§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a number of Land Forces not exceeding 221,300, all ranks, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at Home and Abroad, excluding His Majesty's Indian Possessions, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1906."
§ *SIR JOHN COLOMB (Great Yarmouth)
said he listened on the preceding night with very deep attention to the speech of the Secretary of State for War, a speech which enabled them to under stand the working of the right hon. Gentleman's mind and of that of the Government, and to appreciate the attitude of himself and his colleagues upon the question of Army reform. The first part of that speech was a clear and emphatic repudiation of the principle upon which all former schemes, for the last forty years, of Army reform had proceeded. The second part dealt 1544 with the logical consequence of the adoption of a wholly different basis on which to reconstruct the Army system; while the third part of the speech was an exposition of the difficulties of the situation rather than a declaration of decisions already arrived at, and the concluding portion really was a sort of reconnaissance in order to ascertain the Parliamentary situation and to see how far the logical consequences of the principle adopted could be pushed in dealing with military problems in the House itself. The right hon. Gentleman was justified in endeavouring to discover how far the House of Commons was prepared to accept the logical consequences of the new principle that had been adopted, because no scheme of reform could be carried out unless it secured the assent of the House and of the country, and when they remembered how complete was the reversal of the principle hitherto guiding our Army policy authoritatively laid down by Governments—when they considered that reversal—they were bound to feel that it must take some time before the House and the country could fully grasp the consequences. The right hon. Gentleman was therefore wise to advance cautiously, in order to carry the House and the country with him. That was the state of affairs which the Government had now to face.
There had been many voluminous criticisms, in and out of the House, on the action of the Government, and on the action of the right hon. Gentleman in respect to Army reform, but one thing was clear, and that was that the criticism had not been directed against anything the Government or the War Office had actually done. On the contrary, that seemed to have been accepted with great unanimity by Parliament, but the criticism had been directed against what they had not done. No credit had been given for what they bad done, but the right hon. Gentleman and the Government were attacked and scolded for leaving undone the things they ought to have done. When they listened to those criticisms, what did they find? They found that those who were most violent in their attacks had no alternative policy to offer. It appeared to him that this group of critics of the 1545 Government policy was very much in the position of the costermonger who asserted, "If you won't let me drive the apple-cart I'll upset it." They were ready to upset the Government, but they could show no alternative policy. Their trumpets blared forth criticism of the Government, but they could not agree among themselves on a practical policy. That was the situation which the Government had to face in the present House of Commons. What had they done so far? They had reconstituted the War Office an undertaking which had appalled most Governments and which every Government had in turn shirked. If they looked upon the history of Army reform, they would find one continued long wail as to the incompetence of the War Office, and yet no Government had had the courage to tackle that question. This Government, however, in a very short time had reconstructed that office and had accomplished a task which previous Governments feared to touch. They had also done a great deal towards the devolution of military administration. They had found them-selves face to face with a situation of extreme danger in respect of drafts for India, and they had made a departure in policy which was full of future possibilities. They had, for instance, come to an agreement with the Canadian Government to relieve the mother country of the cost of the garrisons of Halifax and Esquimault, and he regretted very much that they were called upon to discuss these Estimates in the absence of the correspondence with the Canadian Government on this question, the production of which had been promised. They wanted to know the full effect of that correspondence. The fact remained, however, that these things had been done, and the Government had made essential progress in carrying out principles which had been so long desired by all students of the question of Imperial defence.
The causes of the failure of the numerous Army reform schemes which had been brought forward were two-fold—first, proceeding on a false principle, which ignored the influence of sea-power upon military policy; and secondly, the persistent refusal to face the facts of 1546 our geographic position and economic circumstances. Further than that, former Ministers had hurried their schemes through in order to avoid the country finding out this mistake. Much waste and confusion had arisen in consequence. But there was another and more modern feature connected with the discussions in this House to which he wished to call attention, and that was that they had a group of hon. Members who had had a few months experience of operations in the field, and therefore thought themselves competent to deal with the full problem of Imperial defence. He did not want to say anything unpleasant, but it seemed to him, so far as the House was concerned, that the South African War had produced a noxious growth of mushroom Napoleons, and that had these exponents of the right way to deal with the Army lived in Germany twenty years ago they would no doubt have condemned Moltke as a slow coach and bustled him along. But the development of a sound policy suited to the military requirements of the Empire was a matter which ought to be cautiously dealt with, they should only proceed with it step by step. He realised that they had to deal with forces created in a totally different condition of affairs, and that that produced a complicated problem which it must take time to solve. Therefore, he would not join with those—and he envied them their youth, eagerness, and impetuosity—who were urging the Government to take a precipitate course in Army reform. It was a testimony to the reality of the efforts of the War Office that they were not going too fast, and he would raise no note of discontent because the Government, having defined the principle which was guiding them, were not sending up balloons and fireworks to catch a passing popularity, but appreciated the full responsibility of the task devolving upon them of trying to adapt existing forces to the true principles which they had accepted.
In regard to their general scheme, he must say that he heartily concurred in the decision that whatever else happened, the cavalry and field artillery, who took a long time to create and train, should be kept at a higher standard of relative strength than other branches of the 1547 Army which did not take so long to train. He thought it was greatly to the credit of the Government that these most expensive forces were to have this attention, and that they were not giving way to a false cry of economy, but were determined to keep those forces ready for any emergency. He was glad also to see in their policy a clear intention to look closely at the expenditure on the Royal Engineers. The right hon. Gentleman had said that his work in that direction was not completed, and he was not satisfied that the expenditure on that force might not be modified or reduced. For that he thought the Government deserved credit. Then there was another branch of the Army to which he would like to refer, and that was the Garrison Artillery. He would like to point out to the right hon. Gentleman and the House that the arm of the service which had developed most rapidly of late years had been the Garrison Artillery, and the rate of the increase in that force which was now a tremendous charge on the Estimates was due to the collateral position created by disbelief in our sea power. He trusted that his right hon. friend in developing his scheme would remember that, and bear in mind that this large force of Garrison Artillery was created as a necessary corollary to a false principle that an enemy's fleets and armies would be able to move across the sea and attack any place they liked. It was, therefore, an exaggerated War Office notion of naval probabilities which caused fortresses to be created all over the world, and thereby necessitated the increase of the Garrison Artillery force. He presumed the right hon. Gentleman had his close attention fixed upon that point, which required special scrutiny in view of the change of principle in our policy.
He did not propose to touch upon naval questions, but allusion had been made by the right hon. Gentleman to the fact that arrangements had been devised for handing over the aquatic defence, to which a large portion of our Army was devoted, to the Navy, and he thought that when the question came to be thoroughly threshed out it would be found that this work might well be undertaken by men in the Navy and Marines over a certain age, and that it could thus 1548 be done more efficiently and with greater economy to the country. Then he came to the question of the infantry, to the question of long service and short service. He would not dwell upon that. He agreed entirely in the principle of the policy. Seeing that they had to keep such a very large force abroad during peace he confessed he did not see how they could, out of a necessarily long-service system in peace, create such a reserve as it was necessary for them to have incase of an outbreak of war. It was, therefore, necessary that there should be two classes of service in the Army, long and short. He must express his personal regret that the scheme of short-service battalions had not been based more largely on the Militia. It was a matter of opinion, no doubt, but he thought himself that had the Secretary of State, instead of creating entirely a new system of Regular short-service battalions, built one up upon the Militia system, ho would have found less opposition in the country and in Parliament. He himself felt somewhat uncertain as to whether the Militia had altogether been sufficiently recognised as the basis on which to build up the short-service system which really was the nursery of Reservists. He did not pay much attention to arguments founded upon the present relative value of Militia battalions to one another, because since the districts were originally arranged there had been a considerable redistribution of population which had altered the possible conditions of strength and efficiency. If the right hon. Gentleman had proceeded to re-allocate the Militia according to the distribution of the population he would have had a broad Militia basis on which to develop his short-service battalions He was glad to think the right hon. Gentleman was not regarding that as hostile criticism but rather as a reasonable observation. [Mr. ARNOLD-FORSTER assented.] Of course the first step to be contemplated in such a programme as building up the Militia was the extent and area of Militia service and the rendering the force liable for service oversea. If the Government would make up their mind to pursue that policy he believed it would be a step in the right direction. But, of course, the bed-rock of all their difficulties was the difficulty of getting men.
§ *SIR JOHN COLOMB
Of getting any sufficient number for the requirements of a great war. The present inflow of recruiting was to some extent attributable to the condition of trade at the present moment. Looking at it broadly, it must be admitted that the class from which soldiers had hitherto been drawn was a diminishing class.
§ *SIR JOHN COLOMB
said that was his individual opinion, and the question was whether they could offer sufficient inducements to men of a different and higher class to enter the Army. He looked upon conscription as an idle dream: he did not believe this country would submit to it to provide for oversea service. What, then, were they to do? He thought that the country would not be sincere in its treatment of this question till it really appreciated the proportion and magnitude of modern war and the insufficiency of our forces to meet the conditions which might at any day arrive. When the country was sincere it would find its way of escape by a very simple arrangement. That was to secure that the only gate into any civil employment in the State should be through the ranks of the Army. He believed that would in the future—and a not very distant future—prove to be the only means of providing a British Army for oversea service which was the only Army we should require in time of war.
Now he came to the real crux of the whole matter—the question of the Volunteers—and that completed his review of the reform scheme. In regard to the Volunteers, he yielded to no man in his appreciation of their efforts and of the spirit which created them. When the force was first constituted he was one of those who were selected to help in those great gatherings which took place, and he learned to appreciate the spirit which animated them. Although there was then a professional hostile feeling against the force, he certainly did not share it. But he held, and 1550 for forty years had persistently preached that to maintain a gigantic army of Volunteers to repel a great invasion of these shores was incompatible with the doctrine of sea supremacy. At list his view had been accepted by the Government. The difficulty of the Government, now that this force had been created under a false conception of military necessity, was to decide what to do with it. What could they do with a force of 240,000 armed units when they had come to the deliberate conclus on that its maintenance was imcompatible with their true policy. They could not immediately wipe it out of existence, and the process of reduction must be slow. The alternative to a large reduction was to apply the Volunteers to the purposes of service over-sea; but in that case they must catch their Volunteers who were willing to go first, and secure men who were prepared in an emergency to submit to a call for service abroad. He did not think for one moment that the Volunteers would accept that alternative. If hon. Members thought otherwise let them organise a deputation to the Secretary for War with a view of entreating him to circularise colonels of Volunteers, directing them to invite their men who would sign an agreement to serve over-sea in a great emergency to send in their names. Such a proceeding would, he believed, prove up to the hilt that the circumstances and nature of the civil employment of Volunteers rendered it impossible for them to enter into any such obligation. He did not believe 10 per cent. of the men would sign. ["Oh, oh!"] Well, let hon. Members try, and if only 10 per cent, did sign, it meant that they would have to incur the expense of maintaining one hundred Volunteers in order to secure the services of ten men when occasion arose. Would the Volunteer force then be a cheap force? If the House sincerely accepted the doctrine that a great invasion of this country was impossible, the only possible course to pursue with regard to the Volunteers was to reduce them to a certain standard. It was a question of fixing the number that was really the crux of the matter. He thought the Government were shirking the question or fixing numbers too much. He had not heard from the Government 1551 any indication of the number of men in the Militia and Volunteers needed for the requirements of the Empire. It was no use fencing with the question. They must determine the standard for the Army on the principle of their military necessities under the conditions of a supreme Fleet, and then they must apply that principle to the Volunteers. Admitting the possibility of a temporary raid on the coast—though he did not admit the probability—he thought the standard should be fixed at a number which could successfully deal with such a contingency, that the disposition of the Volunteers for the defence of the coast should be arranged with a view to dealing with small and insignificant raids, and that the Militia and Regular Army should be relieved from all duties in connection with attempted landing.
In conclusion, he desired to refer once more to the fact that there had been a total reversal of the principle upon which, for some fifty years, our Army policy had been founded. It was not a now departure, but a return to the old policy by which the Empire was made—the doctrine of a free sea, with a free Army, with its corollary that the low-water mark of the enemy's coast and not our own coast was our frontier. The tangle of our present military confusion arose from the fact that fifty years ago the War Office started the theory that steam fleets were not to be relied upon, and year by year the idea was developed, until two or three years ago the climax was reached when the Secretary of State for War calmly declared that Members must not confuse their minds on the Army problem by thinking about the Navy. That, he thought, awakened the House and the country to the absolute irreconcilability of an armed invasion while we had predominance at sea. Without that predominance we cannot live. Our present military arrangements were the product of that great mistake, and it was for whatever Government that happened to be in power so to deal with the forces created under that idea as to make them fit for the real and not the sham purposes of war. The difficulties were not so much military as political. When the Government were dealing with any great problem 1552 involving expenditure they had to consider the relations of Parties in this House and popular feeling in the country, and that was what made the difficulty in the question of the Volunteers. Personally, he thought the difficulty in course of time would solve itself. The Volunteers themselves were most intelligent thinking men; hitherto they had been encouraged by War Ministers to believe that the country was really in danger of a great invasion, and that they must undergo sacrifices to be ready to resist such invasion; but when they realised that this was only a fad of a defunct War Office and not a fact, they would not consider it necessary or desirable to incur so much self-sacrifice to provide for an emergency which could never arise. On the other hand, if the authorities asked for a real sound force of Volunteers charged with and responsible for the defence of different parts of the coast against small and reckless raids, they would get the very cream of men who, while they could not give over-sea service, were ready to submit to some hardship to perform definite military duties at home. Military arrangements had their ramifications in every grade of society. It was impossible to touch any branch of the service without creating political friction, and when listening to the speeches of distinguished Volunteers in the House he could not help asking himself whether the people of Sheffield, the Isle of Wight, Plymouth, and other places represented by these Volunteer officers really believed that the Volunteers were to rule Parliament, and that Parliament was not to rule the Volunteers. It could not be denied that the Volunteer vote was an important vote, having political influence on the mind of any Government; but he believed that the spread of the truth and a wider comprehension of the obligations and duties of the Empire under conditions of sea supremacy would eventually overcome the difficulties with which the Secretary for War was now confronted. He hoped that both Parties would keep their eyes fixed on the military necessities of the Empire, and manfully crush the opposition which arose from considerations of popularity, which would have to be overcome if the Empire was to be preserved.
§ MAJOR SEELY (Isle of Wight),
in moving a reduction of 10,000 men, expressed his appreciation of the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth, but said his pleasure at finding how near to common agreement were those who wished to arrive at a proper conception of the country's real needs was slightly tinged with regret that he should have implied that Members who happened to be Volunteer officers were influenced by their constituents in thinking it unwise to reduce the Volunteers. He could assure the hon. and gallant Member that he had no desire to influence votes by his support of the Volunteers. Those with whom he acted on Army questions took a view on this question totally different from that of the hon. and gallant Member, but he hoped completely to convert not only the hon. and gallant Member but also the Secretary of State for War. The suggestion that the Volunteers would not go abroad if an emergency arose was a serious allegation, but when the question was last under discussion the Secretary of State for War made a still more serious allegation by saying that the idea that the Volunteers formed any real reserve in case of war was a complete delusion. He hoped to show that the complete delusion was on the side of the Secretary of State for War. It so happened that he was one of many Members of the House who were concerned in the call to arms made during the South African War, when it was really ascertained whether or not the Volunteers would prove a reserve in case of necessity. The hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth suggested that the Prime Minister should be asked to institute an inquiry as to how many of the Auxiliary Forces would volunteer in the future under certain hypothetical circumstances.
§ *SIR JOHN COLOMB
said his point was as to how many would hold themselves in readiness to go abroad in case of emergency.
§ MAJOR SEELY
suggested that a more fruitful matter for discussion was what actually did happen in a period of great national stress, when this very question was asked of the Volunteers and Yeomanry. At that time the War 1554 Office decided to call only for a certain number of Volunteers, and when, say, 100 were asked for, it could not be ascertained how many were really prepared to go. But in a few cases—and it was on this point he proposed to convert the hon. and gallant Gentleman and to ask the Secretary of State for a public apology for his statement on the subject—Volunteers without any limit of number were asked for, and he had particulars of the response made. From the Queen's Westminster 690 volunteered; from the London Scottish, 500; and from the 4th Battalion Queen's, 635 men and 20 officers. The hon. and gallant Member suggested 10 per cent., but did he suppose that these figures did not represent a considerably greater proportion than that?
§ *SIR JOHN COLOMB
said he was speaking not of the Metropolitan corps only, but of the whole Volunteer force.
§ MAJOR SEELY
said that on the 10 per cent, basis the 1st Volunteer Battalion Middlesex should have provided 69.7 men, but, as a matter of fact, 510 were anxious to go to the front. From the 1st Volunteer Battalion Argyll Royal Garrison Artillery, with an establishment probably of about 500, 300 volunteered, and from the 1st Volunteer Battalion Manchester, although it was said only a small number of Volunteers were required, 370 men and three officers came forward. From these figures, which he had been able to obtain since the Secretary of State's amazing statement that it was a delusion to suppose that the Volunteers were of any use to serve oversea—
§ MAJOR SEELY
said he had the words with him, and what the right hon. Gentleman stated was that it was a complete delusion to suppose that the Volunteers could be regarded as of real value as a reserve in time of war for service oversea.
AN HON. MEMBER
asked how many of those who volunteered were physically qualified for service abroad.
§ MAJOR SEELY
said that if the hon. and gallant Member who asked the question meant to imply that the general standard of fitness in the Volunteers was such that it was not worth while maintaining them, he would suggest that the number of recruits for the Regular Army rejected for unfitness was a more fruitful subject for discussion. The figures he had given showed that the Volunteers were ready to furnish from 60 or 70 per cent, of their total strength to serve oversea in a time of national emergency. That was the bed-rock on which the supporters of the Volunteers stood. He was prepared to go further, and confidently to assert that had the War Office frankly said to the Volunteer force that they were at the end of their resources for men, and that they wanted every Volunteer they could get to go to South Africa, 99 per cent. of the whole force would have come forward. He hoped those figures would convince the hon. and gallant Member that he had underestimated the patriotism of these men. After all, it was somewhat the custom to sneer at the Auxiliary Forces and the War Office. He would ask the Committee to remember that whatever these men were worth it was all they had. When this country was engaged fighting against 40,000 farmers we soon came to the end of the men who had had any training at all. There were at least two hon. Members of this House who had had to command, in a war against 40,000 farmers, brave and gallant Englishmen who had had no military training whatever, and who did not know one end of the rifle from the other. If, instead of proposing to reduce the Volunteers, the right hon. Gentleman had aimed at getting as many men as possible to do something in the way of military training this country would in the future be saved from such a bitter humiliation as occurred in the South African War, which culminated in the capture of a great and gallant British general owing to the fact that a 1556 number of the men under him had not learned the elements of military warfare. Now they had the Secretary of State for War coming down to this House and declaring that these men were redundant and proposing to reduce them. This question was going to be fought out, and whatever else they did one thing was certain, that the more men they possessed who had the patriotism and the skill to give some kind of military training to their country the better it would be. Some of them who occasionally cast their eye to what was going on in the rest of the world, and who perceived that in one battle the combatants had lost a total equal to the whole British Army with its Reserves, were occasionally led to think that the more they appealed to the patriotism of the people to fit themselves for war the better it would be. This question would be raised again and again until this foolish policy of sapping the patriotism of the people had been finally condemned.
He moved a reduction of this Vote because they had decided that the great questions of Army policy should be raised on Vote 1, and that they should endeavour to understand on Vote A exactly what they were to fight about. Therefore, he proposed to reduce the Army by 10,000, and strange to say the Secretary of State for War proposed the same thing. Apparently this was the beginning of unanimity. Therefore he would direct his remarks to finding out what the Government intended to do, so that they would know what to condemn and what to approve of. The first question, if they proposed to reduce the Army, was, why was it necessary to reduce it, and what did the Government propose to do in order to make up for the loss of military power which that reduction would produce? All sides were agreed that they must reduce the Army, but the cost per man would continue to increase. The more people thought scientifically the more they would see that the more expensive part of the Army must be increased, and the less expensive parts must be reduced. They must have more officers, more cavalry, and more artillery. Consequently, if they were to fulfil the mandate of this House to reduce the total 1557 cost, they must greatly reduce the numbers, anticipating increases in the more expensive forces of the Army. The Army was not the actual power of the nation, because they all realised that it was no use sending the British Army in the field against a nation that could mobilise 3,000,000 men. The second reason why they must reduce the Army was because of the effect of increasing the term of service for the recruits. The Leader of the Opposition last year warned the Secretary of State for War that in adopting the nine-years system he was going perilously near that moment when they must provide a life career for the soldiers. That was exactly what the Secretary of State was doing, because by taking a man for nine years they robbed him of all chances of taking civil employment at the end of his service. That day ho had received two letters from soldiers who had not learned any trade, asking him to find them employment. What happened in such cases? The hon. Member for Chippenham knew from his connection with civic authorities and with the Army what happened, and he had a special right to speak upon this matter. If it were true that by enlisting men for nine years they condemned them to unemployment in the future, they had a right to ask the Secretary of State for War what he proposed to do.
The right hon. Gentleman said nothing that he had done was going to prevent his successors from either reversing the policy he proposed or continuing it. He did not tell them what he proposed to do in the future, and he did not say at what moment he proposed that the two-years system of enlistment for home service should begin. Was it fair, after having for one year taken advantage of the general wish of the House to give him a chance to undertake a difficult problem, and after saying that he would not produce Estimates on the old basis, to come down and say that while he still intended to prosecute his scheme, for some reason they did not know of the scheme could not be proceeded with? When were they going to begin establishing the home-service Army? Would the Secretary of State for War pledge himself not to proceed with it until the House had had an 1558 opportunity of considering it? He I wished to know whose scheme it was which the right hon. Gentleman now propounded. Was it his own scheme? If it was, all he had to say was that it was I very different to last year's scheme. If it was not his scheme, who had approved of it? Was it the scheme of the Army Council or the Committee of Defence? Were his proposals approved of by his responsible advisers, and did the Auxiliary Forces Department at the War Office desire to reduce the Volunteers? Did they wish to abolish the Militia? To all these things they wanted a reply, so that when they came to discuss Vote 1 they would not be talking in the dark. They had been talking in the dark for a year and a quarter, and he was sure the right hon. Gentleman would be ready to admit that the House had continued to give him their indulgence in a policy of concealment due to the fact that his advisers and himself could not agree. Of course there must come an end to this state of things, and he suggested that it should come before they discussed Vote 1. Did the right hon. Gentleman propose to proceed with the abolition of the Militia? In the second place, did he propose to proceed with the enlistment of a home - service Army, a change to which many of them objected very strongly. Thirdly, did he propose to reduce the Volunteers irrespective of whether they were efficient or not, or was he of the opinion that any man who wished to serve his country should have an opportunity found for him of so doing? Did the right hon. Gentleman adopt the extraordinary theory that after all the duty of the people of this country was to look on and pay up, and that nothing more was required than a few men placed at strategic points, numbering about 40,000 or 50,000, to defend certain isolated places. Those were three very definite questions. He did not think they were asking for anything very outrageous in requesting that replies should be given to those points, because the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman were more far-reaching than any which had been made since the time of Mr. Cardwell. When Mr. Cardwell proposed his changes in the Army it was admitted that they could not be carried through 1559 without full discussion, and ten days were devoted to Army matters in that year before the 31st of March. The fullest disclosures were made of the intentions of Mr. Cardwell and the Government, and no parallel could be found for the policy of concealment pursued by the War Office until the very eve of a decision being taken by the Committee. He asked for this information in order to enable them to form a right conclusion. Although they wanted the British Army to maintain great traditions they realised at the same time that the expenditure must be limited. They realised also that the Army must be composed of the best men they could obtain. At the same time they would not, if they could help it, entertain any proposal to dispense with the services of any Englishman who would submit to any kind of military instruction whatever. They knew that after all the future was dim and dark. They could not lay down precisely with any certainty what would happen when the dark day of war came upon them, but they knew that after all the safety of this country depended not only upon ships but in the first, in the second, and in the last degree upon the patriotism of the people and upon their spirit of self-sacrifice.
§ Motion made and Question proposed, "That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 211,300, all ranks, be maintained for the said Service."—(Major Seely.)
§ *MR. CLAUDE LOWTHER (Cumberland, Eskdale)
said that in listening to the speeches which had been made in this debate, it seemed to him that the keynote of the speakers was "retrenchment," but he had not heard from any hon. Member a practical exposition of the manner in which the admirable reforms suggested could be effected. If the Secretary of State for War, with his characteristic affability, were to be guided by the criticisms of every hon. Member of this House, he would find his task to be no light one. He would have to reduce the Army in order to please some, and he would have to increase the Army in order to satisfy others, and, besides, he would have to add very largely to the 1560 number of the Volunteer force while at the same time reducing the expenditure upon it. The right hon. Gentleman would have to abolish the Army Council and entrust its functions to the hon. Member for Central Bradford by the express desire of the hon. Member for Oldham.
It was easy to use retrenchment as a battering-ram against any Government, but how were they going to retrench today? A few years ago the "blue water" theory still held good, but as things were to-day it was impossible to reduce our Army by a single man without its being a danger and menace to the Empire. In the last year or two conditions had radically changed. We had lost our insular position, and our extended Indian frontier had become as vulnerable as the frontier of any European Power. Recent events proved beyond doubt that if our Indian frontier were menaced, our Indian Army of 230,000 would be found totally inadequate for the calls that would be made on it. Although one naturally hesitated to refer to hostile possibilities in connection with a friendly Power, yet facts could not be blinked. Russia had just completed the Trans-Caspian Railway at enormous expense. It abutted on the Afghan frontier, a country we were pledged to defend. She had done more. During the last twelve months, although plunged in external and internal troubles, she had completed a second great trunk line from Orenburg to Tashkend. Troops and stores had been poured into the Trans-Caspian Provinces, which we could hardly believe were solely for the comfort and protection of "trippers" to the Far East. These railways were, beyond doubt, purely strategical. Wise nations, like wise individuals, did not throw away money to no purpose; and if Russia was preparing for a probable rupture with a friendly country, then so must we. Until recently it would have been impossible for Russia to have sent against us and supported a fully equipped army of more than 150,000 men, but now with two lines of railway completed she would, in the event of hostilities, be able to plant on our frontier an army of considerably over 500,000. This had been proved beyond doubt by the enormous number of troops she had poured into Manchuria, over one line of 1561 railway 5,000 miles long. Under Lord Kitchener's scheme our frontier Army would consist of 160,000 men, of whom one third would be British. It was quite clear, therefore, that in order to successfully resist an attack of three times the number, we must be ready, immediately on the outbreak of war, to send at least 150,000 more troops from this country. The Japanese War had also shown us that we should require a further 200,000 men every year for depletion from calamities and disease. And it was at this moment that without offering any alternative proposal the amateur military critics would cut down our Army to promote its efficiency.
How, then, we were to obtain an Army efficient for the defence of our Indian frontier, which, inadequately guarded, was a direct incentive to any nation envious of our rich Indian possessions? Apart from conscription, a system which would never be tolerated in this country, because it was wholly alien to the British character, there was only one solution which he ventured with great deference to submit to the House. In another year our treaty with Japan would lapse. He urged not only that we should renew it, but that we should make it of such a character that in the event of either country's Asiatic possessions being attacked they should mutually help each other—Great Britain with her Fleet— Japan with her army. It was difficult to gauge the far-reaching advantages of such an alliance, not only to Japan and Great Britain, but to the whole peace-loving world. Great Britain would be relieved of the upkeep of an Army, which if brought to the huge standard of efficiency demanded by the new conditions would become on intolerable burden to the British taxpayer. The idea of all Army reformers might then be realised —a small but efficient fighting force combined with a cheap and serviceable Home Army. And if this alliance had wide-reaching advantages for England, there was no limit to its possibilities for Japan. Like ourselves she was an island Power; like ourselves at the end of this war she would possess a continental frontier, and, therefore, her series of victories, splendid and unbroken as they were would avail 1562 her nothing in the future if she should lose command of the sea. Even if peace were happily concluded, Japan could not ignore the fact that Russia's enormous resources enabled her to build three ships where she could build one, and to build or buy three times as quickly. We had it on the authority of a Russian officer of the highest distinction, Admiral Dubassoff, who had publicly stated that if Russia patched up peace it would only be in order to build a new fleet and renew the struggle with increased vigour. Not only could our Fleet guarantee her immunity from this menace, but behind its shadow she would reap the full fruits of her sacrifices and enjoy that recuperation which alone could save her from financial exhaustion. To Russia such an alliance would be a boon in disguise as it would secure the future peaceful development of a peace-loving people.
§ *MR. CLAUDE LOWTHER
said he would conclude what he had to say by respectfully drawing the attention of the Government to the renewal on a stronger basis of our alliance with Japan, because he saw in it the only possible means by which we could secure retrenchment and efficiency with safety to the Empire.
§ MR. GUEST (Plymouth)
said it was a remarkable thing to find in an Army debate an alliance recommended on the grounds stated by the hon. Member for the Eskdale Division. He supposed the hon. Member was so delighted with the success of Chinese labour in South Africa that the proposal was to relegate the work of the Army to another yellow race. In a speech of singular earnestness, tinged with such a deep sense of melancholy as to make it somewhat more a lament than a statement of policy, the Secretary of State for War appealed for the non-Party treatment of the Army question, and generously offered to his successor the fruits of his own unremitting toil. He welcomed the spirit in which that appeal was put forth, but he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not think hon. Members on his side of the House factious if they found themselves not entirely able to go with him on certain 1563 Army matters. The Secretary of State developed in its extreme form what was known as the doctrine of the blue-water school. He declared that this country enjoyed practical immunity from invasion, that conclusion having been reached as the result of scientific inquiries by the Council of Defence and the Army Council, confirmed by the observations which took place at Clacton-on-Sea last autumn. If we enjoyed that practical immunity how was it that the Secretary of State for War was able to come forward with the proposals he had made? The Secretary of State was either not logical or had not the courage of his opinions to face the logical deductions to which they led him. If we enjoyed this immunity, so far from retaining any portion of the Volunteer force, they should be completely abolished and the Militia also— all those who were tied to the soil—and the Regular Army, which was the only force the right hon. Gentleman could conceive to be possible in future, should be fostered, if not augmented. What had the right hon. Gentleman done? He had not abolished the Volunteers. He had maimed them, and he had threatened the Militia, and so far from having nurtured the Regular Forces of the Crown he contemplated reducing them by 17,000 in the course of the year. He urged the right hon. Gentleman to continue the course on which he had entered.
In order to state to the House his own view as to the necessity of reducing the Regular Army it was necessary to indulge in a short comparison between the state of the Army to-day and in 1898, which was the last normal year before the war. In 1898 an Army of 180,000 was maintained for £20,000,000, whereas the Estimates this year provided for 204,000—after eliminating the 17,000 who were to disappear—and they were to be maintained at a cost of £30,000,000. That was to say, while there was only an addition of 24,000 men the Estimates had risen by £10,000,000. It could not be asserted that the existing Army was in many respects better than the Army of 1898. The Army of 1898 was, at any rate, able to accomplish certain objects, It provided the drafts for our Indian establishment—which he 1564 believed to be the first object which it ought to perform, and which the Army of the present Secretary of State for India egregiously failed to do. Then, that Army of 1898 provided and maintained 444,435 men to serve in South Africa. That was a considerable achievement. Again, in 1898 we had a reserve of 78,000 men; while the Auxiliary Forces maintained under that 1898 system actually sent out to South Africa no fewer than nearly 100,000 men. The question that had to be asked was: "Was the present Army able to do half as well again as that Army achieved?" He thought, on the contrary, that it had not attained that state of efficiency reached by the Army of the right hon. Gentleman's predecessors. If so, why was it that it cost £10,000,000 more to maintain an Army to-day which was only slightly larger than that of ten years ago? If hon. Members examined the Estimates they would observe that by far the largest item in the £10,000,000 was £4,000,000 for increase of pay. The pay had risen 66 per cent. and the number of men 30 per cent. The fact was, the limit of the enlistment system had been ignored. The origin of this increase in the Army was due to the days—now happily done away with —of the megalomania of the Secretary of State for India: to the days of the doctrine of home defence by the Regular Army, now entirely abandoned: and also to the days of that bugbear, the equipoise of the linked battalions. Lord Lansdowne was responsible for increasing the Army by 28,000 men; his successor for an increase of 37,000 men—or a total increase of 65,000 in ten years. He entirely agreed with the Secretary for War when the right hon. Gentleman stated the previous night that if a large Army was necessary for the defence of the Empire, the problem should have been squarely faced and the question of compulsory service should have been fairly met.
If the Committee agreed with him that there was a limit to the voluntary system, it was obvious that if more men were wanted another means of obtaining them must be devised; and that the present system was not the way by which it would or could be done. Unfortunately the standard of the Army 1565 had been tampered with with the most disastrous results. One of the ways by which the increase in enlistment was to be affected was by the late Secretary for War accepting the Motion of the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight insisting on the production of character by recruits. There was a third device by which it was expected a greater number of recruits would be secured— the institution of a short-service system. He maintained that in introducing the short-service system the present Secretary for India had not got the condition of the Reserve in his eye. It was offered as an inducement to recruits in the hope that a considerable proportion of them would prolong their service. Now, what he had been trying to reach was this: the governing factor of the situation by which the size of the Army would be ultimately determined was not the necessities of the Empire, but the normal supply of recruits expected to be obtained in any given year. In 1894 41,000 recruits were raised in this country: but these figures were very misleading, because in the same year no fewer than 21,000 were lost to the Army from causes other than by passing into the Reserve, by purchase, and by completion of service. That was a loss of 50 per cent. It was interesting to observe from what causes that loss took place. There were 1,699 deaths, 1,330 unserviceables, 4,973 invalided; discharged for misconduct 3,656, and other causes 8,444, or a sum total of 21,000. There was not only a large material loss, but a great economic waste. Both from the point of view of efficiency and a consideration of the facts there had to be eliminated, as far as possible, all those men, who, from one cause or another, could not fill the services on which so much money had been spent. There was another ominous fact. He had seen it stated that in 1902 no less than 21,943 soldiers were committed to prison for one offence or another.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Mr. BBODBICK, Surrey, Guild-ford)
said he never lowered the standard of the Army in his life. He had always set his face against lowering the standard of any class of soldiers.
§ MR. GUEST
said he quite agreed that the right hon. Gentleman did not intend to lower the standard; and he knew that the right hon. Gentleman in one particular did raise it very materially. But whatever the right hon. Gentleman might have done, whether by increasing the pay, tampering with the standard, or by reducing the term of short service, more than a certain number of recruits would never be got. The present Secretary for War had much circumscribed the possible cases for which an Army might be needed. All he contemplated was a sufficient force to defend our possessions beyond the seas and the possible provision of a small striking force for dealing with Mad Mullahs or the like.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
said the hon. Gentleman had omitted that one of the most important purposes of the Army at home was to furnish large reinforcements for our Army abroad in case of war.
§ MR. GUEST
said he would include that. As to the terms of service under which recruits might be enlisted, the Secretary for War had two objects in view. First, the provision of an Army in India and the colonial garrisons; and, second, the creation of a Reserve on which he could rely. There were several ways in which these two objects might be achieved. It was well known that a long-service system was much, more suitable for the one, and a short-service system for the other. The late Secretary for War relied on short service, with the inducement to the soldier of an increase of pay of 6d. a day to extend his service. That experiment failed, and the right hon. Gentleman might have foreseen it, because after a man had been only three years in the Army he had not attained an age which precluded him from returning to civil life and learning a trade. But if the soldier continued his service for another seven years, he would 1567 find himself at a time of life when he could not devote himself to learning any sort of trade with success and there would be nothing left to him but his small pension. The present Secretary for War proposed a simultaneous long and short-service system, but that was only the same system as that of his predecessor, only under a different name. There was another system in vogue. First, the long-service Army was to be filled up, and then something was to be done for a short-service Army with an inducement to go into the Reserve. Now, he could not believe that that was a satisfactory conclusion. His own opinion was that they should be driven back to the compromise of so many years with the colours and so many years with the Reserve. The corollary of the reduction of the Regular Army was the maintenance of the Auxiliary Forces. In this country war was only possible if it had the support of public feeling, and that feeling would enable the War Office to rely with certainty on the patriotic readiness of the Volunteers and Militia to serve in any part of the world. The official contempt for Auxilaries was much to be deprecated. In European warfare it was as necessary to protect the line of communication as it was to have a fighting line, and that was a thing for which the Volunteers were well fitted. Again there was the defence of India. If Volunteers could be sent to India to occupy the garrisons whilst the Indian Army went to protect the frontier India itself would still be in a very good position so far as defence was concerned. The creation of the Imperial Yeomanry was the one great achievement of the present Secretary of State for India, and something of the same sort ought to be done for the Militia and Volunteers.
§ *SIR J. FERGUSSON (Manchester, N.E.)
reminded hon. Gentlemen opposite when they criticised the Secretary for India's schemes of reform that the right hon. Gentleman had introduced the most important reform of raising the pay of the soldier after two years service. That was a most gratifying change because it permitted us to obtain the number of recruits we required. The right hon. Gentleman, moreover, had been enabled to enforce the condition that only men of good character should 1568 be enlisted, and it was pleasing to hear that recruits were being obtained of a higher class and satisfactory character. He attributed to the action of the Secretary for India the restoring of a depleted Reserve after the war. The Guards, for example, had long been enlisted for three years with power to prolong their service, and about half of the men enlisted had agreed to continue in the Army. At the same time a large Reserve had been built up, enabling the regiments to send 10,000 men to South Africa and keep the battalions at home at their full strength. He agreed in the main with what had been said by the last speaker as to the project of the Secretary for War n respect of the Auxiliary Forces. He hoped that they were not committed to the project of the practical abolition of the Militia. The Militia had received very hard treatment in being reduced to its present condition, and every one knew that the force had been made the milch cow for the Regular Army. It should not be forgotten that the Militia in former times had supplied the Army with men in time of need. This was the case in the Napoleonic Wars and in South Africa, for it was known that many men fought at Waterloo in their Militia uniforms. He contended, therefore, that it was not necessary on grounds either of economy or of efficiency to abolish the Militia as the Secretary of State had practically proposed to do.
§ *SIR J. DICKSON-POYNDER (Wiltsshire, Chippenham)
supported the Amendment for the reduction, because he was convinced that if they were to reduce the expenditure on the Army it could only be done by a substantial reduction in the number of men. The attack which had been made on the Auxiliary Forces, if carried to its logical conclusion, must become detrimental to the whole military system. He opposed any reduction of the Volunteer force on Imperial grounds. The suggestion that a home-service Army should be established had not taken practical shape as yet, and it therefore became necessary to maintain the only substitute which could provide an adequate Reserve through the maintenance of the Auxiliary Forces. He supported the reduction of men on the Regular establishment, believing it would 1569 in no way jeopardise the drafts for India, The extension of the period of service would give the War Office the same facilities in that respect as they had under the old seven-years system. In connection with three years service considerable difficulty arose in the matter of drafts for India, and the system was shown to be most futile and expensive, as men's term of service expired in many instances so soon after their arrival in India. The costliness of the system would be realised when it was remembered that the cost to India and back was about £18, with £4 or £5 for additional equipment, and that within the last six months no less than 5,000 men had been sent out under these conditions. During the war the short service was necessary in order to get the men, but the time had now come when the longer service must be reverted to. But the fact had to be faced that with a nine years service men were placed in a very precarious position at the expiration of their term.
The real Army problem was the question of the after-employment of men who joined the colours. In his Memorandum last year the right hon. Gentleman made sympathetic reference to the question, but there was nothing further in that direction this year. Was it not time the House took into its serious consideration the question of the after-employment of soldiers? Men joining the service at the age of eighteen and serving nine years, would be discharged in the prime of manhood, but at a period of life later than that at which they could easily adapt themselves to civil occupations, with the result that they would be thrown upon the casual market. He believed the question of unemployment, which he hoped the House would face in the near future, was closely connected with our military system. If the Local Government Board would procure from the local authorities a return showing the number of men out of employment, marking those who at some period had been with the colours, it would probably be found that a very large proportion had served in the Army, and then through no fault of their own had found their way into that class who were the last to be employed in good times, and the first to be discharged in 1570 bad times of trade. The three years system was introduced on the assumption that 70 per cent of the men would re-engage, but only 12 per cent, did so. If an analysis were made of the un-employed during last winter it would probably be found that a large proportion of the 88 per cent. who did not re-engage went to swell the ranks of the unemployed.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
pointed out that that could not be the case, as the three years men had not come to the end of their term of service.
§ *SIR J. DICKSON-POYNDER
thought that, at any rate, many of the men would find it very difficult to obtain employment, although, of course, it would not be so difficult after three years as after nine years service. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would take the matter up, and endeavour to frame some constructive scheme by which the public services and organisations throughout the country might provide employment for these men. No doubt all sorts of objections would be raised and the proposal said to be impossible, but the country was face to face with a great problem; and if the present voluntary system was to be maintained a scheme would have to be devised by which men who joined the colours, provided their conduct during service was good, should be assured of employment when their term with the colours expired. Something might be done through the Post Office, a Department which had 37,000 employees in London alone, and that number represented only 32 per cent. of the total in the country. He would not confine the plan to any one Department, it should be so arranged with different Departments that the men might be evenly distributed about the country. Some assistance might come from the police, though he knew the idea was very unpopular. At present we were moving in a vicious circle. The fact that they were not ensured employment on the expiration of their term of service debarred many men of good character and position from entering the Army. A change in that respect would automatically raise the standard of recruits, and the result would be not only a great gain to the 1571 Army, but a substantial mitigation of one of the grievous problems of the day. The local authorities throughout the country might be approached in the matter. He still held the view which he expressed four years ago, that with our voluntary system the more closely the local governing authorities could be brought into harmony with the military system the better it must be for the country. At the outside, only from 30,000 to 35,000 men were discharged per annum in the ordinary course, and that number distributed throughout the country into different organisations need not be a burden to any particular one. To secure a strong and efficient Army every encouragement must be given to men to enter the Army, and the only real encouragement that could be given was an undertaking that if they conducted themselves as respectable citizens during their term of service they should be sure of employment on their return to civil life.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
I must say I have no reason to complain of the discussion to-day not being in accordance with the request I ventured to make yesterday. It has certainly lacked nothing in breadth or in depth, and if I may say so, it has been a most valuable contribution to the discussion of Army questions. With much that has been said I am in cordial agreement, but with a great deal I am afraid I still remain at variance. I should like if I can to do justice to those who have differed from me, as well as to those who have agreed with me. I have noticed with great satisfaction that there has been a tendency in the direction which I desire we all should travel—a tendency to recognise the truth that after all we are not keeping up, as we ought not to keep up, a large Army primarily for the defence of these islands.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
The hon. Members to whom that tendency has not extended have been left behind in the advance that has been made; but I have noticed a very remarkable tendency in that direction.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
I think almost every speech that has been made. But I will endeavour to make my point good. I do not mean to say that all who have expressed that view are in agreement with me, but I do note that tendency in all their speeches. I am going, not to traverse, but to criticise some of the statements which have been made by the various speakers. If hon. Members will allow me I will explain to them my view of what is the real guiding principle in this matter.
We are told we ought to have a great reduction in the Regular Army. The hon. Member who has just sat down was very emphatic on that point, and I wish to know how he justifies that proposition, whether it is based upon a true view of this question, or whether it is really an idea thrown off because he knew it would be acceptable to all of us, and that that is the shortest way of getting a reduction of cost. It is admitted on all sides that we have to maintain an Army which is suitable for our needs in time of peace, and capable of expansion in time of war. Has he considered whether, if he reduced our Regular Army, it would be able to satisfy those considerations? I am working under strictly limited conditions. The Army Council is working with the object of producing an Army which shall supply in time of peace a garrison for India and the approved garrisons for the Colonies, while having a certain proportion of that Army at home, so as to make a proper circulation between all parts of the Army, and which shall be capable of furnishing the drafts and units necessary for the reinforcements which the Indian Government demand in time of war. The hon. Member suggested that we might with advantage go back to the system of seven and five years enlistment. I traverse that statement for this reason. If you do go back to that system you will get no reduction in cost, and you will most certainly get no Reserve which will enable you to satisfy the demands of the Indian Government in time of war. You will not and you cannot get the Reserve necessary for the requirements of the Army in India if 1573 you put the whole Army upon that basis. You will get nothing near the infantry Reserve required for that purpose, nor would you get the number of units. You will not get units sufficient to supply the demands of the Indian Government in case of war; if you begin to reduce and cut off units you will be not, as I explained before, cutting off the officers, but you will be making it impossible to add to the number of your effective Army when the stress of war comes. It can easily be calculated what Reserve was produced under the previous system. It numbered 54,000 men in the infantry. If you begin to reduce the number of infantry units you pro tanto reduce that Reserve, and that Reserve is entirely inadequate for the purpose we are compelled to regard as binding upon us. The hon. Member said we had introduced the nine years system of service, and that he considers too long. Well, standing as an isolated period, I should agree with him; I think if it were not joined with the short service it would be too long. I would remind him that the period is practically the same as that upon which thousands have been serving before, and it is only one year in excess of the official term which men have been serving for years past. We have fought this battle over and over again, thinking we ought to do all in our power to provide for men who have been in the Army for nine years. I did make a proposition that we should be able to guarantee to every soldier of good character who had served nine years a congenial occupation in the ranks of the Army in connection with the short-service battalions which would provide him with that certainty of employment to which I think he is entitled. I think the hon. Member was mistaken in supposing that little is done for the employment of these men on their discharge. If he would look at the Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting he would see that the proportion of men of good character who cannot obtain employment is comparatively small.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
Oh, no; it is much less, and that fact has been 1574 the secret of success in the Navy, and it will be the secret of success in the Army. The hon. Member has said he considers two periods of service at the same time impossible. A great many things have been said about the impossibility of it. I was told by many great authorities that we should have no chance of obtaining our military recruits for the nine years service, but since October we have obtained 11,000 men on that basis; and to that extent we have passed the calculation of many who were entitled to express an opinion. I believe you must come to this double system of recruiting, and if you do come to it you can successfully carry it out if you comply with the ordinary conditions of common sense.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
Yes. If you continue the long-service recruiting indefinitely you must sacrifice your Reserve. If you do not come to some kind of short-service recruiting you cannot make that Reserve. In order to carry on the two systems side by side you must have great differentiation in the inducements offered to the man who has served the long time and the man who has served the short time. The hon. Member has not remembered that the inducement to the soldier hitherto of enlisting for a long period of service has not been great, and that inducement has never been given to him until he has served two years in the Army. I pass from that view of the question as to how we ought to deal with the soldier in the Army, to what has been the main part of the debate this afternoon; that is, the question whether we can or cannot regard the Auxiliary Forces in their present state as a substitute, or an available substitute, for the Regular Army.
§ MR. CHURCHILL
Before the right hon. Gentleman deals with that question would he kindly answer the Question put by my hon. and gallant friend as to whether he is proceeding with the short-service Army proposals?
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
I have explained that many times, and I say 1575 that it is impossible to proceed with the short-service men until the nucleus of long-service men required for the Army has been raised.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
That, of course, will depend entirely upon the rate at which recruiting proceeds.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
We are recruiting at the rate of about 400 per month, and it will be about seven or eight months before we shall have obtained enough long-service men.
§ MR. CHURCHILL
said the right hon. Gentleman would do better in his own interest if he allowed his interruption.
§ MR. CHURCHILL
I wish to get this information definitely in view of the very important debate on Monday next. Are we to understand that the right hon. Gentleman's policy now is that, as soon as he has got his requisite number of long-service men, that is in eight or nine months time, he intends to proceed with the scheme of last year which he has laid before the House for establishing a dual Army system and short service for soldiers at home?
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
Yes, that is so. I now come to the question as to how far we can regard the Auxiliary Forces as a substitute for the Regular Army. The hon. Member for the Isle of Wight expressed my own sentiments upon this point. This is a question we must examine not from the point of view of 1576 patriotic enthusiasm, but from the point of view of its military value. The hon. Member for the Eskdale Division of Cumberland said that we might rely upon public enthusiasm in time of war. My view is that public enthusiasm in time of war is not enough. There was an enormous amount of public enthusiasm in the year 1870 in Paris, but that war ended disastrously, and something more than that was required. What I want to inquire into is how much we can rely upon it to make itself of value for the purposes of war.
§ MAJOR SEELY
The right hon. Gentleman misapprehends the point I raised as he misapprehended it once before. We had enthusiasm at the time of the Boer War, but then it must be remembered that everybody does not belong to the ranks of the Volunteers. The point was could they rely upon enthusiasm without training. If they could not, then they ought to be able to obtain men who had had some training to fulfil that patriotic enthusiasm.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
If it be true that we can rely upon putting into the field against a foreign army troops which have had only the training of the Volunteers, all I can say is that every other country in the world is making a mistake except ourselves.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
I agree that it is better than nothing, but the question is, is that good enough. If we are right then every other country in the world is wrong. I have abundance of opinion from every military authority in this country, and it is unanimous upon this question, and they declare that you cannot safely enter into combat with a civilised army with men who have had so small a training as that which we give to our Volunteers. But supposing we are right and everybody else is wrong, then surely we are wasting both our time and money on the Regular Army. I cannot accept that, and I cannot bring myself to believe that the Germans, the French, the Japanese and every other country is wrong. It is argued that this force is of great value 1577 to have, however imperfectly trained, because it is a great supplement to the Army in time of war. I admit that up to the point to which that argument will carry me. My view is that it is our duty to provide such an organisation for the Regular Army as will allow a very large reserve of trained men who will have had equivalent training to the troops which form foreign armies. That is why I attach no importance to the particular period, and why I suggested two years as the minimum period of training to be allowed. That is the minimum training adopted by every country except Switzerland, which does not, I suppose, contemplate the undertaking of a foreign expedition.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
Then I withdraw the "public enthusiasm." The Volunteers, it is argued, give us what we are likely to want in time of war. The hon. Member has called me to task for what I have said with regard to the value of the Volunteer force in a great emergency. I think he has endeavoured to put into my mouth words which I did not use. I have said that you must not expect more from the Volunteers than the conditions of the service allow them to give. What do the conditions allow them to give? We know what they gave in the case of the South African War. They gave a great deal, especially on the first occasion when the demand was made. But what do I find in the Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting for the year 1901? The Report says—It was found that it was not possible to obtain the full number of companies, nor, indeed, to obtain companies at the same strength as in the preceding year. The Army Order which appeared on 25th January was consequently modified, and companies allowed to proceed as such at a minimum strength of ninety all ranks. In cases where the requisite 1578 ninety were not forthcoming, Volunteers were allowed to proceed as drafts, to relieve an equivalent number of men of the service company in South Africa, provided a minimum number of twenty-one came forward.
§ SIR HOWARD VINCENT
May I ask my right hon. friend if at that time 5s.a day was being paid to men without any training whatever?
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
A great many men did go out who had no previous training, but I am aware that a great many of these men became as efficient as some of the Volunteers who went out.
, interposing, said the hon. and gallant Member is not entitled to keep up constant interruptions. He was listened to with perfect silence himself.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
I have read the Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting. Let me read some other facts which I think are relevant to the question how far we can rely on this force in time of emergency. The number who volunteered for service in 1900 was 20,929. Of those 3,528 were rejected on medical grounds. Further, there were rejected as not complying with the regulations as to efficiency 3,333. That is to say, 33 per cent. of the 20,929 who presented themselves as willing to serve the country were rejected. I do not blame these men for the fact that they were not medically qualified, or that from the military point of view they were not efficient when they came forward. But we have the fact that 33 per cent. were not accepted by the military authorities on grounds which perfectly justified them in not accepting their services. I am not adducing these facts as a matter of censure at all. I am charged with the duty of seeing whether we have or have not an available military force in time of war, and I have to test the question by the 1579 only evidence available. In his examination Colonel Satterthwaite was asked—Do you consider the medical inspection of the recruits strict enough?—There are many sides to that when you ask whether it is strict enough. One is that in the Volunteers their existence depends on the capitation grant, and if the medical inspection was too uniformly carried out many of these corps would cease to exist.Captain Jenner, Adjutant 3rd Lanark Rifle Corps, in his evidence said—I think if you look at the record of the men that were examined for the service companies that went out to South Africa—and I know some cases that came under my notice—you will find some suitable food for reflection there. You mean in the rejections?—Yes, they were simply terrific the cases that came under my notice in several corps.Colonel Hawarth, 3rd V.B. Lancashire Fusiliers, was asked—How many of your men would have passed the doctor?—I should think 35 per cent. would have been rejected.I do think these are relevant considerations. It is unreasonable to expect the Volunteers as now constituted to be available for foreign service, and especially service in India. We know the class who come into the Volunteers. We know that they are proud of the occupations in which they are employed, and no one would really expect a large proportion of the Volunteer force to sacrifice their occupations in order to undertake the work of a campaign in India. When we eliminate these two sections of the Volunteer force—those unfit medically or on the ground of inefficiency, and those disqualified on the ground of being occupied in such a way that they cannot leave the country and cannot hold themselves available for foreign-service—we shall have to reduce the force considerably. If these facts are as I have stated is there anything unreasonable in the proposals I have made to the Committee? I have proposed that we should take steps, so far as we can, to eliminate from the Volunteers the inefficient. We are asked to make large reductions of expenditure. I have been led to believe that you cannot safely make large reductions in the Regular Army except in the way I myself have proposed. I have always entertained the belief that you can make considerable reductions in 1580 the Militia force, and yet, at the same time, make it more efficient and self-respecting, and much more useful to the nation. But, be that as it may, I am not prepared to accept the proposition that you are to reduce the Regular Army and the Militia and to take no steps at all, in view of the facts I have just recited and many others I might recite, to reduce the cost of the Volunteer force.
What does that reduction mean? It means the reduction of the inefficient part of the Volunteer force. I am quite sure that reductions such as I have proposed can be made without outstepping for a moment what would be included in the description I have given.
My hon. friend the Member for Sheffield asked where I found any support for my allegation that the tendency of the Committee was in the direction of accepting the view that the Volunteers, like every other branch of our Army, ought to be made available, if possible, for foreign service. I find it in the fact that many of the arguments addressed to the Committee, and notably the arguments of the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight, were based on the assumption that when a time of crisis came we can and must rely on the Volunteers. I say that that is a great step in advance, and I said yesterday and I repeat to-day that it is only logical if that be so that I should ask hon. Members to meet me half way, and to allow the War Department to so spend its money and so organise its forces that it may really fulfil that which the hon. Member desires that it should accomplish. Does the hon. Member think that we are going the best way about it by continuing the present organisation of the Volunteer force? The hon. Member spoke of the Volunteer force forming a garrison for India and a protection for our lines of communication. I have two remarks to make in that connection. I have never been a believer in playing what you may call your second eleven. It may be that you have to defend communications which are never attacked; that has happened; and so long as they are never attacked it does not matter who defends them. But if those communications are 1581 attacked you must have troops who are capable of defending them, and I am not going to subscribe to the theory that it is consistent with the safety and dignity of this country to depend upon troops not being engaged when they are placed in a responsible position. If you are going to send the Volunteers—and honestly I do not think you are—to India you must entirely reconstitute that force; you must change its constitution from top to bottom, a thing which I would never think of suggesting to this Committee. How many of the Volunteers went out as an organised force in the late war? Not a single unit.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
That is precisely my point. The organisation of the Volunteers as legally constituted absolutely prohibits their being made use of in the one way in which military forces can be most effectively employed. The Volunteers have been made use of in foreign wars as individuals and not as a military force, and if they are to be employed as a military force it follows as a necessary consequence that they should be organised in such a way that they could go to the seat of war with their own organisation and their own officers.
It has been said that I have made a proposal to abolish the Militia. That, I may perhaps be permitted to say, is an absolute misconception. I had hoped to utilise them, and I still think that it would be much better if we could, in a way which would make them independent of the Regular Army and make them really the basis of the short-service Army of this country. That has been my desire and that is my desire. That was my proposition and it remains my proposition, but it is not the proposition that I have been allowed to make to the House. Hon. Members know perfectly well what I mean. I have stated it over and over again. I find the feeling in this House is unconquerably opposed to any alteration of the organisation of the Militia; but I do believe that the hon. Member who alluded to 1582 this subject is perfectly right in saying that if we were allowed to take the Militia and make them the short-service Army, and make them really fit to face foreign troops in the field we should give the Militia a chance of becoming a real force. That is the "head and front of my offending." I should desire to include in that force a certain number of Line battalions. Now I want once for all to make it clear why I have made that proposal and why I think that that is the proposal which will ultimately be accepted. You have one hundred and fifty-six battalions of the Line, and if you are going to keep the whole of those hundred and fifty-six battalions of the Line on the basis of 800 to 1,000 enlisted for long service with their pay and emoluments as at present, and if you are going to spend any additional money on the Militia as you all desire we should, you will have an enormous increase of the Army Estimates. You will have the upward tendency in the Army Estimates accelerated, and you will have that great increase of our expenditure which the House and the Committee have over and over again said they will not have. There are two alternatives open to you. You may destroy a certain number of battalions of the Line in order to place battalions of Militia in their stead. But when you come to do that, I think you will have a problem which the boldest of us would not care to face. I do not think that public opinion will support the abolition of, say, the 92nd Highlanders in order to put Militia in their place. But that is the absolute logical sequence of forcing these proposals through if you are not to do anything to the Line battalions except to reduce them. What I propose, and what I think is the wisest course, is to level up the Militia battalions to the level of the Line battalions which are not necessary, and which need not be maintained in their full strength in time of peace, and make them the nucleus of the short-service Army. I am not proposing to reduce the Militia, as the hon. Member suggests. The whole Militia Vote is taken this year as it was taken last year; and I am going to ask the Committee, and I hope they will give me their full acquiescence and approval 1583 in the course which I have suggested, that we should deal with the Militia in the only way in which we can deal with it in its present condition—that we should get rid of those units and battalions which are inefficient and are clearly incapable of becoming efficient; that we should consolidate such battalions as would gain by consolidation, and if the result is economical from that process we should devote the funds saved to giving the Militia such additional training as the military authorities may think necessary, and which they are capable of receiving.
I have done my best to answer the question of the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight, though I do not suppose I have satisfied him. I have told him that while we owe an immense debt to the Volunteers, we must not exaggerate their importance. I do not think the hon. Member has made it evident to the Committee that we are justified in relying in the event of a great war on the Volunteer force as at present constituted to fulfil our needs. I do not think he has made it clear that we are in such imminent danger of invasion that it is necessary to keep 630,000 men in time of peace to repel an invasion which I honestly believe will never take place. But the hon. Member ex hypothesi will say half of that force, the Regular Army and the Reserves and the Reserves of the Navy will be withdrawn and we shall be left with a much smaller force at home. If we had to send the whole of the Regular Army out of the country it is absolutely certain that we should have the entire command of the sea, and if that is so, I believe we are on the safe side in proposing to take the steps I propose. What are those steps? It is that we should recognise, in the first place, that the doctrine of the chance of invasion of this country may be fully expressed by the chance of a raid by 5,000 men. We must be prepared to meet such a raid by a properly organised, equipped, and officered force, and in the Volunteers there is ample material for the formation of such a force. If we limit ourselves to a force of 200,000 Volunteers I am convinced we shall have in any part of the country which may be threatened an ample and sufficient force to repel any such raid, and an enormously improved efficiency on the part of the Volunteers 1584 by such a reduction of men and the additional expenditure of money on those remaining in the force.
§ MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)
said he did not attach as much value as some hon. Members did to these debates on Army reorganisation. There were in the House a considerable number of hon. Gentlemen who were under the impression that they ought to be field-marshals. These Gentlemen always seized every opportunity of submitting some particular plan of their own for Army reorganisation, and they generally disagreed with each other; while in most cases their plans involved a considerably larger expenditure. It was, therefore, obvious why the Votes for the Army had increased so much in the last few years. He understood that the debate that had gone on on the previous and was going on that day for such a time was merely a sort of preliminary canter, and that they were to have the whole of next week in which to say what the Army ought to be. He really felt inclined to seize the opportunity of taking a holiday; for he did not pretend to be a sort of professor able to lecture on military administration. He left all the details to the technical men in the profession; but what he had observed was that in all those debates in which money was thrown away and squandered in the most reckless fashion the talk was very much confined to the would-be military section of the House. The right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for War himself was one of those field-marshals; but, after all, they could not have a dozen Ministers for War if there was to be unity in the discussion of those matters. He came there simply as a representative of that burdened creature, the British taxpayer, and to look upon these matters from his point of view. Some years ago they had the great Army Corps scheme, which had disappeared, and all they knew was that the Army cost a great deal more at the present moment. And unless hon. Members specifically said that they would not allow the military men to expend more than the present money, the expenditure would go up and up. He believed in a practical Amendment to reduce the amount of the Vote by so much. His hon. friend the 1585 Member for the Isle of Wight had anticipated him in that course by moving a reduction of 10,000 men; but he understood that the money was to be spent on some other plan of the hon. Member's own. He would vote for the Amendment, because it would be so much less; but he wished it to be understood that he voted for it entirely without prejudice to his right to vote against the whole amount asked for.
He would give one or two good reasons for that course. Last year the Secretary for War came forward with a wondrous plan, and everything was to be changed for the better. He wanted to know what on earth had become of that plan? He consulted his military friends, and they told him that the plan had entirely disappeared; that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War had been overruled by his colleagues. He remembered that last year the right hon. Gentleman told the House that they had got an Army that was perfectly worthless and that all they had got to hope for was that, now he was Minister for War, he would alter it at once. Had the right hon. Gentleman done anything? Not a bit of it. Another observation the right hon. Gentleman made was that, if his plan was adopted, he would not continue to hold the office of Minister for War if he did not reduce the Estimates this year. Where on earth was the reduction? Would anybody tell him where it was? He did not know what the plan of the right hon. Gentleman was; but he gathered from the military critics that, if there was a plan, it was absolutely worthless. They knew that two or three years ago, when the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor produced his plan, the Prime Minister said it was perfection; and now that the House had found that it was not worth the money expended on it, the Prime Minister had thrown over the late Minister for War and taken on the right hon. Gentleman, the present Secretary for War. But that right hon. Gentleman was not allowed to carry out his own views; he was a perfect dummy. The right hon. Gentleman made a bold statement—he was rather bold and egotistical in his habits, and seemed to think that everybody should bow down and worship him—and said that if he 1586 was not allowed to carry out his own views, and if he did not reduce the Army Estimates this year compared with those of last year, he would not remain for a moment at the War Office. But there was the right hon. Gentleman this year at that box, with no plan and no reduction of Estimates. He wanted to know whether the right hon. Gentleman was going to do what he promised. It seemed to him that the right hon. Gentleman uttered that threat not so much to the House as to his colleagues; but his colleagues had got the better of him. They had frightened the right hon. Gentleman out of his promises.
Now, it seemed to him that the House ought to express their opinion that the right hon. Gentleman was not fit for his place, and that the Ministers collectively were not fit for their places. How were hon. Members to do that? By the old constitutional way—let them refuse any money or men to the Government until they gave place to better men. Really, it was monstrous that the right hon. Gentleman should come down to the House and tell them that he was not going to do anything last year, but that this year, if he remained Minister for War for so long, he would do something to reduce expenditure on the Army; and that there would be perfection in the end if only they kept him in office. What the House wanted was that the thing should be done at once; and they were not going to keep the Minister for War, or the Prime Minister either, in office any longer. They wanted both to be turned out and replaced by good sound Radicals, who would carry out in office pledges given in opposition. He knew it was said, "What a monstrous thing! Do you want to be without an Army?" No, he did not want the country to be without an Army. He believed the country required a reasonably large and efficient Army; but they had to use the forms of the House to secure that; and the only way in which they could press their protest against the mode in which the business of the Army was carried on, and show their thorough distrust of the Minister for War and his colleagues, was to vote against any proposal they made. If the right hon. Gentleman had 1587 come forward and asked for a modest Vote on Account, so as to enable the Government to arrange for a dissolution, he would have supported it, but as he had come forward and asked for a Vote to carry them over the whole year, when the Government had not the support of the country behind them, he should vote against it.
§ MR. BECKETT (Yorkshire, N.R., Whitby)
said he could not agree with the proposition of the hon. Member for Northampton that the Secretary of State for War was not fit for his place. The right hon. Gentleman had, whether they agreed with him in all the details of this scheme or not, proved emphatically that he was fit for his place. He had tackled a remarkably difficult problem in the right spirit. He had inherited an estate very heavily involved, and had done a good deal to extricate it from that difficult position. He believed he was on the right lines, and if he was allowed time to develop his policy the result would be most satisfactory. The proposition to reduce the Vote by 10,000 men he did not understand, because he did not know whether that was in addition to the reduction already promised by the Secretary of State for War. At all events, sufficient reason had not been given for such reduction. It was true that a proposition was made two years ago to reduce the Army by 27,000 men. For that proposition he, amongst others, voted, but he thought the conditions now were entirely different. Two years ago, when he voted for the reduction of the men, the scheme before the House was radically wrong in principle and hopelessly impracticable. It was therefore their duty to defeat that scheme by every means in their power. That scheme had been abandoned and another scheme had taken its place, from which the country hoped much better things. In order to complete the former scheme 50,000 recruits were asked for by the Secretary of State for War. It was manifestly impossible that 50,000 could be obtained, and therefore, in asking for a large establishment, the Government were merely asking the taxpayers' money. Now a smaller number of recruits was required, viz., 42,000 men, and as these men could be obtained the posi- 1588 tion was entirely different. Again, men were asked for two years ago for the defence of this country. Men were now asked for service abroad. There was a very great distinction between the two things. Again, two years ago the effective establishment was 311,000 men. Now the effective establishment was 274,000, or a reduction of over 37,000 men in the number of the Regular establishment. He did not therefore think that his hon. friend the Member for the Isle of Wight had made out a conclusive case in favour of a reduction by 10,000 men.
It was not well to reduce the Regular Army at the same time they were endeavouring to reduce the Volunteer force. He admitted that there was a good deal to be said in favour of an effective Volunteer force, but there were certain considerations which had not apparently been borne in mind. The Secretary of State for War said he wanted his Army for service abroad and on the Indian frontier. Supposing we were attacked on the Indian frontier and had to use our forces to repel that attack, should we not have to rely on Volunteer forces of some kind or another in order to supplement our Regular Army? Did the Secretary of State for War believe the Regular Army sufficient to repel an attack on the Indian Frontier without the assistance of Volunteer forces?
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
Certainly we should not have enough forces unless we had a very large Reserve, and that is why I make the proposal.
§ MR. BECKETT
thought experts would maintain that the wastage would be so great that in addition to the Reserve we should have largely to rely upon such assistance as we could derive from Volunteer forces in the country. If that were so, it was necessary to have as many men as possible accustomed to handle the rifle, and they would have a better position with 340,000 men to draw from than with only 200,000.
When they came to discuss the scheme with the right hon. Gentleman next week, he hoped some information would be given on certain points. Only a week or two 1589 ago the Prime Minister said the Secretary of State for War would produce "his" policy. He did not say "our" policy. The Secretary of State for War had also referred very fervently to the present policy as "my" policy. It was very desirable that they should know whether the Government had pinned their faith to this policy and whether they intended to stand or fall by it. That was a point upon which the House and the country ought to be informed by the Prime Minister himself. The Prime Minister was a member of the Defence Committee and must have the whole subject at his finger ends, and, considering the doubt and uncertainty which prevailed as to the true policy of the Government, the Secretary of State for War's statement should be supplemented by a definite statement from the Prime Minister next week. He asked the Secretary of State for War to tell them also what he had decided to do in regard to the striking force, and what shape that force would take. It would be extremely interesting and satisfactory if the Secretary of State for War would explain the system of recruiting a little more in detail, then they would feel more security as to the future of the Army. He had not offered these remarks in a hostile spirit, and would support the right hon. Gentleman in resisting the reduction proposed.
§ MR. MARKHAM (Nottinghamshire, Mansfield)
commented upon the fact that the Secretary of State for War had not offered any explanation of the reasons why he had not been allowed to carry out his policy, although he declared last year that he would not retain his position unless he were allowed a free hand.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
denied that he had been inconsistent or had falsified any of his pledges. He had not gone back one inch upon the proposals he had made.
§ MR. MARKHAM
said the right hon. Gentleman said he had not been allowed to carry out his policy, and the question was who had prevented him? Was it the Prime Minister, the Defence Committee, or the Secretary of State for India? They were in a very remarkable position. The Secretary of State for War stated that in his opinion it 1590 was necessary to have a short-service Army capable of being sent abroad in time of war, and yet he was not allowed to submit his scheme to the House. Was the right hon. Gentleman consulting his own dignity in remaining in the Government under such circumstances?
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER
said the hon. Gentleman was entirely mistaken. All he had said was that he was prevented by the prevailing sense of the House of Commons from making his proposal with regard to the Militia. That was not embodied in his scheme, and therefore he had nothing to withdraw.
§ MR. MARKHAM
Then we understand it is the House of Commons which has prevented the right hon. Gentleman.
§ MR. MARKHAM
said it had been pointed out that we had to face a large expenditure on the Indian frontier because Russia had brought a double line of railway to the frontier, and so long as this country continued to twist the tail of Russia so long a heavy expenditure on the Indian Army would be necessary.
§ MR. SOARES (Devonshire, Barnstaple)
was understood to ask before the Committee divided for some information on the subject of remounts and the disposal of cast horses, explaining that he did not desire to occupy time by repeating his observations of the previous day.
§ THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE WAR OFFICE (Mr. BROMLEY DAVENPORT,) Cheshire, Macclesfield
was understood to say: The hon. Member on the previous day had suggested that we were in no better position to-day with regard to the question of remounts than at the date of the South African War. That was not so. He was not surprised at the suggestion being made because the work had been done in a quiet and unostentatious manner, and it had not 1591 come to the knowledge of hon. Members. It was quite true that there was a smaller number of horses this year, not only in this country but in the world, than there were in 1899, and to that extent the difficulty of securing horses for the Army had not been reduced, but rather increased, but so far as organisation was concerned we were in an infinitely better position to-day than when we went to war in South Africa. The Remount Department had been entirely reorganised and was in a far better position than ever it had been before. They knew where horses were to be found and who they belonged to, the world having been divided into spheres of action. The small prizes given at local shows, to which the hon. Member had referred, would be continued during the coming year, because although they were small it was hoped that they would encourage the breeding of the class of horse likely to be useful for remount purposes. The hon. Member's suggestion as to the sale of cast horses had been considered, but the conclusion had been come to that it was not so economical as the present system. He was afraid they could not give horses to the Brood-Mare Society.
§ the numbers of the Volunteer force. He could not accept the statement of the Secretary of State for War that a large number of Volunteers were medically unfit. Of course so far as possible they should have physically fit men in the Volunteers, but so long as battalions were maintained under the capitation grant it would follow that the larger the numbers in the battalion the larger would be the capitation grant, and if the numbers of the Volunteers were reduced the War Office must be prepared to pay more heavily for those who were fit. [Mr. ARNOLD-FORSTER: Hear, hear!] Referring to the call made upon the Volunteers for active service with the Colours, he pointed out that the call originally made was for two companies from each brigade—one for immediate service and one for service six months hence. It was easy enough to get any number of men to volunteer for active service at once, but not so easy to get men to promise to go out in six or twelve months time, because they did not know what the demands of their business or occupation would be so long beforehand.
§ Question put.
§ The Committee divided:—Ayes, 207; Noes, 258. (Division List No. 90.)1595
|Abraham Wm. (Cork, N. E.)||Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H.||Eve, Harry Trelawney|
|Ainsworth, John Stirling||Causton, Richard Knight||Farrell, James Patrick|
|Allen, Charles P.||Cawley, Frederick||Fenwick, Charles|
|Ashton, Thomas Gair||Cheetham, John Frederick||Ferguson, R. C. Munro (Leith)|
|Asquith, Rt Hon. H. Henry||Churchill, Winston Spencer||Findlay, A. (Lanark, N. E.)|
|Atherley-Jones, L.||Cogan, Denis J.||Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond|
|Barlow, John Emmott||Condon, Thomas Joseph||Flavin, Michael Joseph|
|Barran, Rowland Hirst||Crombie, John William||Flynn, James Christopher|
|Barry, E. (Cork, S.)||Cullinan, J.||Foster, Sir Walter (Derby Co.)|
|Beaumont, Wentworth C. B.||Dalziel, James Henry||Fowler, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry|
|Benn, John Williams||Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen)||Freeman-Thomas, Captain F.|
|Black, Alexander William||Davies, M. Vaughan (Cardigan||Fuller, J. M. F.|
|Blake, Edward||Delany, William||Furness, Sir Christopher|
|Boland, John||Devlin, C. R. (Galway)||Gilhooly, James|
|Bolton, Thomas Dolling||Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles||Gladstone, Rt. Hon. H. John|
|Brigg, John||Dobbie, Joseph||Goddard, Daniel Ford|
|Bright, Allan Heywood||Doogan, P. C.||Griffith, Ellis, J.|
|Broadhurst, Henry||Douglas, C. M. (Lanark)||Guest, Hon. Ivor Churchill|
|Brown, G. M. (Edinburgh)||Duffy, William J.||Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton|
|Bryce, Rt. Hon. James||Duncan, J. Hastings||Hammond, John|
|Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn||Dunn, Sir William||Harcourt, Lewis|
|Burke, E. Haviland-||Elibank, Master of||Hardie, J. K. (Merthyr Tydvil)|
|Burns, John||Ellice, Capt E C (S.Andrw's Bghs||Harmsworth, R. Leicester|
|Burt, Thomas||Ellis, John Edward (Notts.)||Harwood, George|
|Caldwell, James||Emmott, Alfred||Hayden, John Patrick|
|Cameron, Robert||Esmonde, Sir Thomas||Hayter, Rt. Hon. Sir A. D.|
|Campbell, John (Armagh, S.)||Evans, Sir F. H. (Maidstone)||Helme, Norval Watson|
|Hemphill, Rt. Hon. Charles H.||Moulton, John Fletcher||Shackleton, David James|
|Henderson, Arthur (Durham)||Murphy, John||Shaw, Thomas (Hawick B.)|
|Higham, John Sharpe||Nannetti, Joseph P.||Sheehy, David|
|Hobhouse, C. E. H. (Bristol, E.)||Newnes, Sir George||Shipman, Dr. John G.|
|Holland, Sir William Henry||Nolan, J. (Lough, South)||Sinclair, John (Forfarshire)|
|Hope, John Deans (Fife, West||Norman, Henry||Slack, John Bamford|
|Horniman, Frederick John||Norton, Capt. Cecil William||Smith, Samuel (Flint)|
|Hutton, Alfred E. (Morley)||Nussey, Thomas Willans||Soares, Ernest J.|
|Jacoby, James Alfred||O'Brien, James F. X. (Cork)||Spencer, Rt. Hn. C. R. (Northants|
|Johnson, John||O'Brien, K. (Tipperary Mid)||Stanhope, Hon. Philip James|
|Joicey, Sir James||O'Brien, P. (Kilkenny)||Strachey, Sir Edward|
|Jones, D. B. (Swansea)||O'Brien, P. J. (Tipperary, N)||Sullivan, Donal|
|Jones, Leif (Appleby)||O'Connor, J. (Wicklow, W.)||Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)|
|Jones, Wm. (Carnarvonshire)||O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)||Thomas, Sir A. (Glamorgan. E.)|
|Jordan, Jeremiah||O'Donnell, John (Mayo, S.)||Thomas, D A. (Merthyr)|
|Joyce, Michael||O'Donnell, T. (Kerry, W.)||Thomson, F. W. (York, W. R.)|
|Kennedy, V. P. (Cavan, W.)||O'Dowd, John||Tillett, Louis John|
|Kilbride, Denis||O'Kelly, Conor (Mayo, N.)||Tomkinson, James|
|Kitson, Sir James||O'Kelly, J. (Roscommon, N.)||Toulmin, George|
|Labouchere, Henry||O'Malley, William||Trevelyan, Charles Philips|
|Lamont, Norman||O'Mara, James||Ure, Alexander|
|Law, Hugh Alex. (Donegal, W.)||O'Shaughnessy, P. J.||Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)|
|Lawson, Sir W. (Cornwall)||Partington, Oswald||Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.|
|Layland-Barratt, Francis||Paulton, James Mellor||Wason, Eugene (Clackmannan)|
|Leese, Sir J. F. (Accrington)||Pease, J. A. (Saffron Walden)||Wason, J. C. (Orkney)|
|Leigh, Sir Joseph||Power, Patrick Joseph||Weir, James Galloway|
|Levy, Maurice||Price, Robert John||White, George (Norfolk)|
|Lewis, John Herbert||Rea, Russell||White, Luke (York, E. R.)|
|Lough, Thomas||Reddy, M.||Whiteley, George (York, W. R.)|
|Lundon, W.||Redmond, J. E. (Waterford)||Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)|
|Lyell, Charles Henry||Reid, Sir R. T. (Dumfries)||Whittaker, Thomas Palmer|
|Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J.||Richards, T. (W. Monm'th)||Williams, Osmond (Merioneth)|
|MacNeill, J. Gordon Swift||Rickett, J. Compton||Wilson, F. W. (Norfolk, Mid|
|MacVeagh, Jeremiah||Roberts, J. Bryn (Eifion)||Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)|
|M'Arthur, William (Cornwall)||Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)||Wilson, J. W. (Worcestersh, N.)|
|M'Crae, George||Robertson, E. (Dundee)||Woodhouse, Sir J. T. (Huddersf'd|
|M'Kean, John||Robson, William Snowdon||Young, Samuel|
|M'Kenna, Reginald||Roche, John||Yoxall, James Henry|
|M'Laren, Sir C. Benjamin||Roe, Sir Thomas|
|Markham, Arthur Basil||Rose, Charles Day||TELLERS FOR THE AYES—|
|Mooney, John J.||Runciman, Walter||Major Seely and Sir John|
|Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen)||Russell, T. W.||Dickson-Poynder.|
|Morley, Rt Hn. J. (Montrose)||Samuel, H. L. (Cleveland)|
|Moss, Samuel||Schwann, Charles E.|
|Agg-Gardner, James Tynto||Bignold, Sir Arthur||Cochrane, Hon. T. H. A. E.|
|Agnew, Sir Andrew Noel||Bill, Charles||Coghill, Douglas Harry|
|Allsopp, Hon. George||Bingham, Lord||Cohen, Benjamin Louis|
|Anson, Sir William Reynell||Blundell, Colonel Henry||Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse|
|Arkwright, John Stanhope||Bond, Edward||Colomb, Rt. Hn. Sir John C. R.|
|Arnold-Forster, Rt. Hn. H. O.||Boscawen, Arthur Griffith,||Colston, C. E. H. Athole|
|Arrol, Sir William||Boulnois, Edmund||Cook, Sir F. Lucas|
|Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John||Brassey, Albert||Corbett, T. L. (Down, North)|
|Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt. Hn. Sir H.||Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John||Cox, Irwin Edward Bainbridge|
|Bagot, Capt. J. FitzRoy||Brotherton, Edward Allen||Craig, C. C. (Antrim, S.)|
|Bailey, James (Walworth)||Brown, Sir A. H. (Shropsh.)||Cross, H. Shepherd (Bolton)|
|Bain, Colonel James Robert||Bull, William James||Crossley, Rt. Hon. Sir Savile|
|Baird, J. G. Alexander||Burdett-Coutts, W.||Cubitt, Hon. Henry|
|Balcarres, Lord||Campbell, Rt Hn. J. A. (Glasgow)||Dalrymple, Sir Charles|
|Baldwin, Alfred||Campbell, J. H. M. (Dublin Univ.||Davenport, William Bromley|
|Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Manch'r)||Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir E. H.||Denny, Colonel|
|Balfour, Rt Hn Gerald W. (Leeds)||Cautley, Henry Strother||Dickson, Charles Scott|
|Balfour, Kenneth R. (Christch.||Cavendish, R. F. (N. Lancs.)||Dimsdale, Rt. Hon. Sir J.|
|Banbury, Sir F. George||Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbyshire||Disraeli, Coningsby Ralph|
|Banner, John S. Harmood-||Cayzer, Sir Charles William||Dixon-Hartland, Sir F. Dixon|
|Bartley, Sir George C. T.||Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)||Dorington, Rt. Hon. Sir J. E.|
|Bathurst, Hon. Allen Benjamin||Chamberlain, Rt Hn J. A. (Worc.||Doughty, Sir George|
|Beckett, Ernest William||Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry||Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers-|
|Bentinck, Lord Henry C.||Chapman, Edward||Doxford, Sir William Theodore|
|Bhownaggree, Sir M. M.||Clive, Captain Percy A.||Duke, Henry Edward|
|Dyke, Rt. Hon. Sir W. Hart||Laurie, Lieut. -General||Randles, John S.|
|Egerton, Hon. A. de Tatton||Law, Andrew B. (Glasgow)||Rankin, Sir James|
|Faber, Edmund B. (Hants, W.)||Lawrence, Sir J. (Monm'th)||Ratcliff, R. F.|
|Faber, George D. (York)||Lawrence, Wm. F. (Liverpool)||Reid, James (Greenock)|
|Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn E.||Lawson, Hn. H. L. W. (Mile End)||Remnant, James Farquharson|
|Fergusson, Rt. Hn. Sir. J. (Manc'r||Lawson, John G. (Yorks. N. R.)||Renshaw, Sir Charles Bine|
|Finch, Rt. Hon. George H.||Lee, A. H. (Hants., Fareham||Renwick, George|
|Finlay, Sir R. B. (Inv'rn'sB'ghs)||Lees, Sir Elliott (Birkenhead)||Ridley, S. Forde|
|Fisher, William Hayes||Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage||Robertson, Herbert (Hackney|
|Fison, Frederick William||Leveson-Gower, Frederick N. S.||Rolleston, Sir John F. L.|
|FitzGerald, Sir R. Penrose-||Llewellyn, Evan Henry||Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye|
|Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A.||Lockwood, Lieut-Col. A. R.||Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert|
|Flower, Sir Ernest||Long, Col. C. W. (Evesham)||Round, Rt. Hn. James|
|Forster, Henry William||Long, Rt. Hn. W. (Bristol, S.)||Royds, Clement Molyneux|
|Foster, P. S. (Warwick, S. W.||Lonsdale, John Brownlee||Rutherford, John (Lancashire)|
|Gardner, Ernest||Lowe, Francis William||Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool)|
|Garfit, William||Lowther, C. (Cumb., Eskdale)||Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford|
|Godson, Sir A. Frederick||Lucas, Col. F. (Lowestoft)||Sadler, Col. Samuel Alexander|
|Gordon, Hn. J. E. (Elgin & Nairn)||Lucas, R. J. (Portsmouth)||Samuel, Sir H. S. (Limehouse)|
|Gordon, Maj Evans- (T'rH'mlets||Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred||Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)|
|Gore, Hon. S. F. Ormsby-||Macdona, John Cumming||Seton-Karr, Sir Henry|
|Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir John Eldon||MacIver, David (Liverpool)||Sharpe, William Edward T.|
|Goschen, Hon. George Joachim||Maconochie, A. W.||Sinclair, Louis (Romford)|
|Graham, Henry Robert||M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool)||Sloan, Thomas Henry|
|Gray, Ernest (West Ham)||M'Iver, Sir L. (Edinburgh W.)||Smith, H. C. (North'mb, Tynes'd|
|Green, Walford D. (Wednesbury||Majendie, James A. H.||Smith, Hn. W. F. D. (Strand)|
|Greene, H. D. (Shrewsbury)||Malcolm, Ian||Spear, John Ward|
|Greene, W. Raymond (Cambs.)||Manners, Lord Cecil||Spencer, Sir E. (W. Bromwich)|
|Gretton, John||Marks, Harry Hananel||Stewart, Sir M. J. M'Taggart|
|Greville, Hon. Ronald||Martin, Richard Biddulph||Strutt, Hon. Charles Hedley|
|Hain, Edward||Maxwell, Rt Hn Sir H E (Wigt'n||Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)|
|Hall, Edward Marshall||Maxwell, W. J. H. (Dumfriesshire||Talbot, Rt. Hn. J. G (Oxf'd Univ.)|
|Halsey, Rt. Hon. Thomas F.||Mildmay, Francis Bingham||Thornton, Percy M.|
|Hambro, Charles Eric||Milner, Rt. Hon. Sir Fred. G.||Tollemache, Henry James|
|Hamilton, Marq. of (L'nd'nderry||Milvain, Thomas||Tomlinson, Sir Wm. Edw. M.|
|Hare, Thomas Leigh||Molesworth, Sir Lewis||Tritton, Charles Ernest|
|Harris, F. L. (Tynem'th)||Montagu, Hon. J. S. (Hants.)||Tuff, Charles|
|Haslam, Sir Alfred S.||Moon, Edward Robert Pacy||Vincent, Col. Sir C. E. H. (Sheffield|
|Hay, Hon. Claude George||Moore, William||Vincent, Sir Edgar (Exeter)|
|Heath, Sir J. (Staffords, N. W.)||Morgan, D. J. (Walthamstow)||Walrond, Rt. Hn. Sir Wm. H.|
|Helder, Augustus||Morpeth, Viscount||Warde, Colonel C. E.|
|Henderson, Sir A. (Stafford, W.)||Morrell, George Herbert||Webb, Colonel William George|
|Hickman, Sir Alfred||Morrison, James Archibald||Welby, Lt. -Col. A. C E (Taunton)|
|Hoare, Sir Samuel||Morton, Arthur H. Aylmer||Wharton, Rt. Hon. John Lloyd|
|Hogg, Lindsay||Mount, William Arthur||Whiteley, H. (Ashton und Lyne|
|Hope, J. F. (Sheffield, Brightside)||Murray, Charles J. (Coventry||Whitmore, Charles Algernon|
|Horner, Frederick William||Murray, Col. Wyndham (Bath)||Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset)|
|Hoult, Joseph||Nicholson, William Graham||Willough by de Eresby, Lord|
|Howard, J. (Kent, Faversham)||Palmer, Sir Walter (Salisbury)||Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.)|
|Howard, J. (Midd., Tottenham||Parkes, Ebenezer||Wilson, John (Glasgow)|
|Hozier, Hon. James H. C.||Pease, H. P. (Darlington)||Wilson-Todd, Sir W. H. (Yorks.)|
|Hudson, George Bickersteth||Peel, Hn. Wm. Robert Wellesley||Wolff, Gustav Wilhelm.|
|Hunt, Rowland||Pemberton, John S. G.||Worsley-Taylor, Henry Wilson|
|Hutton, John (Y rks, N. R.)||Percy, Earl||Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart|
|Jebb, Sir Richard Claverhouse||Pierpoint, Robert||Wrightson, Sir Thomas|
|Jessel, Capt. Herbert Merton||Pilkington, Colonel Richard||Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong|
|Kennaway, Rt. Hn. Sir J. H.||Platt-Higgins, Frederick||Younger, William|
|Kenyon, Hn. G. T. (Denbigh)||Plummer, Sir Walter R.|
|Kenyon-Slaney, Rt. Hn. Col. W.||Powell, Sir Francis Sharp||TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Sir|
|Kimber, Sir Henry||Pretyman, Ernest George||Alexander Acland-Hood and|
|King, Sir Henry Seymour||Pryce-Jones, Lt. -Col. Edward||Viscount Valentia.|
|Knowles, Sir Lees||Purvis, Robert|
|Lambton, Hon. Fred. Wm.||Quilter, Sir Cuthbert|
§ And, it being half-past Six of the clock, the Chairman, pursuant to the Order of the House of the 16th March, proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of Vote A and Vote 7 of the Army Estimates.1596
§ Question put, "That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 221,300, all ranks, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at Home and Abroad, excluding His Majesty's Indian Possessions, 1597 during the year ending on the 31st day of March. 1906."1598
§ The Committee divided:—Ayes, 268, Noes, 161. (Division List No. 91.)1601
|Agg-Gardner, James Tynte||Dickson, Charles Scott||Jessel, Captain Herbert Merton|
|Agnew, Sir Andrew Noel||Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles||Joicey, Sir James|
|Allsopp, Hon. George||Dimsdale, Rt. Hn. Sir Joseph C.||Kennaway, Rt. Hn. Sir John H|
|Anson, Sir William Reynell||Disraeli, Coningsby Ralph||Kenyon, Hon. Geo. T. (Denbigh|
|Arkwright, John Stanhope||Dixon-Hartland, Sir Fred Dixon||Kenyon-Slaney, Rt. Hn. Col. W.|
|Arnold-Forster, Rt. Hn. H. O||Dorington, Rt. Hn. Sir John E.||Kimber, Sir Henry|
|Arrol, Sir William||Doughty, Sir George||King, Sir Henry Seymour|
|Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John||Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers-||Knowles, Sir Lees|
|Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt. Hn. Sir H||Doxford, Sir William Theodore||Lambton, Hon. Frederick Wm.|
|Bagot, Capt. Josceline FitzRoy||Duke, Henry Edward||Lamont, Norman|
|Bailey, James (Walworth)||Dyke, Rt. Hn. Sir William Hart||Laurie, Lieut. -General|
|Bain, Colonel James Robert||Egerton, Hon. A. de Tatton||Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow)|
|Baird, John George Alexander||Faber, Edmund B. (Hants, W.)||Lawrence, Sir Josoph (Monm'th|
|Balcarres, Lord||Faber, George Denison (York)||Lawrence, Wm. F. (Liverpool)|
|Baldwin, Alfred||Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn Edward||Lawson, Hn. H. L. W. (Mile End|
|Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Manch.||Fergusson, Rt Hn Sir J. (Manc'r||Lawson, John Grant (Yorks. N R|
|Balfour, Rt Hn Gerald W (Leeds||Finch, Rt. Hon. George H.||Lee Arthur H.(Hants., Fareh'm|
|Balfour, Kenneth R. (Christch||Finlay, Sir R. B. (Inverness B'ghs||Lees, Sir Elliott (Birkenhead)|
|Banbury, Sir Frederick George||Fisher, William Hayes||Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage|
|Banner, John S. Harmood-||Fison, Frederick William||Leveson-Gower, Frederick N. S.|
|Bartley, Sir George C. T.||FitzGerald, Sir Robert Penrose-||Llewellyn, Evan Henry|
|Bathurst, Hn. Allen Benjamin||Fitzroy, Hn. Edward Algernon||Lockwood, Lieut-Col. A. R.|
|Beach, Rt Hn Sir Michael Hicks||Flannery, Sir Fortescue||Long, Col. Charles W. (Evesham|
|Bentinck, Lord Henry C.||Flower, Sir Ernest||Long, Rt. Hn. Walter (Bristol, S)|
|Bhownaggree, Sir M. M.||Forster, Henry William||Lonsdale, John Brownlee|
|Bignold, Sir Arthur||Foster, Philip S. (Warwick, S. W||Lowe, Francis William|
|Bill, Charles||Gardner, Ernest||Lowther, C. (Cumb. Eskdale)|
|Bingham, Lord||Garfit, William||Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft|
|Blundell, Colonel Henry||Godson, Sir Augustus Frederick||Lucas, Reginald J.(Portsmouth|
|Bond, Edward||Gordon, Hn. J. E. (Elgin & Nairn||Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred|
|Boscawen, Arthur Griffith||Gordon, Maj Evans- (T'r H'ml'ts||Macdona, John Cumming|
|Boulnois, Edmund||Gore, Hon. S. F. Ormsby-||MacIver, David (Liverpool)|
|Brassey, Albert||Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir John Eldon||Maconochie, A. W.|
|Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John||Goschen, Hon. George Joachim||M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool)|
|Brotherton, Edward Allen||Goulding, Edward Alfred||M'Iver, Sir Lewis (Edinburgh W|
|Brown, Sir Alex. H. (Shropsh.)||Graham, Henry Robert||Majendie, James A. H.|
|Bull, William James||Gray, Ernest (West Ham)||Malcolm, Ian|
|Burdett-Coutts, W.||Green, Walford D. (Wednesbury||Manners, Lord Cecil|
|Caldwell, James||Greene, Henry D. (Shrewsbury||Marks, Harry Hananel|
|Campbell, Rt. Hn. J. A. (Glasgow||Greene, W. Raymond (Cambs.||Martin, Richard Biddulph|
|Campbell, J. H. M. (Dublin Univ.||Gretton, John||Maxwell, W. J. H (Dumfriesshire|
|Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward H.||Greville, Hon. Ronald||Mildmay, Francis Bingham|
|Cautley, Henry Strother||Guest, Hon. Ivor Churchill||Milner, Rt. Hon. Sir Fredk. G.|
|Cavendish, R. F. (N. Lancs.)||Hain, Edward||Milvain, Thomas|
|Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbyshire||Hall, Edward Marshall||Molesworth, Sir Lewis|
|Cayzer, Sir Charles William||Halsey, Rt. Hon. Thomas F.||Montagu, Hon J Scott (Hants)|
|Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)||Hambro, Charles Eric||Moon, Edward Robert Pacy|
|Chamberlain, Rt Hn J. A. (Worc.||Hamilton, Marq. of (Lond'n'rry||Moore, William|
|Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry||Hare, Thomas Leigh||Morgan, David J (Walthamstow|
|Chapman, Edward||Harris, F. Leverton (Tynem'th||Morpeth, Viscount|
|Clive, Captain Percy A.||Haslam, Sir Alfred S.||Morrell, George Herbert|
|Cochrane, Hon. Thos. H. A. E.||Hay, Hon. Claude George||Morrison, James Archibald|
|Coghill, Douglas Harry||Heath, Sir James (Staffs. N. W||Morton, Arthur H Aylmer|
|Cohen, Benjamin Louis||Helder, Augustus||Mount, William Arthur|
|Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse||Henderson, Sir A. (Stafford, W.||Murray, Charles J (Coventry)|
|Colomb, Rt. Hn. Sir John C. R.||Hickman, Sir Alfred||Murray, Col. Wyndham (Bath)|
|Colston, Chas. Edw. H. Athole||Hoare, Sir Samuel||Newnes, Sir George|
|Cook, Sir Frederick Lucas||Hogg, Lindsay||Nicholson, William Graham|
|Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)||Hope, J. F. (Sheffield, Brightside||Palmer, Sir Walter (Salisbury)|
|Corbett, T. L. (Down, North)||Hoult, Joseph||Parkes, Ebenezer|
|Craig, Charles Curtis (Antrim, S||Howard, J. (Kent, Faversham||Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington|
|Cross, Herb. Shepherd (Bolton)||Howard, J. (Midd., Tottenham)||Peel, Hn. Wm. Robert Wellesley|
|Crossley, Rt. Hon. Sir Savile||Hozier, Hn. James Henry Cecil||Pemberton, John S G.|
|Cubitt, Hon. Henry||Hudson, George Bickersteth||Percy, Earl|
|Dalrymple, Sir Charles||Hunt, Rowland||Pierpoint, Robert|
|Davenport, William Bromley||Hutton, John (Yorks., N. R.)||Pilkington, Colonel Richard|
|Denny, Colonel||Jebb, Sir Richard Claverhouse||Platt-Higgins, Frederick|
|Plummer, Sir Walter R.||Samuel, Sir Harry S.(Limehouse||Warde, Colonel C. E.|
|Powell, Sir Francis Sharp||Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)||Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.|
|Pretyman, Ernest George||Seely, Maj. J. E. B. (Isle of Wight||Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney|
|Pryce-Jones, Lt. -Col. Edward||Seton-Karr, Sir Henry||Webb, Colonel William George|
|Purvis, Robert||Sharpe, William Edward T.||Welby, Lt-Col. A C E (Taunton|
|Quilter, Sir Cuthbert||Sinclair, Louis (Romford)||Wharton, Rt. Hon. John Lloyd|
|Randles, John S.||Sloan, Thomas Henry||Whiteley, H. (Ashton und Lyne|
|Rankin, Sir James||Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, East)||Whitmore, Charles Algernon|
|Ratcliff, R. F.||Smith, H C. (North'mb. Tyneside||Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset)|
|Reid, James (Greenock)||Smith, Hon. W. F. D. (Strand)||Willoughby de Eresby, Lord|
|Remnant, James Farqnharson||Spear, John Ward||Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.|
|Renshaw, Sir Charles Bine||Spencer, Sir E. (W. Bromwich)||Wilson, John (Glasgow)|
|Renwick, George||Stewart, Sir Mark J. M'Taggart||Wilson-Todd, Sir W. H. (Yorks|
|Ridley, S. Forde||Strutt, Hon. Charles Hedley||Worsley-Taylor, Henry Wilson|
|Robertson, Herbert (Hackney)||Talbot, Lord E (Chichester)||Wortley, Rt Hon. C. B. Stuart|
|Rolleston, Sir John F. L.||Talbot, Rt. Hn. J. G. (Oxf'd Univ||Wrightson, Sir Thomas|
|Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye||Thornton, Percy M.||Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong|
|Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert||Tollemache, Henry James||Younger, William|
|Round, Rt, Hon. James||Tomlinson, Sir Wm. Edw. M.|
|Royds, Clement Molyneux||Tritton, Charles Ernest||TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Sir|
|Rutherford, John (Lancashire||Tuff, Charles||Alexander Acland-Hood and|
|Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool)||Vincent, Col Sir C E H (Sheffield||Viscount Valentia.|
|Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford||Vincent, Sir Edgar (Exeter)|
|Sadler, Col. Samuel Alexander||Walrond, Rt Hn Sir William H.|
|Abraham, William (Cork, N. E.)||Freeman-Thomas, Captain F.||Morley, Rt Hn John (Montrose|
|Ainsworth, John Stirling||Fuller, J. M. F.||Moss, Samuel|
|Allen, Charles P.||Furness, Sir Christopher||Moulton, John Fletcher|
|Ashton, Thomas Gair||Gilhooly, James||Murphy, John|
|Atherley-Jones, L.||Goddard, Daniel Ford||Nannetti, Joseph P.|
|Barlow, John Emmott||Griffith, Ellis J.||Nolan, Joseph (Louth, South)|
|Barry, E. (Cork, S.)||Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton||Norton, Capt. Cecil William|
|Benn, John Williams||Hammond, John||O'Brien, James F. X. (Cork)|
|Blake Edward||Hardie, J Keir (Merthyr Tydvil||O'Brien, Kendal (Tipperary Mid|
|Boland, John||Harwood, George||O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)|
|Bolton, Thomas Dolling||Hayden, John Patrick||O'Brien, P. J. (Tipperary, N.)|
|Brigg, John||Helme, Norval Watson||O'Connor, James (Wicklow, W)|
|Bright, Allan Heywood||Hemphill, Rt. Hon. Charles H.||O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.)|
|Broadhurst, Henry||Henderson, Arthur (Durham)||O'Donnell, John (Mayo, S.)|
|Bryce, Rt. Hon. James||Higham, John Sharpe||O'Donnell, T. (Kerry, W.)|
|Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn||Hope, John Deans (Fife, West)||O'Dowd, John|
|Burke, E. Haviland||Horniman, Frederick John||O'Kelly, Conor (Mayo, N.)|
|Burt, Thomas||Jacoby, James Alfred||O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N|
|Cameron, Robert||Johnson, John||O'Malley, William|
|Campbell, John (Armagh, S.)||Jones, David Brynmor (Sw'nsea||O'Mara, James|
|Causton, Richard Knight||Jones, Leif (Appleby)||O'Shaughnessy, P. J.|
|Cawley, Frederick||Jones, William (Carnarvonshire||Partington, Oswald|
|Cheetham, John Frederick||Jordan, Jeremiah||Paulton, James Mellor|
|Cogan, Denis J.||Joyce, Michael||Pease, J. A. (Saffron Walden)|
|Condon, Thomas Joseph||Kearley, Hudson E.||Power, Patrick Joseph|
|Crombie, John William||Kennedy, Vincent P (Cavan, W||Price, Robert John|
|Cullinan, J.||Kilbride, Denis||Rea, Russell|
|Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen)||Kitson, Sir James||Reddy, M.|
|Delany, William||Law, Hugh Alex. (Donegal, W.||Redmond, John E. (Waterford)|
|Devlin, Chas. Ramsay (Galway||Layland-Barratt, Francis||Reid, Sir R Threshie (Dumfries|
|Dobbie, Joseph||Leigh, Sir Joseph||Richards, Thomas (W. Monm'th|
|Doogan, P. C.||Levy, Maurice||Rickett, J. Compton|
|Duffy, William J.||Lewis, John Herbert||Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)|
|Duncan, J. Hastings||Lough, Thomas||Roberts John H. (Denbighs.)|
|Dunn, Sir William||Lundon, W.||Robertson, Edmund (Dundee)|
|Ellice, Capt. E. C. (S. Andr's B'ghs||Lyell, Charles Henry||Robson, William Snowdon|
|Esmonde, Sir Thomas||Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J.||Roche, John|
|Eve, Harry Trelawney||MacNeill, John Gordon Swift||Roe, Sir Thomas|
|Farrell, James Patrick||MacVeagh, Jeremiah||Rose, Charles Day|
|Fenwick, Charles||M'Crae, George||Russell, T. W.|
|Findlay, Alexander (Lanark N E||M'Kean, John||Samuel, Herbt. L. (Cleveland)|
|Flavin, Michael Joseph||M'Laren, Sir Charles Benjamin||Schwann, Charles E.|
|Flynn, James Christopher||Markham, Arthur Basil||Shackleton, David James|
|Foster, Sir Walter (Derby Co.)||Mooney, John J.||Shaw, Thomas (Hawick B.)|
|Fowler, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry||Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen)||Sheehy, David|
|Shipman, Dr. John G.||Tillett, Louis John||Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)|
|Slack, John Bamford||Tomkinson, James||Whittaker, Thomas Palmer|
|Smith, Samuel (Flint)||Toulmin, George||Wilson, Fred. W (Norfolk, Mid|
|Soares, Ernest J.||Ure, Alexander||Wilson, John (Durham, Mid.)|
|Stanhope, Hon. Philip James||Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)||Woodhouse, Sir J T (Huddersf'd|
|Sullivan, Donal||Wason, Eugene (Clackmannan)||Young, Samuel|
|Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)||Weir, James Galloway|
|Thomas, Sir A (Glamorgan, E.)||White, George (Norfolk)||TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Sir|
|Thomas, David Alfred (Merthyr||White, Luke (York, E. R.)||Wilfrid Lawson and Mr.|
|Thomson, F W (York, W. R)||Whiteley, George (York, W. R.||Labouchere.|
§ Question put, "That a sum, not exceeding £4,630,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge for
§ The committee divided:—Ayes, 259;
|Agg-Ganlner, James Tynte||Coghill, Douglas Harry||Green, W. D. (Wednesbury)|
|Agnew, Sir Andrew Noel||Cohen, Benjamin Louis||Greene, H. D. (Shrewsbury)|
|Allsopp, Hon. George||Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse||Greene, W. Raymond- (Cambs.|
|Anson, Sir William Reynell||Colomb, Rt. Hn. Sir John C. R.||Gretton, John|
|Arkwright, John Stanhope||Colston, Chas. Edw. H. Athole||Greville, Hon. Donald|
|Arnold-Forster, Rt. Hn. H. O.||Cook, Sir Frederick Lucas||Hain, Edward|
|Arrol, Sir William||Gorbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow)||Hall, Edward Marshall|
|Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John||Corbett, T. L. (Down, North)||Halsey, Rt. Hon. Thomas F.|
|Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt. Hn. Sir H||Craig, Chas. Curtis (Antrim, S.||Hambro, Charles Eric|
|Bagot, Capt. Josceline FitzRoy||Cross, Herb. Shepherd (Bolton||Hamilton, Marq. of (L'nd'nd'y)|
|Bailey, James (Walworth)||Crossley, Rt. Hon. Sir Savile||Hare, Thomas Leigh|
|Bain, Colonel James Robert||Cubitt, Hon. Henry||Harris, F. Leverton (Tynem'th|
|Baird, John George Alexander||Dalrymple, Sir Charles||Haslam, Sir Alfred S.|
|Balcarres, Lord||Davenport, William Bromley-||Hay, Hon. Claude George|
|Baldwin, Alfred||Denny, Colonel||Heath, Sir J. (Staffords. N. W.)|
|Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Manch'r.)||Dickson, Charles Scott||Helder, Augustus|
|Balfour, Rt. Hn. G. W. (Leeds)||Dimsdale, Rt. Hon. Sir J. C.||Henderson, Sir A. (Stafford, W.|
|Balfour, Kenneth R. (Christch.||Disraeli, Coningsby Ralph||Hickman, Sir Alfred|
|Banbury, Sir Frederick George||Dixon-Hartland, Sir F. Dixon||Hoare, Sir Samuel|
|Banner, John S. Harmood-||Dorington, Rt. Hon. Sir John E||Hogg, Lindsay|
|Bartley, Sir George G. T.||Doughty, Sir George||Hope, J. F. (Sheffield, Brightside|
|Bathurst, Hon. Allen Benjamin||Douglas, Rt. Hn. A. Akers-||Hoult, Joseph|
|Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir M. Hicks||Doxford, Sir William Theodore||Howard, J. (Kent, Faversham)|
|Bentinck, Lord Henry C.||Duke, Henry Edward||Howard, J. (Midd., Tottenham|
|Bhownaggree, Sir M. M.||Egerton, Hon. A. de Tatton||Hozier, Hon. James Henry C.|
|Bignold, Sir Arthur||Ellice, Capt E. C (S. Andrw's Bghs||Hudson, George Bickersteth|
|Bill, Charles||Faber, Edmund B. (Hants, W.)||Hunt, Rowland|
|Bingham, Lord||Faber, George Denison (York)||Hutton, John (Yorks. N. R.)|
|Blundell, Colonel Henry||Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn Edw.||Jebb, Sir Richard Claverhouse|
|Bond, Edward||Fergusson, Rt. Hn. Sir J (Manc'r)||Jessel, Capt. Herbert Morton|
|Boscawen, Arthur Griffith||Finch, Rt. Hon. George H.||Kennaway, Rt. Hn. Sir John H|
|Boulnois, Edmund||Finlay, Sir R. B. (Inv'rn'ss B'ghs)||Kenyon, Hn. Geo. T. (Denbigh|
|Brassey, Albert||Fisher, William Hayes||Kenyon-Slaney, Rt. Hn. Col. W.|
|Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John||Fison, Frederick William||Kimber, Sir Henry|
|Brotherton, Edward Allen||FitzGerald, Sir Robert Penrose-||King, Sir Henry Seymour|
|Brown, Sir Alex. H. (Shropsh.)||Fitzroy, Hn. Edw. Algernon||Knowles, Sir Lees|
|Bull, William James||Flannery, Sir Fortescue||Lambton, Hn. Frederick Wm.|
|Burdett-Coutts, W.||Flower, Sir Ernest||Laurie, Lieut-General|
|Campbell, Rt. Hn. J. A (Glasgow||Forster, Henry William||Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow)|
|Gampbell, J. H. M. (Dublin Univ.||Foster, P. S. (Warwick, S. W.)||Lawrence, Sir J. (Monmouth|
|Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edw. H.||Gardner, Ernest||Lawrence, Wm. F. (Liverpool)|
|Cautley, Henry Strother||Garfit, William||Lawson, Hn. H. L. W. (Mile End)|
|Cavendish, R. F. (N. Lancs.)||Godson, Sir Augustus Fredk.||Lawson, J. Grant (Yorks. N. R.|
|Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbyshire||Gordon, Hn. J. E. (Elgin & Nairn)||Lee, A. H. (Hants., Fareham)|
|Cayzer, Sir Charles William||Gordon, Maj Evans-(T'rH'ml'ts||Lees, Sir Elliott (Birkenhead)|
|Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor)||Gore, Hon. S. F. Ormsby-||Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage|
|Chamberlain, Rt Hn J. A. (Worc.||Gorst, Rt. Hn. Sir John Eldon||Leveson-Gower, Frederick N. S.|
|Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry||Goschen, Hn. George Joachim||Llewellyn, Evan Henry|
|Chapman, Edward||Goulding, Edward Alfred||Lockwood, Lieut. -Col. A. R.|
|Clive, Captain Percy A.||Graham, Henry Robert||Long, Col. Chas. W. (Evesham)|
|Cochrane, Hon. Thos. H. A. E.||Gray, Ernest (West Ham)||Long, Rt. Hn. W. (Bristol, S.)|
§ Supplies and Clothing, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1906."
§ Noes, 185. (Division List No. 92.)1605
|Lonsdale, John Brownlee||Percy, Earl||Spear, John Ward|
|Lowe, Francis William||Pierpoint, Robert||Spencer, Sir E. (W. Bromwich)|
|Lowther, C. (Cumb., Eskdale)||Pilkington, Colonel Richard||Stewart, Sir Mark J. M'Taggart|
|Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft)||Platt-Higgins, Frederick||Strutt, Hon. Charles Hedley|
|Lucas, Reginald J. (Portsm'th)||Plummer, Sir Walter R.||Talbot, Lord E. (Chicheater)|
|Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred||Powell, Sir Francis Sharp||Talbot, Rt. Hn. J. G. (Oxf'd Univ|
|Macdona, John Cumming||Pretyman, Ernest George||Thornton, Percy M.|
|MacIver,. David (Liverpool)||Pryce-Jones, Lt. -Col. Edward||Tollemache, Henry James|
|Maconochie, A. W.||Purvis, Robert||Tomlinson, Sir Wm. Edw. M.|
|M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool)||Quilter, Sir Cuthbert||Tritton, Charles Ernest|
|M'Iver, Sir Lewis (Edinburgh, W||Randles, John S.||Tuff, Charles|
|Majendie, James A. H.||Rankin, Sir James||Vincent, Col. Sir C E. H (Sheffield|
|Malcolm, Ian||Ratcliff, R. F.||Vincent, Sir Edgar (Exeter)|
|Manners, Lord Cecil||Reid, James (Greenock)||Walrond, Rt. Hon. Sir W. H.|
|Marks, Harry Hananel||Remnant, James Farquharson||Warde, Colonel C. E.|
|Martin, Richard Diddulph||Renshaw, Sir Charles Bine||Webb, Colonel William George|
|Maxwell, W. J. H (Dumfriessh.)||Renwick, George||Welby, Lt. -Col. A. C. E (Taunton|
|Mildmay, Francis Bingham||Ridley, S, Forde||Wharton, Rt. Hon. John Lloyd|
|Milner, Rt. Hn. Sir Fredk. G.||Robertson, Herbert (Hackney)||Whiteley, H. (Ashtou und. Lyne|
|Milvain, Thomas||Rolleston, Sir John F. L.||Whitmore, Charles Algernon|
|Molesworth, Sir Lewis||Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye||Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset)|
|Montagu, Hon. J. Scott (Hants||Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert||Willough by de Eresby, Lord|
|Moon, Edward Robert Pacy||Round, Rt. Hon. James||Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.)|
|Morgan, D. J. (Walthamstow)||Royds, Clement Molyneux||Wilson, John (Glasgow)|
|Morpeth, Viscount||Rutherford, John (Lancashire)||Wilson-Todd, Sir W. H. (Yorks.|
|Morrell, George Herbert||Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool)||Wolff, Gustav Wilhelm|
|Morrison, James Archibald||Sackville, Col. S. G. (Stopford-||Worsley-Taylor, Henry Wilson|
|Morton, Arthur H. Aylmer||Sadler, Col. Samuel Alexander||Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart|
|Mount, William Arthur||Samuel, Sir H. S. (Limehouse)||Wrightson, Sir Thomas|
|Murray, Charles J. (Coventry)||Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)||Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong|
|Murray, Col. Wyndham (Bath)||Seton-Karr, Sir Henry||Younger, William|
|Nicholson, William Graham||Sharpe, William Edward T.|
|Palmer, Sir Walter (Salisbury)||Sinclair, Louis (Romford)||TELLES FOR THE AYES—Sir|
|Parkes, Ebenezer||Sloan, Thomas Henry||Alexander Acland-Hood and|
|Pease, Herbert P. (Darlington)||Smith, A. H. (Hertford, East)||Viscount Valentia.|
|Peel, Hn. Wm. Robt. Wellesley||Smith, H C (North'mb. Tyneside|
|Pemberton, John S. G.||Smith, Hon. W. F. D. (Strand)|
|Abraham, William (Cork, N. E.||Davies, M. Vaughan (Cardigan)||Hayden, John Patrick|
|Ainsworth, John Stirling||Delany, William||Hayter, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur D|
|Allen, Charles P.||Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles||Helme, Norval Watson|
|Ashton, Thomas Gair||Dobbie, Joseph||Hemphill, Rt. Hn. Charles H|
|Asquith, Rt Hn. Herb. Henry||Doogan, P. C.||Henderson, Arthur (Durham)|
|Atherley-Jones, L.||Douglas, Chas. M. (Lanark)||Higham, John Sharpe|
|Barlow, John Emmott||Duffy, William J.||Holland, Sir William Henry|
|Barran, Rowland Hirst||Duncan, J. Hastings||Hope, John Deans (Fife, West)|
|Barry, E. (Cork, S.)||Dunn, Sir William||Horniman, Frederick John|
|Beaumont, Wentworth C. B.||Ellis, John Edward (Notts.)||Hutton, Alfred E. (Morley)|
|Benn, John Williams||Emmott, Alfred||Jacoby, James Alfred|
|Black, Alexander William||Esmonde, Sir Thomas||Johnson, John|
|Blake, Edward||Evans, Sir F. H. (Maidatone)||Jones, David Brynmor (Swansea|
|Boland, John||Eve, Harry Trelawney||Jones, Leif (Appleby)|
|Bolton, Thomas Dolling||Farrell, James Patrick||Jones, William (Carnarvonshire|
|Brigg, John||Fenwick, Charles||Jordan, Jeremiah|
|Broadhurst, Henry||Findlay, Alex. (Lanark, N. E.)||Joyce, Michael|
|Bryce, Rt. Hn. James||Flavin, Michael Joseph||Kearley, Hudson E.|
|Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn||Foster, Sir Walter (Derby Co.)||Kennedy, Vincent P (Cavan, W.|
|Burke, E. Haviland||Fowler, Rt. Hn. Sir Henry||Kilbride, Denis|
|Burt, Thomas||Freeman-Thomas, Captain F.||Kitson, Sir James|
|Caldwell, James||Fuller, J. M. F.||Lamont, Norman|
|Cameron, Robert||Furness, Sir Christopher||Law, Hugh Alex. (Donegal, W.)|
|Campbell, John (Armagh, S.||Gilhooly, James||Lawson, Sir Wilfrid (Cornwall)|
|Cauaton, Richard Knight||Goddard, Daniel Ford||Layland-Barratt, Francis|
|Cawley, Frederick||Griffith, Ellis, J.||Leese, Sir J. F. (Accrington)|
|Cheetham, John Frederick||Guest, Hn. Ivor Churchill||Leigh, Sir Joseph|
|Cogan, Denis J.||Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton||Levy, Maurice|
|Condon, Thomas Joseph||Hammond, John||Lewis, John Herbert|
|Crombie, John William||Harcourt, Lewis||Lough, Thomas|
|Cullinan, J.||Hardie, J Keir (Merthyr Tydvi||Lundon, W.|
|Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen)||Harwood, George||Lyell, Charles Henry|
|Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J.||Partington, Oswald||Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe|
|MacNeill, John Gordon Swift||Paulton, James Mellor||Tennant, Harold John|
|MacVeagh, Jeremiah||Pease, J. A. (Saffron Walden)||Thomas, Sir A. (Glamorgan, E.|
|M'Crae, George||Power, Patrick Joseph||Thomas, David Alfred (Merthyr|
|M'Kean, John||Price, Robert John||Thomson, F. W. (York, W. R.|
|M'Kenna, Reginald||Rea, Russell||Tillett, Louis John|
|M'Laren, Sir Chas. Benjamin||Reddy, M.||Tomkinson, James|
|Markham, Arthur Basil||Redmond, J. E. (Waterford)||Toulmin, George|
|Mooney, John J.||Reid, Sir R. Threshie (Dumfries||Trevelyan, Charles Philips|
|Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen)||Richards, Thos. (W. Monm'th)||Ure, Alexander|
|Moss, Samuel||Rickett, J. Compton||Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)|
|Moulton, John Fletcher||Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)||Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.|
|Murphy, John||Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)||Wason, Eugene (Clackmannan|
|Nannetti, Joseph P.||Robertson, Edmund (Dundee||Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney|
|Nolan, Joseph (Louth, South)||Robson, William Snowdon||Weir, James Galloway|
|Norton, Capt. Cecil William||Roche, John||White, George (Norfolk)|
|Nussey, Thomas Willans||Roe, Sir Thomas||White, Luke (York, E. R.)|
|O'Brien, Jas. F. X. (Cork)||Rose, Charles Day||Whiteley, Gsorge (York, W. R|
|O'Brien, K. (Tipperary Mid)||Runciman, Walter||Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)|
|O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)||Russell, T. W.||Whittaker, Thomas Palmer|
|O'Brien, P. J. (Tipperary, N||Seely, Maj. J. E B (Isle of Wight||Williams, Osmond (Merioneth)|
|O'Connor, Jas. (Wicklow, W.)||Shackleton, David James||Wilson, Fred. W. (Norfolk, Mid|
|O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.||Shaw, Thomas (Hawick B.)||Wilson, John (Durham, Mid.)|
|O'Donnell, John (Mayo, S.)||Sheehy, David||Wilson, J. W (Worcestersh, N|
|O'Donnell, T. (Kerry, W.)||Shipman, Dr. John G.||Woodhouse, Sir J T (Huddersf'd|
|O'Dowd, John||Slack, John Bamford||Young, Samuel|
|O'Kelly, Conor (Mayo, N.)||Smith, Samuel (Flint)||Yoxall, James Henry|
|O'Kelly, Jas. (Roscommon, N||Soares, Ernest J.|
|O'Malley, William||Spencer, Rt. Hn C. R. (Northants||TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Mr|
|0'Mara, James||Stanhope, Hon. Philip James||Herbert Samuel and Mr.|
|O'Shaughnessy, P. J.||Sullivan, Donal||Bright.|
§ Resolutions to be reported to-morrow; Committee to sit again to-morrow.
§ *THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (Sir A. ACLAND-HOOD, Somersetshire, Wellington)
moved to report progress.
§ MR. WHITLEY (Halifax)
said he understood that no dilatory Motion could be taken until the business of Supply had been dealt with.
What the House ordered was that no dilatory Motion could be received "on that Business"—that "Business" constituting the Business to which this Order relates. That has now been disposed of.
§ MR. WHITLEY
said that the guillotine Resolution referred to the whole Business, which would not end until eleven o'clock to-morrow night.
I do not take the view of the hon. Gentleman. "That Business" referred to in the Order is now concluded.
§ MR. BUCHANAN (Perthshire, E.)
said that the Order stated that 1606 at half-past Six "the Chairman shall forthwith put every Question necessary to dispose of Vote A and Vote 7 of the Army Estimates in Committee." Similar words were in operation when the Chairman put the Motion to report the Resolution to the House a few days ago. Was it not now necessary to report the Resolution to the House and to put the Motion.
I put that Question on a former occasion because the then Resolution was the last which came within the Ways and Means Resolution; and because it concluded the set of Resolutions dealing with 1904. When the last Resolution dealing with 1905 is reached then I will put the Question that I report the Resolution.
§ MR. LOUGH (Islington, W.)
said that this was the last Resolution for 1905–6 they would take this year; and, therefore, they thought the Question was necessary.
§ MR. COURTENAY WARNER (Staffordshire, Lichfield)
said that Mr. Speaker had ruled that there could be no dilatory Motion until the whole business had been concluded. He himself was prevented from making two bites at a cherry for that reason.
§ MR. CALDWELL (Lanarkshire, Mid.)
said that if the Committee referred to the guillotine rule it would be found that the words were that "no Business other than Business of Supply shall be taken." That was not merely Supply within the guillotine Resolution. The Army and Navy Votes were down for consideration; and the Supply to be taken was not limited to that governed by the guillotine Resolution.
§ MR. COURTENAY WARNER
pointed out that when Mr. Speaker gave that ruling the business of the Committee had not been completed.
I am sorry I was not here to hear the ruling of Mr. Speaker. I think the circumstances must have been different. I have given this question my best judgment and I am sorry if I am at variance with the ruling of Mr. Speaker.
And, there being no further Business set down for the Afternoon Sitting, Mr. Speaker left the Chair until this Evening's Sitting.