HC Deb 04 March 1902 vol 104 cc381-3

Now, I want the House to look at some figures in order to realise the problem with which we have to deal. In 1872 we had to provide something like 70,000 men. In 1895 we had an establishment of 225,000 between Great Britain and India. In 1897 we had gone to 212,000, in 1899 to 229,000, and in 1902 to 250,000. At the same time we have kept a reserve which we reckon at 90,000, and that has not been found too large for the present war. The problem we have to deal with tonight is to consider how we are to support an establishment of 250,000 when our effective strength is with difficulty maintained at 210,000. If the House will follow me for a few moments, I will give the figures of recruiting for the last six years. In 1896 we took 27,800; in 1897, 33,700; in 1898, when we lowered the standard, we took 38,400; in 1899, 40,200; in 1900, when we lowered the standard a second time, and with the excitement of the war, we took 46,700; and last year, with the war still continuing, 45,100 recruits were taken.

The problem, then, before us is this: Beginning in 1896 with 27,800 recruits, we have reached in two abnormal years 45,000. But, just as high interest means bad security in finance, so in recruiting a lowered standard and hasty enlistment mean inordinate waste. I have taken out the waste during the last three years. In 1899 the waste of men who fell out of the ranks invalided in their first two years of service, or from desertion, was 3,485; in 1900, the very high recruiting year, the number rose to 5,484; in 1901, after two years of inordinate recruiting, it rose to 8,822. These are very serious figures. I think they prove that we have pressed on beyond our limit of real recruiting under the present system. I think also they prove that the man who looks forward to that rate of recruiting continuing after the excitement of the war is over would take too sanguine a view. I think myself that, if we were to expect when the war is over to get more than 35,000 recruits a year, we should be making an unduly sanguine estimate. Thirty-five thousand recruits a year would not keep up the present establishment. We should be between 40,000 and 50,000 men short.

That is the unfavourable side. What is the favourable side? It is that the best recruiting has been in those regiments which are best paid. The cavalry and artillery, having the same terms of service as the rest of the Army—small as is the difference of 2d. per day in the rate of pay—have been well filled, while the infantry has fallen off. The greatest-success of all has been the Foot Guards, which, five years ago, we kept up with some difficulty to about 5,700 men, and which we now without difficulty keep up to about 8,000. In the Foot Guards there is another inducement. Besides the higher pay there is a shorter term of service. We have had some further light on this subject in the present year. At the beginning of last year we were enlisting for the South African Constabulary for three years and at exactly the same rate for the Yeomanry for one year or for the war. It took us many weeks to fill up the ranks of the Constabulary, for whom, I admit, we asked rather higher qualifications, whilst it took us no time to enlist an enormous body of Yeomanry. That again, I think, shows the preference for the short engagement.

I am obliged to face this problem of having a probable deficiency of 40,000 or 50,000 men if we continue on the present lines of recruiting; because I see no ground whatever for believing that under existing circumstances in the near future we can make with regard to any of our Colonies, or with regard to India, any considerable reduction of the Army. India, if anything, will want more troops rather than less. She requires more artillery, and at any time, in the case of an expedition, she might require assistance from home. It is no use blinking facts. We must be prepared, and are prepared, to keep whatever force is necessary in South Africa for some time alter the war is over; and we have had too much experience of the reduction of colonial garrisons to make it possible to leave them much below strength. Therefore we have to face a difficult problem; and, if we have to face a difficult problem with regard to the active Army, we have also to face the fact of the enormous demands we have made on our reserves. At the beginning of the war they amounted to about 81,000 men. By two processes—by the loss of men in the war, and by the fact that we have had to give bounties to 15,000 or 16,000 men in India to induce them to extend their service and remain with the colours instead of going to the reserve—we shall find the reserve at the end of the war decreased to between 50,000 and 60,000 men. That decreased reserve will not be sufficient to enable us to mobilise our Army.