour disputes, whether they are wanted or not, and it is to that that I most sincerely object. The speech of the Prime Minister was interesting, especially as it had reference to the Featherstone dispute. As we know, the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has been charged on more than one occasion by my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. Keir Hardie) with being an assassin.
§ Mr. KEIR HARDIEI say at once that that statement is inaccurate; that statement as applied to me is inaccurate.
§ Mr. WARDThen I withdraw it at once. I understood the hon. Member himself accepted it this afternoon. Now that he has at last withdrawn it, I most delightedly accept his statement With reference to the Featherstone dispute, if you look at the Motion that I have on the Paper it will be seen that my suggestion is:—
"It shall be unlawful to employ troops armed with rifles and cartridges in aid of the civil power to suppress riots and unlawful assemblies, unless the persons engaged in riots or unlawful assemblies, or some of them are themselves so armed, provided that in other cases where forces are requisitioned to support 1010 the civil authorities, they should be employed with such limited equipment as shall be prescribed by regulations to be made under this Section."
I myself agree, and I think the hon. Member who moved and seconded the proposal now before the House will agree, that there are cases besides labour disputes in which they ought to limit the employment of the military, and the first time that I was ever ridden down in a street was at an unemployment demonstration that had nothing to do with labour troubles. Therefore, if the Clause moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr was passed as it stands, it would not preclude the military being employed in such cases as that. I have also seen one election riot, and on that occasion I do not believe it was necessary to employ the armed forces, but they were so employed. The consequence of this Motion is to limit the employment of the military entirely to labour disputes, and that would be to destroy the principle that we are striving for on this occasion. But what is the most important part of the Resolution and discussion that so far has taken place? I should imagine it would be agreed upon all sides that it is that when the military are called in to assist the civil power they should be armed like civil police, unless they are met by armed resistance to the law, because, surely, it must be the object in calling in the military that you should punish the actual rioters, and that never can be done so long as you employ the present weapons supplied to the military? The Prime Minister referred to the judgment of those very able men who conducted that inquiry in the dispute at Featherstone upon all points except this one. He took their law relating to the liability of the soldier to be called in, and said there were no men he knew in this country whose opinions would be more reliable or that ought to be taken greater notice of than the men who inquired into that particular dispute. That was as far as the law is concerned and the liability of the soldier is concerned, but I only wish he had gone on a little further and agreed to take their advice with reference to the weapons that ought to be used by the military when called in, and even at the risk of boring the House I must call attention to the judgment of these able men in reference to the calling in of the military and in reference to the particular point in which the soldier should be equipped.
1011 The Prime Minister has referred to this Report, and therefore I expect I shall be in order in referring to it for a moment myself. It is rather remarkable that on this occasion, when the military were called in, they were called in clearly with the intention of shooting somebody. They had no intention whatever to overcome the riots, because although there were thousands of people rioting there were only twenty-five soldiers brought on the scene. It is clearly seen at once that they were brought on the scene, just as you would bring a firing party to an execution, for no other purpose at all, and unfortunately the order was given for them to fire. In discussing the question relating to the kind of weapon that should be employed, the Commissioners say:—
A soldier can only act by using his arms. The weapons he curries are deadly. They cannot be employed at all without danger to life and limb, and, in these days of improved rifles and perfected ammunition, without some risk of injuring distant and possibly innocent bystanders. To call for assistance against rioters from those who can only interpose, under such grave conditions, ought, of course, to be the last expedient of the civil authorities.Then, in reference to the way in which the soldier should be called upon they say they took the advice of Sir Redvers Buller, and he pointed out the almost impossibility of arming the soldier with one weapon for the purposes of soldiering and then arming him with another weapon for civil disputes and disturbances, and for that reason he gave most strong evidence in this case against the employment of the military, except with a rifle that will kill a man at a couple of miles, and on this occasion, as a matter of fact, both the men were some three-quarters of a mile away from the scene of the disturbance, and actually, so far as we know, did not know there were any soldiers present or any disturbance in the neighbourhood. They dealt with Sir Redvers Bullet's evidence in their final paragraph, and they say:—The second point to which we directed the attention of Sir Redvers Buller was as to the possibility and expediency, when troops were about to act against the mob of arming the soldiers with some weapon less formidable than the modern rifle and its cartridge. Here again the judgment of Sir Redvers Buller is adverse to any change on the ground of the practical difficulty of providing different arms or ammunition to be used by troops on different occasions, and of instructing the troops in such use. He prefers to rest upon the simpler principle that troops ought not to be called upon except in grave emergency, and if summoned, he believes that it is better for them to be armed in the usual way.Now, if we were sure that they would only be called upon to serve in civil disturbances only in grave necessity, then Sir 1012 Redvers Buller's view and the military view as to the arming of the soldier would be all right, but as I have explained, we are gradually getting used to the interference of the military in our labour disputes as part of the regular policy of the executive Government. The Commissioners go on to say:—It would be beyond the capacity of our Commission to examine at length into this subject, but we are so impressed with the danger of using the modern rifle and cartridge with its full charge of powder against crowds in thickly populated districts where there are close lying collieries and villages, that we cannot rest content that the point should be left without further investigation. We think that the attention of the military authorities should be formally called to the question whether special and less dangerous arms or ammunition might not conveniently be used by troops when employed for the purpose of suppressing riots.That is the unanimous Report of the Commission whose verdict upon the law and usage relating to the subject the Prime Minister unqualifiedly accepts. This Report suggests that there ought to be some other weapon when the military are called upon such as is put forward in my Clause on the Paper. The Report I refer to was presented to Parliament twenty solid years ago, when it was never contemplated that troops would be used so often as they have been used since for this particular purpose. In spite of all the military evidence against the employment of the soldier with his ordinary weapon, this Report has been absolutely ignored up to date, and we are entitled to ask whether it is not possible after this defying of military evidence, that some further investigation such as is suggested by this Committee might not be undertaken by someone to prescribe some less deadly, and for the purpose useless, weapon, because naturally a soldier seeing a rioter in front of him fires over his head, as he does not want to kill his own countryman. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Yes, I only wish that you recognised that always. The soldier does not wish to kill his own countrymen, and the consequence is that he raises his rifle, and no officer can compel him to fire low. The consequence is that innocent people are killed a mile away. That has actually happened in every case where the military have been called upon to fire. It has not been in those cases the actual rioter you wanted to punish who has been punished, but some innocent person miles away. Under the circumstances I suggest that if is time something was done to alter the usage in this matter. With reference to these Amendments I would like to say a word or two. I do not like the term 1013 "disturbance" in the Resolution put forward by the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. Keir Hardie), because I do not think it is good enough. I want it to be a distinct riot before the military interfere with the ordinary policeman's duty. In the second Resolution the words are:—Provided that in such cases where troops are employed they shall not be subject to military law and shall have such limited equipment as shall be prescribed for any police or civil force used for the purpose.That will not do, as the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil will see when I mention that the equipment of the police in Ireland is exactly the same rifle as the soldier in this country. This law applies to Ireland, just as much as it does to England. It must be some different rule and regulation than the ordinary weapon supplied to the police, because in the case of Ireland you would still need the fully equipped rifle as the weapon to be used for a disturbance. It must be some decision arrived at by a responsible authority as to the means by which the soldier can be employed on these occasions. We have heard something about the law on the subject. We know what the law is so far as the private is concerned. We have had one case which settled this problem so far as we are concerned on these benches. While no officer has objected to shoot at our people, there has been one case where the common soldier refused to fire, and it was at Llanelly. That is one case where the soldier refused, and he was arrested and court-martialled. He was not called up to the War Office for an explanation.
§ The CHAIRMANI do not really see how this comes in. The hon. Member is very ingenious in working round, but I do not see that this question comes in on the Clause we are now discussing.
§ Mr. WARDIt is rather difficult, Mr. Chairman, to conform to the very narrow ruling which has been given relating to these matters. I do not know that it is a question of policy whether the soldier is to have a conscience in the future, but I am not going to discuss that matter any further. I only wish to say that if there is to be any latitude or any limitation either of responsibility or of conscience or honour relating to these matters, we claim for the common soldier the same as we claim for the officer.
§ Mr. LEEI do not think the hon. Member who has just sat down has strengthened his case by the insinuation, and, indeed, the assertion he has made that the officers of the Army have no objection to shooting down trade unionists.
§ Mr. LEEThe hon. Member for Stoke evidently is not conversant with the history of this matter. What possible justification has he for uttering such a gross libel upon the officers of a great Service? I cannot imagine what object he can have in view. I do not know how the hon. Member professes to know that no officer has ever made an objection, because there are well-known cases where objection has been made.
§ Mr. OUTHWAITEThey did not object at Johannesburg.
§ Mr. LEEThere is the well-known case of the Bristol riots, where an officer who refused to shoot was court-martialled for his refusal, and he committed suicide. [An HON. MEMBER: "HOW long ago is that?"] I only wish to meet this libel by actual instances. I do not know what authority the hon. Member for Stoke has for speaking on behalf of the Army, and I do not know why he professes to speak on behalf of the private soldier.
§ Mr. LEEThe hon. Member professes to speak on behalf of the private soldier, and I am not aware that he has any special claim to do so.
§ Mr. LEEI do not know why the hon. Member professes to speak for the soldier, but I do protest against this libel on the officers of the Army that they are willing—I think he almost went as far as to say anxious—[HON. MEMBERS: "No!"]— that they raised no objection—
§ The CHAIRMANThe hon. Member has no right to make a remark of that kind. The proper way to interrupt is to rise quietly and wait until the hon. Member in possession gives way. [An HON. MEMBER: "He did rise!"] The hon. Member did not rise in the customary way. I am quite sure if he had risen to make a personal explanation the hon. Member for 1015 Fareham would at once have given way. It would save a great deal of trouble if hon. Members would observe that custom.
§ Mr. LEEI do resent this gross libel upon the officers of the Army. Apart from everything else, it surely must be apparent to the hon. Member that officers could have no possible object in undertaking a duty of this kind, or any possible gratification in seeing the red blood flow. Men who have seen war and who know what it means are not attracted by the sight of bloodshed. Apart from that, what possible inducement could an officer have in placing himself in the position described so clearly by the Prime Minister where he would be faced on the one hand with the possibility of being tried by court-martial for not discharging his duty and using force, or, on the other hand, in the case of using more force than is necessary, being tried by a jury for manslaughter and even for murder. In every case they are bound to be subjected to a legal inquiry of a harassing character, and I cannot believe that any officer who was not almost demented could wish to place himself in a predicament of that kind, or who would not avoid taking part in any such duty. At any rate, I can claim to have some personal knowledge of what the feeling of officers are. When I first joined the Service I remember that one of the first things we discussed at the officers' mess was the almost intolerable character of duty of this kind. I know that the possibility of having to engage in a duty of this kind is regarded not only with loathing, but even with apprehension by the officers.
There is a point raised in this Amendment with regard to the magistrates, which I think is one of considerable substance. I know, again, from hearing this matter discussed recently that what officers feel is that they may be placed in this terrible position in the eyes of the law owing to the action of a single magistrate who may not have a very clear head himself, being able to call upon them, in a moment of panic, to intervene and use force when it may not be necessary. I think there is a point of substance in the Amendments that have been put down by the hon. Member below the Gangway to the effect that a decision of this character should not be left in the hands of one individual. I do not know that I am prepared to go so far as to say that you should always have three magistrates, because it might often 1016 be difficult to get three magistrates together at one particular time. I do not wish to commit myself on this matter, because I have not had an opportunity of giving it sufficient consideration, but I think there might be something to be said for an Amendment requiring that the request for the use of force by the military should be given not by one magistrate, but by not less than two. At any rate, I feel sure that an alteration of that character would be warmly supported by officers. I know that the chief apprehension in that matter is as to how the magistrate is going to behave. It is a fact that a particular officer of considerable character, who knew his business, when placed in a position of that kind, gave instructions to his subordinate that in case there was trouble, and the magistrate was inclined to use force, in the first place, the person of the magistrate should be secured in the event of persons going to extremities, and that he should be required by force, if necessary, to give his order in writing. Therefore, I think there is a good deal in the general spirit of the Amendment which has been moved upon that point. I do not feel competent to intervene in great questions of law, but I do feel competent to rise and to repudiate, and to repudiate with indignation and with some knowledge, the gross libel which the hon. Member for Stoke has made against the officers of the Army without any kind of knowledge and without any kind of justification.
§ Mr. J. H. THOMASI do not subscribe to the doctrine that an officer or private should discriminate in matters of this description. I frankly recognise that if it is necessary at any time to call in the Army, the officer and private have no right to discriminate and do other than obey orders. I know that some of my hon. Friends do not agree with me, but I am stating my own opinion quite frankly, and I say deliberately that, once the power is given to discriminate as between the merits of one dispute and another, there is no limit, and there is an end of discipline and everything else. The primary object of this Amendment is to ask the Government to hold the balance evenly as between employer and employé. We frankly recognise that in the recent shooting, not only have innocent persons been killed, but in the majority of cases the real persons in dispute, namely, the trade unionists themselves, are not the people responsible for the rioting and for 1017 the trouble. Therefore, we say that in an industrial dispute between employer and employé, whatever may be the merits of it, the worker and, indeed, the citizen have a right to demand that the Government shall hold the balance evenly as between the two parties. Unfortunately in many recent disputes that has not been done.
The Prime Minister emphasised his opinion that the military should not be called out except as a last resort, but on the Thursday prior to the railway strike, when the railwaymen themselves asked the railway directors to meet them, and when they had actually said to the Board of Trade, "If you can bring about a meeting, there will be no dispute," the railway companies had a written authority from the Government that the military would be called out. That was two days before the strike was declared, and, as a matter of actual fact, the troops were out guarding the stations two days prior to the dispute taking place. Supposing the railwaymen who were not then out on strike and who were then advised by their leaders that there might be a possibility of avoiding a strike, had said, when they were called upon to carry the troops from place to place, "No, these troops are unnecessary; they are being called out to defeat us, and we will refuse to carry them," that would have been likely under those circumstances to have precipitated the whole matter. For that reason, I say that, according to the policy laid down by the Prime Minister himself, the troops were not called out as a last resort, but were called out as a first resort. We then come to the question of the impartiality of the troops in these matters. I believe it is true to say that the shooting at Liverpool was primarily brought about, not because of a riot and the troops being called in, but because the troops were being used on the side of the employers and was resented by the men in dispute. We say, just as it is likely that men would lose their heads at the moment, it is not unreasonable to suppose that magistrates may lose their heads. Is it not fair and equitable—is it not, indeed, a commonsense suggestion—that in a grave and important matter of this description it should not be left to one magistrate to determine the position, but that at least there should be three magistrates who should be called in before it is necessary to bring in the troops? The hon. Gentleman opposite anticipates some trouble in getting more than one magistrate.
§ Mr. THOMASSurely the hon. Gentleman will admit that a dispute in which it was likely that the troops would be necessary would not occur in some out-of-the-way place where there were really no magistrates! Apply yourself to the practical circumstances and I cannot conceive any place where it would be likely that troops would be called out in which it would not be an easy matter to obtain at least three magistrates. In the next part of the Amendment we ask that even if troops are called out they should not be armed with the deadly weapon which we all know results disastrously to the individual. My hon. Friend (Mr. W. Thorne) also points out that they should not be subject to mutiny law. The hon. Gentleman says that the officers revolt at being called upon to do this, and I agree, but surely he will also agree that the men themselves revolt at being called upon to do it [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] Surely it cannot be suggested that the officer has more compunction in this matter than the men. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Unfortunately there has been more recruiting when trade disputes have taken place than at any other period, and in actual practice we find that those who themselves probably a few years before were in that occupation are the very men who are called out to shoot down their fellows. I submit that the proposal that is being made in this case is a practical proposal. It at least reduces the risk to the absolute minimum. It ensures that no one individual shall be called upon to take the grave responsibility that he is called upon to take to-day, and it also says that no unarmed and even peaceful citizen shall be shot down by people armed as soldiers are armed to-day. I do not accuse the Opposition of wanting to shoot down trade unionists, but I do say, when you yourselves try to discriminate between circumstances in which officers should act, that discrimination should be equally applicable to trade disputes, but you disagree.
§ Lord ROBERT CECILNo.
§ Mr. THOMASBut you did.
§ Lord ROBERT CECILNo.
§ Mr. THOMASIt has been made abundantly clear from that side that there are certain circumstances in which officers and men would be justified in refusing to do their duty. [HON. MEMBERS: "Certainly!"] We say that those circumstances 1019 which you have in your mind are equally applicable to a trade dispute, and we go further and say, if that policy is developed, it cannot do other than lead to chaos and disaster.
§ Mr. MILDMAYI think we are entitled to reinforce the protest made by my hon. Friend below me (Mr. Lee) against the attempt which was made by the hon. Member for Stoke to compare the repugnance of the Army to embark on hostilities in Ireland with their readiness to take part in an industrial dispute. It is quite true that the latter obligation is recognised among them much against their will, because they simply, as my hon. Friend said, loathe that kind of work. It must not be forgotten that in so assisting the police they are not opposing by force of arms the undoubted right of workmen not to dispose of their labour except under conditions acceptable to themselves, for a strike, as we all know, is a legal proceeding. The business of the Army at such times is to assist in protecting life and property from the violence, not necessarily of strikers, but of hooligans and of rioters, and a very uncongenial duty that is. The Army, officers and men, recognise, as I think has been recently made quite clear, their obligation to act in a similar sense in Ulster or anywhere else. I recognise the great moderation of the last speaker, and I agree with much of what he said. I feel most strongly that we are doing wrong in trying, as the tendency is now, in consequence of what has happened recently, to discriminate so much as to what is the duty of the Army. I think we are wrong in trying to define, as many Amendments do try to define, what shall be the obligations of the Army, and I should be inclined to vote against the first Amendment on the Paper in the name of the hon. Member for Dulwich (Mr. F. Hall), which was out of order, just as I would vote against this Amendment. I would oppose any effort to seek to define too strictly in the Army (Annual) Act or elsewhere the duties of the Army under different circumstances, and on that account I am strongly opposed to this Amendment.
§ 8.0 P.M.
§ Mr. PIRIEI wish to voice my agreement with the last speaker. I do not wish the protest to be made only from the Opposition against the cruel aspersions of my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke on the attitude of the Army. I consider that latterly the Army has been far more sinned 1020 against than sinning, and it is time this House recognised to a far greater extent than it has hitherto recognised what it owes to the Army and what it owes to the honour of the Army. It should recognise what the country owes to both Services, to both the Army and the Navy, from the admiral to the sailor, and from the field-marshal to the private. I do not in the least discriminate between them. I know that the Army would carry out their orders whenever called upon to do so. Every one, of course, has in mind recent events, but I venture to assert, in connection with them, that no breach of discipline was committed by the Army. When a soldier or sailor enters the Service he gives his life, his honour, and his conscience to his country—
§ The CHAIRMANI am sorry to say that hon. Members generally have shown me that I was wrong in admitting this Clause as in order. The Debate is getting further and further away from the subject-matter under discussion, and is not proper to the Army (Annual) Bill. I think it may be my duty under these circumstances not to put the Question to the House.
§ Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALDMay I submit a point of Order. Quito apart from the speeches delivered and the points raised, some partly out of order, and some partly in order, have they not been illustrations of the power exercised by the War Office, and showing that troops who have to do these things have done so because it is possible legally for them to do them? We are trying to raise this question, and we cannot do it except as an Amendment to the Army (Annual) Bill, and, although the speakers may have been unfortunate in their utterances, as a matter of fact the Amendment itself is in order, and the matter could not be dealt with in any way except on the Army (Annual) Bill.
§ The CHAIRMANThat is exactly the point which weighed with me this morning when I was giving careful consideration to the Amendment, and it was the reason I called upon the hon. Member to move it. But where it appears in the course of a Debate to the Chairman that a matter is out of order and not relevant to the question before the Committee, it is his duty to withdraw it from the consideration of the Committee. Of course, I am reluctant to take that step unless, I am obliged, but it is clearly my duty under the Orders of the House to do so. I would 1021 suggest to the Committee that they should keep strictly, as the Mover did, to the actual point in the new Clause, or else that the Committee should come to a decision on the matter.
§ Mr. KEIR HARDIEMay I ask whether an Amendment previously submitted to the Committee, and accepted by you, can now be ruled out of order? I may add, further, that as far as we are concerned, being partly responsible for the Amendment, we are prepared to proceed to a Division.
§ The CHAIRMANWhere an Amendment or a Motion has been put to the Committee or the House and it appears thereafter to the Chair that it is not in order, it is the duty of the Chair to withdraw it from the consideration of the Committee. But, as I said, I am reluctant to exercise that duty unless I am obliged to do it by the course of the Debate. The hon. Member was dealing with a point which should be raised on the Army Estimates, and ho was discussing a question that has no bearing at all on the matter before the Committee.
§ Mr. PIRIEI will conclude my speech with a point absolutely germane to the Motion before the House. I believe that the Army—and in that I put on the same level the private soldier and the officer, for they both have the same humane feelings and are both animated by the same sense of discipline—would welcome this new Clause. But in view of the excited state of the whole country, I, hold that it might be better to leave the Act unaltered until the country is in a condition to take a much more sane view of matters as a whole than it is at the present time.
§ Colonel BURNThis is one of the rare occasions on which I find myself in agreement with the Prime Minister. I quite concur with his remarks on this matter. It seems to me that hon. Members who sit on the Labour Benches have brought forward arguments, suggesting that it is a pleasure to officers and soldiers to interfere in any strike. I should like to say, as a soldier, that there is no duty more distasteful to the officer or the soldier than having to interfere in any strike disturbance. A strike is a perfectly legitimate business, and the Army does not operate against strikers. It operates against those hooligans and undesirables who come up on these occasions and really create the disturbance. The hon. Member for Hanley 1022 (Mr. Outhwaite) interjected a remark regarding the conduct of the military in the Johannesburg strike. I know something about that because the regiment in which I had the honour of serving the best years of my life was employed to suppress the strikes there. I know that the officers and men loathed and disliked the part they had to take in these strikes far more than the troublous times they had to go through in the South African War, because in Johannesburg were collected all the riff-raff and hooligans.
§ The CHAIRMANThat, again, is going altogether away from the subject before the Committee, which has nothing to do with Johannesburg.
§ Colonel BURNIt was only the principle that I was speaking about, and I was replying to an interjection by the hon. Member for Hanley. I quite agree that it is a very great responsibility to decide whether the military are to be employed or not. It is a great responsibility to be left to one man, and, while I do not think that this Clause is necessary or feasible, I hold there is much to be said for getting, not only one magistrate, but two or more, if it is possible, in order to decide whether the troops shall be employed to suppress any disturbance. But it must be remembered that these disturbances arise very suddenly, and a decision has to be taken without any delay. It must, in such a case, be left to the magistrate who is available at the time. As regards the arming of the men, it is difficult to see how, in the event of troops being ordered to suppress disturbances, they could have less than their arms and ammunition. We know that nothing is more distasteful to them than having to fire, and it is only as a very last resource that they do fire ball ammunition. The responsibility that is cast upon an officer in command of the troops is very grave and serious. Every officer in the British Army realises that, and no one would give an order to his men to fire unless they felt it was absolutely necessary for the peace of the country. I do not think that the Infantry, at any rate, should be sent to suppress disturbances without ball ammunition. How could soldiers be expected to be armed with any other weapon than those to which they are accustomed? I am very much in favour of the suggestion of my right hon. Friend the Member for the Epping Division (Colonel Lockwood), that wherever possible Cavalry should be employed, because in those cases the moral 1023 effect of Cavalry is very great. The mere presence certainly goes far towards suppressing any rising. At the same time, there is no duty more trying or more harassing to the Cavalry than to having to be on the spot under these trying conditions, with a mob in a very excited state. They are mounted, and they are only dismounted to fire under exceptional circumstances. I therefore think it is wise, wherever possible, to employ Cavalry for this duty.
§ Mr. KEIR HARDIErose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put"; but the Chairman withheld his assent, as it appeared to him that the Committee were now prepared to come to a decision without that Motion. [HON. MEMBERS: "No. no!"] Debate resumed.
§ Colonel BURNI am perfectly certain that the Army, from the Commander-in-Chief down to the youngest recruit, would be very glad to know that they are not going to be employed in the suppression of civil disturbances, but they are ready whenever called upon to take their Place, however distasteful it may be, and to do their duty. I know I can speak for the Army, and say that whatever legitimate duty they are told to perform will be carried out, and that will always be the case so long as we exist as a nation.
It being a Quarter past Eight of the clock, further Proceeding was postponed without Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 4.