§ (1) All claims for unemployment benefit under this Part of this Act, and all questions whether the statutory conditions are fulfilled in the case of any workman claiming such benefit, or whether those conditions continue to be fulfilled in the case of a workman in receipt of such benefit, or whether a workman is disqualified for receiving or continuing to receive such benefit, or otherwise arising in connection with such claims, shall be determined by one of the officers appointed under this Part of this Act for determining such claims for benefit (in this Act referred to as "Insurance Officers"):
§ Provided that—
- (a) in any case where unemployment benefit is refused or is stopped, the workman may require the insurance officer to report the matter to a court of referees constituted in accordance with this Part of this Act, and the referees after considering the circumstances may make to the insurance officer such recommendations on the case as they may think proper. If the insurance officer disagrees with any such recommendation he shall, if so requested by the referees, refer the recommendation, with his reasons for disagreement, to an umpire appointed under this Part of this Act, whose decision shall be final and conclusive;
- (b) the insurance officer in any case in which he considers it expedient to do so may, instead of himself determining the claim or question, refer
1749 it to a court of referees, who shall in such case determine the question, and the decision of the court shall be final and conclusive.
§ (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing an insurance officer or umpire, or a court of referees, on new facts being brought to his or their knowledge, revising a decision or recommendation given in any particular case, but where any such revision is made, the revised decision or recommendation shall have effect as if it had been an original decision or recommendation, and the foregoing provisions of this section shall apply accordingly.
§ (3) The Arbitration Act, 1889, shall not apply to proceedings under this section except so far as it may be applied by regulations under this Part of this Act.
§ (4) For the purposes of proceedings under this section in Ireland regulations may apply all or any of the provisions of the Common Law Procedure (Ireland) Act, 1856, with respect to arbitration.
§ Mr. BARNESI beg to move in Sub-section (1) after the word "determined" ["shall be determined by one of the officers appointed under this part of this Act"] to insert the words "by the trade union in those cases where the benefit is paid by the trade union under this part of this Act, and in other cases."
I might point out that, of course, most of the insured trades would probably be administered under Clause 79, and, therefore, provision is made for what I want in Clause 79, so far as those trade unions are concerned who adopt the Act. There may, however, be trade unions who do not adopt the Act so far as Clause 79 is concerned. There are those unions who are only going to get a subsidy under this part of the Act, and in those cases, of course, it would be absurd to expect every applicant for unemployment benefit to make an individual claim. The object of my Amendment, therefore, is to protect those unions who are only going to get a subsidy under the Act in the ordinary carrying out of their own business. They, themselves, will determine the conditions under which their members are entitled to unemployment pay, and they will recover from the insurance officers in the usual way.
§ Sir J. SIMONI hope my hon. Friend will see his way to withdraw this proposal, because we feel obliged to resist it. Let me first make plain that Clause 64 has 1750 not got any damaging effect upon Clauses 79 or 80. Clause 64 deals with a claim for unemployment benefit, and that is a claim which the workman who is within the scheme makes direct to the insurance officer. Then, as the Committee probably knows, in Clause 79 we propose an arrangement which has a certain analogy to the arrangement under Part I. of the Bill where sickness benefit is worked through and with the assistance of the friendly societies. We propose under Clause 79 in a corresponding way that in certain cases and under proper safeguards, an association, such as a trade union, which already pays unemployment benefit to its members may continue to pay unemployment benefit to its members and may get a corresponding grant from the Central Fund. In those cases, therefore, the trade union workman will not go direct to the insurance officer but will continue to draw from his trade union. There will, from time to time, be an account kept and a proper audit effected, and grants will be made to the trade union in indemnity of what it has done. My hon. Friend proposes that the trade union should be the judge as to whether the workman is or is not within the Act, not in connection with Clause 79 or 80, but under Clause 64.
§ Mr. BARNESIf Clauses 79 and 80 are quite self-contained and leave the trade unions without supervision, then I am quite satisfied.
§ Sir J. SIMONI think the hon. Gentleman will see, if he follows me, that Clause 64 deals with claims for unemployment benefits, and Clause 79 deals with the payment of grants in lieu of paying unemployment benefit. I can assure him on its true Construction the provision in Clause 64 has no application to Clause 79 at all. I think that really meets the hon. Member's point.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr. BUXTONI beg to move in Sub-section (1), paragraph (a) after the word "stopped" ["where unemployment benefit is refused or is stopped"] to insert the words "or where the amount of the benefit allowed is not in accordance with the claim."
This is really a drafting Amendment. It might be held as it stands without these words, "or where the amount of the benefit allowed is not in accordance with the claim," a workman could only have an 1751 appeal where the whole of the benefit had been refused. We think it only fair to the man claiming the benefit that he should also have the right of appeal in reference to a part of the benefit. The insurance officer might say he should have rather less than he claimed. It is purely a drafting Amendment.
§ Question, "That those words be there inserted," put, and agreed to.
§ Mr. BAIRDI beg to move in Sub-section (1), paragraph (a), to leave out the words "to the insurance officer such recommendations on," and to insert instead thereof the words "such award in."
The object of this Amendment is practically to eliminate the umpire. We are setting up a very competent Court of Referees on which both the employers and the workmen are represented, and the chairman of which is appointed by the Board of Trade, and it seems rather strange, if the insurance officer is not able to decide a point, that body should not be competent to decide it finally without having it still further referred to an umpire. Two points arise on the Amendment. First, there will be very great delay which might entail considerable hardship on the man who has to wait for his case to be settled. Secondly, it seems rather a curious thing that it should be competent for the insurance officer to refuse to accept the decision of the Court of Referees if it does not happen to suit him, and to insist on the matter being still further referred to an umpire. That seems to make the decision of the Court of Referees a rather superfluous one. Considering how they are constituted from a panel of representatives of both sides with an independent chairman, it does seem they ought to be sufficient to carry out the work. I went to Strasburg last Easter to see how the unemployment scheme worked there, and I found they had precisely this kind of board of referees composed exactly as this is composed, and there was no necessity whatever in the experience of the Strasburg Unemployment Bureau for anything additional Consequently, I trust the Government will see their way to omitting these words for the purpose of limiting the amount of machinery to the lowest possible margin sufficient to discharge the duties, and at the same time to secure that any difficulties should be settled with the least possible delay.
Mr. BUXTONThere are two points really in connection with this matter raised by the hon. Member and also by the Amendment in which the hon. Member for Dudley (Sir A. Griffith-Boscawen) is interested. I have had an opportunity of talking it over with the hon. Member for Dudley. In the first place, there is the question whether it would be advantageous or not that an apepal should be had from the referees to the umpire, and, assuming that is so, there is in the second place the question whether some provision should not be made for the delay which necessarily may take place and during which the workman would be out of benefit. Taking the last point first, I would like to explain how matters stand. A workman is unemployed, and he applies for his benefit. The insurance officer agrees he should receive his benefit, and no further step is taken; the man gets his benefit. If the insurance officer for any reason thinks the man should not receive his benefit, there is an appeal on the part of the man to the referees. If the referees agree with the view of the insurance officer that the man should not receive his benefit, there is no further step and no further appeal; but, in the event of the referees finding that the man is entitled to his benefit, and the insurance officer is not convinced or converted by their arguments, and still feels the man is not entitled to the benefit, the insurance officer can appeal to the umpire, and in that event the umpire gives the final decision. I do no think it is any reflection on the referees that there should be an appeal on behalf of the insurance officer as against their decision in the event of this dispute arising. I do not anticipate many such cases will arise, but there may be such a case, and I think there ought to be an appeal to such an authority.
There is something to be said as regards the question of delay. The hon. Gentleman has said that in the event of there being an appeal by the insurance officer to the umpire—there may be a great pressure of work—there must be a certain amount of delay during which the man would be out of benefit, though he was unemployed and though in the final resort he might have the decision given in his favour, in which case, of course, he would receive his back-pay. I think there is a hardship there. I communicated with the hon. Member for Dudley and suggested to him something which I hope may meet 1753 with the views of the Committee. I suggested that as far as the appeal from the insurance officer to the referees, which is a rapid process, is concerned, there should be no benefit paid until the matter has been decided; but, if the appeal were taken to the referees, and there was a dispute between the insurance officer and the referees and the case went to the umpire, that during that period and until the appeal was decided, the man should receive benefit in any case. His claim to that is this: though the insurance officer has decided against him, the court of referees, the representative body, has decided in his favour, and it is not therefore unfair he should receive his benefit during that interval. If the decision is given in his favour, he will, of course, get his back benefit as well. If it is not, these weeks of payment will naturally go against his contributions. We obtain under a later Clause power to deal by regulations with this point, but I want to state that is the view we should take in reference to this matter. I understand it meets the views of the hon. Member for Dudley, so that as regards the question of delay there is no difference of opinion.
Then we come to the question whether we should have an umpire at all. The hon. Member says that at Strasburg there was no umpire, but you have your Court of Referees there in one locality, and there is symmetry of dealing. We desire to have this one umpire for the whole of the Kingdom, chiefly—and I think the hon. Member will agree—because it is important in a matter of this sort, especially at the beginning, there should be uniformity of administration, uniformity of decision, and uniformity of treatment. We shall have, perhaps, thirty or forty Courts of Referees, and it might easily happen, without any reflection on them, that there might be a considerable number of diverse decisions in reference to this matter. I press quite strongly on the Committee the necessity for having this final appeal to an umpire, chiefly because we shall get symmetrical dealing in reference to this matter, and all these questions of appeal will be dealt with by the same person on the same lines. I have dealt, I think, with what is the practical difficulty of the umpire in reference to the delay. That, I think, met the views of the hon. Member, and I hope he will give me the umpire while I give him the benefit.
§ Mr. HARRY LAWSONIn spite of what the President of the Board of Trade has said, I think that this provision with 1754 regard to the umpire, is unnecessarily cumbersome, and if it is only to secure uniformity of decision, it means that one official is going to lay down exactly the lines which ultimately are going to prevail. The umpire will really be the man who will lay down the lines on which all decisions are to be given, and in any case, if it is thought desirable to have this at first, I would ask, is it necessary to keep the umpire perpetually in existence?
§ Mr. HARRY LAWSONI would point out that it means expense and a considerable amount of extra legal work being involved which is undesirable, and therefore I suggest, if the President says that he considers it essential, there should be one in the first instance, that there will be a limit set to the activities of the umpire in order that there may not be a perpetual flow for many years to come of decisions involving the employment of legal talent.
Mr. PEELI think there is a great deal to be said in favour of the doctrine of the right hon. Gentleman that you should have the umpire in order to harmonise decisions. But I want to point out certain inconsistencies in the Clause, as far as I understand it. You have a double appeal in cases where decisions are arrived at by the insurance officer, but where he does not come to any decision, and where the first hearing is in the Court of Referees, you do not have any appeal at all. It comes, therefore, to this, that in difficult or troublesome cases, or in somewhat delicate cases where the insurance officer does not want to have to decide—and I can quite understand him not wanting to do so in a great many cases—those cases go straight to the Court of Referees, and in that event the decision of the referees is final. Those are exactly the cases where you want to have the umpire, but it is precisely in those cases where you do not have an umpire, and I think the right hon. Gentleman puts it in the wrong place. He gives you it where it is least wanted, and where it is most wanted you do not get it at all. In the difficult cases you only get one hearing, whereas in the less difficult cases you get three hearings. It is much easier, as everybody knows, for the Court of Appeal to come to a decision after there has been a hearing in the Court below and the points have already been discussed. It seems to me, therefore, that this is an inconsistent proposal.
§ Mr. BAIRDI am quite prepared on behalf of my hon. Friend to accept the benefit, as the President has said, that there is at present, and I do not much mind giving him the umpire in return. I see the point of his argument. He wants to have uniformity, and he quite rightly points out the difference between the practice which exists in Strasburg and the practice suggested in the Bill, and although these umpires are to some extent undesirable, as the whole thing is an experiment, I do not think it would be desirable for my hon. Friend, on whose behalf I move this Amendment, to press it further, and I beg to withdraw it.
§ Mr. BONAR LAWAlthough it seems to me that the appointment of the umpire is undesirable from some points of view, it seems desirable that there should be something like uniformity in the way decisions are given, and if the referees are taken from one place to-day and another place to-morrow you will have no uniform principle on which they can act. Therefore, I think it perfectly right that some concession should be made from that point of view. But if the object is uniformity, then why have Sub-section (b), because as it stands it seems to me the insurance officers are going to send to the Court of Referees the difficult cases. How then will you get uniformity in that case? I should like, therefore, the learned Solicitor to explain to me why (b) is necessary if at the same time it is desired to have uniformity in all the other cases.
§ Sir J. SIMONI appreciate that this is a point which fairly calls for a little explanation. But on the other hand I am sure the Committee will understand that the Clause has been framed, not wildly, but really after considering a series of difficulties, and we think we have arrived at the right conclusion, but the Committee will judge of that. The scheme at present is this: A man applies for benefit; if the insurance officer who decides it says "Yes, you shall have benefit," the man gets it. There is no need to challenge that. That is the simplest case of all. If, on the other hand, the insurance officer says "No," then the man has a right of appeal to the Court of Referees. If the Court of Referees confirm the insurance officer, we think it is necessary, as a matter of administration, that the man should accept that decision. If the insurance officer in the first instance says "No" and the Court of Referees says "Yes," so that there is one decision one 1756 way and one the other, that, we agree, is a case which the umpire may deal with. Now with regard to Sub-clause B. All that Sub-clause says in effect is this: If the insurance officer, whether it be to save time or whether it be that he is confident that it is a case that employers and workmen represented on a Court of Referees should be asked to decide, says, "This is a claim I am not going to adjudicate on, but I am prepared to take the decision of the Court of Referees, and abide by it," no damage is done to the man, because if the Court of Referees' decision is in favour of the man he gets the money, but if their decision is against him he is no worse off. So, although it is a little difficult to work out, there is a reason for it. I agree, if I may say so, that inasmuch as there is not an appeal to the umpire in every case, you do not have at its maximum the opportunities for uniformity, but that is really necessary because if you give an appeal to the umpire in every case you will have every discontented and unreasonable applicant refused his money by the insurance officer appealing to the Court of Referees, and if refused by them insisting on going to the umpire. Therefore the matter stands in this way: If the insurance officer says "Yes," there is no appeal; if he says, "No," the man may appeal to the Court of Referees, and upon such appeal, if the Court of Referees says "No," the man must accept it because everybody has said "No." If they say "Yes," then the insurance officer may appeal, but if the insurance officer says: "I take the decision of the Court of Referees and offer no opinion of my own," he must abandon any right he had to appeal.
§ Mr. HARRY LAWSONMay I ask, is the system to be permanent?
§ Sir J. SIMONI am not in a position to say that, but it is intended for the present to be provided in an Act of Parliament which is permanent. If the system does not work, let us by all means consider hereafter how it is to be amended, but I do not see that it is an advantage to prophesy with regard to the point during the experimental stage.
§ Mr. HARRY LAWSONWill the Law Officer appear before the umpire?
§ Sir J. SIMONI am afraid not, and I do not know that it would be of any advantage to him or to anybody else if he did.
§ Mr. BONAR LAWAs I listened to the Solicitor-General, I was reminded of an old saying that when a good speaker speaks fools think he is right and wise men think he is a good speaker. I am afraid that is all I can say.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr. BUXTONI beg to move, in Subsection (1) paragraph (a) after the word "proper" ["such recommendations on the case as they may think proper"], to insert the words "and the Insurance Officer shall, unless he disagrees, give effect to those recommendations."
This is a drafting Amendment. Without these words, in the event of the Insurance Officer disagreeing with the referees or the referees disagreeing with the Insurance Officer, there is nothing as the Clause now stands to compel him to give effect to their recommendations, and it is in consequence of that I move these words.
§ Question, "That those words be there inserted," put, and agreed to.
§ Mr. GOLDMANI beg to move, in Subsection (1), at the end of paragraph (a) to add the words "Provided always that any inquiries or proceedings under this Act shall be held under conditions which shall enable the public to have access."
Clause 64 lays down the procedure for dealing with claims and disputes. It may be for very good reasons that all these proceedings are withdrawn from the Law Courts, but I do not think it would give to the employed the safeguards that publicity affords. It is for these reasons that I think it necessary the public should have access to these proceedings.
Mr. BUXTONI think if the hon Member will consider this matter a little further, it would hardly be desirable to have these public inquiries. In the first instance, the insurance officer makes his inquiries in the ordinary way, and I think that to bring in an informal Court of Law with regard to each claim would make it quite impossible to work. There are perhaps some plausible reasons for having the Court of Referees held in public, but I think there are two very strong cases to be cited against them. In the first place, you would do what I am sure everybody is very anxious not to do, you would tend to make these two representatives of the employers on the one hand, and the workmen on the other a partisan body on each side if it was made public, and everything 1758 reported, instead of, as we desire to make them all work amicably together in regard to these matters. In the second place, I think it would be very hard on the workmen themselves if, in every case where a question of misconduct was involved, the whole of the proceedings were to be made public, and I think the workmen ought to be protected from such publicity. I cannot see any possible advantage to be gained by it, and I do see the great disadvantages which I have referred to.
§ Mr. HARRY LAWSONWhat happens when the Press is not admitted is that there is usually a garbled version which really misrepresents what happened, and it probably is a more or less disadvantage to everybody concerned if a fair opportunity for reporting is not allowed. I know that a Government Department is allowed to hush up everything it can, but I think they ought in these days to allow in the case of the superior tribunal at all events, public access, which means the Press. I think certainly before the umpire there should be such access.
Mr. BUXTONMy hon. Friend seems to imply that unless these words are inserted none of the processes can be made public, whereas there is full power reserved to make the inquiry public if necessary.
§ Mr. HARRY LAWSONCan you leave it to the Court?
Mr. BUXTONNo, the Board of Trade has power, but the hon. Gentleman's Amendment would make from the first proceedings to the last necessarily public. There is nothing under the Act to prevent them being made public if it is thought desirable.
§ Question, "That those words be there inserted," put, and negatived.
§ Mr. GOLDMANI beg to move, in Subsection (1), at the end of paragraph (a), to add the words—
(b) Any person directly concerned in maintaining the solvency of any unemployment fund may require the insurance officer to report the payment of unemployment benefit in the case of any workman to the Court of Referees, and the referees, after considering the circumstances, may make to the insurance officer such recommendations on the case as they may think proper.
The object of this Amendment is to give an opportunity to any person interested 1759 in the solvency of this fund to make representations against any decision that may be given by an insurance officer or a Court of Referees, or an umpire. The objection he may make is not so much against the claim that has been sustained in a particular case, but may arise from some very important principle which is involved. For these reasons, I think that the parties who are contributors to this scheme and interested in maintaining the solvency of the fund should have an opportunity of making representations to the Courts that are established, and of having their representations heard.
§ Sir J. SIMONI hope my hon. Friend will not think it necessary to press this matter further, although it is, of course, quite a proper point to raise. It would, in the first instance, be very difficult indeed to know what is meant by "any person directly concerned in maintaining the solvency of any unemployment fund." One possible view would be that all employers and workmen and all taxpayers. There is no doubt about the taxpayers, at any rate. The substance of the hon. Member's suggestion is really to meet a case where no useful purpose is served by so doing. If a workman applies, the employer would be communicated with if there was any question of how he came to be out of work. The insurance officer in that case would go to the employer, and the employer would then have an opportunity of stating his view. It does seem that, after all, you have got all the light thrown on this problem that can fairly be thrown upon it, and the Amendment would involve the introduction of what might be undesirable and far-reaching effects. Is it really desirable that the fellow workman of a man who applies should have an opportunity of coming and challenging, and it may be asking to reverse, a decision that has been given? That, it seems to me, would be a very undesirable extension of the existing machinery, and a bad complication of it. We certainly could not agree to embodying it in the Bill.
§ Mr. GOLDMANI have no desire to introduce complications, but it did seem to me that it prevented any person who was directly concerned from making any representations at all. I do not, however, propose to press the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
1760§ Mr. SYDNEY BUXTONI beg to move, "That the Committee do sit after four o'clock to-day."
I make this Motion so that we may reach Clause 66 to-day. The next two Clauses are consequential, and if we reach Clause 66, I propose not to ask the Committee to sit to-morrow.
§ Question, "That this Committee do sit after four o'clock to-day," put, and agreed to.
§ Question, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill," put, and agreed to.