HC Deb 08 March 1905 vol 142 cc741-805

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a supplementary sum, not exceeding £550,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1905, for Additional Expenditure in respect of the following Army Services, viz.—

Vote 1. Pay, etc., of the Army 985,000
Vote 2. Medical Establishments, Pay, etc. 21,000
Vote 6. Transport and Remounts 265,000
Vote 7. Provisions, Forage, and other Supplies 260,000
Vote 12. Miscellaneous Effective Services 2,000
Vote 14. Retired. Pay, Half-Pay, and other non-effective charges for Officers, etc. 1,000
Vote 15. Pensions and other non-effective charges for Warrant Officers, Non - Commissioned Officers, Men, and others 2,000
Less Surpluses on other Votes 386,000
Deduct Excess Appropriations in-Aid 600,000

I beg to move the reduction of the Vote by £10,000.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Item, Vote 1, Sub-head BB (Somaliland Expeditionary Force) be reduced by £10,000."—(Mr. Charles Hob-house.)

MR. PEEL (Manchester, S.)

said that when the debate closed on the preceding evening he was making an attempt to discover the Mullah somewhere in the recesses of Somaliland. He was also trying to obtain information from the noble Lord who represented the Foreign Office as to the political and military position of the Mullah and the whereabouts of his following. The action of the Foreign Office had been very severely criticised by the hon. Member who moved the reduction, and the criticisms had been addressed to various points of view. The Foreign Office had been criticised first for plunging into the war; next for not starting the war soon enough; again, for starting it too soon; then for under-estimating the cost; and finally, for sending too small a force into the country. It was quite true that since the year 1886, when we first took up the responsibility for protecting the tribes of Somaliland, we had gained very wide experience of the nature of the Hinterlands, and we were now realising the responsibility thus thrown upon us. It was quite possible that had we at that time possessed the knowledge we had since obtained our attitude on this question might have been considerably altered. He would be very glad to know from the noble Lord what was the nature and extent, in point of time, of the responsibilities we had taken up towards these friendly tribes. When the matter was discussed a year ago there was some difference of opinion on the subject. The Secretary for War had practically declared that we had given them an absolute guarantee of security, but that statement was, to some extent, controverted by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Croydon, who said it was putting our obligation towards the tribes too high. He believed he was right in saying that since we undertook the responsibility some of the tribes had been placed under the protection of Abyssinia; so that it was clear that if we had an absolute duty to look after them, we still had power to delegate that duty to others.

The hon. Member also criticised, he thought rather severely, at any rate in the case of a friendly Power, the action of the Italians. He said they had a very large protectorate, and he asked why they should not look after the Mullah and the tribes? He seemed to suggest that we were doing dirty work for the Italians, work the responsibility for which should have fallen upon them, instead of upon ourselves. There again he did not think the hone Member had given sufficient consideration to the difficulties of the situation. The boundaries between the Italian, and British, and the Abyssinian protectorates were non-existent; they were imaginary lines of demarcation, and it was absolutely impossible to stand upon some line, as could be done if they were dealing with a country whose boundaries were clearly demarcated. Moreover our obligations with regard to the tribes were so strong that they could not be discharged by our saying, "You have been raided by the Mullah, who has driven your flocks away, but he has now gone into Italian territory, and you must look to the Italians for protection." He did not profess to know to what extent the Italians were in a position to give us assistance as regarded money and men. The hon. Member seemed to think that they ought to have done more, but he ought not to have forgotten that General Egerton, in his despatches, gave the highest praise to the Italian admiral for the assistance he had given our troops in stores and otherwise. He also intimated that he had had very valuable assistance from the Abyssinians, and his despatches showed that the Abyssinian expedition had had very considerable effect in restraining the operations of the Mullah. Short of capturing the Mullah himself a great deal had been done to diminish his power inasmuch as he had been defeated, and so had lost men, prestige, chattels, and stores. That, with a religious reformer of this kind, was almost better than if he had been killed outright, because the idea might then have arisen that he had become a sacred personage, and a series of myths might have grown up around his tomb. But he was now discredited, and in these cases an extinct volcano like the Mullah would be a lesson to other volcanoes not yet in eruption.

The question was, what should be done with Somaliland in the future? He was not certain that it would not be advantageous to hand the country back to the Indian Government. In many ways the Indian Government were able to deal with such a protectorate far better than the Foreign Office. They had considerable experiencee of such military operations as had lately been carried out, and they possessed a great number of officers with full knowledge of the manner in which all these tribes should be dealt with. The hon. Member for East Bristol had suggested that a Sandeman should be sent to Somaliland to exercise over the tribes there the same sort of control as had been exercised on the North-West Frontier of India and in Baluchistan. It was not easy to find such men, and there was also the difficulty that in India they had behind them the whole of the force concentrated in that peninsula, whereas the Somali tribes had no knowledge of British power, so that the exercise of moral force, partly from geographical considerations, would be far more difficult in Somaliland than on the North-West Frontier. Under Foreign Office control, officers had to be collected from all quarters of the British Empire, with the result that the force was of a very composite character, consisting of officers of all descriptions, who were extremely unlikely to be able to work together.

MR. LOUGH (Islington, W.)

asked who would pay the cost, if the administration was transferred to the Indian Government.


said that when India controlled Somaliland previously, the protectorate not only paid its way, but made a contribution to the finances of India. It should be remembered, also, that this protectorate was maintained largely with a view to the question of Aden, and Aden itself was controlled by India. Therefore, on almost every ground, Somaliland would be more naturally managed by India than by the Foreign Office.

Much had been said with regard to the obligations we had taken up towards these tribes, but there were reciprocal obligations on the part of the tribes towards us. But more than once in the recent war it had happened that the tribes we had undertaken to protect against the Mullah and similar persons had had considerable sympathy with these religious reformers; in fact, the Mullah might have been captured if these friendly tribes had given assistance at the right time. If, therefore, the very stringent obligations towards these tribes were being renewed, an investigation should be made as to whether these tribes had been faithful to us and had given all the assistance they could. He asked what were the arrangements now being made with regard to patrolling the coast, and how far the Italians were assisting us, because, if the smuggling in of arms and ammunition could be prevented, it would enormously lighten any future difficulty. He also asked what arrangements were being made for the future management and administration of Somaliland, what civil and military officers were to be kept there, what was the size and composition of the force to be maintained, where it was to be stationed, and what were the characters of the officers and their experience of the country. After the three expeditions which had been sent it might well be that, without being able to send a Sandeman, we might be able to get men who would exercise such an influence over these tribes as, if not to prevent religious reformers rising up, which perhaps was impossible, at any rate, to secure such early information as would enable us to know when troubles were brewing, the forces which might be necessary to cope with them, and the methods by which such eruptions should be met. He did not see how the late war could have been avoided; but it had been a very expensive business, and the country desired to be satisfied that, as a result, we had at least discharged our obligations to the tribes, broken the Mullah, settled the country, and obtained the likelihood of a long period of security.


pointed out that these War Office Estimates covered the expenses only of that portion of the war which had taken place within the last two years, during which period the conduct of operations had not been under the control of the Office with which he was connected. The hon. Member for East Bristol was under a misapprehension as to the character of the Estimate. It was concerned solely with expenditure on warlike operations and the winding up of those operations, and had nothing whatever to do with the expenses of the future administration of the country, for which a separate Vote was being asked in the Civil Service Supplementary Estimates. The hon. Member was also in error in estimating the cost of the war to the British Exchequer at £3,500,000; the actual total cost did not exceed £2,500,000. The total war expenditure for which the Foreign Office was responsible was £73,640, while the war expenditure incurred by the War Office since they had had control of the operations was £252,000 in 1902–3, £1,618,000 in 1903–4, and £550,000 in 1904–5, or a total of £2,420,000.

MR. JOHN ELLIS (Nottinghamshire, Rushcliffe)

asked whether that was inclusive or exclusive of the appropriations-in-aid.


said that amount included the whole of the military expenditure, but it did not include the expenditure under the head of grants-in-aid which had been asked for year by year.


said the question of the hon. Member opposite was not as to grants-in-aid, but appropriations-in-aid.


said he had answered that question by saying that the figures he had given represented the total expenditure on military operations.

An hon. Member pointed out that on April 23rd, 1903, the present Marquess of Salisbury stated that the expenditure of the Foreign Office on military operations was £89,000, not £73,000.


said the figure given him was £73,000. But even taking the higher sum the total would not be much more than £2,500,000. But the hon. Member had not confined himself to the policy of the War Office; he had roamed at large over the policy which led to the war, and the policy of the Government now that it was over. Those who had listened to this and recent debates would naturally infer that His Majesty's Government had been the first Government to set foot in Somaliland, and that they were actuated in that policy either by a desire for military adventure or by quixotic philanthropy. The hon. Member for South Manchester, who had made one of the most useful contributions to the debate, pointed out that two totally inconsistent arguments had been advanced by the mover and the seconder of the Amendment, and the same inconsistency had run through many of the speeches delivered from that side of the House in the course of past discussions. The Opposition had two favourite theories in regard to this matter. One was that the Mullah was a harmless fanatic who might very well have been left to his own devices, and who would have given no trouble if he had not been interfered with. At the time the campaign against him was undertaken, he was actually in occupation of the whole of the eastern portion of the British protectorate, and was seizing all the property of the agents of the Administration. The wife of one of our agents was divorced from her husband by the Mullah, and appropriated to himself. Hon. gentlemen could not find language strong enough to denounce the conduct of Mahomedan peoples in parts of the world for which we had no direct responsibility, but when outrages were inflicted upon people who were under our protection they described them as the methods of a revivalist and temperance reformer. The second theory was that the Foreign Office was mainly to blame for the extent to which we had become involved by not taking the advice of their military advisers soon enough. There was no foundation for that suggestion. An expedition was first recommended by Consul Sadler in 1899, and preparations were at once made, but the Mullah withdrew. On his reappearance in 1900 the force was again collected, and with this force Colonel Swayne advanced in 1901 and inflicted three signal defeats on the Mullah at Ferdiddin, Sanala, and M'Neill's Zariba. It was withdrawn because the Mullah had retired to Muduc in Italian territory, where we had not then permission from the Italian Government to follow him. In 1902 be resumed the offensive, and the Expedition, under Colonel Swayne, met with a severe check at Erigo, where complete disaster was only averted by the pluck and gallantry of the Yao troops. The conduct of the operations then passed from the Foreign Office to the War Office. He did not therefore feel called upon to discuss the strategic policy adopted in the later stages of the campaign.

The hon. Member made it a special ground of censure that the Government had invited the co-operation of the Italian Government instead of calling upon them to keep their own tribes in order; but his facts were inaccurate and his proposals impracticable. The Mullah's following, including as it did the Dolbahanta and Aligheri, was not derived wholly from the tribes in the Italian sphere; and the Italian Government had never professed to exercise administrative control over the Hinterland of their own territory. They had not undertaken the same obligations to the tribes in their Protectorate as we had to the tribes in ours. We only invited Italian co-operation because, the Mullah having retreated into their territory, it was necessary to prevent him from escaping southward and menacing our Protectorate in East Africa. The object being to hem in the Mullah, we attempted to achieve that result by a simultaneous advance from Obbia and Bohotle in co-operation with an Abyssinian advance from the West. It was quite true that this attempt was not completely successful, in the sense that it did not result in the capture of the Mullah, but it enabled us to inflict the crushing defeat at Jidballi, which finally destroyed his effective power, dispersed the great majority of his followers, and has secured, the Protectorate from attack ever since.

He would only say one word more upon the question of policy. It seemed to be imagined by some hon. Members, and was actually stated by the hon. Member for the Elland Division, that the whole of this forward policy on our part might have been avoided if we had been content with more modest measures of a purely defensive character upon our own frontier. That policy was tried in 1901 and reconsidered in 1902, but was abandoned because it would have involved the occupation of a stretch of country 500 miles in length, and the establishment of a permanent garrison of 10,000 men. Now that the Mullah's power had been destroyed the defensive policy had been partially adopted. As to the objects of the war, we had not desired to acquire territory. We had gained nothing in that way; but we had kept something, which, if we lost, we might say "Good-bye" to the idea of governing native tribes at all—the reputation of being faithful to our engagements. Supposing that the Government had made the original miscalculation alleged by the hon. Member, what had that to do with this Vote? The hon. Member for Bristol said that the Government had spoken of this as a military promenade, but he did not recollect any one making use of an expression of that kind.


I quoted that expression from the first White Paper presented to the House, and it was used by the Consul-General.


said he was under the impression that the hon Member was quoting from a speech made by the Prime Minister, and he concluded that he meant to imply that the Government had misled the House.


But I gave the name.


said he apologised to the hon. Member, if he had misunderstood him. Admitting that the Government, acting on the advice of their local officers, who were best able to form a judgment upon the matter, had made a miscalculation, if this were a just, necessary, and inevitable war, then the fact that His Majesty's Government did not know how much it would cost had nothing to do with the matter. If it were an inevitable war the Government was bound to spend the necessary money to see it through, whether they underestimated the total cost in the initial stages or not. Was it a necessary war? The war was mainly undertaken to defend the tribes in our own Protectorate with whom this country had entered into distinct treaty engagements. Some hon. Members had discussed the origin of these treaties, and assumed that they were made by the Foreign Office—another instance of that peculiar administrative incompetence which was supposed to characterise the Department he represented, a Department which seemed to him to have been most unjustly and most unfairly criticized in the past. The Foreign Office was not originally intended or framed for the purpose of undertaking administrative duties of this kind, but as a matter of fact he doubted very much whether any Department could have so rapidly improved the financial status of any one of the Protectorates under the charge of the Foreign Office as that Department had done. It was assumed that these treaties were made by the Foreign Office and by a Conservative Administration. Neither of those hypotheses had the slightest foundation in fact. Not one of the treaties with the tribes in Somaliland had been made by the Foreign Office. Every one was made by the India Office, and out of the nine, six had been made by the Party opposite, and he thought the majority of them when Mr. Gladstone was Prime Minister.

MR. COURTENAY WARNER (Staffordshire, Lichfield)

The conditions have been entirely altered by the extension of the protectorate.


said the whole of these treaties had practically the same character; they were general treaties extending to the tribes the protection of His Majesty's Government. He did not know that it was necessary or very relevant to this discussion to enter upon a defence of the original policy of these treaties. Everybody knew that they were the consequence of our occupation of Somaliland and that occupation was dictated by various considerations of the intimate connection at that time between Somaliland and Abyssinia on the one hand, and on the other the Upper Nile Valley where we had not yet established our position—and the importance of Berbera, both from its situation on the high road to India, and from its convenience as a provisioning basis for the garrison at Aden. The value of Berbera from that point of view depended entirely on our being able to keep open the trade routes to the Hinterland. There were three ways in which that object might be achieved. We might have undertaken the whole expense and responsibility of administering the inferior ourselves. No one had suggested that we ought to have adopted this course. We might have armed the tribes so as to enable them to defend themselves against the Mullah, or we might have adopted the policy, which the Government did adopt, of restricting the area of our administrative responsibilities, and whenever it became necessary to undertake the defence of the tribes to do so by means of punitive expeditions. The Government may have been right or wrong to fall back on the third policy, but they adopted it on grounds of economy. But whether it was right or wrong, there can be no doubt whatever that, having adopted that policy, and having entered into engagements with the tribes, we were bound to carry them out, and all the more bound for two reasons. In the first place, it was largely owing to the fact that we had made these treaties, and that the tribes relied upon us to protect them against attacks by the Mullah, that they had refused to make common cause with him. Another and even more cogent reason for our intervention was that we had deliberately disarmed all the tribes under our protection, and had therefore left them defenceless against the neighbouring tribes who were in possession of arms. In the opinion of the Government no other course was open to them than that which they had adopted unless they were prepared to plead force majeure. To admit that they were unable to carry out their treaty engagements would have been a confession humiliating in itself and would have had a most disastrous effect on the neighbouring tribes. It was a confession which the Government were not prepared to make; and he did not believe that in this matter hon. Members opposite would have followed a different course themselves. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife had never associated himself with the attacks which came from hon. Gentlemen opposite. In the debate on April 30th, 1903, the right hon. Gentleman said— It is perfectly true that the undertakings deliberately given by this country to savage or semi-savage tribes under our protection must be rigidly, honourably, and even scrupulously observed, and it is immaterial what Government is in office at the time. He turned now to the question of our policy in the future. No doubt the situation had changed. In performance of our treaty obligations we had incurred great expenditure both of money and life; and it was open to us, he thought, now to reconsider our position. He had already briefly outlined to the House the three main policies open to the Government originally. They chose the one which they thought would involve the least expense. As a matter of fact, the policy of punitive expeditions had proved in this case, as it had proved over and over again on the Indian frontier, the most extravagant policy which we could possibly pursue. It was not recognised when the treaties were concluded in 1886; but the Government had now come to the conclusion—a conclusion which he thought had been pressed upon them by all sections of the House—that the wisest and most prudent policy to pursue in the future was to limit our administrative responsibility as far as we possibly could to the coast line. But there was a corollary to that policy, and that was that we should arm the tribes and organise them so as to be in a position to defend themselves in the event of any future emergency such as that with which they had been recently confronted.

Sir ROBERT REID (Dumfries Burghs)

Do you adhere your obligations?


said there was no question of repudiating our obligations; it was only a question of devising means to carry them out.


Does the noble Lord mean that in future this country is both to undertake their protection and to defend the tribes by arms, or are they to defend themselves?


replied that he could not say what action in each individual case future governments might think it advisable to adopt, but the Government did not repudiate the general obligations into which they had entered with the tribes in Somaliland. This policy, however, of arming and organising the tribes so as to enable them to stand alone was obviously one which would take a little time, at all events, to carry out. They could not expect tribes never armed and never organised before to be in a fit position to defend themselves at once. Besides, therefore, lending the assistance of political officers for the purpose of controlling the organisation, the Government proposed to provide the requisite stiffening of Regular troops during the interval. They intended, in the first place, to bring the 6th battalion King's African Rifles, which had been seriously depleted, up to its full strength, and to transform it from an infantry into a mounted regiment. In future it would consist of 200 mounted Somalis and a camel corps of 300; and it would represent the permanent garrison of the protectorate. It was further proposed temporarily to locate in the protectorate the 33rd Regiment Punjabis for one year, after which it was hoped that the tribes would be in a position to resist any attack brought against them with the support of the permanent garrison.

There was one other measure they thought it necessary to adopt. It was desirable to strengthen our administrative hold on the coast and to take fresh measures for the control and suppression of the arms traffic which had been responsible for much of the difficulty we had had to encounter in the past. Some hon. Members who had spoken in previous debates had rather implied that the dangers of this traffic had entirely escaped the attention of the Government. That was not the case. During the whole of these operations the Government had devoted the most anxious consideration to every possible method for suppressing it. There were three different sources from which a supply of arms could enter that region—from the coast line under British or Italian influence; from the East African Protectorate where it bordered on the Yuba River; and on the North-West across the Abyssinian frontier, from Harrar or Jibuti in the French sphere of influence. The Government of Zanzibar had since the commencement of the operations kept a very close scrutiny on the importation of arms, the German and Italian Consuls had agreed to exercise strict supervision over their own vessels, and the Governor of German East Africa also issued special instructions on the subject. Between Lamu and Kismayu there was an armed dhow patrolling the coast and a road patrol on the main routes from Yuba to the Hinterland. On the North-West the French Government had given orders that no arms were to be issued to natives under French protection. In Abyssinia, the Emperor Menelik very soon after the war commenced issued special regulations in regard to the sale of arms, having already, under the new regulations, seized a large consignment. No dealer was to be at liberty to sell arms, except under special licence, and no native might carry them without the permission of the Court. The British coast did not present so much difficulty as the Italian—it was so mountainous for 120 out of the 240 miles that, practically, the importation of arms across that barrier was impossible, and off the remainder of the coast we had four British men-of-war. The Italians had employed one man-of-war and one torpedo vessel. The had also established at Bundin Kassim one additional Custom-House station for the control of the traffic. In addition, the Italian Government had allowed us to search suspected vessels in Italian territorial waters, and we had also obtained the consent of the Sultan of Muscat, from which much of the arms traffic came, to search ships flying his flag, not only in Muscat territorial waters, but also on the high seas. We proposed in future to strengthen our administration of the coast-line and Somaliland by placing there two additional coast stations at Hais and Las Khorai, and also an armed steamer, the initial expense of which would be £9,000, part of which would be recouped to us by our being able to dispense with a dhow.

He could not give any precise information as to where the Mullah was at the present moment; he thought it was some where near Illig. In conclusion; he hoped the measures now contemplated would commend themselves to the House as measures which would effectively carry out the declared policy of the Government to restrict the responsibilities of this country in future within the narrowest limits, and that in their effort to suppress the arms traffic they would continue to have the support and assistance of all the neighbouring Powers in Africa, to whose rule, no less than to our own, this traffic was a constant and dangerous menace

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE (Carnarvon Boroughs)

said that the defence of the policy of the Government in Somaliland just made by the noble Lord was very characteristic of all the previous defences of the same policy and of the same Government. The latter part of the speech of the noble Lord gave away the first part; but that was also characteristic of deliverances from the front bench opposite. In the first part the noble Lord stated that the Government had embarked on this expedition in Somaliland because they wanted to prove to everybody that they were a Government that kept their pledges. He did not say it was not necessary for this Government to give some such demonstration; but they might have done it in much better and less expensive ways and without spending two and a half millions of money.




said that there was the hon. Member for King's Lynn behind them; they might have kept their pledges to him, and no one thought that that would have cost —2,500,000. But having sworn to their own virtue, and having entered into treaties with the Dolbahantas and all these tribes, saying, "We will protect you at any cost," they now declared, "We have come to the conclusion that it is too expensive to keep our word." The hon. Member for King's Lynn would have this satisfaction, that he was no worse off than the Dolbahantas tribes, except in one respect, that the Government were going to arm the Dolbahantas. What an extraordinary position


The Dolbahantas are not one of the tribes under our protection.


said it did not matter; the Government were going to arm other tribes then. There were as many of these tribes as there were section amongst His Majesty's Government's supporters. The noble Lord entered into a very elaborate argument to prove how very important it was to prevent the importation of any arms into that part of Africa, and then he said how very difficult it was; how there were mountain barriers along the Somaliland coast, how the Italian frontier was quite impossible, how the French were defending Jibuti, and how the Abyssinians were making arrangements to prohibit the entry of arms in some other part. In fact the difficulties were insuperable. But then the noble Lord went on to say that the Government were going to solve these difficulties. They were going themselves to supply the tribes with arms! The fiscal policy of the Government was difficult enough to understand, but their policy in regard to these tribes was still more difficult. First of all, their policy was to exclude arms, and they entered into engagements with the European Powers and with the Sultan of Muscat to stop all traffic in arms; and then, having broken their word to the Somali tribes, except the Dolbahantas, they proceeded to break their word with all the European Powers. Really the policy of the Government was becoming more and more perplexing from day to day.

The noble Lord said that the cost of this war so far was only £2,500,000. Millions were nothing to the Government; they just flung them away, and on a policy too which they themselves now acknowledged to be a failure. How did they start?—£80,000. The noble Lord said the war was inevitable. All the wars of this Government were inevitable. But not only the wars, but the miscalculations were inevitable. They had heard something of the sort before. £10,000,000 for a cheap trip for the army to Pretoria; £80,000 for an excursion to Somaliland, now run up to £2,500,000. It was the same thing in Tibet— just a few thousand pounds to leave the right hon. Gentleman's card on the Dalai Lama Instead of that it was converted into a great military expedition. This was part of the policy of the Government; the only difference being that at last they had a Minister who said that the whole thing was a mistake and a miscalculation. He was glad that someone had acknowledged that. But what a position it was. They were dealing with a gentleman—a Mullah—he did not know what he was—he might be a revivalist,—but they did not send a military expedition to put down revivalists in this country. Why should they do it in another country? The Mullah was one day an Italian, the next day an Abyssinian, and another day a true Briton. He was just as elusive as the Prime Minister. But why should it be our job to deal with him at all? The noble Lord did not give the slightest indication of what he was going to do. Last year they were told that there was not going to be any more expenditure on this job; that the Government were simply going to negotiate with the Mullah. What had become of the negotiations? Why not send out the hon. Member for Central Bradford as a sort of envoy extraordinary to deal with the situation? It would be just as sensible a policy as that now being pursued. They had gone on year by year piling up expense; starting one policy, departing from it; entering on another, and departing from that. If the Government would only follow some definite line of action and put it through it would not be so bad; but they were simply doing nothing.

There was one point referred to by his hon. friend the Member for East Bristol which was not dealt with by the noble Lord. His hon. friend quoted from The Times newspaper a statement that the Mullah, at the present moment, had more soldiers with him than when he started.


said that the latest information was that the Mullah had from 1,500 to 2,000 rifles.


said that that was more than he had when he started. What a remarkable state of affairs! After four campaigns to put down this religious revivalist the only result had been to increase his power. Of course, part of the £2,500,000 was spent in providing him with rifles. It was the only result of four years campaign. The noble Lord now wanted to start on another tack. Surely it was time that someone should be made responsible.


said that what he stated was that it was a possibly true proposition that the original policy of entering into these treaties was a mistake; but that was a policy for which hon. Gentlemen opposite were more responsible than the Government.


said that an attempt was now being made by the Government to repudiate responsibility for their own action. Someone must have been responsible; and the policy had been begun while the present Government were in power. They embarked on these series of campaigns; and they ought to be responsible and to accept the responsibility. They had irritated the tribes in such a way as to actually increase the power of the Mullah. Anyone reading the documents could see what had happened. These tribes were the prey of both parties. They were between the Mullah and the British forces. One day they were attacked by our forces and the next day the Mullah attacked them. We robbed them of their sheep and camels, and drove them from their wells. The whole expedition was a story of driving the Mullah from well to well, while we attacked tribes whom we had sworn to protect and whom we had entered into an engagement to protect. The result was that they were deprived of their means of subsistence and joined marauding expeditions under the Mullah or some other leader. That was the sort of policy the Government was pursuing, and which they would never pursue if they were at war with a civilised Power. Why in making war on semi-savages should the Government pursue a policy which they would not dare to pursue if they were dealing with a civilised Power? The noble Lord said that they wanted to show the Somalis that when the British swore to a thing they would stick to it; but was it not equally important to show them that we could carry out military operations in a civilised way. What the Government had been doing was, not attacking the Mullah's forces, but attacking the tribes. That was very different. What wore they doing now? They started, first of all, to pursue, the, Mullah. He left. Then they said he was done for. He turned up again with the April rains; he was attacked again; and then it was said he was no more. That was repeated three or four times and now no one knew where he was. That was very like the position of the Government. But really this was, after all, child's play. It was not the way to deal with the Mullah. They would not get rid of the Mullah by ignoring him. They could say that his power was at an end; they could even move the previous Question on him; but back he would come when the wells were full. They had had debate alter debate in this House on this policy; and each time the Government had given a totally different explanation and a totally different reason for entering on it. The only thing they knew was that hundreds of thousands of pounds had been spent on a policy which was absurd. and which created a feeling of distrust in the minds of the tribes and also in the minds of the people of this country.

Sri CARNE RASCH (Essex, Chelmsford)

said he had the good fortune to be associated recently with an officer who was connected with the three campaigns in Somaliland, and who probably know more about the country than any man in India or at home. The mistake which had been made by his right hon. friends on the Treasury bench was in abolishing the war before abolishing the Mullah. The Mullah being an ignorant man did not consider himself abolished; and was by no means an extinct volcano. He had always considered that there was no particular reason why there should be an expedition against the Mullah at all, except that he gave trouble some years ago. The Abyssinians attacked the Mullah; and the Mullah, instead of attacking the Abyssinians, attacked tribes on the coast who were under the protection of this country. Then came the three expeditions. The first was Colonel Swayne's, and if he had had 500 more men he would probably have finished the whole business. The war was conducted with the greatest economy; and Colonel Swayne did not do what he might have done under other circumstances. Then there were the expeditions under General Manning and General Egerton. Money was expended some what recklessly; and the war was brought to an end rather sooner than it might have been. Colonel Swayne was still in command and was holding a very extended line of communication 500 miles long; and the situation was very precarious indeed. The country itself was not worth holding. There was no transport and no water. It was, however, the entrance to Abyssinia and might be very valuable to us in the future. The road from Berbera ran straight to Abyssinia; and if this country abandoned it, no doubt, our German friends would lay hold of it before we knew where we were. He always believed that the best policy was, instead of fighting the Mullah, to square him and make terms with him. The Mullah was what might be called a citizen of the world. He was once a cabdriver on the coast; and his word was not always to be depended on. He exhibited a considerable capacity for annexations which were not confined to gentlemen in Somaliland. He did not think the Government could be blamed for what they had done; they were bound to protect the tribes who were living under British influence; and if the expeditions had been more or less expensive, the Committee should remember they could not make omelettes without breaking eggs.

MR. J. A. PEASE (Essex, Saffron Walden)

complained of the way in which the natives of Somaliland had been victimised owing to the vacillating policy pursued by His Majesty's Government. That policy had been as unstable as water. At times it had been everything and at times nothing. When the Government came into power in 1895 they found a protectorate with a large revenue ably administered by the Indian Government with the tribes extremely loyal to the British Throne, and one of their first acts was to hand over a large number of the, most loyal tribes to Abyssinia, an act which caused a considerable loss of prestige to this country and gave in consequence a good field for the Mullah to work on. The Government were warned that the Mullah, under the pretext of religion, had gathered a large number of armed men around him and that he was a dangerous man. They, however, ignored the warning, as in 1896 they ignored their responsibility in this matter, and allowed the Mullah to raid the tribes both on the coast and in the interior. The Government then commenced operations against the Mullah, but with as little foresight as in most of our expeditions in connection with the South Africa campaign. The result was disaster after disaster. Operations were commenced at the wrong period of the year, when there was no water and camel transport had to be depended upon. Mistake after mistake was made, and we finally found ourselves saddled with an expenditure of £2,500,000, as was admitted by the noble Lord. The noble Lord, however, had not contradicted the figures given on the previous evening, from which it appeared the expenditure was nearer £3,500,000 than £2,500,000. In reply to a question by the hon. Member for Poplar last year, the Secretary of State said the cost of these expeditions was £2,250,000, and we now had on the Estimates £550,000, in addition to which we had grants-in-aid of £159,000 and £76,000. Those amounts would add up to considerably more than £2,500,000, and he thought the Committee was entitled to a definite statement as to what the cost really had been. Thousands of lives had been lost, and now, instead of finding, as the Government did in 1895, a large number of perfectly peaceful natives, we found them armed by our own Government. Had the policy pursued by the Government been pursued by a Liberal Administration they would have been denounced as unpatriotic on every platform in the country. He wanted to see justice done to the natives when this country undertook certain responsibilities with regard to them. He wanted to see the natives properly treated, and did not want to see them armed one against the other. In his opinion the policy pursued by the Government had been most vacillating, and therefore he should vote for the Amendment.

*Mr. MALCOLM (Suffolk, Stowmarket)

said he disagreed with the hon. Member that there was anything like lack of decision in the policy of the Government. The noble Lord had made quite clear to the Committee the policy the Government was about to pursue in Somaliland. He had been much struck by the speech of the hon. Member for Carnarvon, and it had occurred to him that some of the speeches made in that House were so eloquent and sincere that they made a trivial subject appear serious. Other speeches, delivered in a light-hearted way, made the more important subjects appear trivial. Such was the speech delivered by the hon. Member. He had never heard a more grotesque description of the policy of the Government. Nobody more fully recognised than himself how great the expenditure must be in this matter or how far short of our ideal our policy had fallen, but to put it in the way in which the hon. Member had done was to misstate both the ideal and the effect of the policy. The question was not one so much of expenditure as of keeping faith with tribes that were unable to protect themselves. For an Empire like Great Britain that seemed to be the foundation of our Colonial policy. When he heard the phrase of his noble friend "Imperial reasons" laughed at and scoffed at by members of the Opposition; when he heard the explanation of how the expeditions were delayed in 1899 and 1900 ridiculed below the gangway, and when he heard that phrase from the hon. Member for Essex "Somaliland is not worth holding," he thanked God that hon. Members opposite were not responsible for the Imperial government of the country. The Government had plenty to answer for, but they were not wholly responsible for the policy respecting Somaliland. The Opposition was responsible for six of the nine treaties that brought that policy about. The question of keeping faith with the natives was most important, bur he was not perfectly certain that the Government had taken the right line in arming the natives. But what was to be done? In his view a punitive policy with expeditions ad hoc was really the safest and the cheapest. We should certainly be paramount in Somaliland, not only in order that we could protect the tribes in the protectorate, but because of the influence it would give us with regard to the policy of Abyssinia. To retire from the Hinterland might have a very serious effect on our influence in Abyssinia; while, if the Abyssinians chose to imagine that we were hostile or weak, their influence on the Egyptian side might be more unfriendly than we cared to contemplate. He was not sure that the decision of the Government was a wise one, but at the same time he was convinced that the reasons put forward for the reduction of the Estimate were wrong, and therefore he should vote against the Amendment.

MR. JOHN BURNS (Battersea)

said he had been a consistent, and he hoped as long as he was a Member of this House to be a persistent, opponent of expeditions of this kind, which in previous years he had predicted would end, as they had ended, in loss of life, diminished prestige, and a considerable depletion of the national treasury. The opponents of this policy cared nothing for the rebukes of the hon. Member for the Stowmarket Division after the harm had been done, what they wanted was that hon. Members should recognise the justice of their warnings, the prescience of their advice, and the lamentable financial folly which had resulted from the ignoring of both. The hon. Member had said that it pained him to hear Imperial obligations scoffed at, and patriotic policies jeered at. But people were now becoming sober, clothed, and in their right mind. The war was over, expeditions were disappointing to the taxpayer, and a well-informed electorate were getting tired of excursions which compelled even Gentlemen like the hon. and gallant Member for the Chelmsford Division to be bracketed with pro-Boers like himself for scoffing at the Imperial obligations so-called. The hon. Member for the Stowmarket Division was labouring under the common delusion of the Jingo, that mere expansion was Imperialism, that bigness was greatness, that recklessness was courage, and that invasion meant civilisation. There was no foundation whatever for that delusion, and he believed that history would prove that this country was never so great mentally, morally, and physically, as when it had few colonies, and little external territory, and its chief pride was the possession of strong men of good character and transcendent intellect.


When was that?


I should say from the fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century.


England was then harrying the whole world.


said that if the right hon. Gentleman would look up his own primers and histories he would find that, like the rest of the Government, he was directly contradicted when in office and in a hole by himself when out of office, and before the revised versions of his histories were put on the market. A statesman for whom he had a sincere respect expressed his view when, in speaking to Lord Cromer, he said there was a certain school of politicians whose object it was to try and annex the, moon in order to prevent its being appropriated by the planet, Mars. That statesman was Lord Salisbury, who in that matter thought Imperially in the best sense of the word. But if the Secretary of State for War would like an authority from the century he had just misquoted he could have one— By all means it is to be procured that the trunk be great enough to bear the branches and the bough, that is, that the natural subjects of the Crown or State boar a sufficient proportion to the stranger subjects that they govern, for to think that a handful of people can with the greatest courage and policy in the world embrace too large an extent of territory—it may hold for a time, but it will fail suddenly. That was written by Francis Bacon. But there was an even greater authority, and that was King Solomon, who, 4,000 years ago, adumbrated his colonial policy when he said to the Queen of Sheba, "The eyes of the fool are in the ends of the earth." The eyes of the fool had indeed been in the ends of the earth. The hon. and gallant Member for the Chelmsford Division had conveyed to the Committee the view of a distinguished soldier of experience and authority to the effect that Colonel Swayne might have finished the expedition if he had had men enough. Whose fault was it that he had not men enough? It was the fault, not of the House of Commons, but of those responsible for the expedition. If the Government were always going to advance civilisation on a powder-cart why did they not do it thoroughly as King Harry knew how to do it? Instead of that, the Government sent out expeditions imperfectly equipped and badly provisioned to a country of which the Intelligence Department knew very little, where food was difficult to get, and the water still more difficult to obtain, and where for only four or five months in the year it was possible for human beings other than Somalis to live. But the hon. and gallant Member had also stated that the place was not worth holding. He himself had made a similar statement in 1896 and 1898, and was in consequence called a Little Englander and so forth. But the hon. and gallant Member reverted to the modern Imperialism and said the country must be held because it was the straight road to Abyssinia. Surely the Government did not intend holding Somaliland as a base from which to walk the straight and narrow path into Abyssinia. If they did the Abyssinians would surely resent, resist, and defeat the attempt, just as they had resisted and repelled the Italians. But the excuse originally given for having anything whatever to do with Somaliland was equally preposterous, viz., that it was near Berbera, and that Berbera more or less commanded the high road to India, and that we had to look after the upper reaches of the Nile. He remembered the Chairman suggesting that any man who thought that either the west or east coast or the southern portion of the Soudan ought to be occupied to prevent some ingenious French engineer from diverting the River Nile at its lower reaches ought to be not in the, House of Commons, but under detention, with the hon. Member for Central Bradford, in an institution maintained out of the rates.

The noble Lord at the Foreign Office stated that the Mullah had to be put down because he made war on the neighbouring tribes. If Great, Britain was going to be arbiter in all inter-tribal disputes in the waste places of the earth, the annual expenditure on the Army and Navy would have to be not £70,000,000 but £170,000,000. It was urged that the Mullah seized the best men in the neighbouring tribes for military service. There were Members of that House who were in favour of seizing for compulsory military service the best men at home. He wished an expedition could be sent to incarcerate or suppress them, but that was no argument for going to war. The fact was that the so-called Mad Mullah was not half so mad as those who had attempted to catch him. The Mullah was where we were in the fourteenth century when we were making raids upon Scotchmen and Scotchmen were making raids upon us. The Scotchmen got the advantage and they had retained it ever since. The noble Lord the Member for Kensington said this country had gained nothing in territory, but we had gained something in prestige by showing the natives that we had kept our word. How had they done this? An expedition was sent out pledged to suppress the Mullah, but he was still at liberty, his prestige had been enhanced, and his power to raid had been strengthened by the fact that the British Government had been trying to suppress him for four years and had failed. The noble Lord stated that it was now the intention of the Government to stick to the coast line, and he hoped they would adhere to that simple policy. To talk of promoting peace in this territory by arming the tribes was one of the most contradictory things he had ever heard of. Just in proportion as they gave them arms of greater precision and sold them arms more cheaply they provoked wars, and far more serious wars than they would otherwise be able to wage with their primitive weapons.

The Government had pursued a sort of topsy-turvy Colonial policy which could not be justified by wisdom, ethics, or economy. Three nights ago the Irish Members asked the Irish Government to give them money for labourers' cottages and to simplify the procedure for obtaining them, but the Government replied that they had no money to give to the labourers of Ireland. When he heard that £2,500,000 had been spent on Somaliland he consulted the Blue-books and he found that in thirty years the Irish Government had spent out of Irish money only £2,000,000 in building 16,000 cottages for Irish labourers. With the money spent upon this wicked, foolish, and extravagant expedition they could have built 20,000 cottages for Irish labourers and allayed some of the grievances and much of the discontent which Nationalist Members spoke of a few nights ago. They had got many grievances at home. They had the unemployed at their gates and the poor existed in large numbers in every town and city. The Government had promised to bring in some proposal—probably a gingerbread proposal dealing with the Poor Law—relating to the unemployed question. Look what they could have done for our own poverty-stricken countrymen if they had had £2,500,000 to spend upon remunerative employment. "The eyes of the fool are in the ends of the earth," but the eyes of Britain, after these fat years of extravagance abroad and leanness at home, were at home. They saw now what the fiscal campaign had taught them. He appealed especially to the front Opposition Bench to remember this, because they were on the eve of taking office, and this would come about sooner than they were expecting. [MINISTERIAL cries of "No, no!"] Well, it ought to. He asked the House to remember that in twenty years they had had twenty wars and expeditions in twenty different parts of the earth. They had annexed 4,000,000 square miles of territory and brought 60,000,000 of subject races beneath our flag; and for the great loss of life all this entailed and the expenditure of £1,000,000,000, they had secured less international trade from those waste places of the earth than every year this country got from the city of Berlin or Paris, a trade which was obtained without the expenditure of a single £100 for soldiers or war material. If they wanted trade and commerce, the place to get it was not in the waste places of the earth. When he was a commercial traveller up the Niger he found that he could sell more goods for the Royal Niger Company when he took good goods, told the natives the truth, and dealt with them fairly, for then they came again. This Government was now blacking the eyes of its best customers in the four corners of the world, and they were wasting money upon military parades and fruitless expeditions where there was nothing to be got but discredit instead of rehabilitating the finances of this country from the material point of view. Morally this policy was damaging the prestige of the British Empire, which with all its faults was still the greatest Empire in the world; but it would not deserve or enjoy that reputation if it were governed by prancing pro-Consuls, who thought expansion was Imperialism and buccaneering civilisation, and who thought the way to increase our trade was to send expeditions to wild districts, where the natives considered themselves well dressed if they were only a bracelet and a smile. Upon every count this Government stood condemned, but in nothing more, than in the wanton waste and wicked extravagance to which it had subjected the taxpayers of this country. Now that the electorate was aroused and were thoroughly tired of these expeditions he trusted that the Government would give them an opportunity of pronouncing an opinion upon their conduct. When this opportunity was afforded he did not think that any of the acts of folly of the Government would be more strongly condemned than the foolish, extravagant Somaliland policy, which was a discredit and a disgrace to everybody who had had anything to do with it.

MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)

said that behind Somaliland there was a great desert, peopled by a number of wandering Arabs, who were divided into different tribes. He had read that these tribes indulged in stealing each other's camels. Because of this the Government came to the conclusion that, we must occupy the Hinterland, and this was not the first time that this had been done. The same thing had happened in Uganda and many other parts of Africa. They had been told that Somaliland was a very valuable country, but that contention had now been thrown over by the Government, for they had been told in an official dispatch that the country was practically worthless. The more he heard of the Mad Mullah the more respect he had for him. He remembered talking to Ismail Pasha, who told him that they would always have these Mullahs, and he said that he had had the honour of the acquaintance of nine different Mahdis when he was in the Soudan, if he might call making the acquaintance, of a man having him hanged. Ismail Pasha told him that the English ought to give a little money to the tribes and make friends of them. In connection with these expeditions he should like to know about our agreement with Italy. These expeditions were not in our protectorate, but partly in that of the Italians. The Italians were the wisest natron in Europe. They cleared out of Africa as quickly as they could, and if we were to go to the Italian Chamber and ask for money for any of these operations the Chamber would absolutely refuse to give it. We had expended a considerable amount of money in Somaliland and destroyed a large amount of life. He wanted to know how in the name of wonder any Government could justify the agreement with Italy and the mode in which the agreement was carried out. Italy might have liked to have smashed the Mullah, but why in the name of wonder should we make an agreement with Italy? Having done so, we took in hand not only our own job, but the Italian job as well. This was one of the extraordinary illustrations of this Government always doing things in the wrong way. The outcome was that £3,000,000 had been spent there. Would anybody on the Treasury Bench tell him that that money was well and properly spent? The result was that we had made Christianity and civilisation odious in that part of the world by the way we had prosecuted the war. We had massacred the tribes. The Mullah had a better right to punish them than we had, if they were to be punished at all. The country belonged to the tribes. They had been there for countless ages. The Mullah seemed to have been an African Wallace in that part of the world, and he did not like the tribes taking our side. He thought the men who stood by the Mullah and did their best to repel our aggressions were better Somalilanders than the people we bribed to aid us in conquering that country.

The Government had an extraordinary method of meeting this and most other criticisms. They were always throwing the blame on each other. He never saw such an unhappy family. Their first idea was, Whom shall we sacrifice? and over went Jonah into the sea. On the Government bench there would eventually be no one left but the First Lord of the Treasury, and he would have to perform the happy despatch. The Foreign Office made a mess of Somaliland, and they immediately put forward the War Office. The India Office had also had something to do with it. Each in succession had been a greater failure than the other, and the War Office under the auspices of the new Secretary of State for War appeared to have made a more thorough mess of it than anyone else. He employed more men, and announced that it would soon be over. Napoleon had appeared and the thing would be settled at once. It was settled in a practical manner by our clearing out of the place, holding only a small portion, and leaving this African Wallace, so far as he could see, more powerful than he was at the commencement of the operations. The noble Lord the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs had told them that he was going to give up these punitive expeditions and arm the natives. Was there ever anything more abominable and scandalous than that we should arm the natives when we were parties to treaties preventing these men from having arms and preventing arms from being imported into Africa? How could they trust the natives who were to be armed? Did the Government really think if they wanted these arms back they would get them? They would have to undertake another punitive expedition to punish their own friends because they had turned against them.

How long was this going on? Was it not time that we had a definite policy in Africa? We had already a great deal too much of Africa. He wished we could apply to some foreign nations to take a great deal of it off our hands. When Germany gave us a portion of Africa we gave Germany the Island of Heligoland. If Germany would be in favour of taking the whole of Africa from us as a gift, he should be inclined to give the Isle of Man as well. What did Sir Robert Peel say to the Jingoes, the expansionists, and the Chamberlainites of his time? He said he was in favour of the expansion of the Empire and of obtaining territory where Englishmen could colonise, and live and thrive, but he believed that the more we took of those territories where there was a great native population, semi-barbarous, and where Englishmen really could not colonise, the more were we expanding our responsibilities, and the less were we gaining from that policy. That was his view of this African policy. He did not wish to go there to convert the natives. They had their religion, and we had our own. He had no more wish to convert them to our religion than that they should send Mohammedans here to convert us. Do not let us imagine that we were benefiting civilisation by committing atrocities in Uganda or Somaliland. War was carried on in those regions in a manner we would not dare to carry it on in any part of Europe. [An HON. MEMBER: Poisoning wells.] The poisoning of wells was against the code of war. What was the difference between the poisoning of wells and the stopping of people who were likely to drink the water from coming near it? That was not carrying on war by civilised methods. His main objection to these expeditions was that they were an absolute waste of money, and heaven knew there were many social improvements for which we required money in England. When Gentlemen representing the Government came to the House two or three years ago and proposed any expenditure for the purpose of increasing armaments the House was ready to vote for it, and there were many on the Opposition side who backed them up. The people of this country—the Radicals of this country—had converted them. They now sang a very different tale. Now that the Liberal Party had acquired sounder views than they had two or three years ago—in fact had acquired his ideas, he might say—he heartily wished them success at the election, which he trusted would come as soon as possible.

*MAJOR EVANS GORDON (Tower Hamlets, Stepney)

said that he had listened to the debate with very great interest, but he was utterly in the dark as to what any Member opposite would have done had he been in power under similar circumstances. They had not, throughout all their criticism, given a single hint on that point. They had ignored the facts and tried to fix responsibility for what had occurred on His Majesty's Government alone. He happened to have been in the Foreign Office in India when the question of entering into relations with the tribes of the Arabian and African littoral were gone into and thoroughly discussed. It was needless to rehearse the reasons which existed then, and which existed now with still greater force, for the policy which was adopted. After close correspondence with the Government at home, the Indian authorities decided that these treaties should be entered into. As had been pointed out, they were concluded by the Party opposite in six cases; and three others were subsequently formed by the Conservative Party. Therefore what, had been done was quite irrespective from any Party consideration at all. It had been the policy of this country equally pursued by both Parties. These agreements, having been entered into, certain responsibilities were incurred which this country was bound to abide by. These territories were looked after at that time by four British officers. He had been on the Somali coast and could speak from personal knowledge of the extraordinary manner in which those four British officers administered this protectorate, and the influence they were enabled to obtain over the tribes. Their administration would bear comparison with that in the neighbouring French territory, which was much loss in extent but had a perfect army of officials, fudges, soldiers, and Customhouse officers. Those four officers established the most friendly relations with all the tribes and gained their complete confidence. Trade routes, which were formerly dangerous, became as safe as Piccadily; and trade, which had been to a large extent abolished, was re-established. In 1900 the volume of trade amounted to £662,000 per annum, but it fell to £487,000. In 1903 it rose again to £565,000 per annum. Well, into this protectorate, which had been so well administered by those Indian officers, came the Mullah, who raided the tribes, and indiscriminately murdered men, women, and children. Under those Circumstances what would hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have done? Putting all Party feeling aside, he did not believe for a moment that they would have said: "We will leave these tribes to their fate, the men to be murdered, the women to be carried away and the cattle to be driven off. We did not contemplate that when we entered into these agreements and now that they have become inconvenient we will repudiate them." He contended that everything which could be done to suppress the Mullah should be done. Very likely it might be thought that other means could have been adopted to put an end to the Mullah's raiding. But those means having failed, there had to be a resort to force. Hon. Gentlemen opposite would have found themselves in precisely the same position as the present Government. It was most regrettable that those things had to be done, but anybody who had been connected with the administration of native tribes on the Indian frontier or else where, as he had been, must know that it would have been an absolutely fatal policy to desert the Somali tribes and show them that this country was unwilling to carry out its obligations and unable to protect them when we had promised to do so. The hon. Member for Battersea wished to revert to the days of the sixteenth century, when, according to him, we were confining ourselves to our own country, and not adopting any adventurous policy abroad. Why, those were the days of Raleigh and Drake and the Spanish Maine, when we were the great raiders of the world and were laying the foundations of the great Empire the existence of which the hon. Member for Battersea now so much deplored. He held that if we were to maintain ourselves in Somaliland or on the Indian frontiers, where the conditions were much the same as in Somaliland, then we must adhere to our engagements.

As to the policy for the future for shadowed by the noble Lord, he understood that steps were to be taken to enable the native tribes to protect themselves. A great deal of irony had been expended on that policy. On the one hand, it was said the Government wished to keep arms out of the country, and, on the other hand, that they were going to arm the natives. He did not understand that to be the case at all. What he believed the policy to be was the same as that adopted on the North-West Frontier of India. In that region there had been for years and years expedition after expedition against the tribes. He himself was a witness of many of them, but it was found that that policy never led to wholly satisfactory results. It was then thought better to enter into political relations with those people, to appoint special Indian officers, and to arm the tribes so as to enable them to defend themselves from raids from outside. He understood that political officers—he trusted Indian officers—were to open negotiations with the tribes in Somaliland and to arm such numbers of them as they thought necessary to form, as it were, local levies in these territories under the supervision of Indian officers with subordinate native officers, as on the Indian frontier. By the expenditure of a small sum of money in that way he believed it would be found that these tribesmen could be taught to protect themselves from raids by the Mullah and his followers.

MR. BRYCE (Aberdeen, S.)

said that the hon. and gallant Member had made some very interesting remarks, but had answered himself. The hon. and gallant Member asked the question what ought to have been done, and then went on to tell what had been done on the North-West Frontier of India. Why was not a policy similar to that applied everyday on the North-West Frontier and other parts of the India borders carried out in Somaliland?


said it was all very well talking after the event.


said that the whole argument of the hon. and gallant Gentleman was that we had abundance of Indian experience extending over forty years, and the result of that experience and that policy was that the Khyberees and other native tribes found how much better it was to enter into arrangements with the British Government than to go on raiding. The truth was that the Pathans on the North-West Indian Frontier were just as fanatical as the tribes in Somaliland and were even better men; and what had been done in the Khyber Pass and in Beluchistan would have done just as well in Somaliland. Why that policy had not been carried out in Somaliland was that the officers out there and the Government at home did not realise how valuable that Indian experience was, and how much better and cheaper it would have been to keep open the trade routes and subsidise the tribes rather than enter into treaties which led to these deplorable punitive expeditions.


said that the Foreign Office had nothing to do with entering into the treaties with the Somali tribes.


said that he referred to what took place before the Mullah began his raids. That was the time when the steps ought to have been taken to which he had alluded. The noble Lord seemed to think that he shuffled off responsibility by going back to the treaties made some twenty years ago; but those treaties were not made by men who contemplated war. Those treaties were made by Indian administrators who knew how to deal with such people. Why were Indian methods not adopted so as to endeavour to obtain in a peaceful way what had not been accomplished after an expenditure of nearly £3,000,000. They could not have a more instructive illustration of the methods of the present Government, which had entered into this Somaliland War just as they had entered into the South African War. Their first estimate of the cost of the Somaliland War was £80,000, although there was another of £250,000; and their first estimate of the cost of the South African War was £10,000,000. Then, if they were going to send an expedition against the Mullah, why did the Government not give Colonel Swayne sufficient support? Very likely if they had the Mullah would have been disposed of. But the result of all these enormously costly expeditions was to increase the importance of the Mullah. The tact was that the Mullah had entered upon a species of holy war, which was conducted by Mohammedans against the people of other religions, in which every Moslem killed entered straight into Paradise. Therefore, the Mullah's followers had every inducement to carry on the war. He was sure the Mullah must have greatly enjoyed himself in continually getting away from our troops, who were merely idling. That was the way in which these continued expeditions were carried on. So far from the Mullah, being destroyed, the fruitless expeditions had only given him additional credit in the eyes of the inhabitants. There was an instructive phrase in a report of Lieu-tenant-General Sir C. Egerton in which he said that the great thing would have been to strike at the Mullah's chief advisers and his bodyguard. If that had been struck at the Mullah's influence would have been gone. Now his bodyguard and his councillors were undiminished in numbers and he had maintained his credit in the eyes of his people. When he was last heard of the Mullah had 2,000 followers. He believed the noble Lord did not know where the Mullah was at present.


said he was understood to be in the neighbourhood of Illig.


said that that showed how little had been attained by the whole campaign. The Committee ought not to omit to notice what had been said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for, Croydon last year, because he presented an entirely different view to that given by the noble Lord. The right hon. Gentleman said that the position was not quite the same as was suggested, namely, that there was a large number of people under our protection who had been raided and massacred. His recollection, he said, was that a large portion of the inhabitants of that territory were rather in sympathy with the Mullah than with us. Then the right hon. Gentleman said that it was understood that when we drove the Mullah from certain territories we should consider our responsibilities at an end and would retire to our own territory, and by trade routes and perhaps railways extend our peaceful influence in order to counteract the Mullah's movements. It was apparently with that view that the right hon. Gentleman gave his consent to the operations. Now a bill was presented for £2,500,000 according to the noble Lord, but which his hon. friend estimated at £3,000,000. He himself was not satisfied with the noble Lord's figures; and he thought a case had been mad out for showing that more than £2,500,000 had been expended. The result, however, had been nothing; and that was the material point. They had had four campaigns costing from £2,500,000 to £3,000,000 and there was no result whatever. They were exactly where they began, and were told in an easy off-hand way by the noble Lord that the war was inevitable. But a Government existed in order to foresee difficulties and to grapple with them. To be told that a Mohammedan fanatic had the power of putting this country to an expense of £3,000,000 and the loss of many precious lives was a test of the incompetence of any Government. The noble Lord did not state what he supposed the expense of the garrison and the other arrangements he described would be.


said he did not enter into details as he thought it was desired to discuss the general question. They were asking the Committee for a Supplementary Civil Service Estimate for £54,000.


asked if that would include the military expenditure.


said, that in addition to the £54,000, they asked last July for £25,000, making a total of £79,000. That figure would be practically continued as long as the Punjabee regiment remained in the country. They only expected it to be there a year; after that they hoped the expenditure would be about £45,000.


asked if that covered the cost of the coast arrangements.


said it covered everything.


said it, would probably cover everything until there was fresh trouble on the part of the Mullah. It might not turn out to be any benefit in the long run. If they armed these tribes, how could they tell how they would use their arms. They might sell their arms to the Mullah, or the Mullah might take them by force; so that he did not feel at all sure that they were promoting peace and tranquillity by arming these tribes. That was not what was done on the Indian frontier. He should like to ask also whether Somaliland was to continue under the Foreign Office.


said it would go to the Colonial Office with the other Protectorates on April 1st.


said he hoped that the, country would have a better future before it. The entire business was an illustration of the pretext so often used by the Prime Minister that it was necessary for the present Government to remain in power because, it was the only Government that could manage foreign affairs. Could any Government have managed the Somaliland affair worse? His hon. friend the Member for East Bristol had rendered a service by moving his Motion. They had had an instructive debate, during which a great deal of light had been thrown on the policy of the Government. It was only £3,000,000; but it was the number of these little wars that contributed to the frightful increase of taxation which had taken place. Anyone either at the War Office, the Colonial Office or the Foreign Office who would set his face against these little wars would render a great service to the country.


said he was glad that the right hon. Gentleman had in his closing remarks referred to the hon. Gentleman the Member for East Bristol, because he thought the hon. Gentleman had started the discussion on the right lines. He stated what was absolutely correct, that the retention of our hold on Somaliland was a strategic necessity. That dominated the whole discussion and was confirmed by many other hon. Members. If it were necessary in the national interests to retain control over Somaliland the only question that really arose was the extent to which our power should be exercised and the methods by which it should be exercised. A few speakers had thrown over any suggestion of that kind and had let it be understood that our policy should be unconditional withdrawal from Somaliland. But that was not the prevalent view of the Committee. He noticed that the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for the Chelmsford Division, who criticised the action of the Government from some points of view, agreed with the view of the hon. Member for East Bristol. The only hon. Member who took a distinct line to the contrary was the hon. Member for Battersea. The hon. Member used some very strong expressions and went very far in his illustrations; but he himself was not so much moved or convinced by them as perhaps he ought to have been. He did not know whether the hon. Member remembered that this country spent £800,000,000 during the Great War; and that that expenditure gave it control of the highways of the world and practically made the British Empire. The hon. Member drew an idyllic picture of the peaceful conditions in the sixteenth century; but at that period this country was fighting in Scotland, in France, in Ireland, in the Netherlands, and had just founded the Colonies of Virginia and Newfoundland. The hon. Gentleman would have to reconcile these historical facts with his statements before suggesting a return to that period. The hon. Member for Saffron Walden Division did not contest what was said by the hon. Member for East Bristol that there was a military necessity underlying our action. The hon. Member for the Elland Division said that the Government ought to have been more provident; ought to have foreseen what was going to take place; and ought to have been more uniformly successful. He also said that the Government was incompetent to conduct a mission of this kind. That, however, was a matter of opinion. He could carry his memory back to another Government and another expedition. There was then also a fanatic who used his power and influence to the injury of this country. A campaign was undertaken; and he himself gave up contesting a constituency as a protest against it. Blunder followed blunder; there was great bloodshed which horrified the people of this country, and the end of it was the sorrowful tragedy of Khartoum. Osman Digna was a person who came, disap- peared, reappeared, and against whom we had to use, often without success, the forces of the country. As often as he reappeared and used his power for ill-using those who relied upon us for protection, so often were we compelled to proceed against him. Osman Digna had now disappeared forever, and we were reaping the reward of our insistence upon the policy then adopted, and when the hon. Member said that there was nothing to show for what had been done, he himself thought there was a strong opinion to the contrary.

He did not intend to enter exhaustively into this matter, because his noble friend had dealt with it so fully that it was needless for him to do so, but he would like to recapitulate what had been said, in case there were Members now in the House who had not had the advantage of hearing the lucid exposition of his noble friend. He would be as brief as possible. What were the facts? The beginning of this matter did not lie with the present Government at all. The beginning of our connection with Somaliland dated back to 1877, when the Egyptian Government gave us a right to regard certain ports On the coast as free ports. The next step was the withdrawal of the Egyptian Government from those ports. In the opinion of experts of that time it then became necessary for us to assume control over that littoral, and we proclaimed a Protectorate over Somaliland. In 1886 we made treaties with the natives of the littoral, and it was beyond dispute that the majority of those treaties were made by those who belonged to the Party to which hon. Gentlemen opposite belonged. Therefore, the responsibility for those treaties rested on both Parties, and the obligations, if obligations there were, fell upon both Parties alike. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberdeen had asked why the Government had been unable to deal with the situation in Somaliland, where, as he truly said, they had established themselves by resorting to Indian methods of administration. He asked why they could not leave well alone and follow the example set by the Indian Government on the North-Western Frontier of that country. That was exactly what had been done; that example had been followed; Indian administrators administered Somaliland, and peace and order were conferred on that country. But the same thing happened there which had happened over and over again in India; it had often been the case that a long period of peace had been broken by unruly and uncontrolled tribes, influenced by a single man. That had been the case here. In the year 1889, an incursion into or invasion of our Protectorate was made by the Mullah. Hon. Members could not be deceived by descriptions which had been given of the Mullah, they all knew what, kind of a man he was. He had been accurately enough described by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aberdeen as a Mussulman fanatic acting after his kind. He had also been described as an African Wallace. Exaggeration could go no further than that, and the comparison was a poor compliment to a gallant man. But these invasions not only jeopardised life, but led to loss of life and property as well, and no Government that ever existed in this country could afford to stand by and see such eruptions take place without taking any steps to stop them. The Government took steps to resist this invasion of our territory by means of an armed force. That force was not sufficient, and it was true the campaign was not uniformly successful, but lie knew of hardly any British campaign that had been uniformly successful. He knew of some, but very few, and lie did not think it affected the policy of the Government in any degree if, in some engagements, they suffered defeats instead of achieving victory. That was not the point, the point was to see the ultimate goal to which they were moving, the ultimate result of their policy. They had had reverses as he had said, but finally they had a success of great magnitude and drove the forces of the Mullah out of the country. That was the opportunity taken by the Government to bring these operations to a close. It would have been desirable to have Captured the Mullah, and it would have been desirable in the case of Osman Digna, but they did not succeed in capturing either Osman Digna or the Mullah. What they did succeed in was in breaking his power and destroying a large number of those who were his principal adherents. It was a mistake to suppose that the Mullah's following was as large as when he commenced operations. It was not to be compared with the following which he had had many times since. That was the position to which they had brought this matter. They had only moved when compelled to move. They had done their best to achieve and had achieved success, and they had taken the first opportunity of ceasing operations in order to restore that condition of peace which was enjoyed by Somaliland before. Some said that the Government were not doing enough to carry out their pledges, others said they were doing too much; both these views could not be true.

The policy of the future had been explained by the noble Lord. He did not pretend that that policy could be a guaranteed policy, or could provide against all emergencies, it was said that they ought not to supply these natives with arms. But what was the alternative? They had deprived them of arms in the first instance, and they had now adopted the policy which they thought the breaking of the power of the Mullah had justified them in adopting. The result of the operations justified our remaining on the coast and replacing arms in the hands of the natives and restoring to them the right and power of defending themselves against possible enemies. They were entitled to know what hon. Gentlemen opposite conceived to be the duty of the British Government in a state of things of this kind. We were committed to retaining our hold upon this country and to protecting the interests of those to whom we were pledged by treaty. There were only two alternatives. Either we had to break the power of the Mullah, as far as we could, and, having done so, organise the country on Indian methods, by Indian officers, so that it might stand on its own feet for purposes of resistance, or we had to go out of the country and leave the whole of the people to their fate. He ventured to think that if hon. Gentlemen opposite were ever called upon to deal with this question they would do precisely as the present Government had done in the same circumstances.

MR. SYDNEY BUXTOX (Tower Hamlets, Poplar)

said that the right hon. Gentleman compared the Somaliland operations to that of the Soudan. Nobody denied that there was not mess and muddle in the Soudan, but one would have thought that successive Governments would have learnt by the experience of the Soudan and would not have allowed a similar mess and muddle to have again occurred. As the result of the whole of these operations—the right hon. Gentleman did not deny that we had wasted between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000—we were now, so far as Somaliland was concerned, in a worse position than when we started. The speech of the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State provided the greatest condemnation of what the Government had done, because it showed that what they were now proposing was an absolute and entire reversal of the policy which they entered upon this time last year. The right hon. Gentleman asked hon. Members on the Liberal side what was their policy with regard to Somaliland. The policy which they ventured to suggest last year was the very policy the Government now proposed to adopt. It was therefore a satisfaction to feel that the Government had adopted the policy for which they had all along contended. On February 25th of last year the Secretary of State declared that nothing would induce him or the Government to withdraw from the expedition or their then policy, but within a few weeks the right hon. Gentleman wisely came to the conclusion that military operations ought to be brought to an end. The ground then given was that the Mullah had been defeated and was a broken force. But if that was the sole ground for the suspension of operations, surely now that the Mullah had a force of 2,000 riflemen and many thousand spearmen it was the bounden duty of the Government to send another expedition and break up that force. But, fortunately, the right hon. Gentleman had learnt by experience, and was now embarking on a wiser policy.

The whole argument put forward by the Secretary of State for War and the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs in defence of these costly and badly-managed expeditions had been the treaties to which reference had been made. No doubt if definite treaties were made the oblige- tions entered into must be duly observed But these treaties had been put much too high. If the Government had known that the expeditions would cost so much money and lead to so great loss of life, he did not believe they would have adhered to their policy. If the noble Lord contended that the treaties imposed an absolute obligation to defend the tribes from attack, there must also be admitted an obligation to keep them under our ægis. Why, then, did the Government break their treaty obligations by handing over to Abyssinia against their will, some of the most loyal of the tribes?


said the tribes referred to were not included among those with whom we had treaties.


submitted the they were included in the obligation equally with the others. If the treaties were to be used as an argument in one respect they should be used all round. The Under-Secretary also stated that in 1899 the Mullah was in actual occupation of a large part of our Protectorate, and yet the Government made no move in the matter until two years later.


said an expedition was organised in 1899, but the Mullah retreated.


understood from the noble Lord's own account that the first expedition was sent in 1901. These alleged treaty obligations ought to have been discovered before and an attempt made to turn out the Mullah at the earliest opportunity. At that time the Mullah had a comparatively small following; he was in possession of the Protectorate, more or less against the will of the people, and a small expedition could probably have destroyed his force. But he was left alone for two years, and during that time, seeing that the British Government were taking no steps, the tribes naturally went over to his side, with the result that when, at last, an expedition was sent the Mullah's power was infinitely greater than before.

But what was to be done in the future? Apparently the Government intended to play fast and loose with the treaties. The noble Lord stated that whether or not the Government would assist or protect the tribes would depend on circumstances.


said that the manner in which our liabilities were interpreted would rest with the Government in power.


said that possibly that innuendo was added, but the noble Lord in reply to a definite question gave, as representing the Government, a definite answer in these words: "How far we should protect them or assist them would depend on circumstances." In his opinion, that was a very wise answer. But if it depended on circumstances, it was manifestly absurd to base the whole case for this waste of money on absolute treaty obligations. The history of the expeditions showed the shilly-shallying character of the policy pursued by the Government, the only redeeming feature in the whole business being the great gallantry of both white and native troops in the face of most difficult circumstances. In regard to the future, the Government had admitted that they had reversed their policy. He was afraid that the difficulty of carrying out this policy would be infinitely greater now than it would have been at the beginning. The country had been disturbed and largely ruined and the Mullah was still at large. Somaliland itself was in a very bad way financially. This country would have to bear the cost not only of these military expeditions, but the cost of a large garrison, and there would probably be further Supplementary Estimates. This was another object-lesson, of which they had had a great many examples, in the policy of opening up these wild regions too rapidly. He objected to the policy, which was initiated by the right hon. Gentleman. the Member for West Birmingham, of increasing the liabilities of this country in the wilds of Africa, and attempting to carry out our policy quicker than ordinary conditions permitted, with the result that we were landed in this great expenditure.

MR. POWER (Waterford, E.)

said that at first they were told that this expedition to Somaliland was only going to cost £80.000, but they had now been informed that it would cost nearer £3,000,000 than £2,000,000. He had always complained that such expeditions were useless and expensive.

He wished to ask the responsible authorities what steps were being taken for preventing horses being brought back to Ireland with disease. He urged the Government to take all possible steps to see that these animals from foreign countries which accompanied the Army did not introduce into Ireland any of those diseases which were so injurious to horses. He notice in The Times a paragraph stating that the Marquess of Waterford had been obliged to destroy two valuable horses because this South African disease had broken out in his stables. The paragraph went on to say that this disease was brought to Waterford by the artillery horses alter the South African campaign. That was a most serious state of things. At the present time people were afraid to drive into Waterford for fear of this disease, and if the veterinary authorities of the Army had destroyed all those horses upon landing in Ireland they would have prevented this epidemic. In the interests not only of Ireland, but of all classes of the community, it was necessary that some steps should be taken to prevent the spread of this disease. He hoped the House would be assured that effective measures would be taken. The apprehension in Waterford was serious and almost approached to consternation, and it was the duty of the War Office to see that this evil was not allowed to increase.

*MR. MARKS (Kent, Thanet)

said the principal objection to the policy of the Government in Somaliland appeared to be that they had met with less success than had been anticipated, and that the Government were not justified in sending out an expedition. The reasons had already been pointed out why the expedition had had less success than was at first anticipated, and it had been shown that the troops had had to face more than ordinary difficulties on account of the configuration of the country. But those reasons hardly went to the root of the matter. If a nation, having a just and good cause for war, was to be deterred on account of the character of the country or the difficulties to be encountered, the whole history of the world would have been changed. How would England have fared if during the South African War we had abandoned our policy because of the difficulties which our troops met with by reason of the existence of kopjes behind which the Boers concealed themselves? How would the United States have acted in the Modee Indian War when they found the enemy hiding themselves in the lava beds of Oregon? The great consideration the Government had to bear in mind was not the ease or the difficulty of operations, but the justification for undertaking them. He contended that this debate had shown that the Government had every justification for engaging in the Somaliland operations. Having escaped the just penalties of his conduct the Mullah was now held up as a sort of hero, and if he had met the fate he deserved no doubt he would have been held up as a martyr. However that might be, it was interesting to note that, on this occasion at any rate. the conduct of the Government had not been criticised on the other side without some suggestion of an alternative, and in that respect the debate differed from some they had had. A very definite alternative had been offered by the hon. Member for Northampton, who said we should invite Germany to take over the whole of our possessions in Africa, and that we should throw in the Isle of Man. That might have the effect of saving us some money, but he did not think it would commend itself to the Government. He did not think it would make for the reputation or safety of the Empire. Certainly it would not improve our reputation for good faith towards the tribes with whom we had treaties. It was a policy which he was confident would not commend itself to the House. It was a policy which might be left to the Gentlemen opposite who hoped shortly to succeed the present Government.

*MR LYELL (Dorsetshire, E.)

said several speakers on the Government side of the House had complained that no alternative policy had been offered from his side. The policy of the hon. Member for Northampton did not count at all. Speaking for himself he ventured to suggest a policy. They had in the Mullah one very much in the nature of Sir Antony MacDonnell. The Mullah was a distinguished Oriental administrator who did not get on with His Majesty's Government, and worst of all he would not resign. He suggested that the Government should adopt something of the policy with regard to the Mullah which they were adopting with regard to Sir Antony MacDonnell. and that was to recognise him and make the best of him. It had been done already by another European Power concerned in the territory. Italy had recognised the Mullah and come to some arrangement with him. It had been done before by this country on many occasions. For years we fought the tribes in the Khyber Pass. and eventually we came to an arrangement with the tribes and allowed them to keep arms on condition that they would keep the Pass open. That policy had been crowned with complete success. He suggested that as an alternative to the policy which the Government had been pursuing. He congratulated the Government on the loyal support they enjoyed from such Members as the hon. Member for Stowmarket and the hon. Member for Stepney. They supported the policy of disarming the tribes and promising full protection, and now that the tribes were to be armed and the promise of protection withdrawn the Government would receive their support, although they might consider the new policy not so good. He was not so happy as these hon. Members. He wanted to know a little more about this volte face of the Government. Their policy had been to prevent arms of any sort from going into the country, and now they were to have free trade in rifles. It seemed that there was to be a bounty-fed importation of rifles. Were they going to give the natives the discarded rifle of the British Army, or the new short rifle? Were they to be armed with artillery, and, if so, would it be quick-firing guns? Last of all, he should like to know who was to be the organiser of victory for these unfortunate tribes? Who was to be the Carnot of Somaliland? The noble Lord the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs sat with a great War Minister on each side of him. He would suggest that as we were breaking our word with these tribes the least the Government could do would be to send out one of these great War Ministers to organise them. Pacta serva was the motto on which the Empire was built up. It had been said that the moment we broke our promise it was goodbye to British supremacy in that country. He asked the Committee to think of the effect on India when it became known that we had withdrawn our protection from those tribes, and left them to protect themselves with such rifles as we put into their hands.


said the ground taken by the Government was that we were under obligations to these tribes, and that the expeditions had been carried out with as much foresight as could be expected from the Government. It seemed to him that his right hon. friend the Member for South Aberdeen and others had very largely broken down that contention. There was no doubt of any sort or kind that the danger which had been injudiciously handled was a danger which had arisen from the making of these treaties. There was no doubt that within the last twenty years about a quarter of the present British Empire had been added to the Empire. It might be a right or a wrong policy, but all those expeditions, and accompanying and subsequent expenditure, were due to the policy of the Government. If the policy of extending the area of the Empire was pursued, the country must be prepared for this excessive expenditure. It was perfectly idle to make treaties with these semi-savage tribes in dark continents and not expect to pay heavily for it. For his part, he believed that such a policy was unwise. He was most sincerely desirous of maintaining the British Empire as it was, and of strengthening it, but they were pursuing a fatal course, and impairing their resources, if they continued to follow out the lines which necessitated this huge expenditure. That was the real moral to be drawn from the history of these expeditions. Some day the people of this country would not be prepared to pay this expenditure. They would contrast the millions that were squandered in all parts of the earth, in building railways here and sanding expeditions there, with the difficulty of obtaining money at home to extend the natural facilities of the country and to improve the condition of the people. It was somewhat revolting so see money squandered abroad with freedom, and when some money was wanted for schools or for benefiting the poorer classes of the nation in dire necessity, the Treasury was obliged to show the greatest reluctance in granting it. It was time that hon. Members should turn their attention to the moral of these expeditions and see that the expenditure of these vast sums of money was due to unwise policy.

*MR. JOSEPH WALTON (Yorkshire, W.R., Barnsley)

said that one thing had been made clear in the course of the debate, and that was that the policy the Government had pursued in Somaliland had been a lamentable failure The noble Lord the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs had admitted to the House and the country that the Government contemplated a complete reversal of their recent policy in Somaliland. One defender of the Government supported the change of policy on the ground that a similar policy pursued on the North-West Frontier of India and the Khyber Pass had proved eminently successful. But he would remind the Committee that that policy was in full operation on the North-West Frontier long before the Government undertook any expeditions of a military character in Somaliland. He remembered pasting through the Khyber Pass twelve or fourteen years ago and he found it defended by a rifle corps levied from the tribes in that district. That corps had preserved order and tranquillity to a large extent, and if they had enjoyed proper support and the confidence of the Government in the last struggle that arose in that district they would have proved themselves able to repress it. Only after they lost that confidence had the troubles spread and the Government of India been put to a large expenditure. The Committee was face to face with the fact that though the Government had extravagantly spent £2,500,000 of the money of the taxpayers of this country in military operations in Somaliland, no one could confidently say that the difficulties and troubles had been ended. He had been recently in those regions and others adjacent and had had the opportunity of meeting military men and civilians well acquainted with Somaliland, and from them he learned that there was a great fear that the present situation was full of great peril and difficulty. The £2,500,000 had been spent in an absolutely futile manner. When regard was had to the vast responsibilities of the British Empire all over the, world, when the national expenditure had gone up to the extent of £50,000 000, when the need was great for care in the distribution of the national expenditure,

why should £2,500,000 be spent in Somaliland, where the interests of the British Empire were merely visionary? At the same time troops—both cavalry and artillery—were being withdrawn from Egypt and the Soudan, thus creating a situation which might be fraught with serious peril.

Mr. SECRETARY ARNOLD-FORSTER rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 278; Noes, 222. (Division List No. 30.)

Agnew, Sir Andrew Noel Chapman, Edward Gardner, Ernest
Allhusen, Augustus Henry Eden Clive, Captain Percy A. Garfit, William
Allsopp, Hon. George Coates, Edward Feetham Godson, Sir Augustus Fredrk.
Anson, Sir William Reynell Cochrane, Hon. Thos. H. A. E. Gordon, Hn. J E. (Elgin & Nairn)
Arkwright, John Stanhope Coghill, Douglas Harry Gordon, J. (Londonderry, S.)
Arnold-Forster, Rt Hn. Hugh O Cohen, Benjamin Louis Gordon, Maj. Evans-(T'r H'm' ts)
Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse Gorst, Rt. Hn. Sir John Eldon
Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt. Hn. Sir H Colomb, Rt. Hn. Sir John C. R. Goschen, Hon. George Joachim
Bagot, Cap. Josceline FitzRoy Colston, Chas. Ed. H. Athole Goulding, Edward Alfred
Bailey, James (Walworth) Cook, Sir Frederick Lucas Graham, Henry Robert
Bain, Colonel James Robert Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow) Gray, Ernest (West Ham)
Baird, John George Alexander Corbett, T. L. (Down, North) Green, Walford D (Wednesbury)
Balcarres, Lord Craig, Chas. Curtis (Antrim, S.) Greene, Henry D. (Shrewsbury)
Baldwin, Alfred Cripps, Charles Alfred Greene, W. Raymond (Cambs
Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. (JManch'r.) Cross, Alexander (Glasgow) Grenfell, William Henry
Balfour, Rt Hn Gerald W (Leeds) Crossley, Rt. Hn. Sir Savile Gretton, John
Balfour, Kenneth R. (Christch. Cubitt, Hon. Henry Guthrie, Walter Murray
Banbury, Sir Frederick George Cust, Henry John C. Hain, Edward
Banner, John S. Harmood- Dalrymple, Sir Charles Hall, Edward Marshall
Barry, Sir Francis T. (Windsor) Davenport, William Bromley Halsey, Rt. Hon. Thomas F.
Bartley, Sir George C. T. Dewar, Sir T. R. (Tower Hm'lts) Hambro, Charles Eric
Bathurst, Hon. Allen Benjamin Dickinson, Robert Edmond Hamilton, Marq. Of (L'nd'nderry)
Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir Michael Hicks Dickson, Charles Scott Hardy, L. (Kent, Ashford)
Bentinck, Lord Henry C. Dickson-Poynder, Sir John P. Harris, F. Leverton (Tynem'th)
Bhownaggree, Sir M. M. Dimsdale, Rt. Hn. Sir Joseph C. Haslam, Sir Alfred S.
Bigwood, James Disraeli, Coningsby Ralph Heath, Arthur H. (Hanley)
Bill, Charles Dixon-Hartland, Sir Fred Dixon Heath, Sir J. (Staffords. N. W.)
Bingham, Lord Doughty, Sir George Helder, Augustus
Blundell, Colonel Henry Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers Henderson, Sir A. (Stafford, W.)
Bond, Edward Doxford, Sir William Theodore Hermon-Hodge, Sir Robert T.
Boscawen, Arthur Griffith Duke, Henry Edward Hoare, Sir Samuel
Boulnois, Edmund Dyke, Rt. Hn. Sir William Hart Hogg, Lindsay
Bousfield, William Robert Egerton, Hon. A. de Tatton Hope, J. F (Sheffield, Brightside
Bowles, Lt.-Col. H. F. (Middlesex Faber, Edmund B. (Hants, W. Hornby, Sir William Henry
Brassey, Albert Fardell, Sir T. George Horner, Frederick William
Brodrick, Rt. Hon, St. John Fergusson, Rt Hn. Sir J. (Manc'r Hoult, Joseph
Brotherton, Edward Allen Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst Howard, J. (Kent, Faversham)
Bull, William James Finch, Rt. Hn. George H. Howard, J. (Midd., Tottenham
Burdett-Coutts, W. Finlay, Sir R. B. (Inv'rn'ss B'ghs Hozier, Hn. James Henry Cecil
Butcher, John George Fisher, William Hayes Hunt, Rowland
Campbell, Rt. Hn. J. A. Glasgow Fison, Frederick William Hutton, John (Yorks. N. R.)
Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edw. H. Fitzgerald, Sir Robert Penrose Jeffreys, Rt. Hn. Arthur Fred.
Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbyshire Fitzroy, Hn. Edward Algernon Jessel, Captain Herb. Merton
Cayzer, Sir Charles William Flannery, Sir Fortescue Kennaway, Rt. Hn. Sir John H.
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) Flower, Sir Ernest Kenyon, Hon. Geo. T (Denbigh
Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich) Forster, Henry William Kenyon-Slaney, Bt. Hn. Col. W.
Chamberlain, Ht. Hon. J. (Birm Foster, Philip S. (Warwick, SW Kerr, John
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon J. A (Wore Galloway, William Johnson Kimber, Sir Henry
King, Sir Henry Seymour Myers, William Henry Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, East
Knowles, Sir Lees Nicholson, William Graham Smith, RtHnJ. Parker(Lanarks
Lambton, Hn. Frederick Wm. Palmer, Sir Walter (Salisbury) Smith, Hn. W. F. D. (Strand)
Laurie, Lieut.-General Parkes, Ebenezer Spear, John Ward
Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow) Pease, H. Pike (Darlington) Spencer, Sir E. (W. Bromwich)
Lawrence, Sir Joseph (Monm'th Peel, Hn. Wm. R. Wellesley Stanley, Edw. Jas. (Somerset)
Lawson, Hn. H. L. W. (Mile End Pemberton, John S. G. Stanley, Rt, Hon. Lord (Lancs.
Lawson, John Grant (Yorks. NR Percy, Earl Stewart, Sir Mark J. M'Taggart
Lee, Arthur H. (Hants, Fareham Pierpoint, Robert Stock, James Henry
Lees, Sir Elliott (Birkenhead) Pilkington, Colonel Richard Stone, Sir Benjamin
Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage Platt-Higgins, Frederick Stroyan, John
Leveson-Gower, Frederick N. S. Plummer, Sir Walter R. Strutt, Hn. Charles Hedley
Llewellyn, Evan Henry Powell, Sir Francis Sharp Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Lockwood, Lieut.-Col. A. R. Pretyman, Ernest George Talbot. Rt. Hn JG (Oxf'd Univ
Loder, Gerald Walter Erskine Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Col. Edward Taylor, Austin (East Toxteth)
Long, Col. Chas. W. (Evesham Purvis, Robert Thorburn, Sir Walter
Long, Rt Hn. Walter (Bristol, S Pym, C. Guy Thornton, Percy M.
Lonsdale, John Brownlee Quilter, Sir Cuthbert Tomlinson, Sir Wm. Edw. M.
Lowther, C. (Cumb., Eskdale) Randles, John S. Tritton, Charles Ernest
Loyd, Archie Kirkman Rankin, Sir James Tuff, Charles
Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft) Rasch, Sir Frederic Carne Tuke, Sir John Batty
Lucas, Reginald J. (Portsm'th) Ratcliff, R. F. Turnour, Viscount
Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred Reid, James (Greenock) Valentia, Viscount
Macdona, John Cumming Remnant, James Farquharson Vincent, Col. Sir CEH (Sheffield)
Maclver, David (Liverpool) Renshaw, Sir Charles Bine Vincent, Sir Edgar (Exeter)
Maconochie, A. W. Renwick, George Walrond, Rt. Hn. Sir William H
M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool) Ridley, S. Forde Warde, Colonel C. E.
M'Calmont, Colonel James Roberts, Samuel (Sheffield) Welby, Lt-Col. A. C. E (Taunton
Majendie, James A. H. Robertson, Herbert (Hackney) Welby, Sir Chas. G. E. (Notts.)
Marks, Harry Hananel Rolleston, Sir John F. L. Whiteley, H. (Ashton und Lyne
Martin, Richard Biddulph Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye Whitmore, Charles Algernon
Maxwell, W. J. H (Dumfriesshire Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset)
Meysey-Thompson, Sir H. M. Round, Rt. Hon. James Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Mildmay, Francis Bingham Royds, Clement Molyneux Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E, R,
Milner, Rt. Hn. Sir Fredrk. G. Rutherford, John (Lancashire) Wilson, John (Glasgow)
Milvain, Thomas Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool) Wilson-Todd, Sir W. H. (Yorks.)
Molesworth, Sir Lewis Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath
Montagu, Hon. J. Scott (Hants Sadler, Col. Samuel Alexander Wolff, Gustav Wilhelm
Moore, William Samuel, Sir Harry S (Limehouse Worsley-Taylor, Henry Wilson
Morpeth, Viscount Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) Wortley, Rt, Hn. C. B. Stuart
Morrell, George Herbert Seely, Charles Hilton (Lincoln) Wrightson, Sir Thomas
Morrison, James Archibald Seton-Karr, Sir Henry Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong
Morton, Arthur H. Aylmer Sharpe, William Edward T.
Mount, William Arthur Simeon, Sir Barrington TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Sir
Mowbray, Sir Robert Gray C. Sinclair, Louis (Romford) Alexander Acland-Hood and
Murray, Charles J. (Coventry) Skewes-Cox, Thomas Mr. Ailwyn Fellowes.
Abraham, William (Cork, N. E.) Bryce, Rt. Hon. James Dewar, John A. (Inverness-sh.
Abraham, William (Rhondda) Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn Dilke, Rt, Hn. Sir Charles
Ainsworth, John Stirling Burke, E. Haviland Dobbie, Joseph
Allen, Chales P. Burns, John Doogan, P. C.
Asher, Alexander Buxton, Sydney Charles Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark)
Ashton, Thomas Gair Caldwell, James Duffy, William J.
Asquith, Rt. Hn. Herb. Henry Cameron, Robert Duncan, J. Hastings
Atherley-Jones, L. Campbell, John (Armagh, S.) Dunn, Sir William
Barlow, John Emmott Cawley, Frederick Edwards, Frank
Barran, Rowland Hirst Channing, Francis Allston Elibank, Master of
Barry, E. (Cork, S.) Cheetham, John Frederick Ellice, Capt EC (S Andrw's Bghs
Beaumont, Wentworth C. B. Churchill, Winston Spencer Ellis, John Edward (Notts.)
Benn, John Williams Condon, Thomas Joseph Emmott, Alfred
Black, Alexander William Craig, Robert Hunter (Lanark) Esmonde, Sir Thomas
Bluke, Edward Crean, Eugene Evans, Samuel T. (Glamorgan)
Boland, John Crombie, John William Eve, Harry Trelawney
Bolton, Thomas Dolling Cullinan, J. Farrell, James Patrick
Brand, Hon. Arthur G. Dalziel, James Henry Fenwick, Charles
Brigg, John Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen) Ferguson, R. C. Munro (Leith)
Bright, Allan Heywood Davies, M. Vaughan (Cardigan Ffrench, Peter
Broadhurst, Henry Delany, William Field, William
Brown, George M, (Edinburgh) Devlin, Chas. Ramsay (Galway Findlay, Alex. (Lanark, N. E.)
Brunner, Sir John Tomlinson Devlin, Joseph (Kilkenny, N.) Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond
Flynn, James Christopher Lyell, Charles Henry Robson, William Snowdon
Foster, Sir Walter (Derby Co.) Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J. Roche, John
Fowler, Rt. Hn. Sir Henry MaeNeill, John Gordon Swift Roe, Sir Thomas
Freeman-Thomas, Captain F. MacVeagh, Jeremiah Rose, Charles Day
Fuller, J. M. F. M'Crae, George Runciman, Walter
Furness, Sir Christopher M'Fadden, Edward Russell, T. W.
Gilhooly, James M'Hugh, Patrick A. Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland
Goddard, Daniel Ford M'Kean, John Schwann, Charles E.
Guest, Hon. Ivor Churchill M'Kenna, Reginald Seely, Maj. J. E. B. (Isle of Wight
Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton M'Killop, W, (Sligo, North) Shackleton, David James
Haldane, Rt. Hn. Richard B. M'Laren, Sir Charles Benjamin Shaw, Thomas (Hawick B.)
Hammond John Markham, Arthur Basil Sheehan, Daniel Daniel
Hardie, J. Keir (MerthyrTydvil Mooney, John J. Sheehy, David
Harmsworth, R. Leicester Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen) Shipman, Dr. John G.
Harrington, Timothy Moulton, John Fletcher Sinclair, John (Forfarshire)
Harwood, George Murphy, John Slack, John Bamford
Hayden, John Patrick Nannetti, Joseph P. Smith, Samuel (Flint)
Hayter, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur D. Newnes, Sir George Soames, Arthur Wellesley
Helme, Norval Watson Nolan, Joseph (Louth, South) Soares, Ernest J.
Hemphill, Rt. Hn. Charles H. Norman, Henry Spencer, Rt HnC. R.(Northants
Henderson, Arthur (Durham) Norton, Capt. Cecil William Strachey, Sir Edward
Higham, John Sharpe Nussey, Thomas Willans Sullivan, Donal
Hobhouse, C. E. H. (Bristol, E. O'Brien, James F. X. (Cork.) Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe
Holland, Sir William Henry O'Brien, K. (Tipperary Mid.) Thomas, Sir A. (Glamorgan, E.
Hope, John Deans (Fife, West O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) Thomas, David A. (Merthyr
Horniman, Frederick John O'Brien, P. J. (Tipperary, N.) Thomson, F. W. (York, W. R.)
Hutchinson, Dr. Charles Fredk O'Connor, J. (Wicklow, W.) Tillett, Louis John
Hutton, Alfred E. (Morley) O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.) Tomkinson, James
Isaacs, Rufus Daniel O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool) Toulmin, George
Jocoby, James Alfred O'Donnell, John (Mayo, S.) Trevelyan, Charles Philips
Johnson, John O'Dowd, John Walton, Joseph (Barusley)
Joicey, Sir James O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.
Jones, D. Brynmor (Swansea) O'Malley, William Wason, Eugene (Clackmannan
Jones, Leif (Appleby) O'Mara, James Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney
Jones, Wm. (Carnarvonshire) O'Shaughnessy, P. J. Weir, James Galloway
Joyce, Michael Palmer, Sir Charles M (Durham) White, George (Norfolk)
Kearley, Hudson, E. Parrott, William White, Luke (York, E. R.)
Kennedy, Vincent P. (Cavan, W Partington, Oswald White, Patrick (Meath, North)
Kilbride, Denis Paulton, James Mellor Whiteley, George (York, W. R.
Kitson, Sir James Pease, J. A. (Saffron Walden) Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)
Labouchere, Henry Perks, Robert William Whittaker, Thomas Palmer
Lambert, George Pirie, Duncan V. Williams, Osmond (Merioneth)
Lamont, Norman Power, Patrick Joseph Wilson, John (Durham, Mid.)
Langley, Batty Rea, Russell Wilson, J. W. (Worcestersh. N.
Law, Hugh Alex. (Donegal, W. Reckitt, Harold James Woodhouse, Sir J T. (Huddersf'd
Lawson, Sir Wilfrid (Cornwall) Reddy, M. Young, Samuel
Layland-Barratt, Francis Redmond, John E. (Waterford Yoxall, James Henry
Leese, Sir J. F. (Accrington) Reid, Sir R. Threshie (Dumfries
Leigh, Sir Joseph Richards, T. (W. Monm'th) TELLER FOR THE NOES—
Lewis, John Herbert Rickett, J. Compton Mr. Herbert Gladstone and
Lloyd-George, David Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion) Mr. Causton.
Lough, Thomas Roberts, John H. (Denbighs.)
Lundon, W. Robertson, Edmund (Dundee)

Question put accordingly, "That Item Vote 1, Sub-head BB (Somaliland Ex-

The Committee divided:—Ayes, 222; Noes, 278. (Division List No. 31.)

Abraham, William (Cork, N. E.) Barry, E. (Cork, S. Broadhurst, Henry
Abraham, William (Rhondda) Beaumont, Wentworth C. B. Brown, George M. (Edinburgh)
Ainsworth, John Stirling Benn, John Williams Brunner, Sir John Tomlinson
Allen, Charles P. Black, Alexander William Bryce, Rt. Hon. James
Asher, Alexander Blake, Edward Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn
Ashton, Thomas Gair Boland, John Burke, E. Haviland
Asquith, Rt. Hn. Herbert Henry Bolton, Thomas Dolling Burns, John
Atherley-Jones, L. Brand, Hon. Arthur G. Buxton, Sydney Charles
Barlow, John Emmott Brigg, John Caldwell, James
Barran, Rowland Hirst Bright, Allan Heywood Cameron, Robert
Campbell, John (Armagh, S.) Hutton, Alfred F. (Morley) Perks, Robert William
Cawley, Frederick Isaacs, Rufus Daniel Pirie, Duncan V.
Channing, Francis Allston Jacoby, James Alfred Power, Patrick Joseph
Cheetham, John Frederick Johnson, John Rea, Russell
Condon, Thomas Joseph Joicey, Sir James Reckitt, Harold James
Craig, Robert Hunter (Lanark Jones, D. Brynmor (Swansea) Reddy, M.
Crean, Eugene Jones, Leif (Appleby) Redmond, John E. (Waterford
Crombie, John William Jones, William (Carnarvonshire Reid, Sir R. Threshie (Dumfries
Cullinan, J. Joyce, Michael Richards, Thomas (W Monm'th
Dalziel, James Henry Kearley, Hudson E. Rickett, J. Compton
Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen) Kennedy, Vincent P. (Cavan, W Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)
Davies, M. Vaughan (Cardigan Kilbride, Denis Roberts, John H.(Denbighs)
Delany, William Kitson, Sir James Robertson, Edmund (Dundee)
Devlin, Chas. Ramsay (Galway Labouchere, Henry Robson, William Snowdon
Devlin, Joseph (Kilkenny, N. Lambert, George Roche, John
Dewar, John A. (Inverness-sh. Lamont, Norman Roe, Sir Thomas
Dickson-Poynder, Sir John P. Langley, Batty Rose, Charles Day
Dilke, Rt. Hn. Sir Charles Law, Hugh Alex. (Donegal, W. Runeiman, Walter
Dobbie, Joseph Lawson, Sir Wilfrid (Cornwall) Russell, T. W.
Doogan, P. C. Layland-Barratt, Francis Samuel, Herb. L. (Cleveland)
Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark) Leese, Sir Joseph F. (Accrington) Schwann, Charles E.
Duffy, William J. Leigh, Sir Joseph Seely, Maj. J. E. B. (Isle of Wight
Duncan, J. Hastings Lewis, John Herbert Shackleton, David James
Dunn, Sir William Lloyd-George, David Shaw, Thomas (Hawick B.)
Edwards, Frank Lough, Thomas Sheehan, Daniel Daniel
Elibank, Master of Lundon, W. Sheehy, David
Ellice, Cap. E C (S. Andrw's Bghs Lyell, Charles Henry Shipman, Dr. John G.
Ellis, John Edward (Notts.) Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J. Sinclair, John (Forfarshire)
Emmott, Alfred MacNeill, John Gordon Swift Slack, John Bamford
Esmonde, Sir Thomas MacVeagh, Jeremiah Smith, Samuel (Flint)
Evans, Samuel T. (Glamorgan) M'Crae, George Soames, Arthur Wellesley
Eve, Harry Trelawney M'Fadden, Edward Soares, Ernest J.
Farrell, James Patrick M'Hugh, Patrick A. Spencer, Rt. Hn. C. R. (Northants
Fenwick, Charles M'Kean, John Strachey, Sir Edward
Ferguson, R. C. Munro (Leith) M'Kenna, Reginald Sullivan, Donal
Ffreneh, Peter M'Killop, W. (Sligo, North) Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Field, William M'Laren, Sir Charles Benjamin Thomas, Sir A. (Glamorgan, F.
Findlay, Alexander (Lanark, NE Markham, Arthur Basil Thomas, David A. (Merthyr)
Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond Mooney, John J. Thomson. F. W. (York, W. R.)
Flynn, James Christopher Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen Tillett, Louis John
Foster, Sir Walter (Derby Co. Moulton, John Fletcher Tomkinson, James
Fowler, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Murphy, John Toulmin, George
Freeman-Thomas, Captain F. Nannetti, Joseph P. Trevelyan, Charles Philips
Fuller, J. M. F. Newnes, Sir George Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)
Furness, Sir Christopher Nolan, Joseph (Louth South) Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.
Gilhooly, James Norman, Henry Wason, Eugene (Clackmannan
Goddard, Daniel Ford Norton, Capt. Cecil William Wason, JohnCatheart Orkney)
Guest, Hon. Ivor Churchill Nussey, Thomas Willans Weir, James Galloway
Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton O'Brien, James F. X. (Cork) White, George (Norfolk)
Haldane, Rt. Hon. Richard B. O'Brien, Kendal (Tipperary Mid White, Luke (York, E. R.)
Hammond, John O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) White, Patrick (Meath, North
Hardie, J. Keir (Merthyr Tydvil) O'Brien, P. J. (Tipperary, N.) Whiteley, George (York, W. R.
Harmsworth, R. Leicester O'Connor, James (Wicklow, W. Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)
Harrington, Timothy O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.) Whittaker, Thomas Palmer
Harwood, George O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool) Williams, Osmond (Merioneth)
Hayden, John Patrick O'Donnell, John (Mayo, S.) Wilson, John (Durham, Mid.)
Hayter, Rt Hn. Sir Arthur D. O'Dowd. John Wilson, J. W. (Worcestershire, N.
Helme, Norval Watson O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N) Woodhouse, Sir J. T. (Huddersf'd
Hemphill, Rt. Hon. Chas. H. O'Malley, William Young, Samuel
Henderson, Arthur (Durham) O'Mara, James Yoxall, James Henry
Higham, John Sharpe O'Shaughnessy, P. J.
Hobhouse, C. E. H. (Bristol, E.) Palmer, Sir Chas. M. (Durham) TELLERS FUR THE AYES—Mr.
Holland, Sir William Henry Parrott, William Herbert Gladstone and Mr.
Hope, John Deans (Fife, West) Partington, Oswald Causton.
Horniman, Frederick John Paulton, James Mellor
Hutchinson, Dr. Chas. Fredk. Pease, J. A. (Saffron Walden)
Agnew, Sir Andrew Noel Anson, Sir William Reynell Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John
Allhusen, Augustus Henry Eden Arkwright, John Stanhope Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt. Hn. Sir H
Allsopp, Hon. George Arnold-Forster, Rt. Hn. Hugh O. Bagot, Capt. Josceline FitzRoy
Bailey, James (Walworth) Fardell, Sir T. George Leveson-Gower, Frederick N. S.
Bain, Colonel James Robert Fergusson, Rt. Hn. Sir. J (Man'cr. Llewellyn, Evan Henry
Baird, John George Alexander Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst Lockwood, Lieut.-Col. A. R.
Balcarres, Lord Finch, Rt. Hon. George H. Loder, Gerald Walter Erskine
Baldwin, Alfred Finlay, Sir R B. (Inv'rn'ss B'ghs. Long, Col. Chas. W. (Evesham)
Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Manch'r.) Fisher, William Hayes Long, Rt. Hn. Walter (Bristol, S
Balfour, Rt Hn Gerald W (Leeds) Fison, Frederick William Lonsdale, John Brownlee
Balfour, Kenneth R. (Christch. FitzGerald, Sir Robert Penrose Lowther, C. (Cumb., Eskdale)
Banbury, Sir Frederick George Fitzroy, Hn. Edward Algernon Loyd, Archie Kirkman
Banner, John S. Harmood- Flannery, Sir Fortescue Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft
Barry, Sir Francis T. (Windsor) Flower, Sir Ernest Lucas, Reginald J. (Portsmouth
Bartley, Sir George C. T. Forster, Henry William Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred
Bathurst, Hn. Allen Benjamin Foster, Philip S. (Warwick, S. W. Macdona, John Cumming
Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir Michael Hicks Galloway, William Johnson Maclver, David (Liverpool)
Beckett, Ernest William Gardner, Ernest Maconochie, A. W.
Bentinck, Lord Henry C. Garfit, William M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool)
Bhownaggree, Sir M. M. Godson, Sir Augustus Fredrk. M'Calmont, Colonel James
Bigwood, James Gordon, Hn. J. E. (Elgin & Nairn Majendie, James A. H.
Bill, Charles Gordon, J. (Londonderry, S.) Marks, Harry Hananel
Bingham, Lord Gordon, Maj Evans-(T'rH'mlets Martin, Richard Biddulph
Blundell, Colonel Henry Gorst, Rt. Hn. Sir John Eldon Maxwell, WJH (Dumfriesshire)
Bond, Edward Goschen, Hn. George Joachim Meysey-Thompson, Sir H. M.
Boscawen, Arthur Griffith Goulding, Edward Alfred Mildmay, Francis Bingham
Boulnois, Edmund Graham, Henry Robert Milner, Rt. Hn. Sir Fredrk. G.
Bousfield, William Robert Gray, Ernest (West Ham) Milvain, Thomas
Bowles. Lt.-Col H. F. (Middlesex Green, W. D. (Wednesbury) Molesworth, Sir Lewis
Brassey, Albert Greene, Henry D. (Shrewsbury Montagu, Hon. J. Scott (Hants)
Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John Greene, W. Raymond (Cambs.) Moore, William
Brotherton, Edward Allen Grenfell, William Henry Morpeth, Viscount
Bull, William James Gretton, John Morrell, George Herbert
Burdett-Coutts, W. Guthrie, Walter Murray Morrison, James Archibald
Butcher, John George Hain, Edward Morton, Arthur H. Aylmer
Campbell, Rt. Hn. J. A. (Glasgow) Hall, Edward Marshall Mount, William Arthur
Carson, Rt. Hn. Sir Edw. H. Halsey, Rt. Hn. Thomas F. Mowbray, Sir Robert Gray C.
Cavendish, V. C. W. (Derbyshire) Hambro, Charles Eric Murray, Chas. J. (Coventry)
Cayzer, Sir Charles William Hamilton, Marq. Of (L'nd'nderry Myers, William Henry
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) Hardy, L. (Kent, Ashford) Nicholson, William Graham
Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich) Harris, F. Leverton (Tynem'th Palmer, Sir Walter (Salisbury)
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J (Birm. Haslam, Sir Alfred S. Parkes, Ebenezer
Chamberlain, Rt Hn J. A. (Wore. Heath, Arthur H. (Hanley) Pease, Herbert Pike(Darlington
Chapman, Edward Heath, Sir J. (Staftords. N. W.) Peel, Hn. Wm. Robert Wellesley
Clive, Captain Percy A. Helder, Augustus Pemberton, John S. G.
Coates, Edward Feetham Henderson, Sir A. (Stafford, W. Percy, Earl
Cochrane, Hn. Thos. H. A. E. Hermon-Hodge, Sir Robert T. Pierpoint, Robert
Coghill, Douglas Harry Hoare, Sir Samuel Pilkington, Colonel Richard
Cohen, Benjamin Louis Hogg, Lindsay Platt-Higgins, Frederick
Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse Hope. J. F. (Sheffield, Brightside Plummer, Sir Walter R.
Colomb, Rt. Hn. Sir John C. R. Hornby, Sir William Henry Powell, Sir Francis Sharp
Colston, Chas. Edw. H. Athole Horner, Frederick William Pretyman, Ernest George
Cook, Sir Frederick Lucas Hoult, Joseph Pryce-Jones, Lt. -Col. Edward
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow) Howard, J. (Kent, Faversham) Purvis, Robert
Corbett, T. L. (Down, North) Howard, J. (Midd., Tottenham Pym, C. Guy
Craig, Chas. Curtis (Antrim, S. Hozier, Hon. J. Henry Cecil Quilter, Sir Cuthbert
Cripps, Charles Alfred Hunt, Rowland Randles, John S.
Cross, Alexander (Glasgow) Hutton, John (Yorks. N. R.) Rankin, Sir James
Crossley, Rt. Hn. Sir Savile Jeffreys, Rt. Hn. Arthur Fred Rasch, Sir Frederic Carne
Cubitt, Hon. Henry Jessel, Captain Herbert Merton Ratcliff, R. F.
Cust, Henry John C. Kennaway, Rt. Hn. Sir John H. Reid, James (Greenock)
Dalrymple, Sir Charles Kenyon, Hon. Geo. T. (Denbigh Remnant, James Farquharson
Davenport, William Bromley Kenyon-Slaney, Rt. Hn. Col. W. Renshaw, Sir Charles Bine
Dewar, Sir T. R. (TowerH'm'ts Kerr, John Renwick, George
Dickinson, Robert Edmond Kimber, Sir Henry Ridley, S. Forde
Dickson, Charles Scott King, Sir Henry Seymour Roberts, Samuel (Sheffield)
Dimsdale, Rt. Hn. Sir Joseph C. Knowles, Sir Lees Robertson, Herbert (Hackney)
Disraeli, Conings by Ralph Lambton, Hn. Frederick Wm. Rolleston, Sir John F. L.
Dixon-Hartland, Sir Fred Dixon Laurie, Lieut.-General Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye
Doughty, Sir George Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow) Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert
Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers Lawrence, Sir J. (Monm'th Round, Rt. Hon. James
Doxford, Sir William Theodore Lawson, Hn. H. L. W. (MileEnd) Royds, Clement Molyneux
Duke, Henry Edward Lawson, John Grant (Yorks. NR Rutherford, John (Lancashire)
Dyke, Rt. Hn. Sir William Hart Lee, Arthur H. (Hants, Fareham Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool)
Egerton, Hon. A. de Tatton Lees, Sir Elliott (Birkenhead) Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford
Faber, Edmund B. (Hants, W. Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage Sadler, Col. Smuel Alexander
Samuel, Sir Harry S (Limehouse) Strutt, Hn. Charles Hedley Whiteley, H. (Ashton-und-Lyne)
Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester) Whitmore, Charles Algernon
Seely, Charles Hilton (Lincoln) Talbot, Rt, Hn. J. G. (Oxf d Univ. Williams, Colonel R (Dorset)
Seton-Karr, Sir Henry Taylor, Austin (East Toxteth) Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Sharpe, William Edward T. Thorburn, Sir Walter Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.)
Simeon, Sir Barrington Thornton, Percy M. Wilson, John (Glasgow)
Sinclair, Louis (Romford) Tomlinson, Sir Wm. Edw. M. Wilson-Todd. Sir W. H. (Yorks.)
Skewes-Cox, Thomas Tritton, Charles Ernest Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath)
Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, East) Tuff, Charles Wolff, Gustav Wilhelm
Smith, Rt. Hn. J. Parker (Lanarks Take, Sir John Batty Worsley-Taylor, Henry Wilson
Smith, Hon. W. F. D. (Strand) Tumour, Viscount Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart
Spear, John Ward Valentia, Viscount Wrightson, Sir Thomas
Stanley, Edward Jas. (Somerset Vincent, Col. Sir C. E. H (Sheffield Wylie, Alexander
Stanley, Rt Hon. Lord (Lancs. Vincent, Sir Edgar (Exeter) Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong
Stewart, Sir M. J. M'Taggart Walrond, Rt. Hn. Sir William H
Stock, James Henry Warde, Colonel C. E. TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Sir
Stone, Sir Benjamin Welby, Lt.-Col. A. C. E. (Taunton Alexander Acland-Hood and
Stroyan, John Welby, Sir Charles G. E. (Notts.) Mr. Ailwyn Fellowes

peditionary Force) be reduced by £10,000."


claimed, "That the original Question be now put."

Original Question put accordingly.

The Committee divided:—Ayes, 273; Noes, 219. (Division List No. 32.)

Agnew, Sir Andrew Noel Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) Fitzroy, Hn. Edward Algernon
Allhusen, Augustus Henry Eden Cecil, Lord Hugh (Greenwich Flannery, Sir Fortescue
Allsopp, Hon. George Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. J. (Birm. Flower, Sir Ernest
Anson, Sir William Reynell Chamberlain, Rt Hn. J. A. (Wore. Forster, Henry William
Arkwright, John Stanhope Chapman, Edward Foster, Philip S. (Warwick, S. W
Arnold-Forster, Rt Hn. Hugh O Clive, Captain Percy A. Galloway, William Johnson
Atkinson, Rt. Hn. John Coates, Edward Feetham Gardner, Ernest
Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt Hon Sir H Cochrane, Hon. Thos. H. A. E. Garfit, William
Bagot, Capt. Joseeline FitzRoy Coghill, Douglas Harry Godson, Sir Augustus Fredrk.
Bailey, James (Walworth) Cohen, Benjamin Louis Gordon, Hn. J. E (Elgin &Nairn)
Bain, Colonel James Robert Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse Gordon, J. (Londonderry, S.)
Baird, John George Alexander Colomb, Rt. Hn. Sir John C. R Gordon, Maj Evans-(T'r H'ml'ts
Balcarres, Lord Colston, Chas. Edw. H. Athole Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir John Eldon
Baldwin, Alfred Cook, Sir Frederick Lucas Gosehen, Hn. George Joachim
Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Manch'r) Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasgow Goulding, Edward Alfred
Balfour, Rt Hn Gerald W (Leeds Corbett, T. L. (Down, North) Graham, Henry Robert
Balfour, Kenneth R. (Christch. Craig, Chas. Curtis (Antrim, S. Gray, Ernest (West Ham)
Banbury, Sir Frederick George Cross, Alexander (Glasgow) Green, Walford D (Wednesbury
Banner, John S. Harmood- Crossley, Rt. Hon. Sir Savile Greene, Henry D. (Shrewsbur)
Barry, Sir Franeis T. (Windsor Cubitt, Hon. Henry Greene, W. Raymond (Cambs.
Bartley, Sir George C. T. Cust, Henry John C. Grenfell, William Henry
Bathurst, Hn. Allen Benjamin Dalrymple, Sir Charles Gretton, John
Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir Michel Hicks Davenport, William Bromley Guthrie, Walter Murray
Beckett, Ernest William Dewar, Sir T. R. (Tower Hamlets) Hain, Edward
Bentinck, Lord Henry C. Dickinson, Robert Edmond Hall, Edward Marshall
Bhownaggree, Sir M. M. Dickson, Charles Scott Halsey, Rt. Hn. Thomas F.
Bigwood, James Dimsdale, Rt. Hn. Sir Joseph C Hambro, Charles Eric
Bill, Charles Disraeli, Coningsby Ralph Hamilton, Mar. of (L'nd'nderry
Bingham, Lord Dixon-Hartland, Sir Fred Dixon Hardy, Laurence (Kent, Ashford
Blundell, Colonel Henry Doughty, Sir George Hairis, F. Leverton (Tynemouth
Bond, Edward Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers Haslam, Sir Alfred S.
Boscawen, Arthur Griffith Doxford, Sir William Theodore Heath, Arthur H. (Hanley)
Bousfield, William Robert Duke, Henry Edward Heath, Sir James (Staffords NW
Bowles, Lt.-Col. H. F. (Middlesex Dyke, Rt. Hn. Sir Wm. Hart Helder, Augustus
Brassey, Albert Egerton, Hn. A. de Tatton Henderson, Sir A (Stafford, W.
Brodrick, Rt. Hn. St. John Faber, Edmund B. (Hants, W. Hermon-Hodge, Sir Robert T.
Brotherton, Edward Allen Fardell, Sir T. George Hoare, Sir Samuel
Bull, William James Fergusson, Rt. Hn. Sir J. (Manc'r Hogg, Lindsay
Burdett-Coutts, W. Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst Hope, J. F. (Sheffield, Brightside
Butcher, John George Finch, Rt. Hon. George H. Hornby, Sir William Henry
Campbell, Rt. Hn. J. A (Glasgow Finlay, Sir R. B. (Inv'rn'ssB'ghs Horner, Frederick William
Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edw. H Fisher, William Hayes Hoult, Joseph
Cavendish, V. C. W (Derbyshire Fison, Frederick William Howard, J. (Kent, Faversham
Cayzer, Sir Charles William FitzGerald, Sir Robert Penrose Howard, J. (Midd., Tottenham
Hozier, Hn. James Henry Cecil Morpeth, Viscount Simeon, Sir Barrington
Hunt, Rowland Morrell, George Herbert Sinclair, Louis (Romford)
Hutton, John (Yorks. N. R. Morrison, James Archibald Skewes-Gox, Thomas
Jeffreys, Rt. Hon. Arthur Fred. Morton, Arthur H. Aylmer Smith, Abel H. (Hertford, East
Jessel, Captain Herbert Merton Mount, William Arthur Smith, Hon. W.F. D. (Strand)
Kennaway, Rt. Hn. Sir John H. Mowbray, Sir Robert Gray C. Spear, John Ward
Kenyon, Hn. Geo. T. (Denbigh) Murray, Charles J. (Coventry) Stanley, Edw. Jas. (Somerset)
Kenyon-Slaney, Rt. Hn. Col. W. Myers, William Henry Stanley, Rt. Hn. Lord (Lancs.)
Kerr, John Nicholson, William Graham Stewart, Sir M. J. M'Taggart
Kimber, Sir Henry Palmer, Sir Walter (Salisbury) Stock, James Henry
King, Sir Henry Seymour Parkes, Ebenezer Stone, Sir Benjamin
Knowles, Sir Lees Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington Stroyan, John
Lambton, Hn. Frederick Wm. Peel, Hn. Wm. R. Wellesley Strutt, Hn. Charles Hedley
Laurie, Lieut.-General Pemberton, John S. G. Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow Percy, Earl Talbot, Rt Hn. J. G. (Oxf'dUniv.
Lawrence, Sir Joseph (Monm'th Pilkington, Colonel Richard Taylor, Austin (East Toxteth)
Lawson, Hn. H. L. W. (Mile End Platt-Higgins, Frederick Thorburn, Sir Walter
Lawson, John Grant (YorksNR Plummer, Sir Walter R. Tomlinson, Sir Wm. Edw. M.
Lee, Arthur H. (Hants, Fareham Powell, Sir Francis Sharp Tritton, Charles Ernest
Lees, Sir Elliott (Birkenhead) Pretyman, Ernest George Tuff, Charles
Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Gol. Edward Tuke, Sir John Batty
Leveson-Gower, Fredk. NS Purvis, Robert Turnour, Viscount
Llewellyn, Evan Henry Pym, C. Guy Valentia, Viscount
Lockwood, Lieut-Col. A. R. Quilter, Sir Cuthbert Vincent, Col Sir C. E. H (Sheffield
Loder, Gerald Walter Erskine Randles, John S. Vincent, Sir Edgar (Exeter)
Long, Col. Chas. W. (Evesham) Rankin, Sir James Walrond, Rt. Hn. Sir Wm. H.
Long, Rt Hn Walter (Bristol, S Rasch, Sir Frederic Carne Warde, Colonel C. E.
Lonsdale, John Brownlee Ratcliff, R. F. Welby, Lt. -Col A. C. E. (Taunton
Lowther, C (Cumb., Eskdale Reid, James (Greenock) Welby, Sir Charles G. E. (Notts.)
Loyd, Archie Kirkman Remnant, James Farquharson Whiteley, H. (Ashton und Lyne
Lucas, Col Francis (Lowestoft) Renshaw, Sir Charles Bine Whitmore, Charles Algernon
Lucas, Reginald J (Portsmouth) Renwick, George Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset)
Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred Ridley, S. Forde Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Macdona, John Gumming Roberts, Samuel (Sheffield) Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.
MacIver, David (Liverpool) Robertson, Herbert (Hackney) Wilson, John (Glasgow)
Maconochie, A. W. Rolleston, Sir John F. L. Wilson-Todd, Sir W. H. Yorks.
M'Arthur, Charles (Liverpool) Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath
M'Calmont, Colonel James Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert Wolff, Gustav Wilhelm
Majendie, James A. H. Round, Rt. Hon. James Worsley-Taylor, Henry Wilson
Marks, Harry Hananel Royds, Clement Molyneux Wortley, Rt. Hn. C. B. Stuart
Martin, Richard Biddulph Rutherford, John (Lancashire) Wrightson, Sir Thomas
Maxwell, W. J. H (Dumfriesshire Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool Wyhe, Alexander
Meysey-Thompson, Sir H. M. Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong
Mildmay, Francis Bingham Sadler, Col. Samuel Alexander
Milner, Rt. Hn. Sir Frederick G. Samuel, Sir Harry S (Limehouse TELLERS FOR THE AYES—Sir
Milvain, Thomas Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) Alexander Acland-Hood and
Molesworth, Sir Lewis Seely, Charles Hilton (Lincoln) Mr. Ailwyn Fellowes.
Montagu, Hon. J. Scott(Hants) Seton-Karr, Sir Henry
Moore, William Sharpe, William Edward T.
Abraham, William (Cork, N. E.) Broadhurst, Henry Davies, M. Vaughan (Cardigan
Abraham, William (Rhondda) Brown, George M. (Edinburgh) Delany, William
Ainsworth, John Stirling Brunner, Sir John Tomlinson Devlin, Chas. Ramsay (Galway
Allen, Charles P. Bryce, Rt. Hon. James Devlin, Joseph (Kilkenny, N.)
Asher, Alexander Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn Dewar, John A. (Inverness-sh.
Ashton, Thomas Gair Burke, E. Haviland Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles
Asquith, Rt. Hn. Herbert Henry Burns, John Dobbie, Joseph
Atherley-Jones, L. Buxton, Sydney Charles Doogan, P.C.
Barlow, John Emmott Caldwell, James Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark)
Barran, Rowland Hirst Campbell, John (Armagh, S.) Duffy, William J.
Barry, E. (Cork, S.) Cawley, Frederick Duncan, J. Hastings
Beaumont, Wentworth C.B. Channing, Francis Allston Dunn, Sir William
Benn, John Williams Cheetham, John Frederick Edwards, Frank
Black, Alexander William Condon, Thomas Joseph Ellice, Capt EC(S. Andrw's Bghs
Blake, Edward Craig, Robert Hunter (Lanark) Ellis, John Edward (Notts.)
Boland, John Crean, Eugene Emmott, Alfred
Bolton, Thomas Dolling Crombie, John William Esmonde, Sir Thomas
Brand, Hon. Arthur G. Cullinan, J. Evans, Samuel T. (Glamorgan)
Brigg, John Dalziel, James Henry Eve, Harry Trelawney
Bright, Allan Heywood Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen) Farrell, James Patrick
Fenwick, Charles Leigh, Sir Joseph Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)
Ferguson, R.C. Munro (Leith) Lewis, John Herbert Roberts, John H. (Denbighs)
Ffrench, Peter Lloyd-George, David Robertson, Edmund (Dundee)
Field, William Lough, Thomas Robson, William Snowdon
Findlay, Alexander (Lanark, N E Lundon, W. Roche, John
Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond Lyell, Charles Henry Roe, Sir Thomas
Flynn, James Christopher Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J. Rose, Charles Day
Foster, Sir Walter (Derby Co.) MacNeill, John Gordon Swift Runciman, Walter
Fowler, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Mac Veagh, Jeremiah Russell, T.W.
Freeman-Thomas, Captain F. M'Crae, George Samuel, Herbert L(Cleveland
Fuller, J.M.F. M'Fadden, Edward Sehwann, Charles E.
Furness, Sir Christopher M'Hugh, Patrick A. Seely, Maj. J.E.B. (Isle of Wight
Gilhooly, James M'Kean, John Shackleton, David James
Goddard, Daniel Ford M'Kenna, Reginald Shaw, Thomas (Hawick B.)
Guest, Hon. Ivor Churchill M'Killop, W. (Sligo, North) Sheehan, Daniel Daniel
Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton M'Laren, Sir Chas. Benjamin Sheehy, David
Haldane, Rt. Hon. Richard B. Markham, Arthur Basil Shipman, Dr. John G.
Hammond, John Mooney, John J. Sinclair, John (Forfarshire
Hardie, J. Keir (Merthyr Tydvil Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen) Slack, John Bamford
Harmsworth, R. Leicester Moultou, John Fletcher Smith, Samuel(Flint)
Harrington, Timothy Murphy, John Soames, Arthur Wellesley
Harwood, George Nannetti, Joseph P. Soares, Ernest J.
Hayden, John Patrick Newnes, Sir George Spencer, Rt. Hn CR. (Northants.
Hayter, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur D. Nolan, Joseph (Louth, South) Strachey, Sir Edward
Helme, Norval Watson Norman Henry Sullivan, Donal
Hemphill, Rt. Hn. Charles H. Norton, Capt. Cecil William Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe
Henderson, Arthur (Durham) Nussey, Thomas Willans Thomas, Sir A. (Glamorgan, E.)
Higham, John Sharps O'Brien, James F.X. (Cork) Thomas, David Alfred (Merthyr
Hobhouse, C.E.H. (Bristol, E.) O'Brien, Kendal(TipperaryMid Thomson, F.W. (York, W.R.)
Holland, Sir William Henry O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) Tillett, Louis John
Hope, John Deans (Fife, West) O'Brien, P.J. Tipperary, N.) Tomkinson, James
Horniman, Frederick John O'Connor, James (Wicklow, W. Toulmin, George
Hutchinson, Dr. Chas. Fredk. O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.) Trevclyan, Charles Philips
Hutton, Alfred E. (Morley) O'Connor, T.P. (Liverpool) Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)
Isaacs, Rnfus Daniel O'Donnell, John (Mayo, S.) Warner, Thomas Courtenay T.
Jacoby, James Alfred O'Dowd, John Wason, Eugene (Clackmannan)
Johnson, John O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N) Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney
Joicey, Sir James O'Malley, William Weir, James Galloway
Jones, D. Brynmor (Swansea) O'Mara, James White, George (Norfolk)
Jones, Leif (Appleby) O'Shaughnessy, P. J. White, Luke (York, E. R.)
Jones, William (Carnarvonshire Palmer, Sir Charles M. (Durham) White, Patrick (Meath, North
Joyce, Michael Parrott, William Whiteley, George (York, W. R.)
Kearley, Hudson E. Partington, Oswald Whitley, J.H. (Halifax)
Kempe, Lieut.-Colonel George Paulton, James Mellor Whittaker, Thomas Palmer
Kennedy, Vincent P. (Cavan, W Pease, J. A. (Saffron Walden) Williams, Osmond (Merioneth)
Kilbride, Denis Perks, Robert William Wilson, John (Durham, Mid.)
Kitson, Sir James Pirie, Duncan V. Woodhouse, Sir J T (Huddersf'd
Labouchere, Henry Power, Patrick Joseph Young, Samuel
Lambert, George Rea, Russell Yoxall, James Henry
Lamont, Norman Reckitt, Harold James
Langley, Batty Reddy, M. TELLERS FOR THE NOES—Mr.
Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, W.) Redmond, John E. (Waterford Herbert Gladstone and
Lawson, Sir Wilfrid (Cornwall) Reid, Sir R. Threshie (Dumfries) Mr. Causton.
Layland-Barratt, Francis Richards, Thomas (W. Monm'th
Leese, Sir Joseph F. (Accringt'n Rickett, J. Compton

And, it being after half-past Seven of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House.

Resolution to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again To-morrow.

Back to