§ Motion made, and Question proposed,. "That a sum, not exceeding £10,101,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge for the Pay, etc., of His Majesty's Army (including Army Reserve) at Home and Abroad (exclusive of India), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1906."
§ Whereupon Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £9,101,000, be granted for the said Service."—(Mr. Swift MacNeill.)
237§ *MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSEsaid that there were two points to which he wished to draw the attention of the Committee—one had already been touched upon, and the other was new. The alterations in the organisation of the War Office to which the right hon. Gentleman had drawn attention were not really due to the initiative of the Secretary for War, to the activity of the Department, or even to the Government itself. They were due to certain Committees appointed by the Government. He did not mean to say that all the decisions of the Committees were wrong, but he did urge that no Government ought to resort to legislation by means of Committees outside their own body, as to whose composition the House was largely ignorant, of whose opinions they knew nothing, and whose proceedings were carried on in secret. He did not believe that that method was in harmony with past history. The Cardwell reforms were drawn up by Mr. Cardwell himself and considered by the Government; and he thought it would have been more to the credit of this Government if their scheme had been due to the Government and not to a Committee. It was to be noticed that in all his statements the Secretary of State far War had abandoned a certain amount of direction and control which, so for as could be judged, was now taken by a secret Committee of three, with whose names and persons the public were not familiar. The first four were really changes of name, such as had been effected hundreds of times by the War Office without attracting particular attention, while the last eight were concerned with work which used to be done in the Military Secretary's Department without fuss or bother, and carrying with it no really important or responsible duties such as would justify the prominent place given to the changes in the Memorandum.
With regard to the blue-water theory, the view of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State was very definite—viz., that invasion was an impossibility and raids were not a serious source of anxiety. The acceptance of such a theory would justify, and ought to be accompanied by, far greater changes than the Secretary of State had proposed either this year or last. 238 But it was merely the expansion of a doctrine, never before accepted by a Government, though held by various Members for the last five years. In 1901, when the hon. and gallant Member for Yarmouth advocated the theory, the Prime Minister said his view was the logical conclusion of the extreme naval school, and that if it was correct we were bound to disband the Militia, to cease giving subventions to the Volunteers, and not to trouble our heads about garrisoning any of our fortresses. Every one of those proposals had now been made by the Secretary of State for War, and he did not think that such changes ought to be made upon the ipse dixit of a Defence Committee, of the composition of which the House was largely ignorant. The Defence Committee was responsible neither to the House nor, necessarily, to the Government. It appeared to be nothing more than a private Committee of the Prime Minister's, to which he summoned or from which he excluded whom he pleased. Admiral Fisher and Sir G. Clarke were the two men who brought the Committee into existence, and, in the words of their own Report, it was—
A provision for obtaining the expert advice required for shaping national policy.If, therefore, the other members depended upon expert advice, the two gentlemen who created the Committee also guided its decisions, and upon their advice the House was asked to accept the view that in future the blue-water theory was absolutely to control the military and naval policy of the country, although doubt was creeping into the minds even of advocates of that theory whether the policy could be sustained in its entirety. There was no recorded expert opinion, either military or naval, to be found in support of the extreme blue-water theory, but, on the other hand, there were some tolerably recent examples of naval operations which might be held to modify, if not to destroy, it. He was not arguing against a strong, efficient, and sufficient Navy. He was afraid that hardly enough stress was laid upon the sufficiency as apart from the efficiency of the Navy, The blue-water theory must rest upon rather the relative than the positive 239 strength, of the Navy; it must be sufficient to meet any possible naval combination that was likely to be presented against it. There were instances of the successful evasion of a superior naval force, the most notable case being that of the carrying of 35,000 troops in 300 transports from Toulon to Malta, and thence to Egypt, in the face of a far larger squadron commanded by Nelson. Japan had recently furnished other instances, while in the manœuvres two years ago the blockaded squadron in the Ionian Islands successfully evaded the blockading forces which were superior in number, and efficiency, and was not sighted until the two Fleets arrived at the appointed rendezvous five days later. But the most recent illustration was afforded by the Dogger Bank incident. The whole of the British Fleets were absent from the Narrow Seas, and, at the very time when the Prime Minister was defying the Russian nation with far greater courage than he had ever shown towards the Tariff Reform League, the Russian fleet was in command of the Narrow Seas, and for three days could have done anything it liked. Surely that showed that invasion was something less than an impossibility.It was not known what British military opinion generally was upon the point, but, so far as he had been able to gather, it was opposed to the extreme blue-water theory, as it could not accept the view that invasion was an impossibility. The chances of success might be only one in a thousand or even in ten thousand, but an unsuccessful resistance of that one chance would be so absolutely fatal to the existence of the Empire that no possible means of defence ought to be neglected. He hoped that before they unreservedly committed themselves to this theory the House of Commons would remember that there were arguments on the other side, that the theory was new, and that it could not possibly be put into operation until it was too late to correct any mistakes that might arise in carrying it to its logical conclusion. The experience of many able and distinguished men was against the extreme theory. ["Name."] The Duke of Wellington, for instance. 240 [A laugh.] Did the right hon. Gentleman laugh at the Duke of Wellington?
§ *MR. ARNOLD-FORSTERwas understood to say that he certainly did laugh at the name of the Duke of Wellington being mentioned in this connection.
§ *MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSEdid not think the views of the Duke of Wellington should be laughed at simply because in his days steam power had not applied. The advantages of naval attack was certainly as great to-day as they were then. Steam, if it had revolutionised defence, had also revolutionised attack, and the events of the Russo-Japanese War had shown that, properly conducted, the attack was as powerful as ever. Another authority he might quote was Captain Mahan, who agreed with and emphasised the theory of Napoleon that the invasion of this country was possible.
§ *MR. ARNOLD-FORSTERWill the hon. Gentleman refer me to the passage?
§ MR. CHARLES HOBHOUSEsaid he would endeavour to send it to the right hon. Gentleman; he had been most careful to verify his authorities.
In conclusion he would point out that the scheme of 1901 was dead; although some traces of it remained in the accounts; the scheme of 1902 was dead and buried; and the scheme of 1904 was in its death throes. The scheme of 1905, so far as anything was known of it, provided relief, but no reserves for India; it did not provide sufficient garrison for the colonial fortresses; it diminished the number of auxiliaries at home, and it increased the cost of the Army as it existed. The House were told that the War Office was to cost less and to be more efficient. As a matter of fact, more officers than ever were there employed, at a, greater cost of £57,000. Last year there was a lack of agreement but no lack of loyalty on the part of the Army Council; this year it was doubtful whether there was either agreement or loyalty. There could not be loyalty without confidence, and co-operation without something like harmony was impossible. The Council was 241 said to be divided into water-tight compartments, which suggested cast-iron doors devised to cut off communications and to prevent that interchange of views which was absolutely essential to keep the ship of State going. All the changes which had been introduced by the Secretary of State in Army organisation seemed to him to have reacted to the disadvantage of the regimental officer and the private soldier, the two classes to whom the country was most indebted in the last war.
§ *MR. REGINALD LUCAS (Portsmouth)desired to impress on his right hon. friend the extreme difficulty under which the Militia suffered as to the uncertainty of their destiny. It was manifestly impossible to get officers to go into the Militia when they felt that all their work and the expense they would incur might be absolutely thrown away next year. It was imperative that they should know as soon as possible whether they were to be ended or mended. He did not deny that the right hon. Gentleman had considerable force behind him in the Report of the Duke of Norfolk's Commission when he spoke of the shortcomings of the Militia. But if there was to be a civilian service at all, it could not be demanded of them that they should always be able to do what Regular soldiers did. Militia officers usually had some private duties to attend to, and they did not pretend to be all that a Regular officer was. Militiamen could not be as fully efficient or as fully trained as Regular soldiers; the whole point was that if there was to be a civilian Army at all every encouragement should be given them to make themselves as efficient as they could. The proposals with regard to territorial regiments would not put the Militia officer in the same position as before; the conditions would be altogether different. He believed that if proper encouragement was given the Militia would show as much enthusiasm and zeal as could possibly be derived from any force outside the Regular Army. If they were given the opportunity of making the Militia efficient, of setting their house in order, he thought the country would have nothing to complain of in respect of that force.
§ SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANThere is really something absurd in the fact that the House of Commons, which represents, or ought to represent, the country, is still, after more than four years, groping about to find the Army scheme of the Government. We have had several different schemes since 1900. The Secretary for India had a great recasting of the Army which we were told would make us all perfectly safe. Last year we had a new Minister installed in the War Office, a new War Office created; all the chief officials of experience, military and civil, were summarily got rid of; and yet, although these occurrences had occurred, and one would naturally expect that a little time would be required before a solid conclusion was arrived at, the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who is something of a quick-change artist, to adopt a phrase in use in certain places of amusement, was ready after a few weeks with a cut-and-dried scheme. But, unfortunately, we could get no satisfaction on the important point whether that scheme was approved by his colleagues. The Cabinet was absorbed in the investigation of the problem of our military requirements, and we were left in considerable doubt, and remain in doubt to this day, whether the scheme is to be made to suit the requirements or the requirements to be adapted to suit the scheme. We have had a factor introduced into the matter which evidently is of the first importance—namely, the great question of the North-West Indian frontier, and this is held over us to close our mouths if we venture to ask anything about the size or constitution of the Army—very much as that dreadful thing Home Rule is being held over the world in general political matters.
Last year we had avowedly provisional Estimates furnished; this year we looked for something more solid, but they are provisional Estimates again. The right hon. Gentleman, in his speech explaining those Estimates, said a great deal of himself and a good deal of his successor, whoever he may be, but nothing, or very little, at any rate, of His Majesty's Govenment. But last Thursday something happened to which we have grown accustomed of late years. Communications were vouchsafed to another place which were 243 denied to the House of Commons, and the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a speech which throws more light upon the policy of the Government than anything we have heard in this House for the last eighteen months. There are two great questions at issue upon which the whole matter turns. There is the question of the Militia and the question of the terms of service, the constitution, of the infantry of the Line. Now, I think it is so desirable that the House of Commons should have a direct opportunity of learning what the policy of the Government is that I will read what Lord Lansdowne said. He was talking of the necessity of arresting military expenditure, and he said—
We have, then, to consider from that point of view what is the proper place of the Militia, and I am glad to believe that in the opinion of most of us"—"most of us" is a curious phrase—the proper place of the Militia is that it should form a part of that Army which in time of peace remains at home, but which in times of national emergency shall be available for use in the field beyond the limits of these islands. I have no doubt that if my right hon. colleague had these data to work upon he would have been justified in doing what I believe in his original proposal he desired to recommend to Parliament—note the curiously detached way in which one colleague speaks of another; he "believes" that it was his intention to propose to Parliament:that he would have preferred that the Militia should be merged in the short-service Army of which we have spoken in these debates. But sentiment counts for a good deal in these questions, and it became obvious to us"—that I suppose again is the whole Government, including the Whips—that a measure of that kind would have done great violence to the sentiment of a force which we greatly honour and which commands the esteem of the country. Therefore we propose that the Militia should retain its identity and that it should not be merged in the short-service Army, but that, on the other hand, it should be so framed, so equipped, and so officered, that it should be fit when occasion arises to take its place alongside the best troops of the Line for the purposes of foreign service. The noble Marquess expressed his objection to accepting these proposals with regard to the Militia until we have disclosed the whole of our scheme of Army reform. We have made no mystery of the great outline of that scheme.244 Well, there was great mystery made in the House of Commons.They were explained last year by the Secretary of State.No, not as the opinions of the Government, but as the opinions of the Secretary of State, which is not quite the same thing.They have been set forth again in the Memorandum of the Army Estimates, and they have been more fully gone into in the Commons in the last two or three days. I thought it was well understood that the Army proposals contemplated the creation of a long-service Army, recruited for a term of nine years with the colours and three with the Reserve, liable at all times for service abroad, and that, on the other hand, there should be a short-service Army with a period of two years with the colours and six years with the Reserve, available for service abroad only in time of emergency. That is the broad basis of the new scheme.Well, let us look at this new scheme now that we hear what it is. Let me speak first of the Militia. His Majesty's Government, as this shows us, have been oscillating between two extreme opinions. It is either obliterate the Militia, or exalt them. It recalls to me a friend of mine, a colleague in this House many years ago, who paid great attention to the thorny question which is still before us of the liquor traffic, and he said to me—I have devoted many years study to this question, and I have come to the conclusion that there are only two things to do. One would be total suppression, the other free trade in drink, and I do not care, which of the two you adopt.Well, that was recalled to me by this incident. You must either obliterate the Militia, because there is no use talking of a Militia if you make a Militia regiment a mere Reserve-creating machine, such as was proposed in the original scheme of the right hon. Gentleman—it is no longer the Militia as we know it, or as it knows itself; it may be something else very much better, but it is something altogether different; and I do not call that maintaining the Militia in existence at all. Then we have the proposals made, in which, of course, we all agree, that it should be improved in its character and strength and efficiency.This tendency to go from one extreme to another is also discernible in what the right hon. Gentleman 245 has said as to the view of the Government in regard to what is called the blue-water policy—the dinghy policy. The dinghy theory points straight to one thing and one thing only—namely, that we need not maintain any land forces whatever in these islands. But, on the other hand, if we do not accept the dinghy theory, then we are told, "You have nothing before you but conscription. You must have compulsory service of some sort if you reject this theory, and have any regard for the safety of these islands." I belong to a humbler school—what I venture to call the silver-streak school. It is quite good enough for me, and it has been good enough for this country for a great many years, as it may well continue to be. I am not afraid of the conquest of these islands; but I cannot get rid of the idea that there may be in some circumstances a partial invasion, or what is known as a raid; and to say that not even a dinghy can land on our shores is nothing less than an absurdity. On the other hand, I think that we ought to make full use of and never leave out of our minds the advantages which this country possesses from its insular position, while at the same time we ought not to exaggerate them. But to talk of compulsory service in this country is to imply that we are to come down from the vantage ground that we possess to the unfortunate position of our Continental neighbours with hostile Powers on every side. As to this Militia proposal that was before the House of Lords, I will not enter upon that now. But I associate myself with the objection that was made against dealing with the Militia in this piecemeal fashion; and I think we should know more before we alter the conditions of service in the Militia, because, for one thing, we do not know what calamitous effect upon the recruiting of the Militia these alterations of service may have.
Now I pass to the question of the two Armies. I am opposed to two Armies; and I heard with much pleasure the statement of his views by my hon. friend the Member for Oldham, who pointed out that this question of having two separate Armies under separate conditions had been before Government after 246 Government, statesman after statesman, and soldier after soldier, and until recently had been rejected by them all. We are to have a short-service Army with only two years service, and then the men are to be passed into the Reserve; and this Army is not to leave our shores. Where is now the material for the operation of that part of the system? It is postponed, we are told; but I should like to know when to, and whether completely or only in part. What the right hon. Gentleman proposed was that there should be thirty-three battalions of Militia—that was all the Militia he wished to maintain—retained for this purpose, and thirty-eight battalions of the Line, which were to be converted into mere machinery for this purpose. The Government have been frightened out of the Militia part of the scheme. So we are left with only thirty-eight Line battalions to be treated in this manner. What sort of battalions will these be? They will not be part of the Regular Army. They will not be able to support and maintain and relieve the Army abroad. They will be isolated. They will be maintained merely for the purpose of breeding Reserves. As a friend of mine from India said to-day, the Army will be like a swarm of bees—part working bees and the rest mere drones. What will be the number of these Reserves? The right hon. Gentleman is now short of about half his material, and how will he fare for his full number? The old Reserve has been shown to be 6,000 short of the number required to fill up the establishment to war strength. These are figures that I have not seen contradicted. The right hon. Gentleman will, I daresay, contradict them, but they have been before the public now for a long time and have not been contradicted. The right hon. Gentleman takes a strong view about the Reserves. He denies that that can be called a Reserve which is only a force for completing the first Line. He says that the Reserve is meant for filling up and reinforcing the first Line later on. But his Reserve was 6,000 men short even of the first purpose. How much more short will it be when the Militia part of the Reserve is dropped? What will be their quality? They have two years training, they will have no experience of general service, no 247 training with a regiment, they will be merely a mob of recruits, and they will be exceedingly young when in the service, as they have to be enlisted at eighteen years of age.
I do not enter into the question of officers, because I do not understand how it is to be arranged, but I will point out a peculiar thing. Here is the right hon. Gentleman, who is the apostle of esprit de corps. He has declaimed against the double-battalion system because it destroys esprit de corps. But if a man or officer is transferred from one battalion to another of a regiment wearing the same uniform and called by the same name this esprit de corps is destroyed; and here he is to have these Reserves freed from any regimental attachment altogether, and the regimental continuity is destroyed and the local associations are lost, as far as I understand. Is it wise to break up the solidarity and interchangeability of the Army and constitute it into two parts—one deprived of that training and efficiency that comes from varied service and varied experience in foreign stations? On this part we have mainly to depend for our Reserves.
Now, I turn to the other part of the Army, what is called the foreign or long-service part. Each battalion of it will be eighteen years abroad and six years at home. They will be localised in trying climates. It has always been considered most objectionable to put our gallant countrymen to this use. I remember well in the early days of the seventies, when all these questions were being considered and settled at the War Office, that the question largely turned on this point of the health of our men abroad. We all remember the case of the Presidency troops in India. They were in one sense a splendid body of troops, but their discipline came to be bad. They were kept a long time in India until they were invalided or until they died. Hot only was the discipline bad, but their health was bad also. I have looked up the recent Army Medical Report of 1902. It is essential for the House to bear in mind these matter-of-fact circumstances, for they have really more to do with the efficiency of your system than all the fine theories that 248 philosophers can devise. I find that after five years the men rapidly deteriorate in India. During the first five years the average invaliding annually varies from 25 to 30 per 1,000. When you come to the years between five and ten years service, the invaliding is 64 per 1,000. But you are to keep these men in India, and they are to suffer this deterioration in health and condition, and then you are to bring them home and turn them into the world to find their way about. It is a cruel and inhuman system.
§ *MR. ARNOLD-FORSTERWhere does the right hon. Gentleman find that system?
§ SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANYour nine-years men would be seven or eight years in India, and I have shown that after five years the tide turns, and from that time their health becomes worse. Why insist upon the proposed nine years? Even the seven years was an extension of what was desirable to meet the Indian complaints. The Indian Government complained of the great expense of constantly sending men backwards and forwards, and the enlistment was extended to seven years to meet that complaint. But changes have taken place since that concession was made. In the first place, I believe that freights for soldiers to and from this country are almost half what they were in those days. In the second place, under the recommendation of the Committee on Indian Expenditure a year or two ago, the Imperial Government undertook half the cost of that transport so that it is only a quarter of what it was in those days. Yet the right hon. Gentleman proposes to keep these men there two years longer. And what is the effect? He reduces the Reserves by two-thirds and he largely increases deaths and invaliding, two serious evils with no advantage that I can see. I commend these things to the consideration of the House, and I say that any such long prolongation of service is a mistake. These men are enlisted at nineteen years of age, and they are cast back into civil life at twenty-eight, two years later than now, and this makes a very grave difference. In the first place 249 it handicaps them because their habits have become settled in a life removed from their surroundings and they will have less opportunity of finding civil employment. In the second place, there is the marriage difficulty, always great, and increasing the longer a man is kept so late in life under the conditions in which these young men serve And in the third place, when a man has served so long he has acquired a claim you can hardly resist to be put on the pension list. This proposal is for long service of nine years with the colours and only three with the Reserve—it is, on all grounds, a retrograde and undersirable step.
What, after all, does the right hon. Gentleman give us by all these changes that we have not got already? Consider how the old system served us splendidly in the South African War; 90,000, or nearly 100,000, were embarked in a few weeks during 1899 and 1900, and subsequently drafts were sent out to the number of 90,000 more, and that Army was organised for defence and for striking purposes, not for the conquest of a great territory. Now we are told we must have a huge Army and a great Reserve, and a great reservoir of power for the defence of the North-West Frontier. I want to know what are the new facts about the North-West Frontier; how are we to distinguish between prudent watchfulness and restless ambition? High military authorities have laughed at the fears expressed as to danger in that quarter. A mere shaking of the head will not dispose of those authorities; give us the data to support that shaking of the head. I will quote an authority which I have quoted in the House before on an occasion when the Prime Minister flaunted the North-West Frontier in our face. Sir H. Brackenbury—no mean authority—in his evidence given before the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure, said the defence of India was already provided for in that quarter and that it would not be necessary or possible for this country to send out a single man more. What, I ask, has caused the change since that declaration made three or four years ago by an eminent authority, a military member of the Council? I am afraid there are large and ambitious views taken which 250 —I will not say encourage—but certainly lead up to the whole idea of this exceptional danger to the North-West Frontier. We hear that as many men will have to be sent in case of a war in that quarter as went to South Africa; and the right hon. Gentleman is not content to stop there. I took down his words when he said we must be prepared to have men entering into a contest with the flower of other nations. That is an entirely new conception of the purpose for which our Army exists; and I would ask the Committee to try to put some limit to the cost of our preparations, to the expenditure of money, and to the demands for men. Lord Lansdowne a Few years ago, speaking on these Army subjects in Edinburgh, said that of the men of serviceable age in this country—and I believe many Members of the House may not be aware of this fact—of the population available of serviceable age, no fewer than one out of four was actually serving at the moment he spoke either in the Navy, Army, or Auxiliary Forces. How much further are we to go? I believe that this exaggerated view of our danger and our necessities will lead the country into greater misfortunes, and I would ask again to be furnished with the data, in order that we may calmly consider these matters.
I have only a word or two to say by way of going back on the subject of the Militia and Volunteers. As to the Militia, not only the members of that force but all of us are ready for any amount of improvements that may be made, and for great improvements. I believe the Army is steadily improving. I believe even the Militia is better organised, trained, and officered than it was. But go on improving it until you reach a sufficient and satisfactory pitch of efficiency. The Volunteers, also, are ready for any amount of training within reason that you choose to impose upon them, and I am sure that the whole House heard with astonishment the language in which the Secretary of State exposed what he believed to be the almost crippled condition of the members of that force. He has seen the Reports, and if those Reports have any justification what an exposure it is of the general 251 physical condition of the whole community! The Volunteers are probably as good as their neighbours, and mostly young men of spirit, and yet we are told that 40 per cent. are unfit for their duties. A statement like that almost answers itself. But there is no reason in anything that has been put before us for accepting a shadowy scheme such as the right hon. Gentleman now puts forward—a scheme many parts of which are old nostrums that have been rejected again and again in past years—instead of a system which, capable of improvement though it may be, has at least done us good service for many years in the past.
§ MR. PEEL (Manchester, S.)I beg to move, Mr. Chairman, that you now report Progress.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress; and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Peel.)
§ MR. CHURCHILLsaid he would take this opportunity afforded by the Motion to report Progress to state that he thought it would be more convenient if they could come to a decision upon this question at this particular juncture. He understood that that was the general desire upon both sides of the House. The feeling was that if they now allowed this general debate to close the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Sheffield and others who wished to move a reduction in reference to the Volunteers and the Militia would have a better opportunity of doing so. He thought the course he suggested would be for the general convenience of the House.
SIR HOWARD VINCENTsaid he hoped his hon. friend the Member for Manchester would withdraw his Motion to report Progress, because after the discussion which had taken place the House was really able to take a decision upon this question.
§ MR. J. F. HOPE (Sheffield, Brightside)asked if following the suggestion which had been made by the hon. and gallant Member for Sheffield would preclude the Committee from having a general discussion on other Amendments.
*THE CHAIRMANAn understanding was come to the other day that on Vote 1 the discussion was to be general, however long it might last. I understand that the Prime Minister has placed at the disposal of the House Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday for this purpose, and therefore a general discussion will not be precluded upon other Amendments.
§ *MR. ARNOLD-FORSTERsaid the Leader of the Opposition had made an important speech, and he should be exceedingly loth to let such a challenge and attack to go unanswered. He might be confronted to-morrow with a specific reduction upon another subject, which would clearly preclude him from replying to the attack made by the Leader of the Opposition.
§ MR SWIFT MACNEILL (Donegal, S.)The Chairman has ruled otherwise.
§ *MR. ARNOLD-FORSTERsaid the House had heard the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. The Leader of the Opposition had made a very important speech, and he had made statements which he believed were inaccurate, and therefore he intended to exercise his right to set the House right upon this matter.
§ MR. SWIFT MACNEILLDon't talk it out.
§ *MR. ARNOLD-FORSTERsaid he was not attaching any blame to anyone, but in view of the fact that the important 253 speech of the Leader of the Opposition had been made at the close of the debate, he simply desired to reserve his right to reply to it.
And, it being midnight, the Motion to report Progress lapsed without Question put, and the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House.
Committee report Progress; to sit again this day.