HC Deb 12 March 1903 vol 119 cc591-657

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £9,647,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge for the pay, allowances and other charges of His Majesty's Army at home and abroad (exclusive of India) (General Staff, Regiments, Reserve, and Departments), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1904."


said that so far as these debates on the Army question had proceeded the Committee would not differ from him when he said that they had been marked with great good humour and by the absence of personalities, the only exception being the debate on the preceding night, which every Member of the House would no doubt regard with regret. The Government on their part had Accorded those who differed from them on this question of the Army the greatest facility for laying their case before the House and the country, and they were very sensible that the right hon. Gentlemen, the Prime Minister and the Secretary for War, had not desired on any account whatever to prevent these questions being most thoroughly and carefully discussed. He would venture to express the hope that, if the present debate should come to a conclusion that evening, the Prime Minister would afford them another day for discussing the Report Stage. He wished to emphasise, the fact that they were not criticising the action of the Secretary for War; they were criticising his policy, and the right hon. Gentleman would admit that if in the recent reconstruction of the Ministry he had had the fortune, good or bad, to go to the Treasury, he would at this very moment be regarding those whose action he was no doubt, under existing circumstances, strongly disapproving, as praiseworthy, admirable, and proper Members of the Conservative Party. Had any other Minister occupied the position the right hon. Gentleman now did, and were he pursuing the same policy, he would have met with the same hostile criticism. This was a Vote for money, and it brought home with great force the increasing cost of the British Army. If the hon. Gentleman would look back only five or six years he would see that to-day we were spending upon our armaments double the sum which was then thought necessary. We had built up great fortifications; we had organised new regiments; we had purchased all manner of cannon and all means of protection, and what was the result? No one looking at the question as an impartial man could say that we felt to-day more secure than five years ago, or that we had less cause of apprehension from the other nations of the world. The hon. Baronet the Member for Glasgow told them in debate two nights ago that if it were desired to reduce the expenditure the last item to be touched should be the Army. Surely that was not a proper consideration. If any hon. Gentleman could show the same extravagance to exist in other Departments as undoubtedly existed in the Army, he was sure there would be no lack of Members in that House to draw attention to the fact. The view which had been put forward on that side of the House that those who opposed expenditure upon armaments were necessarily unpatriotic could only be compared with the opinion held on the other side of the House that all who supported [the expenditure on education—whether wise or unwise, whether economical or the reverse—were what he might term obscurantists. Such questions must be dealt with on their merits, and there was no reason why those who approached the question of Army expenditure from the point of view of efficiency should be mistrusted because possibly in their hearts they nourished some love of economy. After all economy and efficiency, so far from being antagonistic, were twin sisters.

He wished to draw attention to a few facts which a careful study of the Army Estimates could not fail to bring to the attention of hon. Members who cared to spare the time. The first was the fact of the increasing cost of the Army and the diminishing return proportionately for that increasing cost. He would give a couple of instances taken at random from items of expenditure which fell within the scope of that Vote.

The Secretary of State for War talked the other day about too little being said regarding the Militia. He would take the case of the Militia now. In the year 1898–9 there were in this country 103,000 Militia, and Lord Lansdowne estimated the cost for that year at £553,000. In the present year, according to the returns presented to Parliament, it was estimated that there were 102,000 Militia, and they were to cost £903,000. It was quite fair and necessary to say that they must deduct £150,000 for what the Prime Minister had called the Great Militia Reserve—the Great Militia Reserve which every hon. Gentleman, according to his right hon. friend, had omitted to thank the Government forcreating, and which wasat present, of course, absolutely non-existent. But £150,000 was taken in the Votes last year for the formation of this Reserve. But, of course, because it was not in existence it was not necessary to utilise that sum. Putting aside the £150,000 for this valuable force, there remained this fact, which he invited the Committee to consider with attention: the Secretary of State for War had invested £200,000 of public money in the Militia, and as the result of this extra investment he produced 1,000 Militiamen less than he had in the days when Lord Lansdowne administered the War Department. That was one instance illustrating the point he was endeavouring to establish—the increasing cost and the diminishing return. There was another point, namely, the expenditure on the War (Mice General Staff. Of course, when they approached this item in the Estimates they did so with a feeling of hope, because they knew that the great scheme of decentralisation had lately been carried into effect, and that, of course, it must produce pro- portionate economy at Headquarters. His right hon. friend the other afternoon said— Scarcely a day passes that we do not transfer work and responsibility from Headquarters to the new Army Corps staff, which are created in the country. Let the Committee look at the first fruits of this policy of devolution and decentralisation. In 1898–9 the cost of the War Office was £215,000; in the present year it was estimated to cost £301,000. That was air increase of £28,000 on last year's Estimates, and an increase of £56,000 or 20 per cent. on the last normal year. He reminded the Committee that this was after a very liberal reduction had been made of £30,000 allowed for the extra expenses incidental to the South African campaign. Of course "the labourer is worthy of his hire," but he ventured to think that the Committee would be of opinion that an increase of 20 per cent. in the clerical staff of the War Office was a wholly inadequate reward even for the great exertions and achievements of that Department during the last few years. When he discovered in the Estimates, which he had examined carefully, this increase of £28,000, he was led at first to believe, indeed, to hope, that it was due to an increase in the Intelligence Department, but when he looked at the Army Estimates he found that the estimated cost of the Intelligence Department, after all the agitation, and in response to the demand that the brain of the Army should not be starved, was £27,428 as against £27,721 in the last year. This great and desirable economy had been effected, he observed from a close examination of the Estimates, fry abolishing one lithographic draughtsman and one superintending clerk, and by substituting two ordinary military clerks.


And also doing away with the Permit Office, which is no longer required.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL said he was very anxious to obtain information. Was that not allowed for in the extra expenditure due to the South African War?


I will answer the hon. Gentleman later on.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL said he would await with great interest a statement showing what increases had been made in the Intelligence Department. Unless the noble Lora said that the adding of the Mobilisation Department to the Intelligence Department had caused the increase, he did not know how it could be explained. While on this branch of the subject he would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, when he, alluded to district officers, he alluded to that class of officers who used to be known as A.Q.M.G., and who, under the new Army Scheme were known as D.A.A.G.B. If be was right in his inference it was a very strong order, because they had only half the duties in connection with the different districts with which they were connected. Any accretion to the Intelligence Department attributed to the position of these officers was very illusory, and it ought not to delude the House of Commons in considering this question. He had one more point illustrating his argument of the diminishing return. If the Secretary of State for War and others would refer to the Army Estimates at page 12, they would find under "Total Force" a very useful statement which could be easily understood. From that statement it was easy to make a comparison with similar items in the Estimates of 1898–9. In 1898–9 Lord Lansdowne asked the House of Commons to take upon the establishment of the Regular Army 171,000 regular soldiers, and 83,000 Army Reserve, making a total of 254,000 men. For that total force he asked Estimates of £18,000,000 approximately. In the present year my right hon. friend asked the House of Commons to take on the establishment 197,000 Regular soldiers, and 70,000 Army Reserves, making a total of 267,000 men. The right hon. Gentleman would be the last to dispute that the Army Reserve and the Regular Army were the preponderating and most important part of the Estimates. These figures showed that while he obtained an increase of 13,000 men, there was an increase of £9,500,000 of money on the Army Estimates. That was to say, for an increase of 8 per cent. in the number of men he had caused an increase in the expenditure of 35 per cent.


What year?

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL said the comparison was with the year 1898–9, which, as the right hon. Gentleman would recollect, was the last normal year before the war.


I wish to explain to the Committee that when numbers are voted by the House they are included in the Estimates, but everybody knows that an addition, a very large addition, was made in the year 1898. I think the number was 17,000 men, and it was mentioned at the time that we could not expect to raise all these Regulars in the same year. The amount voted was the money necessary for the men that we expected to raise, and that was included in the Estimates.

Mr. WINSTON CHURCHILL said he would endeavour to be fair, and he had no doubt that some drawback should be considered under that head. The Estimates of this year amounted to £27,500,000, and the Committee had heard of such things as Supplementary Estimates. It was quite possible that the cost of the Army this year would exceed the somewhat optimistic Estimates set forward in these Estimates. But that was not all. Let him remind the House what this £27,500,000 included and what it excluded. The £27,500,000 included the expenditure in regard to South Africa, some of which might continue—his right hon. friend would not deny that it might continue—for two or three years ahead. It excluded all reference to expenditure under the Mowatt programme—a very important item. It excluded practically the whole of the increased pay. In these Estimates there was an item of £495,000 for the increase paid, which fell due this, year. There was also a windfall in respect to the deferred pay of nearly £430,000, which might fairly be written off against that. It excluded all the extra provision for barracks. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be able to give the Committee some idea of the extra cost they must pay with regard" to barracks. Of course it would be an extension of the Military Loans Act of 1891, but it would be a great convenience to the Committee if they were able to calculate in regard to barracks the probable ultimate cost of the Army Scheme of 1901. It excluded all expenditure with regard to the new rifle, which his hon. friend the Member for Plymouth referred to the other day. That was not considerable. It consisted in the cost of cutting a number of inches off the barrel of the rifle—a somewhat doubtful advantage some experts considered. It excluded certain artillery expenditure which was likely to become an important item in future. They had been told that the Volunteers had been entirely re-armed with modern guns. Forty-four batteries of Volunteer artillery had been partially re-armed, and eighty-one batteries remained armed entirely with obsolete weapons, and he said that they ought to be given modern weapons or disbanded.

There were other items which would make themselves felt more and more in the future. The Reserve was to be brought up to 140,000. The Committee could calculate what that would cost at £9 per man. The Yeomanry, at present strength, numbered 22,000; they were to be increased to 29,000, and, if possible, to 45,000; that meant an additional £20 per man, but it was a much more desirable increase than under the head of skeleton and immature recruits. There was to be an increase of the Militia from 100,000 to 150,000 at about £16 per man.

*MR. BRODRICK said that the Militia was not increased from 100,000 to 150,000. The proposal was that on mobilisation the Militia should be raised to 150,000 by the addition of the Reserve.


Then the increase was on the Militia Reserve, which would cost £G per man. He was anxious to bring home to the Committee and the country what the ultimate cost of this Army Scheme would be, to which they were committing themselves by associating themselves with this policy. They had had lately a promise of economy in the future, when the Reserve was filed up, which, he thought, was very encouraging, but of which they would never have heard but for the desirable or undesirable signs of revolt which had made themselves felt below the Gangway. How did the Committee imagine the Reserve was to be filled up? The Line battalions were to be kept in a state of efficiency. They were inefficient cadres at 750 but efficient at 800 ! There was very little margin there. But the whole strength of the case, as presented by the right hon. Gentleman and the Prime Minister, was that this was the irreducible minimum of men necessary for the defence of the Empire. Let them not delude themselves in this matter. The Reserve was only a shadow of the men with the Colours. The proportion of the men with the Colours was the proportion of the men who would be in the Reserve. The moment the men with the Colours were reduced in order to effect the promised economy, the Reserve which was being piled up would begin to be reduced. It would be doing what the right hon. Gentleman the previous night accused the Liberal Government of doing—living on accumulated stores.


said they could not tell exactly the strength to which the Reserve would grow, because they did not know how many men would join for three years service with the Colours and nine in the Reserve, or for four years with the Colours and eight in the Reserve. Every man who joined for three years' service with the Colours would strengthen the Reserve. If there was a reduction of strength with the Colours, as hinted at the other day, the reduction of the Reserve would, of course, be of some magnitude.


said that the process of the reduction of the Reserve might be slow, but it must come. Another point was, what was the quality of the new Reserve as compared with; the old? Three years was not a very long time in which to train a soldier, and in a few years after passing into the Reserve he would lose much of his acquired habits of discipline and training. He would point out that this Reserve would be on the same level as the conscripts in France and: Germany, with this difference, that whereas the conscripts were taken from the whole of the population, including a considerable proportion drawn from the superior classes, unfortunately our Regular soldiers were drawn from the poorest and least favourably circumstanced of all His Majesty's subjects. He would ask the Committee to look back on the inconsistent and contradictory proposals which had characterised the military policy of the Government for two or three years past.

The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War came down to the House and proposed the system of five years with the Colours and seven in the Reserve: he would have nothing to say to the three and nine years' system. Last year he adopted the latter system. Then, three years ago, the right hon. Gentleman was convinced that no increase of pay which the House of Commons was likely to grant would result in any very satisfactory increase in the number of recruits for the Army; but last year his right hon. friend, in a most eloquent and convincing speech, insisted that an increase of pay would be of great advantage to the recruiting for the Army. Last autumn a Bill was passed, one part of which proposed to create an Auxiliary force out of the men who had served with the Colours, and another part proposed to create a Reserve from men who had served in the Yeomanry. It might be quite, right to strengthen the Auxiliary forces at the expense of the Regular Army; and it might also be perfectly right to strengthen the Regular Army at the expense of the Auxiliary forces—he did not think so but they should have the two systems at one and the same time. They were told by the most distinguished military advisers, on the authority of the right hon. Gentleman, that every single man asked for was required—that that was the irreducible minimum, but it might be worth while to consider whether, besides being necessary, it was also possible.

That brought him to the question of recruiting for the Army, for which the country was paying so much. What kind of an Army was it going to be? The right hon. Gentleman set great store on the Report of the Inspector-General for Recruiting, which was his main stall in all these debates. In that Report it was stated that in the present year 50,753 recruits had been netted, as against 47,039 in the preceding year. That was the greatest number of recruits netted in one year under the short service system. Now, 50,000 recruits was the minimum number with which the right hon. Gentleman could manage his scheme, which only left a margin of 750. If the recruiting did not come up to the right hon. Gentleman's estimates, hopes, and beliefs, then his scheme, however necessary or desirable, was going to fail, and he would have to come down to the House of Commons to make fresh proposals. And if it was going to fail, all this unnecessary increased expenditure should not be gone into. The right hon. Gentleman had got to prove to the Committee that the increased pay asked for would increase the number of recruits and improve their quality. Increased pay operated in two ways. It operated immediately when the people of the country read these debates and read the advertisements of the recruiting agencies. There was another circumstance from which the right hon. Gentleman might get some advantage in the course of two or three years, and that was when it was known that the soldier had more money in his pocket than before, and that the Army was a better place to live in. But these influences had not had time to work. It was the immediate influence which they had to deal with. What was the result of the increase of pay? In paragraph 55 of the Report of the inspector-General of Recruiting it was stated that "recruiting was unsatisfactory for nine months." That was for six months after the right hon. Gentleman made his statement as to increase of pay. But during the last three months of the year, the Report went on to say, "there was a vast improvement." The increase of pay and the increase of recruiting did not synchronise. Increase of recruiting was due to the pressure of want, the approach of winter, and the reservists who had come home from South Africa having been thrown on the labour market. Everybody was trying to give these reservists every advantage in the way of employment, and consequently the avenues to the employment of young men were blocked. The latter had therefore found their way into the Army. It was no exaggeration to say that last year was an exceptional one for recruiting According to his hon. friend's contention the increase of pay would not stimulate recruiting.

MR. ARTHUR LEE (Hampshire, Fareham)

said he merely stated that the prospect of increased pay was not sufficient to attract recruits. They wanted the actual pay.


said that that was entirely his point, which was that there was an accretion of men, not in consequence of the increased pay, but because of the pressure of want and winter. He admitted that the right hon. Gentleman had got his recruits; but let the Committee look at the altered condition under which he had got them. In 1901 34,000 recruits enlisted for seven years with the Colours. In 1902 only 9,000 enlisted for seven years. In 1901 8,000 recruits enlisted for three years, and in 1902 38,000 enlisted. That was an exact transposition of the men who enlisted for seven years and for three years. That, of course, was contemplated by the right hon. Gentleman, and was part of his scheme. But let the Committee observe what it meant. In order to compare the recruiting volumes which had been secured during the years 1901 and 1902, he had made a calculation multiplying the number of men who joined by the period for which they enlisted each year. He multiplied one set of men by three years and another set of men by seven years, and the result was that in such a phenomenal and exceptional year of recruiting as 1902 was, they only obtained 208,000 years of service, as against 290,000 years of service in 1901, or a difference of 80,000 years of service. Of course, the right hon. Gentleman expected to be able to induce the men who had enlisted to extend their service. That was a vital question which they had to consider with reference to the sums they were asked to sanction. What would be the alternative before a recruit when he was asked to extend his service. On the one hand, he saw the prospect of going into the Reserve for nine years, during which period he would get 3d. per day for doing nothing, a great advantage in the labour market. On the other hand, he would get 6d. a day extra if he stayed in the Army and went to India. That was a proposition which a young man would think it worth his time to consider very carefully. He would, however, have to decide at the very period when discipline had become a burden, and had not yet become a habit. Many of his friends were returning to civil life; he himself, perhaps, wanted to marry, and was looking forward to life in an English manufacturing town with 3d. a day on which he could count. He would have to decide when to remain in the regiment would involve a change of scene and association, and of everything that would make it desirable for a man to remain in the Army. Would the right hon. Gentleman get a sufficient number of re engagements to make up the deficiency of 80.000 years of service. The figures up to the present were not very encouraging; only 13 per cent. had re-engaged, and he understood that the right hon. Gentleman required 50 per cent. If the right hon. Gentleman failed to make up the deficiency, he would be forced to increase the £27,500,000 sterling, of which he had spoken, by a very large additional bounty to induce the men to make it worth their while to extend their service.

There was another point that he wished to submit to the Committee. Short service in the Army, however excellent, affected the Militia. The more the conditions of the Army approximated to the conditions of the Militia, the more recruits would be taken from the Militia for the Army. That was borne out by the figures, which showed that the number of men who joined the Regular Army from the Militia had increased. The right hon. Gentleman, he believed, was less prejudiced against recruits joining the Regular Army through the Militia than recruits joining the Regular Army direct, because, under certain circumstances, it did not impair the appearance of the recruiting returns, as such men, although there was no desire to falsify the returns, must necessarily be counted twice over. If the quantity of the recruits was doubtful, he would ask the Committee to examine, for a moment, their quality. The right hon. Gentleman stated that only 16. 2 per cent. of "specials" had been enlisted, as against 33 per cent. in 1898, and 34 per cent. in 1899. That was one of the figures which, more than anything else, influenced the House during the debate on the Address; and since the debate it appeared that? no more "specials" were to be enlisted. They were absolutely abolished, ruled out of existence by a stroke of the pen; there were no more "specials" in England; they belonged to the dark ages. That was very encouraging. But what was the cause of the abolition of "specials?" The Inspector-General of Recruiting was evidently a man of great ability, with, a certain pleasing ingenuousness of character which made itself felt between the lines of his Report. He stated— Owing to the introduction of the new system of medical examination, the number of men specially enlisted has considerably decreased. Nothing could be plainer. They were not in a position to judge the medical test. He believed the new test was a very elastic one; it meant the inflation of the recruit's chest, and the difference in measurement when his lungs were full of air and when they were not. No doubt that was a very up to-date and a very suitable test. There was only one point in connection with it that was vital. Was the new test as severe as the old test? If it was not, then, of course, all comparison, all statistics, all the rosy accounts in the Report were absolutely valueless. Was it likely that the test was more severe, or even as severe, as it was before?

He would ask the Committee to consider one or two things in this connection. First of all, supposing the test was not so severe. His hon. friend made a very excellent speech yesterday, but he regretted that he did not carry it to its logical conclusion in the Division Lobby. His hon. friend told the Committee that 106 "specials" out of 180 men were enlisted in one depot, although they were not specified as "specials" in their attestation papers. That would show that the new test was not as severe as the old test. Let the Committee remember the position in which the right hon. Gentleman was. No one was more concerned in the supply of recruits than the right hon. Gentleman was. The whole of the scheme which he had put forward with so much courage and enthusiasm depended on the supply of recruits. He had an urgent need for men, and was making a larger demand on the same class of the population. They were informed by the Inspector-General of Recruiting that an unpleasant feature of his Report was the gradual deterioration among the working classes, particularly in the towns. That was the class on which the right hon. Gentleman was making a larger demand; yet the percentage of rejections in that class, which was deteriorating, was less than in the previous year. The percentage was 32"22 as against 35. The Inspector-General added that well-educated recruits showed a marked falling off. It was perfectly evident that one of two things must have happened. Either by a stroke of the pen, or by some marvellous feat of legerdemain, the physique of the nation had been universally improved; or, on the other hand, the test by which the nation was being judged at the recruiting offices was easier. He would leave hon. Gentlemen to form their own opinion. He was not in the least convinced by the returns which had been presented, either that the number of men would be attained, or that their quality would be maintained. Nothing in the facts or figures proved that; and unless the right hon. Gentleman was able to prove it, he had better make up his mind, while there was yet time, to' reconsider his Army policy de novo, and rely, as he believed he could rely, on the generosity of the House of Commons, in retracing his steps. If he would abandon, the policy to which he was committed, he would encounter no further opposition, but only silent support, even in the very quarters where he must, otherwise, expect the most relentless, uncompromising opposition and criticism.

They had advanced a long way in the consideration of the question, during the debates they had had on the subject. He would like to refresh the minds of hon. Gentlemen as to the various positions which had been successively abandoned. He would not refer to the minor positions. First of all, there was the question of a great Regular Army for home defence. They did not hear much about that now. Then there was the historic phrase which the right hon. Gentleman used at the Colonial Conference against "pitting" the British Army against European troops. "Pitting" was a curious word; and he looked it up, and found that it meant to pit one against the other, as cocks were matched. The idea of "pitting" a small British Army against European troops had now apparently been abandoned. The right hon. Gentleman was so pleased with it, that he used that particular phrase no less than four times in eleven lines. Then they were told of commitments in three continents, two of which had now been disposed of, because after the visit of the Colonial Secretary to South Africa and his effort at conciliation, it would be disrespectful to suggest we should ever again need three Army Corps for South Africa. There remained, therefore, but the Indian continent, but during the course of the debate on the previous night the Prime Minister had considerably whittled down the facts that 120,000 men were needed for the defence of India. Some, no doubt, would be sent to India, and others would be sent to skirmish in other places not specifically defined.

He had noticed lately that whenever a division took place on this Army question it was always in its result hailed with loud. Ministerial cheers; but they did not rely on mere numbers, they relied on arguments. It was unfortunately one of the conditions of debate that the divisions were taken by a large number of hon. Gentlemen who had not listened to the debate but, who came in at the last moment and who very often, if the Army policy was ten times as costly and ten times as foolish as the present, would vote for it with equal equanimity, and would most mistakenly encourage the Government to get deeper into the mire. He believed in the arguments used both in the House and through the country, which would build up an enlightened public opinion on the question of Imperial defence, and he believed most of all in the force of circumstances which would make themselves known to the right hon. Gentle- man through the agency of the recruiting officers; circumstances which in the course of a year or two would make the British public regard this scheme with the greatest distrust and disfavour, and place the Government in a position from which they would not be able to extricate themselves without a considerable loss of credit.


said the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had dealt with the financial and economical conditions of the Army Corps. That was a matter in which he did not now propose to follow, but as be might have to go into technical questions he hoped he would not weary the House. He had entered his reduction on the Notice Paper at this particular time, because it was the first place in the Army Estimates in which the words Army Corps were mentioned. It was not to be found anywhere in tin; previous Vote, nor in the index, and only once in the body of this Vote, all other references being in the appendices. He urged upon the House that if these Army Corps were really to be genuine Army Corps, all the Estimates relating to numbers, pay, trains, and services should be reframed, and the amounts divided up among the different Army Corps, so that hon. Members might be able 10 know what the expenditure of these Army Corps really was, and judge for themselves. In the Vote under discussion there was a vote for general staff's, but those staffs were not split up into the divisions in which they were to be placed in the Army Corps; they were ail lumped together in such a way as to make it impossible to separate the items. After a very careful consideration of this system, extending over two years, he believed, from a military point of view, it was unworkable, and utterly unsuited to the needs of this country, and, from a Parliamentary point of view, it was a scheme possibly fraught with grave danger to the Constitution. These were no doubt strong opinions to put forward at this time, and hon. Members might well ask why they were not put forward two years ago, when this scheme was introduced, but it would be remembered that on that occasion the Resolution was, after considerable discussion.

closured, and the main question put; had it only been closured far enough to admit of Amendments he would have moved to change these six Army Corps into three or four military commands, and have taken the sense of the House upon it. The history of this scheme showed that it was the child of panic, and when the returns and the Army List were examined it would be found that these Army Corps were nothing more nor less than the grouping together of district commands. As a matter of fact, the right hon. Gentleman had commenced his Army reform from the top instead of the bottom: he had started at the roof instead of the foundations. What he ought to have done was to group the units together in brigades, arid to have grouped the brigades in divisions, and in this way have arrived at divisions properly organised, and that having boon done, it probably would have been found advisable not to proceed further with the scheme of organisation. He did not deny that with careful organisation it would be possible to have real Army Corps in these districts, but it would be a task of extraordinary difficulty, rendered greater by the re-organisation having begun at the top instead of the bottom. But suppose these Army Corps had been successfully organised; upon that subject he would like to ask two questions. Assuming the Army Corps to be organised, were the district commands to remain much the same as the old district commands, or were they to be thoroughly le-orgauised both as to area and as to the troops, so as to form true divisions of an Army Corps system? Then, according to the White Paper, there were a certain number of battalions belonging to the Army Corps still abroad. Suppose one of these battalions returned home, and with ten or twelve years to serve in the United Kingdom before going abroad again, would that battalion spend the whole of that period in the particular Army Corps command in which it was located on its return, or would it be shifted, according to the requirements of the home Army, from one command to another? If the latter, it would be totally destructive of an) 'reality in the Army Corps system. That this matter had possibly not been thought out was shown by the Return of the Army Corps, in which the units were scattered about, some belonging to one command being stationed in another, many units not yet returned, and there being absolutely no mention whatever of trains, services, or any of the accessories which made up the reality and mobility of an Army Corps. If the Secretary of State had really understood what an Army Corps was, he could not possibly have furnished such a Return to Parliament. The House of Commons ought to insist, in future, whenever there was a Return of an Army Corps command, that it should 'be a real, and not merely a paper Return. If a board of directors advertised a universal railway in the United Kingdom, and it was then found that they had scattered groups of rolling stock dotted about the kingdom, but no locomotives or permanent way, would it not be thought that those directors were absolutely ignorant of the duties they had to perform? These Army Corps were very much in that position. The units were dotted about the country in groups, but there was no permanent way—which, in the case of an Army Corps, was the trains and services—or locomotives, there being no commissariat in the Return, and an Army, as all knew, marched on its. stomach. What did the right hon. Gentleman look forward to in case of war when these Army Corps had been mobilised and sent away? The problem was much simpler in Germany. There no man was called up for military service until he was twenty years of age. He then served three years with the Colours and four years with the Reserve, followed by thirteen years in the landwehr, from which he was drafted into the landsturm. Hence in peace time there were men of three different years with the Colours, so that on mobilisation two-thirds were available for war, and only one-third had to be replaced. In the Reserve there were soldiers of four different years, or one-third more than the peace establishment with the Colours, so that the Reserve filled up the fighting units to overflowing. Behind that was the land,-wehr, which was more than double the fighting force of the field army. The German system was built on that one foundation. Every man went through the same drill, and therefore took his place with the fighting unit with the same experience behind him. How could that system be compared with our mixed system of Regulars. Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. It was absolutely impossible for it to be so adapted as in any way to approach the perfection of the German system. When the three Army Corps of Regulars, filled up with Reservists, were mobilised, the men would be taken from the parts most exposed to invasion, and the Committee ought to know how they were to be replaced. Supposing the Army Corps had been in existence, in what way should we have been more ready for the wars of the past? How should we have been in a better position on the outbreak of the South African War? The ranks could only be filled up by mobilisation, for under this scheme he did not see how there was to be an efficient fighting force which could be instantly sent abroad. An Army Corps was a complete little army in itself, and to have mobilised one when affairs were so strained in the Transvaal would have been tantamount to a declaration of war. The only force of any use would have been some brigades, which could have been quietly shifted into the garrisons on the frontier without attracting more than ordinary attention. Before the Committee permanently undertook this great responsibility, the practical advantage that was to accrue ought to be proved. It was assumed that the number of the auxiliary Army Corps would remain at three. If there was to be a real and complete organisation of our Auxiliary forces, there would have to be, not three, but twelve or thirteen Army Corps, for a mixed system, composed partly of Army Corps, could not be efficient. Such an organisation, he believed, would be a dangerous military machine in this country. It was sometimes said that those who opposed the scheme were disappointed military critics, or men with fads of their own, but he ventured to say that they had behind them a constantly growing body of public opinion, founded not upon professional criticism, but upon a distrust of a standing Army and militarism. The people of the country, looking forward to the time when there would be these highly-organised military units, saw in them a possible danger to their constitutional liberties. Let one too powerful subject arise, and he might use this great organisation to seize supreme power. Two years ago the House adopted the Army Corps system without understanding it, but it was not yet too late to turn back. The House was a strong one; strong men ac knowledged their errors; only the weak and effeminate were afraid to do so. Before it was too late, and before they burdened the nation with this ever-increasing expenditure, he earnestly urged upon the Committee to turn back now, and declare that instead of having these Army Corps they would have an extension of the old constitutional system. In Ireland there was a Commander-in-Chief responsible for the troops there; let this be extended to the United Kingdom and two other such military commands created, and let there be within them Brigades and Divisions organised as highly as possible, but have nothing greater than a Division, and in such a system he was sure they would find constitutional safety, and an organisation which would be best fitted for the needs of the whole Army.

MR. COURTENAY WARNER, (Staffordshire, Lichfield)

said he wished to move a reduction upon this item. There was an enormous increase in the expenditure under this new system, and it would go on year after year, becauseas these Army Corps developed the efficiency of the Army would have to be developed as well, and consequently the whole of the expenses would increase. The Reserves would increase, and so would the staffs and stores which would be necessary to make up these real Army Corps. The reaction against this expenditure had already begun, and if the Government went on increasing their expenditure, in spite of the feeling in the country, there was not the slightest doubt that the day would come when this reaction would be so strong that not only would these large items for Army Corps be put down, but the expenses of the Army would be largely reduced to a dangerous extent, and possibly the same thing would apply to the Navy. He was sure that all who had the welfare of the Empire at heart would like to avoid such a result. The hon. Member for Oldham had pointed out a good many things that were not included in the Estimates, and he wished to point out that the ranges had not been provided for. If they continued increasing this expenditure reaction was sure to come, unless they could show that they were making economies in other directions. A reduction could be made on the staff as it existed, but instead of this they were proceeding to greatly increase the staff.

He noticed on page 7 of the Estimates a permanent increase of £5,000 a year. But what ought to have been done in this case was to decrease the expenditure by at least four times that amount. It might be said that all these large staffs were not required except for the purpose of giving instruction to the men. A man did not get instruction in commanding troops, and he did not learn the art of war by being the general in command at Gibraltar or Malta. Therefore, these were not the men they wanted to teach the work of generals. They wanted to teach the young men these duties, and not the young men who had earned their laurels. The men of the future were those they wanted to teach. One of the great advantages put forward for this new system of having an extra staff for' this division was that the men should get accustomed to the officers in command. He thought the men would see very little of the general in charge of their Army Corps, but the people they wanted to get accustomed to were the brigadiers. Under this new system, however, they could never make a brigadier a permanent brigadier, for they would be continually changed. If they had all the brigadiers appointed to the different brigades they would not get the men permanently accustomed to them.

The really important point which ought to have been observed in the formation of these Army Corps was to form permanent brigades of troops, and send out the drafts in brigades instead of battalions. Then they could train their brigadiers and men regularly together. The new system of Army Corps had also another defect. Under the old system they had before them a much better scheme, because this country had very often to send from one to six battalions abroad at once. An Army Corps would not help them to do this. Under the old system at Aldershot the regiments were ready to go to India, and they always had a certain number of troops up to war strength. Under this new Army Corps system the Regulars would be distributed in the various Army Corps, and they would not be under the same brigadiers as would be sent abroad. The men would be selected from the different commands and they would not be together as under the old system at Aldershot. He believed this item was the one upon which a reduction could most easily be carried out in the least time, and with the least injury to the Army. By this reduction they would not take away one efficient man. With regard to the officers and the staff he thought it had been shown in South Africa that the men who had had the most training had continually failed, and the men who had had little training had been successful over and over again. If it had been shown that this new scheme would improve the staff and teach them the actual art of war, he thought there would have been a great claim for not reducing this Vote. He thought a reduction was absolutely necessary, and he begged leave to move the Motion standing in his name.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Item A, Pay, etc., of General Staff, be reduced by £60,000."—(Mr. Courtenay Warner.)

*COLONEL BLUNDELL (Lancashire, Ince)

said that in his opinion it was unfortunate that the words "Army Corps" had been used in connection with the schemeinstead of the word "Commands" He thought it would have been better to have included in the Divisions, Cavalry Brigades, Artillery and Engineer commands all troops, whether Regular, Militia, or Volunteers, and to merely indicate those of the Army Corps associated with the command by an asterisk or in some other way. He had no doubt, however, that the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman, would come all right. He only hoped that the staff would be cut down to whatever was necessary for the duties they had to perform.

*SIR A. HAYTEK (Walsall)

thought those who were opposed to the system of Army Corps ought to support the Amendment for the reduction of this Vote. He wished to call attention to three increases which were of the same character, and amounting in all to about £20,000. It was essential that the Committee should be aware how the increase in the expenditure arose, because, as the hon. Member for Oldham had pointed out, by the adoption of the Army Corps system they were not at the end, but the beginning, of a very large expense. There were now four more major generals, the number being increased from twenty-eight to thirty two, the increase on the Estimates being £4,470; there were thirteen additional colonels on the staff—forty-nine against; thirty-six—increasing the Estimates by nearly £10,000; and there were thirteen additional deputy assistant quartermaster generals—forty-one against twenty-four—increasing the Estimates by £6,658. These additions to the charge for "Pay, etc., of General Staff" were consequent upon the additional officers required under the Army Corps system. Of course, having adopted the Army Corps system, they must look to the fact that a great many more general officers would be employed.

One of the reasons why the Secretary of State for War asked Parliament to adopt the system was that it would mean a policy of decentralisation. He was the last person to object to any policy of decentralisation which could possibly be carried out. The light hon. Gentleman referred yesterday to the larger powers which had been given to commanding officers, but such powers, he thought, might have been conferred on the Generals formerly commanding Districts. What was the difficulty in entrusting Generals of Districts with powers to enter into contracts for forage, for repairs, for transport, or matters of that kind? If such powers had been conferred on them it would not have been necessary to have this enormous increase in the pay of the General Staff. There was one point on which he desired an answer with respect to the financial department, and that was whether any arrangement had been made whereby the innumerable returns sent to she War Office to be audited would be dispensed with in future. Ho understood that it was intended to submit pay lists to a financial officer in the district, who would be able to give them a final audit. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be able to tell the Committee that the audit in the division would be the final audit.

On the general question of the Army Corps system, he agreed with those who thought it was not suited for this country. One of the great objects which the right hon. Gentleman had in view, namely, that the men should become accustomed to their commanders, could not be carried out under a system in which they brought out the regiments only by employing lie serve men. Of the wars in which this country engaged, 99 out of 100 were wars in which only a small force was employed. If they sent a brigade to Ashanti, or a division to South Africa, that was as much as they could possibly want. But to do so, is to break up the Army Corps system. Was the Army Corps system suited to times of peace? In times of peace they had to send out continual drafts of troops to the colonies, and for that reason the integral units could not be kept up at all. Again, as to the Militia and Volunteers. Up to the present time our system for the Auxiliary forces had been a county system, and he was very doubtful, indeed, whether the new system of Army Corps was suited to the wants of the Militia Volunteers. He believed it would be a dangerous and expensive one, and he was very glad that the hon. Member for Lichfield had taken this opportunity of pointing out that there would be a very great increase for the cost of the staff, and for the building of barracks.

MR. GALLOWAY (Manchester, S.W.)

said he desired at once to disclaim any right to address the Committee on the Army Estimates from the expert point of view. He did not pretend or claim to have behind him any of those authorities to which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had referred. He did wish, however, to ask his right hon. friend a very plain and simple question, and one on which he hoped he would be able to give an equally plain answer. When the hon. Member for Whit by moved an Amendment to the Address, condemning the whole Army system, he voted against him, because, according to immemorial practice, an Amendment to the Address was regarded as involving a question of confidence in the Government. He had no desire to replace the Secretary of State for War and the Financial Secretary to the War Office by any of the Gentlemen on the Front Bench opposite. Though hedisagreed with some of the suggestions that had been made by the Secretary of State for War, he was quite certain that he had done the work in a much more complete and efficient manner than the hon. Gentleman sitting on the Front Bench opposite would have done. As to the whole question of the Army Corps system, whether it was to be continued in the future or not, and whether the cost of the system was to be reduced or not, the First Lord of the Treasury pointed out that it would be folly to reduce the numbers of the Army at a time when our Reserves were very low.


said that the hon. Member must confine his remarks to Vote A.


said he was sorry he had transgressed the ruling of the Deputy-Chairman, but he had understood that he could discuss the whole question of the Army Corps system on this Vote. He would reserve his remarks to another occasion.

MR. BRYNMOR JONES (Swansea District)

said that there was a great deal of information, more than had yet been given, which should be supplied to the Committee to enable hon. Members to form a correct judgment on the question before them. For instance, he entirely failed to see the effect on the new Army Corps of our financial system. For instance, on page 125, the details of the general staff for home service were given:—" Commanding Army Corps, six generals." Three of them, the generals commanding the First, Second, and Third Army Corps were full generals, and the other three were lieutenant-generals. The pay of the first three generals was £2,928 each per annum, with, he presumed, house accommodation and allowances, and that of the three lieutenant-generals was £2,013 per annum. He wanted to know if that pay included all the money these generals received from the country?


said that the generals of the first three Army Corps would be paid as generals, with certain allowances as well. The officers who might be appointed to command the other three Army Corps would be paid as lieutenant-generals. In point of fact these were not all new appointments.


said that his next question was a practical one. When he looked at the Army List he found that the staff of the Army Corps at Aldershot had been fully constituted. General French was the Commanding Officer, with twenty-one officers on his staff, and two additional officers detached from the War Office. Now that was a much larger staff than existed at Aldershot under the previous system. Was it intended that, under the new system, there should be this large permanent staff at Aldershot? It looked to him as if they were going to have as large a staff at Aldershot as if the Army Corps there were going on a war expedition on the morrow. Was it absolutely necessary that such a large staff should be maintained in time of peace? He was not for a single moment suggesting that the salaries of the generals were excessive.


said that the discussions on the Estimates were mainly useful, not for the purpose of turning out the Government, but of obtaining information from them, and for that purpose he had risen. Tins Vote for the pay of the General Staff included the Vote for the pay of the Inspector-General of Remounts. Major General Truman, he believed, was that officer's name. Now, that general and his conduct had been very considerably canvassed in this House some time last year; and a strong disposition had been manifested on the part of the House to hold that general responsible for the tremendous mistakes he had made in the conduct of the Remount Department. As a consequence of these remarks in this House, the Commander-in-Chief sent for the Inspector-General of Remounts and told him, as was known officially, that he was an incompetent officer, and dismissed him. After that, General Truman was granted a court of inquiry. As to what that court of inquiry had done, or the conclusion it arrived at, the Committee had no information whatever. He believed he was right in saying that the inspector-General of Remounts who figured in this Vote was General, or a sort of General, Truman, and he wished the Secretary of State for War to tell the Committee, if he could, under what circumstances General Truman was dismissed by the Commander-in-Chief, and had been allowed to remain in this employment, and whether it was proposed to maintain him in this employment?

Then he wanted to ask a question in regard to the Military Attaches. There were ten of them, at £800 a year each. Could the right hon. Gentleman tell the Committee where each of these Military Attaches was now placed, and specially, he would like to know whether the Military Attache at Vienna was the same as was at that post for the last year or two; because he was the man who had suffered a stigma at the hands of General Truman when he offered to advise him in regard to Austrian and Hungarian horses, and whom General Truman refused to consult? Then there were six aides-de-camp to the King, at 10s. 6d. a day each. On what grounds were these aides-de-camp selected? Of course, if they were His Majesty's selection, he had nothing to say; but if not, on what sort of principle were they selected—on the ground of merit, or what other ground?


said it was inconvenient to have to answer questions on one portion of a statement, which had been made so absolutely bound up with the whole general question of the Army, and therefore the Committee would excuse him if he were short in dealing with particular questions of detail. The question of the staff of the Army had been one of those most prominently brought forward, not only at the beginning, but throughout the whole of the South African War. There was a feeling that it was not only a staff ready to go abroad that was necessary, but that we had not left behind a staff which would be able to organise the further troops required to be sent abroad. Surely their object ought to be to lay themselves out to improve the system. Under the Vote granted the previous day, they were allowed to consider that they had three Army Corps which they might send abroad, and surely they should take in the Estimates a Vote for a further staff, when the head staffs of the three Army Corps went abroad, which they would be able to call into existence and use and amplify for any future emergency that might arise ! That was the object for which this money had been taken in the Estimates. The only real criticism that had been made was as to whether this staff should be allocated in such divisions as was most likely to control efficiency, and incidentally to effect such economies as they looked and hoped for from the distribution of the various commands. The right hon. Member for Walsall asked why decentralisation only applied to the commanders of Army Corps—why not to commanders of divisions or brigades?


said the words he used were "District Commanders." What he had in his mind was the generals in command at Aldershot and York under the old system.


said he thought he was right when he said the right hon. Gentleman referred to generals of Division. He was against decentralising to generals of Division. He was certain that the more they decentralised from the War Office the better would it be; but the fewer hands that decentralisation was in, the better would be the result. To decentralise to the six generals in command of the six Army Corps would, to his mind, result in efficiency. It would not be cheaper, perhaps, than the present system, but it would put into the hands of commanders of Districts the power of making contracts, of buying forage, and in regard to buildings—which latter would result, he was certain, in an expenditure largely in excess of that which now existed. With regard to decentralisation, the best example he could possibly give was that of Salisbury Plain. He did not think that anyone who had not seen the work done by Sir Evelyn Wood could realise the enormous advantages, not only of the decentralisation which had been given to him in the way of money and other matters, but also the benefit they had derived by the suggestions he had made. That showed them most clearly how very much further they might proceed, by degrees, with decentralisation.

At the present moment, naturally, the staffs were large, both at the War Office and at the various Army Corps centres; but he had not the slightest doubt that, as the machine began to work easier—and it was working easier every day—and when the arrears of the war had been cleared off, there would be a substantial reduction, not in the expenses of the Army Corps districts, but in the staffs of the War Office, from which they proposed, as far as possible, to decentralise all matters of finance. The whole argument of his hon. and gallant friend was that it was not necessary to have this General Staff. When he thought of what his hon. and gallant friend had said, he could hardly see how his hon. and gallant friend could make his arguments square with his speech on the 13th of March, 1900. His hon. and gallant friend then said that in all questions connected with making this large force efficient, the necessity for combining all the smaller units by means of constant inspection throughout the country should be borne in mind; and that if that could not be done by the Headquarters Staff it should be done by the commander of the District. At the present time, he continued, the General Staff was divided into the number of different Districts; that was an old-fashioned arrangement; and if the Government wanted to make the Army really efficient, they should go to the very root of the matter and look into the reorganisation of the General Staff.


said his argument was that they should abolish the Army Corps, but keep the Divisions. He thought a Division was entirely compatible with what the noble Lord had just read.


said that surely when his hon. and gallant friend talked of combining the smaller units, he meant combining regiment with regiment, and brigade with brigade, that they should have a staff prepared to deal with the whole of the force they might have to send abroad, and that they should not have a staff made up, so to speak, piecemeal when the time came; that they should not have a staff for 10,0) 0 men, another for 10,000 men, and a third for 10,000 men, so that when it was necessary to send 30,000 men abroad there would be a mixed-up staff which would be called a general staff.


said he thought the noble Lord had entirely misunderstood his argument. The noble Lord must be well aware that a Division consisted of brigades and regiments. The only difference was that in an Army Corps they grouped, two or three, or four Divisions. It was the Army Corps organisation he wanted to get rid of, not the Divisions. The noble Lord did not appear to know the difference between a Division and a District.


said his contention was that they wanted to have an Army Corps ready as a unit to send abroad, and that when it was sent abroad they should not have what the right hon. Baronet called in 1900 a scratch staff drawn from all parts of the Kingdom, with the result, as the right hon. Baronet said, that when a number of individuals were suddenly thrown together there was certain to be friction on all hands. That was the very thing they were trying to avoid. They were endeavouring to get a staff which would be able to work, in time of war as well as in time of peace, without the inevitable friction of which the right hon. Baronet spoke. The whole secret of Army organisation was that they should have a force which could be increased in time of war by the Reserves. But there was one thing they could not have too large, and that was the staff, on whose organisation the whole success of an expedition would depend. The hon. Gentleman the Member for the Lichfield Division said they could not send away a trained staff because they had not got one. That was perfectly true; and it was precisely because they had not got a trained staff that they were asking for that Vote, not one penny of which he felt sure would be wasted, either in time of peace by the officers being instructed in staff duties, or in time of war by the extra efficiency that would be given to any force that would be sent abroad.


said the noble Lord had not answered one of his Questions.


said he would be glad to answer his hon. friend. His hon, friend asked a Question with regard to General Truman. The account which his hon. friend gave of the proceedings when General Truman was attacked in that House was not quite accurate. What happened was that Lord Roberts impressed on General Truman the necessity for him to clear himself of the errors committed, and gave him an opportunity of having his action considered by a Court of Inquiry. His hon. friend was quite in error in saying that the House knew nothing about the Report of that Court of Inquiry, because it was laid before Parliament and excited considerable comment.


said that what he stated, and he believed he was right, was that there was a Court of Inquiry on which a debate took place in this House, and on the morrow of that debate Lord Roberts sent for General Truman, informed him he was an incompetent officer, and dismissed him. Subsequently General Truman claimed a Court of Inquiry. That Court of Inquiry was held, but they had heard nothing of it.


said his hon. friend was in error. Lord Roberts unquestionably sent for General Truman, and informed him that he had either to meet the allegations against him, or that it would be impossible for him to continue to hold his office. General Truman elected to face a Court of Inquiry, and a court was accordingly appointed. The mistake into which his hon. friend had fallen was that he thought the Report of that court had never been laid before Parliament, but it had. With regard to military attaches, there were permanent military attaches in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Constantinople, Rome, and Pekin; and temporary military attaches in Tokio, Brussels, and Washington. His hon. friend asked a Question with regard to A.D.C's., but as those appointments were made by His Majesty be did not propose to offer any remarks with regard to them. With regard to the question of the staff, he would undertake to say that nobody in the past had done as much as he had, to cut down unnecessary appointments. When he first went to the War Office, sixteen or seventeen years ago, there were on the staffs of general officers a number of officers for whom proper employment could not be found. There was nothing more difficult in his experience—and he believed it was the experience of every Department—than to cut down existing appointments. He remembered the first year he was at the War Office they cut down £20,000 worth of unnecessary appointments, such as a general officer having two military secretaries, who could not possibly find work. What they had now done was totally different. As he explained two years ago, and he did not think there was a dissentient voice regarding it then, they had taken £60,000 for a staff; but it was a staff for the organisation of the Army whether at home or ready to take the field. The sum for the staff for the organisation of the Army at home and abroad included a number of services as to which there had been no question before. He quite understood that hon. Members who voted last night to cut down 27,000 men might well say the staff must be cut down to the equivalent of the number of men who were cut down; but he was sure that hon. Members would not say that, having added 54,000 Regular troops to the Army and 11,000 colonials, they would refuse a staff to keep these men efficient.

He was quite sure that they would admit that so long as a certain force was maintained a proper staff must be maintained. He would take one case in particular. Nobody had proposed to cut down the sixty six batteries of artillery which had been added to the Army, and if they had sixty-six extra batteries of artillery they must have a colonel who had a certain command of artillery, and could man oeuvre these batteries in sufficient bodies, and the staff of the artillery must be considerable. He urged hon. Members also to consider the question of the better organisation of the Auxiliary forces. Up to a few years ago there was no general officer who was charged in any way with the surveillance of the organisation of the Auxiliary forces; it was a thing of quite modern growth. He would take the case of the Second Army Corps. While, on the one hand, Sir Evelyn Wood had made more savings in the course of one year than would pay for the whole of his salary and that of several of his staff officers in that district, on the other hand his staff officers were dealing during the whole of last drill season with 30,000 or 40,000 men, chiefly Volunteers and Militia, brought temporarily on to the Plain for training. The staff of the Second Army Corps would be cheap if it was only devoted to training that large number of Auxiliary forces who had now a definite peace in the Army scheme, and who, it was said on all sides, should be used to the utmost for home defence.

With regard to the actual commanders of Army Corps, he thought they figured in the Estimates for £12,000 a year. No one should run away with the false impression that that was all in addition to the ordinary expenditure. The general officer commanding in Ireland had actually the same pay as he received before. The general officer commanding at Aldershot had an addition to his pay, because nobody at Aldershot was able to make both ends meet. The general officer commanding in Scotland had for a long period been paid as a lieutenant-general, and received the same pay now. The general officer commanding at York had always been paid as a major-general, and when the appointment was made—it was not made yet—he would be paid as a lieutenant-general. Therefore, out of the six appointments in regard to which this £12,000 a year on the Estimates was objected to, four were appointments already existing. The two new appointments were Salisbury Plain, which he hoped, quite apart from the Army Corps scheme, he might claim to be necessary for the largely increased training of the Auxiliary forces which took place there every year, and the London command just about to be formed, which he justified above everything on the same ground, because there were sixty-five battalions of Auxiliary forces which would come under Lord Grenfell. Without such an officer it was absolutely impossible for the War Office to receive reports and to obtain the organisation of the immense number of Auxiliary units that were comprised in that command. These sixty five battalions, reaching about 50,000 men, was work enough for one man alone. For that reason he hoped, if a division was pressed on this question of the staff, it would be understood that it was by no means a development simply for these Army Corps; it was for services which, whether there were Army Corps or not, would have to be carried out; it was to enable them to provide, as they had provided, each of the districts with mobilisation officers who were engaged on work which had not hitherto been performed, but which Lord Roberts found effective in the field in the late war. That was his case, and he hoped hon. Members who desired the efficiency of the, Army would consider these points before recording their votes.


said he only wanted to ask one question. Upon the introduction of his scheme in 1901, the right hon. Gentleman had laid it down as a principle upon which the whole scheme rested, that the officers to whom command of the Army Corps were given should be the officers to command them in time of war. The First Army Corps was commanded by General Sir John French, who would no doubt command it in time of war, but the Second Army Corps was commanded by an officer of whom the British nation was proud, and who had made Alder-shot the seat of military instruction, but who had reached rather an advanced age. Would that officer, and the lately appointed general officer for the Fourth Army Corps, in case of an outbreak of hostilities, proceed abroad in command of their respective Army Corps? He also wished to know whether General Truman was still serving at the War Office.


said, after the report of the Committee of Inquiry to Lord Roberts, Lord Roberts decided that the Report distinctly exonerated General Truman from any neglect in the discharge of his duties. The Committee made some criticisms on the way in which those duties were discharged, but spoke highly of the manner in which General Truman had met the call made upon him, and they more especially pointed out that he was in no way connected with a large proportion of the questions of remounts on which very serious difficulties had occurred. General Truman returned to his work, which he had only given up temporarily during illness, and his five year appointment would expire, he thought, in January next. Until that time he would hold the appointment of Inspector-General of Remounts. The hon. Member asked him whether he had kept his pledge with regard to the appointment of Army Corps commanders. Sir Evelyn Wood was now at the age of sixty-five, and his period of command at Salisbury Plain would continue until, he thought, 1st October of next year. Before he appointed Sir Evelyn Wood to that command, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, he obtained from the Commander-in-Chief a distinct assurance that, in case of war, he considered Sir Evelyn Wood not only competent, but the most competent man to command that Army Corps in the field. What he said in regard to Sir Evelyn Wood he would say in regard to Lord Grenfell. The reason why neither of them was employed in the South African war was, of course, in the first instance, that Sir Redvers Buller was appointed Commander-in-Chief. Both Sir Redvers Buller and Sir Evelyn Wood could not be appointed, and as Sir Evelyn Wood was senior to Sir Redvers Buller, it would not have been usual for him to go out under Sir Redvers Buller. Later in the war few opportunities occurred of detached commands. Sir Evelyn Wood wished to serve in South Africa. We communicated with Lord Kitchener, who had served under Sir Evelyn Wood in Egypt, and he at once said he was prepared to serve under Sir Evelyn Wood, but could not consent to have so distinguished a soldier serving under him. Lord Kitchener's position was such that it would certainly have seemed like a withdrawal of confidence if he had been in any way superseded. The same argument applies to Lord Grenfell. He also had commanded the Egyptian Army with Lord Kitchener under him. Lord Grenfell at the time was holding the very important appointment he is about to vacate, and it would have been extremely difficult to withdraw him. I can truly say that both these officers were considered admirably fitted to serve in South Africa, and both of them would most unquestionably command their Army Corps in the field, or, if the House refused to continue the title of "Army Corps," and they could only command Districts, they would undoubtedly be put in command in case of emergency.


, who said he quite understood the advantage of the Army Corps system so far as decentralisation was concerned, asked whether, at the present time, the officers in command of Army Corps were receiving any training other than that they had before the introduction of the system in 1901, and whether at Aldershot they had opportunities of acquiring that special knowledge of the handling of troops that they would require in time of war by the Army Corps being used as Army Corps.


contended that as the Amendment to reduce the number of men had been defeated it would be absurd to reduce the General Staff'. A little knowledge was a dangerous thing, and he protested against the endeavour of "budding Wellingtons" and "sucking Napoleons," after three months' service in South Africa, to rule the War Office. The General commanding the Second Army Corps was the best possible man for the post, and if any reduction were carried by which his position would be affected, a gross injustice would be inflicted on the Army and on the country at large. The amount asked for was not a farthing too much. How could the generals be expected to incur the great expenditure involved by their position without adequate pay? He hoped the military Members of the House would rally as one man in support of proper provision being made for the General Staff of the Army.

*MAJOR SEELY (Isle of Wight)

said that so far as this Amendment was intended to reduce the expenditure on that part of the General Staff necessitated by the Army Corps system, those Members who were challenging the military policy of the Government felt bound to support it. They differed from the Government on certain fundamental principles, and, although they might be altogether wrong, they had arrived at their conclusions after long and careful consideration. These conclusions had been forced on many of them in the field of war, and were sincerely held. One was in regard to the relative expenditure of the Army and Navy. And so far as the Army Corps system involved increased expenditure they felt bound to oppose it. Another ground of objection was that there were only a certain number of recruits available, and a greater number could be obtained only by reducing the standard of physique and morale. A further contention was that greater reliance should be placed on the Volunteer force of the country. No one suggested that complete reliance should be placed on that force without giving them time to be so organised and improved as to be able to take up the burden.


reminded the hon. Member that a reduction had been moved on a particular item, and that until that reduction had been disposed of the general question could not be discussed.


said that on these general grounds they felt bound to oppose the extra expenditure on the Army Corps staff, but so far as the scheme tended towards decentralisation and the bringing in of Auxiliary forces they were simply friendly critics of the Government. As the question of individual commanders had been raised, he might say that in his judgment there was no one more fit to command the second Army Corpsthan Sir Evelyn Wood. But that raised the question of whether the War Office could hope to carry out the principle that the men who commanded the Army Corps in time of peace should also command them in time of war. That proposition sounded very well, but it could not really be sustained in practice. In order to get officers to serve in the Army they must be given a career, possibly a long and distinguished career, and, with few exceptions, and one very brilliant exception, officers over a certain age were unable to stand the hardships of modern war. If that were so, and they laid down the principle that only those officers should command these great home districts in time of peace who would command them in time of war, the War Office would eliminate from their service the very men of experience and ability whose services they would wish to retain.

The position with regard to the actual Army Corps was this. As to the First Army Corps, they might say that was reasonable and should stand. In the case of the Second Army Corps, which extended from Milford Haven to Dover, it; was contended that they could not expect any man, even with the wonderful energy of the present Commander, to supervise so widely an extended district.: That was a very real difficulty which he suggested might be altered and remedied by a different allocation of the Army Corps. But there also remained another difficulty. The Army Corps to which he alluded was composed entirely of Regular troops destined to go abroad at once if required. In the district from Milford Haven to Dover there was a large number of Auxiliaries, and they would have to conduct the correspondence through the Army Corps. It was plain that in the event of war the whole of the Regular troops, or what had been called the stiffening of this Army Corps, would disappear and the whole of the General Staff would also join. Consequently in such a case the Army Corps in the South of England would not only be deprived of that organisation which they had been told was so essential to efficiency, but it would also be deprived of that stiffening on which the new system so much relied. It could not be denied that that was really the case. Those difficulties might be avoided by another method of distribution. The Army Corps in Scotland and York could retain their organisation, but surely it was not seriously proposed that in the event of war the Auxiliary troops from the North of England and Scotland would come down to take the place of the troops in the South of England? If not, what became of the principle upon which these new Army Corps were founded? He thought he had shown that in the case of the Second Army Corps there was this great drawback. In the case of the Third Army Corps, with certain modifications, that might be allowed to stand. With regard to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Army Corps they were not to be sent abroad.


I think the hon. Member is now talking upon the General Vote, and he must confine his remarks to Item A for the general staff.


said this was a definite Motion to reduce the expenses of the General Staff, and he was endeavouring to show that the increased money asked for would not give that amount of increased efficiency to induce the Committee to sanction it. If they were to engage in war, they might be put to very hard straits. According to the new scheme, Sir Archibald Hunter and his Highlanders would be retained in this country to organise the Auxiliary troops in Scotland. He could not imagine that gallant soldier sitting on the top of Edinburgh Castle, watching the enemy's Fleet approaching these shores.


It is perfectly evident that my hon. friend has not mastered even the rudiments of this scheme. When the three Army Corps go abroad the other three will take their place at home, and if there is an invasion, they will not be placed upon the top of Edinburgh Castle, but will take the place of the troops which have been sent away.


asked if he was to understand that Sir Archibald Hunter would go down to the South of England with his Auxiliary troops in order to take the place of those who had gone abroad?


He would not take their place, because their place is in the various defensive positions and the garrisons they have to occupy. There are most important duties which must' be performed by the troops of those garrisons.


said they must take the world as they found it. In point of fact they could not afford to retain such regiments as the Highlanders and such commanders as Sir Archibald Hunter for so unlikely an event as the defence of these Islands from invasion. These highly specialised men and officers must be sent abroad in the event of a war.


pointed out that the troops in excess of the three Army Corps would remain in England, and be under the command of the same commanders as before.


said that from the nature of things, when their three Army Corps had gone they would be bound to fall back upon these specialised men at home. Therefore, upon general principles, they felt bound to differ in regard to the Army Corps Scheme because they felt that they were fundamentally opposed to those principles, although they realised they were principles which had been carried on for many years. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had merely been continuing those principles, and in doing so had not only done this to the best of his ability, but also with the greatest ability.


hoped he might be permitted in two or three minutes to put some reasons before the Committee why hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House would fail in their duty if they did not support the Amendment the hon. Member had moved. These Army Corps, it had been stated, were formed for foreign expeditions and home defence. He contended that in foreign expeditions it was never likely, under any circumstances, that an entire modern Army Corps would be employed in a foreign country, and on the face of it it was absurd, because such an Army Corps. could not be transported to its proper place in ships, and could not be embarked from any of their ports.


The hon. Member must not go into such questions. This is only a debate on the General Staff", and I think the hon. Member appears to misunderstand what is the question before the Committee.


said they objected to the General Staff because they did not think the Army Corps suggested were fit for foreign expeditions in the first place. In the second place they objected because, in regard to home defence, the Army Corps would not provide for the organisation of the Auxiliary forces, and it was absurd, on the face of it, to have a plan to move three Army Corps all the way down from Scotland to take the place of troops in the South of England. He opposed this scheme because the Army Corps system was the corner-stone of the military proposals of the right hon. Gentleman, which they believed involved a financial outlay which this country could not properly afford. [Cries of "Divide, divide!"]


said he rose to ask a question of great importance concerning the whole of these Estimates. They had been drawn up in a new and a very confusing manner. On page 7 hon. Members would see under Item A.

"Pay, etc, of General staff.

Decrease £348,370.
Normal Increase 5,530.

Then they were told by way of explanation that this was— Due to provision being made for Temporary Staff for Manoeuvres and for the pay of additional officers for the Remount Department.

That was not a decrease but an increase. Then they gave a number of columns of what the War Office chose to call special expenditure, connected with South Africa, China, and Somaliland expeditions, and they made an estimate of what they called a sum due to these wars. That was not the way to draw up Estimates, but they should take the actual sum last year and this year. If there were any differences not stated they should be given to the Committee. With regard to the normal increase of £5,530, which was set out on page 7 of the Estimates, he could not find that sum in any part of the Estimates. Could the noble Lord, or his right hon. friend, refer him to any page in the Estimates where he could find that total, or could he give any explanation of how it arose?


replied that there appeared in the Estimates items which did not occur this year. Although the decrease was practically £348,000 in this case there a normal increase of £5,500. What the House wanted to know was not the difference between war and peace Estimates, but the difference between the amount last year and this year, and that was the sum he had stated.


said the normal increase was not in any single case shown, nor on what principle it was arrived at.

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes, 94; Noes, 226. (Division List No, 24.)

Allan, Sir William (Gateshead) Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn Davies, M. Vaughan- (Cardign)
Allen, Chas. P. (Glos., Stroud) Burt, Thomas Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark)
Ashton, Thomas Gair Buxton, Sydney Charles Dunn, Sir William
Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbt. Hy. Caldwell, James Edwards, Frank
Atherley-Jones, L. Cameron, Robert Evans, Saml. T. (Glamorgan)
Barlow, John Emmott Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H. Ferguson, R. C. Munro (Leith)
Bayley, Thomas (Derbyshire) Causton, Richard Knight Foster, Sir Walter (Derby Co.)
Beaumont, Wentworth C. B. Cawley, Frederick Furness Sir Christopher
Bell, Richard Channing, Francis Allston Gladstone, Rt. Hn. Herbert J.
Brand, Hon. Arthur G. Craig, Robert Hunter (Lanark) Goddard, Daniel Ford
Brigg, John Cremer, William Randal Grant, Corrie
Broadhurst, Henry Dalziel, James Henry Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton
Brunner, Sir John Tomlinson Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen) Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Sir Wm.
Hayne, Rt. Hon. Chas. Seale Palmer, Sir C. M. (Durham) Thomson, F. W. (York, W. R.)
Hayter, Rt Hon Sir Arthur, D. Partington, Oswald Tomkinson, James
Hemphill, Rt. Hon. Chas. H. Paulton, James Mellor Trevelyan, Charles Philips
Holland, Sir William Henry Pirie, Duncan V. Ure, Alexander
Humphreys-Owen, Arthur C. Price, Robert John Wallace, Robert
Jacoby, James Alfred Rea, Russell Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)
Joicey, Sir James Reid, Sir R. T. (Dumfries) Wason, J. Cathcart (Orkney)
Jones, David B. (Swansea) Robertson, Edmund (Dundee) Weir, James Galloway
Kearley, Hudson E. Roe, Sir Thomas White, George (Norfolk)
Labouchere, Henry Samuel, Herbt. L. (Cleveland) Whiteley, G. (York, W. R.)
Layland-Barratt, Francis Shackleton, David James Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)
Leese, Sir Jos. F. (Accrington) Shaw, Charles E. (Stafford) Whittaker, Thomas Palmer
Long, Sir John Shaw, Thomas (Hawick, B.) Wilson, H. J. (York, W. R.)
Lewis, John Herbert Shipman, Dr. John G. Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)
Lough, Thomas Sinclair, John (Forfarshire) Woodhouse, SirJ. T. (Hud'sfi'ld)
M'Arthur. William (Cornwall) Soames, Arthur Wellesley
M'Crae, George Spencer, Rt Hn C. R. (Northants) TELLERS, FOR THE AYES—
Markham, Arthur Basil Stevenson, Francis S. Mr. Courtenay Warner and
Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen) Strachey, Sir Edward Mr. Charles Hobhouse.
Nussey, Thomas Willans Thomas, J. A. (Glam., Gower)
Agnew, Sir Andrew Noel Cubitt, Hon. Henry Houston, Robert Paterson
Anson, Sir William Reynell Dalrymple, Sir Charles Howard, Jno (Kent, Faverhm)
Arkwright, John Stanhope Davenport. William Bromley Hudson, George Bickersteth
Arnold-Forster, Hugh O. Denny, Colonel Jameson, Major J. Eustace
Arrol, Sir William Dickson, Charles Scott Jebb, Sir Richard Claverhouse
Atkinson, Right Hon. John Dimsdale, Rt. Hon. Sir Jos. C. Kemp, Lieut.-Colonel George
Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt. Hn. Sir H. Dixon-Hartland, Sir F. Dixon Kennaway, Rt, Hon. Sir J. H.
Bagot, Capt. Josceline FitzRoy Dorington. Rt. Hon. Sir J. E. Kenyon, Hon. G. T. (Denbigh)
Bailey, James (Walworth) Douglas, Rt, Hon. A. Akers Kenyon-Slaney, Col. W. (Salop)
Bain, Colonel James Robert Doxford, Sir Wm. Theodore Keswick, William
Balcarres, Lord Duke, Henry Edward Kimber, Henry
Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Man'r) Durning-Lawrence, Sir Edwin King, Sir Henry Seymour
Balfour, Capt. C. B. (Hornsey) Elliot, Hon. A. Ralph Douglas Knowles, Lees
Balfour, Rt, Hn. G. W. (Leeds) Fardell, Sir T. George Lambton, Hon. Fredk. Wm.
Banbury, Sir Frederick George Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn Ed. Law, Andrew Bonar Glasgow
Barry, Sir Eras. T. (Windsor) Fergusson, Rt Hn. Sir J. (Man'r) Lawrence, Sir Jos. (Monm'th)
Bartley, Sir George C. T. Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst Lawson, John Grant
Bathurst, Hon. Allen Benj. Finch. Rt. Hon. George H. Lee, A. H. (Hants, Fareham)
Bignold, Arthur Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage
Blundell, Colonel Henry Fisher, William Hayes Llewellyn, Evan Henry
Boulnois, Edmund FitzGerald, Sir Robt. Penrose Lockie, John
Bousfield. William Robert Flannery, Sir Fortescue Lockwood, Lieut.-Col. A. R.
Bowles, T. G. (Lynn Regis) Flower, Ernest Long, Col. Chas. W. (Evesham)
Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John Forster, Henry William Long, Rt. Hn. W. (Bristol, S.)
Brown, Sir Alx. H. (Shropsh.) Galloway, William Johnson Lonsdale, John Brownlee
Bull, William James Gardner, Ernest Loyd, Archie Kirkman
Butcher, John George Garfit, William Lucas, Col. Francis (Lowestoft)
Campbell, Rt Hn J A (Glasg.) Gibbs, Hn A. G. H. (City of Lond) Lucas, Reg'ld J. (Portsmouth)
Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edw. H. Godson, Sir Augustus Fredk. Lyttelton, Hon. Alfred
Cavendish, R, F. (N. Lancs.) Gordon, Hn. J. E. (Elgin & Nrn) Macdona, John Cumming
Cavendish, V C W (Derbysh.) Gore, Hn, S. F. Ormsby (Linc) Maconochie, A. W.
Cayzer, Sir Charles William Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir J. Eldon M'Calmont, Colonel James
Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. J A (Worc) Goschen, Hon. Geo. Joachim M'Killop, Jas. (Stirlingshire)
Chamberlayne, T. (Southmptn) Graham, Henry Robert Malcolm, Ian
Chapman, Edward Gretton, John Maxwell, Rt Hn Sir H. E. (Wigt'n)
Charrington, Spencer Groves, Jamas Grimble Maxwell, W J H (Dumfriesshire)
Clive, Captain Percy A. Guthrie, Walter Murray Melville, Beresford Valentine
Cochrane, Hon. T. H. A. E. Hain, Edward Milvain, Thomas
Coghill, Douglas Harry Hall, Edward Marshall Mitchell, William
Cohen, Benjamin Louis Halsey, Rt. Hon. Thomas F. Montagu, G. (Huntingdon)
Collings, Right Hon. Jesse Hamilton, Rt Hn Ld. G. (Midx) More, Robt. Jasper (Shropshire)
Colston, Chas. Edw H. Athole Hamilton, Maro of (Londondy) Morgan, D. J. (Walthamstow)
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasq.) Hare, Thomas Leigh Morrell, George Herbert
Corbett. T. L. (Down, North) Harris, Frederick Leverton Morrison, James Archibald
Cox. Irwin Edwd. Bainbridge Heath, Arthur H. (Hanley) Morton, Arthur H. Aylmer
Craig, Charles Curtis (Antrim, S.) Helder, Augustus Mount, William Arthur
Cranborne, Viscount Henderson, Sir Alexander Mowbray, Sir Robt. Gray C.
Cripps, Charles Alfred Hermon-Hodge. Sir Robert T. Muntz, Sir Philip A.
Cross, H. Shepherd (Bolton) Hoare. Sir Samuel Murray, Rt Hn A Graham (Bute)
Crossley. Sir Savile Hoult, Joseph Myers, William Henry
Newdegate, Francis A. N. Rolleston, Sir John F. L. Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Nicholson, William Graham Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert Talbot. Rt. Hn. J. G. (Oxf'dUni)
Nicol, Donald Ninian Round, Rt. Hon. James Thornton, Percy M.
Orr-Ewing, Charles Lindsay Rutherford, (verpool) Tollemache, Henry James
Palmer, Walter (Salisbury) Sackville, Col. S. G. Stopford Tritton, Charles Ernest
Parker, Sir Gilbert Sadler, Col. Saml. Alexander Tufnell, Lieut.-Col. Edward
Parkes. Ebenezer Samuel, Harry S. (Limehouse) Valentia, Viscount
Pemberton, John S. G. Sandys, Lt.-Col. Thos. Myles Vincent, Col. Sir C. E. H. (Sheffield)
Percy, Earl Saunderson, Rt. Hn. Col. E. J. Walrond, Rt. Hon. Sir W. H.
Pilkington, Lt.-Col. Richard Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) Welby, Sir Chas. G. E. (Notts)
Platt-Higgins, Frederick Seton-Karr, Sir Henry Williams, Rt Hn J. Powell (Birm)
Powell, Sir Francis Sharp Sharpe, William Edward T. Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Pretyman, Ernest George Shaw-Stewart, M. H. (Renfrew) Willox, Sir John Archibald
Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Col. Edward Simeon, Sir Barrington Wilson, A. S. (York, E. R.)
Purvis, Robert Sinclair, Louis (Romford) Wilson, John (Falkirk)
Pym, C. Guy Sloan, Thomas Henry Wilson-Todd, W. H. (Yorks.)
Randles, John S. Smith, H. C. (North'mb, Tynside) Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath)
Rankin, Sir James Smith, Jas. Parker (Lanarks.) Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart
Rattigan, Sir William Henry Spear, John Ward Wrightson, Sir Thomas
Reid, James (Gree ock) Spencer, Sir E. (W. Bromwich) Wylie, Alexander
Renwick, George Stanley, Hon. A. (Ormskirk) Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George
Richards, Henry Charles Stanley, Edw. Jas. (Somerset) Wyndham-Quin, Major W. H.
Ridley, Hon M. W. (Stalybridqe) Stanley, Lord (Lancs.)
Ridley, S. Forde (Bethnal Green) Stirling-Maxwell, Sir Jn. M. TELLERS FOR THE NOES—
Ritchie, Rt. Hn. C. Thomson Stock, James Henry Sir Alexander Acland
Roberts, Samuel (Sheffield) Stone, Sir Benjamin Hood and Mr. Anstruther.
Robertson, H. (Hackney) Sturt, Hn. Humphry Napier

Original Question again proposed.

MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)

said he was rejoiced at the change of the temperament of the House compared with what he had observed in the last two or three years. A very little time ago any Gentleman who proposed to increase the expenditure on the Army would have been applauded as patriotic, not only by hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House, but by some on his own side; and had anyone ventured to criticise such a proposal, and to say that the money was not needed, he would have been told that he was a traitor to his country. It was the irony of fate to find that hon. Gentlemen who formerly took that line were now as eager for economy in Army matters as he was himself. Yesterday they had voted on the Amendment moved to reduce the Army by 27,000 men. That Amendment was not carried, but it was very evident to those who were in the House, and to the country outside, that, if the really true opinion of the House had been consulted the Amendment would have been carried by a very large majority. In considering what should have been done under these circumstances, it was necessary to look into that Vote. The majority was ninety-one, but twenty-five Unionists voted in the minority, and there were also a con- siderable number of abstainers. The Unionists who voted in the minority were the intellectual cream of the other side of the House. Their Irish friends abstained from voting, but it was known that they were opposed to all increases in the. Army. They had made some sort of arrangement with His Majesty's Government. He was not blaming them for that, but there was a time when hon. Gentlemen on the Government side of the House blamed the Liberal Party for being traitors in making an arrangement with the Irish Party. Somehow, therefore, the Irish Party did not vote. If he were an Irish Member he should look after the interests of Ireland, and in all probability do precisely the same as they had done. There was another point, that the voting on the Amendment took place under the threat on the part of the Government that if it were carried against them they would resign. It was perfectly well known that a large number of men on the other side preferred their Party to their country, and thought it would be a terrible loss to the world in general if the Government were defeated and resigned.


said that the hon. Gentleman must confine himself to the Vote on the Paper.


said he was explaining that the Vote had been granted for the men, and that under some circumstances that might have been the opinion of the House; but his argument was that that was not the real opinion of the House. He thought it had been made pretty clear that the House and the country were thoroughly against this addition of 27,000 men, and therefore he would not pursue the subject. This was hardly a moment to waste several millions in getting these 27,000 men. They were voting this year £3,000,000 extra for the Navy. Owing to the militarism and the military expenditure of the country, trade was stagnant, Consols were on the down grade, wages were going down, and taxes were going up. The refore, they should be most careful not to incur any expenditure which was not absolutely necessary, for they had to fall back on the Income-Tax which pressed on the middle classes, and on taxes on the necessaries of life which were much felt by the lower classes. Eor years past he had protested against increased expenditure on armaments, but he had been as a man preaching in the wilderness, and the expenditure had gone up to over £80,000,000. He had been called a Little Englander, but the fact was, he was, and had always been, a consistent; follower of that eminent Conservative statesman, Sir Robert Peel. In the days of Peel, when demands were made for increased military expenditure, that statesman replied that: "We must incur certain risks; that we could not, without crippling the country, over-tax the people by a war expenditure in time of peace; that it was foolish to look round and see whether there could be any imaginable combination which would be serious or dangerous to the country. The insurance against that would be too high, and a bad, unbusiness-like proceeding." With these dicta of Sir Robert Peel, he had squared his action in denouncing and voting against every increase of expenditure. They had voted the 27,000 men but where did the; control of the House of Commons over the Executive come in? By the power of the purse. It was by that power of the purse that they got, to a certain extent, theirown way. He had previously moved the reduction of the pay after the men had been voted, and the reply of the Government to that was: "What? You have voted the men; would you refuse to vote their pay?" That was Parliamentary nonsense. They would not get the men if they did not vote the pay. Consequently, he maintained that it was their business to act in this matter according to Constitutional usage, and to refuse to vote the money which led to useless and needless expenditure. This Vote for the pay was £8,149,600. That was for 210,000 men, which came out at £36 odd for each. He would, however, deal generously with the Government, and put it down at £30 per man, £30 multiplied by 27.000 came to £710,000. His Amendment therefore was to reduce the Vote by the sum of £710,000.

He was a great advocate for voting in this House. They heard a great deal of talk and noble professions about economy in this House. He was no believer in Parliamentary eloquence; what the constituencies wanted to know was how their representatives voted. If they were practical men it was really time for them to step in and put an end to this wild and reckless expenditure. They had a very able member of the Government who was at the present moment on his travels. That able Gentleman was recently in the island of Teneriffe, and made a speech in which he said he hoped so to expand and enlarge the British Empire that it would reach the skies, and that he would be satisfied if he could only credit himself with having added one brick to the Empire. That one brick was £80,000,000 per annum at the present moment, and if it was to be only the first brick of our Empire reaching to the skies, Heaven alone knew what would happen. He did not think they would ever reach Heaven, or at any rate they would attain the bathos of bankruptcy before reaching the goal. It was said that the colonies were strongly in favour of our spending our money on military affairs. He did not know whether that was the case or not, but most people were strongly in favour of other people spending other people's money. He understood that the colonies had refused to have anything to do with what Sir Wilfred Laurier had called our vortex of Imperialism. The whole of this vast expenditure for building an Empire to the skies—he did not know what that meant, although it might be the latest exposition of Birmingham Imperialism—had to come out of the pockets of British tax-payers. If hon. Gentlemen honestly believed in the Vote which they gave yesterday, that these 27,000 men were unnecessary, they should pursue the Constitutional course of voting against the money. And he would really urge those Gentlemen who voted with the Government, not on the merits of the question, but because they were Party men, to reconsider their position. He was not a strategist. An hon. Gentleman talked about "budding Napoleons" and "baby Wellingtons," but he did not know anything about that. He looked at the matter, however, from an economical point of view, and he was satisfied that they could not go on spending on the Army and Navy without soon finding out that they had touched bottom.

The hon. Gentleman opposite said that Louis XIV. said that victory would remain with the man who had the last sovereign. France, he should then imagine, was the richest country in the world; but victory did not remain with Louis XIV. He found that foreign countries united against him, and any country that went on with the foolish game of "Beggar-my-neighbour" would find that it would be beaten in the long run. He was not opposed to the honour and glory of the Empire being maintained, but he did not believe that this expenditure, coupled with the policy on which it was based, was one that was really for the honour and glory of this country. It would spell ruin in the end, and would crush the commerce of the country. He wanted the money spent for the benefit of the people of England themselves by removing the burdens that had been placed on trade. That was the proper course to pursue, and they ought to make a beginning at once. The Government themselves admitted there was a very strong feeling, which was not confined to this side of the House, against this expenditure, and he had no doubt that if the question were left to the House to be decided on its merits there would be a large majority against it, as ho believed there was a large majority in the country against such wild and lavish expenditure. He begged to move.

Motion made, and Question put, "That a sum, not exceeding £8,937,000, be granted for the said Service."—(Mr. Labouchere.)


said that during the debate on the reduction moved by the hon, Member for the Lichfield Division, he put a question to his noble friend, and he now desired to explain that he did it, not from any hostile motive towards the Government, as he voted for the Government in the division which was taken on the Motion. He would not vote for the reduction which had been moved by the hon. Member who had just spoken. In the first place, he did not in any degree share his views; and in the second place, he believed that the hon. Member's rough and ready calculation as to the amount of money required to pay 27,000 men would, if carried out, have the effect of reducing the Army by a far greater number of men. He did not hold the same views of patriotism as were held by the hon. Member, and he did not wish to be associated with the hon. Member's views, or the means he had taken to support this country in its time of trouble. He had, however, one thing in common with the hon. Member, and that was the desire that this enormous expenditure on the Army should not be increased in the future. The First Lord of the Treasury pointed out that the time to reduce the Army was not when the Reserves were low, or when the Army was depleted in consequence of a great war. That argument entirely convinced him, and, although he was opposed to any further increase in expenditure on the Army he had voted with the Government in order to maintain the Army which the Government thought was necessary for the defence of the country. The question he wished to ask his noble friend was: Would the Government pledge themselves not to increase the normal expenditure of the Army over and above £27,500,000? He of course excluded any exceptional circumstances that might arise. He understood, for instance, that the War Office were about to provide a new rifle; and that, of course, would be abnormal expenditure. He did not wish to bind his noble friend down to any particular sum of money in the matter, but ho wished to know whether the Government were determined that the expenditure which they now asked, and which they were thoroughly justified in asking, was to be the limit of expenditure on the Army. He believed that if they did not make some limit to expenditure, they would inevitably go on until they brought financial ruin on the country.

The Committee should remember that, in deciding the amount of money to be spent on the Army, there were other items which would have to be met, such as expenditure on the Navy, and the land question in Ireland. He believed that it was all-important that they should have a statement from the Government on the matter. The Leader of the House taunted certain of his hon. friends with having shouted for Imperialism, and now objecting to pay for it. He was as anxious as any one to pay what was necessary for the honour and glory of the Empire, but he was also anxious that they should have, not an expensive Army, but an efficient Army, and that the money should be expended in the best possible way. He was anxious that the administration of the War Office should be an efficient administration, which he thought it was not at present; though in saying that he did not mean anything personal to his noble friend. He urged on his noble friend the necessity of arriving at a limit of expenditure; and if the Government did that, they would have nothing to fear when the) 'asked the Committee to vote money they believed to be necessary for the maintenance of the Army.


said there were certain items on the Estimates which might be withdrawn without any loss of efficiency; and he would ask the noble Lord whether he could hold out any hope that men who were ineffective should be removed from the Army Lid. He referred to two sets of men; men who were employed in garrison regiments, and "Native and Chinese regiments who were in charge of coaling stations in the East. Those garrison regiments were raised in a time of great panic, when troops were required at any cost, and they were hustled out to the Mediterranean and other places to take the place of troops who were required for active service. They were quite inefficient in the field; and, therefore, did not fulfil the dictum of the Secretary of State that the Army, though small, should be efficient. They were a great deal more costly than ordinary troops, as, besides their pay, there was the item of the deferred pensions by which, when a man reached the age of sixty-two, he drew Is. 6d. per day. That sum had never been brought into the calculations of the Secretary of State. Then there was the great question of providing barracks for the wives and families of these reservists, which had entailed a further Vote for the barracks at Gibraltar, Malta, Halifax and elsewhere. These troops were of no use outside the limits of the garrison at which they were stationed, because they could not be moved. He thought forts defended by second rate troops were a delusion and a snare. The right hon. Gentleman, very much against his will no doubt, had entrusted the defence of our coaling stations to troops which were not of the best because they were past their prime. But whatever might be said of the troops garrisoning the Mediterranean stations, that argument oculd not be used with regard to the Indian regiments at Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements. Ten thousand native troops held the only two coaling stations we had in the Eastern seas. To a certain extent, on those stations the whole safety of the China Squadron depended, and yet the right hon Gentleman had depleted. those garrisons of white men in order to put Native regiments, whose loyalty he feared would not hold out against the blandishments of a foreign Power, in their places.


said he could not help thinking that the debate to-day was more or less an echo of the question which had been decided on the previous day. The hon. Member who had just sat down had spoken with some contempt of the garrison regiments, but the hon. Member would not find many of the military authorities who had to deal with these regiments agree with him. These regiments were composed of men who, in other walks of life, would be called actually in their prime. They were not put into such a position that they might become a mobile force, but in a position most suited to them, with the result that in Gibraltar and Malta our garrisons were composed of. the best men who had passed through the ranks of the Army. The housing question was admittedly a difficult one, but in this respect he did not think the difficulty ought to force the country in any way into reducing the number of troops who were, in his opinion, of the greatest possible advantage to the Crown. With regard to the coaling stations in the East, those were stations where the garrisons must vary from time to time. The Committee of Colonial Defence sat continuously to deal with these matters, and any recommendations which that Committee made would at once be taken into serious consideration by his right hon. friend the Secretary of State.

With reference to the question of the hon. Member for Manchester, hon. Members knew that there must be increases in Army Votes for pay which would not come into effect until next year. Of course, every year there were different sums to be paid on the loans, the money of which had been used in the building of barracks, but against that would be set the fact that what was commonly know as the Mowat System had completed the Reserve stores, and the reduction on that side would be put against the increase on the other. The hon. Member for Oldham had stated that the Vote showed no increase for the Intelligence Department, but that was not in reality the case. The hon. Member had also spoken of the irreducible minimum of the Reserve, but with regard to that, the hon. Member could not have followed the right hon. Gentleman in his explanation, of yesterday, of how, when the Reserve got to 100,000, he might be able to economise by reducing the number of men. The hon. Member for Oldham stated that if the number to go in were limited, naturally that would limit the number going out. That was pretty obvious, but if that were done, and the same number sent into the Reserve as that which came out of the Army, the country would, in fact, have a Reserve of 150,000 or 160,000, which was too large, and so therefore if they limited the number going into the Reserve, they would limit the Reserve. In regard to increased pay, he had argued against increased pay ex- cept with the long service, whereas this was increased pay with short service.

MR. ARTHUR LEE (Hampshire, Fareham)

asked whether it was a fact that the pay was increased only for the long service.


said that that was the case. It was true, as the hon. Member for Whitby had said, that they were to a certain extent gambling on a sixpence. Time alone would show whether the extra sixpence would get the number of men they required for the Indian drafts. Those most competent to judge thought it would secure the required number, but he would prefer to wait and see what the result was. The hon. Member had spoken of the small margin in the number of recruits. It had to be remembered, however, that the effect of the increase of pay had not been felt. Everybody who knew the private soldier knew that until he got the money in his pocket he would not believe in its existence; therefore although they had several things in their favour, such as bad trade and low wages, they had not in their favour what he believed would be an important factor, viz., that in two years' time they would have men actually in receipt of the extra pay. The hon. Member had made another deduction as erroneous as some of the others. He had taken the number of men joining for three years, and by an elaborate calculation proved that the War Office were losing something like 80,000 years of service. But before the introduction of the new system they took all men, whether they liked it or not, for the long period of eight years; now they took them for the short period, and did not ask on joining whether they intended to extend their service. The only way in which a comparison could be made was to wait until after the first year of the new system, and then compare the number of men extending their time for the long service plus these who in the first instance joined for the whole service.

As to the increased pay not having increased the number of recruits, the House should remember that for a large part of the year the War Office were taking on a great number of men at high rates of pay for special services in South Africa, and although they could not expect to get the whole of those men into the force every year, they might at all events hope that a certain percentage of them would be encouraged by their Army life and the additional attractions that were held out to enter the service. It was also said that the medical tests were less. The Inspector-General of Recruiting had told him that his intention had been and was, to try to reduce the number of men avowedly unfit for the Army, before they reached the medical officer, by previous inspection, and by showing the recruiting officer that it would not be to their advantage but to their disadvantage to continue to send up such men. That was the principal reason for the decrease in the percentage. He had endeavoured to deal with all the points that had been raised, and he hoped the Committee would now allow them to get the Vote.


said he still felt a certain amount of apprehension that the right hon. Gentleman would not get the number of recruits he required in the future, because the surplus hitherto had been in the most popular branches of the service, viz., the cavalry and the artillery, while in the infantry the difficulty had been experienced. Recruiting for the cavalry and artillery having been stopped, what probability was there that the required number of recruits without any specials would be forthcoming in the future? On this matter he desired to make a personal explanation. It appeared that a letter he had written to The Times had given rise to the impression that he imputed bad faith to the Secretary of State. He absolutely repudiated the idea; nothing was farther from his intention. He had simply desired to point out that the decision of the right hon. Gentleman had been come to only a short time before the Address, whereas, from the statement, it might be supposed that it had been in force for some time. As to the increase in the Vote for the Intelligence Department, he strongly felt that it was not at all in accordance with the require- meats of the country. The total amount spent on the Indian Intelligence, the Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence, was a small sum in comparison with the amount spent by the Germans on their Army alone—about £250,000. The country ought to be satisfied that if they were ever engaged in war again they would get the requisite information to prevent a recurrence of the South African disasters. No imputation had been cast on Sir John Ardagh and the other Intelligence officers, at any rate, in the House—


Oh yes.


said that personally he had always contended that the Intelligence officers did their work very well, but that we did not have enough information. In opposing the Army scheme generally he, at any rate, had a clean sheet, because since its introduction in 1901 until this session, he had been out of the country. He felt very strongly against the scheme on the ground of expense, because it might be said that the requirements of the Navy had been starved in consequence of the amount spent on the Army. They knew perfectly well that with the best intentions in the world and with perfect sincerity, the right hon. Gentleman who spoke for the Admiralty had stated that the Army Corps Scheme had not affected their demand for men and ships; but statements of this kind were relative and not absolute. The present Secretary of State for India had said in 1888 that the state of the Navy was satisfactory, and then he came down, three or four months after that statement, and asked for £20,000,000. That showed that the statements made as to the actual state of the Navy could not be regarded as absolute. During the last two months they had seen two battleships of the most approved type sold to another Power. Supposing the Estimates of the Army had been £10,000,000 less, did they suppose that this would have occurred? They should remember that two battleships at that time would count four on a Division. As the House yesterday decided to vote these men, notwithstanding all the arguments that were brought against them, he felt that he could not give a vote now to reduce their pay. As the men had been voted, they could not break faith with them, for they were in duty bound to vote the money for their pay. He thought all those who had criticised the Government policy would feel that the pay should be voted.

MR. LOUGH (Islington, W.)

said the argument of the hon. Member who had just sat down was most illogical. This was the only opportunity they would have for giving a straight vote for economy. A suggestion was made that the number of men should be reduced, and now the hon. Member said he would not vote for a reduction of the money, although he opposed the vote for the men. Having stated that a smaller number of men was necessary, when it came to the test of finding the money hon. Members ought to be consistent and express the same views in the Lobby. If hon. Members opposite were convinced that too much money was being asked for by the Government, then they ought to take every opportunity of reducing the amount. At the earliest stage of this debate he took objection to the position the Secretary of State for War took up in describing these Estimates as almost normal. He had compared the Estimates of 1890 with the Vote asked for this year. The hon. Member for Cambridge University took the same view, and he took the Estimates for 1897; and to-day the hon. Member for Oldham took the year 1898. The argument about each of these three years was exactly the same, viz., that there had been a great additional extravagance. They were getting a smaller proportion of men for the extra proportion of money. The extra proportion of men was 27J per cent. and the extra proportion of money was something like 57 per cent. This was a serious point, to which not a single answer had been given, and every item had been greatly increased. One of the most astounding items was for miscellaneous regimental charges, which had been put down at £10,000, although £100 was considered sufficient three or four years ago. This showed the reckless way in which the whole of the Estimates had been prepared. This particular Vote was the only one upon which they were free from any detail, and upon which they could express their views that too much money was being taken. He could not understand why hon. Members were content to devote only the portion of one sitting to this great Vote. The only instructive speech they had had that afternoon was that made by the hon. Member for Oldham, who treated the matter from a broad standpoint. His hon. friend the Member for Northampton had made a consistent proposal which had been supported by eloquent speeches from hon. Gentlemen opposite, and if they did not support this motion their action would be very inconsistent.

SIR JOHN GOEST (Cambridge University)

said that what was objected to by hon. Members on this side of the House was not the pay, but that they objected to having so many men, and therefore yesterday they voted to reduce the number. The Committee was against them, however, by a large majority, and voted the number of men asked for. The decision of the Committee having been given in this way, it was perfectly logical to say that as the Committee had voted the men they must now pay them.


said that if the Committee did not vote the money now, the Government would not be able to get the men.


said the Government had the authority of the Committee to raise the men, and therefore it would be unreasonable now to refuse them the pay for those men. It was on those grounds that a number of his hon. friends voted against the Motion yesterday, but they were prepared now to vote for the Government's proposal to-day.

MR. BRYN ROBERTS (Carnarvonshire, Eifion)

said that this amendment gave the Committee an opportunity of changing its mind with respect to what it did last night. [Cries of "Divide, divide!"] If the pay was not voted the men would not be engaged, and the object which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University had in view when he opposed the Vote for the men would be attained. This Vote afforded the Committee a second opportunity of deciding the same question. If the right hon. Gentleman opposite now ran away from his position the only thing to conclude was that he was wanting in political courage and was anxious to make peace with the Government.


said the number of men voted was always greatly in excess of the actual numbers kept. It had almost invariably been the case that the number of men—


The number is taken from the average.


said the number of men taken was not really controlled by the Vote taken yesterday, but by the Vote taken to-day. It had always been so, and the Vote being taken now was what controlled the average number of men. Those who wished to reduce the actual number of men ought therefore to vote for this Amendment.

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes, 80 Noes, 223. (Division List No. 25.)

Abraham, William (Rhondda) Goddard, Daniel Ford Reckitt, Harold James
Allan, Sir William (Gateshead) Grant, Corrie Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion)
Allen, Chas. P. (Glos., Stroud) Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton Roe, Sir Thomas
Ashton, Thomas Gair Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Sir Wm. Samuel, Herbt. L. (Cleveland)
Barlow, John Emmott Hayne, Rt. Hon. Chas. Seale Shackleton, David James
Bayley, Thomas (Derbyshire) Helme, Norval Watson Shaw, Thomas (Hawick, B.)
Bell, Richard Hemphill. Rt. Hon. Chas. H. Shipman, Dr. John G.
Blake, Edward Hobhouse. C. E. H. (Bristl, E) Sinclair, John (Forfarshire)
Bolton, Thomas Dolling Humphreys-Owen. Arthur C. Soames, Arthur Wellesley
Brigg, John Jacoby, James Alfred Spencer, Rt. Hn C. R (Northants)
Broadhurst, Henry Kearley, Hudson E. Tennant, Harold John
Brunner, Sir John Tomlinson Layland-Barratt, Francis Thomson, F. W. (York, W. R.)
Burns, John Leese, Sir Jos. F. (Accrington) Tomkinson, James
Burt, Thomas Leigh, Sir Joseph Wallace, Robert
Caldwell, James Leng, Sir John Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)
Cameron, Robert Lewis, John Herbert Wason, E. (Clackmannan)
Causton, Richard Knight Lough, Thomas Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)
Cawley, Frederick M'Arthur, William (Cornwall) Weir, James Galloway
Channing, Francis Allston M'Crae, George White, George (Norfolk)
Craig, Robert Hunter (Lanark) M'Kenna, Reginald Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)
Cremer, William Randal Markham, Arthur Basil Whittaker, Thomas Palmer
Dalziel, James Henry Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen) Wilson, H. J. (York, W. R.)
Davies, Alfred (Carmarthen) Norman, Henry Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)
Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark) Nussey, Thomas Willans Woodhouse, Sir J T (Huddersf'd)
Duncan, J. Hastings Palmer, Sir C. M. (Durham)
Dunn, Sir William Partington, Oswald TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Flynn, James Christopher Pirie, Duncan V. Mr. Labouchere and Mr.
Foster. Sir Walter (Derby Co.) Rea, Russell Courtenay Warner.
Agnew, Sir Andrew Noel Bartley. Sir George C. T. Chamberlayne, T. (Southmptn)
Aird, Sir John Bathurst, Hon. Allen Benj. Chapman, Edward
Allhusen, Aug. Henry Eden Bignold, Arthur Charrington, Spencer
Anson, Sir William Reynell Bigwood, James Churchill, Winston Spencer
Arkwright, John Stanhope Blundell, Colonel Henry Clare, Octavius Leigh
Arnold-Forster, Hugh O. Boscawen, Arthur Griffith Clive, Captain Percy A.
Arrol, Sir William Bousfield. William Robert Cochrane, Hon. T. H. A. E.
Atkinson, Right Hon. John Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John Coghill, Douglas Harry
Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt. Hn. Sir H. Brown, Sir Alx. H. (Shropsh.) Cohen, Benjamin Louis
Bagot, Capt. Josceline FitzRoy Butcher, John George Collings, Right Hon. Jesse
Bain, Colonel James Robert Campbell, Rt Hn J A (Glasg.) Colston, Chas. Edw H. Athole
Balcarres, Lord Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edw. H Compton, Lord Alwyne
Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Man'r) Cautley, Henry Strother Corbett. A. Cameron (Glasg.)
Balfour, Capt, C. B. (Hornsey) Cavendish, R. F. (N. Lanes.) Cox. Irwin Edwd. Bainbridge
Balfour, Rt. Hn. G. W. (Leeds) Cavendish. V C W (Derbysh.) Cranborne, Viscount
Banbury, Sir Frederick George Cayzer, Sir Charles William Cripps, Charles Alfred
Barry, Sir Fras. T. (Windsor) Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. J. A. (Worc) Cross, H. Shepherd (Bolton))
Crossley, Sir Savile Lambton, Hon. Fredk, Wm. Robertson, H. (Hackney)
Cubitt, Hon. Henry Laurie, Lieut.-General Rolleston, Sir John F. L.
Dalrymple, Sir Charles Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow) Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye
Denny, Colonel Lawrence, Sir Jos. (Monm'th) Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert
Dickson, Charles Scott Lawson, John Grant Round, Rt. Hon. James
Dixon-Hartland, Sir F. Dixon Lee, A. H. (Hants, Fareham) Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool)
Dorington, Rt. Hon. Sir J. E. Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage Sadler, Col. Saml. Alexander
Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers Llewellyn, Evan Henry Samuel, Harry S. (Limehouse)
Doxford, Sir Wm. Theodore Lockie, John Sandys, Lt.-Col. Thos. Myles
Duke, Henry Edward Long, Col. Chas. W. (Evesham) Sassoon, Sir Edward Albert
Durning-Lawrence, Sir Edwin Long, Rt. Hn. W. (Bristol, S.) Saunderson, Rt. Hn. Col. E. J.
Elliot, Hon. A. Ralph Douglas Lonsdale, John Brownlee Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Fardell, Sir T. George Loyd, Archie Kirkman Seely, Chas. Hilton (Lincoln)
Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn Ed. Lucas, Reg'ld J. (Portsmouth) Seely, Maj. J. E. B. (Isle of Wight)
Fergusson, Rt Hn. Sir J. (Man'r) Lyttelton, Hon. Alfred Seton-Karr, Sir Henry
Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst Macdona, John Cumming Shaw-Stewart. M. H. (Renfrew)
Finch. Rt. Hon. George H. M'Calmont, Colonel James Simeon, Sir Barrington
Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne Martin. Richard Biddulph Sinclair, Louis (Romford)
Fisher, William Hayes Maxwell, Rt Hn Sir H. E. (Wigt'n) Skewes-Cox, Thomas
Fison, Frederick William Maxwell, W J H (Dumfriesshire) Sloan, Thomas Henry
FitzGerald, Sir Robt. Penrose Melville, Beresford Valentine Smith, H. C. (North'mb. Tyneside)
Flannery, Sir Fortescue Milvain, Thomas Smith, Hn. W. F. D. (Strand)
Forster, Henry William Mitchell, William Spear, John Ward
Galloway, William Johnson Montagu, G. (Huntingdon) Spencer, Sir E. (W. Bromwich)
Gardner, Ernest Montagu, Hon. J. Scott (Hants.) Stanley, Hon. A. (Ormskirk)
Garfit, William Moon, Edward Robert Pacy Stanley, Edw. Jas. (Somerset)
Gibbs, Hn A. G. H. (City of Lond) More, Robt. Jasper (Shropshire) Stanley, Lord (Lancs.)
Gibbs, Hn. Vicary (St. Albans) Morgan, D. J. (Walthamstow) Stirling-Maxwell, Sir Jn. M.
Godson, Sir Augustus Fredk. Morrell, George Herbert Stock, James Henry
Gordon, Hn. J. E. (Elgin & Nrn) Morrison, James Archibald Stone, Sir Benjamin
Gore, Hn. S. F. Ormsby (Line Morton, Arthur H. Aylmer Sturt, Hn. Humphry Napier
Gorst. Rt. Hon. Sir J. Eldon. Mount. William Arthur Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Graham, Henry Robert Mowbray, Sir Robt. Gray C. Talbot, Rt. Hn. J. G. (Oxf'd Univ)
Gretton, John Murray, Rt Hn A. Graham (Bute) Thornton, Percy M.
Groves, James Grimble Myers, William Henry Tomlinson, Sir Wm. E. M.
Hain, Edward Newdegate, Francis A. N. Tritton, Charles Ernest
Halsey, Rt. Hon. Thomas F. Nicholson, William Graham Tufnell, Lieut.-Col. Edward
Hamilton, Rt Hn Ld. G. (Midx) Nicol, Donald. Ninian Valentia, Viscount
Hamilton, Marq. of (Londondy) Orr-Ewing, Charles Lindsay Vincent, Col. Sir C. E. H. (Sheffield)
Hardy, Laurence (Kent, Ashfd) Palmer, Walter (Salisbury) Walker, Col. William Hall
Hare, Thomas Leigh Parker, Sir Gilbert Walrond, Rt. Hon. Sir W. H.
Harris, Frederick Leverton Percy, Earl Webb, Col. William George
Hay, Hon. Claude George Pilkington, Lt.-Col. Richard Welby, Sir Chas. G. E. (Nolls).
Helder, Augustus Platt-Higgins, Frederick Whitmore, Charles Algernon
Henderson, Sir Alexander Powell, Sir Francis Sharp Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Hermon-Hodge, Sir Robert T. Pretyman, Ernest George Willox, Sir John Archibald
Hoare, Sir Samuel Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Col. Edward Wilson, A. S. (York, E. R.)
Hoult, Joseph Purvis, Robert Wilson, John (Falkirk)
Houston, Robert Paterson Pym, C. Guy Wilson-Todd, W. H. (Yorks.)
Hudson. George Biekersteth Randles, John S. Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath)
Jebb, Sir Richard Claverhouse Rankin, Sir James Wrightson, Sir Thomas
Jessel, Capt. Herbert Merton Rattigan, Sir William Henry Wylie, Alexander
Kemp, Lieut.-Colonel George Reid, James (Greenock) Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George
Kennawav, Rt. Hon. Sir J. H. Remnant, Jas. Farquharson Wyndham-Quin, Major W. H.
Kenyon-Slaney, Col. W. (Salop) Richards, Henry Charles TELLERS FOR THE NOES—
Keswick, William Ridley, Hon. M. W (Stalybridge) Sir Alexander Acland-
Kimber, Henry Ridley, S. F. (Bethnal Green) Hood and Mr. Anstruther.
King. Sir Henry Seymour Ritchie, Rt. Hn. C. Thomson
Knowles, Lees Roberts, Samuel (Sheffield)

Original Question again proposed.

And, it being after half-past Seven of the clock, the Chairman proceeded to interrupt the Business.

Whereupon MR. BALFOUR rose in his

place, and claimed to move. "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The Committee divided:—Ayes, 208; Noes 61. (Division List No. 26.)

Aird, Sir John Arkwright, John Stanhope Atkinson, Right Hon. John
Allhusen, Aug. Henry Eden Arnold-Forster, Hugh O. Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt. Hn. Sir H.
Anson, Sir William Reynell Arrol, Sir William Bagot. Capt. Josceline FitzRoy
Bain, Colonel James Robert Gretton, John Pretyman. Ernest George
Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Man'r) Groves, James Grimble Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Col. Edward
Balfour, Capt. C. B. (Hornsey) Hain, Edward Purvis Robert
Balfour, Rt. Hn. G. W. (Leeds) Halsey, Rt. Hon. Thomas F. Pym, C. Guy
Banbury, Sir Frederick George Hamilton, Rt Hn Ld. G. (Midx) Randles, John S.
Bartley, Sir George C. T. Hamilton, Marq. of [Londondy) Rankin, Sir James
Bathurst, Hon. Allen Benj. Harris, Frederick Leverton Rattigan, Sir William Henry
Bignold, Arthur Hay, Hon. Claude George Reid, James (Greenock)
Bigwood, James Helder, Augustus Remnant, Jas. Farquharson
Blundell, Colonel Henry Henderson. Sir Alexander Ridley, Hn. M. W. (Stalybridge
Boscawen, Arthur Griffith Hermon-Hodge, Sir Robert T. Ridley, S. F. (Bethnal Green)
Bousfield, William Robert Hoare, Sir Samuel Ritchie, Rt. Hn. C. Thomson
Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John Hoult, Joseph Roberts, Samuel (Sheffield)
Brown, Sir Alx. H. (Shropsh.) Houston, Robert Patersoll Robertson, H. (Hackney)
Butcher, John George Hudson, George Bickersteth Rolleston, Sir John F. L.
Campbell, Rt Hn J A (Glasg.) Jebb, Sir Richard Claverhouse Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye
Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edw. H. Jessel, Capt. Herbert Merton Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert
Cautley, Henry Strother Kemp, Lieut.-Colonel George Round, Rt. Hon. James
Cavendish, V C W (Derbysh.) Kennaway, Rt. Hon. Sir J. H. Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool)
Cayzer, Sir Charles William Kenyon-Slaney, Col. W. (Salop) Sadler, Col. Saml. Alexander
Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. J. A. (Wore) Keswick, William Samuel, Harry S. (Limehouse)
Chamberlayne, T. (Southmptn) Kimber, Henry Sandys, Lt.-Col. Thos. Myles
Chapman, Edward King, Sir Henry Seymour Sassoon, Sir Edward Albert
Charrington, Spencer Knowles, Lees Saunderson, Rt, Hn. Col. E. J.
Churchill, Winston Spencer Lambton, Hon. Fredk. Wm. Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Clare, Octavius Leigh Laurie, Lient.-General Seely, Charles Hilton (Lincoln)
Clive, Captain Percy A. Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow) Seely Maj. J. E. B. (Isle of Wight)
Cochrane, Hon. T. H. A. E. Lawrence, Sir Jos. (Monm'th) Shaw-Stewart, M. H. (Renfrew)
Coghill, Douglas Harry Lawson, John Grant Skewes-Cox, Thomas
Cohen, Benjamin Louis Lee, A. H. (Hants. Fareham) Sloan, Thomas Henry
Collings, Right Hon. Jesse Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage Smith, H. C. (North'mb. Tyneside)
Colston, Chas. Edw H. Athole Llewellyn, Evan Henry Smith, Hon. W. F. D. (Strand)
Compton, Lord Alwyne Lockie, John Spear, John Ward
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glasg.) Long, Col. Chas. W. (Exesham) Spencer, Sir E. (W. Bromwich)
Cox, Irwin Edwd. Bainbridge Long, Rt, Hn. W. (Bristol, S.) Stanley, Hon. A. (Ormskirk)
Cranborne, Viscount Lonsdale, John Brownlee Stanley, Edw. Jas. (Somerset)
Cripps, Charles Alfred Lord, Archie Kirkman Stanley, Lord (Lancs.)
Cross, H. Shepherd (Bolton) Lucas, Reg'ld J. (Portsmouth) Stirling-Maxwell, Sir Jn. M.
Crossley, Sir Savile Lyttelton, Hon. Alfred Stock, James Henry
Dalrymple, Sir Charles Macdona, John Cumming Stone. Sir Benjamin
Denny, Colonel M'Calmont, Colonel James Sturt, Hn.-Humphry Napier
Dickson, Charles Scott Martin, Richard Biddulph Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Dixon-Hartland, Sir F. Dixon Maxwell, Rt Hn Sir H. E. (Wigt'n) Talbot, Rt. Hn. J. G. (Oxf. Univ.)
Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers Maxwell, W J H (Dumfriesshire) Thornton, Percy M.
Doxford, Sir Wm. Theodore Melville, Beresford Valentine Tomlinson, Sir Wm. E. M.
Duke, Henry Edward Milvain, Thomas Tritton, Charles Ernest
Durning-Lawrence Sir Edwin Mitchell. William Tufnell, Lieut.-Col. Edward
Elliot, Hon. A. Ralph Douglas Montagu, G. (Huntingdon) Valentia, Viscount
Fardell, Sir T. George Montagu. Hn. J. Scott (Hants) Vincent. Col. Sir C. E. H. (Sheffield)
Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn Ed. Moon, Edward Robert Racy Walker, Col. William Hall
Fergusson, Rt Hn. Sir J. (Man'r) More, Robt. Jasper (Shropshire) Walrond, Rt. Hon. Sir W. H.
Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst Morgan, D. J. (Walthamstow) Webb, Col. William George
Finch, Rt. Hon. George H. Morrell, George Herbert Welby, Sir Chas. G. E. (Notts)
Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne Morrison, James Archibald Whitmore, Charles Algernon
Fisher, William Haves Morton, Arthur H. Aylmer Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Fison, Frederick William Mount, William Arthur Willox, Sir John Archibald
FitzGerald, Sir Robt. Penrose Mowbray, Sir Robt. Gray C. Wilson, A. S. (York, E. R.)
Flannery, Sir Fortesoue Murray, Rt Hn AGraham (Bute) Wilson, John (Falkirk)
Forster, Henry William Myers, William Henry Wilson-Todd. W. H. (Yorks.)
Galloway, William Johnson Newdegate, Francis A. N. Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath)
Gardner Ernest Nicholson, William Graham Wrightson, Sir Thomas
Garfit William Nicol, Donald Ninian Wylie, Alexander
Gibbs, Hn A. G. H. (City of Lond) Palmer, Walter (Salisbury) Wyndham. Rt. Hon. George
Gibbs, Hn Vicary (St. Albans) Parker, Sir Gilbert
Godson, Sir Augustus Fredk. Percy, Earl
Gordon, Hn J. E. (Elain & Nrn) Pilkington, Lt.-Col. Richard TELLERS FOR THE AYES-
Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir J. Eldon Platt-Higgins, Frederick Sir Alexander Acland-
Graham, Henry Robert Powell, Sir Francis Sharp Hood and Mr. Anstruther.
Abraham, William (Rhondda) Bell, Richard Brigg, John
Allan, Sir William (Gateshead) Blake Edward Broadhurst, Henry
Barlow, John Emmott Bolton. Thomas Dolling Burns, John.
Burt, Thomas Leigh, Sir Joseph Tennant, Harold John
Caldwell, James Lough, Thomas Thomson, F. W. (York, W. R.)
Cameron, Robert MacNeill, John Gordon Swift Tomkinson, James
Channing, Francis Allston M'Crae, George Wallace, Robert
Craig, Robert Hunter (Lanark) M'Kenna, Reginald Walton, Joseph (Barnsley)
Cremer, William Randal Markham, Arthur Basil Warner, Thos. Courtenay T.
Dalziel, James Henry Morgan, J. Lloyd (Carmarthen) Wason, E. (Clackmannan)
Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark) Norman, Henry Wason, J. Cathcart (Orkney)
Duncan, J. Hastings Nussev, Thomas Willans Weir, James Galloway
Flynn, James Christopher Palmer, Sir C. M. (Durham) White, George (Norfolk)
Goddard, Daniel Ford Pirie, Duncan V. Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)
Grant, Corrie Rea, Russell Whittaker, Thomas Palmer
Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton Reckitt, Harold James Wilson, H. J. (York, W. R.)
Helme, Norval Watson Roberts, John Bryn (Eifion) Wilson, John (Durham, Mid)
Hemphill, Rt. Hon. Chas, H. Roe, Sir Thomas
Hobhouse, C. E. H. (Bristol, N.) Samuel, Herbt. L. (Cleveland) TELLERS FOR THE NOES—
Labouchere, Henry Shackleton, David James Mr. Robert Spencer and
Layland-Barratt, Francis Shaw, Thomas (Hawick, B.) Mr. John Sinclair.
Leese, Sir Jos. F. (Accrington) Shipman, Dr. John G.

Original Question put accordingly.

The Committee divided:—Ayes, 202 Noes, 53. (Division List No. 27.)

Aird, Sir John Dalrymple, Sir Charles Kimber, Henry
Allhusen, Aug. Henry Eden Denny, Colonel King, Sir Henry Seymour
Anson, Sir William Reynell Dickson, Charles Scott Knowles, Lees
Arkwright, John Stanhope Dixon-Hartland, Sir F. Dixon Lambton, Hon. Fredk. Wm.
Arnold-Forster, Hugh O. Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers Laurie, Lieut.-General
Arrol, Sir William Doxford, Sir Wm. Theodore Law, Andrew Bonar (Glasgow)
Atkinson, Right Hon. John Duke, Henry Edward Lawrence, Sir Jos. (Monm'th)
Aubrey-Fletcher, Rt. Hn. Sir H. Durning-Lawrence, Sir Edwin Lawson, John Grant
Bain, Colonel James Robert Fardell, Sir T. George Lee, A. H. (Hants, Fareham)
Balfour, Rt. Hn. A. J. (Manr) Fellowes, Hon. Ailwyn Ed. Legge, Col. Hon. Heneage
Balfour, Capt. C. B. (Hornsey) Fergusson, Rt Hn. Sir J. (Man'r) Llewellyn, Evan Henry
Balfour, Rt. Hn. G. W. (Leeds) Fielden, Edward Brocklehurst Lockie, John
Banbury, Sir Frederick George Finch, Rt. Hon. George H. Long, Col. Chas. W. (Evesham)
Bartley, Sir George C. T. Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne Long, Rt. Hn. W. (Bristol, S.)
Bathurst, Hon. Allen Benj. Fisher, William Hayes Lonsdale, John Brownlee
Bignold, Arthur Fison, Frederick William Loyd, Archie Kirkman
Bigwood, James FitzGerald, Sir Robt. Penrose Lucas, Reg'ld J. (Portsmouth)
Blundell, Colonel Henry Forster, Henry William Macdona, John Cumming
Bolton, Thomas Dolling Galloway, William Johnson M'Calmont, Colonel James
Boscawen, Arthur Griffith Gardner, Ernest Martin, Richard Biddulph
Bousfield, William Robert Garfit, William Maxwell, Rt Hn Sir H. E. (Wigt'n)
Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John Gibbs. Hn A. G. H. (City of Lond) Maxwell, W. J. H. (Dumfriessh.
Brown, Sir Alx. H. (Shropsh.) Gibbs, Hn. Vicary (St. Albans) Melville, Beresford Valentine
Campbell, Rt Hn J A (Glasg) Godson, Sir Augustus Fredk. Milvain, Thomas
Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edw. H. Gordon, Hn. J. E. (Elgin & Nrn Mitchell, William
Cautley, Henry Strother Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir J. Eldon Montagu, G. (Huntingdon)
Cavendish, V C W (Derbysh.) Graham, Henry Robert Montagu, Hon. J. Scott (Hants.)
Cayzer, Sir Charles William Gretton, John Moon, Edward Robert Pacy
Cecil. Lord Hugh (Greenwich) Groves, James Grimble Morgan, D. J. (Walthamstow)
Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. J. A. (Worc) Hain, Edward Morrell, George Herbert
Chapman, Edward Halsey, Rt. Hon. Thomas F. Morrison, James Archibald
Charrington, Spencer Hamilton, Rt Hn Ld. G. (Midx) Morton, Arthur H. Aylmer
Churchill, Winston Spencer Hamilton, Marq. of (Londondy) Mowbray, Sir Robt. Gray C.
Clare, Octavius Leigh Harris, Frederick Leverton Murray, Rt Hn A. Graham (Bute)
Clive, Captain Percy A. Helder, Augustus Myers, William Henry
Cochrane, Hon. T. H. A. E. Henderson. Sir Alexander Newdegate, Francis A. N.
Coghill, Douglas Harry Hermon-Hodge, Sir Robert, T. Nicholson, William Graham
Cohen, Benjamin Louis Hoare, Sir Samuel Nicol, Donald Ninian
Collings, Right Hon. Jesse Hoult, Joseph Palmer, Walter (Salisbury)
Colston, Chas. Edw H. Athole Houston, Robert Paterson Parker, Sir Gilbert
Compton, Lord Alwyne Hudson. George Bickersteth Percy, Earl
Corbett, A. Cameron (Glang.) Jebb, Sir Richard Claverhouse Pilkington, Lt.-Col. Richard
Cox, Irwin Edwd. Bainbridge Jessel, Capt. Herbert Merton Platt-Higgins, Frederick
Cranborne, Viscount Kemp, Lieut.-Colonel George Powell, Sir Francis Sharp
Cripps, Charles Alfred Kennaway, Rt. Hon. Sir J. H. Pretyman, Ernest George
Cross, H. Shepherd (Bolton) Kenyon-Slaney, Col. W. (Salop) Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Col. Edward
Crossley, Sir Savile Keswick, William Purvis, Robert
Randles, John S. Seely, Charles Hilton (Lincoln) Tufnell, Lieut.-Col. Edward
Rankin, Sir James Seely, Maj. J. E. B. (Isle of Wight) Valentia, Viscount
Rattigan, Sir William Henry Shaw-Stewart, M. H. (Renfrew) Walker, Col. William Hall
Reid, James (Greenock) Skewes-Cox, Thomas Walrond, Rt. Hn Sir William H
Remnant, James Farquharson Sloan, Thomas Henry Webb, Col. William George
Ridley, Hon. M. W. (Stalybridge) Smith, H. G. (North'mb. Tynside) Welby, Sir Charles G. E. (Notts.)
Ridley, S. Forde (Bethnal Green) Smith, Hon. W. F. D. (Strand) Whitmore, Charles Algernon
Ritchie, Rt. Hn. Chas. Thomson Spencer, Sir E. (W. Bromwich) Willoughby de Eresby, Lord
Roberts, Samuel (Sheffield) Stanley, Hon. Arthur (Ormskirk) Willox, Sir John Archibald
Robertson, Herbert (Hackney) Stanley, Edw. Jas. (Somerset) Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.)
Rolleston, Sir John F. L. Stanley, Lord (Lancs.) Wilson, John (Falkirk)
Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye Stirling-Maxwell, Sir Jn. M. Wilson-Todd, W. H. (Yorks.)
Ropner, Colonel Sir Robert Stock, James Henry Wodehouse, Rt. Hn. E. R. (Bath)
Round, Rt. Hon. James Stone, Sir Benjamin Wrightson, Sir Thomas
Rutherford, W. W. (Liverpool) Sturt, Hon. Humphry Napier Wylie, Alexander
Sadler, Col. Samuel Alexander Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester) Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George
Samuel, Harry S. (Limehouse) Talbot, Rt Hn. J. G. (Oxf'd Univ.)
Sandys, Lieut.-Col. Thos. Myles Thornton, Percy M. TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Sassoon, Sir Edward Albert Tomlinson, Sir Wm. Edw. M. Sir Alexander Acland-
Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) Tritton, Charles Ernest Hood and Mr. Anstruther.
Abraham, William (Rhondda) Helme, Norval Watson Shaw, Thomas (Hawick, B.)
Allan, Sir William (Gateshead) Hemphill, Rt. Hon. Chas. H. Shipman, Dr. John G.
Barlow, John Emmott Labouchere, Henry Tennant, Harold John
Bell, Richard Layland-Barratt, Francis Thomson, F. W. (York, W. R)
Blake, Edward Leese, Sir Jos. F. (Accrington) Tomkinson, James
Brigg, John Leigh, Sir Joseph Wallace, Robert
Broadhurst, Henry Lough, Thomas Walton. Joseph (Barnsley)
Burns, John MacNeill, John Gordon Swift Wason, Eugene (Clackmannan)
Burt, Thomas M'Crae, George Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney)
Caldwell, James Markham, Arthur Basil Weir, James Galloway
Cameron, Robert Norman, Henry White, George (Norfolk)
Channing, Francis Allston Nussey, Thomas Willans Whitley, J. H. (Halifax)
Craig, Robert Hunter (Lanark) Palmer, Sir Charles M. (Durham) Whittaker, Thomas Palmer
Cramer, William Randal Pirie, Duncan V. Wilson, H. J. (York, W. R.)
Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark) Rea, Russell Wilson, John (Durham, Mid.)
Duncan, J. Hastings Roberts, John Byyn (Eifion)
Goddard, Daniel Ford Roe, Sir Thomas TELLERS FOR THE NOES—
Grant, Corrie Samuel, Herbert L. (Cleveland) Mr. Robert Spencer and
Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton Shackleton, David James Mr. John Sinclair.

Resolution to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again this evening.