*SIR WILLIAM ALLAN (Gateshead)moved, as an Amendment to the Address, at end, to add: "And we humbly express our regret that no mention is made in 434 His Majesty's Gracious Speech of the unsatisfactory condition of His Majesty's Navy." He said that during the recess he had been much struck with the great number of speeches that had been made in England and Scotland by Ministers, ex-Ministers, and Members of Parliament, 435 and in looking over these speeches he found that, with hardly an exception, the importance of the Navy was dwelt upon. What, however, had struck him as very peculiar in all these references was that there never was any allusion to an efficient Navy: it was all a question of the number of ships. The idea that possessed the minds of those who expressed their love for the Navy was apparently "Give us plenty of ships and our Empire will be safe." That might be so; but these gentlemen, for all they said, would be satisfied with a flotilla of mud-punts. He had put his Amendment down on the Paper solely for the reason that he whished to show that the question of the Navy was not a matter of mere platform platitudes and oratorical display. These would not secure an efficient Navy, although he admitted that some hon. Members wished to increase the Navy at the expense of the Army. What he wanted, by means of his Amendment, was to insist that the Navy was in an unsatisfactory condition. He started away with that. Now, he, for one, with all due allowance to the experts, so-called, held that our modern Navy was unsatisfactory, and he would endeavour to prove his position. What constituted a real modern warship, an efficient ship? He used the word "efficient," because they were dealing with efficiency. Further, he would ask, "Have we got efficient warships?" An efficient warship ought to be of maximum offensive power, of maximum defensive power, of maximum steaming power, with safety, and of minimum dimensions with least exposure to an enemy. He would endeavour to show that we had not got such vessels. He would put his indictment in as plain language as possible, divested entirely of all professional technicalities. What had we got as a safe battleship? He would take the "Russell," which was built on the Tyne by Palmer, was supposed to be a perfect example of the efficiency of British Naval Power, and was to be sent to the Mediterranean to relieve the "Canopus."
It must be borne in mind that in the old days of wooden fighting ships a great amount of value was given to what was called the fighting tops. These tops were large spaces on which sharp-shooters stood for the purpose of shooting down on the enemy's vessels. In those days vessels were fought "hammer and tongs" 436 fashion, alongside each other, which gave our seamen and opportunity to board and capture the enemy. But the modern style of fighting was very different. The idea was still dominant with the Admiralty, and with our so-called experts, that the fighting would take place with the opposing vessels alongside each other. But in future naval battles the ships would be 4,000, 5,000, or 6,000 yards apart. There would be no more "hammer and tongs" fighting, and no more boarding pikes. We would try to demolish the enemy's ships with our big guns. Now what did we find on the "Russell"? There was foremast and a mainmast both with fighting tops each weighing forty-five or fifty tons. Now, and this was a question of efficiency, what was the use of fighting tops on a modern warship? Supposing that the "Russell" was in action and that her foremast was struck by a 380 lb. shell. Why the mast, weighing forty or fifty tons, would, if it fell forward, crush and disable the forward gun turret; if it fell astern it would smash every funnel on board; and if it fell to the side it would destroy the bulwarks and broadside armaments. Suppose the mast had fallen on to the funnels, the men would all be asphyxiated between decks. These appliances were not fit to stand the stern test of war. The ships would be destroyed before they could escape. The Navy was relying on things of the past which were now practically useless.
He might be asked what he would propose instead. He would make an efficient warship with the least possible number of things on deck that could be carried away. Instead of thirty-five, forty or fifty ton masts, he would put up a light pole for signalling and showing lights, and if that were carried away the blue-jackets would be able to throw it overboard. With reference to funnels, he would go back to the old plan of telescopic funnels. Take one of the four-funnelled frauds, the modern cruisers, and put her into action. Where would she be if her funnels were knocked down? He would have no top hamper on the vessels, and only the least possible number of objects that could be hit. He had shown the House, he thought very plainly, and at least practically, that the Navy had not efficient ships in that respect. This was a question of design. He wanted to show that the designs were 437 bad, and that an efficient warship could not be built from them. The top hamper and gear which was now fitted on deck was a very dangerous adjunct to a warship.
He would now refer to the guns. Two and a half or three years ago he brought to the attention of the House the undergunning of ships in the Navy, and he referred at that time to the great displacement of Navy vessels. If the least attention had been given to what such vessels should be, as offensive machines, they would never have been gunned as they were. He admitted that the Admiralty were now paying attention to the matter. Two great cruisers, the "Powerful" and the "Terrible" were built eight years ago in reply to the construction of two Russian cruisers. The "Powerful" and the "Terrible" cost over a million of money each, and it was only now that more guns were being put into them. Why was not that done at the beginning? Where were the experts, and where was the efficiency? Several of the ships in the Navy were undergunned, and there was no getting away from that fact, Take the "County" class, which were being built at present. What was their discharge? He thought only 1,400 lbs. Why was that? He for one could not see the reason for it; neither could he see the efficiently of it; but he could see the weakness of it. He had taken a special interest in the "Terrible" and the "Powerful," which the then Chief Constructor of the Navy had fitted with French contrivances instead of boilers. He himself warned the Chief Constructor of the danger that was looming ahead as the result of what he was doing, of the rock he was going to strike upon, and the ruin to which he was about to bring the British Navy. So much was he interested in the matter that he wrote to the Chief Constructor and told him that he did not wish to see one leaf taken from his laurels, but for Heaven's sake to be careful what he was doing.
The House of Commons was nothing if not a business assembly. Hon. Members were not theorists. They should be all practical Britons, and look at things from a practical point of view, and they should not be upset by theoretical notions. Boilering was the weak point in the 438 Admiralty, who imagined themselves the immaculate conceptors of new contrivances. He could not understand the weakness, but he knew that the Admiralty were afraid to own up to their own shortcomings. The "Powerful" was sent to China, and he was not exaggerating one iota when he said that the vessel consumed all the spare coal at Colombo and Singapore on the way out. He knew the quantity of coal she burned, and it was startling. She was now home again, and what had taken place? Why, nothing. She was lying down at Portsmouth, and let the Admiralty now try and steam her the twenty-three knots for which she was designed. Although she was not yet two years old, they could not do it. She was simply scrap. Then take the case of the "Terrible." Much had been heard about the men of the "Terrible," who were terrible in name and in nature, and about their grand shooting with Captain Percy Scott's marker. But what did the "Terrible" steam? She steamed from Wei-hai-wei to Hong Kong in nine months; and during the whole time that she was out in China he did not believe that she did six months fair steaming. Where was she now? She was lying at Portsmouth, and let the Admiralty try and take twenty-two knots out of her if they could.
He wanted to know how the money was being spent, and to direct attention to the extravagance, the squandering, and the inefficiency which characterised the Department which was supposed to give the nation a proper Navy. He challenged contradiction of what he had said. Hon. Members were elected to look after the interests of the Empire, and were they to sit dumb when Estimates for £33,000,000 sterling were brought before them, and never ask a question as to how the money was to be spent? No Member of Parliament had a right to represent a constituency unless he went to the bottom of the expenditure of the country. That was his position, and that was the position he had taken up ever since he had the honour of being a Member of the House. But he could not get at the bottom of the cost, or of the extravagance and ramifications which were at work. The result was —and he was sorry to say it—inefficiency, and ships that could not be depended upon. He would not make a single statement that 439 could not be substantiated up to the hilt. He had oftentimes been accused of exaggeration and of painting the picture incorrectly; but every word he had uttered had been proved up to the hilt. He had shown that the ships on which they were depending were inefficient, and that they were badly designed to meet the stress and strain of real war. They appeared very well on paper; nothing was more beautiful than a warship on paper; but it was war they would have to face; f they were not fit for that, then he held they were inefficient; they would come to grief the moment their top hampers were blown down. No number of letters in The Times, or apologies from the late Chief Constructor could get over the facts, which could not be disputed.
He now wished to refer to what he would call the financial aspect of the unsatisfactory condition of the Navy. As he had said, it was the duty of every Member to get to the bottom of the expenditure of the country if he could. What did they find with regard to the Navy? He would show the House conclusively how the money was being spent. Unfortunately hon. Members were kept in the dark, and it was only by adopting certain methods that he got to know what was happening. He would show the House what the country had to pay for inefficient ships. It was well known that the body politic of the Admiralty was nothing else than an experimenting body. He would show that the work which was being carried on by the Admiralty could have been carried on for a mere song if the experts knew their business. An expert, after all, was a man who ought to know his business; and an expert at the Admiralty who did not know his business cost the country millions. It was well known that the Admiralty decided to fit a German boiler into the "Medusa" and a Yarrow boiler into the "Medea." The Scotch boilers in those two ships were perfectly good, but the ships were sent down to the Tyne, to Palmer's, who were given a free hand to cut up the decks and take out the so-called old boilers—which were quite as fit as a German boiler which the Admiralty knew nothing about—and as the Yarrow boiler, of which they 440 knew only a little. No specification was given, and the job was carried out on what was known as "time and lime." Why did the Admiralty take out first-class boilers and put in boilers of which they knew little or nothing? £50,000 would be spent on each of the ships before the job was finished. Why could not the Admiralty experts—the word "experts" grated on him—buy two collier steamers for £4,000 each? He imagined that many hon. Members would be glad to sell two of their ships at that figure. The old boilers could be taken out and the new ones put in; the ships could be run up and down the coast carrying coal for the Admiralty and earning their own money; and the horse-power, the quantity of coal burned, and the defects could be ascertained. That was one way in which money was being spent without a word being said. Take another case. The "Diadem," a brand new ship, was sent down to Glasgow to Fairfield's, and was handed over without one scintilla of a specification as to the work to be done. The Government were to pay for the labour and the material, 20 per cent. for charges, and 10 per cent. for profit. He would take on the entire Fleet for that, and make his fortune mighty quickly out of it. But would any business man call that business? At present there was a ship on the Tyne, and one of the officials told him that the contractors would keep her as long as they liked, as they had no specification and there was no check. Hundreds of thousands of pounds were being spent in that way, and there was nothing to show for it but an inefficient Navy.
He would be prepared to vote money without demur. No one could say that he had ever raised his voice against expenditure on the Navy; but he had raised his voice against building inefficient ships and deluding the country. He would give the House a list of the inefficient ships. When the "Canopus," a first-class battleship, was sent abroad there were the usual newspaper platitudes coming from the Admiralty, of course, as to what a magnificent vessel she was. All the vocabulary of Mesopotamia was used Now the "Canopus" was home again, and although she was only three years old she was practically done. Where 441 was the "Montagu"? She was lying in harbour now and could not steam. And why? Simply because the water tube boilers put into her would not hold peas, let alone water. The Secretary to the Admiralty at one time was a capital critic, but he was muzzled now. He could not, however, get away from the fact that there was a great squandering of the public money going on, and that we were only getting inefficiency in return. He would read a list of vessels which were practically of no use to us at the present moment. They included the "Montagu," the "Canopus," the "Crecy," the "Glory," the "Terrible," the "Niobe," the "Diadem," the "Furious," the "Europa," the "Hermes," the "Pactolus," and the "Hyacinth." These were only a few of the vessels which were laid up, and he wanted to direct the attention of the House to the fact that all of them were new ships. They had cost the country from £1,000,000 downwards. They were vessels on which we and the country were told we could depend for the defence of the Empire. Was that the case? It was not. They were cripples. Where was their boasted efficiency?
Parliament voted £32,000,000 or £33,000,000 annually for building and keeping up ships which were of no use. How long were they going to continue that? He could not understand why it was they were all so dumb and silent in the face of such a grave position. Members of Parliament in their speeches of late had had a good deal to say about the Navy, which they had described as our first line of defence, and on the maintenance of which they had advocated the spending of more money, even going so far as to suggest that less should be devoted to the Army. They had adopted that line because they had said that upon the Navy we must depend for the security of our food supply in time of war. That was all very well theoretically, but what were the practical facts? Our ships could not steam, and why? No man could fight a battle, or run a race, or do any work if his heart was bad. What was the condition of the British Fleet? The boilers are the heart of a ship. The heart of every one of the ships was bad. They could not trust them. Their dockyards were piled up with vessels awaiting repair. The Government establishments could not overtake the work, and conse- 442 quently the ships were being sent to Barrow, the Clyde, and the Tyne. He challenged the Admiralty to disprove these facts; he challenged them to show there was a single ship they could keep on full-speed power continuously without coming to grief. He was sorry to have to say these things. Nothing would give him greater pleasure than to be able to declare that our Fleet was incomparable and invincible. But when he looked at these vessels—which had cost the nation millions of money—lyingin our dockyards, doing no work, he was driven sorrowfully to the conclusion that the public money was being spent uselessly and wastefully.
Take the case of the submarines. What were we getting in regard to them for our money? We were obtaining these vessels from America, and at the same time we were going to France and Germany for our boilers. We had better have the enginerooms staffed with Frenchmen, for apparently we could not do without Frenchmen in our Navy. But to return to the submarines. He told them long ago that they would not do, that he feared they would soon hear of more explosions with fatal results, and that they would have further instances of money being wasted. One objection to them was that gasoline engines were used in them. The fumes from these were very deleterious. One never knew what was going to happen, and he would not be the least surprised at any moment to hear of the bursting up of some of these vessels. Had the Admiralty had the interests of the country at heart, had they been the true patriots they represented themselves to be, they would have offered a prize of £5,000 or £10,000 for the best submarine boat of British design, instead of buying them from America and France. Why did they not experiment with them before they purchased them? They obtained a number of submarine boats from the States without knowing their value and without giving them a fair trial. Was it business for a Department which had the administration of public money to go and buy vessels costing £30,000 or £40,000 a piece without first trying them? He ventured to say it was gross extravagance. There had been a gross squandering of the public money, and it was the duty of the House to look into the matter.
By pursuing such a policy they were tending to ruin the Empire, 443 not to save it. Their ships were bad—the House knew it, and the Admiralty knew it. The designs were bad, and the vessels were under-gunned. He had warned them often, but he had been speaking as unto milestones and not to men. He had warned them that with such cripples for vessels they might expect at any time to hear of disasters involving the loss of many lives. They had no fleet on which they could depend. He had attempted to prove, and he challenged disproof, that they were squandering the nation's money and getting no equivalent for it. They were designing ships which would be of no use in war time, and they were putting in them Babcock and Wilcox boilers which were tried in the merchant navy years ago and were found not to be a success. At one time the Admiralty was "Bellevilled," now it was being "Rosenthaled." He knew all the moves. It was the duty of Parliament to look to the safety of the Empire, but they are not performing that duty. He thought he had proved incontestably that the money voted by the House for these vessels was not spent wisely or well, and that in time it would be found to be detrimental to the best interests of the Empire. He begged to move the Amendment standing in his name.
*MR. RENWICK (Newcastle-on-Tyne)seconded the motion. He said he represented a constituency which, like that of the hon. Member who had just spoken, took a great interest in naval matters, although on political topics their views differed. He was not an expert. He desired, however, to give expression to the views of his constituents, views which were, in fact, those of the man in the street, with regard to this important matter. What were the reasons generally advanced for the statement that the Navy was in an unsatisfactory condition? The first was that so many of our ships were fitted with water-tube boilers, the second was scarcity of men to man the Navy, and the third was the large number of ships that were at all times unfit to go to sea. Why was it that at a time when there was such uneasiness expressed in regard to our food supplies in time of war there was such a general lack of confidence in the Navy? He ventured to say that in addition to the 444 reasons already mentioned there were the following, which called for serious consideration—the increased strength of foreign navies, the importance of our food supply, the acquisition by America of our fastest steamers, and the publicity which had been given to the failure and defects of our brand new cruiser the "Good Hope," which had recently taken the Colonial Secretary to South Africa. Speaking not as an expert on naval matters, but as a merchant shipowner who had for many years taken some interest in the improvement of boilers, he was absolutely surprised that the Admiralty had caused our Navy to be used to so large an extent for experiments in connection with water-tube boilers. He had made enquiries in regard to these boilers in all directions from experienced men, and he was told that the main advantage to be gained was that they got up steam quickly. He was also told that they did not weigh so heavy as the Scotch boilers. These were all-important advantages, but what were the disadvantages? The first was that they are apt to break down at a most critical time, and, secondly, that the repairs and renewals of these boilers were most expensive. Concurrently with the outlay of a large amount on repairs, the ships had to lie idle for a considerable time. They also found that the stokers had lost confidence in the boilers. That, in itself, would be a most serious matter in time of war.
They further found that there was a very heavy coal consumption. What was the use of having a boiler lighter than the Scotch boiler if they were going to counteract that advantage by carrying a larger supply of coal? For thirty years he had been told that the water-tube boiler was the boiler of the future. It appeared to him that it was still the boiler of the future. Thirty-five years ago water-tube boilers were fitted to vessels on the Tyne, but they had to take them out. They were no doubt excellent boilers in some respects, and he knew of one which had since been used most successfully for driving machinery on land, although while it was in a vessel at sea it was found to be absolutely inefficient. He found from a Return moved by the noble Lord the Member for Woolwich that the highest outlay in respect of Scotch boilers in ships named in the Report was about £8,250.
445 But what was the case with the water-tube boiler? The "Hermes" was only commissioned in 1899, and no less than £40,863 had been spent on her boilers, including £32,400 for new boilers. Yet he could mention a ship in which he was interested that had on board a boiler of 150-lbs. pressure, which was built in 1882, and on which not 500 shillings had since been spent. The "Europa" was commissioned in July 1899. The expenditure on her water-tube boilers had since amounted to £26,935. In the case of the "Powerful," which was commissioned in 1897 the expenditure was returned at £20,675. What had the mercantile marine shipowners been doing for the last thirty or forty years? They had been endeavouring to get a boiler which would last for a large number of years and decrease the coal consumption. That boiler was found in the Scotch boiler. There was no better or more efficient boiler.
Our Navy had been made the ground for a gigantic series of experiments with these water-tube boilers. He did not blame the Admiralty for experimenting with new inventions. It was their duty to do so, but the Empire ought not to be exposed to the danger of having many of its finest ships fitted with boilers which were practically unknown and in which there was no confidence. He desired to press upon the Admiralty the fact that these boilers were likely to break down in critical times, such as when a vessel was called upon to pursue an enemy, or to retreat from one who was too strong. Even if they had to sacrifice some small advantages, they wanted a boiler in which they had confidence. He would like to ask the Admiralty whether they proposed to fit water-tube boilers to the two new fast Cunarders which were to go longer voyages and be able to overtake and destroy the very fastest merchant cruisers of other nations. In view of what was to be expected of them, they ought not to put in boilers in which they had no confidence.
He was amazed at the number of comparatively modern ships he saw lying absolutely idle in the dockyards. Some of them had been only short voyages and others had practically never been commissioned. He was told that in the first place something was the matter with the machinery or boilers, 446 and then, in a sort of confidential way, that there were not sufficient men to man them. What was the use of continually building new ships if there were no means of manning them? In a Blue-book issued last session he found that in 1891 we had in the mercantile marine 127,567 British born sailors, 23,884 foreign born sailors and 21,332 Lascars, but on 31st March, 1901, we only had 120,412 British-born seamen, whilst the number of foreigners had risen to 32,614, and the Lascars numbered 33,610. While, therefore there was a very small increase in the total number, it was entirely among the Lascars and foreigners, and the British numbers had decreased by 7,150. Bearing those figures in mind, and remembering that whilst in 1891ndash;2 we only required 61,000 sailors and marines for the Navy, in 1901ndash;2, we required 104,000, and in 1902ndash;3 the number had risen to 120,000, he would ask the Admiralty to tell them whether they were increasing their reserves in a similar ratio to the increase in the number of men required, year after year, in the Navy. This was a most serious matter, because, in time of war, the first thing the Admiralty would need would be to take men from the mercantile marine to remforce the Navy. If that were done, what was to become of our food supplies in time of war? He sincerely trusted that one of the results of the debate would be that the naval authorities would cease to allow our ships to be used wholesale for experimental matters. If they had made mistakes, let them have the courage to retrieve them, and take care to regain the confidence of the people in the Navy.
Amendment proposed, at the end of the Question, to add the words—
And we humbly express our regret that no mention is made in His Majesty's Gracious Speech of the unsatisfactory condition of His Majesty's Navy." — (Sir William Allan.)
§ Question proposed, "That those words be there added."
*SIR JOHN COLOMB (Great Yarmouth)said he rose for the purpose of making a few observations on the Motion submitted to the House by his hon. friend opposite. He hardly thought the hon. Gentleman behind him, who had seconded 447 the Motion, could have very carefully read the Resolution, because he had practically seconded a Motion expressing a wish that there should be in the King's Speech the words, "My Lords and Gentlemen, the condition of my Navy is unsatisfactory." He deprecated raising a discussion upon this great question in this form. They were close to the time when they would have an explanatory statement as to the condition of the Navy from the authorised representatives of the Admiralty, when they could discuss it. He deprecated raising a debate upon the matter in this way, because, in his opinion, it was neither in the interests of the public service nor of the Navy itself.
*THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. ARNOLD-FORSTER,) Belfast, W.said he shared the views of the the last speaker that it would be convenient to discuss this question more thoroughly than could be done now after he had had an opportunity of explaining the policy of the Admiralty in greater detail to the House, but it was due to the House, when once the subject was raised, for the Minister responsible to the House to make some sort of reply. He had listened, as he always did, with great interest to the hon. Member who brought forward the Motion, but he was disappointed that the hon. Gentleman should have thought it necessary to take an exaggerated view of the incapacity of the Admiralty. The House would welcome bona fide criticism of any Department of the State, and especially of the Admiralty, but he did not think that criticism became more valuable when carried to the extreme of some of the expressions used by the hon. Member. The great questions of armament and machinery were not dealt with under the authority of Government officers in the light spirit suggested; and he pointed out that it had been his own happy fortune, during the two years he had been in office, to see a large number of changes which the the hon. Member and others had advocated carried into practical effect. He was not there to defend the Belleville boiler. He was exonerated from that task by the report of the Boiler Committee. He had never been able to see the wisdom of the great experiment which was made in the introduc- 448 tion of the Belleville boiler to the whole of our ships under construction. But that was a matter long past; and the Committee had reported to the effect that the Belleville boiler, though very good in some respects, was the least suitable watertube boiler for the Navy. His hon. friend would give the Admiralty credit for the fact that from that time the Belleville boiler was discontinued, and it had been discarded for His Majesty's ships. The hon. Member had been an advocate of the cylindrical boiler. For the first time for many years, the Admiralty were trying the newest and latest type of cylindrical boiler in our ships, and they were building ship after ship in which the latest pattern of cylindrical boiler was being inserted. The hon. Member had often alleged that. They had been comparing the cylindrical boilers in our ships put in ten years ago with the latest pattern of water-tube boiler, but they were also giving a trial to the new type of cylindrical boiler. Though he did not dissent from the finding of the Boiler Committee, he thought that the opinion expressed by them was far from being generally adopted. He could not assent to the hon. Member's criticism when he spoke of the inefficiency of the Navy—that was a phrase he could not consent to allow to go unchallenged. Was there any country in the world where the practice this country had adopted had not been followed? If they had to go to war, they would find foreign ships with precisely the same type of boiler.
*SIR WILLIAM ALLANThat is no argument at all. If your opponent has a wooden leg are you to put on one also?
*MR. ARNOLD-FORSTERsaid he thought that the argument was a very strong one when it was found that the navies of all other countries were combining in the interest of efficiency to introduce and use certain appliances adopted by this country. The hon. Member had spoken of the Babcock and Wilcox boiler. He had heard him before now draw comparisons not altogether favourable to 449 this country in favour of the United States of America, but the Babcock and Wilcox boiler had been selected by the United States Navy for half their battleships and the Niclausse boiler was also used; so that the hon. Member was not correct when he supposed that we are along it trying this unknown boiler.
*SIR WILLIAM ALLANThe Babcock and Wilcox boiler, the right hon. Gentleman must remember, is an American boiler and not an English boiler.
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTERsaid that he was unable to see the relevancy of that observation. As to the designs of our ships, we had the advantage of having two designers unparalleled in their career, and it was very remarkable that their design should have been condemned.
*MR. ARNOLD-FORSTERIn what respect had these designs been condemned? Mention had been made of the "Russell." He had been in many foreign battleships and in all our own, and there was not a single battleship in any foreign Navy which was so lightly masted, or which had such little top-hamper, or was so little encumbered as the "Russell." If errors so gross and palpable had been made by our designers, it was remarkable that the errors should be copied in an exaggerated form by foreign designers. The hon. Member quoted the "Powerful" and "Terrible" as two vessels that showed beyond contradiction the failure of the Admiralty designs in comparison with those of the "Rossia" and the "Rurik." He would take the opinion of any naval officer as to which of those two types of ships he would rather be on board of in an action. He had been in both; and he could only say Heaven help the men in those vessels with unprotected guns in an action with vessels like the 450 "Powerful" and "Terrible," which had all their guns protected. The hon. Member said that the Admiralty were entirely forgetting the question of gunnery in our ships. He himself had shared the opinion of the hon. Member that some of our ships had not the gun power that they ought to have. But that was years ago. Class after class of those ships had been strengthened because other ships had been built to compete with them. The "Terrible" and the "Powerful," the "Centurion," and the "Barfleur," and all the ships in the "Eclipse" class had had their armament strengthened; and the new ships like the "New Zealand" and the "Duke of Edinburgh"—which really ought to be chosen for comparison with the new foreign ships—possessed a protection and gun power which were unparalleled in any Navy of the world. The way in which the hon. Member had spoken of submarines was an example of the extraordinary rashness and recklessness of his assertions. He said that the Admiralty ought to have experimented with some of these vessels before committing themselves, and ought to have introduced British talent into their construction. That was precisely what the Admiralty had done. They bought five of what was at the time the one successful type, which was available so that trials might be made in more than one place and at more than one time. The vessels were experimented with and examined from every point of view by exceedingly competent naval officers and engineers. The value of their suggestions was utilised to the full, and as a result it had been possible in this brief space of time to produce a vessel, substantially of British design and wholly of British manufacture, which was believed to be a great improvement on the original boat.
Then the hon. Member fell foul of the Admiralty for the system of repairs which they had adopted. He appealed to any large shipowner to say whether this system was not the most profitable, and whether it was not found that the contractors, instead of swindling those who entrusted work to them, saw it to be to their own interest to do the 451 work as quickly, cheaply, and efficiently as they could. To say that the Admiralty knew nothing about what was going on in the repairing yards was one of the extraordinary exaggerations into which the hon. Member allowed himself to fall. The Admiralty had inspectors in all these yards, though personally he did not place his chief reliance on the minuteness of their inspection. He relied much more on the fact that that the Admiralty was dealing with great companies who knew that the continuance of the Government's custom, and the renewal of orders, must depend upon the success with which their contracts were carried out. He would ask the House to wait Until the Admiralty had carried their experiments further; and when the firstfruits of those experiments had been gathered he believed it would be possible to show that the experience of all the great mercantile companies was not contradicted by that of the Admiralty.
The hon. Member for Newcastle had fallen into a fallacy, which vitiated his argument, of comparing the needs of the mercantile marine with those of the Navy. Any conclusion based on an analogy between men-of-war and mercantile vessels must be misleading. Probably the new Cunarders were not to be fitted with water-tube boilers, as the hon. Member suggested. But the class of work which they had to perform was totally dissimilar from that of a cruiser doing the ordinary work of the Navy. Those ships were specifically designed to enable them to overtake the ships of a precisely similar character with which they might be confronted in time of war. As long as they performed that office, it was all that could be expected of them. The case was not strengthened by saying that their arrangements differed from those of a cruiser which had to carry on the ordinary work of a cruiser in time of peace. As to the question of manning, there was no difficulty about the manning of the Navy such as the hon. Member suggested. There were certain branches of the Navy in which the Admiralty intended to have a larger personnel; but the personnel as voted by Parliament was actually over borne. He hoped in a few days to lay before the House the proposals of the Government with regard to these lacunce, which undoubtedly did exist. Sir Edward Grey's Committee had 452 reported, and its recommendations had not been left out of sight; and he should soon be able to give the effect of the Admiralty's proposals with regard to any shortage in the personnel of the Navy. He must protest emphatically against the acceptance of such an Amendment, and the suggestion that the Navy was at the present time inefficient. He absolutely denied that suggestion. The Navy was making very rapid strides in the direction of improvement. The advance was palpable; and the hon. Member for Gateshead, instead of indulging in jeremiads, might have given some credit for the progress which was being made.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Main Question again proposed:—